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and many people really shared the opinion that increased the capability and deterrence capability until what? until north korea is giving up or collapsing or coming to the table? i don't think it's possible in the near future.

i am kind of in between progressive and him. because i cannot fully criticize him right now but progressives are really frustrated. they expected him to be different from the predecessors. and domestic politics. although it has not been done much on engagement issue but still, they are widespread concern if not suspicions on his weak point and even trump said

his appeasement. and the deployment of that becomes a paper from both directions from u.s. and from progressive. i'm worried he is a losing support base of progressives. it seems to me to be influx. it is confusions. that's what i'm saying. why trump wants to be -- his

policy has emphasized the pressure with little clarity on what conditions for engagement. my last point, no question about it, trump continued to give mixed messages. he has to decide to accomplish other goals for domestic purpose. because china's help is critical. u.s. trying to divide china

which makes it much more difficult and make it much more difficult. both as washington should continue to try. there can be no serious progress without china's cooperations. the debate that obsess sz over the u.s. mainland bliel ignoring the clear a present danger as

debates in the reason and reliability in the face of china. >> thank you. >> thank you. so i have a couple of questions. the first has to do with deterrence and containment. we don't want to go there and all that. i get that. after all of diplomatic military efforts and north korea does gain this capability to deliver a nuclear weapon over long distances, the big question is

[ inaudible ] >> how sure are we -- how confident should we be? the second question is on china because you brought it up a little bit. we haven't talked about it in terms of dealing with north korea, china announced saturday it would halt exports to stop importing textiles and this is issuing a directive and we watched it for a long time.

and i just have one clarifying question for you. when you said losing progressive votes, i'm not sure, what are they expecting? he has reached out to north korea many times asking for dialogue and engagement many times. so what is he supposed to do about that? >> okay. of course we have to think about what the posture and that's why some people argue tactical nuclear weapons or upgrading the conventional weapons systems.

so these options should be seriously considered by u.s. as well as south korea. of course some countries are starting the deployments as long as they keep developing the icbm. we are just started the real sanctions but we have not gone to the level. so we have been following fangss a

-- sanctions. it is very critical. it is the way we with bring about changes inside north korea. now it is what they call -- we have to think about how we can utilize our views of north ko a korea. it must be guaranteed. we cannot be sure about it. we can think about it as that.

those are the things i can think of to approach the nuclear program. >> first i would like my glass is half empty. i think one can look negatively particularly if you live in south korea at the united states current fixation on the idea that we will become vulnerable to the north koreans with ballistic missiles made with nuclear weapons, a situation which they have been living with for quite some time. it would be a negative interpretation of an america

first interpretation. i live here so i don't take it that way. you take it as a manifestation as a structural problem which are long recognized and we had that problem as the europeans came to understand -- not that it took them very long, one of the problems with our nato guarantee and our nuclear umbrella when the soviet union had extraordinary capability. would we trade one of our cities for one of their cities? that question could be asked of us now. i think there are two things. one is those does it lose any credibility once we become -- i have a short answer to that. no. but the question stands. the second thing is what do

americans particularly want or ask of their government with respect to the north korean capability to take one of those boosted or truly thermo nuclear weapon and put it on an american city. do they expect our government to stop the north koreans from this. not a preexemptive strike but preventive strike to stop that capability know that for south korea but a second korean war or do we instead of going that way and risking that we risk the vulnerability of the uncertainty of deterrence of the leader of north korea. i like this as a question for

american people and the president. i know what my answer is. i don't know what the american peoples answer is. third point, china, american presidents always discover china when they try to deal with north korea. i'm prepared to believe the chinese figured out what we want them to do. we don't need to send anymore envoys to explain that to them. i would like an envoy to go and be as clear as possible about american thinking intolerance and our expectations for their restraint under certain

circumstances. i recognize that and i believe to believe that's true. i am not prepared to believe we should fall in love with sanctions. i think sanctions should increase pressure. it may be good or bad depending what we want to achief. it is not going to stop their programs. so you may get them to the table. if that's your objective okay. if you have another objective i think that's not going to happen and we shouldn't make believe it will. >> do you have an answer? let me take a stab at a couple

of these. i guess we would say first on tactical nuclear weapons i'm not a fan. i don't think it's at this point necessary. i think i'm with bob on the extended deterrence issue. we practice these and they are real commitments. i think it's the first one. a lot of arguments when you hear them about reintroduction appear to be around a trip wire.

it is the treaty commitments. they are as deep and abiding commitment there. a couple of other quick points. i would say orn the american involvement, you know, look there. if there's a silver lining there it shows that this crisis shows how deeply commitmeted the unit states is. i would say it is on a bipartisan basis through the obama and bush administrations. i would argue clinton as well it

does show americans continue to show asia is the moegs important of the world. they believe we should receive japan if there's an attack against them. so not just the government at high levels but also the american people are deeply engaged with this issue as well. we'll stop there. it is like a conservative, some kind of ground on sentiment because of the crisis caused by north korea.

so the position is not the solution for the crisis. you have to understand first is the outcome of candle light demonstrations. one of the big issues and big promise. they understand the situation and understand why it is more inclined to the policy. you know, the mixed message from trump, they understand -- no. i understand he is try to go get aspurns from the u.s.

and he try today clarify it and make them understand and get the assurance to understand from competition inside. so it is too much and too much work. they note this is not the time for engagement but at least they want to show some kind o positioning. you know? with time over time it's not true. that's the point. and those mixed messages.

and lindsay gram's comments and over the fda things. i don't think china has made a decision. for china the preservation is of utmost interest over north korea. i don't think china will push to the limit because they are afraid of the collapse i don't

know how long they are k enforce. so i am a little bit cautious about the chinese corporation enforcing the sanctions. but actually the problem in having chinese corporations, how far the u.s. is willing to go for these, how far the u.s. is going to use this power or influence over china to do what they are supposed to do. >> right now it looks like -- i mean u.s. government is committed to that. >> yes. >> sense we are running out of time i want to take some questions from the audience and i'll take them in a glup. if you would keep it concise and identify yourself. any questions from the audience?

>> hi. i'm a student at georgetown university. i have a question. do you think there would ever be a point in the future to consider placing tactical weapons in north korea and what would that point be? thank you. >> a question here. >> good afternoon. thank you for your speech. i enjoyed it and learned a lot from you. what are the other options rather than the more offensive weapons or the impression or

attend to north korea. what are the options left for south korea and the u.s. could do -- what are the options to deal with north koreans? >> i know he said his dream was to take his elderly mother to north korea and he would prefer to live there as well. you have that on the one hand. is that the progressive? we have not heard the word reunification once.

how many of the south korea young people feel anything other than just the security, military threat and are they just in their own other world and thirdly, how many people in north korea would be just devastated if kim were to depart? if kim jong un would not be head of government, how many people would be devastated? >> we'll take one more. >> hi we is everything agreed china when it comes to north korea issues.

also it seems like everybody kind of reads it as very important. >> okay. so first question at what point if north korea goes nuclear and at some point is that acceptable or not. second question is what other options are there. third on unification and then the last question if sanctions fail, then what do you have? kind of similar overlapping questions. we can choose whatever you want to answer. >> so maybe i'll lump the first

and third together. i don't think you want to take options all the table. i would say the bar is extremely high for reintroduction for proximity concerns you can seen engagements as well. that's, you know, something that both administrations have been exercising because the issue at hand is if you do too much, one, you actually release all of your

leverage and what you're trying to do is essentially speed up the chinese clock. >> i think my personal experience is it is more like -- he is such a prag-- to me. after he became the president i

think he became more problema c problematic. get the leverage from these two countries. we never used this pressure and engagement at the same time. so at this moment is to also -- it's not the same communications. we need some kind between these three cooperations so u.s. china

is maximizing pressure. i think that's the one inside -- i don't exactly know. that's why they are arguing and asking to have a public petition rather than zigzagging. and about young general rakss, they really worry about it. many are surprised how calm they are against -- in this situation. maybe one reason is because it's been a while. north koreans always like that. we are really worried because of

unpredictability because of president trump. and of course, you know, nuclear bombs. so young generations, they prefer peace. they really -- i don't think they really care about it at this point. inside they were welcoming. >> any concluding costs? he promised to spend 2.9%. so the sooner the better. he is going to actually preserve

and combine forces command. >> you can see the last few minutes at cspan.org. now urban affairs hearing on diplomatic actions as the u.s. seeks to deter north korea's nuclear program. >> we have asked each of our witnesses to shorten their opening statements to a couple of minutes each so we can get to opening request wes. i will ask the senator to follow the fe minute allocation for their questioning.

let's proceed. >> thank you. distinguished members of the committee i'm honored to appear before you to discuss the treasury department's strategy the destabilizing and repressing actions of north korea. today i will share with you aspects of our strategy which we are executing at a pace. we are foe cussing on key financial vulnerability. it can be used to support directly oirn directly its weapons development programs.