at thecenter is looking complicated history between u.s. and russian leaders over the last century. the discussions included assessments of franklin d nixon,lt, jfk, richard torch h w bush, and bill clinton, as well russian counterparts. >> ladies and gentlemen, welcome panel, our second relationsu.s. soviet in the 1960's and 1970's. i am not going to chair the panel that i will turn the duties over to my colleague at the miller center, professor barbara perry who is going to acre the panel. she is a noted scholar of the kennedy era and is the director

of presidential studies here at the miller center. a very seasoned oral and written historian and for many years she led the oral history program here at the miller center. in interviewing the leading members of the presidential up until thens recent past. we have completed the oral histories under her leadership of every administration through the george w. bush administration and we are planning to lay siege to the obama administration. and we will find out what the trump administration's attitude is about being interviewed.

i will turn things over to barbara. thank you to stephanie for organizing and executing a timely yet history based battle conference this year. this is the very essence of miller's -- miller center scholarship and programming. panel will go until 1:00 and we will do this into house. will feature mark silverstone. he chairs the centers residential recordings program transcribes, and indicates the secret white house tapes. if you watch the ken burns vietnam series you will have namemarks names -- mark's

prominently displayed in each episode. they were crucial to providing clips from the nixon and johnson years and also from the kennedy tapes. mark is a foreign policy historian focusing on the cold vietnam, and the kennedy and johnson policies towards it. my favorite of his publications is his book, a companion to john f. kennedy, which sounds like it might be about some of the world friends of the president, -- girlfriends of the president, but very seriously, it is a major work that mark edited. essays onseveral every topic of jfk's life and career and president --

presidency and i rely on it almost exclusively as i prepared to speak about president kennedy. i think of him as my colleague even though he preceded me at the miller center. and tim, after serving director of the nixon library has become a associate professor of history at nyu. he is the co-author of many books but one called khrushchev's cold war. if you are a fan of cnn documentaries, you will recognize him as the star of many of them. i highly recommend to all of you, if you have not read them, before essays for this panel. they are formatted -- they are

informative and compelling. andnt to begin with mark begin with the end of his essay, which is a set of conclusions that he draws on jfk's role and behavior in the cuban missile importantly for this conference, to draw out the lessons of jfk's role and behavior in the cuban missile crisis for current issues. after mark, we will turn to tim and he will offer some lessons from the khrushchev russian side. let me turn to mark. mark: good morning to everybody and thank you again for the opportunity to participate in this. audience,t in the there are many who have written copious amounts on the cable is

-- cuban missile crisis and i think all of you. i would like to offer some lessons on how this may bear on contemporary matters. jfk had already learned some important lessons by time he had to confront moscow's deployment of nuclear missiles to cuba. several lessons involved matters of personnel process and they would be useful during the missile crisis in october of 1962. there was a failed operation of the bay of pigs and these lessons were hard-earned. they are not without qualification. by and large they ended up serving him and the world pretty well. before highlighting these lessons which might be applicable to current relations with russia, i want to touch on an earlier history that the

intodent did not translate useful site and which contributed to the missile crisis. the first of these lessons policyd policy and pronouncement. overthrowning for the of fidel castro had gathered steam, kennedy's rhetoric at the tail end of the election campaign came close to operationalizing. his provocative language in 1960 which called for more aggressive action to undermine the cuban regime might have helped him in it raised the political cost of canceling what would become the bay of pigs operation. here is the first case in the true to three towards --

trajectory where words mattered. while this public pronouncement narrowed his maneuver once he toame president, his failure consider more creative policy aboutes and discussions the relative dangers that cuba proposed. well kennedy did a series of meetings with those planning the bay of pigs operation, they revolved largely around matters of tactics and operational details as opposed to the broader strategic implications of the operation or the underlying assumptions. both pronouncement and policy, statements about the necessity

of moving against castro as well as policy trained to affect it made it more likely that kennedy would mount some aggressive maneuvers against castro once he became president. the intensification of it after the bay of pigs would later contribute to the onset of the missile crisis itself. , it mentioned in the paper was hardly the only reason for the missile deployment and the crisis it sparked. washe fall of 1961, castro commanding more and more attention from the kennedy administration and it was undermining the cuban regime. as the efforts of seven taj became to look more -- sabotage looked more menacing, they pushed khrushchev towards action. one of those actions was the deployment of nuclear missiles

to the island. in the course of that deployment , kennedys former rhetoric would again complicate his presidency and raise the stakes of not following through on stated intentions. deriveffort to once more political benefit from a policy statement by cuba, kennedy declared in september 1962, two months before the midterm elections, that the introduction of weapon systems to the island would result in the greatest of circumstances. effectively establishing a public read line for all to see. so both his policy and announcement continue to whichen drama around cuba shaped khrushchev's and then kennedy's responses to the islands. it is kennedy failed to recognize or consider how these statements and activities might box him in and create real risk

for his presidency and the world, he nevertheless took positive steps to ensure the way he managed national security policy gave him at least a better shot at getting good advice and making wise decisions. processin personnel and . trusted -- the aids he trusted both, particularly -- back channel conversations were not all to the good that they helped convey key bits of information at key moments of the crisis. kennedy helps to improve the flow of information into the white house. address the to

missile deployment, kennedy encouraged extended conversations among his military aids shielded from public view. this gave them time to reflect on the magnitude of what lay before them and to figure out how they might untie the knot of war. the share judgment of the was important.lf after lurching towards a military response, considered the less than ideal chances for oncess, the impact adversaries, and the zealotry of those around him who thought it was the only option. so there is this her wake narrative -- her heroic narrative.

can elements of this heroic narrative spark another one? thoughts. few on the matter of rhetoric, as i mentioned, red lines can be trouble. they were for trouble who -- they were for kennedy. lessps president trump's likely to make them with regard to you the ukraine. turns down any marker when it comes to u.s. the mastic policy. --is easier for him to do so domestic policy. given his lack of rhetorical

discipline and his freewheeling use of media, it is more likely than not that he will deliver this type of ultimatum before long. he might calculate the political cost of doing so very differently then kennedy did. in keeping the conversation going. these lessons from the missile crisis were relevant for crisis situations. they underline the importance of cultivating relationships more broadly. relation -- u.s. have a relationships more historically natural theition of conflict, artues of diplomacy is quality we associate with kennedy in the missile crisis.

on the matter of combining diplomacy with force, it complicates the matter, the heroic narrative that we have heard for a while. jeff agreed to pack up the missiles and send them home -- nikitaring about khrushchev agreed to pack up the missiles and send them home before hearing about jfk's decision. the prospect of a military engagement prompted nikita chris jeff's offer to remove the his publicd to forgo call when it seemed war was imminent. havesaid, this could easily resulted in armed

conflict, as many here have written. so well kennedy's mobilization of force really does seem to have made his diplomacy more effective, we will need to be much more granular in underlining which strategic come in a more a role contemporary scenario in which americans and russians find themselves i to i. thank you. -- eye to eye. thank you. barbara: his essay has an especially evocative title, grab dodd by the beard. chris jeff and the kennedys. jeff --khrusis

hchev and the kennedys. i am going to plant a word that my former colleague and friend mentioned. granular. what we have for the 1960's is a , bothar understanding because of the american side, the tapes that i spent some time with your, and on the soviet side. we have the capacity of oferstanding the politics that time in a way that is not true of all times. i am going to try to do that on the soviet side. to lay a basis i want to remind

you of a few things. because of the structure of this conference, we jumped over korea. i believe that the korean war is fundamental to understanding the cold war. absent korea, if you want to talk about possibilities, you do not have the korean war and i think there is a change in the nature of the competition between the soviets and the u.s. in the q&a we can talk about korea. there are two other things that are extraordinarily important that are happening in the world that are going to shape the environment that kennedy and khrushchev are seeking to manage. of thethe decolonization developing world. events a very important

and it is an independent variable from the u.s. soviet relationship. but it opens up the possibility ,or the soviets and khrushchev he sees it as a source of opportunity. the other is a soviet achievement, sputnik. the changes the nature of these strategic relationship between u.s. and the soviet union. mentioned, once the american homeland gets threatened, it raises questions about the extent to which extended deterrence israel. put newricans actually york at risk for the sake of paris? that happens because of sputnik. you have these two destabilizing events that are happening in the

1950's. it is that world that khrushchev and kennedy are seeking to manage. approach -- khrushchev's approach that world is not what america anticipated. nuclear dangerh about that statesmanship involves reducing the threat of nuclear war, that as we see with khrushchev, he is all about disruption. he is interested in crisis. it is why he is interested in crisis that i think is the essence of understanding his 1961,or, not simply in but in 1962.

let me talk to about a summit conference in 1961 that people don't talk about. everyone talks about vienna. -- at that,d the for me, the more interesting the defaultrence is and kennedy summit. they share a lot. , it is ans argument , hisent that has relevance argument is when you deal with a disruptor, you should ignore them. hyperventilate about berlin. he is going to do nothing. he does not have the power to do anything. the only thing you can do is

actually increase his desire to disrupt i engaging him. engagement is a mistake with a disruptor. kennedy's argument is, i can't take that chance. threatened us in 1958 and if he does it again it means he is seeking something, or it means there is something internal in the soviet system that is forcing him or the soviet empire to do that, and i have to take that seriously because he could risk nuclear war out of the urgency to change the status quo in central europe. and de gaulle said, i disagree with you completely. let the soviets sign a piece treaty with east germany. it does not matter. it is just a piece of paper. kennedy said, i do not agree with that at all. that would shift a sense of

opportunity and burden of power to east berlin, which might lead to even more risk-taking in europe. which youbasic debate will see over and over again about different countries and different leaders. do you leave them alone or do you engage? and is the engagement, the decision to engage, somehow threatening to your own standing at home or abroad? it turns out that de gaulle was wrong. and we really only knew how saw the was when we soviet materials about 15 years a vladimir putin government declassified the resolutions and transcripts of the bureau from 1950-1964.

it turns out that khrushchev was revising the cold war settlement in europe. he was a revisionist. he was not seeking more security through reducing nuclear danger, he was prepared to take advantage of the existence of nuclear danger to achieve a revision of the world war ii settlement in berlin. as we learned from presidential records, khrushchev told his colleagues that he was willing to use force to achieve what was required in berlin. de gaulle had not assumed that. de gaulle was convinced that when push came to shove, khrushchev would not use force. khrushchev, before vienna, tells his colleagues, once we sign a

peace treaty with east germany, we are not going to make the mistake that stalin made in 1948. we are not going to allow the tot to use the air corridors continue to supply west berlin. we are going to shoot down a british or american plane to send a signal that the air corridors are closed. de gaulle did not predict that. kennedy did. and kennedy's thinking was, we must engage to give the russians a sense that if they choose diplomacy over militarized conflict, something good will come out of it. so in 1961, without having access to the internal discussions of the bureau, because the cia never penetrated the presidium, kennedys deep politicians led him to

make a different call then de gaulle. i will give you an aside on kennedy in relation to khrushchev. if you want to understand how kennedy thought about foreign leaders, you should read profiles in charge, even though kennedy did not write the final draft, it represents kennedyesque thinking about power. kennedy was all about understanding the interests and incentives that shaped politicians decision-making. what he did was he projected on the soviet leadership and on france and on every single leader he ever dealt with. he assumed they had interests and if you could change the incentive structure, you might alter the way in which they acted on their interest. initially on this

khrushchev in 1961 it does not work. that is because khrushchev is not interested in engaging the united states. what he wants is the revised settlement in berlin. he is willing to take risks to achieve it and willing to have a bad summit conference in vienna. one of the old arguments about vienna, the conference between kennedy and khrushchev in 1961, was that kennedy screwed up. it was a mistake. kennedy was immature and did not understand what he was doing. soviet records later read that argument. khrushchev went to vienna spoiling for a fight. there was nothing jfk could have , save conceding a nato presence in berlin, there was nothing kennedy could have done to have a good conference. vienna was a setup.

it was an ambush. khrushchev set it up. he wanted to put pressure on kennedy in the hope that kennedy would give him something that eisenhower had been unwilling to give him, which was the removal of the nato presence in west berlin eared kennedy stood up to him and did not given and went and called up some reserves. khrushchev backed down. the essential thing to understand about khrushchev is that he believed that the soviet union was strategically inferior. assumed thaters countries believe themselves to be strategically inferior are not risk takers. it is a basic misunderstanding that you can see throughout the u.s. foreign-policy elite that

goes back to world war ii in japan. american observers of the international system, because they project the united states on the world, tend to think that foreign leaders who know they are strategically inferior will not take risks. but in fact, many american adversities do the opposite. --strategically inferior they are strategically inferior and that makes them take a rest area that is why the japanese attacked pearl harbor and that is why the soviets in 1962 will undertake a series of crises that were not predictable if you knew that they knew they were behind. so why did khrushchev do so? and the materials that we have, or make a strong argument on the way they thought

-- he thought about the world. khrushchev was like a puffer fish. eight tougher fish does not want to be by bigger fish so they puff themselves up. understood that the soviet union was strategically inferior. he saw the u.s. doesn't existential threat -- as an existential threat to the world he hoped for. khrushchev was a romantic. ideological. he felt over time history would very the soviet experiment well. in the short-term am a the soviets were vulnerable. so you half up the fish to -- puff up the fish to avoid a war you know you would lose. this had an unintended consequence in the u.s. american public opinion does not handle puffer fish very well.

americans were scared. that is exactly what the soviets hoped for, except that then the americans spend money on nuclear weapons when they get scared. believes, heshchev is well aware of the missile gap crisis, he believes this will have a restraining effect on the use of american power and will perhaps lead to an agreement in central europe. believesbecause he that he is always dealing with a rational actor emma wants to change the incentive structure for khrushchev. the satellitence can provide the u.s. government with absolute certainty that these soviets are behind, he decides to share that with the soviets.

public statement by the undersecretary of defense. does thatovernment thinking that if the soviets know that they are behind, they will stop the risk-taking. it has the opposite effect, because this takes from khrushchev his strategic approach to the international system. he cannot be a puffer fish anymore, everyone knows he is small. and that leads to the cuban missile crisis. the more research i do on the cuban missiles crisis, the less support and i think cuba is. attempts toushchev different strategies for dealing with american power. the first is that meniscus .ragedy -- strategy goblet.na system is a

you fill water to the brim and whereing it to the point the next drop of water would spill or the only way to restrain american pattern -- power is to create crises. no american advisor at the time would have assumed that was the soviet approach. he made that approach and it lasted for a month until he saw that the americans were still powerful and could deal with these crises along the border. so he needed another approach. so he puts missiles in cuba to scare the americans so he can contain american power. one of the lessons of studying khrushchev that is relevant today is that americans tend not

to understand that their country is an existential threat to other people. americans believe, let me put it this way. more often than not, american policymakers will believe that specific american actions will define how other countries view this country. when it is the very fact of american power, the hugeness of the economy, the size of the military which is a daily threat to many countries, which will either join with you or try to oppose you. our very existence poses a threat. never lost track of the fact that the u.s. was more powerful and richer. he believed in a future if the competition was kept to economic

interaction that the soviets would ultimately bury us. if you understand that we are an existential threat, that makes you understand why people would act against you. theif you accept proposition that strategically inferior countries will try to us, thatby scaring would also allow you to understand certain foreign countries. i think this is much less useful in understanding vladimir putin than it is in understanding north korea. or if we could go back in time, understanding saddam hussein. we have a hard time in this country understanding dictators because we assume that they play the game the way we do.

and one of the outcomes of studying the khrushchev kennedy relationship is that you see that khrushchev was rational, it's just his incentives were different. the u.s. did not understand them but what kennedy understood was that when push came to shove, khrushchev was not suicidal. he was reckless but not a madman. that basic understanding laid the basis for kennedy's masterful handling of the second week of the cuban missile crisis. the first week was much messier than people think. but this understanding of khrushchev as basically being someone who is not a madman that made possible the peaceful resolution. thatessons, to sum up, are where adversary can be irrational in your eyes, and the

is a function of your assumption. if you assume them to do one thing and they do something else that makes them irrational to you. but in fact this thinking is perfectly logical. other countries are afraid of us. that fear can lead them to take risks and we should be more introspective about the nature of their fear. this is not a judgment about moral, this is not moral equivalency. i am just arguing that the very nature of the american success of the u.s. in developing its power also leads to challenges. in the early 1960's, it was a time where the united states tried to engage the soviets and they were dealing with a leader

who did not want engagements, he wanted revision. when he changes his mind, it is when the system becomes more stable. so this is an argument for the importance of individual. khrushchev who decides in 1963, a enough with this i'm going to let kennedy have this. thank you. [applause] barbara: i will just throw out one question that relates to both of your essays and then we will open up the floor. could you delve a little bit ,ore into the back channeling mark, what you know from the kennedy side, particularly robert kennedy, and tim, what you know having delved into the archives on the other side of

the ocean? today, inlessons for light of backpedaling with the russians. >> tim has done great work on and it is lackl of use in several key moments, .nd misuse came to use it to try to figure out what was going on in the caribbean in the summer of 1962 as it became clear that there were more and more soviet shipments being sent to the island, it appeared as though there were weapons systems being delivered. i was used by khrushchev to provide disinformation. -- that was used to khrushchev

to provide disinformation. i think that at key points, it helped to keep the conversation going with regard to its use during the missile crisis. fromof that conversation was a fronty channel. it is a case where candidate was actually delivering a specific message to bobby to speak with the people you want to convey a message to. the ambassadors to the soviet union. it is a recognition that the standard channels that you might use through the state department are not always going to be effective. was not always thrilled with the performance of the

state department. so i think it provided him with some other options to try to hear from people whose voices andnot heard as frequently as we have heard, it seems as though those channels are being used today with regards to north korea, which sounds like an encouraging sign. it is another way to keep the conversation going privately when publicly would create risks. i think the robert kennedy bolshevik back channel is more interesting as a reflection of jfk's understanding of domestic politics than as a reflection on how the soviets were thinking. khrushchev was baffled by the back channel. if you look at the way in which they managed it, the soviets really did not want the back channel. the front door was

good enough. can be felt he had to you -- kennedy felt he had to use the back channel because he wanted to offer things to the soviets he cannot talk about publicly and he wanted it to be deniable. he did not use the state department, he thought they would be a leak. so he used his brother. i see the back channel as what john kennedy actually thought about the cold war. of 1963merican speech reflected ideas that kennedy had in 1961. there is a basic narrative for , thatnnedy administration kennedy is learning. kennedy could not say it publicly at the 19 six -- in 1963.

so he shared this with the soviets in 1961 but they are not listening because khrushchev wants to revise the world war ii settlement and he keeps saying, berlin. kennedy is not saying or lynn the a bobby -- not saying berlin the a -- via bobby. john kennedy proposed a joint project to the moon first, before telling the world he would go to the moon. dotold the soviets, let's this together. the soviets were not interested. channel, to me, is more a reflection of what kennedy is thinking then it says anything about the soviets.

khrushchev does use it to pollute the relationship in the summer of 1962. wasof kennedy's mistakes that this back channel is very dangerous. he did not share, bobby kennedy rarely wrote up notes about the meetings. he just told his brother orally. thisrother did not share with john mccone, the head of the cia. did not knowts anything about with the soviets were saying to the kennedys and the back channel. analysts had heard in august of 1962 that the soviets, that khrushchev was asking the president's -- the

president not to undertake surveillance of their shipment, some pieces that had not been coming together would have come together. thee was a debate between pentagon and the cia over the importance of these shipments. max taylor and the pentagon said it does not matter. even though the shipments were accelerating in the summer, the u.s. military was not that worried about them. the cia said there was something weird here. if the pentagon had heard that had actually asked for the u.s. to stop surveillance, i think that would have solved this debate in favor this is big., but kennedy did not share this with anybody, just his brother. so there is danger of back channel if you do not share the material with your

foreign-policy team. i think it changes one's view of kennedy but also shows the those kinds of operations. in the end, i think it inured khrushchev to believing what bobby kennedy said so it had a good outcome, it made the end of the cuban missile crisis possible, because when bobby offers to remove the missiles from turkey, the soviets are accustomed to bobby kennedy saying things they are not hearing anywhere else, and believing them. >> and observation and two questions. the more i listen, the more i find my mind relating the

experience to relations with north korea. organizers, ience urge you to expand the universe in which we apply this. two questions. first, i have always been curious why the soviets did not make more of the fact of the removal of missiles from turkey. it would have given him an opportunity to say, look, i got a better deal than everybody in -- everybody expected. the second question is about disruptors. you apply your insights to a situation with korea today. we have two disruptors. trump. president

he is not only disrupting on the korean peninsula but i would argue he is disrupting the economical american order and then you have a third player, the writ -- the revisers in china. what insight do you have to not --=o you have from nats that? i got a chance to try out my approach to north korea at yale university. i know to be very careful of analogies as most are fraudulent and incomplete. i see the north koreans as puffer fish.

if i had clearances, if you accept the proposition that they and if youcidal accept the proposition that they no longer believe it possible to invade south korea, and i am positing those two things. if you accept those propositions, what we have here is the north koreans reacting to the threat of the united states. the united states has viewed them publicly that they are a threat to the system. they are also an unstable dictatorship and it is useful that -- useful for them to have an enemy. if you accept that then you

manage them differently. you see they are not really a military threat to us. it is unlikely they would ever attack guam. i don't think they know for sure that if they launched a missile that it wouldn't hit japan. see have to accept these propositions. then this is an issue of deterrence. as you accept the fact that they have nuclear weapons, as they do, and we all know this. nonproliferation has not worked with regard to countries that want nuclear weapons. the u.s. did not want israel to have nuclear weapons. felt theyid what they needed to and they used denial and deception. the u.s. to not want india to have them. the indians used denial and deceptions and they got what they wanted. it goes on and on. the real achievement is when you

can delay their acquisition of nuclear weapons. you did lay it long enough -- you delay it long enough until the world is ready to deal with it. so if you accept the proposition that north korea has weapons and , i woulddeter them like south korea to deter them. i think sending a deterrence there is a mistake for us. it pulls us into a fight that is not ours. let south korea deter them and then it is over. we can pull away and deal with the south china sea. that is my lesson. >> your deterrence might work if you do not have a disruptive.

-- a disruptor. well here we are talking about containing the president. inflaming.c is only there could not be anything worse than the current approach our president is taking. tim, i always like to say that sessions are provocative, and you have provoked me. with adversaries being more rational than we think and other nations are afraid of us. but i do not think that you frame this entire issue appropriately.

i think it is eliminated by the fact that you keep saying, khrushchev said, berlin. when khrushchev wrote to kennedy and talks to kennedy at vienna, he did not say, berlin, berlin. he said germany, germany. let me talk to you about germany. let me tell you why we believe germany is such a threat. let me explain to you what it was like during world war ii. let me tell you what it was like to be in ukraine and to experience german occupation. let me tell you about the way we perceive the evolution of west german power. i want tell you, but i am really afraid of the fact that west

germany is a magnet to east germany. i am really afraid of the prospect that west germany might acquire nuclear weapons. these were all fundamental undergirded khrushchev's motives. so when you say khrushchev is a disruptor and you just use that as a way to characterize him, and,implify and trivialize what is more important, it raises the whole question about, did kennedy really understand adversaries interests? maybe he did. but he was not willing to accommodate them. i am not saying that he should have, but there is a real confrontation here of vital interests. that you say

americans did not think weaker adversaries would be risktakers, i think belies the major issue you said at the beginning. we really need to talk about korea. so the overriding lesson of must was that we americans build up military capabilities so that no competitor in the world in the future will take risks. we will have a preponderance of deter future risk-taking. so much of american policy all through the 1950's was about how much power do we really need to

have to deter risk-taking, and if risk taking should take place, how much power do we need to have and what sorts of military capabilities do we need to have two dominates a crisis -- to dominate a crisis? i would like you to respond on these issues and reflect on whether that should help us reach understand this context and its applications. >> it is fun to provoke. i think i see that we have a fundamentally different approach to this. khrushchev more agency in this story. maybe because of my generation or all of this detail came out and i got lost in it, but i see

the soviets as making choices. and khrushchev making choices. and i found that analyses that made the united states more by thecant were skewed fact that u.s. documents existed when people were writing these books. that might be unfair. this as thissee russians dealing within the american world. i see the russians making their own choices. and to go to the details, to letters that were sent to tween the soviets and americans, between khrushchev and kennedy starting in 1961. they are really boring. but they are interesting for us

because it is all about trying to seek some kind of agreement that would make the soviets feel secure. it is all about berlin. it is the details of what it is the soviets are ultimately seeking in berlin. the americans draw a line. one thing kennedy cannot agree with is the removal of nato. that iskhrushchev everything for the agreement. kennedy did not need to be lectured about world war ii. kennedy is all about trying to seek an understanding with the soviets. they go into great detail. it drives the french mod. .- mad they do not even want to participate in these

discussions. and forthll this back between paris and washington about whether to get into detail about berlin. if the united states was blind to khrushchev's needs and interests, i do not think you would see these detailed negotiations. they failed in the end, because the americans could not go where the soviets wanted to go. --espect you and are mostly , and you raise an important point about west german acquisition. there, i believe the americans did screw up. because the americans came up with the multinational force in , toffort to try to calm find a way to make the french happy because the french wanted nuclear weapons, and to somehow

tamp down a-- desire for nuclear weapons. what moscow saw was a proliferation of nuclear weapons within nato. that i agree. i think berlin is really important. historians disagree. >> somewhat narrower point, it sounds to me like you're saying degaulle's advice would apply to north korea. and connected to that, i am

wondering to what extent eisenhower came close in his dealings with khrushchev to taking degaulle's advice, compared to kennedy. to be sure eisenhower did let -- the to be pressured summit in paris because he was worried. i don't think eisenhower produced the same impression on khrushchev as the bay of pigs and kennedys behavior in the vienna. >> i don't think you should ever debate with a pulled surprise winning biographer -- blood

pulitzer -- prize winning author. khrushchev describes kennedy as being the same as eisenhower. we could have this discussion off-line about why people are convinced that khrushchev had this view. in the materials released in 2002-2003, i did not see evidence of him saying that kennedy is this immature guy we cannot take seriously. viewhchev had this bizarre of the american system. he was interested in wall street and the pentagon. again, it is a foolish game to debate with such a brilliant biographer.

korea, yes,to north i think given that north korea is not the soviet union -- the soviet union was a threat to us --itarily -- that behooved that was the argument for engagement. engage the south koreans in finding a way for a source of deterrence is a better idea. we have two disruptors simultaneously. our first objective should be to contain or persuade the american s to be -- to keep ratcheting up the volume. >> [inaudible] this will be our last question because we want to leave equal time for the second half of our panel. on the eisenhower point, i did make eye contact with my

colleague, but i am recommending his forthcoming book this march on eisenhower which will be the definitive work on the 34th president. >> [inaudible] up -- about follow khrushchev being a disruptor regarding berlin. east germany was the crown jewel of the soviet empire. they were losing that crown jewel, educated people leaving east germany through berlin. brutally solve that problem and the crisis dissipated shortly after that. it seems to me khrushchev tried to defend his position rather

than disrupting it. >> i am sorry i did not mention will's book. i do not agree with you about berlin. the berlin crisis did not end. i know that is the standard view. end.hrushchev, it did not you have to keep in mind, if you want to change the nature of the settlement in central europe, and he makes it clear that he in 1962. the question is of tactics. power. to deter american in the summer of 1962, after the cubans except the missiles -- accept the missiles, the soviet

decision-making system --khrushchev was more powerful than anybody else. the soviet leadership was surprised by khrushchev's suggestion of putting missiles in cuba. they wanted to slow him down. we will do this -- the cubans were surprised. the cubans were surprised. when the cubans say yes, khrushchev gets very excited because he sees the opportunity to put pressure on the united states. soviet foreign

ministry, the preparation for what i feel -- if you remember the old mousetrap game, the soviets were setting up for a nominal moment in the united nations where khrushchev would make a speech and he would threaten war with the united states if there was not a new settlement in berlin. he was doing that on the basis of his knowledge that he would have nuclear weapons in cuba to pose a real threat to the american homeland. see how these events would have occurred in 1962. this is not to say the united states was involved -- i think we do not give enough agency to khrushchev. he is making decisions not always in response to an american action. he makes decisions in response to the existence of the united

states. >> one of my big takeaways, regarding berlin versus cuba and the rationale for the deployment of missiles, khrushchev is saying different things to different levels in the hierarchy. the first tier officials, he is talking about berlin. second, it is probably gravitating in that direction. those people were hearing more about the cuba rationale. >> the cuba rationale spin. he doestion about why not take credit, that is a great question. him, if you said to say anything about the turkish deal, it will not happen. in 1964, he is out.

why he does not take credit in his memoirs, i do not understand. >> [inaudible] --at length >> [inaudible] cubanschinese and the were vicious in attacking him. that he would have really gone to town against them. he does not do that and i cannot explain that. next halfd spend the going back over this material. please join me in thanking kevin and we will move on to our second panel. relate to football players kneeling today? of --have a long history

>> you could be featured during our next life program, join the conversation on facebook and on twitter. >> my fellow americans, this week was the start of the eighth year of my presidency. i would like to take a few minutes to look ahead to some of the challenges before our nation this year. i will be doing a more -- a lot more looking ahead on monday night when i deliver the state of the union address. it is the only statement that the constitution itself requires the president to give. almost all presidents have delivered states of the union in person. this will be my seventh time. let me tell you, where so many

presidents have stood and signifies our determination that a government of, by, and for the people shall not perish. that thrill never goes away. i am looking forward to monday night and i hope you will tune in. i will tell congress that we in washington have a lot of work ahead of us. news, our we had good trade deficit dropped by 25%. our exports, which have been climbing for more than a year, shot forward nearly 10% in one month and reach the highest levels in american history. american industry is an export boom and our economy is strong. we know there are still unanswered questions about our economic future, the biggest -- are we going to keep working to

reduce our budget deficit? the administration and congress have made progress. more.d to do monday, i will remind congress of some good ideas that are past due for action. like the line item veto and the balanced budget amendment. i may have a surprise, too, a way for congress to show it is serious. no issue we will take up in the year ahead is more significant than the issue of peace and freedom. i will formally submit to the senate for a device and consent to ratify the intermediate nuclear forces treaty. it is a good treaty, solid with make americat will and its allies more secure.

i will remind congress that this step toward enduring peace would never have come if the forces of democracy had not been strong and i will ask for expeditious -- in central america, the key is that strength of the democratic forces. even the sandinistas are talking peace and democracy because of the freedom fighters. they have not gone through with one concession to democratize that they cannot easily reverse. at stake is whether nicaragua becomes a soviet base camp. imagine if the sandinista vision of a communist central america is realized and mexico is threatened. the next vote on aid to the

freedom fighters may be the most cast.ant this congress i will ask congress to vote yes. there are great opportunities for the year ahead. raise thetion ways to quality of our schools and i will remind congress that the most important thing is not to throw quantities of money at education but to tie funding to results and have commitment to quality. that is a glimpse of the year ahead. you will are more monday night -- you will hear more sunday night. themay have read about three-year-old who was born with a severe birth defect. she received five new organs. her appearance have exhausted

their medical insurance. a fund has been set up to help them. i know you join me in praying that she will someday be able to lead a normal life. until next week, thanks for listening. god bless you. cut. >> >> 50 years ago president faced many crises. north korea seized a naval intelligence ship and 83 crew members were taken prisoner. vietnamry 30, north launched surprise attacks against south vietnam. next,