american history tv on c-span 3 focuses on the civil war all week. at 8:00 p.m. eastern tonight, a seminar on civil war leadership. with talks about confederate general robert e. lee and ulysses s. grant. landmark cases returns live next february on c-span. join us to hear more stories of the people who sparked groundbreaking cases and the justices and lawyers who were key to the supreme court's review. up next on american history tv on c-span 3, author dan welch on confederate general stone wall jackson and the second battle of manassas in virginia. in that battle, the confederate general earned the moniker stonewall. this is 50 minutes. >> dan welch is a music educator in ohio. but for many, many years he's

had a deep passionate love affair with the civil war as many of us have had and he fell in love with the civil war at gettysburg. so much so that eventually he studied at the gettysburg institute and has become a ranger at gettysburg national battlefield park where you can find him in the summertime giving tours all over the field. he's also co-author with rob orson of the emerging civil war series book "the last road north, a guide to the gettysburg campaign," which traces the movements of both armies from virginia up into pennsylvania and then follows their retreat route after gettysburg. it's a fantastic book. and it's modeled after the civil war trail system. later today, we'll hear a little bit more about the civil war trails. it's a fantastic initiative. that helps put people on the field, on the spot where great events happened. without further ado, it is my delightful pleasure to introduce to you from the great state of ohio, my friend dan welch. [ applause ] >> good morning, everyone. before we get started this

morning, i'd like to take a moment to thank chris mackowski and chris white and all of my colleagues at emerging civil war and all of you for getting up so early this morning and coming out to learn a little bit more about stonewall jackson. and second manassas. jackson's defensive line had been bruised and battered. they had been subjected to numerous federal attacks throughout august 29th and now on the afternoon of august 30th, some of jackson's units literally had nothing left to give in the lines defense. along jackson's right the men of brigadier general william starks brigade, now under the command of colonel leroy stafford and colonel bradley johnson, had been engaged for the last 30 minutes in a furious defense of that portion of the line. the immense pressure was part of fitsjohn porter's assault on jackson's position. over the course of the last 30 minutes as men from new york, michigan, pennsylvania, and massachusetts assailed the confederate defenders the cartridge boxes of the

confederate defenders had run dry. numerous confederates left the fight in droves scouring the dead and dying in search of ammunition but with little success. the stout resistance along the railroad embankment was physically quieting as the guns slowly silenced. according to an article in the "philadelphia weekly times" written in december of 1881, at this moment an irishman in stafford's brigade yelled above the battle, "boys, give them rocks." all along the line, stafford and johnson's regimens started to hurl large bolders over their head and grab smaller rocks and throw them, like so many fastballs from the pitching mound. a soldier in the 24th new york whose unit was on the front line against that railroad embankment recalled "huge stones began to fall about us and then one of them would happen to strike one or another of us with the very unpleasant effect." some federal solar judges began to return the favor in kind.

and so ensued one of the more famous episodes of stonewall jackson's defense at second manassas. in reality, this moment had no overall effect in the end result of the fight. the federal assault had risen and reinforcements had arrived to the scrape. but what the story does instraight, however, is the fewerosity in which jack son's men deend iffed their position. a story that we will explore today. as we make our way through the program today, we're going to be examining several key factors to jackson's defense during the fight at second manassas. first and foremost, we're going to examine some of the strategic events that led to jackson's defense at second manassas. and what we're going to come to find as we examine those strategic defenses is the word "defense" will little be found in the writings of stonewall jackson, robert e. lee, and many other confederate leaders associated with this campaign. as we finally make our way to the fields and plains of first bull run and second bull run,

we'll explore the numerous tactical moments that compromise jackson's defense on august 29th and august 30th, 1862. and lastly, we'll examine just how well jackson did in this defensive line all those years ago. so we need to begin a little further before second manassas and take us back to the fight at malvern hill. although the new commander in the field robert e. lee provided the capital the confederacy more breathing room the threat was far from over. and had come at an enormous cost. the threat for the confederacy in the state of virginia came on three fronts following malvern hill. george b. mcclellan's massive army was still on the virginia peninsula, albeit further away from richmond. troops under the command of ambrose burnside were appearing

along the raphanic river in the fredericksburg area and a new army, the army of virginia under the newly arrived officer john pope, was moving southward and eastward from the northern part of the state. as the month of july pushed ever closer towards august, general lee began to gain greater confidence that at least one of these armies no longer posed a serious threat to the confederate capital. seeking an opportunity to exploit and regain the military initiative, a hallmark of lee's command style, lee felt that general mcclellan and his massive army no longer posed a threat to richmond. and, with that belief, he began to transfer troops to the virginia piedmont. first, he sent jackson with two divisions of soldiers to gordonsville and eventually he would reinforce jackson with units whose numbers would soar to approximately 25,000 men. this would be the beginning of lee's first campaign that was solely his. and all indications pointed to

the -- that this one would be one of an offense, an offense, not a defensive in nature. what was lee's as well as confederate president confederate jefferson davis' strategy for the confederacy, in the summer of 1862? well, for jefferson davis, his view of the confederate's grand strategy was something that he termed, a coin that he phrased offensive/defensive. of those two words within davis' strategy, however, davis as well as lee much preferred the offensive. this can be evidenced by the use of the offensive on both the strategic and tactical levels from fort sumpter summer of 1861 to the most recent battles around richmond. for davis, although there were situation that's dictated a defensive posture, he believed that was the use of the strategic and tactical offense that was the key to gain confederate war aims. thus davis' belief in the offensive strategy and the tactical application is best expressed when he wrote in march of 1862 "the advantage of selecting the time and place of

attack was too apparent to have been overlooked." lee wholeheartedly conquered, concurred, particularly once he took the field, following general johnson's wounding. the only way to relieve richmond and restore control of virginia was to go on the strategic offensive. during this immediate post-malvern hill time period, lee could little focus on anything else other than general mcclellan's 100,000 man army still on the peninsula, including john pope and the army of virginia. setting upon a campaign against pope was still not on lee's horizon, nor was a tactical defense by stonewall jackson. now as lee remained focused on mcclellan, it was pope's advance of a portion of the new army of virginia that would draw lee's attention and the possibility of a new campaign not against mcclellan but pope. the army of virginia commander had not only advanced his army far enough south to be within

the theater of operations but he also sent a probe against the confederate supply line. the movement and probe made matters worse for lee. if hope advanced on the confederate capital from the north, his army would be caught between a classic pins eshg movement. at the same point in time, the removal of bernside's corps from north carolina led lee to believe that either mcclellan's force or pope's force would be reinforced for this movement. despite the sensitive strategic situation, on july 25th, 1862, after already having moved jackson and his two divisions, lee expressed for the first time any sense of the direction of the new impending campaign. he wrote to jackson he was "extremely anxious" to send him reinforcements to "suppress" pope. "suppress" is hardly a word used to describe defensive strategy or tactics. two days later, july 27th, lee ordered ap hills division in louisiana to reinforce jackson hoping to double jackson's size.

lee counseled jackson "cache your troops as much as possible until you strike your blow and be prepared to return to me when done." i will endeavor do keep general mcclellan quiet until this is over if rapidly executed. clearly this next campaign for jackson was to be one of an offensive nature. lee's hope for a quick offensive action by jackson against pope in the army of virginia and the return to his army was quickly dashed. jackson was slow, careful, and cautious during this time period. he had heard of federal forces concentrating in fredericksburg which if true posed a serious threat to richmond and the line of communications with the confederate capital. he was also struggling, as he told lee, to find a way to turn pope's position north of the rapiddan river. lee concurred with jackson's assessment to avoid frontal assaults against the position to

use maneuver to get pope out of his strong position, bring him out into an open field and participate in then one of the classic assaults and hopefully victories. on august 8th, lee received a dispatch from jackson dated the previous day suggesting that he would attack the vanguard of pope's army as they concentrated at culpepper. they moved the division 15 miles to hanover. where they could protect jackson's flank. pope's scouts reported jackson crossing the rapidan and pope correctly identified culpepper as the destination and thus sent bank's corps to meet them. the fight that ensued was august 9th. it was become known as the battle at cedar mountain. jackson's men fought aggressively but it was a poorly managed affair as one historian wrote. and the victory was only due to the inability of the franc segal's first corps of the army of virginia to march efficiently

to the support of union soldiers engaged on the field. at the same time, the guns were blazing at cedar mountain, general lee decided that his theater of operations had reached a stalemate and that stalemate needed to be broken immediately. therefore, lee would send general longstreet north to assist in the matter. and by august 14th, five days after the conclusion of cedar mountain, general lee decided to leave richmond, virginia, where he had been in charge and commanding this new effort. and he would take the field himself. by the time that lee took the field, it is clear that he had selected stonewall jackson's wing to be the leading force in his grand strategy of a turning movement against pope. lee sought to maneuver pope out of his strong position and then attack him out in the open on ground that would favor the confederate army. lee met with jackson longstreet and stewart on august 24th. lee recalled the meeting in the outline of his plan for the coming days in june of 1863 when he filed the report. on the second manassas campaign.

he said, quote, the actions determined on, jackson was directed on the 25th to cross above water lou and move around the enemy's right so as to strike the orange and alexandria railroad in his rear. jackson wrote in his april 1863 report, "pursuing the instructions of the commanding general, i left jeffersonton on the morning of 25th to throw my command between washington city and the army of general pope and to break up his railroad communications, with the confederate capital." oh, excuse me, federal capital. one clear issue with these reports, there was nothing mentioned about what jackson should do after cutting that railroad. so far this campaign had been one of an offense in both strategy and tactics. maneuvering pope out of his strong position, an offensive strategy. bringing him out into a piece of ground that would favor a confederate assault, again, offensive tactics. would or should jackson remain with this strategy that has

already been set by lee after he cuts that railroad line? what should he do next? or should he switch to defensive operations? as historian joseph harsh noted, i think we'll hear a lot from dzhokhar, over these next several presentations today as we did last evening as well with dr. jordan. as historian joe harsh noted, he said "either lee did not make clear to jackson this operation was basically a raid and that he was not to get mired in serious fighting with the enemy at manassas, or else jackson violated the spirit of his instructions." the former is more likely the case. lee may have miscalculated before he arrived on the scene. perhaps, perhaps he underestimated pope's ability to concentrate the federal army in the vicinity of manassas and overestimated his own ability to join jackson in a timely fashion. by august 25th, however, following the meeting with lee, jackson would spend the

remainder of august 24th the day before, preparing for those objectives. to cut the federal communication and the supply line of the orange and alexandria railroad. jackson and his command's movements during the next days were a classic example of control and execution of army logistics. jackson's foot cavalry had covered 25 miles with 23,000 men in just the first 14 hours of his march on august 25th. the next day he covered the same distance in 14 hours, again, and reached bristo station on the orange and alexandria railroad by sunset. pope's rear and the railroad line behind it had been cut. but now what? returning to historian harsh, he said "in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, it is difficult to believe that lee expected jackson's detatched column of 23,000 men on its own strength to engage in serious fighting with the vastly superior numbers pope might bring against him.

lee may well have given stonewall the discretion to attack if the opportunity arose to inflict great injury on the enemy. but it is doubtful the confederate commander wanted the turning column to initiate a major battle in the manassas area that would commit the entire army of northern virginia. although there is no extent record of any understanding reached by lee and jackson on the ultimate objective of the campaign, on august 30th, lee would write bluntly to davis, my desire has been to avoid general engagements and to achieve success "by maneuvering." so lee does not expect jackson to bring on any serious engagement. jackson may be unclear of his role following the cutting of the orange and alexandria railroad line, the supply line and communication line to pope, his army and the federal capital. in addition, lee hopes that no major battle will be fought in

manassas. but if we read a little further between the lines, lee noted that he would hope that jackson would attack if and only if it would cause serious injury to pope's army and give the confederates a clear victory. as the events begin to pan out over the next several days, we'll be able to determine if any attack jackson made was one that would demonstrate a clear cut advantage and a confederate victory or that he should have waited. by noon on august 27th, jackson accomplished the objective. as laid out by lee. he had a southern flank protected. he sent the cavalry towards washington, sweeping the enemy away from the northern flank, and he sat on the main federal communication route at manassas junction. further, jackson and his men had captured an immense amount of supplies. he had the main road to

gainesville situated so they could withdraw the thorough fair gap should it become necessary. the gap that jackson used to reach his current position and where robert e. lee with longstreet and his wing were marching towards with every passing moment. conversely, however, despite jackson being quite well situated on august 27th, jackson was also beginning to lose his offensive capabilities with the position he had placed his command in. almost being forced to take a defensive posture in the coming hours. why? well, first, his proximity to washington, d.c., meant that more reinforcements could be sent from the federal capitol to his position quickly and at any moment. there were two corps in the federal army, mcdowell and siegel's corps marching northward. towards the rear at gainesville. jackson had nothing to protect that retreat route to lee and thorough fair gap and as another historian noted, his men had become engaged in an orgy of plunder. many were drunk and fighting

effectiveness of all had been impaired at least temporarily. jackson's guys can't march in a straight line let alone load in five steps and fire. after what they had captured at manassas junction. major w. roy mason recalls he said jackson's first order is to knock out the heads of hundreds of barrels of whiskey, wine and brandy. i shall never forget the scene. streams of spirits ran like water through the sands of manassas and the soldiers on their hands and knees drank it greedily from the ground. a sight to be held. by the evening of august 27th, jackson had each of his divisions marching towards a temporary position. and it appears that jackson was not only unsure of his next move but where he wanted to make it. as august 28th would dawn and jackson accomplished that objective that lee had laid out at that plan between jackson, longstreet, stewart and himself days earlier, general longstreet's four divisions

had begun their march in jackson's foot steps. on the afternoon of august 26th, they had covered 14 miles in that objective. but the following day on august 27th, long street's column had only reached six miles. lee, who had traveled with long street, allowed the same slowing pace of six miles to occur on the 28th. if jackson was to make any move he would need the support of longstreet and longstreet's plotting was taking a lot longer than jackson had anticipated or hoped. by the late morning, longstreet's leading brigades approached the choke point at thoroughfare gap on august 28th. and toward evening, stonewall jackson received good news on two fronts. a currier reported longstreet's success at thoroughfair gap suggesting that old pete would connect with jackson's right early the next day. as longstreet's men are plotting towards thoroughfare gap that choke point, and they're

plodding along slowly, what is going on on jackson's front on the 28th? during the post-dawn hours of august 28th, jackson had finally chosen a position to take in the area in which he had been operating. he had decided to move his scattered divisions into a concentrated position just west of the warrington turnpike. along a line from groveton to sudley springs. jackson sent curriers to the divisions to have them move towards this new position. jackson's position that he decided to take was one that anyone would expect of the commander. jackson's line covered the road from haymarket to sudley springs. thus if lee was blocked at thoroughfair gap, he could take an alternate route to jackson. on his immediate front, the position was defensively strong, running along a moderately high ridge, part and i reinforce this, part of which included the embankments of an unfinished railroad and the flanks of the warrington

turnpike. additionally, if things went bad for jackson, he had the sudley springs road that led to aldey gap. thus, jackson's true position was not, not the railroad cut you see pictured here as popular history conveys. it must take a moment at this point in time to give a lot of credit to my friend and colleague rob orison. it was about a little over a month ago, i decided to get some photographs for this presentation this morning and i think temperatures reached over 100 degrees that day as we trudged the second manassas battlefield. he wanted to make sure these were included in the presentation. if you see rob, thank him for these great photographs. so jackson's true position despite popular history is not the position you see pictured on the right. this unfinished railroad embankment. that ran through the manassas area. as historian scott pachin notes, contrary to the popular misconception, jackson's troop did not use that landmark as a trench for

protection. in most cases, it was held only by a skirmish line with the main battle line to the rear of the cut or grade as the terrain required. pickets were generally posted in advance of the cut to provide advance warning of any approaching federals. if we were to get inside of jackson's mind or get in some of those military theorist that's chris white talked about last night, a true strong defensive position would be to order the men into this cut. it is a fortified position. but jackson is not deploying his men on august 28th in the cut. skirmishes are nearby. those early warning systems for the main body of the army. but jackson's men are not taking a position in the cut. jackson's line then was on stoney hill or stoney ridge depending on who you read and which map you look at. it is a strong position. but it is not invulnerable. jackson's flanks are particularly weak. on his left, the railroad line was generally lower and less protected by woods.

on the right of the line, page lane led right into the right flank. additionally, the heavy wooded fronts along the left and center of the line voided the use of effective artillery for his position. the unfinished railroad did not furnish a consistent line in which to align troops and further some of the cuts were too deep, over 15 feet down, while others passed through open fields or were level with the ground. this position, however, would further solidify after the days events of august 28th. but it's worth pausing that for the first time in the campaign jackson has switched strategic and tactical pursuits from the offensive to the defensive as he is taking this position. later on august 28th, the aggressive jackson, however, could not remain idle on the defensive for long. after ordering his divisions to approach this new position, jackson throughout the day sought to attack, not to defend. his first opportunity that morning did not pan out and jackson had his commanders

continue to look for opportunities to exploit throughout the day. later in the day as general lee and longstreet trudged and finally arrived at thoroughfare gap and when jackson received word of their arrival feeling relieved that lee and longstreet were in the vicinity, he went to take a nap. now sleeping, his staff received word from general stewart's scouts that rufus king's union division was marching eastward. jackson's staff woke him and informed him of the intelligence. hunter holms mcguire remembered the moment, saying general jackson sprang up and moved rapidly towards his horse, buckling on his sword as he moved and urging greatest speed around him directing yule to attack the enemy. jackson would say to yule and talafor, gentlemen, bring out your men. they would opt fight for jackson

with part of the command. at 4:30 p.m. he ordered them to most batteries. the second virginia and second wisconsin would engage for nearly 15 minutes before reinforcements arrived. jackson bringing reinforcements, georgians himself would be funneled in from the federal side as well. 30 minutes into the fight, general yule got the rest of his men in the action. federal men had been parried. by 8:00 p.m., jackson's command finally achieved a superiority in numbers along the line and he pushed the assault forward to finally clear his front. the losses of this engagement were heavy for jackson's command, losing 1,250 men in the engagement of which his own brigade, the old stonewall brigade, had suffered 340 casualties of the 800 they took into combat that afternoon. why jackson chose to attack this lone federal division is interesting. particularly as we already established that jackson was concentrating his divisions into a strong defensive position. if you are taking a strong defensive position, why are you going on to the offensive and

the assault? he could not have expected any direct support any time soon. so jackson must believe that a victory was at hand against this division and that it would have a significant impact on the campaign. if anything, however, jackson had just committed the army of northern virginia to battle before they had become unified. while at the same time, by committing the battle, he's going to limit general lee's opportunity to maneuver in this theater. returning back to historian joseph harsh. harsh would lament this. in his seminal work on the maryland campaign. he said "victory would come if at all through bloody combat and from tactical blunders by the enemy. there would be no heavy victory from easy fighting." by 10:00 p.m. august 28th, general pope received news of the fight that took place at his headquarters in centreville.

the news that pope heard was that jackson was discovered in the vicinity of groveton and sudly springs and engaged. pope deduced that, quote, he subsequently drafted orders for august 29th based upon the intelligence. his orders were drafted based upon the belief that kings and ricket's division that's had been involved in the fight at brawner farm would be blocking jackson's escape route to the west and preventing any junction between lee, longstreet and jackson. frans siegel's corps of the federal army was already in position on henry house hill and thus pope would order him to attack the enemy vigorously the next morning, the largest body of infantry soldiers of the federal army to jackson's position. pope would continue to dictate his orders for the following day. he would order major general philip carney at centreville to march his diversion of the third carp of the army

of the potomac the battlefield at 1:00 a.m. and continue forward until he made contact with jackson's pickets and then attack him at dawn. he received the orders at 11:00 p.m. on august 28th. a staff officer delivering the orders to carney recalled his reaction. "tell general pope to go to hell. we won't march before morning." he directed him to follow carney at 3:00 a.m. pope would order jesse reno on bull run from the road to manassas junction to centerville to march to that hamlet and then turn west, taking the turnpike. upon reaching the battlefield, these forces were to join the attack against jackson. pope then ordered major general john porter whose 5th corpse was at bristow station to march to centerville and then to the battlefield. going into the 29th, pope believed he had jackson boxed in. as pope prepares his orders and

his men to go into the assault, what was the final position that jackson had taken in the area? what exactly did it entail and how were his men laid out? during the predawn hours of august 29th, jackson's position would be firmed up as his divisions deployed to the rear of the unfinished railroad line. major general ambrose powell hill's division held the left with six brigades in two lines of battle upon stoney ridge. hill's left flank rested near sudley mill, not far from sudley church pictured here. brigadier general maxi occupied the wooden knoll about 60 yards behind the railroad cut on the left flank of ap hill's division and 1,000 yards southwest of where this photograph was taken. colonel samuel mcgowen recalled the left of jackson's line that day. he said "this position was slightly an advance of the general line and was considered important because of the sudley road forward which it commanded.

our line made an obtuse angle pointing toward the enemy, one side of which ran nearly parallel with the railroad cut and the other along the fence bordering the cleared field on our left." brigadier general fitslee's brigade moved further to the left and covered sudley ford and prevenltsed the generals from getting into the rear as they had done in 1861. as jackson's line moved southward to the center of his position was the groveton sudley road. two brigades of yule's division now commanded by lawton after the grievous wound of the night before would deploy in the center of the line astride this road pictured here. brigadier general early would take his brigade and the louisiana brigade to the extreme right of jackson's battle line and anchored their flank on the warrenton turnpike. the two brigades deployed immediately west of and parallel to page glen lane, just west of the brawner farm battlefield. early also deployed two regimens of infantry on the south side of

the pike to screen any approaching federals in that sector. artillery would be deployed along the heights of stoney ridge, an excellent position in which to support jackson's infantry. on the morning of august 29th, as frans siegel's men advanced towards jackson's position trying to uphold pope's orders, they strugled to maintain a division or even brigade front. the problem developed as a result of pope's and thus siegel's intelligence on jackson's position, siegel's corps fanned out because it was attempting to find jackson's position. no one seemed to know exactly where jackson was in the vicinity. and sher's division, a large gap would develop between the brigade on the left advancing front and colonel alex ander on the right. as the advance against the position, the brigade slowed directly to a halt. two confederate batteries under the command of crenshaw and

braxton opened on the right of sherser's advance. at the same time, they received word of troops on the right and rear and he halted his command. those troops would later turn out to be general carney's division. this would be the first attack on jackson's line, and it was an attack that broke down quickly by the federals advancing towards his position. the division was supposed to maintain the line with robert millroy's independent bringing gait on his left. who, in turn, was supposed to connect with brigadier general robert shanks further to the left. as the advance went forward, they broke the connection to millroy who then broke their connection with shank. meanwhile, kernoski's brigade advanced at a rapid rate pulling far ahead of rest of the line and engage the confederates first. the brigade and brigadier general maxie greg, hearing the fight to his right, general millroy would send two regiments of his brigade to assist.

of the fight between millroy and the south carolinians and georgians who had gotten in on the action, an ohioan recalled of the fight, "we had not advanced more than two rods into the woods when a terrible volley was poured in upon us from the front and from behind the railroad embankment, mowing our men down like grass. the attacks would end near 10:00 a.m. on the morning of the 29th and it had not altered the tactical situation on the field at all. jackson's line had held. and on several occasions, jackson's units went on the offensive following these federal charges. but siegel would not give up. with the arrival of carney's division on hill's already battered left, general sherz would order the brigades to renew the assault. the blessing of the 74th pennsylvania recalled this renewed attack. at that point a heavy shower of great shot and canister pouring into us, we withdrew to the railroad dam. general sherz was. under the belief that carney

would advance with him but he failed to do so. as we began to explore these early attacks against jackson's defensive line at second manassas, one of the things that i hope is beginning to stick out about the federal plan is that each and every time these units are going in are going in on their own hook. jackson's line in the entirety has yet to be pressed to the full federal advantage in numbers. but why had general carney failed to advance? frans siegel's assaults, from sherz's brigade and millroy and shank had a significant impact on the left of jackson's line, especially ap hill's front. several of the attacks had even broken through jackson's defense. for example, the 82nd ohio detached by millroy to assist to the right had temporarily broken jackson's line in an area known as the dump. both participants in the morning attacks on august 29th and historians since contend that

had carney assisted, had he followed up and supported siegel's advance, that jackson may have been pushed out of his defensive position. was jackson's line a good defensive stand after all? general hinesleman, pictured here on the left, reported "several orders were stoent him to advance but he did not move until after the troops on his left had been forced back." while general sherz pictured on the right of the screen noted i'm persuaded by that general carney had done at that moment what he did so gallantly late in the afternoon, that is to say if he had thrown his column upon the enemy's flanks, we might have succeeded in destroying the enemy's left wing. historians feel clearly he had been within the realm of possibilities that morning. however, general carney after getting a late start, struggled to get his troops into combat on a timely basis. will green conjectures that

carney possibly indulged in a bitter grudge that he held against seigel. perhaps we'll never know. we'll never know carney's exact reasons for not advancing that morning. what we do know, however, is that lack of the forward movement in conjunction with the support of siegel's men had allowed jackson's line to defeat those piecemeal attacks. it has also left jackson's defense untested against equal or higher numbers numerically. by the afternoon of august 29th, general pope had arrived on the field to further coordinate the offensive attacks against jackson's line. pope's further orders for the day were continued frontal assaults against jackson's line. these were all to serve as a diversion until general porter arrived on the right and rear. pope would not yield to the notion that longstreet and lee had arrived to the battlefield and now occupied the very front that porter was supposed to push through to get to jackson. despite pope's delusional

miscalculation regarding porter and jackson's right, these further assaults tested just how strong jackson's defensive line really was. as midday approached, pope ordered divisions to move forward to replace sherz's battered units from the morning assaults against the confederate left. as sherz pulled out, some of his hard-fought gains, pieces of ground along that railroad, were quickly occupied by edward thomas' georgians. thomas, however, had made a tactical mistake in the redeployment. he left a 125 yard gap between his line and the line of great south carolinians to his left. not only would jackson's line be tested again with larger federal assaults, it would teeter on the verge of collapse due to thomas' mistake. shortly before 3:00 p.m., grover's brigade of hooker's division moved out as part of the renewed attack against jackson. expecting an order for his b brigade to attack, grover rode ahead and examined the terrain of the confederate position

where he was to assault. "after rising the hill under which my command lay an open field was entered," and from one edge of it gradually fell to have a slope to a valley through which ran a railroad embankment. the forest continued and the corresponding heights behind were held by the enemy in force and was supported by artillery. after grover returned from his reconnaissance, he received the order to advance at 3:00 p.m. hooker ordered him to advance in line of battle over this ground, pass past the embankment, enter the woods beyond and hold it. grover would lead the advance at 3:15 p.m. general millroy suggested to grover after his experience that morning to go to the right and use the bayonet. deploying his five regiments, 1500 man brigade into two lines, before moving forward, grover explained to the men to fire one volley and then rely upon the bayonet. the brigade would veer to the right just as millroy suggested trying to avoid the open ground in the front as well as maintain contact with carney's brigade to the right. grover was under the impression that carney would advance with

his man, an impression that was sorely wrong. grover's direction of march, however, brought the brigade directly into the breach between thomas' georgians and maxie greg's south carolinians. yet again for the second time on august 29th, jackson's line had been pierced. but also yet again, confederate reinforcements would be sent forward to seal the gap and expel the federals from their new foothold. later on the afternoon of august 29th, following grover's attack as they had been defeated, another confederate -- union brigade had been sent forward. this brigade was under the command of general novel. his brigade would go into action further to the left of grover's brigade and would meet with many of the same results that the previous federal brigades had charged received throughout the day from jackson's line. following the attack that day

and other attacks made by nelson taylor, hooker would throw no further units into this fight. no further units into this fight. the confederates continually, time after time, would seal the breaches, and reinforcements would arrive just in the nick of time. by late afternoon on august 29th, jackson's line was about to be attacked yet again. pope would consolidate the army's position and clarify the early orders to porter to positively attack jackson's right flank. at the same point in time, he ordered general carney to go ahead and assault the left of jackson's line, a position that had been battered time and time again throughout the day. as carney prepared to attack along his front, a.p. hill sent jackson a message via one of his staff officers, henry douglas, to apprise him of the situation on the left of jackson's defense. and ammunition was low and hill's troops were weary and hill questioned his ability to hold against another assault. douglas wrote that when he gave this news to jackson, that jackson seemed to "deepen the

shadow on his face, and the silence of the group about him was oppressive." jackson told the courrier to return to general hill with the following message, "tell him if they attack again he must beat them." not waiting for the message to deliver, rode in search of hill. when he rode to hill, he said general, your men have done nobly. if you are attacked again, you will the beat the enemy back. with the situation they created for him, hill replied, "here come the next attack." and he rode away. jackson called out into the distance after hill, i'll expect you to beat them. the next attack that was making the way towards hill's line was that of general carney's men, 2,700 men from ten regimens regiments spread across three brigades. it was 5:00 p.m. leaving carney's diversion was general john c. robinson's brigade. general kearny rode up to hayes of the 63rd and yelled,

"i want you to drive those people out of the woods that are annoying hooker. bring your regiment along with me and i'll show you where i want to put you in." hayes' men were piling over the bank in disorder. kearny would steady the men to strike them on the flank in front. i will support you handsomely. kerney now turned to rallying the federals from taylor's key feeted brigades earlier in the day. kerney was riding up and down along the line saying, fall in here, you sons of bitches and i'll make major generals out of every one of you. mean while, the remainder of robinson's three remaining regiments hads kroed the railroad. they had exposed their battle line perpendicular to the railroad cut and it had angleled perfectly to strike hill's exposed flank. yet again, the federals succeeded in cracking jackson's line but, yet again, further reinforcements would be sent to sale the breach.

by 5:15 p.m., as kerney's assault moves forward, he is looking for any and all available reinforcements to send forward. something he had not done earlier in the day. he would find ledgers, 700 men in all, these men would go forward with the remnants of taylor's men that kearny had been able to rally. general kearny would ride up to isaac stevens, ledger's divisional commander, in regards to ledger's brigade asked, will they men fight? stephen's replied, by god, general kearny, these are my round heads, referring to the 100th pennsylvania volunteers. feeling secure in his selection of reinforcements, kearny said to ledger, quote, this is your line of advance and sweep everything before you. look out to your left. i'll take care of your right. the last of the federal assaults of the day had just ended. and, like previous ones, it had ended in a federal repulse. jackson's line had held. on jackson's left, the brigade completely emptied the cartridge boxes and lost fully half its

men, while the rest of the light division suffered severely as well. general hill later sent word to jackson that the enemy had attacked in his front and the attack had crested and they had pulled back from his line. when jackson heard the news, a rare smile came across his face. tell him, i knew he would do it said jackson. thus on august 29th, had lee, jackson launched and had they participated in offensive actions on the plains of manassas? or had they instituted add strong defense? on numerous occasions throughout the day, jackson's line had been severely tested and, at time, broken. additionally, because the line had bent and broken, it offered required jackson's particularly a.p. hill's brigades to go on the offensive to restore their line. jackson's defense necessitied a strong offensive in its execution. at the same point in time, lee on the field in the late morning of august 29th with longstreet strongly desired to go on the attack. lee's order for an attack was

riding high. surprisingly, it took a combination of the aggressive jackson and the even handed longstreet to cool lee's desire to switch from a defensive posture to an offensive action. but the fighting at manassas was not over. plans would begin to develop on both sides for the following day. pope wanted to attack yet again. but for lee, longstreet and jackson, sthout that no attack would come from pope on august 30th. just in case that no attack came, lee was beginning to prepare for other options. by 3:00, on august 30th, however, that attack did come. fitsjohn porter's massive assault against jackson' center and right, sending 10,000 troops into position against this terrain. it would be the final main federal assault on jackson's position. that attack would take place as deep cut and others along this unfinished railroad line.

and like so many other occasions on august 30th, the federal attack would break jackson's position. yet again, confederate reinforcements arrived on the scene just in the nick of time. by midafternoon, jackson needed help. his line was bruised, battered and broken, had been cracked many times. federal soldiers had gotten into his line and taken absolutely everything he had left to rebuild that defensive position. it was finally time for general longstreet and his wing to enter the fight. as we examine whether or not jackson's defense that we heard about today was a great defense or not, we have to ask several questions. was jackson outnumbered at any point in time during the battle? what was the numerical reality on the field? was the myth of a mighty federal army attacking some lone, small isolated confederate body of troops accurate? what we can do is look at all

these numbers in the minute detail and we can tell you that at no time was jackson outnumbered on his front in that defensive position. because of the nature of which general pope's federals continued to attack over and over and over, they did so in a piecemeal fashion. jackson's line should have held but was continually broken time and time again. and if it was not for strategically placed reinforcements along the stoney ridge front, jackson may have been pushed out of that defensive position that he had taken on the 28th and 29th. not only on numerous occasions throughout august 29th and 30th did jackson's line numerically outweigh the attackers due to the strategical and tactical plans of pope and the piecemeal attacks ordered thereof, but even with that advantage, jackson's line broke almost every time as a result of those assaults. either the momentum of the assault broke the line of -- or the attacks made by the federal forces succeeded in finding the gaps and jackson's defense. in both cases, it required numerous reinforcements to be brought to bear.

to restore the line. clearly, jackson's defense was not standing like a stone wall. furthermore, jackson's men had sustained high casualties. far higher than what a defender should sustain in direct relation to the attacking column. overall jackson and lee's casualties were incredibly high and a third day in which pope's army was removed from the field. the casualties sustained based on the tackitics of the defense. of the 18 top regiments in the confederate army, nine of them were from jackson's command. the greatest percent of casualties in a regiment was jackson's unit. they had the majority of the greatest percentage of casualties of any other unit on the field. jackson's unit would lose nearly 5,000 men in those three days, nearly half of all casualties of the army of northern virginia sustained during the entirety of the second monassis campaign.

ultimately, however, great are not, jackson's line had held. instrumental in that victory. jackson and his foot cavalry were not done in this campaign, however. lee would order jackson to pursue pope and try to cut him off. in his retreat to washington. maneuver, not defense, would again be the strategy and tactic of the day. thank you. [ applause ] >> we have time for just one or two questions. anybody have any questions for dan? anybody? anybody? bueller? bueller? anybody? one question in the back here. again, a reminder when you ask a question, please introduce yourself, tell us where you're from and please make sure you have a question. >> him mike block from virginia. great presentation. i wanted to ask you to elaborate a little bit more on lee's

strategic intent in july and august 1862. you mentioned that burnside was moving and lee did not know that at the time. and i submit to you that lee sending jackson to gordonville was a strategic defensive move as opposed to an offensive move in preparation for second manassas. >> the question is what does lee know as far as july and august, and how does it influence his strategic planning during that time period. surely, the number one concern for lee in the month of july is mcclellan. despite everything that lee's done, mcclellan is still on the virginia peninsula and his army is massive, over 100,000 men are still on the virginia peninsula. lee does become aware of this new army of virginia under pope that is assemblying and moving. but even at that point in time, lee has no strategic plans of an offensive nature or a defensive nature. towards pope. he's still all eyes on

mcclellan. but as further intelligence continues to flood into lee's headquarters, lee begins to feel that mcclellan is less of a credible threat on the virginia peninsula. and i'll content that the reason why he sends an offensive maneuver is because of pope's advance towards the the confederate capital. if lee does not go on the offensive to stop pope from moving any further southward against the confederate line of supply, against confederate line of communication, towards the confederate capital, it squeezes lee from two directions. and so, that aggressive movement by pope moving southward towards that confederate supply line forces, in my opinion, lee to go on the offensive, to stop pope from moving any further towards that supply line, towards the route of the capital and towards placing him in a classic pincer movement. if he sends jackson there defensively and pope continues to move forward it gives lee a whole lot less room to maneuver out of a possible pincer

movement. >> ladies and gentlemen. >> thank you. >> american history tv on c-span3 focuses on the civil war all week. at 8:00 p.m. eastern tonight, a seminar on civil war leadership with talks about confederate general robert e. lee and u.s. army general ulysses s. grant. this week at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. tonight, a forum on the changing role of cities. here's eduardo paez, former mayor of rio de janeiro. >> this is a transition period, and i think cities will play a major role fighting against this populism. so, the way cities can change representative democracies, see cities as a great machine to change what's going on. >> thursday, an in-depth look at the opioid epidemic, including

ohio attorney general mike dewine, who's suing several drug companies for their marketing. opioid painkillers. >> what is different about this drug problem that we have is how pervasive it is. it is absolutely everywhere. it is in our smallest communities, it's in our cities, it's in our most affluent suburbs. and friday, a conversation with supreme court justice elena kagan. >> you said at the very beginning of our conversation, we're not a pure democracy, we're a constitutional democracy. and that means that the judiciary has an important role to play in policing the boundaries of all the other branches, and that can make the judiciary an unpopular set of people when they say to a governor, a president, or congress, no, you can't do that because it's just not within your constitutional powers. >> watch this week at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span and

c-span.org, and listen using the free c-span radio app. after the union victory in the civil war battle of antietam in maryland, president lincoln issued the emancipation proclamation, freeing slaves in the south. up next on american history tv on c-span3, a conversation on the 1862 battle. >> our next speaker is one of the great emerging voices in the entire field. when i first met kevin pawlak, i thought, this is going to be one of those guys that's going to be a rock star. in fact, he already is. i hear when i travel all across the country to roundtables, we've got to get more young people involved! well, if we need a poster child for getting young folks involved with the civil war, kevin pawlak is it. although kevin's about to grow up in a really quick way, he's getting married in just a couple weeks. so, as you know, that will be a major life shift for him. ke i