question, what a surprise. >> other questions for chris? other questions? anything? anything? >> i think they're all hungry, chris. >> ladies and gentlemen, chris kohlcowski. >> thank you. [ applause ] >> american history tv focuses on the civil war all week. a seminar on civil war leadership with talks about confederate general robert e. lee and u.s. army general ulysses s. grant. >> landmark cases returns live next february on c-span. join us to hear more stories of the people who sparked groundbreaking cases and the justices and lawyers who were key to the supreme court's review. up next on american history tv on c-span three, author dan welch on confederate general stonewall jackson and the second

battle of manassas in virginia. in that battle the confederate general earned the moniker stonewall. this is 50 minutes. >> dan welch is a music educator in ohio, but for many, many years he's had a deep, passionate love affair with the civil war as many of us have had, and he fell in love with the civil war at gettysburg. so much so that he studied at the gettysburg institute and he's become a ranger at battlefield park where you can find him in the summertime giving tours all over the field. he's also co-author with rob orson with the book "the last road north. a guide to the gettysburg campaign" which traces the movements of both armies from virginia up into pennsylvania and then follows their retreat, and it's a fantastic book and it's modeled after the civil war trail system. later today we'll hear more about the civil war trails and it's a fantastic initiative that

helps put people on the field and on the spot where great events happen. so without further ado, it is my pleasure to introduce to you from great state of ohio, my friend, dan welch. [ applause ] >> well, good morning, everyone. before we get started this morning i would like to thank chris mocowski and my colleagues at emergent civil war and for all of you for getting up so early this morning and getting up to learn more about stonewall jackson and second manassas. jackson's defensive line had been bruised and battered. they'd been subjected to numerous federal attacks through august 29th and now on the afternoon of august 30th, some of jackson's units literally had nothing left to give in the line's defense. along jackson's right, the men of brigadier general william stark's brigade, now under the command of colonel leroy stafford and they'd been engaged

in the last 30 minutes in a furious defense of the portion of the line. the immense pressure was part of fits john porter's assault on jackson's position. over the course of the last 30 minutes as men from new york, michigan, pennsylvania and massachusetts assailed the confederate defenders, the cartridge boxes of the confederate defenders had run dry. numerous confederates left the fight in droves, scouring the dead and dying in search of ammunition, but with little success. the stout resistance along the railroad embankment was physically quieting as the guns slowly silenced. according to an article in the philadelphia weekly times written in december 1881 at this moment an irishman named o'keefe yelled above the battle, boys, give them rocks. all along the line, stafford and johnson's regimen began to hurl large boulders as well as grabbed smaller sized rocks and throw them like fast balls over

the pitching mound. >> a soldierier whose unit was on the front line recalled, quote, huge stones began to fall about us and one of them would happen to strike one or another of us with a very unpleasant. some soldiers be ga know to return the favor in kind, and so ensued one of the more famous episodes of stonewall jackson's defense at second manassas. in reality, this moment had no overall effect in the end result of the fight. the federal assault had already kre crescendoed and confederate reinforcement his arrived to the scene, but what this story does illustrate, however, is the verocity with which jackson's men explored today. as we make our way through the program today we'll be examining several key factors to jackson's defense during the fight at second manassas. first and foremost, we'll examine some of the strategic events that led to jackson's defense at second manassas and

what we'll come to find as we examine those strategic defense that the word defense will legal be found in the writings of stonewall jackson, robert e. lee and many other confederate leaders associated with this campaign. as we finally make our way to the fields and plains of first bull run and second bull run, we'll explore the numerous tactical moments that comprised jackson's defense on august 29, and august 30th, 1862 and lastly, we'll examine just how well jackson and his men did in his defensive line all those years ago. so we need to begin a little further before second manassas and take us back to the fight at malvern hill. the guns had grown silent. thousands upon thousands of confederate soldiers lay dead from the fighting over the last month. although their new commander in the field robert e. lee had provided the confederacy richmond more breathing room and the threat was far from over and

had come at an enormous cost. the threat for the confederacy in the state of virginia came on three months following malvern hill and george b. mclellan's massive army was still on the peninsula along the raphanic river in the fredericksburg area and a new federal army, the army of virginia under the newly arrived officer john pope, was moving southward and eastward from the northern part of the state. as the month of july pushed ever closer towards august, general lee began to gain greater confidence that at least one of these armies no longer posed a serious threat to the confederate capital. seeking an opportunity to exploit and regain the military initiative, a hallmark of lee's command style, lee felt that general mcclellan and his massive army no longer posed a threat to richmond. and, with that belief, he began to transfer troops to the virginia piedmont. first, he sent jackson with two divisions of soldiers to gordonsville and eventually he

would reinforce jackson with units whose numbers would soar to approximately 25,000 men. this would be the beginning of lee's first campaign that was solely his. and all indications pointed to the -- that this one would be one of an offense, an offense, not a defensive in nature. what was lee's as well as confederate president confederate jefferson davis' strategy for the confederacy, in the summer of 1862? well, for jefferson davis, his view of the confederate's grand strategy was something that he termed, a coin that he phrased offensive/defensive. of those two words within davis' strategy, however, davis as well as lee much preferred the offensive. this can be evidenced by the use of the offensive on both the strategic and tactical levels from fort sumpter in april of 1861 to the most recent battles around richmond. for davis, although there were situation that's dictated a defensive posture, he believed

that was the use of the strategic and tactical offense that was the key to gain confederate war aims. thus davis' belief in the offensive strategy and the tactical application is best expressed when he wrote in march of 1862 "the advantage of selecting the time and place of attack was too apparent to have been overlooked." lee wholeheartedly concurred, particularly once he took the field, following general johnson's wounding. the only way to relieve richmond and restore control of virginia was to go on the strategic offensive. during this immediate post-malvern hill time period, lee could little focus on anything else other than general mcclellan's 100,000 man army still on the peninsula, including john pope and the army of virginia. setting upon a campaign against pope was still not on lee's horizon, nor was a tactical defense by stonewall jackson. now as lee remained focused on mcclellan, it was pope's advance

of a portion of the new army of virginia that would draw lee's attention and the possibility of a new campaign not against mcclellan but pope. the army of virginia commander had not only advanced his army far enough south to be within the theater of operations but he also sent a probe against the confederate supply line. the movement and probe made matters worse for lee. if hope advanced on the confederate capital from the north, his army would be caught between a classic pincer movement. at the same point in time, the removal of bernside's independent corps from north carolina led lee to believe that either mcclellan's force or pope's force would be reinforced for this movement. despite the sensitive strategic situation, on july 25th, 1862, after already having moved jackson and his two divisions, lee expressed for the first time any sense of the direction of the new impending campaign. he wrote to jackson he was "extremely anxious" to send him reinforcements to "suppress"

pope. "suppress" is hardly a word used to describe defensive strategy or tactics. two days later, july 27th, lee ordered ap hills division in louisiana to reinforce jackson hoping to double jackson's size. lee counseled jackson, "cache your troops as much as possible until you strike your blow and be prepared to return to me when done." i will endeavor to keep general mcclellan quiet until this is over if rapidly executed. clearly this next campaign for jackson was to be one of an offensive nature. lee's hope for a quick offensive action by jackson against pope in the army of virginia and the return to his army was quickly dashed. jackson was slow, careful, and cautious during this time period. he had heard of federal forces concentrating in fredericksburg which, if true, posed a serious

threat to richmond and the line of communications with the confederate capital. he was also struggling, as he told lee, to find a way to turn pope's position north of the rapiddan river. lee concurred with jackson's assessment to avoid frontal assaults against the position to use maneuver to get pope out of his strong position, bring him out into an open field and participate in then one of the classic napolionic assaults and hopefully victories. on august 8th, lee received a dispatch from jackson dated the previous day suggesting that he would attack the vanguard of pope's army as they concentrated at culpepper. lee approved of the plan and bolstered it by moving the division 15 mile s to hanover. where they could protect jackson's flank. pope's scouts reported jackson crossing the rapidan and pope correctly identified culpepper as the destination and thus sent bank's corps to meet them. the fight that ensued was august 9th. it was become known as the battle at cedar mountain. jackson's men fought aggressively but it was a poorly

managed affair as one historian wrote. and the victory was only due to the inability of the franz sigel's first corps of the army of virginia to march efficiently to the support of union soldiers engaged on the field. at the same time, the guns were blazing at cedar mountain, general lee decided that his theater of operations had reached a stalemate and that stalemate needed to be broken immediately. therefore, lee would send general longstreet north to assist in the matter. and by august 14th, five days after the conclusion of cedar mountain, general lee decided to leave richmond, virginia, where he had been in charge and commanding this new effort. and he would take the field himself. by the time that lee took the field, it is clear that he had selected stonewall jackson's wing to be the leading force in his grand strategy of a turning movement against pope. lee sought to maneuver pope out of his strong position and then attack him out in the open on ground that would favor the confederate army. lee met with jackson longstreet

and stewart on august 24th. lee recalled the meeting in the outline of his plan for the coming days in june of 1863 when he filed the report. on the second manassas campaign. he said, quote, the actions determined on, jackson was directed on the 25th to cross above waterloo and move around the enemy's right so as to strike the orange and alexandria railroad in his rear. jackson wrote in his april 1863 report, "pursuing the instructions of the commanding general, i left jeffersonton on the morning of 25th to throw my command between washington city and the army of general pope and to break up his railroad communications with the confederate capital." oh, excuse me, federal capital. one clear issue with these reports, there was nothing mentioned about what jackson should do after cutting that railroad. so far this campaign had been one of an offense in both strategy and tactics. maneuvering pope out of his

strong position, an offensive strategy. bringing him out into a piece of ground that would favor a confederate assault, again, offensive tactics. would or should jackson remain with this strategy that has already been set by lee after he cuts that railroad line? what should he do next? or should he switch to defensive operations? as historian joseph harsh noted, i think we'll hear a lot from joe harsh over these next several presentations today as we did last evening as well with dr. jordan. as historian joe harsh noted, he said, "either lee did not make clear to jackson this operation was basically a raid and that he was not to get mired in serious fighting with the enemy at manassas, or else jackson violated the spirit of his instructions." the former is more likely the case. lee may have miscalculated before he arrived on the scene. perhaps, perhaps he underestimated pope's ability to concentrate the federal army in the vicinity of manassas and

overestimated his own ability to join jackson in a timely fashion. by august 25th, however, following the meeting with lee, jackson would spend the remainder of august 24th, the day before, preparing for those objectives. to cut the federal communication and the supply line of the orange and alexandria railroad. jackson and his command's movements during the next days were a classic example of control and execution of army logistics. jackson's foot cavalry had covered 25 miles with 23,000 men in just the first 14 hours of his march on august 25th. the next day he covered the same distance in 14 hours, again, and reached bristow station on the orange and alexandria railroad by sunset. pope's rear and the railroad line behind it had been cut. but now what? returning to historian harsh, he

said, "in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, it is difficult to believe that lee expected jackson's detached column of 23,000 men on its own strength to engage in serious fighting with the vastly superior numbers pope might bring against him. lee may well have given stonewall the discretion to attack if the opportunity arose to inflict great injury on the enemy. but it is doubtful the confederate commander wanted the turning column to initiate a major battle in the manassas area that would commit the entire army of northern virginia. although there is no extent record of any understanding reached by lee and jackson on the ultimate objective of the campaign, on august 30th, lee would write bluntly to davis, my desire has been to avoid general engagements and to achieve success, "by maneuvering." so lee does not expect jackson to bring on any serious engagement.

jackson may be unclear of his role following the cutting of the orange and alexandria railroad line, the supply line and communication line to pope, his army and the federal capital. in addition, lee hopes that no major battle will be fought in manassas. but if we read a little further between the lines, lee noted that he would hope that jackson would attack if and only if it would cause serious injury to pope's army and give the confederates a clear victory. as the events begin to pan out over the next several days, we'll be able to determine if any attack jackson made was one that would demonstrate a clear cut advantage and a confederate victory or that he should have waited. by noon on august 27th, jackson accomplished the objective. as laid out by lee. he had a southern flank protected. he sent the cavalry towards washington, sweeping the enemy away from the northern flank,

and he sat on the main federal communication and supply route at manassas junction. further, jackson and his men had captured an immense amount of supplies. he had the main road to gainesville situated so they could withdraw the thoroughfare gap should it become necessary. the gap that jackson used to reach his current position and where robert e. lee with longstreet and his wing were marching towards with every passing moment. conversely, however, despite jackson being quite well situated on august 27th, jackson was also beginning to lose his offensive capabilities with the position he had placed his command in. almost being forced to take a defensive posture in the coming hours. why? well, first, his proximity to washington, d.c., meant that more reinforcements could be sent from the federal capitol to his position quickly and at any moment. there were two corps in the federal army, mcdowell and siegel's corps marching

northward towards the rear at gainesville. jackson had nothing to protect that retreat route to lee and thorough fair gap and as another historian noted, his men had become engaged in an orgy of plunder. many were drunk and fighting effectiveness of all had been impaired at least temporarily. jackson's guys can't march in a straight line, let alone load in five steps and fire. after what they had captured at manassas junction. major w. roy mason recalled. he said jackson's first order is to knock out the heads of hundreds of barrels of whiskey, wine and brandy. i shall never forget the scene. streams of spirits ran like water through the sands of manassas and the soldiers on their hands and knees drank it greedily from the ground. a sight to beheld. by the evening of august 27th, jackson had each of his divisions marching towards a temporary position. and it appears that jackson was not only unsure of his next move but where he wanted to make it.

as august 28th would dawn and jackson accomplished that objective that lee had laid out at that plan between jackson, longstreet, stewart and himself days earlier, general longstreet's four divisions had begun their march in jackson's footsteps. on the afternoon of august 26th, they had covered 14 miles in that objective. but the following day on august 27th, longstreet's column had only reached six miles. lee, who had traveled with long street, allowed the same slowing pace of six miles to occur on the 28th. if jackson was to make any move he would need the support of longstreet and longstreet's plotting was taking a lot longer than jackson had anticipated or hoped. by the late morning, longstreet's leading brigades approached the potential choke point at thoroughfare gap on august 28th. and toward evening, stonewall jackson received good news on two fronts. a currier reported longstreet's

success at thoroughfare gap suggesting that old pete would connect with jackson's right early the next day. as longstreet's men are plotting towards thoroughfare gap that choke point, and they're plodding along slowly, what is going on on jackson's front on the 28th? during the post-dawn hours of august 28th, jackson had finally chosen a position to take in the area in which he had been operating. he had decided to move his scattered divisions into a concentrated position just west of the warrington turnpike. along a line from groveton to sudley springs. jackson sent curriers to the divisions to have them move towards this new position. jackson's position that he decided to take was one that anyone would expect of the commander. jackson's line covered the road from haymarket to sudley springs. thus if lee was blocked at thoroughfare gap, he could take an alternate route to jackson. on his immediate front, the position was defensively strong,

running along a moderately high ridge, part, and i reinforce this, part of which included the embankments of an unfinished railroad and the flanks of the warrington turnpike. additionally, if things went bad for jackson, he had the sudley springs road that led to aldey gap. thus, jackson's true position was not, not the railroad cut you see pictured here as popular history conveys. it must take a moment at this point in time to give a lot of credit to my friend and colleague rob orison. it was about a little over a month ago, i decided to get some photographs for this presentation this morning and i think temperatures reached over 100 degrees that day as we trudged the second manassas battlefield. he wanted to make sure these were included in the presentation. if you see rob, thank him for these great photographs. so jackson's true position despite popular history is not the position you see pictured on the right. this unfinished railroad

embankment. that ran through the manassas area. as historian scott pachin notes, contrary to the popular conception, jackson's troop did not use that landmark as a trench for protection. in most cases, it was held only by a skirmish line with the main battle line to the rear of the cut or grade as the terrain required. pickets were generally posted in advance of the cut to provide advance warning of any approaching federals. if we were to get inside of jackson's mind or get in some of those military theorists that chris white talked about last night, a true strong defensive position would be to order the men in to this cut. it is a fortified position. but jackson is not deploying his men on august 28th in the cut. skirmishes are nearby. those early warning systems for the main body of the army. but jackson's men are not taking a position in the cut. jackson's line then was on stoney hill or stoney ridge

depending on who you read and which map you look at. it is a strong position. but it is not invulnerable. jackson's flanks are particularly weak. on his left, the railroad line was generally lower and less protected by woods. on the right of the line, page lane led right into the right flank. additionally, the heavy wooded fronts along the left and center of the line voided the use of effective artillery for his position. the unfinished railroad did not furnish a consistent line in which to align troops and further some of the cuts were too deep, over 15 feet down, while others passed through open fields or were level with the ground. this position, however, would further solidify after the days events of august 28th. but it's worth pausing that for the first time in the campaign jackson has switched strategic and tactical pursuits from the offensive to the defensive as he is taking this position.

later on august 28th, the aggressive jackson, however, could not remain idle on the defensive for long. after ordering his divisions to approach this new position, jackson throughout the day sought to attack, not to defend. his first opportunity that morning did not pan out and jackson had his commanders continue to look for opportunities to exploit throughout the day. later in the day as general lee and longstreet trudged and finally arrived at thoroughfare gap and when jackson received word of their arrival feeling relieved that lee and longstreet were in the vicinity, he went to take a nap. now sleeping, his staff received word from general stewart's scouts that rufus king's union division was marching eastward. jackson's staff woke him and informed him of the intelligence. hunter holms mcguire remembered the moment, saying general jackson sprang up and moved rapidly towards his horse, buckling on his sword as he moved and urging greatest speed around him directing ewell to attack the enemy. jackson would say to ewell and talafor, gentlemen, bring out

your men. they would open the fight for jackson with part of the command. at 4:30 p.m. he ordered them to move the batteries. the second virginia and second wisconsin would engage for nearly 15 minutes before reinforcements arrived. jackson bringing reinforcements, georgians himself would be funneled in from the federal side as well. 30 minutes into the fight, general ewell got the rest of his men into the action. federal men had been parried. by 8:00 p.m., jackson's command finally achieved a superiority in numbers along the line and he pushed the assault forward to finally clear his front. the losses of this engagement were heavy for jackson's command, losing 1,250 men in the engagement of which his own brigade, the old stonewall brigade, had suffered 340 casualties of the 800 they took into combat that afternoon.

why jackson chose to attack this lone federal division is interesting. particularly as we already established that jackson was concentrating his divisions into a strong defensive position. if you are taking a strong defensive position, why are you going on to the offensive and the assault? he could not have expected any direct support any time soon. so jackson must believe that a victory was at hand against this division and that it would have a significant impact on the campaign. if anything, however, jackson had just committed the army of northern virginia to battle before they had become unified. while at the same time, by committing the battle, he's going to limit general lee's opportunity to maneuver in this theater. returning back to historian joseph harsh. harsh would lament this. in his seminal work on the maryland campaign. he said "victory would come if at all through bloody combat and

from tactical blunders by the enemy. there would be no heavy victory from easy fighting." by 10:00 p.m. on august 28th, general pope received news of the fight that took place at his headquarters in centreville. the news that pope heard was that jackson was discovered in the vicinity of groveton and sudley springs and engaged. pope deduced that, quote, he subsequently drafted orders for august 29th based upon the intelligence. his orders were drafted based upon the belief that kings and ricket's divisions that had been involved in the fight at brawner farm would be blocking jackson's escape route to the west and preventing any junction between lee, longstreet and jackson. franz sigel's corps of the federal army was already in position on henry house hill and thus pope would order him to attack the enemy vigorously the next morning, the largest body of infantry soldiers of the

federal army towards jackson's position. pope would continue to dictate his orders for the following day. he would order major general philip kearny at centreville to march his diversion of the third corps of the army of the potomac the battlefield at 1:00 a.m. and continue forward until he made contact with jackson's pickets and then attack him at dawn. he received the orders at 11:00 p.m. on august 28th. a staff officer delivering the orders to kearny recalled his reaction. "tell general pope to go to hell. we won't march before morning." pope would order commanding the 9th core on the road to centerville to march to that and turn west taking the turnpike. upon reaching the battlefield, these forces were to join the attack against jackson.

>> not far from the church pictured year. occupied at a, quote, small nol 60 yards behind on the left flank and about 1,000 yards southwest of where this photograph was taken.

and besides being on the extreme left was considered important. because of the sudly road ford which it commanded. our line made an angle pointing toward the enemy. one side of which ran nearly parallel with the railroad cut, and the other along the fence boarding the cleared field on our left. brigadier general fitz lee's brigade moved left, preventsing the confederates from getting into the rear, as they had done in 1861 as jackson's line mouth south towards the center of his position was the sudly road. two brigades of yule's division now commanded by lawton after yule's grievous wound would deploy the center of the line. brigadier general early would take his brigade and colonel foreigno's louisiana brigade to the extreme right of jackson's battle line and anchored their

flank on the warrenton turnpike. early also deployed two regiments of infantry on the south side of the pike towards groveton to screen any approaching federals in that sector, artillery would be deployed along stoney ridge, an excellent position to support jackson's infantry. on the morning of august 29th, as franz siegel's men advanced towards jackson's position, trying to uphold pope's order they struggled to maintain a division or brigade front. the problem developed as a result of pope's and siegel's intelligence on jackson's position. siegel's core fanned out, it was attempting to find jackson's position. no one seemed to know exactly from jackson was in the vicinity. and sure's division, a large gap would develop between bun

brigade and colonel alexander shimmelfening on the right. shimmelfening's brigade slowed to a halt. two confederate batteries under the command of crenshaw and braxton opened on the right of the advance. at the same time, shimmelfening halted his brigade. those troops would turn out to be general carney's division. this would be the first attack on jackson's line. and it was an attack that broke down quickly by the federals advancing towards his position. shurz's position was supposed to maintain the line with millroy's brigade on his left, who in turn was supposed to connect with colonel shank's core on the left. as the advance went forward, shurz's division broke their connection to millroy, who broke their connection with shank. meanwhile, another brigade advanced

rapidly, engaged the confederates first. the brigade engaged maxi gregg south carolinians. hearing the fight to his right, general millroy would send two regiments of his brigade to assist. of the fight between kurz and millroy and thomas's brigade, an ohioan recalled of the fight quote, "we had not advanced more than two rods into the woods when a terrible volley was poured in upon us from the front and from behind the railroad embankment on the left, mowing our men down like grass." franz siegel's attacks would end near 10:00 a.m. on the morning of the 29th, not alterred the tekt cal situation on the field at all. jackson's line had held. and jackson's units went on the offensive following these federal charges. but siegel would not give up. with the arrival of kerrny's division, general shursz would

order his briggaids to assault. the it was recalled of the attack, at this point a heavy shower of grapeshot and cannister pouring into us, we withdrew to the railroad dam. general shurz was under the believe that kerrny would advance with him, but he had failed to do so. as we begin to explore the early attacks against jackson's line at second manassas, one of the things that i hope is beginning to stick out about the federal plan is that each and every time these units going in, are going on on their own hook. jackson's line in its entirely has yet to be pressed to the full federal advantage in numbers. but why had general concerny failed to advance? franz siegel's assaults from shurz's brigade to millroy and shank had had a significant impact on the left of jackson's line. especially a.p. hill's front. several of these independent attacks had even broken through jackson's defense.

for example, the 82nd ohio detached by millroy to assist with kurznofsky had temporarily broken jackson's line in an area known as the dump. both participants in the morning attacks on august 29th, historians since contend that had kerrny assisted, had he followed up, and supported siegel's advance, that jackson may have been pushed out of his defensive position. was jackson's line a good defensive stand after all? general heintzleman pictured on the left, said several orders were given to him to move, but he did not. while general shurz wrote, i am persuaded if general kerrny had done at that moment what he did so gallantly later in the afternoon, if he had thrown upon the enemy's flanks we might have

decided in destroying the enemy's left wing. historian feels that an opportunity for a union success against jackson had clearly been within the realm of possibilities that morning. general kerrny after getting a late start on his battlefield march struggled to get his troops into combat on a timely basis, historian will green also conjectures that kerrny indulged in a bitter grudge. perhaps we will never know. we will never know kerrny's exacts reasons for not advancing that morning. what we do know, however is the lack of the forward movement in conjunction with the support of siegel's men had allowed jackson's line to defeat those piecemeal attacks. it is also left jackson's defense untested against equal or higher numbers numerically. by the afternoon of august 29th, general pope had arrived on the field to further coordinate his offensive attacks against jackson's line. pope's further orders for the day were to continue assaults

as a diversion until general fitz porter's division arrived. woep poep would not yield to the notion that longstreet and lee arrived to the battlefield and occupied the very front that porter was supposed to push through to get to jackson. despite pope's delusional miscalculation regarding porter, these further assaults tested just how strong jackson's defensive line was. as mid day approached pope ordered the divisions of isaac stevens and joseph hooker to move forward to replace shurz's battered units from the morning. as shurz pulled out, some of his hard-fought gains pieces of ground along the railroad were occupied by edward thomas' georgias. thomas had made a tactical mistake. he left a 125-yard gap between his line and the line of gregg's south carolinians to his left. not only would jackson's line be

tested again with larger federal assaults, it would teeter on the verge of collapse due to thomas' mistake. shortly before 3:00 p.m., grover's brigade of hooker's division moved out. expecting an order for his brigade to attack, grover rode ahead and examined the terrain. quote after rising a hill in which my command lay an open field was entered. from one edge of it, fell off to a valley through which ran a railroad embankment. beyond this the forest continued and the corresponding heights beyond were held by the enemy in force and supported by artillery. after grover returned, he received the order to advance from hooker at 3:00 p.m. hooker ordered him to advance in line of battle over this ground. past the embankment. enter the edge of the woods beyond and hold it. grover would lead the advance from diagnosen ridge at about 3:15 p.m. on the afternoon of the 29th. general millroy suggested to grover after experience that morning to go to the right and use the bayonet. deploying his five regiments,

1500-man brigade into two lines before moving forward grover explained to the men in the ranks fire one volley and rely on the bayonet. the brigade would veer right just as millroy suggested, trying to avoid the open ground. as well as maintain contact with kerrny's brigade to the right. grover was under the impression that kerrny would advance with his men, an impression that was sorely wrong. grover's direction of march brought the brigade directly into the breach. between thomas' georgians and maxi gregg's south carolinians. yet again, for the second time on august 29th, jackson's line had been pierced. also yet again confederate reinforcements would be sent forward to seal the gap and expel the federals from their new foothold. later in the afternoon, following grover's attack, as they had been defeated, another union brigade had been sent forward this brigade was under the command of general nobel. his brigade would dw into action

further left of grover's brigade and meet with many of the same results that the previous federal briggaids that had charged had received throughout date from jackson's line. following nagel's attack that day and other attacks made by nelson taylor, hooker would throw no further units into this fight. no further units into this fight. the confederates time after time would seal the breaches, and reinforcements would arrive just in the nick of time. by late afternoon on august 29th, jackson's line was about to be attacked yet again. hope would consolidate his army's position and clarify his early orders to porter to positively attack jackson's right flank. at the same point in time he ordered general kerrny to assault the left of jackson's line. a position that had been battered time and time again throughout the day. as kerrny prepared to attack along his front, a.p. hill sent jackson a message via one of his

staff officers to apprise him of the situation on his left of jackson's defense. ammunition was low and hill's troops were wary that the courier reported and hill question his ability to hold against another assault. douglas wrote when he gave this news to jackson that it seemed to deepen the shadow about his face and the silence of his group about him was oppressive. jackson told curry to return to hill with the following message, quote tell him if they attack again he must beat them. not waiting for the message to deliver, jackson got on his horse and rode in search of hill. when he rode up to hill, he said general, your men have done nobly, if you are attacked again, you will beat the enemy back. as jackson and hill discussed the situation, hill replied, here comes the next attack and he rode away. jackson called after hill, i'll expect you to beat them. the next attack that was making the way towards hill's line was that of general kerrny's men.

2,700 men from 10 regiments spread across three brigades, it was 5:00 p.m. leading kearney's division was general robinson's briggaid. general kerrny rode up to the brigade and yelled, i want you to drive those people out of the woods that are annoying hooker. hayes' men encountered pender's brigade piling over the banks in disorder. and as the 63rd and robinson's brigade moved in kearney turned to rallying the federals from nagel's and taylor's defeated brigades earlier in the day. kearney was riding up and down the line, fall in here you sons of bitches and i'll make major-generals out of every one of you. the remainder of robinson's regiments had crossed railroad and wheeled left. exposing the battle lines and

angled perfectly to strike hill's exposed flank. yet again, the federals had succeeded in cracking jackson's line. but yet again, further reinforcements would be sent to seal the breach. by 5:15 p.m. as kearney's assault moves forward he's looking for any and all available reinforcements to send forward. something he had not done earlier in the day. he would find daniel lesher's 700 men in all. they would go forward with taylor ad nagel's men that kearney had been able to rally. general kaer i didn't would ride up to stevens, and in regard to lesher's brigade asked, will these men fight? and stevens replied, by god, general kearney, these are my round-heads, referring to the 100th pennsylvania volunteers. feeling secure, kearney pointed out to lesher that this is your line of advance and sweep everything before you. look out to your left, i'll take care of your right.

the last of the federal assaults of the day had just ended and like the previous ones it had ended in a federal repulse, jackson's line had held. on jackson's left gregg's brigade had emptied cartridge boxeses and lost half its men. while the rest of the light division suffered severely as well. general hill sent word to jackson that the enemy had attacked to the front and the attack had crested and pulled back from his line. when jackson heard the news, a rare smile came across his face. tell him, i knew he would do it said jackson. thus, on august 29th, had lee, jackson, had they participated in offensive actions on the plains of manassas? or had they instituted a strong defense? on numerous occasions throughout the day jackson's line had been severely tested and at times broken. additionally because his line had bent and broken it often

required jackson's, particularly a.p. hill's brigades and regiments to go on the offensive. jackson's defense necessitated a strong offensive in its execution. at the same point in time, lee on the field in the late morning of the 29th with longstreet strongly desired to go on the attack. lee's ardor for attack was riding high. it took a combination of the aggressive jackson and the even-landed longstreet to cool lee's desire to an offensive action. but the fighting at manassas was not over. plans would begin to develop on both sides for the following days. pope wanted to attack yet again but for lee, longstreet and jackson the prevailing thought would be that no attack would come from pope on august 30th. just in case no attack came lee was beginning to prepare for other options. by 3:00 on august 30th, that attack did come. fitz john porter's massive assault against jackson's center and right spending 10,000 troops into position against this

terrain, it would be the final main federal assault on jackson's position. that attack would take place as deep cut and others along this unfinished railroad line. like so many occasions on august 30th, the federal attack would break jackson's position. yet again. confederate reinforcements arrived on the scene. just in the nick of time. by mid afternoon jackson needed help. his line was bruised, battered and broken. it had been cracked many times. federal soldiers had gotten into his line to take absolutely everything he had left to rebuild that defensive position. it was finally time for general longstreet and his wing to enter the fight. as we examined whether or not jackson's defense that we heard about today was a great defense or not, we have to ask several questions. was jackson outnumbered at any

point in time during the battle? what was the numerical reality on the field? was the myth of a mighty federal army attacking some lone small isolated confederate body of troops accurate? what we can do is look at all the numbers in the minute detail, we can tell you that at no time was jackson outnumbered on his front. and that in the defensive position. because of the nature of which general pope's federals continued to attack, over and over, they did so in a piecemeal fashion. jackson's line should have held, but was continually broken, time and time again. if it was not forced strategically placed reinforcements along the stoney ridge front, jackson might have well been pushed out of that defensive position he had taken on the 28 and 29. not only on numerous occasions through august 29 and 30, did jackson's line outweigh the attackers, due to the piecemeal attacks, but even with that advantage, jackson's line broke

almost every time as a result of those assaults. either the momentum of the assault broke the line or the attacks made by the federal forces succeeded in finding the gaps in jackson's defense. in both cases, it required numerous reinforcements to be brought to bear to restore the line. clearly, jackson's defense was not standing like a stone wall. furthermore, jackson's men had sustained numerous casualties in the defense of their position, far higher than what a defender should sustain in direct relation to the attacking clul. jackson and thus lee's casualties were incredibly high for an army that had fought two days on the defensive and a third day in which pope's army was routed from the field. the casualties sustained based on the tactics of the defense in this case did not support its use. of the 18 top regiments in the confederate army with number of highest casualties, nine are from jackson's command. the greatest percentage of casualties in a regiment in jackson's unit, they had the majority of the greatest

percentage of casualties of any other unit on the field. jackson's wing in all would lose 4,518 over those three days, nearly half of all casualties that the army of northern virginia sustained during the entirely of the second manassas campaign. ultimately, however, great or not, jackson's line had held. his men on the front lines had been instrumental in that victory. jackson and his foot cavalry were not done during this campaign, however. lee would order jackson to pursue pope and try to cut him off from his retreat towards washington. maneuver, not defense would be the strategy and tactic of the day. thank you. [ applause ] >> we have time for one or two questions. anybody have any questions for dan? one question in the back here.

again, a reminder, please introduce yourself, tell us from you're from and please make sure you have a question. >> i'm mike watt, dan, great presentation. i want you to elaborate more on lee's strategic defensive move, as opposed to an offense move in preparation for second manassas. >> the question is what does lee know in july and august and how does it influence his strategic planning during that time period. surely the number one concern for lee in the month of july is mcclellan, despite everything that lee has done, mcclellan is still on the virginia peninsula and his army is massive, over 100,000 men are still in the virginia peninsula. lee does become aware of the

army under pope that is assembling and moving, but even at that point in time lee has no strategic plans of an offensive nature or defensive nature. towards pope. he still all eyes on mcclellan. as further intelligence continues to flood in to lee's headquarters, lee begins to feel that mcclellan is less of a credible threat on the virginia peninsula. and i'll contend that the reason why he sends jackson in an offensive maneuver is because of pope's advance. towards the confederate capital. if lee does not go on the offensive to stop pope from moving further south against the confederate line of supply, but against confederate line of communication towards the confederate capital it squeezes lee from two directions. so the aggressive movement by pope moving south forces lee to go on the offensive. to stop pope from moving further towards the supply line, towards the route of the capital and towards placing him in a

position of a classic pincer movement. if he sends jackson there defensively and pope continues to push forward, it gives lee less room to maneuver out of a possible pinser movement. >> thank you very much. [ applause ] american history tv on c-span tv focuses on the civil war all week. at 8:00 p.m. eastern tonight, a seminar on civil war leadership with talks about con federal general robert e. lee and ulysses s. grant. >> grand lark cases returns live next thursday on c-span. join us to hear stories of the people who sparked ground breaking cases and the justices and lawyers who were key to the supreme court's