live coverage in washington.

this is a annual event that the japan program hosts to invade thinkers who we often don't get to listen to here in washington. this year i am extremely honored to have these leaders. they have been my mentors. i respected them deeply. they have caught me so many things over the years that i have known them. i'm very very happy they agreed to come to washington and talk to us this morning. you all have a bio in the program that's in your seats. i save you from a lengthy

introduction. it is to demonstrate joint operations on self-defense forces and we will listen to what they have in mind about future defense posture. before i start i'm a director of japan program here. this annual event could not have happened without a lot of the sponsors and supporters of the japan program. i would very much like to thank all of the japan program

supporters at this occasion. you can see the list of supporters at the back of this pro su bro sure. hopefully this will grow over the years. a couple of administrative announcements before we start the program. first of all you all picked -- some of you picked up the trancelation head siet. there are ones right outside of this room. channel 2 is english and channel 10 is japanese. the speakers are going to speak in japanese so you'll probably need -- most of you will probably need the head sets and get to channel number two. if you haven't done so please do so at this time while i'm stretching my time making these announcements.

you'll also notice that you see a note card and a pen or pencil in your seat to conduct the q and a session more efficiently. i usually do this only for this event. but as you listen to the speakers write down questions. finally, the head sets, when you leave this room, please leave it in your seat. it is very important. these are expensive. please help us. and this is how we are going to do, the first half an hour, 45 minutes i will pose them a couple of questions and ask

their responses and after i go through those couple of questions we are opening up the floor to your questions and their feed backs. so with that i will go ahead and start with the first question. so since the prime minister came into the office he promoted the peace and security legislation. under his watch japanese government had reinterpreted the constitutional interpretation of whether japan can or not. so from outside particularly here in washington it looks to us tliek are great changes that

are happening on the legal foundations and policy orientations in a way of how japan engages in the area of international security in particular. how does that look to you? do you feel that japan should reorient in the way that it engages with the world in the realm of security policy? i'll start from you and i think i'll go down the aisle. >> before i answer this question there are two things i would like to say on behalf of myself and my colleagues.

the first is that recently there have been two marine disasters near japan. they had accidents close to our country and as a result 17 sailors parished. as a representative of the self-defense forces i would like to express my condolences. their wonderful contribution has helped to maintain peace in our region and helped to bolster our national security. i would like to once again express my thanks to the united states for its work and also to express my condolences for these

irreplaceable lives that were lost. that's the first thing i wanted to say. the second is she has been supporting us for a number of years and self-defense forces as a whole. so it's wonderful that we have the opportunity to spend time with you today. the three of us are graduates of national defense and we have had long relationships with her and also stimson center has played a large contribution to allowing us to have direct talks and exchanges of views and i would like to express my thanks to her for everything she has done.

as far as the question i was just asked i believe prime minister has changed our posture through his idea of a corrective contribution to peace and we -- those of us who have served in the self-defense forces feel that our constitution something that we need to protect and something we need to do. it is important for us to pursue corrective contribution and the fact that we have had new interpretation of our constitution allows us to change our stance. it has been changed in security legislation. further, as far as what we can

do, we have been able -- as a result of some of the changes brought about to support the united states so we are able to do things that we were not able to do because of the checks placed by the contribution. further, japan with its article 9 of its constitution was not allowed to use force and some people misunderstand and think that we will be using force. that is not the case. the constitution has not changed. we will not use force outside of japan. there's no change in our stance. so it may look as though there hasn't been much change in our constitution, in our room for operation, but some people may also think why is it that there's so much discussion in japan.

what i can tell you is that our public sentiments are still not completely mature. we don't know how it is that we should act, how it is that we should be on the international stage and what it is that we should do to maintain peace. should we do something outside of japan to try to maintain global peace? and i think that the change will allow us now to play a larger role than we could up until now. some of the public -- the media in japan wants to try to lead people in thinking that there will be a change in our constitution, that it will be a dangerous path from here on, but that is not the case. we have not had really an adult conversation in japan about

this. i think we have had a couple of steps forward and so i think that that's one thing i would like to have you understand. as far as i'm concerned of the navy and up until now i have been in a position where i have had to keep from criticizing the united states but now that i'm app dem academic. as far as the question that she asked about japan's national security policies, whether it has changed or not i think that the coalition partners have --

it looks as though it has changed their stance, but if you look from a different angle what you can see is that things have not changed drastically. it is just that the government, there was not much progress in terms of our legislation and relating to national security. and basically i think what has happened is there has been little bit of a changed. there are a number of different things that happened. one thing i can point to is the

fact that the government released the captain of a chinese fishing vessel that caused an accident. the other thing is the east great japan earthquake. i don't think the government responded effectively. and so this basically set the stage for a change in government. how is it that japan will change its stance on security issues? one thing is if you look at the guideline it's easy to understand. the guideline itself was published in 1978 for the first time and it set out to be a road map for cooperating under our alliance. in 1997 this was revised and

then it was -- from 1993 to 1994 there was the first korean crisis. there was a discussion about what it is we should do to support the united states in the case of a crisis around us. so the guideline was revised with that in mind. and then in 2005 there was another revision of the guideline. in 2015 this was revised after the earthquake and title wave so there was an idea about not just crisis in our environment around us but also what we can do to respond to domestic issues. it should be involved in its

national security and what sort of policies should it pursue. one thing i think we need to do is continue to apply our policies this is what's happening in north korea -- rather it's possible in the future that north korea might have missiles, might have nuclear weapons. that sort of thinking did not exist when it was revised. there is a question whether the most recent revision is in line with the times or not. so i think this is something we are going to need to think

about. we need to have a 24 hour operation that will allow us to respond to any crises that might generate and we need to look at what we need to do in a three party type situation with south korea. what it is that we can do together with not only the u.s. and japan but also the u.s., japan and korea. another thing i should talk about is that there's a limit to what forces can do. >> and therefore japan reaches the united states and also south

korea and those countries should work together to get that deployed force how we maintain. i think the corporation is really needed in that regard. it is important to be deployed. thirdly, in order to reduce a u.s. burden japanese engagement in the region we need to revise once again and the burden which is currently born by the united states in order to reduce that we should take more initiative in order to contribute to the peace and stability of the

region. there is a good possibility. i think we should discuss u.s. forces in order to have a better coordination between japan and the united states. i think it would be the new way for japan to engage in this region. thank you for this opportunity. >> i was involved in the project to think about the u.s. foreign policy and from different think tanks of the washington, d.c. i was invited to attend the symposium. i mostly turned down and i returned to japan and then i i

could not turn down the request. thank you very much for this wonderful opportunity. before answering her question very briefly i would like to ta united states and how the appliance between the two countries should work and the 1954, the sdf and defense agency was established. the ground defense force in 1950, the one year before the korean war, it was -- is it started as a reserve police officer and two years before the maritime started but the self-defense forces 73 years ago in 1954, the forces -- 63 years ago, no that was started -- and that after that there is a good development of the sdfs. but if i may summaryize briefly, during the cold war era and in

1989 there was collapse of berlin war, the cold war collapse, however even after that the sdfs together with the u.s. forward deployment forces in order to keep their presence including logistical activities had been making great efforts particularly the maritime and air soelf-defense forces and th ground forces in order to put emphasis on the northern area including hokkaido and also both maritime and the air, surveillance activities have creased, so together with the u.s. members we had been fighting together. that's what i'd like to emphasize at the beginning and after the terror and also for other -- the u.s. -- the american bases in japan we had been protecting those bases

together and as was already explained by the two speakers. there have been signs of changes and as sdf have come to the point where we really need to adjust our roles and in 2015, the security legislation was formulated and during the peace time. i think we all incorporated into what we can do during the peace time in that legislation. emergency or contingency in order tort sdf to play the role of -- there are more things to be done so we have come to the point where we really think about those points more seriously. >> thank you. i think that's a great segue into the second question i have for all of you. we talked about the -- how japan had responded and adjusted to the changes in international

security environment and which resulted in the internal changes that you all laid out. so in that context just as was pointed out, if the self-defense forces is at the phase indeed to really, we think about how to posture themselves to respond to such changes, what kind of defense posture should the self-defense force look for, looking over next ten, 15, 20 years? i guess i will start again with you and go down, perhaps. >> thank you very much. the ever changing security environment that was mentioned in order to share that concept together as of four years ago as

the government there was a cabinet decision that was the national defense program guideline that is a program for the next ten years and i would like to touch upon that. and when we think about the changing security environment, north korea, china and russia, those are very important factors to take into consideration, seven or eight years ago, we thought that north korea was the crisis there and the china -- the crisis in near future and russia was the crisis in distant future. that was our interpretation seven or eight years ago but over the last four to five years, i think there has been some change in the -- our perception and the north korea, this is exactly the immediate

eminent threat and that china i think for the near future and russia, unless you watch closely, it will be very dangerous. i think those are the changes of perception about the crisis and four years ago under those circumstances in order to respond to the change of the crisis, they integrated defense posture. so in other words, at the southwestern islands which were the vacuum, that is from the south of -- to taiwan and the china called it the first island chain from okinawa to the southwestern islands and the taiwan and philippines and that is the first island change and 1,400 kilometer the distance in this region and there the grand self-defense forces -- the force were deployed in area coming to

taiwan there were no other force. so there was vacuum of the forces in this region. and first that vacuum historically when we consider that china over the 50 to 100 years, china has been building up their strengths and you can see the south -- in the south china sea. so without creating the force, we really have to build up our force structure so is that the concept from four to five years. the vacuum area of the southwestern islands we decided to build up and strengthen the power and there are three things. the first is -- we have a standing force here in this region and second stage is when there is any emergency or contingency here, new force will

be injected and the force will be injected in order to eliminate the vacuum in this southwestern area in order to strengthen the deterrence so those are the two ways to increase a deterrence. in the third stage still some island is taken by the opponent. we have to retake it so the new force for that purpose is created. so those are three -- the phases in order to avoid and fill the gap of the vacuum of the southwestern islands in order to build up the defense but that program was started four years ago and we are in the fourth year so we're in the mid-way but there is help with the u.s. forces this program has been

moving steadily. >> both the united states and japan are attempting to maintain the status quo. the -- there are neighborhoods that are trying to change the status quo but in order to keep the status quo what is it that wee need to do, the maritime self-defense forces is thinking about what japan needs to be able to do in order to maintain it and as far as maritime self-defense is concerned, what i'd like to say is that we want to have two kinds of deterrence one is deterrence by punishment and one is deterrence by denial and these two kinds of deterrents would allow us to maintain the status quo. india and the pacific ocean in

order to maintain the status quo here we need to have sufficient forces. the third is to have a strong u.s.-japan alliance and we and the self-defense forces -- the maritime self-defense forces must do their part in order to maintain a strong alliance with the united states. as far as deterrence is concerned, people often think about nuclear weapons, but there are two kinds of nuclear weapons, one is tactical and one is strategic. we of course are dependent on the united states for nuclear deterrence and what it is that japan can do is to maintain deterrence with conventional weapons and so in order to do that, japan needs to strengthen its forces and also japan has -- needs to be able to maintain and strengthen its deterrence by denial. and as i said earlier about

north korea and the change of situation there, what is it that we can do to respond to that? what we need to do is to strengthen our cooperation with the united states in our region. one other thing is the reactive versus proactive deterrence. up until now the self-defense forces especially the maritime self-defenses forces had reactive deterrence and what that means is if something happened we would be able to respond. we had ability to respond and that would include the -- our vessels and our planes. one thing is antisubmarine warfare in order to respond to something with a submarine.

we would look at that threat, we would sink the ship that was posing a threat, that's sort of reactive but proactive defense has to do more with gray zone operations. for instance, always having sufficient information. also to have a situation where under the sea and on top of the sea and if there were a crisis we would be able to use that in order to gain the advantage if hostilities were to break out. and so this sort of proactive deterrence is something that i think we need to enhance for the self-defense forces in the future. >> so i'm hoping to hear -- >> okay.

then i will talk about the air self-defense forces. the u.s. air force 1947 and we have only had an air force since 1954 and the imperial army did have a air force component. it was set up in 1910. that was the first time in which we had an air force in japan and in 1945 we lost or the end of world war ii and that was the end of our air force. we've really only had this new air force for a relatively short period of time. it's been 35 years since our air force was set up. so in order for us to have an organization that can fight

effectively, we need to keep in mind the fact that there's not much history to our air force and the united states air force really was also set up after world war ii and so what is it -- what kind of role should our forces play in the air? basically, it is to support operations on the ground and on the sea. there are many different discussions about this and various ideas, perhaps the air forces should be more independent. they should have their own planning, their own operations. some people have that sort of view on things and this was tried during the persian gulf war. and so we need to keep this historical perspective in mind when we think about what it is that the air forces should do. i think that one thing is that

the air force needs to have extremely advanced technology at its hands, and the air self-defense forces, what is it that we need to do and as far as the two ideas about protecting the southwest islands and enhancing our deterrence, i think that self-defense forces fit into here having especially a deterrent effect. the idea of having strategic nuclear weapons in japan is not something we're considering now, but our air service defense forces is charged with protecting the country with conventional weapons. how can we enhance deterrence with conventional weapons. this is something we need to consider. this is something that is really at the center of what it is that

we need to think about. >> if the person can start collecting the cards, have them -- if you have the card already filled up, wave to these two people and then they'll come and get your card and give it to me. thank you. up to here we talked about how japan should engage in the world and what type of defense posture is appropriate for the -- for self-defense force to adequately provide a national defense but when you think about these goals, what are the challenges that you see either internally or externally? and i think for the last question, i think i might flip the order and if that's okay, i would like to start and come back down. >> as i said earlier, since the

beginning of the self-defense forces, we've had quite an abrupt difference from the imperial army. we've had a very close cooperation with the united states, also we have had our thinking, our tactics our technology and our logistical support in all of these areas, our self-defense forces function as a defense force of a democratic country and we've learned a lot from the united states in that regard. the united states really helped us to build up our forces and i think that we need to think from here on out what it is that we can do to have joint planning with the united states, to have better planning with our wonderful friends in the united states. i think it's the most important thing we need to think about.

>> you're always in the middle, sor sorry. >> let me talk a little bit more in abstract terms. unfortunately this will be a little bit abstract. i think the one thing we need to do is to make sure that we are aware of the situation, have a good take on the situation. there are -- have been huge changes in the international security arena and what is it that japan needs to do to respond to this. we really need to have a clear view of what's happening and we need to try to have a better clear view of what's happening. as i said earlier, the guidelines that are currently in place may not be sufficient to deal with today's realities so these might need to be revised.

we need to know -- we need to have a clear take on what's happening and use that for our the course in which we'll proceed. there is an assessment and in order to compare that relative forces we come to understand the short fall. also -- which is a dynamic so those are the ways that we have to make more efforts and i think the general will talk about this more, so assessment in a statistic -- in a static way, japan has not been very eager up to this point so we have to reinforce the static of assessment and also both public and private we should share the crisis, the consciousness and awareness and as a nation a static approach is really needed and in japan we have a national security council which was established and so that could

prepare the nation properly. now we are able to turn to the same future and we are able to move ahead together. the private sector should also be involved in order to have a breakthrough in a crisis situation in order to address all different types of crisis, how to result the private and public work together. in the next -- we do have a country which can handle this very well. one country in government is able to control the resources, time and energy freely including the private sector. so just like the south china sea, reclamation in -- by china started but when the timing they actually created the official

island in a very speedy manner. so resource and the energy could be used under the government's discretion very freely by our neighbor. so in order for japan to respond the public and private should work together to make efforts moving to the same direction. and the since the change is so rapid now needs to be maintained in a very robust manner and rather than overdepending on united states, what japan can do independently that we need to think about, if you think about maritime self-defense force, the -- we learn from the u.s. navy, we introduce new equipment and also learn from new tactics from u.s. navy but now time has changed. the maritime self-defense force together with navy we have to develop the new equipment, new

tactics and we have to think together how to fight the war and i think that's what the u.s. navy wants us to do if that is a different i would like you to tell us but so the asia pacific region, the relative u.s. influence not absolute but relative influence has been in decline at least in our perception, so maritime self-defense force with navy we should make joint efforts to keep can u.s. presence constantly in this region. so in other words, we should make up for the some of the short fall of u.s. farorces and that is the purpose of the alliance and i think we should work together with that purpose. >> from my side, as i said, we need to understand the current stat theus, so when the four years ago when we created the

national defense program guideline, although the vector, the direction is the same but the pace of change has been accelerated. if you think about the north korea, the other day, the second time their missile flew over the hokkaido, so missile and the nuclear, the threat is real one so for over the last two years. the threat has increased. so we do need to challenge this and make a force for that purpose. and the china -- china's aggressive stance in south china sea and from east china sea for the first time the passing the strait of nialko moved to the pacific ocean in a very rapid space as a fleet, the activities

become more aggressive so a to ad which is the finest by america, and this china strategy they have already demonstrated by using their own -- the activities of naval and air force activities of china have become more aggressive. we do need to step up our efforts to respond to this change and the other change is u.s. -- there is a change of u.s. the strategy -- and so in order to counter that, the first -- the first island chain we treat u.s. forces to the east of guam and the first island chain defense is left up to the alliance -- allied countries and

using long distance strike try to contain china, we heard that that strategy has been currently studied. if that strategy becomes reality as mr. takei mentioned, so how we should strongly defend the first island chain, so i think over the last four years, i think that's what we really study from now. so with all those changes, the japan have come to the point of revising the national defense program guidelines since four years ago, the situation has changed and in order to adapt ourself to the new change, new revised national defense program guidelines should be put in place and visa vie, the prime minister also gave the instruction to study this. and so what kind of change is necessary? i think government will be thinking about this but my

personal view is that the north korea should be further reinforced -- and those alone cannot withstand the many attacks from north korea and therefore in order to farther strengthen japanese capability -- and government already announced that that would be deployed very soon and that should be done quickly and toward china the defense of the southwestern islands, the three -- the services of japan have done that but we should reinforce that and the third set, the strategy if there is a retreat of the u.s. forces to the guam, the -- the defense of the southwestern islands or first island japan should step up efforts to defend this and as

mr. takei mentioned, we should never forget the standpoint of farther enforcing japan's alliance and there is that japan-u.s. bilateral planning, in other words, on a very equal basis, we should consider japan-u.s. forces together and four years ago the guideline was established and i didn't think that the total alignment of japan-u.s. forces was not done under that guideline -- after two years we had a guideline japan-u.s. defense corporation but i think they should have been done together because mission capability should be carried out in a joint consultation meetings and then in order to introduce bmd not

only in the inception but strike against the enemy base. well the u.s. has been the sword and japan has been the shield that is mission role capability, the sword and the shield between japan and u.s. but we need to think about this once again. so the part of the strike capability on the enemy basis can be owned by japan and so in other words, i think we need to have a more good alliance of the strategy between japan and united states. i think that importance will farther increase between japan and the united states and mr. takei said the net assessment or mission assessment. so i think we need to farther study the mission assessment and america has created the vision

and it's been implemented this to make it more concrete and it has formulated policies whenever the contingencies occur and in japan there is no net assessment office or csab so now we need to create those functions because we are counterpart to the united states so organizational setup needs to be proved and so we should have a better realignment between japan and united states in order to consider the force structure. >> thank you. and there is actually a member from csb in this audience, so they should be grateful for the prop that just gave them. i'm going to open up the floor to the question and answer and actually, you stole my first question because especially given the yesterday's missile

launch by north korea, there were a lot of questions on north korea particularly focusing on the potential for japan to have a counterattack capabilities and do you support. there were very direct question about shouldn't japan have a tomahawk, so -- so we already heard what you heard on it. let's continue on that line and ask admiral takei to see if -- if you have some additional thoughts to add on the -- weather japan should be really seriously considering counterattack capability or in case of something a little bit more drastic like tomahawk, whichever one of you -- you're spared from this because you've already done this. it's open to either of you.

[ speaking in foreign language ] >> the idea of having ability to attack enemy base, counterattack capability, when you think of bmd, there are four things that are important. the first is to enhance our ability to strike down a missile and that has to do with the ejus peace and also deterrence to be able to strike enemy missile bases. another thing is that we have the control cooperation with the united states, we need to continue that and then missile defense whether we can protect 100% against missiles. i think that's very difficult.

so what is it we can do about damage control if we were not able to shoot down 100% of the missiles. and so that's the counterattack capability. japan does not have this at all and my colleagues have something to say about that, but given that what is it that we can do? as i said earlier, u.s.-japan strategy needs to be more in alignment. we need to be more aware of what it is that we need to do and keep that in mind as we attain arm aments, targeting information and total overall strategy, we need to have a 360-degree view of this and without cooperation with the united states, there's -- we really don't have that much we can do. we need to be more on the same page with the united states.

>> the question about north korea that our icbm that north korea has and what should japan be able to do against that, there has been a lot of discussion about this and what we need to keep in mind is that around japan, there are countries that have nuclear missiles, long range missiles, short range missiles, medium range missiles. these countries already exist in our neighborhood, russia, china, they already have nukes and these missiles and whether we can -- should have the tomahawk or whether we should be able to shoot down missiles or not, we really don't think too much about this or hear too much about this in japan and the reason for that is that we

always feel the presence of the united states with good relationship with the united states, a good alliance with the united states that the united states has our back. the other reason why there's not much discussion of this is that china and russia are considered to be rational actors. they can make a reasonable decision. they're not rogue nations, china and russia are not -- so they have these weapons but they're rational actors and china and russia are basically friendly states to japan and so we have the nuclear deterrence of the united states and we've been able to rely on that so we haven't had to do too much by ourselves, when it comes to north korea, separate from the nuclear issue, we need to think whether they are rational or

not. why does north korea want to have nukes? what does it want to have icbm? i imagine they want to maintain the kim dynasty or to ensure the continuation of the regime. i think that's one of the reasons and what will -- what would north korea do with nuclear weapons, i think there's no way they would give up their nuclear weapons and i think it's of course north korea poses a grave challenge to us. and then you consider what is it we should do given that? how can we counter that? when north korea is able to put a nuclear warhead on a missile, i imagine it'll be difficult to deter them with american nuclear deterrence and should japan be able to shoot that down, that's when you think about the

tomahawk missiles and my answer is i don't know. i think that this is something the government's going to have to decide. it'll be very difficult. what does -- as i said earlier, we -- if north korea's able to make rational decisions we might not have to worry about this, but if north korea cannot make rational decisions then we'll have to have some way to counterer that threat. should we have our own capability or should we continue to depend on the united states. tomahawk or the ability to shoot enemy bases, this is not something we can just do with a couple of missiles. we need to have better information gathering, recognizance and counterattack, what to do if there is an attack, we need an overall system, also we need to think of it in terms of an overall theater, so it's not an easy one answer solution. there's no one solution to the

question posed. >> let me try to put this into perspective a little bit. in march of this year, there was discussion of having -- there was a possibility -- there's a discussion of having capability to strike an enemy base and this is something that was deliberated in the diet and the discussion focused on long distance missiles, whether -- whether these were allowable in a legal sense or not and the idea was probably yes, and one large issue that came up is if japan were to arm itself with the ability to be offensive, this would be a huge change in our posture, we would have to have a system for targeting, we

would have to have more surveillance, we'd have to have better information gathering, what sort of weapons should we have, what sort of platform would we need, so this is an overall systems approach that necessary. we'd have to really start all over again in our arm aments approach and so the united states of course in this regard is extremely important and i'm glad to be able to have channels to talk to the united states, but i think this would be a large change in our traditional posture. i think we need to take time and have more discussion on this. to add to that there is one thing we can do without spending more money and that is to include -- japan in american armaments. for instance, tomahawks missiles and other armaments, we could have joint operations with the

united states. that wouldn't require us to spend money and so -- but in that regard we would have to lift the political and other obstacles we've had up until now. >> since the general raised the possibility that depending on the discussion toward the new -- new national defense program guidelines and perhaps more specifically mid-term defense program there may be a need for self-defense forces to look at how to equip themselves very differently from the past programs, and we often talk about cyber as the very new domain that perhaps such orientation can start from and i just -- and that's actually another question that given that japan is hosting a couple of major international sporting

event, 2019, and in 2020 there's tokyo olympics so it seems to me that cyber may be the very ripe area where these kind of how to equip themselves, what kind of capability that self-defense force also needs to have and perhaps japan, all of the government approach, also needs to have is very appropriate. i just want to get reaction and how do you feel about cyber space and how self-defense force should tackle this very new battle domain. whoever would like to start, signal me and i would ask you. >> outer space operation it must commit itself because for the

future this is a new battle domain and therefore there's no way but thinking about this seriously and in u.s. the forces, those who engage in cyber operation, if you look at the size of the operation and the size of the operation in sdfs, this is just oso the sdf operation is still very small compared to u.s. so it's not injected in this important area. that we need to change. and so the -- the -- what we begin to do is have defense posture or structure which is in accordance with our national strengths so when we think about the future, the defense structure or posture, japanese domestic issue is very important and grave and particularly for

the defense vision, the strategic environment is its spaces. for instance, declining population in japan and the very difficult recruit young members in sdf in japan any more in coming years and economically or fiscally, the difficult condition continues and therefore the overall, circumstances we need to improve the defense posture, so limited resources, how we best utilize it and how we recruit them effectively. in other words, we cannot get everything we want so what we are able to have is limited resources and how those limited resources can be effectively, efficiently used is a very important and cyber and outer space is a new challenge and therefore we need to put more

emphasis in those new domains and maybe there's efforts to stop what we're doing so far. >> and about the cyber area as mr. hiranaku mentioned already between the united states, those who engaining in cyber issues in the united states they're the tens of thousands and in japan is about the hundred. in other words, 100s of the size of u.s. so we need to increase the size of cyber operation in japan so it integrated the cyber operation and each service cyber operation so i think for both the self-defense forces have been making efforts but not only the self-defense forces but government as a whole created has already created the organization to counter in order

to prepare for the tokyo olympics and i think i'm sure we need to address the cyber more seriously. so new domain is also electromagnetic area, in china and russia and in three services, grounds, air and maritime and so in addition to that, the three, the cyber outer space and the electronics and so those cross domain that combat, the study has been carried out so in those new domains, what kind of combat and fighting can be possible. i think we need to join this kind of study. >> in cyber space, how we should carry out activities. i think we need to now take the very concrete steps for the

maritime self-defense forces like tenth fleet of the u.s. navy, something like that should be the owned by the japanese self-defense forces in order to strengthen our capability against cyber, which has already mentioned japan is somewhat delayed in this area and therefore we need to have a support from the united states including educational support and those efforts have started since several years ago. and at maritime self-defense force, i should say in navy and if the sea -- the ship goes to the sea, people assume that there is no cyberattack on the ship, however, even the latest of u.s. navy there's seven hole.

if there's a hole at the bottom, the ship sinks but there's seven holes inside the domain so the gps, the second is that communication satellite, through the communication satellite from cyber domain there is a chance of invasion. so the john mccain collision, the fitzgerald collision, there is always the worry that the cyberattack might be possible and there is the investigation carried out. so that has become -- the threat has become already reality for u.s. navy and therefore i think that we should follow the suit and -- the same sea area but when the two -- the navies, u.s. and japan work together. u.s. is and japan is not equipped properly, i think we're

not able to engage in effective joint operation but therefore we need to step up air force so u.s.-japan coordination can be well organized. >> thank you. these three gentlemen really makes my job easier because they feed off of each other and this is exactly why i wanted them to come together so i'm really glad that they're able to do so. let me switch gear a little bit and talk about japan and the other u.s. allies and partners in the region. japan has been investing a lot in its security relationship with southeast asian countries, countries like australia, india and in light of ratcheting up tensions in korean peninsula, south korea is also a natural partner or at least its supposed

to be that way. how do you see japan's future of japan's security cooperation with these countries? i think probably i would put south korea in a little different categories from the rest because this is really in response to very specific and concrete threat, but more generally relations with country southeast asian, australia, india and even i would say even with europe nowadays. who would like to start? >> the rule of law and free navigation in the seas, in order to maintain these we need to cooperate with countries who

have the same values as ours and in the center of that, of course the united states and in order to fill in some of the gaps that exist, we need to be able to cooperate with other countries and if you think about the oceans, europe and you're asia is on the edge of euro asia continent and the northern route will be opening up as a result of changes and this would allow us to -- or force us to think about the safety and security of countries in northern europe and sfors australia is concerned -- we need to look at the indian ocean, also the regional powers, india it cannot be ignored,

australia cannot be ignored also. another country indonesia which is becoming having more of -- is becoming more of a sea power al also. the uk which has bases in the middle east, so these are countries that agree with us and the importance of the world law and free and open oceans. as far as south korea is concern concerned, it's geographical issue between our two countries it's a different dimension. how is it that we can deter north korea? how is it that we can maintain the status quo as we talked earlier about the cooperation between united states, japan and south korea. japan and south korea have a

common geographical issue. what is it that japan can do? what is it that south korea can do? we -- once the united states, japan and south korea are able to work for effectively together then we can use our geographical advantage -- our geographical conditions to our advantage. if you just think of this in defense terms, deterring north korea requires that our three countries work together. >> and as he said, i agree with what he had to say and if there's a country that wants to change the status quo through power, we need to work together with the united states and to south korea or the united states and australia in this try lat ral or in the multi-lateral arrangement and so for the past

ten years, the u.s.-japan and australia have been conducting strategic talks also from a different perspective. there is the philippines which is part of the island chain concept and the united states navy is not able to go into the philippines recently and japan might be able to fill in some of the gaps that exist with the united states in concert with the philippines. also veet nap is a country that has issues with china and vietnam has worked with japan under the ejus of the pko in about three different operations there's also mongolia and also india and so these countries i think we need to cooperate with them and have a multi-lateral or

trilateral arrangement in order to be able to counter any actor that might try to change the status quo by force. >> after 2000 the self-defense forces has been engaged in defense personal exchanges and there has been quite a lot of discussion about other countries with which we should cooperate and the first thing we need to do is make sure that there is no accidents, that there are no mishaps and other things that we can do joint practice, joint exercises and then the final level would be fighting together with other countries and so the ministry of defense is looking at these issues and one thing i'd like to point out is that the u.s.-japan relationship i think that all of you in the room are quite interested in the relationship between our two countries and we consider you --

many of you to be wonderful friends but as far as our relation, it's different for instance, the relationship between the united states and the uk. there's quite a large distance and what is that distance. the difference is i can only talk really about defense issues but if you look at the united states and its foreign policy we have -- uk has a number of venues in which it can think and share the same values and thoughts as the united states but as far as japan is concerned, i think that we're not currently at that state and i think that we should be able to become more in line with the united states, be able to think more on the same page as the united states and we need to increase our intelligence level in order to be able to do that. we do have a wonderful relationship trust with the united states but in the worst scenario can japan really fully

exercise its capability or not? that's something we need to think about. >> thank you. this is actually a good segue into some of the interesting questions. we talked about japan's potential relationship with other u.s. allies and partners in the region. i wonder if i can get a thought from you on japan and taiwan. obviously, there's no formal diplomatic ties but japan and taiwan have culturally, economically people to people grassroots level, they've to have enjoyed a close relationship friendly relationship and, in fact -- in fact, a lot of the times, in terms of revision of the guidelines sometimes people here

raise is what -- where would japan fit in case of taiwan contingen contingency? and is there independent taiwan security cooperation similar to the interaction that u.s. and taiwanese have? so i just wanted to get the -- your general thought on either potential or limitations of japan's security relationship with taiwan. i realize it's a sensitive question so i'll give you a moment to pause. but there are several people who are -- who are very keen to know your thoughts on this, so it's my obligation to pose that. >> so i will give you an answer to the extent that i'm able.

strategically, we are part of the same first island chain as taiwan from okinawa, 1,400 miles south. the unigui is the farthest south of our country and we have 180 people on patrol and from 100 kilometers south of that is taiwan. it's very close and the next cry down is the philippines, so strategically i think that also from the ad perspective we need to cooperate with taiwan. that's my feeling. on the other hand, as the question was asked, as far as formal diplomatic relationship, this does not exist, so our active officers -- are not able to engage in exchanges with taiwan's forces but we can just leave the situation as it is or can we just leave it as it is?

could we have a track two relationship with taiwan? that might be a possibility. that's about the only thing i can say. that's about as far as i can go in my answer. >> you did all you could. >> as far as the japan maritime defense forces and taiwanese counterpart there is no relationship currently. up until now we've not had any exchanges with them, but if you think about preventing accidents at sea it might be a little bit more advantageous if we did have -- shouldn't they be able to acknowledge each other. there are signals that ship's use to communicate and they allow them to express their intentions and so i think that

we probably need to move in that direction with taiwan as well. and then what is it that japan might be able to do with taiwan? that becomes a political issue, policy issue so i can't really address that, but i think this is something we need to consider. and then indirectly, the taiwan issue has quite a large influence on american presence in our america. we need to keep that in mind. japan needs to keep this in minds. in concrete terms, china's wants to have unification with taiwan and to the extent that taiwan is not reunited with china the chinese communist party is not able to follow through on one of its commitments, so for the

communist party in china, taiwan will continue to be central point of interest. and if there were to be a crisis in taiwan, there would be quite a dilemma. in other words, if something were to occur, the united states would be able to guarantee the energy route and what can we do during times of peace, the indian ocean and other areas need to be paid attention to and so this taiwan dilemma has quite a lot of different implications. and if the united states had a less of a presence in our neighborhood, this would -- effect us quite a lot and we would need to not only have deterrence but also to be able to exercise control.

if ships had to go around taiwan, it would be quite inconvenient and so we think of what it is that we can do to cooperate with the united states in order to deal with any issue that might occur in taiwan. >>translator: the taiwan issue, i think japan will be affected seriously. and so china and taiwan, if there is a cross straight of emergency or contingency, china, which is a greater power than north korea, i think there is just incredible impact on japan. so we do need to think about all those scenarios. but u.s./taiwan relations, it is very delicate, just like

japan/thailand relations constituently in diet, the diet member who called the taiwan country had to have some penalty. and so have to call it territory. and so however, actually there is significant impact if anything happens between china and taiwan. so we really have to have good exercise of our mind. >> i think this will probably be the last question to pose all of you. again, i would like to go back to what the general said in the beginning about the challenges other than defense equipment and policy that japan faces, like aging population, very strict fiscal pressure. so non-military challenges that

japan has when it comes to thinking about japan's defense for the future. in a sense, in the united states also we have been going through a period of defense budget cut, sequestration has been put in effect at some level a few years ago. we have not seen that yet, but it could come back, depending on how the budget negotiation goes. and more and more, especially since the beginning of the trump administration, there is an increased level of discussion that u.s. allies should not only do more, but provide more resources for its own defense. as most of these people in the

room, including ourselves, know, japan spends about roughly 1% of gdp on its defense, which is extremely low percentage given the capability that it needs to have. and how would you respond to this, you know, average american question saying why should we spend our taxpayers' dollars to in a sense protect japan and provide stability in the asia-pacific when japan only spends a fraction of what we spend? how would you respond to that? >> translator: thank you very

much. just as our perception, the abe government has been making efforts. if you look at the budget requests by the government in august, that is a time of the budget request. and if you look at the gross vis-a-vis the last year and after the abe government, t the .8% annually. but next year, if you look at the gross of the budget from this year to next year, 2.5% the gross is projected. so at least the government has been making a lot of efforts to increase the budget. so whether the 1% of the gdp is enough, i think it has already exceeded the 1%. and trump administration asked nato the 2%. i think that is right approach

and i think that will be addressed to japan as well. so based on that assumption, if i answer the question and you as taxpayers pay money and send u.s. forces to the asia -- but that is not only for america. actually they work for the peace and stability of far east, asia and also eventually this is for america. and so the taxes paid by the taxpayer is not only for the protection of japan. that is for the world and for america eventually. >> translator: yesterday when i discussed the speaker, we discussed on that issue. and in japan the ministry of

defense if we want to double our budget, whether we are able to use ways to spend that increased budget now we are not able to think about the ways to spend increased budget. because ever since establishment, the old joint staff office or defense industry and the ministry of defense, of course their mindset is a very clever housewife. that is if the budget is very limited, we are able to handle with limited budget. but we can just cut back our budget from the $10 vegetable to the $5 vegetable and we can survive. so if suddenly we are told that you are able to buy the vegetable of $10, not $5, very difficult to change our diet, because our body cannot

withstand that and our stomach may not absorb that. so we really have to think very carefully about how to increase. there are two ways to increase a budget. the one is just what is the ceiling of percentage is a different argument. whether we can increase the budget, what we have to think is that the reenforcement of japanese defense capability and this strengthening of the capability, whether that will enforce japan/u.s. alliance. so with very sophisticated kw d equipment and higher price and takes care to maintain, the joint research, joint development of equipment is very important. and we do have the legal infrastructure to enable that. so even though the budget is

still limited, japan is able to make efforts within the limited budget. in other words, the for instance welding of the submarine, the technology for that after the war, japan has engaged in the production of the submarine. in other words, the welding, the skill compared to u.s. workers, our skill level of the welding of submarine is higher. so the exchange in that regard will be very helpful. and for the technology which is superior to japan, i think that we should exchange and we actually should be the mutually complimentary in order to strengthen equipment. i think that will eventually lead to the stronger alliance.

so if the budget is used for the stronger japanese defense capability and the stronger alliance, i think that is the best way. as i mentioned at the beginning, 63 years ago self-defense forces were established. and that served as the mail tear. we do not call it military, but the defense for the democratic nation. for the u.s. taxpayers and japanese taxpayers, what is the difference in perception about that national defense force? the greatest difference is that the majority of the japanese population are taxpayers. they are not interested in the self-defense forces. in other words they try to put distance between themselves and the mailitary because of the unfortunate defeat of the war, the political, the community could not control the military

before the war. a very bitter lesson out of that was drawn. when we consider the defense policy, there are three factors needed to consider, the political leaders and the commanders as self-defense leaders and the population. those are three major players and factors. and the self-defense force is the national defense force itself. and we do not have sufficient basic knowledge. i think there is a lack of awareness as the taxpayers. why the self-defense forces exist, i think there is a lack of understanding, because we are not educated that way. and there is change of the law during the first term of abe administration. so now the japanese pupils in

schools learn the way state should operate. but in our generation we were not educated as such, and it would take another decades and significance of self-defense forces. i think understanding and basic understanding about the necessity of the national defense has been lacking in the population at large. and so when the budget increases, we need to seek ways to use the money effectively, but in order for the organization to function effectively, the politics and the population and the military, and three of those parties should have a good communication so that proper judgment can be given to the important phases

and civil military relations are still yet to improve in japan. with this, i think, the self-defense forces are able to exercise that power to the fullest extent. >> thank you. i have to admit this is the first time i heard a four star admiral talking about the defense budget in the context of wise homemaker. [ laughter ]. >> but it was actually pretty revealing. it was enlightening, i think. it kind of give me a fresh outlook on this. i would like to thank admiral take, general iwata and general here once again for coming to washington for the gathering. i would like to thank all of you for joining us on friday morning. i hope that weather is

cooperating with us. so that's good news. thank you again for coming and i hope you have a good rest of friday. thank you very much. [ applause ].

one day when i was 14 and another teenager angered me and i tried to stab him with a camping knife -- fortunately he had a large metal belt buckle on. the knife blade struck can suwih force that it broke. he was terrified. but i was more terrified because i was trying to take someone's life over nothing. that had a profound effect on me. i locked myself in the bathroom. i started thinking about my life. i had turned things around academically. i had gone from a terrible student to the top of the class. i realized i would never become

a doctor with a temper like that. my options would be jail, reform school or the grave. and none of those appealed to me. i said lord help me. and there was a bible and there were all these verses about angry. proverbs 16:32 mightier is the man who can control his temper than the man who would conquer a city. i stayed in there praying and reading and came to the understanding that to react violently was not a sign of strength, it was a sign of weakness. it meant that you could easily be manipulated by your environment and by people in your environment. i decided i wasn't going to be manipulated. >> see all of that c-span profile interview with hud secretary ben carson tonight at 8:00 eastern on c-span.

hillary clinton gives her personal account of the 2016 presidential campaign in her new memoir "what happened." she'll talk about it monday evening to her former aide melissa muscatine. saturday at 6:00 p.m. eastern on the civil war. the final military maneuvers that led to general robert e. lee's vender. >> all the skirmishing day to day, all these dramatic fights right up until the last morning, they're full of hydra ma. the army is crumbling around

them. then at 8:00 p.m. on lectures in history, professor montoya on the ludlow coal miners strike and massacre. >> on the morning of april 25th, there is an exchange of gunfire. both sides think the other one who shot. the national guard will attack the camp. by the end of the day the national guard, in order to stop the fighting, they decide to pour kerosene on the tent colony and light a fire. sunday at 6:00 p.m. eastern on american artifacts, the american treasures exhibit at the national constitution center. >> wilson saw that the articles of confederation were too weak

and wanted a stronger central government and a strong president elected by the people, insisted that we the people of the united states are as a whole sovereign, not the people of the state and not the parliament itself as in britain. >> american history tv, all weekend, every weekend, only on c-span 3. britain is going to be negotiating new trade agreements once brexit goes into effect. the u.s. chamber of commerce hosts a discussion with the british secretary of state for exiting the european union. secretary david davis says globalism, not protectionism will guide the british trade philosophy following brexit. his comments are about an hour. wow. what a behaved crowd. go