so from 50 years ago to where we today, what has been done, what needs to be done. >> i think the carter commission laid out one of the most xpansive series of conclusions and recommendations to eliminate in american they viewed the prs racism. as racist policy. therefore they put forth a series of solutions that would racism by providing opportunities, housing, jobs. that is the way we eliminate this problem. fundamentally what races and results in is groups of people having less opportunities than other groups. those with more opportunities thinking they are more successful because they are superior, when they have more

opportunities and resources. the kerner commission made the case we need to equalize opportunities, equalize resources. that is what we should have done in 1968 and we should seek to do today. had aa historian, if you chance to sit down with dr. king, what would you ask? -- thatld ask him whether he still felt his dream had turned into a nightmare by the time he died. king gave a prominent interview with a reporter where he stated my dream from 1963 has turned into a nightmare. of course, the evening before his assassination he gave the mountaintop speech. he said i may not get there with you, but i have seen the

mountaintop. i believe we are going to get to the mountaintop. it was a message of hope, just as the message in 1963 was i have a dream that i think will be actualized. in 1967 he was questioning that. particularly as he was organizing the campaign and receiving resistance from a president that stated he was waging a war on poverty. i would ask what he believed. is racism a nightmare to him, or does he still have the dream? >> are there is still physical , or have we968 moved on in america's cities? >> there are still physical scars. for people who were arrested for trying toriod

provide a better community for people who look like them who are still in prison, to businesses that left and never came back. people in the community have not received resources to build those businesses. i certainly think there are scars. >> if people want to follow you on twitter or facebook? ribram.ter is @d >> for the american historical association convention, next we mentioned the kerner report. that is the focus of the next panel. we will talk to harvard professor elizabeth hinton and take more of your calls. live coverage on c-span 3. the next seven months, the commissioners and staff they a probingpursued

examination of conditions that fueled the riot, including visits to 20 three cities, interviews with residents and activists, and confrontation with realities invisible to most politicians and policymakers. the kerner commission produced a 704 page report that sold 2 million copies. we have a group or today prepared to offer insight into the report, the historical context, and significance. i will introduce them in the order in which they will present. julian zelizer. and publicf history affairs at princeton university cnn. news commentary on he is the author of numerous books on american political history.

his recent book is a monumental study of lbj's legislative season which produced civil rights legislation, the war on poverty, and transformative initiatives. he published a new edition of the kerner commission report which includes an excellent introduction. julian zelizer will consider the policy constraints and considering the political backlash that was underway by 1968. is a professor at trinity college, dublin. his work focuses on the intellectual, political, and cultural significance of the united states. , the moynahan legacy

provides a critique of the controversy of the 1965 report regarding african-american families, including the role of black feminists in shaping the debate. he will develop tensions within the kerner commission and growing divisions among liberals regarding policing, civil liberties, and how to address african-american inequality. elizabeth hinton is the assistant professor of history in african-american studies at harvard university. her research focuses on the persistence of poverty in the united states. on the war onhor poverty to the war on crime: the making of mass incarceration in america which was published in 2016. recommendations

when it comes to policing and black urban communities. had worked with the public health service and the national institute of mental health before joining the staff of the kerner commission. produced the team that harvest of american racism, a controversial report on policing the firingh led to of him and his associates and the suppression of the report. as an assistant to police reform or patrick first andshington's only director of public safety. in his work in policing practices and criminal justice reform and academic training, his career has included in the publick and private sector and a faculty

appointment at carnegie mellon university. this year, harvest of american racism will be published by the university of michigan prep. his comments will draw on his experience in the kerner commission and controversy surrounding harvest of american racism. elizer. begin with z thank you for coming and putting the panel together. it is a pleasure to speak on this topic. until year ago we had a president that understood the need to address the problem of institutional racism that had been broadcast to the entire world through smartphones and criminalf a racialized justice system. we now have a president and republican congress who shifted

the agenda towards the theme of law and order and away from policies that were under 2016.sion in 2015 and this is not the first time we have seen this. when questions over race and policing were front and center in 1968, the federal government failed to take the steps necessary to make any concrete changes. the government understood how institutional racism was playing out in the cities, and how it exploded into violence in the summer of 1967. the electorate was confused by richard nixon's calls for law , leaving and crackdown most of the problems of institutional racism untouched. rather than deal with the way racism was inscribed in many institutions, the government focused its attention on

building a massive and cultural several -- car state andal police state. in july of 1967 in the aftermath of the riots in detroit and newark, new jersey, and smaller startedeach of which off with incidents of police againsty african-americans, president lyndon johnson establish the national advisory commission on civil disorder, known popularly as the kerner commission for chairman auto koerner -- otto kerner. politicallye at a fraught time for president johnson. the so-called concer conservatie

coalition and congress was bleeding and insurgents following 1966 where republicans in the backlash against some of the lyndon johnson's policies. disastrous vietnam war was consuming most of the president's attention and conservatives on capitol hill were starting to force lyndon johnson to make a decision between spending for guns or spending for butter. the black power movement turning tensions toward bolder stands that were needed on housing discrimination, policing, and unemployment. desperate to do something, but not in a position to do much more than defend his existing accomplishments, president johnson created the commission we are discussing. the president staffed much of the commission with established

moderate political figures who were committed to working within the existing system. he wanted them to demonstrate to the public the administration took the problem seriously, but also to avoid making any embarrassing recommendations that would cause political problems. johnson was cognizant of the problemsand racial afflicting cities, but felt there was not much more he could do. by late 1967 given the politics of the moment. which is why the first version of the report would be killed. commission staffers, with the lead member on our panel, produced a radical draft of the report in november of 1967 called the harvest of american recounted the deep-seated racial divisions that shaped urban america with damaging conclusions about johnson's programs.

the report said only offered moderate assistance while leaving the white power structure "in place." rioting as anted understandable political response to the conditions of the city. a truly revolutionary spirit had begun to take hold, it said. an unwillingness to compromise, to risk death rather than have people continue in subordination. report andinated the eliminated the social scientists who worked on it. the final kerner report was hard-hitting, especially given where we have come today. basic conclusion is our nation is moving towards 2 societies, one black, one white, and an equal.

the softened much of language from the original draft, but the argument remained quite powerful, the focus on institutional racism. meaning racism was not a product of that individuals who believed african-americans were inferior to white americans, but racial hierarchies were indebted in the structure of society. segregation and poverty, the report said, created in the racial ghetto a destructive environment unknown to most white americans. what white americans have never fully understood in the negro league and never forget is why society is implicated in the ghetto. white institutions created it, maintain it, and white society condones it. the riots in detroit and newark were not caused, nor were they the consequences of, any

.rganized plan or conspiracy the police received the most scrutiny. in a section of the report it believed "negros firmly police brutality and harassment occur repeatedly in negro neighborhoods." had shown police enforcement had become a problem, not a solution, in race relations. more aggressive policing and the militarization of officers had he come the de facto response to urban decay. in several cities, the principal train theas been to equipped with more sophisticated weapons. stressedt law enforcement officers were " to thetart factor riots, but had come to symbolize

"white power and white racism." they argued they had to stop arming the police and recruit more african-americans into the forces and impose stricter guidelines. they would to cry the commissioners from backing away from the tougher language. language that would acknowledge the violence was often used in fashion against protesters and helpfully police brutality against african-americans was constant, not sporadic. in 1968 the kerner report included tough language from an official government body. the commissioners warned of nothingconsequences if changed. johnson tried to ignore it as long as possible and refused to formally meet with the commissioners. he didn't want to talk about the report for weeks. the public did not ignore it and

the press broke the story. , a 700 plusuction page paperback with the bestseller list in 1968. the kerner report was the fastest selling book sense "valley of the dolls." marlon brando even read part of the book out loud on the joey bishop show. environment had changed so dramatically since 1964. any historians stressed of the limits of the report and johnson, it is to understand what the political environment had been when the report came out which constrained part of what he could do. the report made recommendations employment,nts in education, and housing that johnson knew would not move through congress.

a respected pollster told were to be congress given such a program at this time, i presume it will not pass." believing that white middle-class voters would determine the midterm election said "i would follow a program of lot and order balanced with goodies for the ghetto." that is what happened. the government and public moved in a different direction. johnson decides not to run for reelection. vice president humphrey concentrated energy on trying to find some solution to vietnam. despite his historic role in the civil rights act of 1964 feared that the power of the right was going to be more important than the power of the left. he kept a distance from some of

the grassroots activists who were urging the party to do more on the recommendation. it was former vice president richard nixon and alabama wallen whoorge framed the way americans would talk about racial unrest and governor wallace did not hold back. "the people know the way to stop a right is to hit someone on the ."ad anxietiesed to these with a way that would resonate with the mainstream. blasting liberal court decisions on crime and denouncing radical civil rights activists who accepted violence as a means of protest. he called for a means to restore law and order. we have been amply warned, he said, that we face war in the making of our own society.

we have seen the gathering hate. we have threats to burn, bomb, and destroyed. a taste of what the organizers of insurrection are planning. we must take the warning star heart and prepare to meet with force if necessary. he fine tuned some of these arguments in the 1966 midterm when he campaigned around the country helping republicans gain elections. now he had a better atmosphere to sell his message. d we all of the decent, law-abiding citizens of america to take the defensive against the criminal forces that threaten their security and rebuild respect for law across the country. his law and order arguments won the day. books such as the new jim crow, booksizabeth and dan's

cover these became the foundation for a racially unequal justice system that exists today. one that disproportionately punishes and african-american and revolves around a prison system, police forces, and sentences individuals with minor crimes to jail. the problem is politics have moved again in the wrong direction. a little bit like what happened .fter 1968 structural racism has to be addressed and president trump and the republican congress has criminald progress on justice reform. in charlottesville the president sent a clear message when he hesitated and resisted coming down hard against american nazis . president trump will likely play

to some of the worst racial sentiment in the country, and use this moment to build an expansion of the criminal justice system rather than change it. in the 1960's the united states so what could happen if institutional racism was allowed to persist. of racial violence americans witnessed in the past few years has brought the nation to a comparable inflection point and has moved in the wrong direction. this makes grassroots activism and a pushback against more urgent than ever before. thank you. [applause] >> the kerner report has often been recognized as a quintessential document of american liberalism. reflecting the government's

ability to understand the underlying poverty as it saw as the root cause of the urban uprising of 1967. no other document embodies the strengths and limitations of 1960's liberalism and endorsed racial integration, valued civil liberties, generating policies and enlightening the public, and that america's problems could be solved within the established political system. it would be a mistake to see the kerner report as reflecting in monolithic liberal response the issues of inequality and policing raised by the uprising. my comment will highlight the divisions among liberals that have too often been overlooked by historians. i will thereby contest some of the standard interpretations of

liberalism that contrasts a coherent liberalism to existing conservatism, or assume that a liberal consensus pervaded american politics, or that c 1960's liberals paving the way for massive incarceration and over policing. none of these interpretations account for the heterogeneity of postwar liberalism which we can see in the making of the kerner report that embodied three strands of liberalism. first of all, lyndon johnson's liberalism. he commissioned the report, but famously disowned it. d by the republican victories, the vietnam war, and uprisings which seemed to reveal liberalism's faults. it seemed like liberalism was making a quick retreat after the

seeming triumph of the great society. i won't say too much more, except that we cannot take the johnson administration's policies as the whole of liberalism at this time. secondly, the liberalism of the kerner commission itself. this was a liberalism that was far bolder and more ambitious than johnson's liberalism and the liberalism of the great society a few years before. commission envisioned massive spending to address the problems it saw behind the uprising. a bipartisan commission advocated programs of the kind that only someone like bernie .anders today would contemplate they went beyond this to examine the causes of civil disorders and how to prevent them and offer a comprehensive statement on the social and economic conditions of lower class

african-americans. it called for significant social investment in employment, education, and housing to be funded by tax increases if needed. the kerner report endorsed civil for a' leaders calls marshall plan for investment in african american ghettos. this was hardly an original approach, but was notable or who was endorsing it. a significant part of the political establishment. as the journalist to introduce "theriginal report wrote, devastating validity that it was drawn by representatives of the moderate and responsible establishment. not by black radicals, militant leftists."cademic the rejected by johnson, the out a program that

defined the liberal wing of the democratic party for several years. running in the 1968 primary, kennedy called for the reports to be implemented insisting the crisis in our cities and ghettos have been met with too little, too late. fred harris, one of the people on the commission, who later runs and has presidential ambitions as well and is running on his part in the kerner commission. liberalism,rands of notably those that saw the issue as poverty and inequality, and those who saw it as white racism. i will focus on the difference between the final report and a third liberalism. this is the draft of the harvest of american racism written by the social science division.

i'm delighted that we have robert shellow, who headed that division. if i say anything wrong, he can correct me. it is a remarkable report. you should look for it. not justinterest historically, but of significant interest to many issues that we are discussing today. this report, which led to the firing of the entire division of the social science division, had a key difference with the current report in the treatment of policing. resized thereport violent overreaction in oppressing the uprisings and rejected the use of lethal force against rioters and looters. not insignificant. the majority of white americans thought the killing of black rioters was fine in opinion polls. it sidestepped to a degree the

issue of police violence that precipitated nearly all of the uprisings. wereeport recognize there 2 riots. one of african-americans against white property. the far more deadly and destructive coming from police that behaved in a lawless fashion. in the the tories incident in detroit, kerner found policechers rearranged the bodies of killed african-americans killed by police forces to make it seem like the police were responding in self-defense. document pulled no punches in calling the police "one of the most reactionary and racist institutions of white society." it made it clear

addressing the underlying causes would require federal effort to correct the lawless practices of in powerice forces and urban african-americans. the report made radical recommendations. it was politically unpalatable to the kerner commission, but the authors are characterized as liberals. they are not radicals, really. no one known to oppose the vietnam war could work on the kerner commission. that was one of johnson's stipulations. that would exclude almost anyone on the new left at the time. when the kerner report came out, though social science division is critical to a degree, but supports much of what the final report says. the lead researcher gives the kerner report 2 cheers, not 3,

but appreciates the accomplishment. radicals, they are what i would characterize as left liberals. , there was no single liberal approach to the uprisings and the many issues they raised. liberals differed in their understandings of uprisings and what they were willing to say publicly and what programs they would advance. history should pay as much attention to differences among liberals as they do between liberals and radicals, or liberals and conservatives. thank you. [applause] >> thank you for organizing this panel. the introduction, for all of you for coming and

exploring the issues of today and those of you watching. i would like to reflect on ways in which the conclusion reached by the kerner commission on pursued an alternative to the consensus that supported the federal war on crime that lyndon johnson began in the late 1960's. johnson's staff the kerner commission with moderate liberal policy makers who sought integration as the desired path for future domestic policy. the kerner commission recommended the creation of 2 million jobs for low income americans, federal intervention to ensure school integration, year-round schooling for low income youth, the immediate construction of housing units in deprived communities, and a guaranteed minimum income. the precursor to the bernie sanders platform. expanded policing was part of

the prescription, but within and to the american intervention in southeast asia. calling for a massive $50 billion federal urban police program to be paid for by pulling out of vietnam. the kerner commission believed the federal government had three domestic policy options to manage the crisis of race relations. all of which resonate today. the federal government could but to foster separate equal access to institutions. it could enact structural reform such as busing or affirmative action. or it could continue the current course while the nation hopes for the best. goals of black nationalist organizations and the preference of sections of the american public, the first option was the enrichment choice . it was premised on the idea that

african americans could achieve "equality of opportunities with whites while continuing in conditions of nearly separation -- nearly complete separation." some might be satisfied with the quality of continue separation the commission and sought enrichment as only a means towards the goal or interim americansting poor from poverty and giving them "the capacity to enter the mainstream of american life" until the integration option could be realized. taking this path the federal government would simulate the outmigration of black americans from cities to server's, create -- to suburbs and create that her access to opportunities. the goal must the achieving freedom of every citizen to work to his abilities, not his color.

on the part of political institutions that would make visible impacts on life for african americans, the commission warned that the nation would be plagued by violent crimes and lasting and equality here the kerner commission believed what it called maintaining the existing community action, manpower development, and war on poverty would be the most detrimental for the future of american democracy. the federal government did nothing to address the forces that perpetuated exclusion. that an action could conceivably urban apartheid with semi martial law in major cities and enforce the segregation of negros in areas. prediction inng the age of mass incarceration.

maintaining current programs would unleash conditions where ining portion of negros disadvantaged areas might look as -- they suffer the inherent inequalities within , the kerner commission feared a spiral of police force would emerge, compromising games of the civil rights movement and critical reforms of the great society. despite such warnings, the pursued nonenment of the broad domestic policy options. not even the maintenance of existing policy. the attention to the role of white racism in perpetuating any quality and segregation may johnson uncomfortable. even though the president

staffed the commission with liberals, he viewed it as unreasonable and to radical. the controversial nature of the conclusions led policymakers to distance themselves. although the kerner commission received more public attention than any other task force in the impact they lacked the of its predecessor, the crime commission. in 1965, the crime commission brought together experts from the civil rights and corporate world that shared moderate implications and were committed to preserving the current order. johnson carried out the most extensive investigation on crime ever. research program that would the for congress.

among the crime commission's recommendations that shape interaction with law enforcement, the phone number became the basis for 911. compared to the crime commission, the kerner commission had a subtle influence. current policy that was ongoing with recommendations coming to fruition when the kerner commission championed strategies developed by the crime commission with respect to the issue of urban policing strategies. commission identified five problem areas in urban police departments. the kerner commission encouraged local law enforcement to develop screening procedures. operating on the assumption that there is more crime in the ghetto than other areas, the kerner commission hoped

screening measures and special sensitivity programs would kurt practices,minatory promoting positive community relations and preventing violent outbreaks. second, the kerner commission agreed to deploy manpower to ghetto areas would reduce crime. unlike the predecessor, the crime commission resolved urban police forces needed to focus on apprehending suspects involved in serious crime rather than minor infractions like loitering, which seemed to foster distrust. third, the kerner commission proposed institutional reforms, including the development of internal and external police review boards. that departments needed to policy guidelines to

regulate contact between citizens and police and high crime urban areas to help officers determine when to break up a social street gathering and make arrests for victimless crimes. the kerner commission suggested that field interrogation quotas established by police administrators discouraged officers to differentiate that isbehavior suspicious and behavior that is suspicious to an officer simply because it is unfamiliar. wouldng policy guidelines involve reducing or moving entirely specific arrest quotas during each duty. the fifth recommendation was the only policy adopted ivy on the of -- by the omnibus act 1968. the effort to develop community support of law enforcement. commission members urged

policymakers, in addition to increased the number of african-american police officers, to rethink the purpose of urban police by emphasizing the community service role due to the fact that the police occupied a front-line position dealing with ghetto problems, the kerner commission thought it was important to give police the opportunity to provide services. bringing police officers into the war on poverty programs seemed to satisfy the need to crime commission identified. improving police community relations. in line with larger domestic policy, the carter commission of the kerner commission endorsed law-enforcement and urban's situations. in one of the most important recommendations the kerner commission argued if police officers were to perform social

service functions and partner as part of the national fight on poverty, incentives would need to shift accordingly. since the late 19th century, it has been the purpose of american police to enforce the law, make arrests, and build criminal cases. suddenly, police officers were called upon to deliver turkeys on thanksgiving, played with children in afterschool programs, and help low income couples and marital disputes. these had the potential to promote public safety and innovative ways. in practice, officers have little incentive to dedicate themselves to social welfare. law enforcement authorities measure the performance of rank and file cops by the ability to catch criminals and based the criteria for awards, promotions, bonuses, and selection assignment on demonstrated

activity. arrest this takes equal cognizant of the work of officers who improve the relations with alienated members of the community and minimize the potential for disorder. federal policymakers didn't heed this recommendation. proceeding to increase patrol and surveillance of black urban americans on the streets, schools, social welfare services, without refashioning the definition and reward for effective police work and vulnerable neighborhoods. officers who were expected to build long-term relationships rarely receive the reckoned -- received the recognition as their partners who participated in high-speed shootouts. kerner commission took fo granted that community pathology

caused crime. it identified black urban neighborhoods as the primary targets for the federal government's intervention. described a situation where police responsibilities in , as other have grown institutions of control have so little authority. failing public schools and the decline of religious and community volunteer organizations, it is the police that deal with this institutional vacuum. like other officials, the kerner commission did not imagine the state of affairs to be altered role.duce the police they called to participate in social programs, particularly those serving black youth, it was one that policymakers found worth pursuing. defending the return to

surveillance, the kerner commission affirmed the focus andintention on -- attention on african-american youth based on data projections indicating the black population was the fastest-growing group in .he and united states use and population trends, the kerner commission predicted african-american populations would reach 21 million people. this was discounted in the early 70's. the johnson administration crew concerned about the conclusion that the population of young black americans would "grow much faster than the negro population as a whole or the white population of the same age group." 15 and 24 wereen identified as being responsible for most urban crime and urban disorder. they maintained "the problem is white racism compounded by poverty.

the suggestions reinforce the unit ofof the historic intervention. in the final analysis, the kerner commission supported the war on crime that targeted low income african-americans. the crime commission's blueprint for national law enforcement set the course for the escalation of the war on crime. we celebrate the kerner commission and its lofty goals. we criticize the kerner commission as a celebration of it. african-americans lived in the shadow of the crime commission to one can imagine what the united states with look like if the kerner commission had the same lasting legacy as the more punitive forerunner. thank you. [applause]

>> the one question that i had in 1967 was why me? know, there were 167 throughout the summer of the united states in 1967. one predominant theory that was concurred by the head of the federal bureau of investigation, was there was a conspiracy afoot. probably even a foreign conspiracy. is sort of the mindset that beginninginto at the

of september of 1967. why me? i am not and never have been a prominent social scientist. there were a number of them that were approached. people ofn, considerable stature. none of them could find the time or inclination to take on this task. i think a number of them felt it was going to be a whitewash, so to speak, and they didn't want to be associated with it. background -- first of all, i was a commissioned officer in the public health service. that meant i was available and cheap. the budget was a very serious

and important matter to the commission director. i had done work with police. called the riot that didn't happen, and it was a description of work a colleague with thend myself did prince george's county police department to prevent a ride from occurring by training the police officers. basically, the elements of collective behavior theory and applying them on the street. credential,ind of if you will. i had just come back from europe. i had been over there for a year on assignment. when i arrived i had read about sensedts, but i hadn't

what the mood of the country was and how alarmed they were. i was mostly recovering from culture shock. by the waste in abundance in the united states. i was trying to get used to that. the -- i was approached, it is described in this publication coming up by the university of hasigan, that publication the harvest of american racism, the political meaning of the 1967.ce of the summer of re along withe comments from the 4 surviving

authors of it. the 5th is deceased. in that document, we talk about how we reacted to the assignment. thing was put together, recruited, and how we did the work. that is detailed. all i can tell you is that there , we wereirst of all confronted with many disturbances. we approached the problem in a linnean fashion, to classify them as best we could and sample from them. we were able to do that in 23 based that were selected

on the characteristics of disturbances throughout the disturbances that occurred. characteristics such as large lasting arbances considerable number of days that adjacenta cluster of communities that also went into disturbance. these were the large city dual cities like minneapolis st. paul that had a characteristic that others didn't have. then there were isolates as well. the intensity o and familiarities of the spatial characteristics.

set out.e they were for the most part, not social scientists. one commentator said the commission hired 100 social scientists and fire them later. that didn't happen. lawyers.e mostly young many people coming back from peace corps volunteers that had returned to the united states and were working under contract with companies that provided the staff. they were sent out to these cities to do intensive interviewing and collect all of the data they could. i can tell you we were inundated by the tsunami of information being brought in from all of the cities, filling an entire room with documents, recordings, and

what have you. team, the five of us plus three students that were helping out, plus three consultants and collective , they came iny wee or twice to monitor what were doing and give their opinion if we were going in the right direction. what we did with the material is suppose,ted it to, i careful analysis. the difference in our approach rather lawyers was sharp. tended to start with

their conclusion and search for the evidence to back it. it is a good way to do it, too, if you are trying to make a case. we started with the data and search for relationships or patterns within it and let the chips fall where they may. at least we hoped we were doing that. thatd produce a document discovered, within the document, we pointed out there were certain elements of certain disturbances that were not for seen. inse were political elements the sense they were disturbances that alternated violence with negotiation.

this particular finding did not find its way prominently in the final kerner report. 5 chapters of the harvest are devoted to an examination of who participated in the riots and something of motivation. we were looking for why. we took one of the president's charges quite seriously, what caused them? not what happened. that was one of the things. haskerner report in spades told us what happened. tons of data, graphs, and information. sense from the broad statements. even about racism, that is an amorphous explanation.

it is not what we were seeing in our analysis. queste seeing the the powerrticipate in relationships and communities. a quest to do so to maintain a certain amount of respect. many of the lead participants of the riots in many cities were not destitute. they were educated. they were northern, many of them. was --ey were doing maybe i shouldn't go too far with this one with what they if they were aware of the fact that the disturbances

may have been an expression of exasperation, of desperation, what have you. that they could be utilized, possibly. that they could be converted into something rational that maybe could improve matters in their communities as well. that is what we wrote about. had to turn out a report . we thought we would spend five to six months doing this. the decision was made to go to one report and we ended up with 12 weeks to do office. we didn't -- to do all this. we did it know this until the 11th and-a-half week. the result was there was a

demand for what we had in hand. top directorship of the commission, not the commissioners, but the staff wanted to see what we were going to deliver. they put enormous pressure on us to do that. we had been spending 12 weeks, 18 hour days, seven days a week, described by one of my colleagues in an interview at one point that you could come in at any time and see people running around in their underwear with their toothbrush, sleeping on couches, and what have you. we were living there. if i can convey the intensity of the commitment of the young people that were working on this

, that would do it. pretty strapped. we were essentially caught off guard, cut short. we had a document that had gone through a couple of revisions. 110-150 pages he wanted to tie into the analytical part of the report. that was not completed. it was only partially done. and yet, we had to deliver right away, and we delivered.

it is my responsibility that i very goodve a very, look at the last chapter. the last chapter was written by lew goldberg. he soared with it. goose, ifooked our you will. years, i really hadn't given to much thought to the current commission, or what we had done, or what had happened, until most recently when i was interviewed by steve gillen for his new book coming out called " separate and unequal," which i think is most -- is a most remarkable and thorough examination of what commission

politics and how they operated. anyway, when he interviewed me, then i began to wonder, began to think about it, and began to harvest ofmaybe the american racism should be made public. there were very few people who know about it. scholars took the trouble of going down to austin and digging through the johnson library and through my papers. there they would find it very, 272 pages ofopy of the word "destroy" written across the front of it. and those who did see parts of it, or had heard about it, did write about what was in it, but for the most part, they focused

on the last chapter. in the last chapter was the one that caused the problem. and why did it cause a problem? i did not understand that until a couple of years ago. within the commission, there were two factions. on the one hand, there was john lindsay and fred harris. on the liberal side. on the other side was on thornton, and industrial ceo, and congressman mccullough. they were the republicans and very much into law and order. and the problem that the executive director and victor

somethingying to find that these two factions could agree upon. thethat is when they saw harvest, they had heartburn, that heartburn. [laughter] so they moved ahead. they had to move ahead. and i could see why. i could see why the harvest, particularly the last chapter, and had language that was rather overheated. it could have been toned down and made acceptable, but i doubt it because the notion of thetical elements within south was something that was very difficult, and would be very difficult to get those two

factions to agree to. ok. a couple of things. point andop at this maybe answer questions as to what else might have been true, but if --why don't i just do that. [applause] >> thank you. ok, before we open it up to the floor, i want to see if any of the palace want to make any remarks? >> it is interesting the discussion is not just about the report, but about american liberalism and taps into this debate we have had since we started writing about the decades, about what liberalism was about, and i think there is variations.

whether different kinds of liberalism? was liberalism as expressed in the johnson administration? was it more moderate than it was presented? -- or inelizabeth elizabeth's case, a very longboard approach? -- a very law and order approach? johnson facing the possibility of liberalism on capitol hill. it is interesting to hear this debate, which we have had several generations still withng out as we discussed the current reported what it did in my its recommendations did not really have an effect. i have a brief response. i am wondering in terms about coming into this environment where there was a notion that

there was a conspiracy. startingon's response with lots, his response to what the riots represented, not questioning, but thought it was a conspiracy, and was looking for a conspiracy. with dan laying out these variations of individuals moving in this political moment, liberalism is like a catchall, that sort of mrs. the distinctions -- that sort of misses the distinctions. >> just to add to that, the johnson administration and the right after the new york and detroit uprisings, johnson was sort of convinced that this was the work of outside agitators and that stokely carmichael -- that this could not have been a reflection of frustration and hopelessness, impact of social

economic inequalities. part, if it was really about -- in part, if it was really about the amount of work needed to be done in the massive transformation of resources required to fix it, that would mean that johnson would have to come to terms with the fundamental shortcomings of the war on poverty. if it is outside agitators coming in, it is not a political tactic rather than the natural, violent response to living under a set of violet conditions that are increasingly being policed and surveilled. >> if i can jump in, johnson had different positions on this. he would talk in the same conversation about both conspiracy and carmichael, would talk about the misfit there he, which you guys debunked, which was often used to explain riots, but he would also talk about unemployment. he would talk about the kind of

brutal conditions children were living under. know, i think he was more complex in seeing what was going on in the riots. i think there is a conversation with the labor leader -- with a labor leader after watts. he does it all in one conversation. but he did have in many instances that i saw an awareness, initially of economic conditions and how that bread some of the frustrations. if i one point, he said, was experiencing what they protesters were expressing, i would riot, too. >> yeah, the johnson administration is really vacillating between different positions. on the one hand, seems to have understanding that is similar to the report, but can't get it through.

on the other hand, moves over to the law and order between. wing. we should not expect administrations to be ideological consistent. >> we would like to open it up for questions. if you would please come to the is taping the cnn session, and speak into the microphone. [indiscernible] i am studying african american history from 1960 to the end of the 20th century. we know that the development of community action was part of the johnson administration's strategy on the war on crime. how and why the community action fail? did community action fail. >> that is a big one. [laughter]

the kind of conventional argument is obviously the ways in which community action ran directly into the interests and power of local democratic machines. we'll have the stories of mayors , such as mayor daley, who was uncomfortable with losing control over federal money. and federal influence to activists who were often on the far left, radical, had different strands of liberalism. i think that is an argument that still holds a lot of water. i think it plays out in the conversation, and often, the direction some of the community action groups were going i do think were either places that johnson's administration would not tolerate.

and 1968, johnson thought it was impossible. he was desperate to protect what had already passed from that program to medicare and medicaid . congress was coming after what he did domestically. it is crucial to understand or you miss where johnson's mind was by this time. in ourt little thing, conversation, one of the concrete measures -- in the summer of 1967, pushing the extermination bill from congress. it was about eliminating this problem in the city. it is killed after the riots. ie conservative coalition, cannot remember the term they used, but they also -- but they almost blame it for the rioting and demonstrations. i think that part clashed with what local activist wanted, and rightly thought was necessary to end poverty. >> if i could add to that.

ofwe understand the politics the\of local democratic establishments, we could understand why the recommendations from the report would not fly politically because they are saying the federal government needs to step in, and tell local police forces to revise their practices and very significant ways. and that was going to have backlash. they were going to tell mayors were the riots were occurring to direct police forces. that was going to be difficult, even for the liberals. it is easier to say given their interest, let's put a lot of money into these areas. the liberal democratic mayors had to get the money, but they don't want the federal government stepping in and looking at the racism on the police forces. write-off the

committee action programs. i think they had a positive effect in the sense that it brought people to the point where they became involved in the community. -- and ultimately, were political leaders were in those communities. i speak from personal experience. after the commission, i went to work for pat murphy here in the district. and we came up with the idea of a pilot police precinct, and that was funded by the office of economic opportunity, much to the dismay of the local poverty program. and the police, i was placed in tardive it for two years, and

that prompted the response of a militants, you might say, one of whom was cutting his political teeth on me. he used the old salt and whiskey approach, that if you want to destroy something, go after it is hard as you possibly can. and he got a lot of coverage, and as a result, he became quite prominent in the district. rionhis name was mary and barry. exactly. that was positive. happened i hear, that in a number of cities as well. that people ultimately, ok, maybe wrote off the whole poverty program and things have changed, but now they began to

understand that now they have to go after the political power, and go through the legitimate means. and that is what we are beginning to see return, if you will. >> hello. teresa.is i have two short questions. how much did this commission cost? did that affect the kind of imposition of the time constraints that were unbeknownst to you? you mention that the lawyer started with conclusions and searched for evidence to validate them. can you speak more about what those conclusions were, and if they were kind of racial, or kind of class-based assumptions adhered in those conclusions? thank you.

>> i think this is for me, i guess. discovered again after 50 the top staff of the commission, had a pretty good idea what they were going to say. and what they wanted from us was kind of a scientific legitimacy, if you will. mention in thei book we are talking about, i was recruited by means of a steak dinner over at the hotel, which was very nice. at the end of it, as they are

interviewing me during this dinner, afterwards, he said to me, we would like you to take this job running the social science program. and i said, what do you mean? i don't have any background in survey research. i am not a historian. you guys would have done a much better job than me. said, that doesn't make any difference. you got that phd, he said. i should've known better. i should've known better. but the kinds of things they had in mind, the kinds of things that they thought were pretty much the major emphasis that were in the final report. lacknow, the poverty, the extent, theyome

probably put it in terms of isolated or personal insensitivity of police officers to the people that they are sworn to serve. and then broad category of the institutional racism -- and then the broad category of institutional racism. and they sawut it it as the reason or the basis. their task was a herculean one. how could they bring these concepts out through the commission process, and have them survive, and get them through the commission itself? to make a unanimous decision on how they spoke. toidentally, with regards

the suppression of the harvest document, after it was suppressed, many of the team leaders and team members were very upset and were threatening to go to the press. and members of my staff were, too. but i did not believe that this was a great catastrophe. maybe that is because i was a bureaucrat and i have seen this so many times. asked them to come i implored them not to do anything until we saw that the commission was going to say. as far as i know, there was only one week, if you will, and that was close to the time of the report was released. .t was drowned out >> from what i understand, and knowsis in the back, and

that he was not very generous. maybe that was a strategy to limit from the start to not give you full resources. it is 19 66, paul douglas, a senator, big civil rights advocate, lost to charles percy. one of the themes in that campaign was law and order. except even comes to the state -- nixon even comes to the state. ethnic light in chicago, these were traditional democratic areas. set up ine commission the budget is set up, those are some of the considerations on his mind. >> place. -- please. >> thanks.

my name is next and i'm a doctoral candidate. study history of magnet school reform. --as interested to know elisabeth invited us to consider , what if carter styler was that critique, and if it was listen to? julian's summary and what you have said since suggests that the story is a political one about the rise of conservatism, orboth in the form of nixon conservative machine democrats. i wonder if the panel would adjust that story at all? if it is a political answer to why the critique like that could not move into the 1970's with any sort of real legs. but then secondly, what we theld make of

administrative or judicial liberalism in the 1970's, like continued pushes for metropolitan school desegregation of community control initiatives. whether these categories of urban reform, what relationship we should think them to have with these types of liberalism from the 1960's moment? one other thing that i argue, and this is why the only domestic policy that consistently, over the past years that everyone has agreed on, or crime control policies. it is rooted about what the commission pointed out which is the heart of the problem -- commission pointed out the heart of the problem, which is institutional racism on the behalf of policymakers

supporting policies that would disrupt and transform racial hierarchies that have defined this country historically. get a new0's, we thoroughly implemented social program. we get a massive investment in a job creation program for police officers. that is not for low income citizens. this really reflects policymakers' priorities in the policies they are willing to support. as julian mentioned, there is an awareness and commitment to attacking the problem some andployment and housing often inhumane living conditions on the part of johnson and the johnson administration and other policymakers. but at the end of the day, there is this well, the problem of poverty is going to take this method infusion of resources.

but over the short term, we have to manage the problems with police. and eventually, by the end of the 1970's, there is a massive disinvestment from social welfare programs. and in its place, get police officers increasingly becoming the arbiters or managers of the material consequences of continued social economic inequality and neglect of some of the most marginalized and isolated communities in the u.s. i think a racism is very much rooted and shapes those policies and those kinds of outcomes. the kind of long-term response to problems of unemployment and failing public schools with police surveillance, and ultimately incarceration. add a couple just of things. one, yes, it is a political story, but let's not make it too overdetermined. robert kennedy doesn't get

,ssassinating -- assassinated and the watergate scandal did not happen, the liberal democrats were in power, that could have easily happened, they do, weave been able to don't know, but it is a live program really for several years in american politics. however, and this is one of the proms with the report. it is proposing many programs, but it is tied to the riots. rights, butking after that, they die down. that seems to take away the urgency of the report. on the other side, it opens up the conservatives to make the point, you are just calling for this as like, you are being ransomed by the rioters to spend

this money, which in fact, the commission were calling for that. part of the is long-term politics of it. the report was so tied to those events. at the most basic level, i mean, the report for all of its limits -- the language is worth reading again. it is really remarkable. when i edited again, reading through it come and again, understanding limitations was quite stunning given where we are today, to see this from a modern government body is tom wicker said, but it was about the power structure. they are that term and talking about, and level, if you take it seriously, their account of why the rights are happening, extraction of power from people who held it -- police, mayors --

that is the natural logic. call foris a long policymakers. so, i think it's some level, that was the other kind of, not bury her, but challenge -- not ier, but challenge. that is beyond the politics of congress and the right. it is right at the core of the problems they had highlighted pretty effectively. please come up to the microphone. marybeth, and this has been fascinating. it is one of those moments in so often, in racial relations.

some of the ideas you suggested that came out of the report, such as guaranteed minimum wage and such, were not new at this time. they had been part of the cio's postwar program, but there were certainly new dealers. again, the militarized police response to the rioters, the meeting of violence with excessive violence comes up a bit as well when you look at the history of labor in terms of the militarized police response to strikers over the course of the century. so, my question is, did the commission make some of these connections in terms of what had been proposed in prior years with regards to employment and income? if it did make those connections, what would -- with the dismissal of the report been

different? >> i was going to point out, if you read the report and the way it concludes," a social scientist who said to the commission, we have these riots and we have the commission and everybody knows what needs to be done and nothing happened. >> like alice in wonderland. >> exactly. in that sense, they were aware. it -- whatwhat made makes it so different is that these ideas are not new, but they are being put together an informal commission report sponsored by the president, and reported on at the washington post, which breaks the original story with the headline "white racism." impact was,what the rather than is brand-new, original analysis. it was the way -- it was where it was being presented and by who. more.

final twoe our questions. phdi, my name is greg, candidate at stony brook university. was wondering, did either of the draft of the report spent much time looking at police violence imitative or immigrant communities? i am just curious if there were differences between the two drafts on the subject. the report often puts in conversation contrast the comparisons. road beyond report the melting pot, which is a very problematic book that took of violence and communities. thank you very much. >> when you refer to the two drafts of the report, are you referring to the harvest as being the first draft? >> yes. >> it was not. and it was never intended to be. historian by the

name of abraham miller, got that wrong. he said that johnson had seen fired --ou know, had and nonead not seen it of the commissioners, although one of the commissioners probably knew what was in it because he had led the commission his top secretary, and she was my secretary perry [laughter] . [laughter] but this was not the first draft of the current report by any means. not at all. a report of the social sciences group, and we hoped it carnal of thehe kernel report. , not because of the

itself, but simply because johnson decided he was not going to fund it anymore. it was not enough money. they had run out of money. lobbied by his own bureau of the budget guy. he had had it with him. it had nothing to do with the harvest. >> i had not realized that. thank you. >> ok. >> hello. student from wednesday university in detroit, and i have been studying the riots. found and seen firsthand is that there is this intense debate as to whether or not to call what happened in 1967 a right or a rebellion. people on both sides have really

good points and make a lot of strong arguments. so my question was, when you are writing the kerner commission, which by and large, calls -- was it a conscious decision to labeled it a neutral term? what are the panel's general thoughts on the debate? yeah, and our examination of what we were seeing, and we were looking at all of this. data coming back, we could not identify the animal called "riot." we really could not. we were saying many different kinds of events, collective behavior, from a sociologist's point of view, that had

different elements and they were not all the same. what we did was we tried to tease out the differences. it became complicated. became very difficult to use a single term. of a statue in the dallas, used to be the dallas -fort worth airport of a texas ranger who stands about 14, 15 feet high, and there is an inscription on it that says "one riot, one ranger." notiont is the popular that any kind of collective action that involves violence, if it somehow or another, the meaning or the direction isn't understood, it is considered to be a right.

-- it is considered to be a r. but riot. -- thehink we should word. >> it implies a level of organization and was not there. people want to call it a suggested itt it was a conspiracy of a certain kind. these are spontaneous events not being directed. know, other hand, i don't it is particular to modern american history that riot has is weird connotation. riots,talk about meaning, they are not political. if you have this conversation with european historians, they

will look at you very funny because they would say what do you mean? there is something very weird where riots have a connotation. i would be hesitant to criticize people using the term riot. is that soment level of organization, and some kind of clear intention is necessary to make it a political but the report showed it is a response to very political institutions. and in that way, i think, it made a convincing case that the reason -- and so many city -- in so many cities, it is a common and familiar response to the same institutional problems. that is what made it political, even if they were not coordinated, or well thought

through, in the end, that is why there was a political character to what was going on. >> are right. our panelnt to thank and we look for to the publication which will be a great contribution to the discussion and understanding of the report. much, and thank you all. [applause]

>> it is just past 12 :00 the washington d.c., and you are coverage on c-span3's american history tv of the annual meeting -- coming up, a conversation of one of the panelists you saw a moment ago. professor elizabeth hidden. we will be talking about the kerner report and the government's response to crime, in his report that was commissioned by president lyndon johnson in july of 1967. our phone lines are always open. a reminder, our full programming

is available on our website you can check it out on the main page at you spend.org. in many of these programs will be airing the week of january 22 here on c-span3 prime time beginning at 8:00 eastern time in 5:00 for those of you on the east coast. her way over,akes we will begin the conversation in just a moment, but more scenes from the park hotel.

c-span3's watching historical meeting and washington d.c.

elizabeth hidden, professor at harvard university, of african-american studies. you said that the kerner report led to a war on crime. explain. >> the kerner report is not responsible for the war on crime. kernerhnson called the commission in 1967, he are he declared the war on crime. it involved a real investment in police court systems in prisons for the first time in u.s. history. this was part of domestic policy. war on crime was a very important component to johnson's great society, but the kerner report identified the major problems that police department one countering and was much in line with the goals of johnson's police intervention, which was

to improve relations between communities and police officers, and also make sure that adequate police force were in urban communities that were susceptible to urban disorder or rioting. the recommendations of the kerner commission that actually achieve legislative implementations were not only reinforced -- not only -- focused on the policing aspects of how to deal with the problems, rather than the larger social economic critiques and policy suggestions that was put forward. the kerner commission placed real strong emphasis on the role of white racism, leading to the kind of unrest we witness in american cities in the mid-1960's. >> for the mistakes? --what were the mistakes? elizabeth: the police officers

resorted to brutal force. police brutality was a catalyst of disorder in the 1960's. and there were separate incidents between 1955 and 1968. it was a real kind of major issue that was often a response to kind of indiscriminate, brutal police force, and the police officers in that of being the cause of unrest, but quickly moved on to the larger social institutions. part of what the kerner commission wanted to do was promote improved relationships between police officers and the residents who they were serving. the idea being that it would alleviate fear on both sides, fear of black residents to police officers, and police officer to black residents.

there would be review boards on thate departments so police grievances would be adequately addressed. part of what the kerner commission wanted to do was to emphasize a more intra-goal role of police officers into the community, not just focus on crime such as loitering and vagrancy, but to also prosecute serious crimes instead of locking people up or arresting people. >> why was governor kerner selected, the governor of illinois? elizabeth: illinois was a key kind of state. he was seen as somebody who was a moderate political orientation to steer the committee in a direction that would hopefully

not produce conclusions that were too radical or would not be amenable to policy changes. >> one of the questions asked, why did it happen? in 1964/1965, yeah the civil rights act, so there were efforts in play to try to help african-americans, but we saw these demonstrations and uprisings. why? elizabeth: the civil rights act in the voting rights act in the war on poverty did not address the social economic problems that low income black urban people were facing in the mid-1960's. because of the dismantling of jim crow and desegregation in the southern states, northern african-americans were subject to segregation, redlining, and isolation and marginalization that was not being addressed by national policies. jobsar on poverty was a

training program. what was needed was a massive infusion of programs. it led to the frustrations of a come right into these incidents in the 1960's. >> detroit was one of the epicenters, was in it? calledth: yes, johnson the commission during the detroit uprising. it allowed johnson to take action on something that really required a long-term legislative and well-planned response. graduate of hidden, columbia university. let's get to your phone calls. iris is joining us from michigan. hi, and happy new year to you both. i was born and raised in detroit i am 84 years old. we had a mixed neighborhood.

what public schools. schools. public we do not have a problem. no kidding. everybody got along. my school was mixed, central high. director forpaign two folks running for class offices. 12th grade, we danced together, laugh together, and there was no trouble, seriously. we all lived together, and there was no separation. poor, rich, in between, no one was looking in your pocket books. two orhink bussing took three hours out of every kid's education just having to get on a bus, go to a different neighborhood, crossing county lines to integrate for a couple of hours into a system that they made no friends and had to go

back to the same community, and we are told about the people in the suburbs were the ones who moved out of this neighborhood is because everything was local at that time. we do not run around the country. people did not have that kind of wealth, and if they did, they did not fool around with it. it was safe. but we do not have this dissension until the federal government sent the troops and after the riots. we did not have the problem -- we did not have a problem with police. it was soldier standing there with guns and hanks rolling -- and tanks rolling in. they were carrying nightsticks. >> iris, thank you for sharing your story. thank you for calling from the detroit area. elizabeth: you made to really important points. is that what was needed was an infusion of

resources in urban public schools that were underfunded. it is really about where do we allocate resources and how can we improve the kinds of institutions that people who are at the margins of society have access to? the second point about the police, one of the misconceptions about the uprising is there were all of these attacks on police by black residents. and in detroit, there were at least 20 casualties a black residents at the hands of policing. what ends up happening in these situations, police officers get scared and start firing their guns and people end up dying. dying atpeople end up the hands of police. early report came out in 1968. within a few months, martin luther king would be assassinated and then john kennedy would be assassinated.

>> and then we get hundreds of riots in major american cities in the spring. >> let's go to tom in california. go ahead, please. >> yes. i am 71 years old. as far as i can see, what we are constantly doing is making excuses for people instead of people taking responsibility for their own lives. in my life, i was married at 16, dropped out of high school, had two kids when i was 20 years old, and i had never received a welfare check, never received an employment check, no kind of government help. i work and did my job -- i worked and did my job. my kids went to college and did well. we need to stop making excuses for people and have them be responsible for their lives. >> tom, thank you.

elizabeth: thank you for that. the same time, we have to take into account our history and the history of systemic discrimination that has handed out some opportunities to some, and missed opportunities or prevented opportunities for others. >> when you are in the classroom trying to explain this to the millennial generation, what kind of reaction do you get from them? do they view this as ancient history or think these are problems we still have today? elizabeth: especially teaching kind of in the context of black lives matter, and ferguson and baltimore and the obama presidency, trump's election, i think students are very aware that the 1960's was a very crucial moment in that we are still living in the unfinished legacy of what the current commission called the crisis of race relations, that the

fundamental problems of american society that the current commission pointed out, which still -- which is what we are still dealing with. >> having read the report, i want to get your reaction to what stands out the most. but first, bob is joining us from indiana. you are with us with elizabeth hidden from harvard university. >> yes. i read for some years about the police helping and communities in new york city for some years. and it seemed to be really effective. it took a little dip when we got into the mode of assassinations of police. i read this morning in the wall street journal how the program is active in a number of cities

and building some successes. i am pleased to hear that. my question is, how can we publicize this a lot more? that encounter what i am seeing as a very negative attitude? the protests are polarizing us. we have the publicize the good things that are going on, and try to get to an operation -- and try to get joint cooperation. background and your point of view on this. >> i am 79 and i have been in business. we lived in detroit in the suburbs in 1966. very thrilled on trying to help on this and i read a lot. i understand some of the programs.

i want to support that so strongly as opposed to all the polarization i see going on. >> thank you, bob. inzabeth: in recent years the wake of ferguson, there has been a number of reforms led by the federal government. local police departments are making an attempt to improve relations with the community, and there was a lot of about communities that are targeting police. can confront those issues and have honest conversations, this misrepresentation is going to continue. >> is the mistrust greater than it was 50 years ago? mistrust ishe greater, if not the same. >> nancy is joining us from new

york city. go ahead, nancy. hello. a professor testified in front of the kerner commission and wrote the book in which he documented that in all the --ies across the country they felt they had no other recourse as professor fogelson said. it showed people that the conventional thought that the people ie