captioning performed by vitac that is also important to soviets and that's acquisition of nuclear weapons and there i believe the americans did screw up. because -- because the americans came up with the multi-national force. in an effort to try to calm -- actually to find a way to make the french happy because the french wanted nuclear weapons and the united states didn't want them to have nuclear

weapons and to somehow tamp down -- it's more bavarian desires. that is european centered approach which has unintended consequences with moscow because what moscow saw was a proliferation of nuclear weapons within nato. there i agree. it's an unintended consequence. but in the penpal letters that set the stage in '62 they're talking about the detales of berlin so i think berlin is real really important. but historians disagree. it's part of the fun of our business. >> somewhat more narrower point, it sounds, tim, as if you're saying de gaulle's advice would apply to north korea, and sort of connected to that, i'm

wondering in retrospect to what exat the present time eisenhower came close in his dealings with khrushchev to taking de gaulle's advice. compared to kennedy. to be sure, eisenhower did let himself be pressured into having the visit to the united states by khrushchev and the summit in paris in april 1960 because he was worried but i don't think eisenhower produced the same impression on khrushchev as the bay of pigs and kennedy's behavior at the summit in vienna which you didn't take all that seriously. that is, i think kennedy did strike khrushchev as a kind of immature, young man who might be pushed around in ways that eisenhower with all of his seniority, maturity and military background might not. >> i don't think you should ever debate with a pulitzer prize

winning biographer. bill, all i'll say is that in the transcripts of the polyb rit sessions, khrushchev describes kennedy as being the same as eisenhower. we can have this discussion of why people had this view but in the materials that were released in 2002, and 2003, i didn't see evidence of him saying that kennedy is this immature guy we can't take seriously. he saw structures as more important than individuals and interested in wall street and the pentagon and the issue for him was who was strong enough to deal with wall street and the pentagon. but it's, again, it's a fool's game to debate with such a brilliant biographer but i saw data that led me to -- in a different direction.

with regard to north korea, yeah, i think -- i think given that north korea's not the soviet union and the soviet union was a threat to us militarily and therefore i think that behooved engagement. that was the argument for engagement. north korea is not that important. that i think letting the south koreans engage and finding a way to make south korea the deter, the source of deterrence is a better idea but as mr. zeleck pointed out, our first objective should be to somehow contain or persuade the american disrupters so he doesn't keep ratcheting up the volume. >> frank -- if you could come forward for frank has a question. this is the last question to leave equal time for the second half of our panel, and while we're getting ready for that question, on the eisenhower point, i did make eye contact

with my colleague will hitchcock who waved me off but i recommend his fourth coming book this march on eisenhower which will be the definitive work i believe so everyone prepare for that. >> buy the book -- >> microphone is right here for you. >> i want to follow up the question with khrushchev to berlin. east germany was a crown jewel of the soviet empire and they were losing that crown jewel as the immigration and most talented, educated people leaving east germany through berlin into the west. we know that. and the berlin wall saw ill elegantly, brutally solved that problem and the problem dissipated shortly after that. i mean, in terms of being a disrupter, it seems to me that khrushchev was trying to defend the position rather than

disrupting it. >> since we're -- i'm sorry. i didn't mention will's book. will will tell us what eisenhower was really thinking and if he liked de gaulle enough to take his advice. i don't agree with you about berlin. the berlin crisis did not end in 1961. i know that's the standard view. but the soviet materials make clear that for khrushchev it didn't end and you have to just keep in mind that he wants a change in the nature of the settlement in central europe and he does it -- wants it in '62 and makes it clear. the question's the tactics. in the beginning of '62 he says we have time. in the meantime we have to deter american power. and then in the summer of 1962, after the cubans accept the missiles, the soviet -- the soviet decision making system

was first among equals. khrushchev was clearly more powerful than anybody else but the others were not all ciphers and mikulyon was really important. he calmed khrushchev down. the soviet leadership was surprised by khrushchev suggestion of putting missiles in cuba which he came up with himself when he was in bulgaria and wanted to slow him down and the presidium said we'll do this if the cubans want it. well, the cubans were surprised. the cubans were surprised and when the cubans say yes khrushchev gets very excited because he sees the opportunity to put pressure on the united states and maybe achieve those changes in central europe he was seeking and you see in the

materials of the soviet foreign ministry the preparation for what i feel is sort of a -- if you remember the mouse trap game this leads to that to this to that, the soviets were setting up for a phenomenal moment at the united nations where khrushchev would make a speech and where he would threaten war with the united states if there wasn't a new settlement in berlin. and he was doing that on the basis of his knowledge that he would have nuclear weapons in cuba at that time to pose a real threat to the american homeland. so if berlin has been solved in his mind in '61 i don't see how these events would have occurred as they did in '62. this is not to say the united states wasn't involved in provoking the soviets, but i think we don't give enough agency to khrushchev. he is making decisions not always in response to an american action. i think he often makes decisions in response to the existence of the united states.

>> i would just add to follow up one of my big takeaways from your work on khrushchev is that regarding berlin versus cuba and the rationale for the deployment of the missiles khrushchev is saying different things to those different levels in the hierarchy. first tier officials he is talking about berlin and part of the gearing up and second tier officials doesn't necessarily mean it's the secondary reason but it's probably gravitating in that direction. >> i think it's spin. the cuba rationale is spin coming out later trying to explain why he did this. the other thing -- the question of why he doesn't take credit, that's a great question. i know why initially because the americans say to him, if you say anything about the turkish deal it won't happen. but -- and then he's -- in '64 he's out. why he doesn't take credit in

his memoirs i don't understand it. those memoirs as, you know, as strobe in the back knows better than anybody in here -- >> he does. >> at length? at length? >> no. >> because, i mean -- >> he does write -- >> recognize. because the chinese and the cubans were vicious in attacking him for the outcome of the cuban missile crisis and you would think because he's quite repetitive in his memoirs that he would have really gone to town against them saying, you know, i just couldn't tell them what i had achieved and i can't explain why. maybe strobe has an explanation. >> we could spend the next half going back over this material but please join me in thanking tim and mark an we'll mod we'll to our second. today the white house correspondents holds a discussion with sarah sanders and former white house press

secretary mike mccurry followed with a panel with correspondents. live coverage starting at 6:30 on c-span. c-span, where history unfolds daily. in 1979, c-span was created as a public service by america's cable television companies. and today, we continue to bring you unfiltered coverage of congress, the white house, the supreme court, and public policy events in washington, d.c. and around the country. c-span is brought to you by your cable or satellite provider. next on the presidency, a look at what motivated president richard nixon and soviet premier leonid brezhnev during a period known as detente. the miller center held a conference looking at complicated history of the u.s. and russian leaders.