committee tonight at 10:00 p.m. eastern on cspan. wednesday morning we're live in phoenix arizona for the next stop on the cspan bus 50 capitols tour. michele reagan will be our guest on the bus starting at 9:30 a.m. eastern. >> next on cspan 3 a discussion about iran's missile program and the missile capabilities of other countries in the region including israel. this was hosted by the atlantic council. it's about an hour and a half. >> good morning, everyone. i direct the future of iran initiative here at the atlantic

council and i'm happy that we have yet another extremely topical panel. as you all know, the trump administration requested some sort of understanding or follow on agreement on the subject of missiles. and we thought it would be very topical to get real expectations. is it a threat or not to its neighbors what might be expected in any kind of follow on agreement. perhaps any agreement is not feasible at this time so we assembled quite a panel. i'll briefly introduce them and turnover the moderating responsibilities to my director at the south asia center.

he is a true rocket scientist. he managed the program in arms control and international security at the university of illinois where he oversaw developing projects on south asian security issues. he also worked at cornell university and he is a true rocket scientist. he has a ph.d. in mechanical engineering with a specialization in numerical acoustics. i don't even know what that is and we have just a terrific panel. the go-to man in washington the principal author of the iiss iran's ballistic missile capabilities and assessment. long bio. he is the go-to guy and the

center to come and provide perspective particularly on the gcc point of view. melissa long worked on these issues and also served in government and we're lucky to have her and last but not least our own dr. aaron stein. he's an expert on turkey and following the situation in syria as well and we look forward to his comments. so thank you for supporting our program. if you're going to tweet, please tweet at ac iran and i'm delighted that cspan is joining us this morning.

so i'm going to launch the space. >> we talk not so much about the history of iran's missile program. and the answer period. what i wanted to look at what, you know these common claims are all developed and they must -- we must stop allowing them to deliver a nuclear weapon in the future and there's broad

generalizations now of course there's reasons to be concerned. this is a priority area. as barbara mentioned there's a lot of discussion on going with the administration and the european allies over how to address the missile issue. let me start by saying the international standard though it's not recognized law for terming the inherent capability is the threshold established by the 1987 missile technology control regime which was established to help someone build missile systems that delivered a 500 kilogram payload. so what we have seen is people generally use those threshold values to define what is nuclear

capable. if we do apply those 8 of iran's 13 current missile systems, which is the largest most diverse arsenal in the region exceed that threshold. and are deemed to be incapable. the other five which are some version of the family of missiles are, while currently lethal, especially when shipped to hezbollah for use against israel they don't bus through the threshold but it's important to remember that capable is not equal to intent. when the u.s. security council drafted resolution 2231 in july of 2015 to accompany the iran nuclear deal that was reached

earlier that month the element of intent was added to the resolution that add dretsaddres the missile issue itself. they talked about missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. the 2015 resolution calls upon iran not to engage in activities concerning missiles designed to be capable. intent was captured. so what does it mean to be designed to be nuclear capable? but there are technical clues and intelligence information that can guide analysis.

assess design intentions on the capabilities and lineage of the systems. from where did they come? in doing so, we should have a report coming out late they are week on the iiss website. i don't know if hard copies will be produced or not but we looked at this in detail and we concluded that two of iran's short range missile systems which are based on the soviet ones were designed to carry conventional weapons and not nuclear weapons. they're about 20 centimeters shorter than the nuclear version

they do exceed the thresholds and are capable of carrying a nuclear weapon but it would be incorrect to claim, in our view that the export versions were designed for nuclear delivery. iran's reason for acquiring them in the first place were for attacks against iraq. there's strong evidence that the gutter system was designed with the nuclear payload in mind. as has been well reported the schematics on a computer hard drive handed over in 2004 demonstrate efforts to redesign the reentry vehicle to accommodate what appears to be a nuclear implosion device. the solid fuel and the liquid fuel have the same baby bottle

shape nose cone and thus can also be said presumptively to have been designed to carry nuclear weapons. it appeared several years after the intelligence surfaced and it was primarily there because it separates it and is more stable using that baby bottle shape. a conclusion is supported by it's origins. it can also be said to have been designed for nuclear delivery. it's not entirely clear from where the design originates whether it's from north korea or the soviet union.

but we know both countries would have developed it for nuclear weapons delivery. the external dimensions, by the way, are exactly scaled to those of the nuclear version. it might be said to be nuclear capable. we can assign it in that category. iran recently tested the missile and it's much harder to judge because there's a lot of good information about this particular missile if it is

based on that particular technology it would be logical to assume or reasonable to assume that it is designed by the russians and soviets at the time to deliver nuclear weapons and north korea had those designs in mind. this is the real controversial part. in my view it's not controversial at all. both are optimized. they're optimized for satellite launching. not as a ballistic missile. neither rocket has been tested as a ballistic missile and they would require rather extensive modifications for use.

but this i don't think allows one to declare that it was designed to carry nuclear weapons. quite the opposite. it was designed as a satellite launch vehicle. it's interesting to note that no country has ever converted a liquid propel atlanta satellite launcher into a ballistic missile. it's always gone the other way around. they usually draw around operational requirements. but if we look at the north korean program it's the best example. the two icbms that they're developing. look nothing like, use very different technologies designed in in house satellite launcher. that gives you an example of why people don't just convert. now given the central role that ballistic missiles play in

iran's defense doctrine it's highly unlikely. now departing a little bit from the discussion so far i'd like to take an opportunity to say that iran has said that it does not require a ballistic missile. we should negotiate it might be acceptable and in this way we can at least have a first step toward limiting iran's

capabilities. that is a nuclear armed icbm from iran. if they don't want to see a repeat of what happened there in iran in the future you'd have to deal with iran's satellite launcher and there's ways to verify if iran is willing to be transparent that their systems are designed for satellite launching and you can put restrictions on some of the technologies they use to make it much more difficult to actually take your experience from satellite launches and apply them and build a ballistic missile. so i'll end there.

in terms of the relationship or however you want to define it and then within this idea of the fpcr guidelines that all are for intent and are designed at least from the out set to carry weapons of mass destruction even slight variations or relatively well done. that they're entirely worthless as tools of war that they can't hit the target that you're aiming at unless the target is large. therefore the only feasible thing to do with them is to make

sure that your war head, your blast is big enough to cover up for inaccuracy and therefore it's best suited for chemical and how difficult that is. improve and include a separate multilateral negotiated limit on ballistic missiles with iran in mind. so think about how many countries have ballistic missiles in the middle east and

i have a small list that i put together and i probably left some off. 1973 the egyptians fired some skuds at the israelis. the first use of ballistic missiles since world war ii. the 1980s, the iran or iraq war. what we now call the war of sys. you have the yemen civil war. you have in 1986 the u.s. strike on assets in libya. libya decided to try to shoot a skud. 1991 you had iraq firing at

saudi arabia and would be one of them on a u.s. base. and the iraqi use of both modified ballistic missiles and cruise missiles against u.s. forces. from iran to he hzbollah. the current syrian conflict. yemen, as i said the civil war. these have been used frequently since the 1970s and states have taken notice. so if you do a march around the

region and has emerged as a supplier for missiles and has others that have programs themselves. you have egypt. you have the syrians despite this war that's been going on that has probably missile production capabilities and facilities. you have the saudis.

you have the united arab emirates that imported missiles at least twice and then they may be able to at least fabricate for disassembled iranian missiles or capability. and on the other side, you have seen iraq proliferation. their use in yemen today. their use in 2006 by hezbollah against israeli forces. and acquisitions of more and more capable systems by american allies and the saudi with the purchase of european made storm

shadow. so while we in the u.s. are focused on the iranian ballistic missile program it should not be separated from what i think is a rather obvious missile proliferation race in the middle east. they want to try to improve upon the jcpoa because they're not satisfied with security council resolution as the all encompassing catch for to limit, i should say, further iranian development of ballistic missiles, then you have to ask yourselves what incentives do they have when everybody else

around them is requiring it and is an overarching security frame work that places a limit on ballistic missiles in the middle east a good idea. and for now more capable and accurate systems to strike targets before they get off the ground and missile defense. without asking the questions, does the rapid proliferation of more and more capable missile defenses incentivize regional states to try to defeat the missile defenses by building more missiles? so you're trying to reassure allies to try to prevent their worst nightmare which is sort of

bolt from the iranian ballistic missile attack. so with all of that said, i do have some policy recommendations that i think builds off of taking yes for an answer. a 2,000 kilometer cap on missile ranges in the region is a good idea. i'd be interested to hear how you would verify that because i'm sure that would come up. but the other one is the region sticks out in that i believe that the only country in that area is a member of turkey and if you want to get together and cartel to prevent the exports of certain missile components, if you have iran sitting outside of it, that buses your cartels.

the iranians and the north koreans outside of your cartel, you don't have a cartel. no nobody wants the iranians but something along the lines of abiding by the guidelines. something they do. varying degrees of success but keeping the bar very very low. recognizing most of these things will probably fail and even something along the lines of just all the states coming together and adhering to the code of conduct. the idea that you have at least declaratory of how you want them. something along those lines because the mistel fligsile flis are so high that trying to grab

everything at once and force capitulation in a region where there's not a history of that working versus settling for managing an issue and what is good enough maybe the best policy option going forward. >> great. delighted to join the panel today and excellent comments by my colleagues thus far. looking forward to the discussion to follow on. you know in starting with an acknowledgment that the united states itself maintains a considerable presence in the gulf to deter them and that includes strike, assets based on shore but also via the

occasional swing through of the group as well as several missile defense installations in several partner gulf countries but under the last few decades the united states also embarked on several cooperative agreement with partners in the region to build their own missile defense capacity that's largely functioned along bilateral lines with partners multilaterally. what is really driving their interest to make these capability investments and certainly for the saudi and the uae they see a significant challenge by iran's missile build up in the missile defense and the relationship and projection that iran maintains in being able to leverage it's

cruise missile capabilities along the coastlines with it's capabilities that have impeded throughout the gulf which is of course shared interest strongly with the united states and the saudis in particular made investments to combat that array of challenges but to include the missile defense area. the smaller gulf states i think fear more being caught in the cross hairs of a potential conflict between iran that the united states and primarily targeting saudi and them and of course trying to hedge their bets in the relationship with iran. in, you know, these shared interests, shared threat perceptions are really based on

a view that iran leverages it's missile capability as part of its tool kit and part of its core strategy that is largely asymmetric in that. it's below the area of conventional warfare but uses an array of capabilities. but also conventional. the ballistic missile capability in particular as it's acing it as a significant point of leverage in terms of its prestige and ability in the region. but display it's investments and missile defense capabilities, at the end of the day they tend to

prioritize focus and against some of the other capabilities that the iranians bring to bear. it's information operations activities and it's cyber activities and you see that reflected in both public statements but i think also in on going consultations with the united states. and where the level needs to reside. saw that play out in the obama administration and i think it continues in this one. but i also think we're seeing a bit of a frame shift when it comes to iran's missile challenge in the region that both michael and aaron have touched on and that is largely due to yemen. and the fact that the primary challenge, i think, in many ways for our partners, the u.s.

partners in the region isn't so much that it's from across the gulf but it's more through the back door. within saudi territory against commercial shipping has shown both to partners in the region as well as to the united states that there's a different missile challenge emanating from iran and leveraging it's proxy assets in the region outside of the traditional relationship with hezbollah and this raises questions in terms of u.s. strategy and the investments that it's making. and on going consultations in terms of whether to deploy their assets to the south and address the challenge and a good process

of lessons learned to talk about the strike in saudi territory and what may or may not have happened in terms of the response to holistically in the maritime domain about the commercial shipping challenge that's want just in the gulf and its immediate vicinity, but really one that stretches from the gulf up to the babel mendev and into the suez canal as being looking at that as one holistic picture and the partners in the region need to bring to bear to address that flow and to keep it free and open for global shipping. from a u.s. policy perspective, the truffle administration is clearly limiting the ballistic missile program to one of the four conditions essentially for continuing the u.s. commitment to the jcpa thoos been statat's

publicly. since the beginning the trump administration has made very clear that it does not necessarily separate the jcp way from iran's broader strategy. it has clearly disparaged the previous administration in termless of deprioritizing iran's other activities and capability development in the region and the ballistic missile capability being the link between the jcp way and broader activities and looking at them as one comprehensive whole which is, in many ways, imperiled the jcp way, but has also at the same time helped strengthen some of the support from the gulf countries who believed that the obama administration had deprioritized some of the other elements of iranian focus, and i think they have in some ways

appreciated the linkage although that's maintained commitment to the jcpoa more difficult. both a benefit, but also a weakness in kind of making that linkage together in u.s. policy, and the trump administration has been quite clear in at least one arm of its -- of its new strategy, that of trying to expose to the public iranian missile activities and more broadly, it's destabilizing activities. you'll recall ambassador hailey's quite public unveiling of iranian materiel that had collected in yemen that is also now on display of boeing air force base for think tankers to come and view by invitation from the department of defense. you may have seen that on social media from some think tankers in

town. so, clearly, the trump administration is trying to expose the level of iranian investments and its missile capability to try to build some momentum forring for th momentum for further strengthened action and there was a new report that came out that was discussed at the u.n. that many of you have heard speaking to experts, describing iran's non-compliance with u.n. sanctions on its weapons and ballistic missile development, specifically related to yemen and this is likely to be leveraged as a tool for international support to constrain iran's missile development. we've also seen increased sanctions from the u.s. treasurys with entities responsible for the production of iran's ballistic missiles.

i would presume we would see more. this, of course, follows on sanctions efforts pushed in 2017, and it seems that the uptick in sanctions is in some ways a continuation of what the obama administration had been building towards in the last year or two of its administration. in fact, the 2017 sanctions, i believe, some of the information for justifying those sanctions was a case that had been built during the obama administration and somewhat of a continuation there. clearly, that is another leg in addition to exposing the pressure through sanctions is another leg of the administration's policy, and then you see the reflection on capitol hill in terms of the house putting forward, sanctions and measures to address to the

destabling activities that has been handed over to the senate. in some ways, in my analysis how the administration may end up on the jcp way to show some resolve and to try to convince the administration that congress is taking this issue seriously, but i believe the fact it has not progressed is because of the fact of the ongoing dialogue of the hill and the administration in terms of trying to uphold the deal despite these broader concerns. and you know, how this plays into the what the exposure and the sanctions being pressed and how that plays into the dip the ma dip t diplomatic leverage and i think

it fundamentally comes down to whether this administration which is taking a very hard line tact that is considering what the iranians want out of the equation, and out of the negotiations, and whether that dialogue is -- is possible in this current political environment when this administration has taken such a hard line stance, and even if a negotiation results in a ranged cap as the 2000-kilometer limit which is well and good and should be pursued, reflecting back on the challenges in the region and if the frame has shifted to yemen, and some of those regional challenges being created for some of our partners and as well as for the u.s. and global commercial interests, is that as far as it's going to go in terms of addressing the

iranian challenge. i think we'll stop there. >> thank you. >> i think what i hear from all of you is it's not a technological problem because these are relatively easier technologies compared to many of the technology to acquire or master and it's also legally, there is no binding framework for you to address this problem, but the broader problem is the lack of political frame work, vis-a-vis the iranian interest and what -- but there is a technical issue that i will pick, and i want to go back to you and i want to start with you both on that. i used to be a testing agent. i worked in the high-altitude testing, and you know, as they say putting iran's missile program in perspective, the united states loosely speaking the united states tests its missiles 30 to 40 times before it declares operational under

varied conditions and you watched the iranian missile program much closely than i do, and i -- off-the-cuff, i don't think the iranians subject themselves to those rigorous testing conditions. >> i would -- >> i'll relate it to the next question. you mentioned the possibility of the hague court of conduct, and one provision under the hague court of conduct is the pre-notification of any testing equipment which also provides me an opportunity to technically look at this program and also politically, an opportunity if you want to restrict an iranian missile program they awoke an international framework to see this because the reason i draw this is in my own region where i work, india and pakistan are not to the hague court of conduct and they have a bilateral agreement amongst them and the

ballistic missile launch notifications and that works very well despite the political relationship of the worst of conditions. so is there an opportunity that more or less that you can draw from here? >> well, let me address the issue of testing. i agree with you that, you know, historically countries whether the u.s., france, the soviet union would test dozens of times before actually deploying a system, but we don't see that necessarily in other countries and i think there's a number of reasons why. in iran, i think they typically test five, six, seven before they actually go to deployment. they may announce deployments earlier, but i'm not sure they're truly deployed, but i think it's very instructive to look back at the development program. this is a two-stage, solid fueled missile capable of traveling about 2,000

kilometers. they began some ground testing and i think the first launch was in 2009, if i'm not mistaken and they did five or six tests. they haven't tested at all since february of 2011, and i think what happened is they encountered some technical difficulties that they weren't sure they could overcome and it became less of a priority with the shelving of the nuclear program or at least placing the nuclear program in advance, and i think they've kind of set this system aside and they showed how testing can reveal the inability to master. i think they were also affected by the, quote, accident. was it in november of 2011 or '12 at the facility where i think upwards to 15 or 17 iranian missile scientists were

killed by a series of explosions in a period which would not have had energetic material, but that's beside the point. you can draw your own conclusions, and i think that set their program back, as well. but my point i want to make is most of the missiles that iran, you know, is developing are based on scud or nodong engines, which they imported large numbers of these engines from the koreans back in the '90s and early 2000s, that reduces the requirement for testing because the engine and the guidance system are the two real challenges, and we don't have an accurate idea of where they are because when we're testing a new

modification because we don't know what the aim point is, presumably we don't. they may not either. it's hard to tell. this is one of the issues the koreans have right now is they have no idea how accurate or inaccurate their current long-range missiles are and i would expect to see them testing more, but you're right. they don't test a lot. just one other note, the iraqis in the middle of their war with iran wanted to extend the range to reach tehran. what they did was they cannibalized three scud missiles to create two kind of longer air frames that allowed them with a lighter payload to reach tehran, and i think it was 600 kilometers away and they tested that thing ten or 11 times over the course of a year, year and a half before they started launching them against tehran and that gives you an example of if you're really serious about creating a new capability you have to do a lot of testing and

they did it. they learned how to make that system work as a result. so people that argue, you know, not everyone holds the same set of requirements. yeah, that's true, but if you want to achieve something you cannot avoid doing the necessary number of tests. >> i can talk a little bit about intent because i think it's important. i don't think there's anything technical holding back the iranians from developing longer-range systems. i know they're going to run into problems and i actually completely agree with that, but i think if the government commits the resources and puts the political backing behind it. if you look at a time frame over a decade and maybe a little longer these challenges will probably be worked out and the reason why i say this is because i think it's pretty well established, particularly on the u.s. side is the data exchanges and the technical cooperation between the dprk and the

iranians and we see some external proof of this, if you can look at the hwasong 14 which is one of the space launch vehicles and within the u.s. treasury designations, the linkage is about the 80-ton rocket engine, and the 80-ton engine where there could be cross -- >> i would like to challenge. yeah. sure. i know there's disagreement in the community about this. i think the point that there is disagreement in the community about this suggests that we don't really know how technically capable they are, and we are looking from the outside in, but when you look at intent. it looks like the iranians threw in this testing or push toward longer-range systems have chosen not to for this period, and i think that choice is ultimately reflective of government policy so you don't always have this push to go longer and longer even though you probably have a

technical capacity to do so, and about the idea of a framework for a bilateral -- that sounds like a good idea to me. i mean, within the overarching framework of the region. the question is is everybody willing to do something that simple, and i think that that would be the challenge for the diplomats. >> the cooperation between iran and north korea to me is clearly, they, change idea xs some information. i don't think there's much debate we could have about that, the degree to which they're cooperating, however, i think is it's not as deep as some would suggest and i'm not suggesting that you are one of those, but if you look at the design of the satellite launch vehicles, they actually use a cluster of nodong

engines for the first stage and that's a logical thing to do if that's what you've got. you know, i think engineers would readily, you know, conclude the same that most engineers would. if you have these technology, this is what you can do with it, but how they arrange them, how they fit the steering engines on there and power them, they adopted two very different approaches. so if you look at the details of the designs they are different. with the r-27 steering engines, we're not quite sure how the second stage of the hwasong 14 or 15 are configured which it's more conjecture based on the little bit of data we have. i happen to agree with that assessment, but again, it's making do with what you've got and i don't know who created that idea first whether it was the iranians or the north koreans, but i would say that the degree of cooperation would

be severely limited by the security both countries impose on their particular systems, and that is they compartmentalize everything, and i've talked to a number of russian and ukrainian scientists who worked? iran and north korea during the early 2000s and they all said the same thing, independently. yeah. we knew so and so was supposed to be in korea and iran, but we never saw them because we were stuck with a certain group of people and those were the people that we discussed specific things about. so if you have that type of program structure, it's really hard to be cooperating on the grand scale. last thing, on the 80-ton, quote, engine, the actual sanction says working on an 80-ton booster. a booster is typically a full stage, not just the engine. both the first stage of the unha

and satellite launchers happen to weigh about 75 to 80 tons, so i think it's in reference to that. i've been trying to find out exactly what they meant, and who wrote it and why. they may not distinguish between booster and engine. so far i come back leaning more toward booster as opposed to engine, but it's a little bit unclear. >> i'll come to you, but i just wanted to touch on your point about north korea and iran. the other interesting point that strikes to me is both these countries' programs are inherent inherently self-referential and it makes sense to refer to each of the countries however compartmentalized they are and the cooperation at the strategic level to know that my designs are accurate and that i'm headed in the right direction and that also plays into a level of

validation of testing so as to speak, if the batch number 11 up this missile mortar is tested here then if my designs are based on those designs, the shelf life of my rocket mortars are also validated for the next five years. so i would not discount that. but -- >> no, i mean, i think, you know, aaron and michael have sufficiently covered the more technical elements and from a policy perspective, the value of pursuing technical discussions accident broader framework have multiple sources of value. there's the information that the international community can gather in the process given some of the gaps and understanding and just better knowing the iranian capabilities and their trajectory. there is a confidence building that occurs by forging those technical links upon which you can build, perhaps, broader

political and policy level discussions, and even if you aren't able to pursue the longer term agreement, you at least have that baseline level of understanding a bit more information on the technical basis and perhaps a launching pad down the road to be able to resume policy, political discussions if the diplomatic scene and the political players shift in a few years' time. >> just one thing on that. i think what's really interesting as an outsider looking in on this because we're all watching from the outside looking in is how iran has used its missiles in syria and yemen. i think the multiple uses of the kiom has been at least, for me particularly enriching because you get to learn more about how the kiom works and how accurate it may or may not be and i think you can see the limits of its

range and the payload with what we saw with the attack on the saudi airport, and then the iranian missile when they fired it into eastern syria. and the way in which they use that and the way we conceptualize it from a policy perspective is yemen is like a playground and they're testing things out. they're going up against high-end u.s. systems. again, not operated by u.s. personnel, but nevertheless, more or less what they would face in a showdown over the gulf and they're doing pretty well, and i think we have to acknowledge that and to figure out how these technologically, less developed systems are posing unique challenges to american hardware, particularly in yemen. syria, far more conventional and yemen, far more asymmetric.

if i was sitting in the u.s. military, i would be watching every single day as i'm sure everybody is, writing down notes and saying, wow, this is how they plan to employ these things because they're quite -- they're quite creative, i should say in how they're ruling these things out. >> just, if i could just as an addendum to that. i think the differentiator with yemen, though, is a potential principal agent problem that we might have in drawing lessons from the yemen context versus how the showdown might occur in the gulf, in so far as iran has been increasing its contact with the houthis, but at the end of the day the relationship with iran and the houthis is not as close as it is with lebanese hezbollah and the dynamics would be different in a situation where you have a conflict in the gulf where iran is the primary actor itself. >> you shed light on this a

little bit, but i wanted to amplify it, and if i hear all of you and whatever i'm reading, i get the feeling that iran and north korea have the most transparent missile program because everybody is looking at them, but nobody is looking at close placing the other countries in such a microscope. so what -- can you just shed a light on the other broad capabilities and the intent around the gulf? >> i think the saudis paraded their missiles for the first time a few years back which was quite shocking, but it was at the period when iran was testing a lot of different systems. it was also when iran, and it was before jcpoa, et cetera, so i think they were trying to advertise their capabilities,

and the emiraratis received scu and they have just a small number of them and i have no idea what they would use them for, if they were attacked by ballistic missiles they would have retaliation and they're not really going do much damage. they kind of lack the range to hit anything, but the base right across the gulf from there and it was under a bus and whatever it's called. so, yeah, the egyptians, you know, they've had missile development programs sense tinc '50s and they've launched how many? half a dozen scuds at the israelis? is it 57 or 73? >> they've had a lot of scuds that they purchased from first the soviets or given to them by the soviets during the civil war

and after and they also imported scuds from north korea. i think there's the 2002 intercept by the spanish navy, but that went on to yemen, but they really had no reason to advertise it because i don't know who yemen would be advertising to at that time. and your rundown of missile-capable countries and you left out the most sophisticated capabilities and that is israel which i found somewhat interesting because israel doesn't really test ballistic missiles. they use the jericho two and three are essentially the same elements as their satellite launcher and these are solid propellant systems which are different and you can transform them for -- for missile or space launch use more easily, but it's

with the liquids. they haven't tested jericho in two or three as a ballistic missile. i don't think they've done it with the jericho 3. i think the one time they're accused of doing it, it was a failed launch at least when i look at what little trajectory data i have. >> nothing to add other than i forgot the israelis. >> it's easy to do with the list of so many countries. before i jump to the audience, i have another technical question for you which is essentially the one thing that keeps coming up is the satellite launch vehicles, the modification, the ballistic missiles and the other way, and the suggestion that the extensive modifications and there could be a lab grade for the modifications that you are referencing to? >> yeah. if you look in the case of the iranian, the second stage of both the satellite launches are

two-stage systems. the north koreans have always used three stages which is another interesting departure between the two, but the second stage uses these steering engines from the old soviet r-27 and a submarine launch missile. they also use a more energetic thrust, when you're launching a satellite that's okay. the satellite launches goes up and it parallels the surface of the earth and you're not fighting gravity in the same way. so you're trying to accelerate by the tangent of the surface to get the orbital speed you need. the maximum altitude of a satellite launcher goes to in the case of the iranians was 2 hun or 400 kilometers and a long-range missile, an icbm on a maximum range trajectory peaks at 1200 kilometers. it goes up much high are.

so you'll be fighting gravity as you try to use it as a ballistic missile because of the long, low thrust, burn times, gravity is going to pull it down. so if you want -- and it's going to rob you of a lot of range. so what you're going to do is put a higher thrust. so you will completely refigure the second stage and you know, this can be done. people have done it in the past, but again, it's usually done the other way around with the lower thrust systems. >> and it needs to re-enter as well. >> plus, you have to master re-entry and you have to test this thing as a ballistic missile because the flight paths are very different. this is something the koreans will face and they've been using the highly lofted trajectories and it's easy to do some of the second-stage starts when you're in a vertical configuration as opposed to something that's 30 degrees. so that's another issue.

>>. >> thanks, guys. ooechl curious on a practical level. the iranians have said they won't accept new agreements on missiles they've been quite specific about this. is there anything you envision that the united states and the europeans could agree on in regard to the iranian missile program perhaps over the proliferation of rockets to yemen. what about the israeli point of view on this? they've been very specific about not allowing rocket factories in syria. they've shown they will bomb anything that they feel threatens them. how do you see that playing out? and just a point, in a few years iran can theoretically buy anything it wants including sophisticated bombers so is this the wrong debate to be having in some sense? iran has missiles because it doesn't have the kind of air

force that the israelis certainly have and the uae and saudis have? thanks. >> president macron's comments last week about placing a missile program on our international surveillance, the prospects? i can address part of your question of shamelessly plug the double s. we did a project looking at how iran might re-arm itself in 2020 when they're allowed to purchase things and we look specifically at the air force. they don't have the money to buy a new air force. they're going to buy one or two fighter wings, probably something like the -- was it the su-30 or something from china. they just don't have the capital to invest the billions and billions of dollars it would require, and i think the protest showed something that the iranian regime faced and i think

that's only going to get worse. so iran will rely on ballistic missiles for the foreseeable future because of that, and also, this is their way of war. i mean, this, if you look at the wars that have been fought in the region, they've extracted lessons from every one of those wars and it re-affirms their belief that ballistic missiles are their best way to offset the superior air forces and fire power of the other -- of its rivals in the region and the united states. yeah. i think this goes back to an idea of attempting to introduce in my opening thoughts which is that, you know, the united states and its allies and its european allies and the regional partners need to have a conversation in terms of what really matters and where the shared interests are. the 2,000-kilometer range cap matters, i think, to the united

states and european allies in so far as it circumvents that icbm potential direct threat to the homeland. in terms of regional interests where our regional partners lie, but also u.s. interests in the region so far as the united states maintains the personnel there, and has an interest in the security of its allies and partners and using its missile capabilities through proxies in syria and yemen matter and should be a part of a larger conversation about trying to address the causes and drivers and outcomes of those civil wars. does that mean trying to not only interdict arms flows to yemen which is an ongoing activity? is there a step beyond that in terms of where the houthis actually deploy and target the missile capabilities and can there be some sort of dialogue along those lines when it comes to syria and the buffer zone that currently exists to a certain degree in southern syria

cannot be extended further northward, can there be a conversation in terms of the types of capabilities that are deployed south of that buffer zone? i think there should be an internal conversation between the united states, and its allies in terms of where those relative challenges rest and where the shared consensus is and then pursuing those lines of effort together with the iranians. >> that's fine. that's fine. >> thank you. john greenwald, ex-foreign service and international crisis group. thank you for all of the very good detail and the problems and the issues and thank you also for some indication of policy achieve ams that you think would be useful if one could achieve them to deal with those issues but one hardly ever gets something for nothing and diplomacy as with any other part

of life, so i would like to ask what concessions from the united states and other countries concerned about iranian missiles might be commensurate, appropriate and potentially interesting from the iranian point of view? >> i'll take it. it builds on the first question. so the first policy recommendation is the u.s. and the europeans have to agree on something. i don't think the u.s. and europeans are agreeing and if you don't agree amongst yourselves and allies then you can't maximize leverage on the iranians to triay and force concession. the nuclear we was really, really easy because nobody wants proliferation in iran and that includes russia and china and you can win broad based consensus and what can iran get in return for a cap? this is why my original point is

you have to think of the region as the region and not bilaterally and so you would have to expand the scope of conversation so that everybody would be subjected to the same limits that you would want to place on the iranians. this is not something where you had one non-proliferation treaty and there was consensus the idea that you could -- you could have pressure to bring them back in compliance. this would be something external to that and everybody in may opinion would have to abide buy it or come up with something. this is what the iranians say they want, and this is extremely easy to say because nobody's going to agree to that because i think the inspections or anything like that would be so onerous they would make people uncomfortable particularly in u.s. allied countries and so

they have, in my opinion, a lot more flexibility a, because of the lack of consensus with the a plus 1 and the u.s. and the europeans in particular and lack of consensus within the p5 plus 1 adjacent g, cc where they are not willing to discuss either. i don't have a great answer to your question other than it's significantly challenging, far more than the jcpoa was. >> yeah. you know, i actually have had a project on this specific issue, and i actually wrote about it in arms control today a few years ago. to make it region wide, the two real challenges besides iran would be the df-3s that are in saudi arabia and the jericho systems in israel. i was in tel aviv last october

talking about this very issue and whether they would accept any limits and pretty much the universal answer is why should we? we're not, you know, we don't care if they can threaten europe. in fact, we kind of like the idea that they can threaten europe because it puts more pressure on iran and these other issues. they're more concerned with the transfer of 110 and the rockets and those types of things to hezbollah because they can be fired in very large numbers. the 2,000-kilometer range does not provide much to the israelis. the saudis are pretty cool because they don't want to enter into anything that relieves pressure on iran, and i can understand both positions. i think the alternative concession might be, as i said earlier, allowing some form of space launch activity in iran as

long as it's very transparent, just the space launch part and they are reasonably trance patient and they go to international conferences and they explain in detail the form and function of their launches, but it would have to be some technical limitations on large, solid, strap-on boosters, for example, would be forbidden. the use of cryogenic engines would not and using high-energy propellent formulations that you see in the hwasong 14 and 15 and 12, those would have to be capped and those are things and it would be pretty intrusive and there are things you can consider that might win them over. i wouldn't hold my breath, but it might win them over. >> wait. >> are you suggesting that the quid pro quo would have to be a missile or would it be

asymmetric vis-a-vis on. >> as it was for the jcpoa. >> right. >> i haven't given that much thought myself. >> i think it comes down to again, what do the iranians want? you know, and the most recent example of that was the jcpoa negotiation comes which they did want to have a broader array of p options available and sanctions relief and economic relief and that's not necessarily a total consensus view within iran and there are some elements of iran that don't want an opening to the west either that view that as a back doorway for the west to undermine the iranian basis of governance, but you know, i think that that potentially could be on the table, but we're in a different frame shift here in the united states in so far as what might be politically palatable for the united states

to be able to consider given the stance of this administration, given hard line positions in congress, so i think at the end of the day it would be more of a european shift where that trade space might occur in determining what degree of relief could be given to induce the iranians on the missile score while at the same time maintaining pressure on other areas of activity that both the united states and europeans care about. so it's quite delicate, but i suspect that the iranians would be interested in a conversation along those lines. >> i'm a council member. you mentioned that all of the iranian missiles have or the range 2,000 kilometer or there were some that are more than 2,000 kilometer? >> well, there is 2,000 or

3,000 -- >> it seems like you said that most of the missiles in iran are 2,000-kilometer range and because of that, they're incapable of having nuclear warheads. am i correct? >> no. what we conclude side those missiles that actually can fly 2,000 kilometers all seem to be either the basis for the missile was designed for nuclear use or their modification of the missile, for example, was specifically -- there was an intention to put a nuclear warhead on it if you accept the authenticity and there's no reason not to, of the documents that were smuggled out of iran in 2004. so the presumption is these are all designed to be nuclear capable. the one that's a little less certain is this new core, because we just don't know too

much about it. it, in principle, can actually flying for thor than 2,000 kilometers, but they put huge warhead on it supposedly, but we just don't have enough information of what its basis is. >> what's the limitation for it to have in order to be able to put nuclear warheads on them or should be the range? >> well, i think you can put a nuclear warhead on anything you want. if you can make the warhead small enough. we put it on little davey crocket rockets, you know, pakistan is using the artillery rocket. we put them on honest johns and these are all systems that are less than 300 kilometers. you know, it really depends on how small you make it. we have nuclear artillery and so did the soviets during the cold war. the one comment i will make is no country has ever developed a 2,000-kilometer missile without first having had a nuclear

weapon which is an interesting thing, and i kind of point that out when iranians started developing it, it concerned me, wait, this isn't something someone does unless they have an intention down the road to do something else. >> thank you. andreas foster with the german newspaper, and this is also to you, michael, because you made such a point in pointing us to the fact that the notion of intention was introduced and that security council resolution. i'm unclear as to what the political significance of this is after what you described that there are a lot of missiles that seem to have that intention. so does this, in your opinion make sense in the first place, and it seems like a slightly change that's favoring iran. did that make political sense to you and does this distinction,

in your opinion today, provide any diplomatic openings at all or is the sheer breadth of the intentional nuclear arsenal that it is so great that it doesn't really matter. >> you know, when we started -- when mark and i started looking at this the project and pursuing it, you know, what we were trying to do was provide or offer a possible framework for delineating, what it means -- what the security council resolution means and what would be prescribed under that council resolution and what would be permitted, and so we kind of threw something up there that was a little more structured and simple and we just used what the ntcr says. the ntcr was reached by 35 countries now, but originally it

was seven countries in 1987, and the father of the mtcr richard spear told me how he came up with this definition which was interesting, as well and what we wanted to do was put something out there. we may not be right. i'm not claiming that our -- we've answered the issue. what we want to do is prompt a debate that looks at it. we do know that in debates in the security council since the passage of 2231, the chinese and russians keep saying, well, that's not what the imad wasn't intend to be a nuclear development system following the logic that the iranians have put out there. that may or may not be true, but do we have a framework for doing the analysis to determine what its intent was, whether it's the original intent or iran's intent. >> i think one of the challenges of this is i think that the security council resolution was clearly one of those things that was a compromise in order to get

the jcpoa over the final goal line, and what i mean by that is the basic framework for the u.s. understanding or at least public understanding outlined in the iaea documents for the iranian nuclear program was a specific design for a nuclear weapon that would fit in the baby warhead that michael keeps talking about and that baby bottle warhead was on the schedule and will you've seen it elsewhere and you can have baby bottle warheads for conventional stuff so they can fly farther, but that is what makes this difficult, but one of the things that we've learn side the iranians were not willing to discuss hard caps on the ballistic missile program and if you're sitting in washington or a different p501 capital, do you worry about what goes inside the missile? we care about the design of the warhead and stopping that

production rather than stopping a hard cap on missiles and that's where the trump administration has moved things forward and where they become asynchronous with a lot of the countries involved in this because the missiles are secondary to the issue of what goes inside the missile is this idea of nuclear capable, it's amorphous, good job and i'm looking forward to your report of trying to define it, but trying to define what nuclear capable mean, you can put a nuclear weapon on anything. >> it's very muted. >> it's trying to figure this out and so that's the hard part and clearly, that was crafted diplomatic language in such a way to where it largely doesn't say, and it doesn't place the type of restrictions and it's being interpreted at least in the press now particularly in the u.s. >> thanks. what about focusing on something

that is covered by 2231 which is the transfer of missile technology? is there any realistic way of doing a better job of enforcing that? is that something, do you think -- i'm trying to imagine the russians or the chinese -- follow this program online at c-span.org, search iran missile. we will leave this and head to the white house. president trump is hosting sweden's prime minister. they're holding a joint news conference. this is the first time the two have met since the president took office. live coverage here on c-span3. >> the president of sweden at our first meeting in the white house. sweden is one of our oldest and closest partners and was among the first european nations to offer the united states an unsolicited treaty, a friendship, a treaty signed, believe it or not in 1783. that's a long time ago. my daughter ivanka had a wonderful time watching ameri