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every foorts afforts are un we react as we see fit, words to that he eek infect. >> i don't want to under estimate the declaratory policy, but if we had one, he we have specific actions and then not acted. and that has the inverse effect of inn encouraging future actions. so i think less time on figure out the exact words that will go forward on the declaratory

policy and focus on pointing points on the board and executing response to the actions that have taken place in violation of numerous statements from two administrations that really agreed on very little very well. >> >> i would now ask them why we have an act viv, but heim not going to do that. or i could ask them how do we get out of the trap of making statements? i'll put that one on the table. but before i do those questions, let me see if there's anyone audience who has a question now. we've got one, two, three, four, five six. we've got a lot of questions. so maybe we'll just go down the row. go ahead. >> steve winters, independent consultant. you mentioned the ola gark

several times. he said nothing's working and n a way to get to putin and the people that runs the country for them and attack them where they're going to feel it in their lifestyle and their money. the principle here, you're not saying the ole garts are involved in a cyberattack, it's putin putting a squeeze on him and they're going to say chance your behavior because we don't like what's being done to us. if you extended that principle, if you didn't like what she ging spinning doing, take the top 100

billion -- >> a role in decision making and in support of some of these criminal networks that were mentioned earlier as well. there are a substantial number to whom that would be applicable. >> and one thing i mentioned because i forgot was why china is such a difficult target than russia because of the greater economic strength t.j. h economic strength it has and the complicated kmushl relationship with the u.s. we is have a couple things we can come back to. but there were more questions. could you put up your hands again? >> i have two questions.

so why do you say that we're more vulnerable in cyber space ant russians? that's number one. number two, if there's an unwillingness to act on everything you've said, what are our options? i mean, other than the hand ringing? but so far the administration has shown and unwillingness to do much, even to acknowledge that russia is a problem. what wheredo where do we go from there? >> the reason i said the u.s. is more vulnerable than russia is because we sore much more dependent on computers and networks and information systems that underpin our day on this-day lives. frefrg groceries showing up in the grocery store and gas showing up in gas stations on time to the network that supports your debt card to pay for those things to the power that goes to your house. all of those things are

inter2009 inter20inte intertwined. there's a report on the dhs website that talks about the intertwined financial telecommunications and electrical power and critical infrastructure and how if any one of those goes down, everything goes down. >> the good newsy think we're approaching parody in terms of lines on the internet. maybe not all of russia but certainly key parts in len nin grad, pardon me, in sapt petersburg, moscow. by the way, hold your hands up again and this time every time i say that more people hold up their hands. just pass the microphone along apps we go and that will save a little time. but we've got the individual there with the blue shirt. thanks. >> mike connell, center for naval nam sees. they broached the idea of internet sovereignty as we way

of moving forward, sbu sovereign control of that with their territory spt there any opportunity of working with them in that area or there's no room for compromise in that area? >> any of you guys want -- >> well, so the idea has occurred could you make a trade where you acknowledged the desire by russia and several other countries for greater control over the net in exchange for some level of cooperation, perhaps on cybercrime, perhaps on stability. and it just -- there's two fundamental problems. but first there's very often the deal would involve abandoning core parts of the universal czech cla raftion humration of and western countries aren't willing to do that. and second you could get the confession and not get anything

in response. so it has been talked about in the past few years and doesn't seem to be a useful avenue. even the russians don't raise it anymore. we have another one? go ahead. >> thomas schwartz, also at cna. i think mr. miller mentioned early on that putin perceives himself under awhack tack attac west is aiming for regime change. and going after the ole garks was mentioned several times. are these two things reconcile able? are we risking unwanted escalation by threatening the very thing that you said that he feels is fundamentally at risk here? >> in my view, it's important to go after those people who are involved in this -- this type of activity or pursuing this activity either officially or unofficially and who are tied to

president putin. and at the same time to show that we have limited aims to state we have limited aims and by the actions we take, not -- not demonstrate that we vun limited or broader aims of regime change or undermining the power structure within the kremlin or the power structure within the country. anything that would dhat would be a very high level of escalation. >> and there's a precedent, you know, so with china where with the indictment of five members of the people's liberation army but it was very specifically tied and public messaging surround mabe made clear this was because of a particular type of activity that targeted private enterprise here for the commercial benefit of private competitors overseas. and subsequent actions matched that principle, it alous loloud

break through where president xi agreed to that principle and since then we've seen a decrease in that type of activity. not all activity, but the time that was within that principle. and then you saw in the u.s. side there weren't. there have been additional actions outside of that principle. so clear messaging and sticking in your lane is what matters. >> if we have time, maybe we won't have time, how could you persuade the russians? >> we weren't kidding with we were serious we weren't going to change the regime because i think they're deeply paranoid about that if the. >> skblur oure. >> one more question. >> i think if you took a comprehensive look at our policy on sanctions for russians, it's going after the oia garts is what hitters pute tint most. we've sanked them and banks all

over the world. my view on is that i think that what putin values most is the puppet master. he likes control the intelligence services. he likes controlling illicit activity, whether it be through federal agencies or, you know, his army of hackers or mercenaries in different countries. what approach can we take to attack him if that's what we think hurts him the most, being the puppet master, the kgb officer that formerly was? >> i'll give a quick first response. your question highlights why it's important to have a campaign and you and take the steps that may be taken today and could be taken innocent future. my own judgement is that if -- if you lead off by going directly off the instruments of state control and the center of

president putin's or anyone aelss power that's a big move. if i were seriously going after some of the assets associated with some ole garks and other sanctions, i would think you'd want to get that on a higher escalation and understand could you get there. but when we get there, president putin says what's good for the goose is good for the gander if you will and there are steps that could be taken the other way around that could lead to, in my view, potentially serious escalation. i wouldn't take that step off the table, by would say that if you believe that the already worried about regime change, which i do believe, to go after the instruments of power would reinforce that view and cause them to believe that they had to escalate in order to be successful. the capability do that is

something we desire to prevent them from escalating rather than something we would lead with, in my view. >> if i can just chime in. i would agree with that except i would add one more thing in adoition to the ole garks i would demonstrate the ability, all the though not do it at scale, to get information into russian sit zones information flow. there's thousands of technical ways do that, everything from broadcasting, television over satellite to the country to doing things on the internet. and so i would demonstrate that and i'd also signal that we can do this if we want to. so it's, you know, we're holding back because we're, again, trying not to be es ka la tori but we want to demonstrate this capability. >> retired fbi agent, former chief cybersecurity adviser for mike video soft in the uk. let me set the stage. and rick, this question is for you. if we rightly assume that russia

has something that they're holding over trump's head, is it possible, and i'm going to ask if your answer could be yes, no, or maybe, is it possible that trump is taking actions that the actions that trump is taking to destroy our relationships with our allies and other countries with the intention -- with the intention of making us act sing s -- singularly such that our allies will not support us in the future is that possible? yes, no, or maybe. >> is it possible sore it likely? >> likely. >> there's a fourth option had is if you've ever seen sesame street the option is me no recall. >> i think that's highly unlikely. i think if you look at president trump's behavior over his career and how he interacts with other

entity, there's a consistency there, it's not like a 90 degree or 180 degree change in behavior. so i think that this is just the extrapolation of behavior into his new role. >> one in the back and then maybe we could move on tho thves side. there's a couple three coming close to time [ inaudible question ] >> given that the u.s. has had time to respond and will [ inaudible ] do you believe that this will set a precedent -- >> oops, sorry. do you believe that this has set a pattern for others to interfere in western democracies and finance that is the case what other countries could we consider as potential threats? >> so i'll take a quick -- i think each of the other people would have more expertise on

that on the technical side. think that we're very slow to respond to chinese sbebintellec property. they did it at scale, and it has economic cost to the united states and economic benefits to them that i think are measured at least in the hundreds of billions if not trillions. so that was how we were late to take action. i'm please and proud that president obama did so and i'm please and i was frankly a little bit surprised at how successful it has been in reducing the scope and scale over what the smoochinese were doing. your question is right, is along the correct lines. if you area i lesser developed country and you're looking to bootstrap your economy, trying to find niches or even larger areas where you can gain intellectual property and have a second advantage where you can invest in the research and development and you can exploit

it would look awfully attractive and a small investment could bring that along, the good news is that in putting pressure on those countries, it adds a lot of tools including not just legal and diplomatic but economic pressure as well for smaller countries. and it's really considering what a campaign could look like in that regard, i don't -- i'll turn it over to my colleagues. i was not aware of any countries, any small countries attempt doing that, attempting to do that at scale in a way that having that diplomatic conversation and the threat of economic action would not be sufficient but it's something to consider in the future. >> i agree with what jim said. i misinterp at the time pretted your question by the thought you said would other countries take a cue from the russians and pull levers to affect the elections in had the united states and the answer to that is, yes. and i also think that it's not just governments that are doing

it, a colleague of mooin mine was in europe and talked told about a contact that was offering information operations in support of a brand in a not very friendly veil over to not speak possibly about his brand but speak negatively of other people's brands. think of it as combat advertising. >> we had a briefing on effective social media presence by political operate tichives. and we should do it to boost ratings. could we move the microphone over to this side to get those questions? >> i fully have one question. >> go ahead. >> it was about social media earl dwler was a comment about giving facebook 3,000 editors to clean up their confent. facebook continues itself more as a conduit air platform for articles. what does this look like when the u.s. government. >> asking things like twitter and face back to help combat the

fake news? >> i think just in terms of -- so some of you may remember my space, which was one of the original social media sharing-type companies and the first wave, i think is they at first did not take seriously the fact that child predators were exploiting that platform to reach kids. and that, to some fact that the platform no longer felt safe drove my space out of business and is where facebook originally got its rise. and then we saw -- who draup a new strategy of crowd sourcing an attempting to use social media just like al-qaeda used western technology in the form of aviation to kill, they were trying to use social media to turn particularly young,

troubled people into human weapons to kill. and it took a little while in terms of conversation to convince those in social media companies this was real issue, threat of abuse. and when they were convinced, and i think that's a combination private conversations and public attention to t attention to the issue, they took serious steps to combat and put additional resources in. and we're just to the beginning of focussing on the nation's threat and the use of those platforms do things like attack fundamental values of undermining democracy. in the interim, the other issue that they've been having is bullying, had is the decrease in people in society use the platform as a way of preventing free speech if you're so bullied when you articulate an opinion that you leave the platform. so i think there are deep business reasons consistent with their motto why they want to make it ultimately a safe place.

i think as rick said or whether there's some transparency as well. so we have private access to the view but you know where it's coming from. and that should be encouraged. and on the government part requires sharing as much information as they can about what the threats look like in the way that the companies can consider and then take appropriate action using their platform. >> it's worth noting, too, that it's not just the u.s., it's also a number of countries in western europe driven more by islamic terrorism than by russia, in many occasions. or not by political extremism. so it may not just be the u.s. that asks these companies to change that they do. >> with can we move to this side? i think -- we've got time for -- i think we got two questions here, is that right? >> hi. first thank you very much for coming today, really appreciate

hearing from each you. i'm john, i'm an air force officer and have a quick question about information operations. so as it pertains to i know had you mentioned the gek earlier today. the way that you portrayed it was not very effective in your opinion. what would it need to be effective and is the state department the right place for it and then just kind of at large your thoughts on information operations and how do them effectively and the authorities, legalities that are maybe needed and what we can do to make them work? thank you. >> great question. in terms of effective information operations there certainly are areas in which the u.s. military does effectively at the tactical level and you can go through multiple cases including in certain parts of times and in many locations in iraq and afghanistan during those operations. that's obviously not what we're talking about here. what we're talking about is effectively communicating to kpr

ternl audiences including international audiences regarding on the one part of the gek's mission, iceal and alkide and the new part about russia. and to me what that fundamentally means and what is the centerpiece of effective information operation at a task level is truth telling. and in the reality is that the united states is not going to be most credible source of information about islam or about -- or about russia. and so that means, to me it means building coalitions. and emphasizing that the mission is to get the true story out and to shed light, literally, so that this is on what's really going on. and i think any effort to -- anything that has the slightest taint of propaganda will be

absolutely counterproductive and whether in the counterterrorism or in the combating propaganda from russia role. it's got to be about truth telling and getting the story out. and working with other who would be more credible than our state department in that regard. >> i agree. the mod he in my mind is like a combined joint task force where you've got from all across the whole of government and international partners and they work together under some kind of control construct to say we agree on the goal and they agree on the campaign plan and then execute it in that way. and you've got myself i would not put do dmrks charge because that res son nates in a negative way. >> nooet peter nolan of kings college had a good idea a year or two together. i don't know it's published but we should just get out of the

business because people aren't going trust aunsd we're too old ant whole bit and they said why don't you just create contents on youtube and have a $10,000 prize for the best had we're talking antiterrorist video? let some kids do a rap vid video o hip hop on -- we used to call them useless when i was a child, but state department entity's responsible for this. i think we have time for one more chemical weapon, is that right? >> yeah, while we're waiting that's kind of my feeling, i think they call. madison valley wood coalition that the previous administration put together to get madison avenue, silicon valley together try produce counterterrorism messaging. >> they arrived right where you did, which was i think they sponsored called paca on this of developing content in iefrts and government just explain the terrorism problem and step back and say we'd be the world's

worst messenger. >> that's another area of consensus i think everyone up thinks that usg should get out of the business. go ahead. >> rob shaw, usg. homeland security. i think my question dovetails with the last two in talking about the information influence base and building resilience and maybe this question is to you specifically. what viability do you see in a german-style law or approach that says social media companies should have a reporting mechanism business their users for this kind of information and maybe a reporting mechanism to the usg on how they handle that? do you see this as something that could work here or would that run afoul of -- >> the first part of social media companies having a mechanism so that users could report content that's in

violation of terms of service essentially that mechanism think there you're seeing that movement by our social media companies already. the question of is then whether that will require reporting to government probably will be a much more difficult and maybe not desirable to mandate. there's huge -- incentives depending on the type of activity, but 'it's criminal or other type of activity to do those reports or do them in scale ultimately. and then as jim was touching on, we're in a world of multinational corporations where we need to operate and abide by the values of multiple countries and legal systems simultaneously. so the actions of countries in europe are going to effect -- sometimes they can be confined to the country.

beginning in the case of france where certain content, if you had the same law here it would be violated of the first amendment. but there you can work out a mechanism where it doesn't hit what looks like it's a french ip address. but by in large i think the solutions need to be ones that consist of global tests of their value that it's endorsing has to be one that's consistent with dhaunts sha countries that share our values and ones that do not on human rights so it's of neutral value and secondly the execution is one that they could abide by as multiple countries without violating the law. that's an easier -- if you violate terms of service, then that is an easier twoun come up with a reporting nemechanism an do the country diagnostic. >> metllet me try to summarize

little bit. what i got from this is we're in a conflict. it's not the kind of conflict we expected but it's the one we're in. we need to act. another declaratory policy or demarshmallow will not do us any good. we need a campaign plan and it's the good to be a whole of government campaign plan, it can't just be a one off type of thing. we need a portfolio of responses that includes legal, diplomatic, economic and potentially military. either overt or covert. when i say military, it could be the intelligence community, it could be d.o.d., cyber command. but first responses have to be part of this. this game will be more than one move. it will be multiple moves and we need to think ahead of how we will deal with those moves. and finally, messaging is important. both to the american public, the political leaders so they know what we're up to, but also to the rest of the world and to the

russian people. and that includes contact well, the russian leadership to let them know we have limited goals. we're interested in stability, regime change is not the target here. did i miss anything? is there thinking you want to add? >> only i might add is that part of that preparatory work is getting everybody on the same sheet of music so we're if not completely unified most of the compass arrows are pointing in the same direction for sustainability. >> thinking about how to work with allies, making this more than a unilateral approach. so that's a good point. >> two quick additional points, and they dovetail well with yours, jim. one is that we need to expect escalation and if we don't respond for a long period of time we'll have a rapid later escalation and we're better off having substantial steps. but we need to understand that that will happen. and your point about limited

aims, that speaks to that. second, increasing the resilience of the critical infrastructure and included in our electoral system or 50 plus electoral systems and the technology behind them and to find ways to reduce the impact in the instances of fake news are important not just because of russia but because these dynamics exist within our country. and other actors, including terrorist groups and small states that may wish a sale like north korea will want to exploit them and their capabilities are coming up spot we can't overlook that defense side as well. >> tom, any final? >> i concur on the defensive side i think we need to start thinking moon shot and incentivizing the research that says we've put certain systems -- we've moved information over a very short period of time historically 25-year period -- we'll leave