people read the battles and leaders argument but grant is admitting she kind of right. you'll have historians that go back and forth. i think the pendulum is swinging towards wallis. >> ladies and gentlemen, ryan quinn. [ applause ] author dan welch talks about stone wall jackson's defensive stand at the battle in virginia which took place in late august 1862. jackson's troops held their ground against repeated assaults by union troops, bying time for the confederates to launch an attack and send the union army into retreat. this 50 minute talk was part of of a symposium on great defenses of the civil war most hosted by

the civil war blog. >> dan welch is a music educator in ohio but for many many years he has had a passionate love affair. he fell in love with the civil war at gettysburg. he studied at the institute. you can find him in the summertime giving tours all over the field. he is also coauthor of the last road north, a guide to the gettysburg campaign which traces both armys from vir vr ginia upo pennsylvania. it's a fantastic book and modelled after the civil war trail system. later we'll hear more. it's a fantastic initiative that helps put people on the field, on the spot. it is my pleasure to introduce to you from the great state of

ohio my friend, dan welch. >> good morning everyone. thank all of you for getting up early this morning and coming out to learn a little more about stone wall jackson. jackson's defensive line had been bruised and battered. they had been subjected to numerous federal attacks and now on the afternoon after august 30th some had nothing left to give in the line's defense. the men of williams starks under the command of stafford and bradley johnson had been engaged in the last 30 minutes and a furious defense of that portion of line. the pressure was part of the assault on jackson's position. over the course of the last 30

minutes as men from new york, michigan, pennsylvania and massachusetts assailed the confederate defenders the boxes of the confederate defenders had run dry. no scouring the dead and dying in search of ammunition but little success. the resistance was physically quieting as the guns slowly silenced. according to an article written in december of 1881 at this moment an irishman yelled above the battle boys give them rocks. all along the line staffords began to hurl large bolders over their head and throw them like so many fast balls from the pitching mound. a soldier in the 24th new york whose unit recalled huge stones began to fall about us. one of them would happen to

strike one or another of us with the very unpleasant effect. some federal soldiers began to return the favor in kind and so ensued one of the more famous episodes. in reality this moment had no overall effect in the end result of the fight. the federal assault had already crescendoed and had arrived to the scene. what the story does illustrate is the fer osty in which their men defended their position, a story we will explore today. as we make our way through the program today we will be examining several key factors during the fight. first and foremost we'll examine the that lead at second and what we'll come to find as we examine those that the word defense will little be found in the writings of stone wall jackson, robert e.

lee and many other leaders associated with this campaign. as we make our way to the fields and plains we'll explore the numerous tactical moments that comprised on august 30th, 1862. we'll examine how well they did in the defensive line all those years ago. so we need to begin a little further before that and take us back to the fight. the guns had grown silent. thousands upon thousands of soldiers laid dead or wounded from the fighting over the last month. the new commander in the field had provided the capital of the confederacy more breathing room the threat was far from over and had come at an enormous cost. the threat for the confederacy came on three fronts following that. the massive army was still on

the virginia peninsula. troops under the command were appearing along the river in the fredericksburg area and a new federal army, the army of virginia under the newly arrived john pope was moving southward and eastward from the northern part of the state. as the month of july pushed ever closer towards august general lee began to gain greater confidence than at least one of these armys no longer pose add serious threat. seeking an opportunity to exploit and regain the military initiative, a hallmark lee felt that the massive army no longer posed a threat to richmond and he began to transfer troops to the virginia paeidmont. he will we enforce jackson with units whose numbers would soar

to approximately 25,000 men. it would be the beginning of lee's first campaign that was solely his and all indications pointed that this one would be one of an offense, not dae fencifenc -- a defensive in nature. well, for jefferson it was something that he termed, a coin he named offensive, defensive. davis is much preferred the offensive. it can be evidenced on the strategic and tactical levels there you the most recent battles around richmond. for davis he believed that it was the use of the thstrategic gain confederate war aims.

it is best expressed when he wrote in march of 1862 the advantage of selecting the time and place of attack was too apparent to have been overlooked. lee wholeheartedly concurred particularly once he took the field. the only way to relieve richmond and restore control of virginia was to go on this strategic offensive. during this time period lee could little focus on anything else other than his 100,000 man army still ton peninsula including john pope and the army of virginia. setting upon a campaign against pope was still not on lee's horizon for was a tactical defense by stone wall jackson. as he remained focused it was pope's advance that would draw lee's attention and the possibility of a new campaign.

the arm commander had advanced his army far enough south but he had also sent a probe against the confederate supply line. the movement and probe made matters. if he advanced from the north his army would be caught between a classic movement. the removal of the independent corp. lead to believe that his force or pope's force would be reenforced for this movement. despite the sensitive strategic situation on july 25th, 1862 after having already moved lee expressed for the first time any sense of the direction of this new impending campaign. he wrote to jackson that he was extremely anxious to send him reenforcements to suppress pope. it is hardly use today describe.

two days later lee ordered in louisiana brigade to reenforce jackson hoping to double jackson's size. until you strike your blow and be prepared to return to me when done. i will endove vor until this is over if rapidly executed. clearly this next campaign was to be won of an offensive nature. lee's hope far quick offensive and then return to his army was quickly dashed. jackson was slow, careful and cautious during this time period. he had heard of federal forces contemplating which if true posed a serious threat to richmond and the line of communications. he was also struggling as he found a way to turn the position

north of the river. lee concurred to avoid frontal assaults to use, maneuver and get pope out of his strong position and bring him out and participate in one of the class ic assaults and hopefully victories. lee receive add dispatch suggesting he would attack the vanguard of pope's army as they concentrated. lee approved of the plan and bolstered it by moving 15 miles to hanover. they reported him and pope correctly identified culpepper as their destination and sent the corp. to meet them. the fight that ensued was august 9th. it was become known as the battle at cedar mountain. his men fought aggressively. the victory was only due to the

inability to march sufficiently to the support of union soldiers engaged on the field. at the same time the guns were blazing general lee decided it had reach add stalemate and it needed to be broken immediately. therefore lee would send him north to assist in the matter. by august 14th five days after the conclusion of cedar mountain he decided to leave where he had been in charge and commanding the new effort. he would take the field himself. by the time that lee took the field it is clear he had selected stone wall jackson's to be the leading force in a turning movement against pope. he sought to maneuver him out in the open on ground that would favor the confederate army. they met on august 24th. lee recalled the meeting and the

outline in june of 1863 when he filed his second report. he said in purr sunts to the plan of operations directed upon he was instructed to move around the enemy's right so as to trielk the railroad. jackson wrote in his report of the campaign quote pursuing the instructions i left jeffersonton to throw my command between the army of general pope and to break up railroad communications with the federal capital. one clear issue with these reports, nothing jug zested what he would do. so far it had been one of strategy and tactics. removing it an offensive strategy.

bringing him out, again, offensive tactics. what should he do next or should he switch to defensive operations? as they noted i think we'll hear a lot from these next several presentations as we did last evening as well. as his to y'alls they said lee did not make sure it was basically a raid and he was not to get -- or else jackson violated the spirit of your constructions. lee may have miscalculated before he arrived on the scene. perhaps he under estimated pope cease ability in the area and overist mated his to join with

the rest of the confederate army. by august 25th however following the meeting with lee jackson would spend the remainder of august 24th, the day before preparing for those objectives to cut the federal communication and supply line. jackson and his command movements war classic example of control and execution of army logistics. jackson's had covered 25 miles with 23,000 men in the first 14 hours on august 25th. the next day he covered the same distance in 14 hours again and reached the station on the orange and alexandria railroad. pope's rear and the railroad line behind it had been cut but now what? returning to historian he said in the absence of convincing evidence to the krcontrary he

expected it of 23,000 men to engage in serious fighting with the vastly superior numbers pope might brink against but it is doubtful the confederate commander wanted to initiate a major battle in the manassas area that would commit the entire army of northern virginia. although there is no extant record of any understanding reached by jackson on the ultimate objective of the campaign, on august 30th lee would write bluntly to davis, my desire has been to achieve success by maneuver.

jackson may be unclear of his role following the cutting of the orange and alexandria railroad line, the supply line and communication line to pope, his army and the federal capital. in addition, lee hopes that no major battle will be fought in manassas. but if we read a little further between the lines, lee noted that he would hope that jackson would attack if and only if it would cause serious injury to pope's army and give the confederates a clear victory. as the events begin to pan out over the next several days, we'll be able to determine if any attack jackson made is one that would demonstrate a clear cut advantage and a confederate victory or that he should have waited. by noon on august 27th, jackson accomplished the objective. he had a southern flank protected. he sent the calgary towards washington sweeping the enemy away from the northern flank and he sat on the main federal communication route at manassas junction. further, jackson and his men cap toured an immense amount of supplies.

he had the main road to gainesville situate sod they could withdraw the thorough fair gap should it become necessary. the gap that jackson used to reach his current position and where robert e. lee with longstreet and his wing were marching towards with every passing moment. conversely, however, despite jackson being quite well situated on august 27th, jackson was also beginning to lose his offensive capabilities with the position he had placed his command in. almost being forced to take a defensive posture in the coming hours. why? well, first, his proximity to washington, d.c., meant that more reinforcements could be sent from the federal capitol to his position quickly and at any moment. there were two corps in the federal army, mcdowell and siegel's corps marching northward. jackson had nothing to protect that retreat route to lee and thorough fair gap and as another

historian noted, his men had become engaged in an orgy of plunder. many were drunk and the fighting effectiveness of all had been impaired at least temporarily. jackson's guys can't march in a straight line let alone load in five steps and fire. major w. roy mason recalls he said jackson's first order is to knock out the heads of hundreds of barrels of whiskey, wine and brandy. i shall never forget the scene. spirits ran like water through the sands of manassas and soldiers on their hands and knees drank it from the ground. a sight to be held. by the evening of august 27th, jackson had each of his divisions marching towards a temporary position and it appears that jackson was not only unsure of his next move but where he wanted to make it. as august 28th would dawn and jackson accomplished that objective that lee had laid out

at that plan between jackson, longstreet, stewart and himself days earlier, general longstreet's four divisions began their march. on august 26th, they covered 14 miles in that objective. but the following day on august 27th, longstreet's column had only reached six miles. lee who traveled with longstreet allowed the same slowing pace of six miles to occur on the 28th. jackson was to make any move he would need the support of longstreet and longstreet's plotting was taking a lot longer than jackson had anticipated or hoped. by the late morning, longstreet's leading brigades approached the choke point at thoroughfare gap and stonewall jackson received good news on two fronts. a courier reported longstreet's success at thorough fair gap

suggesting that old pete would connect with jackson's right early the next day. as longstreet's men are plotting towards thoroughfare gap that choke point, and they're plotting along slowly, what is going on on jackson's front? on the 28th? during the post dawn hours of august 28th, jackson finally chosen a position to take in the area in which he had been operating. he decided to move his scattered divisions into a concentrated position just west of the warrington turnpike. jackson sent curriers to the divisions to have them move towards this new position. jackson's position that he decided to take was one that anyone would expect of the commander. jackson's line covered the road from haymarket to sudly springs. if lee was blocked at thoroughfair gap, he could take an alternate route to jackson. on his immediate front, the position was defensively strong, running along a moderately high ridge, part and i reinforce this, part of which included the em bankments of an unfinished

railroad and the warrenton turn tike f things went bad for jackson, he had the sudly springs road that led to aldy gap. thus, jackson's true position was not, not the railroad cut you see pictured here as popular history conveys. it must take a moment at this point in time to give a lot of credit to my friend and colleague rob orison. fwz a little over a month ago i decided to get some photographs for this presentation this morning and i think temperatures reached over 100 degrees that day as we trudged the second manassas battlefield. he wanted to mike sure these were included in the presentation. if you see rob, thank him for great photographs. so jackson's true position is not the position you see pictured on the right. this unfinished railroad embankment. contrary to the conception, jackson's troop did not use that landmark as a trench for

protection. in most cases, it was held only by a skirmish line with the main battle line to the rear of the cut or grade as the terrain required. pictures were posted to provide advance warning of any approaching federals. if we were to get inside of jackson's mind or get in some of the military theorist that's chris white talked about last night, a true strong defensive position would be to order the men into this cut. it is a fortified position but jackson is not deploying his men on august 28th in the cut. skirmishes are nearby. those early warning systems for the main body of the army. but jackson's men are not taking a position in the cut. jackson's line then was on stoney hill or stoney ridge depending on who you read and which map you look at. it is a strong position. but it is not invulnerable.

jackson's flanks are particularly weak. on his left, the railroad line was generally lower and less protected by woods. on the right of the line, page lane led right into the right flank. additional lishgs the heavy wooded fronts along the left and center of the line voided the use of effective artillery for his position. the unfinished railroad did not furnish a consistent line in which to align troops and further some of the cuts were too deep, over 15 feet down, while others passed through open fields or were level with the ground. this position would further solidify. after the days events of august 28th. but it's worth pausing that for the first time in the campaign jackson has switched strategic and tactical pursuits from the offensive to the defensive as he is taking this position. later on august 28th, the aggressive jackson, however, could not remain idle on the defensive for long. after an ordering his divisions to approach this new position,

jackson throughout the day sought to attack not to defend. his first opportunity that morning did not pan out and jackson had his commanders continue to look for opportunities to exploit throughout the day. later in the day as general lee and longstreet trudged and finally arrived at thoroughfare gap and when jackson received word of their arrival feeling relieved that lee and longstreet were in the vicinity, went to take a nap. now sleeping, his staff received word from general stewart's scouts that rufus king was marching eastward. jackson's staff woke him and informed him of the intelligence. hunter holmes mcguire remembered the moment, general jackson sprang up and moved rapidly towards his horse, buckling on his sword as he moved and urging greatest speed around him, directing to attack the enemy. jackson would say, gentlemen, bring out your men.

they would opt fight for jackson with part of the command. 4:30 p.m. he ordered them to most batteries. the second virginia and second wisconsin would engage for nearly 15 minutes before reinforcements arrived. jackson bringing reinforcements, georgians himself would be funneled in from the federal side as well. 30 minutes into the fight, general yule got the rest of his men in the attack. by 8:00 p.m., jackson's command finally achieved a superiority in numbers along the line and he pushed the assault forward to finally clear the front. the losses of this engagement were heavy for jackson's command, losing 1,250 men in the engage ment of which his own brigade, the old stonewall brigade had suffered 340 casualties of the 800 they took into combat that afternoon. why jackson chose to attack this lone federal division is interesting.

particularly as we already established that jock son was concentrating his divisions into a strong defensive position. if you are taking a strong defensive position, why are you going on to the offensive and the assault? he could not have expected any direct support any time soon. jackson must believe that a victory was at hand against this division and that it would have a significant impact on the campaign. if anything, however, jackson had just committed the army of northern virginia to battle before they had become unified. at the same time, he's going to limit general lee's opportunity to maneuver in this theater. returning back to historian joseph harsh. harsh would lament this. he said "victory would come if at all through bloody combat and from tactical blunders by the enemy. there would be no heavy victory from easy fighting."

by 10:00 p.m. august 28th, general pope received news of the fight that took place at his headquarters in centreville. the news that pope heard was that jackson was discovered in the vicinity of groveton and sudly springs and engaged. he subsequently drafted orders for august 29th based upon the intelligence. his orders were drafted based upon the belief that kings and rick et's division that's had been involved in the fight at brawner farm would be blocking jackson's escape route to the west and preventing any junction between lee, longstreet and jackson. siegel's corps was already in position on henry house hill and thus pope would order him to attack the enemy vigorously the next morning, the largest body of infantry soldiers of the army to jackson's position. pope would continue to dictate his orders for the following day.

he would order major general philip carney at centreville to march the diversion of the third carp of the army to the battlefield at 1:00 a.m. and continue forward until he made contact with jackson's pickets and then attack him at dawn. he received the orders at 11:00 p.m. on august 28th. a staff officer delivering the orders to him recalled his reaction. "tell general pope to go to hell. we won't march before morning." he directed him to follow carney at 3:00 a.m. pope would order jesse reno on bull run from the road to manassas junction to centerville to particular to that handle and then turn west. upon reaching the battlefield, these forces were to join the attack against jackson. pope then ordered major general john porter whose fifth corps was at bris tow station to march to centerville and then to the battlefield. pope believed he had jackson boxed in.

as pope prepares his orders and his men to go into the assault, what was the final position that jackson had taken in the area? what exactly did it entail and how were his men laid out? during the predawn hours of august 29th, jackson's position would be firmed up as his divisions deployed to the rear of the unfinished railroad line. major general ambrose hill's division held the left with six brigades in two lines of battle upon stoney ridge. left flank rested near sudly mill, not far from sudly church pictured here. brigadier general maxie a rocky wooden knoll about 60 yards behind the railroad cut on the left flank of ap hill's division and 1,000 yards southwest of where this photograph was taken. colonel samuel mcgowen recalled left jackson's line that day, he said "this position was slightly an advance of the general line and was considered important because of the sudly road forward which it commanded.

our line made an on tus angle pointing toward the enemy, one side of which ran nearly parallel with the railroad cut and the other along the fence bordering the cleared field on our left." brigadier general fits lee's brigade moved further to the left and covered sudly ford and prevenltsed the generals from getting into the rear as they had done in 1861. as jackson moved to the certainty of his position was the groveton sudly road. two brigades of yule's division now commanded by lawton after the grievous wound of the night before would deploy in the center of the line astride this road pictured here. brigadier general early would take his brigade and the louisiana brigade to the extreme right of jackson's battle line and anchored their flank on the warrenton turnpike. they deployed immediately west

of and parallel to page glen just west of the brawner farm battlefield. early also deployed two regimens of infantry on the south side of the pike to screen any approaching federals in that sector. artillery would be deployed along the heights of stoney ridge and excellent position in which to support jackson's infantry. on the morning of august 29th, as siegel's men advanced towards jackson's position trying to uphold pope's orders, they strugled to maintain a division or even brigade front. the problem developed as a result of pope's and thus siegel's intelligence on jackson's position, siegel's corps fanned out because it was attempting to find jackson's position, no one seemed to know exactly where jackson was in the vicinity. and the division a large gap would gap two develop between the brigade on the leftst advancing front and colonel alex ander on the right.

as the advance against the position, the brigade slowed directly to a halt. two confederate bat under the commands opened on the right of the advance. at the same time, they received word of troops on the right and rear and he halted his command. those troops would later turn out to be general carney's division. this would be the first attack on jackson's line and it was an attack that broke down quickly by the federals advancing to his position. the division was supposed to maintain the line with robert millroy's brigade loevent who was supposed to connect with brigadier general robert shanks further to the left. as the advance went forward, they broke the connection to millroy who then broke their connection with shank. meanwhile, the brigade advanced at a rapid rate pulling far ahead of rest of the line and engage the the con fed rats first.

the brigade and brigadier general maxie greg, hearing the fight to his right, general millroy would send two regimens to assist. of the fight between millroy and the south carolinians and georgians who had gotten in on the action, an ohioan recalled of the fight, we will not advanced more than two rods into the woods when a terrible volley was poured in upon us from the front and from behind the railroad imbankment mowing our men down like grass. the attacks would end near 10:00 a.m. on the morning of the 29th and had not altered the tactical situation on the field at all. jackson's line had held. and on several occasions, jackson's units went on the offensive following these federal charges. but siegel would not give up. with the arrive afl carney's division on hill's already battered left, general sherz would or the the brigades to renew the assault. the blessing of the 74th pennsylvania recalled this renewed attack. that point a heavy shower of great shot and canister pouring into us we withdrew to the railroad dam.

general sherz was under the belief that carney would advance with him but he failed to do so. as we began to explore these early attacks against jackson's defensive line at second manassas, one of the things that i hope is beginning to stick out about the federal plan is that each and every time these units going in are going in on their own hook. jackson's line in the entirety has yet to be pressed to the full federal advantage in numbers. but why had general carney failed to advance? frans siegel's assaults, from the sherz brigade and millroy and shafrpg had a significant impact on the left of jackson's line, especially ap hill's front. several of the attacks had even broken through jackson's defense. for example, the 82 nld ohio detached by millroy to assist to the right had temporarily broken jackson's line in an area known as the dump.

both participants in the morning attacks on august 29th and historians since contend that had carney assisted, had he followed up and supported siegel's advance that jackson may have been pushed out of his defensive position. was jackson's line a good defensive stand after all? the general on the left here reported "several orders were stoent him to advance but did he not move until after the troops on his left had been forced back." while general sherz pictured on the rightst screen noted i'm persuaded by that general carney had done at that moment what he did so gallantly late in the afternoon that is to say if he had thrown his column upon the enemy's flanks we might have succeeded in destroying the enemy's left wing. historians feel hit clearly been within the realm of possibilities that morning. however, general carney after getting a late start, struggled to get his troops into combat on

a timely basis. will green conjectures that carney possibly indulged in a bitter grudge that he nurtured against franz siegel. perhaps we'll never know. we'll never know carney's exact reasons for not advancing that morning. what we do know, however, is that lack of the forward movement in conjunction with the support of siegel's men had allowed jackson's line to defeat those piecemeal attacks. it is also left jackson's defense untested against equal or higher numbers numerically. by the afternoon of august 29th, general pope had arrived on the field to further coordinate the offensive attacks against jackson's line. pope's further orders for the day were continued frontal assaults against jackson's line. these were all to serve as a diversion until general porter arrived on the right and rear. pope would not yield to the notion that longstreet and lee had arrived to the battlefield and now occupied the very front

that porter was supposed to push through to get to jackson. despite pope's delusional miscalculation regarding port er's -- further assaults tested just how strong jackson's defensive line really was. as midday approached, pope ordered divisions to move forward to replace the battered units from the morning assaults against the confederate left. as sherz pulled out, some of hard fought gains, pieces of ground along that railroad were quickly occupied by edward thomas' georgians. thomas, however had, made a tactical mistake in the redeployment. he left 125 yard gap between his line and the line of great south carolinians to his left. not only would jackson's line be test depend with larger federal assaults, it would teeter on the verge of collapse due to thomas' mistake. shortly before 3:00 p.m., grover's brigade of hooker's division moved out as part of the attack against jackson. expecting an order for his brigade to attack, grover rode ahead an examined the terrain of the confederate position where

he was to assault. "after rising the hill under which my command lay an open field was entered". and from one edge of it gradually fell off in a slope to a valley through which ran a railroad embankment. the forest continued and the heights behind were held by the enemy in force and was supported by artillery. after grover returned from his reconnaissance, he received the order to advance at 3:00 p.m. hooker ordered him to advance in line of battle over this ground, pass the embank ment and enter the woods beyond and hold it. grover would lead the at advance at 3:15 p.m. general millroy suggested to grover after the experience that morning to go to the right and use the bayonet. two men went into two lines -- before moving forward, grover explained to the men to fire one volley then then rely upon the bayonet. the brigade would veer to the right just as millroy suggested trying to avoid the open ground

in the front as well as maintain contact with carney's brigade to the right. grover was under the impression that carney would advance with his man, an impression that was sorely wrong. grover's direction of march, however, brought the brigade directly into the breech between thomas' georgians and maxie greg's south carolinians. yet again for the second time on august 29th, jackson's line had been pierced. but also yet again, confederate reinforcements would be sent forward to seal the gap and expel the federals from their new foothold. later on the afternoon of august 29th, following grover's attack as they had been defeated, another confederate -- union brigade was sent forward. this brigade was under the command of general novel. his before he gad would go into action further to the left of grover's brigade and would meet with many of the same results that the previous federal brigades that had charged had

received throughout the day from jackson's line. following the attack that day and other attacks made by nelson taylor, hooker would throw no further units into this fight. no further units into this fight. the confederates time after time would seal the breeches and reinforcements would arrive just in time. pope would consolidate the army's position and clarify the early orders to positively attack jackson's right flank. at the same point in time, he ordered general carney to go ahead and assault the left of jackson's line, a position that had been battered time and time again throughout the day. as carney prepared to attack along his front, a.p. hill sent jackson a message via one of his staff officers henry douglas apprise him of the situation on the left of jackson's defense. and ammunition was low and hill's troops were weary and hill questioned his ability to

hold against another assault. douglas wrote that when he gave this news to jackson that jackson seemed to deepen the shadow on his face, silence the group about limb was oppressive. jackson told the currier to return to general hill with the following message, "tell him if they attack again he must beat them." not waiting for the mess tooth message to deliver, jackson got up on his horse and road in search of hill. when he rode to hill, he said general, your men have done nobly. if you are attacked again, you will the beat the enemy back. as jackson and hill discussed the situation, hill replied, quote, here comes the next attack. and he road away. distance after hill, i'll expect you to beat them. the next attack that was making the way towards hill's line was that of general carney's men, 2700 men from ten regiments

spread across three brigades. i was 5:00 p.m. leaving carney's diversion was john c. robinson's brigade. general kearny rode up to hayes and yelled, "i want you to drive those people out of the woods that are annoying hooker. bring your regimen along with me and i'll show you where i want to put you in." hayes' men were piling over the bank in disorder. kearny would stead yes the men to strike them on the flank in front. i'll support you handsomely. meanwhile, they crossed the railroad and went tloest, they exposed the battle line to the railroad cut and angled perfectly to strike hill's exposed flank. yet again, the federals succeeded in cracking jackson's line but further reinforcements would be sent to seal the breech. by 5:15 p.m., kerney's assault moves forward, he's looking for any and all available

reinforcements to send forward, something he didn't do earlier in the day. he would find ledgers, 700 men in all, these men would go forward with the remnants of taylor's men that kearny had been able to rally. general kearny would ride up to stevens, the divisional commander in regards to his brigade and ask will these men fight? stephen's replied, by god, general kearny, these are my round heads referring to the 100th pennsylvania volunteers. feeling secure in his selection of reinforcements, kearny said that this is your line of advance and sweep everything before you, look out to your left, i'll take care of your right. like the previous ones that ended in a federal repulse, jackson's line had held.

on jackson's left, the brigade completely emptied the cartridge boxes and lost fully half its men while the rest of the light division suffered severely as well. when jackson heard the news, a rare smile came across his face. tell him, i knew he would do it said jackson. thus on august 29th, had lee, jackson launched and had they participated in offensive actions on the plains of manassas or institute aid strong defense, on numerous occasions throughout the day, jackson's line was severely tested and at times broken. additionally, because i had line had bent and broken, it offered required jackson's particularly a.p. hill's brigades to go on the offensive to restore their line. jackson's defense necessitated a

strong offensive in its execution. at the same time, lee on the field and late morningst 29th with longstreet strongly desired to go on the attack. lee's order for an attack was riding high. it took a combination of the aggressive jackson and the even handed longstreet to cooley's desire to switch from a defensive posture to an offensive action. but the fighting at manassas was not over. plans would begin to develop on both sides for the following day. pope wanted to attack yet again. but for lee, longstreet and jackson, sthout that no attack would come from pope on august 30th. just in case that no attack came, lee was beginning to prepare for other options. by 3:00, on august 30th, however, that attack did come. fitsjohn porter's assault against jackson' center and right sending 10,000 troops into position against this terrain. it would be the final main federal assault on jackson's position.

that attack would take place as deep cut and others along this unfinished railroad line. and like so many other occasions on august 30th, the federal attack would break jackson's position. yet again, confederate reinforcements arrived on the scene just in the nick of time. by mid afternoon, jackson needed help. his line was bruised, battered and broken, hit been cracked many times. federal soldiers had gotten into the line and taken absolutely everything he had left to rebuild that defensive position. it was finally time for general longstreet and his wing to enter the fight. as we examine whether or not jackson's defense that we heard about today was a great defense or not, we have to ask several questions. was jackson outnumbered at any point in time during the battle,

what was the numerical reality on the field, was the myth of a mighty federal army attacking some lone, small isolated confederate body of troops accurate? what we can do is look at all these numbers and the detail and we can tell that you at no time was jackson outnumbered on his front in that defensive position. because of the nature of had which general pope's federals continued to attack over and over and over they did so in a piecemeal fashion. jackson's line should have held but was continually broken time and time again. if it was not forced strategically placed reinforcements along the stoney ridge front, jackson may have been pushed out of that defensive position that he had taken on the 28th and 29th. not only on numerous occasions throughout august 29th and 30th did the line outweigh the attackers due to the tactical an strategic plans of pope and the piecemeal attacks ordered thereof, but even with that advantage, jackson's line broke almost every time as a result of those assaults. either the momentum of the assault broke the line of -- or the attacks made by the federal forces succeeded in finding the gaps and jackson's defense.

in both cases, it required numerous reinforcements to be brought to bear. clearly jackson's defense was not standing like a stone wall. the greatest percent of casualties in jackson's unit, they had the majority of the greatest percentage of casualties than any other unit on the field. jackson's unit would lose nearly

4,518 men over those three days, nearly half of the all casualties of the army of northern virginia sustained during the entirety of the second monassis campaign. jackson's army had helped. they were not done with this campaign, however. lee would order jackson to pursue pope and try to cut him off. maneuver, not defense would again be the strategy and tactic of the day. thank you. [ applause ] >> we have time for just one or two questions. anybody have any questions for dan? anybody? bueller, anything? one question in the back here. again, a reminder when you ask a question, please introduce yourself, tell us where you're from and please make sure you have a question. >> great presentation. i wanted to ask you to elaborate

a little bit more on lee's strategic intent on july in 1862. you mentioned that burn's side was moving and lee did not know that at the time. and i submit to you that lee was a strategic defensive move as opposed to an offensive move in preparation for man nas sis. >> the so question is what does lee know as far as july and august, and how does it influence his strategic planning during that time period. surely, the number one concern for lee in the month of july is mclecken. he's still on the peninsula and his army is massive. lee does become aware of this new army of virginia under pope that is assembling and moving.

but even at that point in time, lee has no strategic plans of an offensive nature or a defensive nature. lee begins to feel that mclecken is less of a credible threat on the virginia peninsula. i'll contend the reason why he sends jackson on an offensive maneuver is because of pope's advance toward the confederate capital. if lee does not go on the defensive to stop pope against the confederate line of supply, confederate line of communication it squeezes lee from two directions. so that aggressive movement by pope moving southward towards that federal supply line, forces in my opinion for lee to go on the offensive. to stop him from placing him in a position of a classic pincer movement. if he sends jackson there defensively and pope continues to move forward, it gives lee a whole lot less room to maneuver out of a possible pincer movement.

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>> what's different about this problem we have is how pervasive it is. it is absolutely everywhere. >> and friday, a conversation with supreme court justice i lay th -- elena kagan. >> that means the judiciary has an important role to play in policing the other branches. that can make the judiciary an unpopular set of people when they say to a governor or president or congress, no, you can't do that, because it's just not within your constitutional powers.