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>> what would be the case, though, is that it wouldn't be the president alone persuading a single military officer alone on the other side of the telephone. there would be a large group of advisers and legal advisers weighing in on this, and that's an important part of the context that is sometimes lost in the media coverage. there would be a lot of people under the scenario that you've described -- not imminent, not waking the president up, but we have time to decide this. many, many people would be weighing in, including many lawyers. >> i think this was answered to some extent, but i'll ask you, dr. feaver, would the possession of a nuclear weapon capable of reaching the united states constitute an imminent attack, in your opinion? the simple possession of a nuclear weapon capable of hitting the united states, does that constitute an imminent attack? >> i'm not a lawyer, and so i

could not judge whether that would meet the legal test. i think it would, in most people's minds, constitute a grave threat to u.s. national security, particularly if it was a north korean nuclear warhead atop a north korean missile that was capable of reaching the united states. i think most americans would view that as a grave threat to our national security. whether that would meet the legal test of imminence would require legal judgment, and i'll defer to counsel on my right. >> mr. mckeon? >> senator, the mere possession of a nuclear weapon i do not think would meet that test. i think there would be time required for congressional authorization, if the decision were taken that the mere possession of a nuclear weapon by a state such as north korea was unacceptable to u.s. national security interests. they have a nuclear weapon today. we know that much. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator rubio. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you all for being here. i want to say at the outset, this is an important

conversation but one we should tread lightly on. our allies who rely on u.s. defense assurances are watching. and if we create doubt in their minds about the capability or willingness of the united states to live up to those commitments in any way, and i am not claiming that's what anyone's doing, i think it could have repercussions that are significant, including encouraging some of them to perhaps pursue their own deterrent capability if they come to doubt our political ability and our willingness to live up to our commitments, actually making the world more dangerous, not less dangerous. i also think our adversaries are watching. and i'll get to that part in a moment, but i think if anyone out there thinks they could somehow get away with something because in politics of the united states would prevent the commander in chief from acting expeditiously, that could also encourage miscalculation, particularly on behalf of people that are isolated from the world, don't get a lot of information and have never had anyone tell them they're wrong or no. and i have one person in particular in north korea that concerns me in that regard. i don't think there's any debate about imminent attack or under

attack. i think we all, i would agree, i think we would all agree that the president of the united states has to have the capability to quickly respond if we are under attack and/or under potential imminent attack, and obviously, there could be some debate about it. i also think it's important for us in the context of this new posture review to know that the traditional cold war threat of a massive exchange between the u.s. and the then soviet union is probably not likely in the short term. i think the likelier threats remain the use of russia tactical battlefield weapons to escalate in order to de-escalate a battlefield event, a terrorist organization that comes into possession of a nuclear device or some other weapon of mass destruction, and then a rogue regime that doesn't have any of these safeguards we've talked about. it's basically one guy who has a bad night and gets up and decides he wants to do something about it. so, these are things that it's important to understand, i think this whole debate is about first use. and i want to touch on a topic

that was first innovated during the cold war in the context of an overwhelming conventional advantage of the warsaw pact had, but we also saw it operative in the first gulf war, and that's the notion of calculated ambiguity. and i believe it served us in both, and particularly in '91 when saddam hussein was perhaps tempted to use biological and/or chemical weapons. one of the reasons why perhaps he did not pursue it was that there was calculated ambiguity about whether or not that would trigger a u.s. nuclear response, and i think we could all foresee what that conflict would have looked like, had he deployed biological and/or chemical agents that he had in his possession, could potentially have used. is calculated ambiguity still an important concept in the 21st century? the notion that adversaries should have doubt in their mind about whether or not the united states retains the right to strike first, should they either use a weapon of mass destruction and/or move in a dangerous

direction? is calculated ambiguity still useful and still operative in this set of threats that we now face? >> senator, i believe that it enhances our deterrents to have some doubt in the mind of an adversary about under what conditions we would use a nuclear weapon. >> senator, i agree and i'd go further and say that president obama, who was no fan of nuclear weapons and who moved us back on the nuclear threat index in his 2010 nuclear posture review, nevertheless left in place calculated ambiguity in precisely these scenarios. and his rewriting of it was taken to mean we would not threaten countries who were attacking us with nonnuclear weapons, but a close reading of what he decided left in place enough ambiguity to achieve

precisely the deterrent effect you described, and that was from a president who was openly hostile to nuclear weapons. >> yes. is the answer to your question. >> the last point in 4the 40 seconds i have left is this notion of if it's legal, you have a right. i think we understand what that means. if a military official's ordered to go into a village of civilians and kill everybody, that clearly violates the law that governs armed conflict. i think there's also danger in that regard here. now, we have to be careful about how we talk about that as well. we cannot have a bunch of bunker lawyers that basically -- or activists up and down the chain who decide that they're going to disobey any order that they disagree with. we can foresee where something like that could spin out of control, and ultimately in this republic, we have elections, and one of the things voters think about when they elect someone to the office of president of the united states is whether or not they want to entrust them with this capability. so, it is good that people are aware of this issue, but i think we need to be very careful when we talk about that component of

it. >> i agree. i just want to say, i don't think you'll hear from my opening comments, i cannot agree more that both for our adversaries and those who are friends that we need to be careful in how we discuss this. we do not want any of them to fear that, somehow, the ability to make decisions that benefit our country and them or disbenefit them, if they're acting against us, is being taken away. so, i couldn't agree more. senator markey. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you for having this very important hearing. i requested this several weeks ago, and i just think it's so important that you have such an important discussion, because a few questions are as important to u.s. national security as the question of presidential authority to use nuclear weapons, not only to deter or defend against a nuclear attack, but also to start a nuclear war.

nuclear weapons are for deterrence, not war fighting. launching nuclear weapons first would be an unprecedented act of aggression and war, whether limited or massive. any first-use nuclear strike would devolve into retaliatory strikes and war causing unimaginable death, suffering, and destruction. absent a nuclear attack upon the united states or our allies, no one human being should have the power to unilaterally unleash the most destructive forces ever devised by humankind. yet, under existing laws, the president of the united states can start a nuclear war without provocation, without consultation, and without warning. it boggles the rational mind. i fear that in the age of trump, the cooler heads and strategic doctrine that we once relied upon as our last best hope against the unthinkable seem less reassuring than ever.

in other areas of government, our constitution's system of checks and balances ensures that the president does not have sole power to make extreme decisions without some level of national consensus. but on the president's sole authority to start a nuclear war, even in the absence of a nuclear attack against our country, no one can tell the president no, not secretaries mattis or tillerson. even general kelley, the president's chief of staff, can't control the president's twitter tantrums. as a result, many americans share my fear that the president's bomb baskic words could turn into nuclear reality. the fact that any american president has the unilateral ability to start a nuclear war is why i have introduced legislation co-sponsored by 13 of my senate colleagues to restrict any president's authority to launch a first-use nuclear strike without congressional authorization. the founding fathers believe that congress has an integral

role in any decision to start a war, and today more than ever, it is imperative that congress reassert that constitutional authority. mr. mckeon, is the president legally required to consult with or receive approval from anyone else before ordering the launch of a nuclear weapon? >> senator markey, in the context that you described, in the absence of an attack or an imminent attack, i think the constitution requires him to come to congress and get that authority. >> okay. does the protocol for the president to launch a nuclear weapon change if we are under nuclear attack or are deciding to launch a first-use strike? it is different when we are not under attack -- >> those are two different questions. >> two different questions? >> if we are under attack, the president would have the authority under article two to defend the country, and there's no distinction between his authority to use conventional or nuclear weapons in response to such an attack. >> is there a formal process by

which anyone in the chain of command, from the secretary of defense down to the submariner or airman actually initiating the launch sequence that may object to or legally refuse to carry out a presidential order or launch a nuclear weapon? >> well, as general kehler has described, the officers in the chain of command, the senior officers and the secretary could raise objections if they believe the order was illegal. i think the system is designed to protect the first or second lieutenant, 23-year-old air force officers who are in the launch control center from having to make that grave decision. it's really the four-stars and the secretary who need to bear that burden. >> because disobeying such an order would be considered a violation of federal law under the uniform -- under the united states code under uniform code of military justice. so, in your testimony, mr. mckeon, you say that in

august, the national security adviser, mr. mcmaster, suggested the possibility of a preventive war, which would require a congressional authorization. in other words, if there had been a decision that was being made by the president to use nuclear weapons, maybe small, tactical nuclear weapons, to hit the nuclear weapons system in known locations in north korea as part of a preventive nuclear war, it is your opinion that the president would have to come to the united states congress in order to receive congressional approval, is that correct? >> yes, correct. >> is that correct? so, when mr. mcmaster, when general mcmaster talks in those terms, preventive war, and that is, i think, what most people

are most concerned about, this question of the president actually using them as part of that kind of a scenario, there is in your opinion a constitutional responsibility for the members of congress who have to have voted on that before such a nuclear war is commenced by the united states? >> correct. and in my view, the president would lack the authority. we had hearings, not in this committee, but in the judiciary committee before the gulf war in 1991, and i was working for senator biden and the chairman of that committee. one of the witnesses, harold cocco koe, later the legal adviser, said silence has a sound. if the sound from congress is silenced, then the answer is no. >> yeah, well, the sounds of silence has finally ended after since 1976 to today on this issue, and i think, mr. chairman, that you deserve much praise for having this very important discussion. thank you. >> thank you. thank you so much for your interest in the topic and for

pursuing this for so many years. senator kaine. >> thank you, mr. chair. and i also want to thank you for having this hearing. i have a strong belief that under administrations of both parties and under congresses of both parties' leadership, there's been a significant, kind of creeping abdication of the power in the war peace and diplomacy space from congress to the president. there are article 2 powers that are very important with respect to being the commander in chief and also with respect to the conducting of diplomacy, but there's also very strong congressional prerogatives and the power to declare war but also in the powers to oversee treaties and other diplomatic matters. and in recent years, i think this committee has started to pull some of that power back to this into pennsylvania avenue in important ways. that was what the iran review act did. president obama at that time was asserting an ability to do this to deal with iran on the nuclear program without seeking a vote of congress, and we felt that no

congressional imprematur was wise and we pulled that back. we tried to pull back a little bit of the oversight responsibility. i've been engaged in an effort with colleagues and the chair recently held an important hearing on the question of the 9/11 authorization, whether it still applies to military operations against other nonstate terrorist organizations and al qaeda, and i view this hearing as much the same way, trying to make sure we all share an understanding of what current protocols are, but then ask ourselves whether congress is taking the steps we need to, to make sure we're not abdicating the article and responsibilities we were granted by madison and the other founders in 1787. general kehler, i was interested in your testimony about your, just from a military standpoint as somebody who's the head of stratcom, as a leader, your thought about an order. if a president gives an order and you would grapple with whether or not, you know, you viewed it to be lawful.

the question of legality and lawfulness starts with the constitution. you take -- you and we take oaths to the constitution not to a flag not to the president or a party, but to the constitution. so clearly, if you thought an order violated the constitution, i assume that was incorporated in your testimony. but i wonder about your thought about internal protocols, if it's more than just the constitution, but if you were to feel that an order to use a nuclear weapon, say violated internal protocol as been agreed upon within the military, either with respect to proportionality or some procedural protocol, is that the kind of, just using it as a hypothetical, would that be the kind of thing that might make you decide, no, i cannot execute on that order? and then i'm interested in understanding whether there is a widely shared view of what this line between a lawful order and an unlawful order would be. >> excuse me, senator.

senator, the -- this issue about legality of orders exists at every level of command, no matter whether the order is to use nuclear weapons or weather to use some other kind of weapon, perform some other kind of operation. the principle remains the same. in order for our military to follow the orders of the civilian leaders, then those orders have to be two things. there are a couple of tests. one test is that it has to come from someone who has command authority. >> right. >> and second, it has to meet the legal tests of the law of armed conflict. so, issues about the extent of presidential authority, et cetera, et cetera, are really constitutional issues for all of you to hammer out and then provide to the military. that's the way i think that works. and then second, though, when these issues are in military decision-making, i always had a legal adviser by my side.

i think you would find the commanders across the board these days have legal advisers by their side. the secretary of defense and people who would be part of a conference, having a conversation about nuclear decisions, legal advisers would be part of that conversation. and certainly, my experience with this has been that legal advisers are not reluctant to raise their hand and say, before we go further, here are the things you need to consider about legality. i think brian's points about at what point do we need congress to weigh in, et cetera, et cetera, while they might not be at the fingertips of every military commander, they are certainly discussed in the military legal profession. and so, i was never concerned that i would not have the appropriate legal adviser at hand and that legal concerns would not be part of that conversation. >> dr. feaver, i'm about out of

time, but if you would like to answer that, that would help me. >> so, the military has an obligation to follow legal orders, and there is a presumption that the orders that come through the chain of command are -- and from competent authority -- are legal, but those orders are simultaneously vetted by the legal advisers, as general kehler said. but as senator rubio pointed out, that does not mean that every order that comes down is an opportunity to discuss and debate between the chains of command. there's a presumption that the orders are legal. and when there's an extraordinary order, like an order to launch a nuclear weapon, that would require a lot of attention and would galvanize attention. the second point i would make is you may, chairman, want to have loirdz back to talk about what are the legal authorities that are extent now regarding content on the korean peninsula. we are still under armed

hostilities just in an armistice from the first korean war, and there have been multiple u.n. security council resolutions, all of which provide some legal basis for action, u.s. action, and i'm not a lawyer to adjudicate those, but i'm sure that the dod lawyers are looking at those issues. >> thank you. >> thank you. sir, can i add something to this? i know the senator's out of time. if i wasn't getting legal input, i was asking for it. and my obligation, my responsibility as the commander of strategic command was to clear up any of those concerns on the behalf of the operating forces. they are not in a position, really, to make a legal determination with an order that is given to them. so for example, i spent a lot of time in a missile launch control center over my early parts of my career. i have no way to know whether

the target that i was being told to strike was a legal target or not a legal target. i was relying on people above me in the chain of command to carry that out, and my view as the commander of strategic command was that was my responsibility to do. >> if i could go back, dr. f dr. feaver, what was your last admonition to me? >> it was not an admonition, but a suggestion, sir. >> i took it as an admonition, but -- >> there have been many questions about what would be the legal authority for u.s. military action on north korea, particularly with regards to nuclear weapons. and while it would certainly be politically advisable that the president go to congress to get new authorization for any new hostilities, it's at least possible, and i'm not a lawyer, so i'm suggesting that lawyers be consulted on what is the legal basis that is already existing because of prior u.n. security council resolutions that authorized the first korean war, which is not over.

it's just in a ceasefire, and subsequent resolutions involving north korea's nuclear program. >> thank you. >> if i could comment on senae r yor kaine's issue, these acommander not shrinking violets. i recall where a commander was looking down the road and saw he would be getting an order and wondered if that would be a legal order and he started asking questions months in advance of the general counsel in osd. so, obviously, it's a human system, and the human system can break down, but we have -- pope don't get to be four-star generals unless they have strong individuals. >> thank you, senator risch. >> thank you. first of all, thank you for your

thoughtful analysis of the issues here. i do want to state for the record, however, that you know, every single word that's been uttered here this morning in this hearing is going to be analyzed in pyongyang. and they are going to look very carefully at how we, the american people, view this. and for those who are doing the analysis, i want to underscore that our discussion here today is not as practical as it is academic. we all have strong ideas about the power of the first branch, congress, and the second branch, the president and the military. the constitution was written in a day when things were much different than they are today, moved much slower than they are today. every time that the president has used force, he has been backed by the american people and by congress. so, i want to make sure that pyongyang understands that this

talk about lawyers and this talk about standards and proportionality and all the other things we all talk about is not a discussion that is going to take place in the heat of battle in today's world. these decisions have to be made in moments, and it is not going to be made by courts or by lawyers or by congress, it's going to be made by the commander in chief of the american forces, and he is going to do that, as you've pointed out, in all likelihood, with the experts that he has surrounded himself with, but nonetheless, he will make that decision, and pyongyang needs to understand that they are dealing with a person who's commander in chief right now who is very focused on defending this country, and he will do what is necessary to defend this country. so, lest anyone be confused, as

most people would be -- and i have sat through scores of hours of arguments about the power of the commander in chief, the power of congress, et cetera -- from a very practical standpoint, the president of the united states is going to make this decision, and he's going to make it quite quickly, if he has to. and so, i want everyone to understand how this works, and it isn't a gray situation. it isn't a situation where lawyers are going to get involved and argue about proportionality and all these other standards we talk about. unfortunately, we live in a world that is full of realistic decisions that have to be made, and they will be made. thank you, mr. chairman. >> i think that's the reason we're having the hearing. thank you. thank you so much. senator markley -- >> mr. chairman, i've got a few minutes left. let me respond to that. i agree with that, and i think we should have the hearing, but

the problem i have with that is there are legitimate disputes over the power of the president and the power of congress when it comes to this sort of thing. i want everyone to understand, particularly those in pyongyang, that these are pragmatic decisions that have to be made and will be made, and they are not going to be clouded by arguments of an army of lawyers on each side arguing what is proportional and what isn't. now, you can argue whether that's right or wrong, but that's the facts on the ground. >> i think that's correct, and i don't think there's any question, and one of the reasons we've had some of the -- we've passed some of the pieces of legislation that we have through the years, whether it's on the u act or the russia sanctions bill that we passed or through the years, there's no question there's been a tremendous tilt to the executive branch, and certainly still is and will always -- >> especially -- >> -- as it relates to war, there's no question, but that's

the purpose of the hearing. and i think it's been a good one to ferret out some of these issues and causes us to think more fully about what happens during these periods of time. senator markley. >> thank you, mr. chairman. dr. feaver, i believe you said something to the effect that in the case where you have time to consider a response, the cooperation of many strategic commanders is required to execute an order. is that more or less accurate? does that essentially sustain the vision that there has to be a person between the president and the nuclear briefcase who cooperates in order for that briefcase to be utilized? >> i can't speak in open session about the particularities, but i will say that the system is not a button that the president can accidentally lean against on the desk and immediately cause missiles to fly, as some people

in the public, i think, fear it would be. it requires the president to work with military aides who are attending him and who have possession of the materials that he needs, and it requires personnel at all levels, echelon command ault way do command, all the way down to the missile silo to carry out an order. the president himself cannot press a button and cause missiles to fly. he can give an authenticated order which others would follow and then cause missiles to fly. >> in the context, you've put the condition in the, when you have time to consider a response. so when you do not have the time to consider a response, there's been a lot of conversation together about reacting in short order to an assault, is it still the case that you have to have the cooperation of strategic commanders to execute an order? >> yes, but in those settings,

that's where the military is waking up the president, because they are the ones who are monitoring the intelligence picture, they're the ones who are getting the warning that a missile launch against the united states is about to happen, and so they're already cooperating by waking up the president, advising him or her of the situation and presenting them the range of options. so, i would code that as cooperating with the president in order to give the president the options of making a decision. >> those are the types of scenarios that really give people nightmares. there's been over a dozen such scenarios of false alarms where there were folks on both sides, the russian side and the american side, have been extremely worried that a major attack was under way with minutes to spare. i'd like to enter into the record an article that details more than a dozen such events. there is the famous moonrise incident in 1960, there's the training video era of 1979.

there's a case when boris yel yeltsin activated the nuclear briefcase in response to a nuclear research missile being launched by the norwegians. and it's those cases that give people great worry. and part of the point of a nuclear triad -- this hasn't been mentioned today, so i wanted to make sure it is mentioned -- part of the point was to have forces that could survive an initial attack -- submarines and bombers that carry weapons -- so that you didn't have to make a decision within a couple minutes. you had assured retaliation with at least two legs of the triad that were more survival. can i get a response as to whether that's a reasonable analysis? >> i think that is, senator, and that's precisely why no previous strategic leader decided to put in place an automated response.

they always wanted a human in the loop. and in the cases that you mentioned, and others, it was a human assessment that concluded this was not real, we have time to wait, and that's why i would support and advocate for anything that can be done to extend that time, whether through better missile defense, more hardened communications technology so more people can be brought in, updating other aspects of the command and control system, so that there's time for the human element to make the assessments necessary to reach the right decision. we've had too many close calls over the course of the cold war, but they were avoided in the end by wise human decision. >> in some cases, yes. well, i won't go into details, but. so, in the 2010 nuclear posture review, is it not the position of the united states that we essentially are saying we would not use a nuclear first strike against a non -- an npt,

non-proliferation treaty participant who does not have nuclear forces? >> i've written an op ed in "the new york times" about this at the time. that's how it was covered in the media, but when you read it closely, i believe it still leaves wiggle room, in particular because it says those countries in compliance with the non-proliferation treaty obligations, and it leads opaque who determines whether they're in compliance. i inferred from that opacity that it was the white house will determine whether they were in compliance, which is a loophole that gives the president the strategic ambiguity that he might wish for deterrence purposes. >> part of the reason for the discussion over no first use is because it creates more confidence among other nations that are nuclear armed not to perceive a false attack by the united states as occurred in the case, the 1995 case in which yeltsin activated their nuclear

briefcase. do you see any value, or do any of the three of you see any value in strengthening the perception that the u.s. by policy would not utilize nuclear weapons in a first strike? >> i do see some value from such an assurance, but i also see some costs, and i think that is why every previous administration, including president obama, who might have been expected to adopt a no first use policy, chose not to at the end adopt a blanket no first use policy. i doubt that this administration would either. if president obama couldn't be convinced that it was worth the risks, i doubt that president trump would be. >> there's a longer conversation about the pros and cons of that, but i'm out of time. thank you, chairman. >> thank you so much. senator shaheen. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for holding the hearing, and thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. dr. feaver, in your written testimony, you said that even a single nuclear detonation would

be so consequential and might trigger an escalatory spiral that would lead to civilization-threatening outcomes. can i just ask if everybody on the panel agrees with that? >> i would agree with it in principle, i think. one of the deterrence features, of course, that has been with nuclear weapons since the beginning, is the high risk that any nuclear use will not be controlled or could not be controlled, although we have in place -- >> absolutely, and that's what helps contribute to the deterrence factor. >> it does, but we have in place means to try to control it, if deterrence ever fails. >> mr. mckeon, do you agree with that? >> i agree with peter's statement. >> now, i think it is that statement that is so concerning

and certainly gives me pause and others pause and i think is one of the reasons for the hearing, when we have an administration where the national security adviser has suggested that we can have a preventive war on the korean peninsula when the president has said that he has asked our military leadership to come up with plans to address the north korean regime. it suggests that what we're talking about is a nuclear war of a first strike. and certainly, the potential for that to escalate, as everyone has suggested, is very difficult to even contemplate. and i think one of the challenges is that we are dealing with a president, as

senator cardin has said, who has not seemed to be willing to accept advice on an issue, many issues affecting power. and while i agree with senator risch's comment, that if the united states is threatened, we want the president to act, i want the president to act in a way that acknowledges input from a lot of experts and not to act based on a twitter post and the anxiety that that produces i think contributes to the concern about whether we're in a situation where we need to look at, in congress, a first nuclear strike policy and banning that. so, you talked about the importance of calculated ambiguity. senator rubio raised that.

and the importance of that in enhancing deterrence and making war less likely. can you imagine a policy that would both limit the president's authority to use nuclear weapons and at the same time not weaken the deterrence value of our nuclear arsenal? >> in thinking about this hearing, senator shaheen, i've struggled to come up with constructs that make sense, and it's hard to develop a principled way to constrain the commander in chief's power within the executive branch. as i said earlier, i think, hard cases make bad law, and i think if we were to change the decision-making process in some way because of a distrust of this president, i think that would be an unfortunate precedent for future presidents, and i say that as somebody who worked in this chamber for 20 years and i feel strongly about

congressional powers in this sphere. >> dr. feaver? >> i think that there are proposals that are floating out there that are worth looking at. there's a group of academics like myself who study this issue, and we've been kicking around various proposals that would delimit the scenarios so it wouldn't set aside the reprisal, the launch under attack scenarios, and then just where there's plenty of time, then specifying various protocols for authenticating an order, for validating that the order's legal and things like that. each of these proposals raises important questions about article two. and so, they'd have to be closely vetted. but i think there are proposals like that that could be examined and that it might improve. however, there are some things that unambiguously would help, and that is modernizing the technology in the command and

control system, which is overdue in some areas for upgrade. these are very expensive, but precisely before, the reason you said, senator, that an accident or an unauthorized use would be so catastrophic, it's an investment worth making. >> general kehler. >> senator, we've talked about a lot of potential scenarios this morning. my view on this is it is not possible to envision all of the scenarios in advance. and when we try to come up with ways to place limits on various scenarios, my concern would be that we are creating some detriment to the overall deterrent. as unfortunate as it is, the big paradox of the nuclear age is still here. i said that in my written testimony. in order to prevent their use, which is the objective here, we have to be prepared to use them. and for us to presuppose all of the scenarios under which we

would want to somehow limit the power of the commander in chief, i would just urge you to be very cautious here for all the reasons that were raised today. it has implications for the deterrent, it has implications for extended deterrents, and it has some implications, if these just remain unresolved issues, it has implications for our own military men and women and the confidence and trust that they place in the chain of command. so, certainly, i believe we always get better by having these conversations and debating and doing all the things that we've done throughout the cold war and beyond. i would just urge you to be very cautious about suggesting changes to this particular system. again, my perspective from my view was that the process accounts for the kind of scenarios that we have been talking about today.

it certainly accounts for tactical warning that an attack is under way, and we have preplanned options and the vetting has been done. it accounts for the potential for using before an adversary weapon has been used -- >> and i appreciate that and certainly hear the caution that each of you are giving us, but doesn't it also suggest that it's important for the commander in chief to also be cautious in how he talks about this issue so that there is not a miscalculation on the part of our aggressors who would do us harm about what the real intent here is? >> i fully agree with you on that, senator. the statements the president makes through his twitter account no doubt cause concern and confusion on the other side of the pacific.

they don't have a constellation of satellites to see where we are moving our forces, when he says an armada is coming. that obviously has to give them some pause. and people may say, well, what he says in his twitter account doesn't matter, we have policies, we have the leadership of the national command and authority, the secretary and the chairman will take care of it. that doesn't compute in kim jong-un mind that what the president says doesn't matter. so, i'd be very worried about a miscalculation based on continuing use of his twitter account with regard to north korea, as i understand you are. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. let me -- so, as i understand it, first of all, this has been from my perspective a great hearing, very balanced, i think obviously informative after 41 years of not having a hearing on this topic, and i appreciate all those, including crs, that somewhat encouraged us to do so.

if, in fact, you feel like you did. i think mr. mckeon and general kehler, basically, you're saying you don't see any legislative changes that ought to be made at this time. i think that's where you both are. and dr. feaver, i think what you were saying was really not legislative changes as it relates to the power that the commander in chief has. you were talking about other types, that there are more pragmatic changes as it relates to just the decision tree, is that correct, after the command has been given? >> i would be very wary of legislative fixes because there's second and third-order effects that are hard to anticipate. and the history of the nuclear command and control system is discovering that changes that had been made and well intentioned at one level producing an unexpected result

in another aspect, so i'd be wary of legislative fixes, but it doesn't mean i wouldn't review them. i think there are good proposals out there. and part of the value is reassuring the american public that they have a nuclear arsenal that is well maintained and well guarded against unauthorized use. i think the senators are channeling some concerns that the public has about this and reviewing and then deciding not to make a change, legislative fix, would go some distance to reassuring the public. >> and there's another component -- go ahead. i'll let you -- go ahead. >> just to comment on what you said, mr. chairman, i am wary of a legislative change on the decision-making process, but the larger conversation we've had in this hearing about the war power really falls on you and your colleagues here in this body to continue to step forward and make the case for the constitutional imperative. in both the gulf war in 1990-'91 and even the iraq war in 2002, the executive branch was rather

grudging in agreeing to -- exceeding to a congressional vote and authorization. and george h.w. bush either before or right after said something disparaging about i don't need some old goat in congress to go to war against iraq. so, the institutional instinct of the executive branch will always be we can do this under article two. and you will need as a political body to continue to assert your rights to make the case that we've discussed. >> thank you. >> i agree with the points that have been made. i would not recommend any legislative changes at this point as well, but i would recommend a couple of things that i know are being openly talked about by my colleagues who are still wearing uniforms, and one of those is we can always do a better job, i think, in training our people who are involved in these processes in terms of where the safeguards are. and the fact that -- the point i was trying to make this morning

about raising the legality issue is to remind everybody that the military does not blindly follow orders, and that is true with nuclear orders as well. and i think that should be a reassuring piece for the american public, and it ought to be reassuring to our allies and our adversaries as well. the final thing that i would do is, it is time to invest -- i know this committee doesn't have jurisdiction, but it is time to invest in the nuclear command and control and communications system. it's been -- it has suffered from a lack of investment for too long, and i think it's very important that congress be on board to modernize that system as a high priority as well as the forces. >> now, if i could, that coincides with what i wanted to close with. when we did the new start treaty, i was a part of a group on our side of the aisle that approved that treaty, and it's part of that, and i'm glad that i did, by the way. it was the right thing to do.

as part of that, we pushed the administration towards modernization. would all three of you agree that to have our nuclear arsenal is coming down, we want to make sure that these weapons, in many cases created 50, 60 years ago, we want to make sure that if they're called upon to be used, they will actually do the things they're intended to do? and would all three of you agree that continued modernization of our nuclear arsenal is something that protects our nation and ensures that in the terrible event they're ever necessary, we have the capability of delivering? >> yes, i do. >> yes. people who are worried about nuclear war should be in favor of reasonable modernization measures that will provide greater safety and security in our existing system. >> mr. chairman, i would use the word recapitalization of both the warheads and the platforms

of the triad. on the latter, all the platforms of the triad are aging out simultaneously, and there are plans in place to replace them over the next decade, and i know that will be an expensive proposition that will be well debated. but if the policy decision is made to maintain a triad, then those investments and those platforms will need to be made. >> i would just say this for the american people. many of us have visited the facilities where these are modernized and developed, and it's amazing that some of the guidance systems that have been in existence are not much more sophisticated than the tubes on a black and white television. and you know, we need to continue to invest and make sure we're using the proper technology, so in the unfortunate case of them being utilized, they'll actually be there for us. and other countries are aware of our need to modernize also. so, with that -- >> mr. chairman, may i just have a minute?

>> you may. >> i thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. again, i want to divide this question toward the committee between an imminent attack on the united states where the president has the authority to protect our country that is and should be the case from a president launching a preemptive nuclear war against another country. and i think that's really what is of the most concern to the american people, that no one human being should ever have that power. so, from my perspective right now, given what general mcmaster said about the potential for preventive war, that means that there could be plans in place right now in the white house given to the president to launch a preemptive war against north korea using american nuclear weapons without consulting with,

informing congress whatsoever, by aggregating that power to the executive branch, in clear violation of the united states constitution, in clear violation of the united states constitution. of the united states constitution. so to the extent to which we're having this discussion and there's legislation that is pending, you know, before congress to ensure that congress reasserts its authority to ensure that a nuclear war is not begun in the name of the united states by this president or any president, i think that's a legitimate constitutional prerogative that we should be reasserting. i don't think we should be trusting the generals to be a check on the president. i don't think we should be trusting a set of protocols to be protecting american people from having a nuclear war

launched on their behalf. i think we should be relying on a group of individuals to be resisting an illegal order when they have all pretty much been hired by the president to have the jobs in which they have. it's going to be homo geniagaho that process that does not offer resistance if the president insists on his way. that's just the reality of it. i agree that it should be the congressional prerogative to declare a nuclear war. i think that is something we should continue to explore given the assertions made by the national security adviser. and i would think that our other two witnesses would agree that if there is a preemptive nuclear

war that's being considered, that congress does have the constitutional responsibility, although it has been left as mr. mckeon said in ambiguity. president after president has been created around whether or not they are going to defer to our authority. so this is the hearing, this the place. i'm glad thank you are kicking it off. i don't think the assurances i received today would be satisfying to the american people. i think they can still realize that donald trump can launch nuclear codes just as easily as he can use his twitter account, without a check and balance the united states congress would be seeking and constitutionally responsible to exercise. i think this has been a historic hearing and i hope there's more to follow. >> thank each of you for being

here. i cannot imagine having a more balanced panel, a more sober panel. i think this was edifying for members of the committee but also the american public. we thank you for that. we thank you for your service to our country, being here and previous service in other ways. and i think you know there's typically follow-up questions. if you could first of all, committee members will close that process on the close of business on thursday. to the extent you could answer those fairly promptly we should appreciate it. i think you've contributed greatly to the national debate and dialogue today, and we thank you very much for that. with that the meeting is adjourned.

today world bank president jim yong kim will talk about recent trends in the global economy. live coverage from the press club begins at 1:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. tonight on "the communicators" adam alter talks about his book "irresistible". >> what they say is we know the dangers of technology. they don't say things like we've built in special mechanisms did he signed to hook people, therefore we don't want our kids hook. that's the sense you get. basically never get high on your own supply. you're creating something, you know what the dangers are, you want to make sure other people you love and hold dear aren't

going to be affected by them. >> watch communicators tonight at 8:00 eastern on c-span2. now to a discussion with senator tom cotton on u.s. policy toward iran. he spoke at an event hosted by hudson institute that focused on countering violent extremism. after senator cotton's remarks we'll hear from white house strategist steve bannon talking about administration's middle east strategy and efforts to combat isis. so next up we have catherine herridge interviewing senator tom cotton. katherine is the award winning correspondent for fox news channel. she covers intelligence, justice department and department of homeland security