then general robert e. lee's antetum defense, the defense at stones river and union general john buford's gettysburg defense. american history tv is in prime time all week with recent civil war conferences. on tuesday, a seminar with robert e. lee and grant. american history tv and prime time begins at 8:00 p.m. eastern. dan welch talks about confederate general stonewall jackson's defensive stand at the battle of second manassas in virginia which took place in late august 1862. jackson's troops held their ground against repeated assaults by union troops, buying time for the confederates to launch a flank attack and send the union army into retreat. this 50 minute talk was part of a symposium on great defenses of

the civil war hosted by the emerging civil war blog. >> dan welch is a music educator in ohio. but for many, many years he's had a deep passionate love affair with the civil war as manufacture many of us have had and he fell in love with the civil war at gettysburg. he studies at the gettysburg institute. and has become a ranger at gettysburg national battlefield park where you can find him in the summer time giving tours all over the field. he's also co-author with rob orson of the civil war series book the last road north, a guide to the gettysburg campaign which traces the movements of both armies from virginia up into pennsylvania and then follows their retreat route after gettysburg. it's a fantastic book. it is model after the civil war trail system. we'll hear about the civil war trails. it's a fan it tastic initiative.

without further ado, it is my delightful pleasure to introduce from the great state of ohio, my friend, dan welch. >> good morning, everyone. before we get started this morning, i'd like to take a moment to thank chris mcyou could ski and chris white and my colleagues at emerging civil war and all of you for getting up so early this morning and coming out to learn a little bit more about stonewall jackson. and second manassas. jackson's defensive line had been bruised and battered. they had been subjected to numerous federal attacks throughout august 29th and now on the afternoon of august 30th, some of jackson's units literally had nothing left to give in the lines defense. along jackson's right the men of brigadier general william starks brigade under the command of colonel leroy stafford and colonel bradley johnson had been engaged for the last 30 minutes in a furious defense of that portion of the line.

the immense pressure was part of fitsjohn porter's assault on jackson's position. over the course of the last 30 minutes as men from new york, michigan, pennsylvania, and massachusetts assailed the confederate defenders the cartridge boxes of the confederate defenders had run dry. numerous con fed rats left the fight and droves scouring the dead and dying in search of ammunition but with little success. the stout resistance along the railroad em bank mentes with physically quieting as the guns slowly silenced. according to an article in the philadelphia weekly time written in december of 1881, at this moment an irishman in stafford's brigade yelled above the battle, boys give them rocks. all along the line stafford and johnson's regimens started to hurl large bolders over their head and grab smaller rocks and throw them like so many fastballs from the pitching mound. a soldier in the 24th new york whose unit was on the front line

recalled "huge stones began to fall about us and then one of them would happen to strike one or another of us with the very unpresident an unpresident anlt effect." they started to return the favor in kind. and so ensued one of the more famous episodes of stonewall jackson's defense at second manassas. in reality, this moment had no overall effect in the end result of the fight. the federal assault had risen and they arrived to the scene. what the story illustrates is the fur os ti in which jackson's men defended their position. a story that we will explore today. as we make our way through the program today, we're going to be examining several key factors to jackson's defense during the fight at second manassas. first and foremost, we're going to examine some of the strategic events that led to jackson's defense at second manassas. and what we're going to come to

find that word defense will little be found in the writings of stonewall jackson, robert e. lee, and many other confederate leaders associated with this campaign. as we finally make our way to the fields and plains of first bull run and second bull run, we'll explore the numerous tactical moments that compromise jackson's defense on august 29th and august 30th, 1862. and lastly, we'll examine just how well jackson did in this defensive line all those years ago. so we need to begin a little further before second manassas and take us back to the fight at m malvern hill. although the new commander in the field robert e. lee provided the capital the confederacy more breathing room the threat was far from over. the threat for the confederacy

in the state of virginia came on three fronts following malvern hill. the massive army was still on the virginia peninsula, although further away from richmond. troops under the command of ambrose burnside were appearing along the rap han of course river in the fredericksburg area and a new army, the army of virginia under the newly arrived officer john pope was moving southward and eastward from the northern part of the state. as the month of july pushed ever closer towards august, general lee began to gain greater confidence that at least one of these armies no longer posed a serious threat to the confederate capital. seeking an opportunity to exploit and regain the military initiative, a hallmark of lee's command style, lee felt that general mcclellan and the massive army no longer posed a threat to richmond. and with that belief, he began to transer if troops. he sent jackson with two divisions of soldiers to gordonsville and eventually he would reinforce jackson with

units whose numbers would soar to approximately 25,000 men. this would be the beginning of lee's first campaign that was solely his. and all indications pointed to the -- that this one would be one of an offense, an offense, not a defensive in nature. what was lee's as well as confederate jefferson davis' strategy for the confederacy, well, for jefferson davis, his view of the confederate's grand strategy was something that he turned, a coin he phrased offensive defensive. of those two words within davis' strategy, however, davis as well as lee much preferred the offensive. this can be evidence by the use of the offensive on the strategic and tactical levels from fort sumpter to the most recent battles around richmond. for davis, although there were situation that's dictated a defensive posture, he believed that was the use of the strategic and tactical offense

that was the key to gain confederate war aims. thus davis' belief in the offensive strategy and the tactical application is best expressed when he wrote in march of 1862 "the advantage of selecting the time and place of attack was too apparent to have been overlooked." lee wholeheartedly conquered, particularly ones he took the field following general johnson's wounded. the only way to relieve richmond and restore control of virginia was to go on the strategic offensive. during this immediate post malvern hill time period, lee could little focus on anything else other than general mcclellan's 100,000 man army still on the peninsula including john pope and the army of virginia. setting upon a campaign against pope was still not on lee's horizon nor was a tactical defense by stonewall jackson. now as lee remained focused on mcclellan, it was pope's advance

of a portion of the portion of the new army of virginia that would draw lee's attention and the possibility of a new campaign, not against mcclellan but pope. the army of virginia commander had not only advanced the army far enough south to be within the theater of operations but he sent a probe against the confederate supply line. the movement and probe made matters worse for lee. if hope advanced on the confederate capital from the north, the army would be caught between a classic movement. at the same point in time, the removal of bernside's corps from north carolina led lee to believe that either mcclellan's force or pope's force would be reinforced for this movement. despite the sensitive strategic situation on july 25th, 1862, after already having moving the diversions, he expressed for the first time any sense of the direction of the new impending campaign. wrote to jackson he was extremely anxious to send him

reinforcements to suppress pope. suppress is hardly a word used to describe defensive strategy or tactics. two days later, july 27th, lee ordered ap hills division in louisiana to reinforce jackson hoping to double jackson's size. lee counselled jackson cache your troops as much as possible until you strike your blow and be prepared to return to me when done. i'll endeavor do keep general mcclellan quiet until this is over if rapidly executed. clearly this next campaign for jackson was to be one of an offensive nature. lee's hope for a quick offensive action by jackson against pope in the army of virginia and the return to his army was quickly dashed. jackson was slow, careful, and cautious during this time period. he had heard a federal forces concentratesing in fredericksburg which if true posed a serious threat to richmond and the line of communications with the

confederate capital. he was also struggling as he told lee to find a way to turn pope's position north of the rapiddan river. lee concurred to avoid frontal assaults against the position to use maneuver, to get pope out of his strong position, bring him out into an open field and participate in then one of the classic assaults and hopefully victories. on august 8th, lee received a dispatch from jackson dated the previous day suggesting that he would attack the vanguard of pope's army as they concentrated at culpepper. they moved the division 15 miles to hanover. wr they could protect jackson's flank. pope's scouts reported jackson crossing the rapidan and identified culpepper as the destination and thus sent bank's corps to meet them. the fight that ensued was august 9th. it was become known as the battle at cedar mountain. jackson's men fought aggressively but is was a poorly

managed affair as one historian wrote. the victory was only due to the inability of the first corps of the army of virginia to march efficiently to the support of un john soldiers engaged on the field. at the same time, the guns were blazing at cedar mountain, general lee decided that his theater of operations had reached a stalemate and that stalemate needed to be broken immediately. therefore, lee would send general longstreet north to assist in the matter. and by august 14th, five days after the conclusion of cedar mountain, general lee decided to leave richmond, virginia, where he had been in charge and commanding this new effort. and he would take the field himself. by the time that lee took the field, it is clear that he had selected stonewall jackson's wing to be the leading force in his grand strategy of a turning movement against pope. lee sought to maneuver pope out of strong position and then attack him out in the open on ground that would favor the confederate army. lee met with jackson longstreet

and stewart on august 24th. lee recalled the meeting in the outline of the plan for the coming days in june of 186 when -- 1863 when he filed the report. he said jackson was directed on the 25th to cross above water lou and move around the enemy's right so as to strike the orange and alexandria railroad in his rear. jackson wrote in his april 1863 report, pursuing the instructions of the commanding general, i left jeffersonton on the morning of 25 venth to thro command between washington city and to break up his railroad communications with the confederate capital. excuse me, federal capital. one clear issue with the reports, there was nothing mentioned about what jackson should do after cutting that railroad. so far this campaign had been one of an offense in both strategy and tactics. maneuvering pope out of his

strong position, an offensive strategy. bringing him out into a piece of ground that would favor a confederate assault, again, offensive tactics. would or should jackson remain with this strategy that's been set by lee after he cuts that railroad line. what should he do next? or should he switch to defensive operations? as historian joseph harsh noted, i think we'll hear a lot from joe harsh as we did last night with dr. jordan, as historian joe harsh noted, he said "either lee did not make clear to jackson this operation was basically a raid and that he was not to get mired in serious fighting with the enemy at manassas or jackson violated the spirit of his instructions." lee may have miscalculated before he arrived on the scene. perhaps, perhaps he underestimated pope's ability to concentrate the federal army in

the vincinity of manassas and overestimated his own ability to join jackson in a timely fashion. by august 25th, however, following the meeting with lee, jackson would spend the remainder of august 24th preparing for the objectives, to cut fralt communication and supply line of the orange and alexandria railroad. jackson and his command was a classic example of control and execution of army logistics. jackson's foot calgary covered 25 miles with 23,000 men in just the first 14 hours of his march on august 25th. the next day he covered the same distance in 14 hours, again, and reached bristow station by sunset. pope's rear and the railroad line behind it hado@cu been cut. but now what? returning to historian harsh, he said in the absence of

convincing evidence to the contrary, it is difficult to believe that lee expected jackson's detatched column of 23,000 men on its own strength to engage in serious fighting with the vastly superior numbers pope might bring against him. lee may well have given stonewall the discretion to attack if the opportunity arose to inflict great injury on the enemy. but it is doubtful the confederate commander wanted the turning column to initiate a major battle in the manassas area that would commit the entire army of northern virginia. although there is no record of any understanding reached by lee and jackson on the ultimate objective of the campaign on august 30th, lee would write bluntly to davis, my desire has been to avoid general engagements and to achieve success "by maneuvering." so lee does not expect jackson to bring on any serious

engage ment. jackson may be unclear of his role following the cutting of the orange and alexandria railroad line, the supply line and communication line to pope, his army and the federal capital. in addition, lee hopes that no major battle will be fought in manassas. but if we read a little further between the lines, lee noted that he would hope that jackson would attack if and only if it would cause serious injury to pope's army and give the confederates a clear victory. as the events begin to pan out over the next several days, we'll be able to determine if any attack jackson made is one that would demonstrate a clear cut advantage and a confederate victory or that he should have waited. by noon on august 27th, jackson accomplished the objective. he had a southern flank protected. he sent the calgary towards washington sweeping the enemy away from the northern flank and

he sat on the main federal communication route at manassas junction. further, jackson and his men cap tuf toured an immense amount of supplies. he had the main road to gainesville situate sod they could withdraw the thorough fair gap should it become necessary. the gap that jackson used to reach his current position and where robert e. lee with longstreet and his wing were marching towards with every passing moment. conversely, however, despite jackson being quite well situated on august 27th, jackson was also beginning to lose his offensive capabilities with the position he had placed his command in. almost being forced to take a defensive posture in the coming hours. why? well, first, his proximity to washington, d.c., meant that more reinforcements could be sent from the federal capitol to his position quickly and at any moment. there were two corps in the federal army, mcdowell and siegel's corps marching

northward. jackson had nothing to protect that retreat route to lee and thorough fair gap and as another historian noted, his men had become engaged in an orgy of plunder. mr. were drunk and the fighting effectiveness of all had been impaired at least temporarily. jackson's guys can't march in a straight line let alone load in five steps and fire. major w. roy mason recalls he said jackson's first order is to knock out the heads of hundreds of barrels of whiskey, wine and brandy. i shall never forget the scene. spirits ran like water through the sands of manassas and soldiers on their hands and knees drank it from the ground. a sight to be held. by the evening of august 27th, jackson had eachst divisions marching towards a temporary position and it appears that jackson was not only unsure of his next move but where he wanted to make it.

as august 28th would dawn and jackson accomplished that objective that lee had laid out at that plan between jackson, longstreet, stewart and himself days earlier, general longstreet's four division gas began their march. on august 26th, they covered 14 miles in that objective. but the following day on august 27th, longstreet's column had only reached six miles. lee who traveled with longstreet allowed the same slowing pace of six miles to occur on the 28th. jackson was to make any move he would need the support of longstreet and longstreet's plotting was taking a lot longer than jackson had anticipated or hoped. by the late morning, longstreet's leading brigades approached the choke point at thoroughfare gap and stonewall jackson received good news on two fronts. a currier reported slongstreet's

success at thorough fair gap suggesting that old pete would connect with jackson's right early the next day. as longstreet's men are plotting towards thoroughfare gap that choke point, and they're plotting along slowly, what is going on on jackson's front? on the 28th? during the post dawn hours of august 28th, jackson finally chosen a position to take in the area in which he had been operating. he decided to move his scattered divisions into a concentrated position just west of the warrington turnpike. jackson sent curriers to the divisions to have them move towards this new position. jackson's position that he decided to take was one that anyone would expect of the commander. jackson's line covered the road from haymarket to sudly springs. if lee was blocked at thoroughfair gap, he could take an alternate route to jackson. on his immediate front, the position was defensively strong,

running along a moderately high ridge, part and i reinforce this, part of which included the em bankments of an unfinished railroad and the warrenton turn tike f things went bad for jackson, he had the sudly springs road that led to aldy gap. thus, jackson's true position was not, not the railroad cut you see pictured here as popular history conveys. it must take a moment at this point in time to give a lot of credit to my friend and colleague rob orison. fwz a little over a month ago i decided to get some photographs for this presentation this morning and i think temperatures reached over 100 degrees that day as we trudged the second manassas battlefield. he wanted to mike sure these were included in the presentation. if you see rob, thank him for great photographs. so jackson's true position is not the position you see pictured on the right.

this unfinished railroad embankment. contrary to the conception, jackson's troop did not use that landmark as a trench for protection. in most cases, it was held only by a skirmish line with the main battle line to the rear of the cut or grade as the terrain required. pictu pictures were posted to provide advance warning of any approaching federals. if we were to get inside of jackson's mind or get in some of the military theorist that's chris white talked about last night, a true strong defensive position would be to order the men into this cut. it is a fortified position but jackson is not deploying his men on august 28th in the cut. skirmishes are nearby. those early warning systems for the main body of the army. but jackson's men are not taking a position in the cut. jackson's line then was on stoney hill or stoney ridge

depending on who you read and which map you look at. it is a strong position. but it is not invulnerable. jackson's flanks are particularly weak. on his left, the railroad line was generally lower and less protected by woods. on the right of the line, page lane led right into the right flank. additional lishgs the heavy wooded fronts along the left and center of the line voided the use of effective artillery for his position. the unfinished railroad did not furnish a consistent line in which to align troops and further some of the cuts were too deep, over 15 feet down, while others passed through open fields or were level with the ground. this position would further solidify. after the days events of august 28th. but it's worth pausing that for the first time in the campaign jackson has switched strategic and tactical pursuits from the offensive to the defensive as he is taking this position. later on august 28th, the

aggressive jackson, however, could not remain idle on the defensive for long. after an ordering his divisions to approach this new position, jackson throughout the day sought to attack not to defend. his first opportunity that morning did not pan out and jackson had his commanders continue to look for opportunities to exploit throughout the day. later in the day as general lee and longstreet trudged and finally arrived at thoroughfare gap and when jackson received word of their arrival feeling relieved that lee and longstreet were in the vicinity, went to take a nap. now sleeping, his staff received word from general stewart's scouts that rufus king was marching eastward. jackson's staff woke him and informed him of the intelligence. hunter hole ams mcguire repd the moment, general jackson sprang up and moved rapidly towards his horse, buckling on his sword as he moved and urging greatest speed around him directing yul toechlt attack the enemy. jackson would say to you'll and

talafor, generatlemen, bring ou your men. they would opt fight for jackson with pafrt the command. at 4. 3067 4:30 p.m. he ordered them to most batteries. the second virginia and second wisconsin would engage for nearly 15 minutes before reinforcements arrived. jackson bringing reinforcements, georgians himself would be funneled in from the federal side as well. 30 minutes into the fight, general yule got the rest of his men in the attack. by 8:00 p.m., jackson's command finally achieved a superiority in numbers along the line and he pushed the assault forward to finally clear the front. the losses of this engagement were heavy for jackson's command, losing 1,250 men in the engage ment of which his own brigade, the old stonewall brigade had suffered 340 casualties of the 800 they took into combat that afternoon.

why jackson chose to attack this lone federal division is interesting. particularly as we already established that jock son was concentrating his divisions into a strong defensive position. if you are taking a strong defensive position, why are you going on to the offensive and the assault? he could not have expected any direct support any time soon. jackson must believe that a victory was at hand against this division and that it would have a significant impact on the campaign. if anything, however, jackson had just committed the army of northern virginia to battle before they had become unified. at the same time, he's going to limit general lee's opportunity to maneuver in this theater. returning back to historian joseph harsh. har wosh lame harsh would lament this. he said "victory would come if at all through bloody combat and

from tactical blunders by the enemy. there would be no heavy victory from easy fighting." by 10:00 p.m. august 28th, general pope received news of the fight that took place at his headquarters in centreville. the news that pope heard was that jackson was discovered in the vicinity of groveton and sudly springs and engaged. he subsequently drafted orders for august 29th based upon the intelligence. his orders were drafted based upon the belief that kings and rick et's division that's had been involved in the fight at brawner farm would be blocking jackson's escape route to the west and preventing any junction between lee, longstreet and jackson. siegel's corps was already in position on henry house hill and thus pope would order him to attack the enemy vigorously the next morning, the largest body of infantry soldiers of the army

to jackson's position. pope would continue to dictate his orders for the following day. he would order major general philip carney at centreville to march the diversion of the third carp of the army to the battlefield at 1:00 a.m. and continue forward until he made contact with jackson's pickets and then attack him at dawn. he received the orders at 11:00 p.m. on august 28th. a staff officer delivering the orders to him recalled his reaction. "tell general pope to go to hell. we won't march before morning." he directed him to follow carney at 3:00 a.m. pope would order jesse reno on bull run from the road to manassas junction to centerville to particular to that handle and then turn west. upon reaching the battlefield, these forces were to join the attack against jackson. pope then ordered major general john porter whose fifth corps

was at bris tow station to march to centerville and then to the ba battlefield. pope believed he had jackson boxed in. as pope prepares his orders and his men to go into the assault, what was the final position that jackson had taken in the area? what exactly did it entail and how were his men laid out? during the predawn hours of august 29th, jackson's position would be firmed up as his divisions deployed to the rear of the unfinished railroad line. major general ambrose hill's division held the left with six brigades in two lines of battle upon stoney ridge. left flank rested near sudly mill, not far from sudly church pictured here. brigadier general maxie a rocky wooden knoll about 60 yards behind the railroad cut on the left flank of ap hill's division and 1,000 yards southwest of where this photograph was taken. colonel samuel mcgowen recalled

left jackson's line that day, he said "this position was slightly an advance of the general line and was considered important because of the sudly road forward which it commanded. our line made an on tus angle pointing toward the enemy, one side of which ran nearly parallel with the railroad cut and the other along the fence bordering the cleared field on our left." brigadier general fits lee's brigade moved further to the left and covered sudly ford and prevenltsed the generals from getting into the rear as they had done in 1861. as jackson moved to the certainty of his position was the groveton sudly road. two brigades of yule's division now commanded by lawton after the grievous wound of the night before would deploy in the center of the line astride this road pictured here. brigadier general early would take his brigade and the louisiana brigade to the extreme right of jackson's battle line and anchored their flank on the

warrenton turnpike. they deployed immediately west of and parallel to page glen just west of the brawner farm battlefield. early also deployed two regimens attempting to find jackson's position, no one seemed to know exactly where jackson was in the vicinity. and the division a large gap would gap two develop between

the brigade on the leftst advancing front and colonel alex ander on the right. as the advance against the position, the brigade slowed directly to a halt. two confederate bat under the commands opened on the right of the advance. at the same time, they received word of troops on the right and rear and he halted his command. those troops would later turn out to be general carney's division. this would be the first attack on jackson's line and it was an attack that broke down quickly by the federals advancing to his position. the division was supposed to maintain the line with robert millroy's brigade loevent who was supposed to connect with brigadier general robert shanks further to the left. as the advance went forward, they broke the connection to millroy who then broke their connection with shank. meanwhile, the brigade advanced at a rapid rate pulling far ahead of rest of the line and

engage the the con fed rats first. the brigade and brigadier general maxie greg, hearing the fight to his right, general millroy would send two regimens to assist. of the fight between millroy and the south carolinians and georgians who had gotten in on the action, an ohioan recalled of the fight, we will not advanced more than two rods into the woods when a terrible volley was poured in upon us from the front and from behind the railroad imbankment mowing our men down like grass. the attacks would end near 10:00 a.m. on the morning of the 29th and had not altered the tactical situation on the field at all. jackson's line had held. and on several occasions, jackson's units went on the offensive following these federal charges. but siegel would not give up. with the arrive afl carney's division on hill's already battered left, general sherz would or the the brigades to renew the assault.

the blessing of the 74th pennsylvania recalled this renewed attack. that point a heavy shower of great shot and canister pouring into us we withdrew to the railroad dam. general sherz was. >> narrator: belief that carney would advance with him but he failed to do so. as we began to explore these early attacks against jackson's defensive line at second manassas, onest things that i hope is beginning to stick out about the federal plan is that each and every time these units going in are going in on their own hook. jackson's line in the entirety has yet to be pressed to the full federal advantage in numbers. but why had general carney failed to advance? frans siegel's assaults, from the sherz brigade and millroy and shafrpg had a significant impact on the left of jackson's line, especially ap hill's front. several of the attacks had even broken through jackson's defense.

for example, the 82 nld ohio detached by millroy to assist to the right had temporarily broken jackson's line in an area known as the dump. both participants in the morning attacks on august 29th and historians since contend that had carney assisted, had he followed up and supported siegel's advance that jackson may have been pushed out of his defensive position. was jackson's line a good defensive stand after all? the general on the left here reported "several orders were stoent him to advance but did he not move until after the troops on his left had been forced back." while general sherz pictured on the rightst screen noted i'm persuaded by that general carney had done at that moment what he did so gallantly late in the afternoon that is to say if he had thrown his column upon the enemy's flanks we might have succeeded in destroying the enemy's left wing.

his to historians feel hit clearly been within the realm of possibilities that morning. however, general carney after getting a late start, struggled to get his troops into combat on a timely basis. will green conjectures that carney possibly endullthed in a grudge that he lobbied against siegel. perhaps we'll never know. we'll never know carney's exact reasons for not advancing that morning. what we do know, however, is that lack of the forward movement in conjunction with the support of siegel's men had allowed jackson's line to defeat those piecemeal attacks. it is also left jackson's defense untested against equal or higher numbers numerically. by the afternoon of august 29th, general pope had arrived on the field to further coordinate the offensive attacks against jackson's line. pope's further orders for the day were continued frontal assaults against jackson's line. these were all to serve as a diversion until general porter

arrived on the right and rear. pope would not yield to the notion that longstreet and lee had arrived to the battlefield and now occupied the very front that porter was supposed to push through to get to jackson. despite pope's dilutional miscalculation regarding port eastern jackson's right, these further assaults tested just how strong jackson's defensive line really was. as midday approached, pope ordered the doif ordered divisions to move forward to replace the battered units from the morning assaults against the confederate left. as sherz pulled out, some of hard fought gains, pieces of ground along that railroad were quickly occupied by edward thomas' georgians. thomas, however had, made a tactical mistake in the redeployment. he left 125 yard gap between his line and the line of great south carolinians to his left. not only would jackson's line be test depend with larger federal assaults, it would teeter on the verge of collapse due to thomas' mistake. shortly before 3:00 p.m., grover's brigade of hooker's division moved out as part of

the attack against jackson. expectsing an order for his brigade to attack, grover rode ahead an examined the terrain of the confederate position where he was to assault. "after rising the hill under which my command lay an open field was entered". and from one edge of it gradually fell to have a slope to a valley through which ran a railroad embankment. the forest continued and the heights behind were held by the enemy in force and was supported by artillery. after grover returned from his reconnaissance, he received the order to advance at 3:00 p.m. hooker ordered him to advance in line of battle over this ground, pass the embank ment and enter the woods beyond and hold it. grover would lead the at advance at 3:15 p.m. general millroy suggested to grover after the experience that morning to go to the right and use the dbayonet. two men went into two lines

before moving forward, grover explained to the men to fire one volley then then rely upon the bayonet. the brigade would veer to the right just as millroy suggested trying to avoid the open ground in the front as well as maintain contact with carney's brigade to the right. grover was under the impression that carney would advance with his man, an impression that was sorely wrong. grover's direction of march, however, brought the brigade directly into the breech between thomas' georgians and maxie greg's south carolinians. yet again for the second time on august 29th, jackson's line had been pierced. but also yet again, confederate reinforcements would be sent forward to seal the gap and expel the federals from their new foothold. later on the afternoon of august 29th, following grover's attack as they had been defeated, another confederate -- union brigade was sent forward. this brigade was under the command of general novel. his before he gad would go into action further to the left of grover's brigade and would meet with many of the same results

that the previous federal brigade this is had chargehood received throughout the day from jackson's line. following the attack that day and other attacks made by nelson taylor, hooker would throw no further units into this fight. no further units into this fight. the confederates time after time would seal the breeches and republican he for reinforcements would arrive just in time. pope would consolidate the army's position and clarify the early orders to positively attack jackson's right flank. at the same point in time, he ordered general carney to go ahead and assault the left of jackson's line, a position that had been battered time and time again throughout the day. as carney prepared to attack along his front, a.p. hill sent jackson a message via one of his staff officers henry dug tloos apprise him of the situation on the left of jackson's defense.

and ammunition was low and hill's troops were weary and hill questioned his ability to hold against another assault. douglas wrote that when he gave this news to jackson that jackson seemed to deepen the shadow on his face, silence the group about limb was oppressive. jackson told the currier to return to general hill with the following message, "tell him if they attack again he must beat them." not waiting for the mess tooth deliv message to deliver, roet in search of hill. when he rode to hill, he said general, your men have done nobly. if you are attacked again, you will the beat the enemy back. they created for him, hill replied, "here come the next attack." and he rode away. jackson called out into the distance after hill, i'll expect you to beat them. the next attack that was making the way towards hill's line was that of general carney's men, 2700 men from ten regimens

spread across three brigades. i was 5:00 p.m. leaving carney's diversion was john c. robinson's brigade. general kearny rode up to hayes and yelled, "i want you to drive those people out of the woods that are annoying hooker. bring your regimen along with me and i'll show you where i want to put you in." hayes' men were piling over the bank in disorder. kearny would stead yes the men to strike them on the flank in front. i'll support you handsomely. meanwhile, they crossed the railroad and went tloest, they exposed the battle line to the

railroad cut and angled perfectly to strike hill's exposed flank. yet again, the federals succeeded in cracking jackson's line but further reinforcements would be sent to seal the breech. by 5:15 p.m., kerney's assault moves forward, he's looking for any and all available reinforcements to send forward, something he didn't do earlier in the day. he would find ledgers, 700 men in all, these men would go forward with the remnants of taylor's men that kearny had been able to rally. general kearny would ride up to stevens, the divisional commander in regards to his brigade and ask will these men fight? stephen's replied, by god, general kearny, these are my round heads referring to the 100th pennsylvania volunteers. feeling secure in his selection of reinforcements, kearny said that this is your line of advance and sweep everything before you, look out to your left, i'll take care of your

right. like the previous ones that ended in a federal repulse, jackson's line had held. on jackson's left, the brigade completely emptied the cartridge boxes and lost fully half its men while the rest of the light division suffered severely as well. when jackson heard the news, a rare smile came across his face. tell him, i knew he would do it said jackson. thus on august 29th, had lee, jackson launched and had they participated in offensive actions on the plains of manassas or institute aid strong defense, on numerous occasions throughout the day, jackson's line was severely tested and at times broken. additionally, because i had line had bent and broken, it offered required jackson's particularly a.p. hill's brigades to go on the offensive to restore their line.

jackson's defense necessitied a strong offensive in its execution. at the same time, lee on the field and late morningst 29th with longstreet strongly desired to go on the attack. lee's order for an attack was riding high. it took a combination of the aggressive jackson and the even handed longstreet to cool lee's desire to switch from a defensive posture to an offensive action. but the fighting at manassas was not over. plans would begin to develop on both sides for the following day. pope wanted to attack yet again. but for lee, longstreet and jackson, sthout that no attack would come from pope on august 30th. just in case that no attack came, lee was beginning to prepare for other options. by 3:00, on august 30th, however, that attack did come. fitsjohn porter's assault against jackson' center and right sending 10,000 troops into

position against this terrain. it would be the final main federal assault on jackson's position. that attack would take place as deep cut and others along this unfinished railroad line. and like so many other occasions on august 30th, the federal attack would break jackson's position. yet again, confederate reinforcements arrived on the scene just in the nick of time. by mid afternoon, jackson needed help. his line was bruised, battered and broken, hit been cracked many times. federal soldiers had gotten into the line and taken absolutely everything he had left to rebuild that defensive position. it was finally time for general longstreet and his wing to enter the fight. as we examine whether or not jackson's defense that we heard about today was a great defense or not, we have to ask several questions. was jackson outnumbered at any

point in time during the bat snl what was the numerical reality on the sneeld was the myth of a mighty federal army attacking some lone, small isolated confederate body of troops accurate? what we can do is look at all these numbers and the detail and we can tell that you at no time was jackson outnumbered on his front in that defensive position. because of the nature of had which general pope's federals continued to attack over and over and over they did so in a piecemeal fashion. jackson's line should have held but was continually broken time and time again. if it was not forced strategically placed reinforcements along the stoney ridge front, jackson may have been pushed out of that defensive position that he had taken on the 28th and 29th. not only on numerous occasions throughout august 29th and 30th did the line outweigh the attackers due to the tactical an strategic plans of pope and the piecemeal attacks ordered thereof, but even with that advantage, jackson's line broke

almost every time as a result of those assaults. either the momentum of the assault broke the line of -- or the attacks made by the federal forces succeeded in finding the gaps and jackson's defense. in both every time. in both cases it required numerous reinforcements to be brought to bear to restore the line. clearly, jackson's defense was not standing like a firm wall. far higher than what a defender should sustain in direct relation to the attacking column. over all the casualies were incredibly high in and a third day in which pope's army was removed from the field. of the 18 top regiments in the confederate army nine of them were from jackson's command. the greatest percent of casualties in jackson's unit, they had the majority of the

greatest percentage of casualties than any other unit on the field. jackson's unit would lose nearly half of the all casualties of the army of northern virginia sustained during the entirety of the second monassis campaign. multily, jackson's army had helped. they were not done with this campaign, however. lee would order jackson to pursue pope and try to cut him off. maneuver, not defense would again be the strategy and tactic of the day. thank you. [ applause ] >> we have time for just one or two questions. anybody have any questions for dan? anybody? bueller, anything? one question in the back here. again, a reminder when you ask a

question, please introduce yourself, tell us where you're from and please make sure you have a question. >> great presentation. i wanted to ask you to elaborate a little bit more on lee's strategic intent on july in 1862. you mentioned that burn's side was moving and lee did not know that at the time. and i submit to you that lee was a strategic defensive move as opposed to an offensive move in preparation for monassis. >> the so question is what does lee know as far as july and august, and how does it influence his strategic planning during that time period. surely, the number one concern for lee in the month of july is mclecken. he's still on the peninsula and his army is massive. lee does become aware of this

new army of virginia under pope that is assemblying and moving. but even at that point in time, lee has no strategic plannes ofn offensive nature or a defensive nature. lee begins to feel that mclecken is less of a credible threat on the virginia peninsula. i'll contend the reason why he sends jackson on an offensive numeev is because of pope's advance. if lee does not go on the defensive to stop pope against the confederate line of supply, confederate line of communication it squeezes lee from two directions. so that aggressive movement by pope moving southward towards that federal supply line, forces in my opinion for lee to go on the offensive.

to stop him from placing him in a position of a classic pincer movement. if he sends jackson there defensively and pope continues to move forward, it gives lee a whole lot less room to maneuver out of a possible pincer movement. we'll continue the presentations from the emerging civil war blog symposium in a moment with general robert e. lee's antietam defense, union general john buferred's gettysburg defense and the siege of vicksburg and confederate defense. >> american history tv is in prime time all week with recent civil war conferences. on tuesday a conference focusing on the civil war leadership.

american history tv in prime time begins at 8:00 p.m. eastern. author kevin pawlak talks about confederate general robert e. lee's positioning at the 1862 battle of antietam and how he used it to take opportunities on the defensive. with 23,000 casualties between the two sides and ended as a union strategic victory as the fighting halted lee's invasion of maryland. this 45-minute talk was part of symposium on the great defenses of civil war hosted by the emerging civil war blog. our next speaker is one of the great emerging voices of the entire field. when i first met kevin pawlak i thought this is one of those guys when is going to be a rock star. in fact, he