past year has been our fiscal budget situation here in louisiana. not uncommon to a lot of other states, i think ours say littise unique that a good bit of what we face in 2018 is the roll off of some temporary revenue in the form of taxes that will expire in june of 2018. so the ability to -- to be able to find the solutions for that, both on the revenue side and the expense side are what we'll be working on and diligently hopefully coming up with solutions before we arrive in 2018. voices from the states on c-span. now a hearing to consider the president's authority in ordering the use of nuclear weapons and to look at possible legislation that would require congressional approval for nuclear strikes.

among the witness, a former defense department official from the obama administration and a retired air force general who led the u.s. strategic command. this senate foreign relations committee hearing is just under two hours. >> the hearing itself will actually come to order. we thank general kehler, dr. feaver, mr. mckeon for joining us today and for sitting through the business meeting over the last 15 minutes. a number of members on both sides of the aisle of this on and off the committee have raised questions about the executive's authorities with respect to war making. and the use of nuclear weapons and from a diplomatic perspective entering into and terminating agreements with other countries. as i've mentioned publicly, this is one in a series of hearings where our committee will examine all of these issues, but today it's my hope that we will remain focused on the topic at hand, the authority and the process

for the use of nuclear weapons. the congressional research service tells us this is the first time that the foreign relations committee of the senate or house has met on this topic since 1976, 41 years ago. making the decision go to war of any sort is a heavy responsibility for our nation's elected leaders, and the decision to use nuclear weapons is the most consequential of all. the atomic energy act of 1946 and the subsequent practices recognize that the use of nuclear weapons must be subject to political control. this is why no general or admiral or defense secretary has the authority to order the use of nuclear weapons, only the president, the elected political leader of the united states has this authority. the nuclear arms race between the united states and the soviet union during the cold war dramatically elevated the risk of nuclear conflict. as the soviets developed massive

numbers of nuclear weapons and the smss ystems to deliver them the united states, we plan for the unthinkable, how to get our missiles in the air within those few minutes before their warheads could hit us and possibly destroy our ability to respond. in that kind of scenario, there's no no time for debate. having such forces at the ready has been successful in deterring such an attack and for that we are grateful. but this process means the president has the sole authority to give that order. whether we are responding to a nuclear attack or not. once that order is given and verified, there is no way to revoke it. to be clear, i would not support changes that would reduce our deterrence of adversaries or reassurance of our allies. by would liking to explore as our predecessors in the house did 41 years ago the realities of this system. i want to thank all our

distinguished witnesses and the members of this committee for the seriousness with which -- with which they approach this topic before us today and hope that together we can have a productive and enlightening discussion about this sober issue. with that, i'd like to turn to my friend and distinguished ranking member, senator cardin. >> well, mr. chairman, thank you so much. i almost always in a perfunctory way thank you for holding hearings but in this case i believe this is a critically important discussion to have not just with ourselves in the united states senate, but with the american people. i must tell you i am always amazed as to what subjects come up at town hall meetings that i hold throughout maryland. most of the subjects deal with the local economic or domestic issues. we don't normally get a lot of foreign policy questions at town hall meetings. but of late, i've been getting more and more questions about

account president really order a nuclear attack without any controls? that question is asked more and more by the american people. and of course it's fueled by comments made by president trump in regards to north korea. quoting the president, his august interview. north korea best not make anymore threats to the united states, they will be met with fire and furry like the world has never seen. or the president's comments we'll have no choice fwbut to totally destroy north korea. now, many interpret that to mean that the president is actively considering the use of nuclear weapons in order to deal with the threat of north korea. that is frightening. and as the chairman pointed out, based on my understanding of the

nuclear command and control protocols, there are no checks, no checks, on the president's authority. the system as it is set up today provides the president with the sole and ultimate authority to use nuclear weapons. and that was developed because of the -- the realities of the security of our country. the nuclear command and control system we have in place is the result of three factors. the first was that the particular threat and challenge of the cold war. for decades the united states faced a nuclear armed adversary in the soviet union with a large and capable nuclear force. the united states settled upon a strategy of mutual assured destruction which placed distinctive skmands commands on our nuclear war fighting command and control system. the second and related factor is the law of physics. an icbm launch from russia to

the united states would have about a 30-minute flight time. there wasn't time to convene a special session of congress or to have the type of conactual u s -- consultations that would infrings upon our ability to have a deterrent. this means the president and his team have a short window to identify, assess and if necessary launch a nuclear worse. there's no time for cabinet meetings and no time for consultation. the cold war may be long behind us, but such a scenario based upon the need to deter a massive soviet nuclear attack with little or no warning time remains the driving force behind the current command to control architecture even today. the final factor behind u.s. nuclear command and control system rests with the fact that nuclear weapons every since their development have always been considered unique, not like any other military weapon. starting under president truman, the point wads made crystal clear that the white house was

in charge of the atomic bomb and its uses, not the military. nuclear bombs were not a military weapon who's use would be controlled by the armed forces but a strategic weapon under strict control of civilian and presidential officials. the president has our highest level civilian official and commander in chief under the constitution played a unique role with this unique weapon. the president and only the president assumed the sole and unchecked power to launch nuclear attacks. as president truman said, you have got to understand that this isn't a military weapon, it's used to wipe out women and children and unarmed people and not for military uses. so we have got to treat this thing differently from rifles and canons and ordinary things like that. nuclear weapons remain unique, but today we face a different question than the one we faced during the cold war. given today's challenges were we need to revisit this question on whether a single individual should have the sole and

unchecked authority to launch a nuclear attack under all circumstances, including the right to use it as a first strike. the most likely attack that we face is not a massive surprise nuclear attack by russia or china but a nuclear conflict that springs from an escalating conflict with the smaller nuclear forces such as north korea. in this sort of circumstance where the united states would not face the same sort of use them or lose them pressure we faced during the cold war, it may be possible and certainly wise for the president to take the time to consult congress before the profound and historic decision to use nuclear weapons is made. i would like to be able to tell my constituents and the american people we have a system in place that prevents an impulsive and irrational decision to use nuclear weapons. unfortunately, i can not make that assurance today. i look forward to hearing from our three very distinguished witnesses. i would like to acknowledge mr.

mckeon's presence hereto a former counselor of this committee it's nice to have him back before our committee. >> thank you so much. our first witness today is general bob kehler, commander of the united states strategic command from 2011 to 2013. thank you for being back with us today and thank you for your service to our country. our second witness is dr. peter feaver, professor of political science at duke university. thank you so much for being here today. our third witness is dr. ryan mckeon, the acting undersecretary of defense for policy during the obama administration and once a staff member as was mentioned on this committee. thank you for coming back. if all of you are very familiar, if you could summarize your comments in about five minutes, we would appreciate that. any written materials you have without objection will be entered into the record and if you could just begin and proceed in the order introduced, we would appreciate it. >> thank you and good morning, mr. chairman. good morning, senator cardin,

distinguished members of the committee. it's my honor to appear today to discuss nuclear decision making, decision making. i'm also really pleased to appear with these two outstanding panelists and colleagues to my right. command and control is a critically important component of our nuclear deterrent and i applaud you for taking the time to understand it better. at the outset, i must say that the views i expressed this morning are mine. i no longer represent the department or strategic command or the u.s. air force. i will try to bring the perspective of almost four decades of military service and senior military command to my remarks today and much of that was in nuclear-related duty. let me also add that some of the nation's most closely guarded secrets are associated with nuclear weapons. with the plans associated with them and with the processes as well. so there are limits on what i can say, even if some aspects of this matter are discussed openly by others. in the interest of time, i'd like to make just three brief

opening remarks. first, as this committee knows well, the u.s. now faces more complex security problems and greater uncertainty than it did during the cold war. nuclear weapons are not gone from world affairs and it doesn't look to me like they're going to be gone from world affairs anytime soon. russia and china are modernizing their forces as the basis of strategies designed to expand their positions at our expense and the expense of our allies. russia frequently makes explicit nuclear threats to include the threat of nuclear first use. china will soon deploy ballistic missile submarines opening a new chapter in their nuclear history. north korea threatens our regional allies and forward based forces and is pursuing the capability to tlent the u.s. directly. north korea has also threatened nuclear first use. iran, of course, remains a country of interest. other strategic threats like long range conventional weapons, cyber weapons and threats

against critical space assets have emerge and can arrive at our doorstep quickly, but nuclear weapons remain important in the strategies of our potential adversaries.

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