interested in american history tv? visit c-span.org/history. you can view our tv schedule and watch college lectures, using them tours archival films and war. american history tv. c-span flirt history of the daily unit in 1979 c-span was created as a public service by america's cable television companies and is brought to you by your cable or satellite provider. we take you live to spotsylvania been pennsylvania. this years theme is great defenses of the civil war. historians will talk about the strategies of the union and confederate armies during battles. topics covered including the battles of gettysburg, antietam,

stones river, the seeds of six per. first up emerging block cofounder christopher white talks about general jackson's stand at the battle at second and asked. -- second manassas. two-minute warning ladies and

gentlemen, two-minute warning.

>> good morning ladies and gentlemen. good morning. after we wrapped up last night, i crawled under the book table and slept for about an hour and a half and we got back up. i hope you guys had a restful night's sleep. i am christmas koski, i want to welcome you to our presentation in stephenson ridge.

to thank the folks from c-span and our audience at c-span live. mary andce, hunter, angie who kept as caffeinated this morning. [applause] colleagueshank my thanks to the folks at the front desk. we have an ambitious schedule today. today we are meaning serious business. we have a speakers today. the first one comes to us from ohio. very good. dan welch is a musical educator in ohio, and for many years he

has a love affair with the civil war. he fell in love with the civil war at gettysburg. eventually he studied at the gettysburg institute and has become a ranger at the battlefield park, or you can find him in the summer times giving tours. he is a co-author with robert which traces the movement of both armies in virginia up into pennsylvania. it's modeled after the civil war trails in later today we will hear more about the civil war trails. it helps put people on the field where it happened. it is my delightful pleasure to introduce to you from ohio dan welch. [applause] >> good morning everyone.

for we get started i would like to thank chris michalski and chris light and all of my car -- colleagues and all of you for getting up so early this morning and coming out to learn a little bit more about stonewall jackson and second manassas. he had been bruised and battered. he had been subjected to numerous federal attacks, and on the evening of august 30 some of his units had literally nothing else to get. along his right william starks brigade under the come -- command of colonel bradley johnson had been in gaetz for the last 30 minutes. the immense pressure as part of -- on jackson's position. men from new york, michigan, pennsylvania and massachusetts

assailed the confederate , cartridge boxes had run dry. numerous confederates left the fight and drove skelter the dead and dying for ammunition. the guns were slowly silence. , at this to an article moment an irishman named okies yelled above the din of battle, boys, give them rocks. all along the line stafford's and johnson's regiments begin to hurl boulders and grab smoke -- lower -- slow rocks. huge stones began to fall about us and then one of them would happen to strike one or another of us with them.

some federal soldiers begin to return the favor in kind. and so ensued one of the more famous episodes of stonewall second's defense, manassas. this had no overall effect in the end of the fight. the federal assault had already kersh endo until reinforcements arrived. illustratetory does is the ferocity in which the jackson's men. as we make our way through the program we will examine several key factors, to jackson's defense during the fight. foremost we will examine some of the strategic defense that led to his defense at second manassas. what we will come to find as we examine these is the word defense will little be found in the writing of stonewall jackson , robert e. lee, and many other confederate leaders associated with the campaign.

as we make our way to the field, first and second bull run, exploring the numerous tactical moment second prize jackson's defense on august 29 been august 30. and we will examine how well jackson and his men did in his defense of the line. a littleo begin further before second manassas the fight atack to malvern hill. the guns had grown silent. thousands of soldiers lay dead or wounded in hospital of the fighting. although their new commander robert e. lee more breathing room the threat was far from over. it had, at an enormous cost. the threat for the confederacy came up three friends following malvern hill, mcclellan's massive army was still on the virginia peninsula. troops under the command of

burnside were appearing in the fredericksburg area and a new federal army the army of virginia, under the western theater officer john polk was moving south and east from the northern part of the state. as the month of july push closer --ards august, they grained gained greater confidence that one of these armies no longer posed a threat to the capital. seeking to regain the military lead felt that general mcclelland and his massive army no longer pose a threat to richmond, and with that belief he began to transfer troops to the virginia piedmont. jackson toid gordonsville, and would to 25,000 men. this will be the beginning of his first campaign that was his,

and all indications indicated of anhis would be one offense. what was lee's and jennifer davis's strategy for the confederacy? for jefferson davis, his view of the confederates grand strategy was something that he termed, offensive defenses. davis istwo words, much preferred the offense of. this is evidenced by the tactical levels from fort sumter in april of 1861 and the battles around richmond. although there were situations that dictated the defense of posture. he believed it was a deep tactical offense the key to gain the gain. it is best expressed when he

wrote in march of 18 62, the advantage of selecting that time and place of attack was to apparent to have been overlooked. we confer. -- the only way to relieve richmond and restore control of virginia was to go on the strategic offensive. during this immediate time. , lee could little focus on anything else other than general mcclelland hundred thousand man army. setting on a campaign still not lee's horizon nor was a tactical defense by stonewall jackson. as leader remained focused on mcclelland, it was pope's advance of his new army of virginia that would draw his attention in the possibility of a new campaign against polk. farm --dvanced his army

furnace south, and send a probe against the confederate supply line. his movement made matters worse for lee. his army would be cut between a classic concert movement. at the same point, the removal of burnside independent court from north carolina lead lead to believe that either mcclellan or coax for would-be reinforce for the movement. despite the sensitive, strategic re:ation of july 25 1862 having moved jackson's two divisions, the expressed any sense of the direction of this pending campaign. he wrote to jackson that he was extremely anxious to send in reinforcements to depress pope. word used toy a describe a tactic. brigadered a louisiana

to reinforce jackson hoping to double jackson size. cachetnsel jackson quote your church as much as possible. be prepared to return to me when you're done. rapidly executed, this next campaign for jackson was to be one on an offensive nature. leasehold for a quick offensive and then returned to his army was dashed. jackson was slow, careful, and cautious during this time. it posed a serious threat to richmond in the line of communications. he was struggling to find a way to turn polk's position north of the river. use maneuver, to get pulled

out of his strong position, bring him to an open field and participate in one of those classic assault and hopefully victories. on august 8 lee perceived to dispatch from dave jackson suggesting he would attack the vanguard of posts army as they concentrated at culpepper. lee approved of the plan. polk scouts reported jackson nothing, thus he said of banks to meet them. the fight that ensued that was august 9 was to become known as --. jackson's men fall valiantly. the victory was due to the inability of the first core of toginia to march efficiently the support of union soldiers engage on the field.

at the same point that the guns were blazing, generally decided that the theater of operations had reached a stalemate and that stalemate needed to be broken immediately. lee was sent shock along street to assist in the matter. by august 14 five days after the conclusion generally decided to leave richmond where he had been in charge and commanding this new effort. he would take the field himself. of a time that lee took the field it is clear that he had selected stonewall jackson's wing to be the leading force in his strategy against paul. maneuver polled out of his strong position and then attack them in the open on ground that would favor the confederate army. met on august 24. he outlined his plan for the coming days.

he said in pursuant of the plan of operations determined upon and move around the enemy's flank so as to strike the orange and alexander railroad. 19 --n wrote in his april 1863 report pursuing the instructions of the commanding throw my command in uphington city and to break israel communication with the capital. there was nothing mentioned about what jackson should do maneuvering polk out of his strong position and offensive , wouldy bringing him out

or should jackson remain with the strategy that has already been set after he cut set railroad line? as historian noted, with dr. noted eithertorian -- he was not to get ated in serious fighting manassas or roast jackson violated the spirit of reconstruction. the former is more likely the may havelay -- lee miscalculated before he arrived on the scene. perhaps he under smith's tomato overestimated his own ability to join jackson with the rest of the confederate army in a timely fashion. 25 following the meeting with lee, jackson would

spend the remainder of august 24 preparing for those objectives to cut the federal communication and supply line. jackson and his command movements during the next few days were an example of control and execution of army logistics. his foot calvary had covered 25 miles with 23,000 men in just 14 hours of his march. the next day he covered the same distance in 14 hours again and reached bristow station on the railroad by sunset. folks reared in the railroad line behind it had been cut. but now what? historian harsh he said in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, it is difficult to believe that lee expected jackson's of 23,000 men to engage in serious fighting with

the vastly superior numbers pulled might bring against him. lee may have given stonewall is to attack if the opportunity arose to inflict great injury on the enemy but it is doubtful the confederate commander initiates the manassase in area that would commit the entire army of northern virginia. record onhere is no the ultimate objective of the campaign on august 30 lee would write to davis, my desire has been to avoid engagement and to achieve success by many right. maneuvering. lee does not expect jackson to bring on any serious engagement. jackson maybe unclear of his role following the cutting of the supply and communication line.

in addition lee hopes that no major battle will be funded manassas. if we read further between the lines, lee noted that he would hope that jackson would attack if and only if it would cause serious injury to pulse army and give the confederates and clear victory. as events pan out over the next thatal days, any attacks were made it with demonstrated clear-cut advantage. he should have waited. by noon on august 27, jackson has accomplished his objective as laid out by lee. --had his southern flank sweeping the enemy away from its northern flank. jackson and his men had captured an immense amount of supplies at the junction to her jackson had his main body near the road

situated so that they could withdraw to several for gap. where robert e. lee, along street and his wing were marching towards with every passing moment. situatedackson being on august why seven jackson was -- andbeginning to forced to take offensive posture in the coming hours. why? proximity to washington dc that is his position quickly at any moment. mcdowell and siegel's core were marching northward towards his rear end gainesville, jackson had done nothing to protect that retreat route to lee and thoroughfare gap. his men had become engaged in an

or g of plunder, many were drunk and the fighting effectiveness have been impaired at least temporarily. march and ays can't straight line after they captured at nasa's junction. jackson'sn recalled, first order was to knock out the heads of hundreds of barrels of and brandy.e streams of spirits ran like water through the sands of manassas and the soldiers on their hands and knees drank it greatly from the ground. a site to be held. by the evening of august 27 jackson had each of his divisions marching towards the position. it appears that jackson was not only unsure aware he wanted to make it. 28 was gone and jackson accomplished the ,bjection that lee had laid out

general long streets for divisions have begun their march. 26the afternoon of august they covered 14 miles in that objective. the following day long streets column had only reached six miles. lee who had traveled long streets allowed the same slowing pace of six miles to occur on the 28th. if checksum was to make any move he would need to support one areet and in what is taken lot longer than jackson has anticipated. , ag streets leading brigade chokepoint and thoroughfare gap received -- a thater reported suggested it would connect with jackson's right early the next day. as long streets men are plotting

towards their affair gap that chokepoint and there are plotting along slowly what is the 28. on his front on do the post hours of august 28 jackson have finally chosen a inition to take in the area which he had been operating. he moved his division into a concentrated position along a line. jackson sent couriers to his division to have him move towards this position jackson's position that he took was one that anyone would expect. jackson's line covered the line. thus if lee was blocked at thoroughfare gap he could take an alternate route. on his front the position was defensively strong running along , part of which including the embankment of an unfinished railroad.

if things went bad for jackson which suffix springs road led to the loudoun valley. his position was not the railroad cut you see pictured here as popular history conveyed. credit to rob gore i decided to give some photographs for this , as weation this morning trudged the battlefield and he wanted to make sure that these were included in the presentation. so jackson's true position despite popular history is not the position you see pictured on the right. historian notes he says trips there -- jackson's to not use that landmark as a

trench for protection. it is a four to five jackson is not -- early warning systems for the main body of the army, jackson's men are not taking a position in the cut. jackson's line was on stony hill or stony rage depending on which map that you look at. it is a strong position. it is not invulnerable. jackson's blanks are weak.

the unfinished railroad did not some of the cuts were too deep, over 15 feet down while others pastor open fields over or leveled with the ground. this position was further solidify after the day's event of august 28. it is worth saying that for the first time in the campaign jackson has switched strategic and tactical pursuit from the office of to the defense of as he is taking this position. 28 jackson could not remain idle on the defensive for long. after ordering his divisions jackson saw to attack not to

attend. his first opportunity did not pan pan out. any continue to look for opportunities to exploit throughout the day. later in the day as they trudged and arrived at thoroughfare gap and went jackson received word of their arrival he went to take a nap. receiveding his staff word that rufus king is marching eastward to fight. jackson staff informed him. he said general jackson sprang up. directing his sword, them to attack the enemy. jackson would say, gentlemen bring out your men. the division would open the fight with only part of his command. at 4:30 p.m. he ordered the the secondtillery

engage for nearly 15 minutes before reinforcements arrive. 30 minutes into the fight, the general got his men in the action. every attack jackson had thrown out at job gibbons' federal men had been fairied. jackson's men achieved a superiority in numbers and pushed the assault forward. the loss of engagement was heavy for jackson's command, losing 1,250 men in the engagement. of which his own brigade, the old stonewall brigade had suffered 340 casualties of the 800 they took into combat that afternoon. why jackson chose to attack this lone federal division is interesting. particularly as we established jackson was concentrating his divisions into a strong defensive position.

if you're taking a strong defensive position, why are you going on to the offensive and the assault? could not have expected any direct support any time soon so jackson must believe a victory was at hand against this division and that it would have a significant impact on the campaign. if anything, however, jackson had just committed the army of northern virginia to battle before they'd become unified while at the same time, by committing the army of northern virginia to battle with his men, he's going to limit general lee's opportunity to maneuver in this theater. returning back to historian joseph harsh, he would lament this in his work on the maryland campaign and said, quote, victory would come, if at all, through bloody combat and tactical blunders by the end of me. there should be no heavy victory from easy fighting. by 10:00 p.m. on august 28, general pope received news of the fight that had taken place

at brauner farm. the news he had heard is jackson had been discovered in grovely springs and engaged. the prospects of crushing jackson was certainly excellent. he drafted orders for august 29 based on intelligence and his orders drafted based on the belief that kings and rickets division that had been involved in the farm would block jackson's escape route and prevent any junction between lee and jackson. on segal's corps of the federal army was on henry house hill in position and pope would order him to attack vigorously the enemy the next morning, the largest body of infantry soldiers towards jackson's position. him polk would order major kearney to march his army of the potomac to the battlefield at 1:00 a.m. and continue

forward until he made contact with jackson and attack at dawn. kearney received the orders august 28 and a staff officer delivering the orders to kearney recalled his reaction, quote, tell general pope to go to hell. we won't march before morning. pope informed kearney's corps commander of kearney's instructions and directed hinesleman to follow with hooker's division at 3:00 a.m. they would order jesse reno commanding the camp at bull run from manassas junction to centreville to march to that hamlet and take the warrenton turnpike west. upon reaching the battlefield they were to join another tack against jackson. pope order majority general porter who was camped at briscoe station to march into the battlefield. going in august 29, pope believed he had jackson boxed n.

as pope prepared his men what was the final position jackson had taken in the area and what does it entail and how were his men laid out? during the predawn hours of august 29, jackson's position would be firmed up as the division is deployed to the rear of the unfinished railroad line. his division held jackson left with six brigades employed to two lines of battle upon tony ridge. hill's left flank rested near suddenly mill not far from suddenly church. the other brigade was on the left flank of a.p. hill's division and a thousand yards southwest of where this photograph was taken. colonel samuel mcgowan of the 14th south carolina recalls jackson's line and said quote, this position was slightly in advance of the general line and besides being on the extreme left was considered important because of the sudly road fort

which is commanded. our line made an obtuse angle pointing towards the enemy, one side of which ran parallel with the railroad cut and the other along the fence bordering the cleared field on our left. brigadier general fits lee's brigade moved further to the left to cover sudly ford and prevented the generals from getting in the rear as they'd done in 1861. as jackson's line moved southward towards the center of his position was the sudly road. two brigades of yule's division would deploy in the center of the line astride this road pictured here. brigadier general jubil early would take his bringing eight and foreigno's brigade to the extreme right of jackson's battle line and anchored their flank on the warrenton turnpike. the two brigades were parallel to pageman's lane west of the brawner field of the's night before.

two towards the south side of the pike towards groveton to screen any approaching federals in that sector. artillery would be deployed along the heights of tony ridge, an excellent division to upport jackson's infantry. on on the morning of august 29 as franz segal's men advanced towards jackson's position trying to uphold pope's orders, they struggled to maintain a division or even brigade front. the problem developed as a result of pope's and thus segal's intelligence of jackson's position. segal's corps fanned out because they were attempting to find jackson's position. no one seemed to know exactly where jackson was in the vicinity. nd a large gap would develop between vlad myrrh's brigade and alexander shim ell on the right. as the advance vietnammle brigade slowed to a -- shimel's

brigade slowed to a halt. carter m. braxton opened on the ride of scherzer's advance. shimel received word of troops on his right and halted his command. the troops would turn out to be general kearney's division and be the first attack on jackson's line and it was an attack that broke down quickly by the federals advancing towards his position. scherzer's division was supposed to maintain his line with robert mill roy's independent brigade on his left who in turn was to contact with brigadier robert thanks division of the corps further to the left. as the advance went forward, scherzer's division broke the connection to milroy who broke their connection with shank. meanwhile, kerzinovsky pulled far ahead to the line an engaged the confederate's burst. it engaged maxi greg south carolinian and hearing the fight to the right general milroy would send two regiments

to sst, between milroy and thomas' brigade who had gotten in on the action, an ohioan recalled of the fight, quote, we'd not advanced more than two rods in the woods when a terrible volley was poured upon us from the front and from behind the railroad embankment from the left mowing our men down like grass. segal's attacks would end near 10:00 a.m. on the morning of the 29th and it had not altered the tactical situation on the field at all. jackson's line had held. and on several occasions ackson went on the offensive following the charges but segal would not give up. general scherzer would order his brigades to assume their salt. the blessing of the pennsylvania recalled the new attack and said quote, at this point a heavy shower of canister pouring into us, we withdrew to the railroad dam. general scherzer was under the

belief kearney would advance with him but he failed to do so. as we explore these early attacks against jackson's defensive line at second manassas, one of the things i hope is beginning to stick out about the federal plan is that each and every time these units going in are going in on their own hook. jackson's line in its entirety has yet to be pressed to the ull federal advantage. why had general kearney failed to advance? franz segal's assault, scherzer's brigade to milroy and shank had a significant impact to the left of jackson's line, especially a.p. hill's front and several of the independent attacks had broken through jackson's defense. 82nd ohio had temporary broken jackson's line in an area known as the dump. both participants in the

morning attacks august 29 and historians since contend had kearney assisted, had he followed up and supported segal's advance that jackson may have been pushed out of his defensive position. was jackson's line a good defensive stand afteral? general hinesleman pictured on the left said several orders were sent to be to advance but did not move until after the troops on his left had been forced back. while general scherzer said i'm persuaded if general kearney had done at that moment which he did so gallantly late in the afternoon, that is to say if he had thrown his column upon the enemy's flanks we might have succeeded in destroying the enemy's left wing. historian scott pachen said the opportunity for the union's success against jackson had clearly been within the realm of possibilities that morning. general concernier after getting a late start on his battlefield march struggled to get his troops in combat on a

timely basis. will green conjectures kearney indulged in a bitter grudge he nurtured against franz segal. perhaps we'll never know kearney's exact reason. for not advancing that morning. we do know, however, the lack of the forward movement in conjunction with the support of segal's men had allowed jackson's line to defeat those piecemeal attacks. it is also left jackson's offense untested against equal numbers numerically. by the afternoon of august 29 general pope arrived on the field to further coordinate his offensive attacks against jack's line. pope's further orders were continue frontal assaults against jackson's line and all to serve as a diversion until general fits john quarters arrived to general jackson's rear. pope would not yield to the notion long street and lee had arrived and now occupied the very front porter was supposed to push through to get to jackson. despite pope's delusional

miscalculation regarding porter and jackson's right, these further assaults tested how strong jackson's defensive line really was. as midday approached, pope ordered the divisions of isaac stevens and joseph hooker to move forward to replace scherzer's battered units to the confederate left. as scherzer pulled out his hard-fought gains and pieces of the ground along the railroad were occupied by edward thomas' georgian and he made a tactical mistake and left a 120 yard gap between the line and not only would jackson's line be tested again with even larger federal assaults it would teter on the verge of collapse due to thomas' mistake. shortly before 3:00 p.m. grover's brigade of hooker's division moved out as part of the renewed attack against jackson, expecting an order for his brigade to attack, grover rode ahead and examined the terrain of the confederate position to where he was to assault. quote, after rising the hill in

this my command lay an open field was entered and one edge gradually fell off to a slope in the valley which through ran an railroad embankment and beyond that the forest continued and the corresponding heights beyond were held by the enemy in force and supported by artillery. after grover returned from his reconnaissance he received the order to advance from hooker at 3:00 p.m. hooker ordered him to, quote, advance in line of battle over this ground, past the embankment and enter the edge of the woods beyond and hold t. grover would lead the advance at 3:15 on the 29th and it was suggested after his experience to go to the right and use the bayonet, deploying his regiment into two lines before moving forward, grover explained to the men in the ranks to quote, fire one volley and rely upon the bayonette. the brigade would veer to the right as milroy suggested trying to avoid the open ground in the front and maintain

contact with to the right. grover was under the impression kearney would advance with his men, an impression that was sorely wrong. grover's direction of march brought the brigade directly into the breach between thomas' georgians and maxi greg's south carolinians and yet again for the second time on august 29 jackson's line had been pierced. but also yet again, confederate reinforcement has been sent forward to seal the gap and expel the federals from their new foothold. later on in the afternoon of august 29 following grover's attack as they had been defeated another confederate -- excuse me, union brigade had been sent forward and this brigade was under the command of general nothingle and his brigade would go further to the left of grover's brigade and meet with many of the results the previous federal brigades had charged had received throughout the day from ackson's line. following the nombings oggl's

attack, hooker would throw no further units into this fight. no further units into this fight. the congressional fetrits would seal the breaches and reinforceles would arrive in the nick of time. by late afternoon august 29 jackson's line was about to be attacked yet again. pope would consolidate his army's position and clarify his orders to porter to positively attack jackson's right flank. at the same point in time he ordered general kearney to go ahead and assault the left of jackson's line, a position that had been battered time and time again throughout the day. as kearney prepared to attack along his front, a.p. hill sent jackson a message via one of is staff offensives, henry kde douglas. ammunition was low and hill's troops were weary that the courier reported and hill questioned his ability to hold against another assault. douglas wrote when he gave this news to jackson that jackson, quote, seemed to deepen the

shadow on his face and the sigh leps of the group about him was oppressive. jackson told the currier to return to hill with the following message, quote, tell him if he attack again he must beat them. not waiting for the message to deliver, jackson got up on his horse and rode in search of hill. when he rode up to hill he said general, your men have done nobly, if you're attacked again, you will beat the enemy back. as jackson and hill discussed the situation that noggle's men created for him, hill replied, quote, here comes the next attack and he rode away. jackson called out into the distance after hill, i'll expect you to beat them. the next attack that was making the way towards hill's line was that of general kearney's men, 2,700 men from 10 regiments spread across three brigades. it was 5:00 p.m. leading kearney's division was brigadier general john c. robinson.

kearney rose to haze of the brigade and yelled, quote, i want you to drive the people out of the woods annoying hooker and bring your regiment with me and i'll show you where i want to put you in. hayes men encountered pinder's brigade piling over the bank in sort of disorder. kearney would steady hayes' men to spring raise into them and strike them on the flank in front and i'll support you handsomely. as the 6 rd -- 63rd brigade rode in, they defeated brigades from earlier. and noggle was yelling fall in line you sons of pitches and i'll make generals of every one of you. three remaining regiments crossed the railroad and yielded to the left and exposed their battle line perpendicular to the railroad cut and was able to strike perfectly. the federals had succeeded in cracking jack's line but further reinforcements would be sent to seal the breach.

by 5:15 p.m. as kearney's assault moves forward he's looking for any and all available reinforcements to send forward, something he had not done early in the day and would find daniel lesure's bringing eight, 700 men in all and would go forward with the remnants of taylor and noggle's men kearney had rallied. and kearney would ride up to stevens, legur's brigade and asked will these men fight? stevens replied, by god, general kearney, these are my round heads, referring to the hundred pennsylvania volunteers. feeling secure in his selection of reinforcements he pointed back to lesur, this is your line of advance and sweep everything before you, look out to your left, i'll take care of your right. the last of the federal assaults of the day had just ended. and like the previous ones it had ended if a federal repulse, jackson's line had held. on jackson's left, greg's brigade had completely emptied

the cartridge boxes and lost fully half its men and the rest of the light division suffered severely as well. general hill sent word to jackson the enemy had attacked his front and that attack had crested and they'd pulled back from his line. when jackson heard the news, a rare smile came across his face. tell him i knew he would do it, said jackson. thus on august 29, had lee, jackson participated in offensive actions on the plains of manassas or had they instituted a strong defense? on numerous occasions throughout the day, jackson's line had been severely tested and at times broken. additionally because his line had bent and broken, it often required jackson, particularly a.p. hill's brigades and regiments to go on the offensive to restore their line. jackson's defense necessitated a strong offensive in its execution. at the same point in time lee on the field in the late morning of the 29th with long street strongly desired to go on the attack.

lee's ardor for an attack was riding high. surprisingly it took a combination of the aggressive jackson and evenhanded longstreet to cool lee's desire to switch from a defensive posture to an offensive action. but the fighting at manassas was not over. plans would begin to develop on both sides for the following day. pope wanted to attack yet again but for lee, longstreet, and jackson the prevailing thought would be no attack would come from pope on august 30. just in case that no attack came, lee was beginning to prepare for other options. by 3:00 on august 30, however, that attack did come. fits jon porter's massive assault against jackson's center and right, sending nearly 10,000 troops in position against the terrain and would be the final main federal assault on jackson's position. that attack would take place as

deep cut and others along the unfinished railroad line and like so many occasions on august 30 the federal attack would break jackson's position yet again, confederate reinforcements arrived on the scene just in the nick of time. by mid afternoon, jackson needed help and his line was bruised, battered and broken and cracked many times. federal sold herself gotten into his line and taken absolutely everything he had defensive ild that position time for longstreet and his wing to enter the fight. as we examine whether or not jackson's offense we heard with today was a great offense or not, we have to ask several questions, was jackson outnumbered at any point in time during the battle? what was the numerical reality on the field? was the myth of a mighty federal army attacking some lone, small, isolated confederate body of troops accurate? what we can do is look at all

these numbers in the minute detail and tell you that at no time was jackson outnumbered on his front in the defensive position. because of the nature of which general pope's federals continued to attack over and over they do so in a piecemeal fashion. jackson's line should have held but was continually broken time and time again and if it was not for strategically placed reinforcements along the tony ridge front, jackson very well might have been pushed out of the defensive position he had taken on the 28th and 29th. not only on numerous occasions throughout august 29 and 30 did jackson's line numerically outweigh the attackers due to the strategic plans of pope and the piecemeal attacks ordered thereof, even with that advantage jackson's line broke almost every time as a result of those faults, either the momentum of the assault broke the line or the attacks made by the federal forces succeeded in finding the gaps in jackson's defense. in both cases it required

numerous reinforcements to be brought to bear to restore the line. clearly jackson's defense was not standing like a stonewall. furthermore, jackson's men had sustained numerous casualties in the defense of their position, far higher than what a defender should sustain in direct relation to the attacking column. overall jackson and thus lee's casualties were incredibly high for an army that fought two days on the defensive and a third day in which pope's army was routed from the field. the casualties sustained based on the tactics of the defense in this case did not support its use. of the 18 top regiments in the confederate army with the highest number of casualties, nine are from jackson's command. the greatest percentage of casualties in a regiment in jackson's unit, they had the majority of the greatest percentage of casualties of any other unit on the field. jackson's wing in all would lose 4,518 men over those three days, nearly half of all casualties of the army of northern virginia sustained during the entirety of the

second manassas campaign. ultimately however, great or not, jackson's line had held. his men on the frontlines had been instrumental in that victory. jackson in his foot cavalry were not done with the campaign. lee would order jackson to pursue pope and try to cut him off from his retreat towards washington, maneuver, not defend, would again be the strategy and tactic of the day. thank you. [applause] >> we have time for one or two questions. anybody have questions for dan? anybody? anybody? buhler? buhler? anybody? the one question in the back here from mike black. again, a reminder, when you ask a question difelice introduce yourself and tell us where you're from and make sure you have a question. >> i'm mike watt, great presentation. i want to ask you to elaborate a little more on lee's

strategic intent in july and august of 1862. you mentioned the burnside was moving towards fredericksburg and lee did not know that at the time and i submit to you to lee sending jackson gordonsville was a strategic offensive move as opposed to an offensive move in preparation for a second manassas. >> the question is what does lee know as far as july and august and how does it influence his strategic planning during that time period? surely the number one concern for lee in the month of july is mcclellan, despite everything lee's done, mcclellan is still on the virginia peninsula and his army is massive, over 100,000 men are still in the virginia peninsula. lee does become aware of this new army of virginia under pope that is assembling and moving but even at that point in time, lee has no strategic plans of an offensive nature or defensive nature towards pope.

still all eyes on mcclellan. as further intelligence continues to flood into lee's headquarters, lee begins to feel mcclellan is less of a credible threat on the virginia peninsula and i'll contend the reason why he sends jackson in an offensive maneuver is because of pope's advance towards the confederate capital. if lee does not go on the offensive to stop pope from moving any further southward against the confederate line of comply and communication towards the confet federal rit capital it squeezes lee from two directions so that aggressive movement by pope moving southward towards that confederate supply line forces, in my opinion, lee to go on the offensive to stop pope from moving any further towards that supply line, towards the route of the capital and towards placing him to a position of a classic pincer movement and if he sends him there defensively and pope continues to push forward it gives lee a whole lot less room to maneuver out of a possible pincer movement.

>> ladies and gentlemen. >> thank you. [applause] >> dan does have copies of his book "the last road north" for sale. visit the book table. we'll take a short break and when we come back, kevin policy ok will take us to antietam. >> you're watching live coverage of the emerging civil war symposium on c-span 3 american history tv. after this break, we'll be back with kevin pollack. he's the author of shepherd's town in the civil war, one vast onfederate hospital.

>> sunday on american history tv on c-span 3, on american artifacts, american presidents life portraits, we tour the exhibit at the herbert hoover presidential library and museum at west branch iowa at lyndon b. johnson's exhibit. >> lyndon johnson was always on the telephone. he had a telephone installed in his bathroom and would talk with people and bring them in there and talk to them in the bathroom and be a little disconcertaining. he recorded telephone conversations he had and those were supposed to be not open to the public until 50 years after he had died. >> at 7:00 p.m. on the presidency, harry truman and celebrities, archivist david clark looks back on the president's relationship with celebrity athletes, politicians and entertainers. >> president truman didn't necessarily seek out entertainers or well known

people, yet he cultivated some relationship with them, especially jack benefiting he had a good friendship with. this is a clip. ♪ [applause] ♪ >> american history tv, all weekend, every weekend on c-span3. tonight on c-span two possible tv on after words, how the justice department handles white-collar crime in his book, the chicken chip club -- the chicken shit club. >> raising your site so that you

are not picking off the vulnerable low hanging fruit but againstainst up the -- the most powerful lawmakers in society and not being worried that you can't take them on or you might lose the case. p.m., bloomberg businessweek senior national correspondent joshua green 2016 political partnership between the president and his chief strategist in his book, the devils bargain, donald trump and steve bannon, the storming of the presidency. >> i'm sure the president is frustrated -- republicans have unified control of congress and they seem unable to get anything done. anythingho is getting ,one for trump is jeff sessions looks like he is about to be fired or driven out. >> watch tonight beginning