live coverage of the american historical association's annual meeting in washington dc. if you missed any coverage we will reair all of today's panel discussions and discussions ahea d on history tv on c-span3. you can also visit our website at www.c-span.org/history to view today's american historical association's schedules in its entirety. programsatch other tv such as our programs such as our series on the civil war and the presidency. again, that is at www.c-span.org /history. an interview on u.s.-korea

an interview on u.s.-korea relations with an historian from the university of wisconsin, madison. we recorded this yesterday at the american historical association meeting. >> david is a historian that specializes in a very timely field, u.s.-korea relations. what is the most important thing that anyone who was watching the news right now worrying about the state of things should know about korea and u.s.-korea relations? >> the most important thing to understand is that the division of korea was originally a jewish idea. this division -- originally a u.s. idea. this would originally create a unified state. this eventually became permanent. the reason that this matters so much. the koreans very much see themselves as one people, one race, and would very much like to be reunified, especially the older generation of koreans that have family in north, some of whom who have

not spoken in decades. this matters because in many ways, koreans hold the united states responsible for that decision. there is a latent stream of anti-americanism running through korean society that does not always manifest, but could manifest under the right circumstances. >> the perplexing thing about seeing themselves as one nation is that they have two very different governing systems. how would that rectify itself? if you look at the deprivation people have in north korea versus thethere is a latent strt all fit? mr. fields: the koreans like to claim they have 7000 years of history on the peninsula. , but it is true history as oneg

united people. they have become very different. -- very divergent. they look at the long path they have had together as proof that in the history as one united people. they have become very different. -- future they can reunify. how can that happen? that remains to be seen. the official plan is for a loose confederation between the north and south, initially while they try to work out the very sticky details of reunifying. practically impossible as long practically impossible as long as the kim regime is in power in the north, but does not stop koreans from wishing it will happen. host: how many troops do we have howhe ground today, and many are from the south? mr. fields: i believe about 28,000 troops on the korean

peninsulapeninsula spread in vas throughout -- in bases throughout korea. next few years they will be re-concentrated into one base south of seoul. previously they were stationed hownd the many are from the south? dmz, which meant they were essentially the tripwire force. any invasion by the north would mean almost dmz, which immediatd by the americans. the dynamics have changed. one reason they wanted to do that is they wanted to narrow the american footprint, concentrate the americans into one zone, and get them out of the center of seoul. garrison when it was originally constructed was outside of seoul. it has grown so rapidly that it is now in the center. this is a minor irritant for the koreans, and would be for any people to have a foreign garrison stationed right in your capital. support a foreign

presence? mr. fields: they do. in a perfect world, the south koreans would wish the united states was not there. they wish they could manage their security affairs on their own. it is a wide view that it is needed to balance the competing interests of china and north korea. the south koreans would like to live in a world where the americans could be gone. there is a tension of needing the americans but not necessarily wanting them. host: you said it's impossible as long as the kim regime is in power. give us a history of them. mr. fields: the first was kim a guerrilla fighter against the japanese. he was a red officer.

he was brought into north korea by the soviet union, who established him as a puppet lea der. when they did that, they thought they could exert more influence on him than they could. kim il-sung remained an independent line from china andt and the communist party. he ruled korea until the 1990's, --il fighter against the japanese. he was a red officer. kim jong-un, the grandson of kim il-sung, took over.

there are a lot of tales of extreme violence which may or may not be true. it is definitely true that he has purged some of the holdover leadership from his father's regime, including his uncle. it seems unlikely that his style of leadership will end up in results that are much different from what his father and grandfather pursued. host: what should the american know about the everyday korean's life since the conflict? lifefields: north korean's depends tremendously on class. there is a core class that lives pyongyang that has an excellent life by north korean standards. it would not compare much to a high-level bureaucrat in the last, but these people generally do not go hungry, they live in

buildings with heat. then there are north koreans who are a waiver in class that live in -- wavering class that live in humans deprivation. -- immense deprivation. there was a time when north koreans were starving by the hundreds of thousands. the kim regime uses underdevelopment as a way of maintaining its power. this makes it different from the soviet regimes. it is a mistake to think of them as a communist regime. they modified their constitution to remove all references of communism. it is not interested in developing its people, it is interested in keeping them underdeveloped. those spending 12 to 14 hours a day trying to meet subsistence will not be threatening to the regime. they are too busy with their own

survival. host: we see these dramatic bids for escape. our policy is based on the fact that we presume all north koreans wish for a better life and for some semblance of a democratic process. is that the case? mr. fields: i don't think that is the case. if you were to ask a lot of north koreans, they would see the 1950's and 1970's of kim il-sung as a golden era. they would prefer to go back to that rather than life in the west. host: what is the golden era for them? mr. fields: one, they had economically secure lives. at that time, north korea had a very robust ration system. no one went hungry. north koreans lived in apartments with heat. their lives were fairly good, especially compared to what they

had under the japanese. more importantly there is an ideological element. many north korean defectors that come to the south find south korean existence very empty, because their lives are nothing further perspectives besides the pursuit of profit, which they are taught to disparage. when -- life in north korea is about maintaining the north korean race, about maintaining the north korean revolution. every korean has a purpose in that struggle. the north korean defectors say terrible things about kim jong-un. they are less likely to say those things about kim jong-il. he will almost never hear one of them say anything kim il-sung. i think many north korean see kim il-sung as a great leader. host: what should the average american know about the south

korean government's attitudes toward the west? mr. fields: south koreans have a sense of grievance see kim il-sa great against the united states. not just because of the division. we helped establish a separate state, but then we left korea in 1949, against the wishes of the south korean government, who begged us to stay. if you leave, the north koreans will invade. then they asked for concrete guarantees that in the event of a northern invasion, we would come back. those guarantees were never given. this is ultimately why joseph stalin gave kim il-sung permission to invade. that was an important factor that the south koreans have not forgotten. if you go to the war memorial in seoul, you will see this laid quickly that it was thertant

lack quickly that it was the lack of american security guarantees that encouraged the north to invade. there is an underlying sense of distrust in the americans. when our presidents calls the south koreans free riders on our security, these things are very upsetting to south koreans. when he refers to the sea between korea and japan as the sea of japan instead of the east boil.t makes korean blood there is a chance that a preemptive strike against north korea without firm south korean support could lead to a backlash against the american president that could have unforeseen there is a chance thatconsequenr position in east asia. host: this is the history and lesson for the age. we don't have a rockstar --

in southck solid ally korea. mr. fields: we do at the moment, but that could change drastically with a rash american decision. we could get away with it, but nobody knows. there is a wholesome scent of possibilities. we tend to think if we strike first, x number of koreans will die. it will make much more sense from the north korean perspective if we were to attack them not to level seoul, but to show that they had rolled the dice with tens of mainly -- the dice with tens of millions of south korean lives. they will say, do you really need the americans? they are the greatest threat.

host: we have referenced china a few times. what is the influence china can exert on north korea? we see from our policymakers we are looking to them to stabilize the kim jong-un regime. mr. fields: the chinese have tremendous influence, but it is a v china a few times. what is theery blunt weapon. the chinese could put enormous pressure on the north korean regime. they could cut imports from the regime. doing so risks the collapse of the north korean regime. most of those people will not go south, they will go north into china. the northern border between china and north korea is not militarized. in some places, it is hardly marked. that is the chosen route by defectors. this is not what the chinese

want. they couldwant. they could lose a buffer between themselves and americans in the south. there is a tremendous amount of ethnic koreans who are chinese citizens that live in that region. this is one of the minority populations that has had no problem with latent nationalis m. they are ardent nationalists, and he would be inviting tens of millions into your country. this is not at all what the chinese want. the chinese want the north koreans to behave. they wanted to stop doing nuclear and missile tests, but they basically have one button they can push, and the repercussions could be much more severe than they want. host: what are japan's interests? thefields: the effects of alarming.japan or

alarming. for the first time in decades the japanese are talking about rearmament. japan has a specifically pacifist constitution that we wrote for them after the war. they have no armed forces. they do not have the right to wage war outside japan. all that is changing now because of the north korean threat. the japanese are beginning to discuss revising the chinese want. constitution. this matters because relations between the south koreans and japanese are not good. japanese militarism causes more distrust among south koreans. one way of viewing what the north koreans are doing now is forcing all nations involved -- south korea, u.s., and japan, to ask fundamental questions about relationships with each other. he answer will not be agreeable

he answer will not be agreeable to all parties involved. host: as a historian, is there a metaphor you can use to describe the current situation as you are looking at it? is it a tinderbox waiting for a spark, or something other than that? mr. fields: i think a better metaphor might be some sort of precarious tower, that is actually fairly strong or iron.e, made of it can look strong and collapse suddenly. our alliances with south korea and japan are fairly robust,sud. but that does not mean certain ations, particularly preemptive strike against north korea, could cause this edifice to come down with shocking speed. a timely context for north

korean affairs. thank you very much. >> a a timely context tweet aske that still resounds today. his question is about how many people who are fathered by u.s. gis in vietnam -- how are they treated 45 years after u.s. departure? >> could be featured during our next live program. facebook.com/cspanhistory. istory.tter @cspanh >> on "afterwards," appellate judge john newman looks at his career. he is interviewed by senator richard blumenthal. of 45 years, having gone from that active life of going to court and advocating a case, to judge and,

was that a difficult transition for you, and did you miss the life of advocacy? was not difficult. i have known people became judges and so disliked the decision-making process that they left the bench. i was an advocate. i was glad to be an advocate. while the decision-making process was different, i found it to be enormously satisfying. i have to say i loved being a judge. the opportunity to resolve --putes, large and small they all matter to somebody, wa. i have known people became but some have large political significance -- that is a satisfying role. on"afterwards" on book tv, c-span2. weekend, american history

weekend, american history tv is featuring springdale, missouri. c-span's cities tour staff recently visited many site showcasing its history. in 1861, more than 16,000 union and confederate troops fought the battle of wilson's creek near springfield, which resulted in a confederate victory. learn more about springfield all weekend on american history tv. researching the telework townsite 1998. -- the delaware townsite 1988. i live across one of the fieldnotes denoting the location of what became known as delaware village. i believe it was 400 square miles southwest of the state, which included springfield. delaware town was south of springfield, just across the green county line. over the course of five