prosperity, period. >> this week in primetime, on c-span. >> monday, on landmark cases, griswold c. connecticut. the supreme court ultimately ruled the statute to be unconstitutional and in the process established a right to privacy that is still evolving today. our guests are helen alvare, a law professor at george mason university and rachel rebouche, the associate dean and law professor at temple university. watch landmark cases monday and join the conversations. our hashtag is #landmarkcases and follow us at c-span. and we have resources on our website for background on each case. the landmark cases companion book, a link to the national constitution center's interactive constitution, and

the landmark cases podcast at c-span.org/landmarkcases. >> on march 16th, 1968, u.s. army soldiers killed between 300 and 500 unarmed vietnamese civilians in and near the village of my lai. next on american history tv, we look back at that moment during the vietnam war with military law experts and historians. they discuss what happened. the trials of the servicemen involved and its impact on the u.s. army. from the center for strategic and international studies, this is just over two hours. >> let me welcome you here to csis. i'm mark. i am the interim director of the project on military and diplomatic history. we are conducting this event today jointly with the army center for military history and we are very pleased to welcome

that here to csis. csis's project on military diplomatic history endeavors to bring historians into the policy community and to give their craft more visibility than maybe it gets otherwise, the academy not paying as much attention to those sorts of history as maybe they did in the past. i want to make one simple announcement before we get going, simple administrative announcement, and that is in the case -- the unlikely event of a emergency, i'll give instructions about what we'll do, either stay here or go out the front door or the back door. so, now, on to our panel. i just want to introduce our moderator, dr. james wilbanks. he's a vietnam veteran, career army officer. he teaches at the army command

and general staff school where he is the martial professor of military history. he got his doctorate from university of kansas. and we are very pleased to welcome him here and to have us moderate this panel. over to you, dr. willbanks. >> pretty sure they put me on the end of the table here to see if i'd fall off and add some levity to a topic that desperately needs some. it's my privilege today to act as a moderator of this discussion of what professor howard jones said in his recent book, a dissent into darkness. 50 years ago tomorrow, elements of company c first battalion, 20th infantry, 11th infantry brigade were air lifted by the

174th assault helicopter company into a group of hamlets. once on the ground, the unit began to sweep the area in search of the 48 nlf battalion. by the end of the day, despite the fact that there was no significant enemy contact, more than 500 south vietnamese civilians, old men, women, children, and infants laid dead, killed by the men of charlie company. evidence of what was clearly were a crime was covered up for over a year but eventually it came to light. resulting in a high level investigation by the army, not only of the massacre but also of the cover-up. 13 officers and enlisted men were charged with war crimes. another 12 officers were charged with having actively covered up the murders. ultimately, however, only six soldiers were prosecuted and only one of those tried was found guilty. my lai became a flash point in

the debate over american involvement in vietnam and it continues to have implications for contemporary military operations today. so, what we have here is a distinguished panel of leading historians and military legal experts to discuss the important lessons and legacies of the my lai massacre. i will briefly introduce our panel members for more information on their impressive background, i refer you to the program. we will begin today and i'll introduce them in the order that they will be speaking. first, eric, military historian with the u.s. army center of military history. he is the author of the recently published book, "combat operations, staying the course, october 1967 to september 1968." and he will be talking about the strategic and operational overview. our second presenter will be colonel retired fred borj iii. serving from 1980 until 2005. he is currently historian and

archivist for the j.a.g. corps and he is the author of a number of books on legal and nonlegal topics. he will talk about the kelly case. our third presenter is dr. gary soli solis, a retired marine. twice serving in vietnam as an armor officer. he served as a marine judge advocate for 20 years. he is a law professor. he is the author of a number of books on military operations in the land of -- law of land warfare. he will be talking about the other cases involved in the my lai massacre. and our last presenter is brigadier general joseph b. berger, commander of the united states army legal services agency and chief judge, u.s. army court of criminal appeals. he is a west point graduate and has served in his presence position since june 2017. additionally, he has served in germany, somalia, iraq,

afghanistan, and a number of stateside appointments. before we begin our remarks, perhaps a bit of rules on the rules of engagement. once all the remarks are completed, we will take questions from the floor. there will be personnel here from csis and from cmh who will be circling the room and collecting your questions on the cards provided. please indicate your name, affiliation, and to whom you are addressing your question, whether it be to a specific panelist o or the panel in general. so without further ado, eric, the floor is yours. >> all right. again, thank you all for being here. i mean, this is really incredible that we have a full room like this. i've been to csis a few times and this is capacity crowd, so i'm glad you're here for this very important event. i'm here just to give you a little bit of background on the

strategic and operational situation prior to the my lai massacre. so, i'll give you a little background on the setting and the opposing sides. the province we're talking about is in the northern part of what was then south vietnam. going back to the first indo china war when the french still controlled vietnam as a colony, most of the countryside was under the control of the predecessors of the vie t cong. much like you would see in 1968 and 1950, 1952, the government controlled basically the regional towns and a thin strip of territory along highway 1, which was the main north-south road that ran through the coastal lowlands. so in that respect, not a lot had actually changed. but in 1954, with the geneva

accords that create ad a cease fire and for france to withdraw from the country, the terms of the accord created a temporary division of the country between north and south and a period of time where people could move there one area to the other because the north would be controlled by ho chi minh's communist party and the south would be controlled by a noncommunist government, the idea being that there would be national elections in 1956 to decide the issues of reunification. so in this province, most of the vietcong soldiers went nofrrth r military training and ideological preparation for future contingencies but at the time, the idea was that the viet minh would stay to organize

the political struggle. as we know, those elections never took place. diem became the president of south vietnam. he called off the elections because he felt there was no chance that they would be free and fair and we'd probably go to the communists and by 1956, he began a very vigorous, indeed brutal, campaign to exterminate the viet minh who had stayed behind. so from '56 to '59 was a bleak time for the communists. in 1959, north vietnam decides to begin supporting an armed insurgency in the south because the southern cadre were just gotten clobbered is so in '59, they began sending troops and material first very small numbers but growing numbers in the years to come by '61, there

were battalion-sized units, now we're calling them vietcong but they called themselves battalion liberation forces. in 1965, when the united states intervened militarily, it had once again become a communist stronghold. just the other day, i actually found an after action report from an operation in early '65, some american advisers were part of this. it was south vietnamese operation, but it was in the village. and the schema maneuver was almost exactly like it would be in 1968 and you read the report and they said, we went into this village, there's tunnels everywhere, there's booby traps everywhere and nobody, no men. so by '65, you have this

communist stronghold, very much in evidence. so, moving forward, as the war expanded, by late '67, the american troop commitment is going towards 500,000, on its way to 525,000, which was the authorized limit at the time. in this area of the country, southern icor, four military zones in south vietnam and icor was the northern most, five provinces. so quangnai was the southern part of icor. the plrincipal american force i the region was first something called task force oregon, which was a conglomeration of brigades that were kind of thrown together to bring more security to this region and that transformed into the americal division. so by the end of '67, beginning

of '68, you have this new division that is still forming and it is based around the 196 brigade, which had been in country for several years now, was pretty experienced. but then two new infantry brigades which had been raised specifically to fight in vietnam, the 11th, which was trained in hawaii, and the 198th, which is trained in texas. so you have these three light infantry brigades covering really the southern half of icor. it's a big stretch of territory from the lower part of quangnam and quangnai province. the -- these new units, the 11th and 198th, arrived just basically at the end of 1967 so they're newly arrived in country and some of our other authors will talk about some of the training issues they had. but the arrangement was that part of this unit, the americal,

would protect the southern districts in quangnai and then part of it would protect the northern districts so particularly bin son in the snoo northeast, just on the border, was an area for the americal. nish initially the 198th brigade took control of it. when the south korean brigade moved farther north so this switch happens in around january, that they come into this district. and within a few weeks, they create this special task force, task force parker, made of three companies from different battalions or different of the regiments to protect this area. so, the thing to keep in mind here is that this is a new division, which is still coming

into being and you have this particular area, which is now under the jurisdiction of not even a true, you know, brigade but in fact a number of battalions and companies drawn there different parts of the division. the main focus of this area was a guerilla and vietcong local force. there were several nva divisions operating in southern icor and they were fed from the ho chi minh trail and there's a number of base areas in quangnai province where these big divisions would go back to get supplies and ammunition. it was these what they call local force battalions, particularly the 48th that we've heard about. their responsibility was to

operate in a specific district and create -- act as a link between the local population and these larger nva units, so like the 48th local force battalion would, for example, conduct attacks in conjunction with these big nva units, but they would also support the local guerillas so i think of it as single a baseball, a a, aaa, and the majors so the local force guys are like aa and then the aaa is the provincial battalions. the single a are those local guerilla companies so that's the 48th. it's operating in a relatively constrained area and has very

close ties to the population. that's where it's getting the food. they're getting their men and weapons and ammo from the trail but not their food. that's grown locally so the 48th is the one that's helping arrange that. so the thing that really changed the dynamic here and kind of sets the stage for the my lai massacre is the tet offensive. one of the big initiative in 1967 was the revolutionary development program. this is a south vietnamese government effort to put these teams into select hamlets to help secure them, teach literacy, dig wells, do all the things that you would want to do to bring that hamlet under government control. so this was a big initiative, and in quangnai, they were having a really hard time

getting -- okay. that's fine. o okay. really had a heaard time getting -- that sounds better -- getting a foothold in the countryside because again, once you got off of highway 1 outside the regional towns, there wasn't much of a government presence so there was a big initiative to try to finally turn that tide. when the tet offensive happened, nationwide attacks, the 48th battalion and every other vc unit in quangnai province participates in attacks on regional towns and the regional capital at quangnai province. the south vietnamese drive back those attacks. the 48th is hurt quite badly in the process. so, after tet, there is a real desire to get after these

vietcong units that had been so badly damaged during the tet offensive and knock them out once and for all so that this revolution development program could in fact start to get some headway. so that was the concept behind task force barker, what it was doing in february and march, is to seek out whoever the biggest threat was locally. in this case, that was the 48th battalion. this is a battalion which had attacked and overrun district headquarters before, attacked quangnai city, had generally had, you know, 500 men but was down to 100 now, apparently. so the thought was, let's go and clear them out. where'd they go to lick their wounds? that was son tinh district and places like my lai so that's why they asked for the authority to operate outside of its normal

zone. muscatane was bin son district but not son tinh so they said because this is important, we want an extension. we want to operate in a place where we don't normally operate and that was the thinking behind this operation. so, with that in mind, you know, in the march time frame, the push to get the rd program back on track was visible throughout the country, and so the -- it was the american units, really, who had the mobility, who had the fire power, to go into these normally vc areas where the south vietnamese troops didn't like to go so that was why they were operating in this area. they had the ability to do things the government didn't and with all the dislocation of tet, this was a lot of pressure coming down to the general and every other division commander

to turn this thing around. so, that was also something to keep in mind, a sense of real urgency that something had to be done and the vc had never been so weak. so here was an opportunity, hopefully, they thought, to take out what had been a real thorn in their side. and with that, i will pass it to the next person. >> thank you, erik. >> okay. good afternoon, one and all. it's not an accident that you're here today, because tomorrow is 50 years to the day that the killings occurred at my lai. and others are also going to remember this tomorrow. in fact, on tuesday, i got a phone call at my office at the army's legal center and school, a reporter from the german broadcasting network wanting to do an interview with me about my

lai, recognizing that the anniversary was coming up. so, i think tomorrow, which is the actual 50-year mark, you'll be reading about my lai and obviously it is important, although it happened a half a century ago. as i look out here, i see that some of you in the room were alive a half century ago. including me. i was a teenager, so i remember. i remember my lai. he's only 29 or so. but most americans don't remember my lai and will give you a rather puzzled look if you say, rusty cali? so i want to talk about three things. first thing i want to do is talk a little bit about rusty callie. i want to talk a little bit about what happened on march 16, 1968, and then finish up, part three of my remarks, the

aftermath of the case. so a little bit about william laws "rusty" calley. known as rusty because of his red hair. not a big man, 5'3" or 4". not a very good student. finished 666th in his high school class of 731. some of you might think 666 is not a coincidence. and at ocs, at officer candidate school, finished in the bottom quarter of his class. so for those of you who know something about army ocs, it's a way for deserving men and women to get a commission. three ways to get a commission, obviously, or four. you can go to one of the academies, rotc, ocs, and we do have some direct appointees.

today, you have to have a college degree to get into army ocs. back in calley's era, you didn't even have to be a high school graduate. calley was very much a low quality kind of officer, but we needed officers in 1968. he had some schooling, military schooling in georgia, and that was enough to get him in. but again, finished in the bottom quarter of his class. so, on march 16, 1968, second lieutenant calley is in vietnam with the americal division, in charlie company, commanded by captain ernes t medina and he's going on what they fully expect to be a serious mission. intelligence is that they're going to be facing the 48th vc

battalion, as dr. villard talked about, told they're going to be outnumbered two to one. you can expect sniper fire. you can expect this is going to be tough. and it's going to be a real fight. and so, calley and the soldiers are nervous. they're afraid. as dr. villard said, tet has already happened, but somewhat ironically, the men in this particular platoon n this particular company, didn't have any combat during tet. they're still untested. but there had been some soldiers in the unit who had been harmed, injured by booby traps and a very popular sergeant in the company had been killed a couple of days earlier, and so the soldiers are nervous, they're anticipating a big fight, and that isn't what happened.

they're air lifted in by helicopter. they get to the hamlet of my lai about 7:00 a.m. in the morning. and there's no fire coming their way. there's no sign of enemy action at all. there are no booby traps, there are no mines. they're in a small village, and all they find are women, old men, and children. no military age males. and these young -- these people are going about their daily chores, having breakfast, and getting ready to do what they do in the village. and so from the beginning, the soldiers are really confused about what they need to do, and an important point is no one ever instructed calley or his men what to do if all they encountered were unresisting,

unarmed civilians. they come into the village and almost immediately some soldiers begin to kill livestock, throw grenades into hooches, and calley and the men begin to round up civilians and put them in areas in the village, one particular area is by a ditch, and at some point, calley comes along to a private first class by the name of midlo and he says to him, how about taking care of these villagers and then calley walks away and sometime later, he returns and says, i thought i told you to take care of these villagers. and he says, we are taking care of them. we're watching them. and calley replies, no, i mean kill them.

and so they open up on the unresist, unarmed villagers with their m-16s and begin to kill them. and by the 11:00 a.m. mark, four hours after they've entered the village, as dr. villard said, between 350 and 500 civilians have been killed by calley and his men. there were certainly some soldiers who refused to open fire on these civilians, but most of the men in the platoon, of whom there were about 20, did so. and the result was this horrendous massacre, this horrendous war crime, a real tragedy.

a couple of things are important here. the first thing was that while the massacre, while the killing was going on, a helicopter, a small observation helicopter, a raven, was called at the time piloted by warrant officer hugh thompson who was providing really observation for the ongoing mission. hugh thompson saw who was going on down below. he saw there were at least 150 bodies, and he was so upset, he landed his helicopter on the ground between a group of american soldiers who were chasing fleeing vietnamese to put a stop to it. and he instructed his door gunner, a man by -- a soldier by the name of larry colburn, that if, when thompson went to talk to the americans, if they did not break off their chase, that they were to open fire on the americans. fortunately, it did not come to that. thompson had a very tense

conversation with a second lieutenant who we believe was not calley but a lieutenant by the name of brooks who was subsequently killed in action and they did break off the chase. thompson, therefore, saved some lives. he was also later able to evacuate on his helicopter a number of vietnamese children, thereby probably saving their lives. thompson is really one of the true heroes of the day and is later decorated by the army. unfortunately, quite a few years later, recognized for his noncombat heroism with the soldiers medal. professor solis will talk about some of these individuals, but the company commander is captain medina. he's not actually in my lai, but he and his first sergeant are adjacent to the village, certainly every reason to

believe that medina and his first sergeant knew what was going on. medina, by the way, is a decorated combat veteran, silver star, well liked by his men. task force barker, as dr. villard said, is named after lieutenant colonel barker. he's later killed in a helicopter crash and that's one of the reasons why we never talk about a court-martial for barker. the brigade commander is a colonel henderson. he's only been in command from the day before. and then finally, the americal division commander is samuel koster. he's a fast burner, protege of west moreland, going places, in fact, he's the superintendent at the military academy after vietnam.

so, this is what happens that particular day. calley and his men open fire on these unarmed, unresisting villagers and kill between 350 and 500. we're not really sure how many because of the cover-up that happens almost immediately. at every level of the brigade staff and the division staff, officers cover up the war crime. cover it up either by intentionally failing to investigate the water crime or report it to higher authority as was required by military assistance command vietnam directives. you were required by macv directives to report all suspected war crimes and investigate them. but almost immediately, colonel henderson reports to major general koster that at most

maybe 20 noncombatants have been killed and if you hear otherwise, it's just vc propaganda. so, it is covered up, and it's not until april 1969 that another real hero in this episode changes things and that's a sergeant by the name of ron, and he had not been at my lai, had not participated in the military operation, but he knew some of the soldiers who had been there and he began to hear about this massacre in which a lieutenant by the name of cally, as he spelled it in his subsequent letters, had taken part. and he has such a sense of justice that he writes a letter to the president, the white house, 23 members of congress,

the chief of staff of the army, everyone he can think of saying, we've got to take a look at this, look at this war crime. general westmoreland, who's chief of staff of the army at this point, gets the letter and immediately instructs his inspector general to begin doing an investigation. that happens. there is an investigation. and we begin to uncover the war crime. there's also a subsequent investigation headed by lieutenant genere pierce, the very famous pierce inquiry, that looks into the atrocity skand t pierce inquiry is really the gold standard when it comes to understanding what happened at my lai. calley obviously is identified as someone who's actually a trigger puller here, charges are proffered against calley in november 1969.

so, the massacre, the event, march 16, 1968. ridenhour's letters don't start coming in for 14 months later and calley is charged november 1969 and he is prosecuted at fort benning, trial opens in november 1970. pierce actually recommends charges against about 25 others, and professor solis will talk about some of these other cases. only six are court-martialed, of whom calley is the only man to be convicted. so, the case opens at fort benning, georgia, and two rather inexperienced judge advocates in the sense that they're army lawyers in their first tours as j.a.g.s are given this case to

prosecute, which looking back today, i think, is quite mind boggling, but i guess lawyers were really good back then. a lot of pressure and bringing this case and what's their big fear as prosecutors? their big fear is jury nullification. you'll remember the vietnam war has very much split the country. a lot of arguments about why we should be there and is calley a scapegoat, and the result is a lot of pressure, a lot of beliefs that maybe there will be jury nullification here. the government puts on its case and the defense case is -- well, the government's case is calley murdered these people when he shot them. he and his other coconspirators, he's charged with murder. the defense is, calley was only following orders.

calley insists that he only killed the villagers because captain medina ordered him to kill everyone in the village. not surprisingly, when medina testifies, he says, i never gave that order. why would i tell someone to kill civilians? the jury sees it the government's way, and calley is convicted of premeditated murder and the finding comes back march 29th, 1971. but it wasn't really an easy case. the jury of six, a colonel, four majors, and a captain, spent 79 hours in deliberation. 79 hours in deliberation. so, we can talk more about the case later, but let me just tell you that in an unprecedented move, after calley is convict, the president of the united

states, richard nixon, interferes in the case and directs from the white house that calley will not be sent to levenworth but he will be put in his on post quarters where he will be able to live in sort of a house arrest situation pending the outcome of the case. and so as the case winds its way through the system, nixon eventually decides to take no more action. calley has been found guilty of premedicated murder. he's sentenced to life, confinement at hard labor for life, but the convening authority in the case, the general who put the case together, when he takes final action, reduces the case to the -- the sentence to 20 years and then the secretary of the army later reduces it to 10 years. calley's gone to levenworth by now, but under the rules as they

existed at the time, once you'd served a third of your sentence, you were eligible for parole. so, if you added the six months he spent at levenworth plus his time under house arrest, calley's eligible for parole and he is paroled. 9 november, 1974. you often hear that nixon pardoned or commuted calley's sentence. not true. but he did interfere in the case and as a result calley did not go immediately to levenworth. thank you very much. professor? >> gents, ladies. the fact that military justice didn't make sure -- the fact is that military justice didn't make sure that those responsible for my lai and its cover-up were properly punished.

i feel that those trials and nontrial results are totally inequitable. that's a quote from lieutenant general william pierce who conducted the pierce investigation. i'm with general pierce. he led the 92-strong team that definitively investigated my lai. it was pierce who brought charges against the soldiers who were tried for my lai as trigger pullers and against officers who covered it up for more than a year. how many unarmed and defenseless vietnamese old men, where i am, and children were murdered, how many young women and children were raped and gang raped. how many of those women and young women had their vaginas ripped by bayonets by those soldiers. the american public didn't hear about those sexual offenses but it's the epic failure of

american military justice that i will discuss. i was a marine judge advocate for 18 years. in the early 1970s, military courtrooms were overflowing with courts martial, administrative discharges were rare, desertions and drugs were the order of the day with violent racial conflict, the constant background. fragings weren't unusual. courts martial numbers were at record highs. to establish my military law bona fides, from 1972 through ' '76, i prosecuted courts martial. i never defended. as a military judge in the mid '80s, i heard another 331 cases. and in the '70s, as a young lawyer, i had already been in the court for eight years. i heard the details of the my lai cases. i understood what had happened,

and i was appalled. i remain appalled. the military -- the my lai cases were american military justice's darkest day because of the my lai cases that were not tried, the my lai cases that were poorly tried, and the my lai cases that were buried by senior officers. we know that my lai war crimes occurred on 16 march 1968. on 24 november 1969, general westmoreland appointed lieutenant general william pierce to investigate the my lai war crimes. congressman mendel rivers convened his armed services committee and announced hearings through an investigative subcommittee which will play a role in a moment. on 17 march of 1970, general pierce's investigation report was released to the public. 12 officers were charged with ucmj -- i didn't start my clock. clever.

12 officers were charged with ucmj cover-up offenses. the convenes authority, the general officer who has the authority to make a court-martial happen, was lieutenant general jonathan seaman, commanding general to the first army. after february of 1971, he was replaced as commanding general and convening authority by claire hutchen. 12 cases charging my lai cover-up were preferred by lieutenant general pierce and sent to general siemen's first army headquarters. only one of them made it to court-martial. 13 additional charges for war crimes were sent to lieutenant general albert connor, commanding general of the third army, a total of 25 cases, every one of them already complete with charges brought by pierce. a three star general tested in world war ii, korea, and vietnam, combat. he was supported by a 92-man

team of investigators that included military and civilian lawyers, all of whom walked the ground at my lai taking sworn statements from surviving vietnamese victims as well as every u.s. soldier involved in the my lai operations. over the next three years, the 12 officers charged with my lai cover-ups plus two chaplains not previously mentioned, fared well. first, major general samuel koster, his charges were dismissed by general siemen the day before the general retired. he did issue a letter of censure to general koster and secretary of the army reduced him to brigadier general and withdrew his distinguished service medal and he was relieved as superintendent at west point. when i tell cadets that at west point, they can't believe. a supe was relieved. general pearce wrote, i was

especially disturbed by the dismissal of charges against the senior officers. in effect, it was a travesty of justice that would establish a precedent that would be difficult for the army to live down. yet other officers charged with the cover-up did better. lieutenant colonel william ginn, accused of failure to obey a lawful order, charges dismissed prior to trial. major david gavin, failure to obey a lawful order, false official statement, charges dismissed prior to trial. major frederick, failure to obey a lawful order, dereliction of duty, charges dismissed prior to trial. major charles calhoun, charges dismissed prior to trial. lieutenant kenneth, disobedience of a lawful order to report possible war crimes, charges dimissed prior to trial. lieutenant dennis johnson, charges dismissed prior to trial. and captain carl creswell, chaplain corps, united states

army, he told his superior, lieutenant colonel lewis of warrant officer thompson's observations from his helicopter over my lai. creswell told no one else as he was required to do under a standing order. only his boss. the charge was dismissed by the secretary of the army before the case even reached general siemen. lieutenant colonel francis lewis, division chaplain, disbaens of a lawful order, dismissed by secretary of the army. even more disturbing to anyone even slightly familiar with military justice, four of the charged cover-up officers cases were dismissed without an article 32 investigation having been held. an article 32 is a preliminary -- a required preliminary before any general court-martial. it's been said to be akin to a grand jury proceeding, to determine whether or not there's probable cause to believe a

crime has been committed and has been committed fwhi individual. general george young, the assistant brigadier general, assistant division commander, general siemen dismissed all his charges as unsupported by the evidence without an article 32 investigation. colonel parson, failure to obey a lawful order, dismissed. lieutenant colonel robert looper, failure to obey a lawful order. major robert mcknight, dismissed without a 32. why were these four officers not parties to an article 32 investigation? how did the general determine that there was insufficient evidence to take them to trial? the reason given for the dismissal of charnlz, when he didn't convene the very proceeding designed to make that determination. we'll never know. neither the ucmj nor d.o.d. orders require a convening authority to detail the reasons for their decisions.

i've located no writing to explain how general pierce could have found probable cause to charge 14 officers, counting the 2 chaplains, and been wrong in 13 of those 14 cases. the 14th officers cover-up case, it went to trial, colonel henderson, commander of the 11th infantry brigade. he was tried by a general court-martial with members, which, that is a jury, which resulted in his acquittal. the acquittal very strongly smacks of jury nullification. but we can't know that as fact. general pierce said of colonel henderson's acquittal, if his actions are judged as acceptable, the army is indeed in deep trouble. then there were the 13 additional charges of war crime cases involving four offerings and nine enlisted men. they also fared well. through the good graces of

another convening authority, lieutenant general albert connor. for example, sergeant esequiel torres, charged with murder, charges dismissed before trial. he was discharged at the convenience of the government. private max hutchison, charge of murder, dismissed before trial. robert soves, honorable discharge. sergeant kenneth homagedges, honorable conditions. kenneth sheel, corporal, murder charge dismissed, discharged under honorable conditions. first lieutenant thomas willing ham, charges of false official statement and failure to report a felony, dismissed prior to trial, honorable discharge. were there 32 article 32

investigations in those eight dismissed cases? i have not been able to locate any source that mentions article 32 and i suspect that none of the 8 soldiers mentioned did have an article 32 determined probable cause whether or not they had indeed committed an offense. colonel henderson had been tried and acquitted. charges were dismissed prior to trial in 21 other my lai cases, counting 2 chaplains. that left five cases and all five were tried at general courts martial with members. sergeant david mitchell charged with assault with intent to commit murder, congressman mendel rivers investigative subcommittee refused to provide mitchell's defense team with the transcripts of testimony of four prospective prosecution witnesses before the subcommittee. the transcripts were needed by mitchell's defense team for their cross-examination of the four. the congressional refusal was held to be a government violation of the act that requires military lawyers to

produce defense oriented evidence for the defense. resulted in the court's order that no witness who had appeared before the subcommittee would be allowed to testify at his court-martial. thus, the prosecution was fatally wounded. mitchell was acquitted. sergeant charles hudo, the second of the five cases, charged with assault with intent to commit murder, charges of rape and murder had been dismissed prior to trial. he was acquitted by members. despite his written sworn statement that he had killed a group of unarmed civilians with his m-60 machine gun. the statement was admitted into evidence and read to the members. the members took less than an our to acquit. captain eugene, charged with maiming and assault. he was charged with using a b bowie knife and questioning a vc suspect during which time he cut off the tip of his finger.

he claimed it was an accident. the members took less than an hour to acquit. here's the interesting case, in my opinion. captain ernes t medina, the c.o. of calley's platoon. he was charged with aggravated assault times two, premeditated murder of not fewer than 100 vietnamese and my lai, and premeditated murder of an adult female and a male child. a charge of failure to obey a lawful order as well was -- excuse me -- a charge of failure to obey a lawful order was inexplicably dropped before trial. the case was defended by f. lee bailey, at the time a very prominent defense counsel. medina was not charged with making a false official statement, ucmj article 57 or with dereliction of duty or with disobedience of a lawful order to report a law crime or with a

felony. all seemingly viable charges. instead, he was charged as a principal to murder, article 77, requiring conviction as aid err er or abetter that he shared criminal intent of the perpetrator. proving specific intent is always a challenge. proving it to a co-actor once removed from the alleged principal actor is a very high bar for a prosecutor. it was a very strange charge to bring. the prosecutor failed to call former soldiers whose testimony in earlier proceedings placed medina within my lai when the killing was going on. nor could the prosecutor get the my lai photographs into evidence, although they were on the cover of life magazine. a trial observer, then writer mary mccarthy.

she wrote despite the prosecutor's familiarity one would think at this time with the my lai matter, they appeared surprised and scolded and corrected by the judge. l.a. times reporter noted that many thought the prosecutors were simply not up to a contest with bailey, noted defense counsel. closed quote. pursuant to the prosecutor's request, the prosecutor's request, the military judge instructed members, the jury, the accused could be convicted only if he knew his men were committing or were about to commit war crimes and he failed to stop the acts. the military judge emphasized that actual knowledge, actual knowledge was required. actual knowledge was not then and is not today an element of aiding or abetting, as requested by the defense. and like specific intent, proving actual knowledge is a high bar for a prosecutor. on 22 september, 1971, members deliberated for an hour again

before acquitting captain medina. the medina prosecutor wrote in a law review article, quote, the prosecutorial record of the my lai cases was abysmal. closed quote. having lost three of six my lai cases that went to trial, he should know. we heard about the case of lieutenant william callie, trial counsel was captain aubry daniel. finally at the right moment, and i know that fred agrees with me, finally at the right moment in history, the military justice system got it right. aubry daniel, 25 years old, was pitch perfect throughout the callie trial. thorough, spectacularly competent, outlawyered everyone in the room including the capable military judge. so seven soldiers at least

should be remembered at my lai who refused to obey orders to kill. michael bern heart, herbert carter, robert maple, dennis hunting, joseph ders ee, leonard gonzales, all refused orders to kill unarmed civilians. the courage of helicopter pilot hugh thompson was beyond heroic. so of 27 my lai cases again counting two chaplains who are usually not kounlcounted, 21 we dismissed before trial. 21 entirely dismissed before trial. at least four of those were without article 32 investigations. six cases went to trial. five of them resulting in acquittal. three of five acquittals prosecuted by one judge advocate. trial lawyer's axiom is no trial is too hard for the lawyer who doesn't have to try it. still, judge advocate's first

loss was huddle, whose acquittal sounds like jury nullification and if it wasn't, it certainly rhymes. the prosecutor can't be faulted for losing huddle. reasons for second acquittal are unknown because there was very little media coverage and court-martial acquittals have no verbatim record of trial as do convictions. only a summarized record, usually less than a page long. so there's no way to examine the record to reflect on trial tactics and legal strategies. looks like a simple prosecution case but we weren't there. captain medina's case is another matter. though an acquittal leaves no verbatim record to examine, media coverage of the medina case tells a damning story, more significantly questions raised by the government charges suggest legally deficient approach to the case from the outset. combine those points with the prosecutor's own writings on his proeks of the case and it appears the trial strategy and

command of military law were lacking. from selection of charges to jury instructions. in my opinion, medina was winnable, lost through prosecutorial inept i tud. the final trials are cases that were not charged, conduct went unexamined and not tried. two known cases, few in this room have heard the names, but they were among the worst uniformed criminals in my lai. videos wits forced women to strip and murdered them when they refused to have sex with him. the other allegedly forced a woman to perform oral sex holding a gun to the head of hur child. event sworn to by callie in his trial. yet they were never charged, despite sworn statements to cid describing their criminal conduct. is there a reason they weren't charged? i believe there is.

although it can never be proved. i believe higher military authorities didn't charge them for the same reasons they dropped 21 and 27 cases before trial. because they didn't want the american public to know the full extent of the criminality exhibited by u.s. personnel in my lai and undermine america's on-going war effort. i believe that was the reason not a single rape charge went to trial. why sexual mutilation charges were not even considered. i believe convening authorities wanted the whole damn my lai case to go away, with as little media attention as possible. thus, 21 my lai cases, sworn to by a lieutenant general supported by a handpicked team of military lawyers were dismissed without trial, without legal explanation. thus assuring no trials, no publicity, no national outcry. the tragedy of my lai didn't end when the last round was fired.

>> well, good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. i hope to be able in the next few minutes to show you that we as your army today have the ability to listen, absorb, learn from, an act on lessons of the past. i hope to be the good news coda to the story. cicero famously asked whether or not laws are silent in time of war. i think the answer is absolutely not. but there are prerequisites to have an army and in order to fight a war such that the law and rule of law remains. it requires a professional disciplined army with institutionized training and self policing, it requires knowledge of the law of armed conflict to be treated as core competency among professional

soldiers, and requires leadership, officers and ncos who are adequate in character to the task at hand. when we look back at history and look back at the pierce inquiry, he found we lacked a professional, disciplined army, reliance on drafties, again, not a single cause in and of itself, but certainly a contributing factor. we lacked proper training. training described as lackadaisical, we were joking earlier if you gave a soldier a card with rules of engagement on it, that doesn't hold up well in 12 minutes when it is wet. even if the soldier were inclined to look at the reference and most wouldn't be, it would be gone, lost to them. then there was lack of leadership adequate in character. not just callie but the cover up

and failure to police our own ranks as a profession. so i tell you today there are three things i think you need to know about your army, about our army that have fundamentally changed. those things that give us the moral, legal, ethical foundations to ensure legitimcye of our operations. on the 6003rd day in afghanistan, that moral and legal ethical foundation has to remain solid. what is it, what are the three things? it is comprehensive integrated na nature how we train and ensure compliance with the law of armed conflict. we do it from entry level training through senior service colleges that are at our highest level, for sergeants, majors at the academy, we do it from cradle to grave. we do it in the classroom, we do it in practical exercises, and

we incorporate it in large scale training and combat training centers. and we do it in every operation center around the globe. we'll come back to that in more detail. what else has changed? second thing you need to know that's changed is the role of judge advocate. i got it. many would cringe to think really, more lawyers? that's a solution? but i tell you, the people asking for more lawyers today are not the lawyers. they are the commanders. and i submit to you, it is not because they're gun shy and afraid. i won't list names, but commanders i had the privilege of working for who have asked for more legal support are names that would resonate in this room, and you would not find any of them shirking. it is the ability to be both the command's legal adviser in that strict left, right limit of what is the law, what are the policy

limitations, but to be counselled. we can do it, but should we do it. and to be part of that commander's inner circle, to be part of that discussion beyond the can and could to the should. it is integration with the staff at every level and it's present in every formation from brigade up. brigade combat teams have three judge advocates. a major and two captains and they have a series of paralegal ncos underneath them working across the formations. different types of formations have different numbers beyond bcts, but we have lawyers at every echelon. so with that training and presence of those judge advocates and quality of the junior leaders, the final thing i think is required, especially our ncos, we have an all volunteer army that invests heavily in the training and education of our force. and that makes the difference i

think today. so what do we do differently now than then? in 1972, judge advocate recommended to the judge advocate general out of the peers inquiry we ought to have a war law program, ought to have what became the dod law of war program. in 1974, that program was codified and it was critical because it was an initial step in changing the army's mindset about the appropriate role to be played by attorneys in the military, but beyond that it got to training requirements, the professionalism of our force, of junior officers, of ncos would follow in time with evolution of the all havevolunteer army. the two things i highlighted you needed to know were critical. it became the precursor for what became known as operational law. if you're involved in academia, you hear it called national

security law. over the last 25, 30 years, it was the active evolution and rapid evolution of operational law, that is judge advocates, the staff, and commanders working together to ensure that operations were within compliance, to treaty obligations, to fundamental principles of law of armed conflict and to national policy limitations that are part and parcel of every operation we are part of. it was dod mandated. and it required extensive law of war training be provided to all armed forces personnel. we'll talk a little more about that. it also specifically mandated judge advocates must be involved in both development and review of op plans in order to ensure the plans comply with law of wars requirements. a significant mindset change for the army.

at the time of massacre, we were doing none of it. today, it is part and parcel of how the army and joint force conducts business every day without second thought and without hesitation around the globe. qualified embedded legal advisers became a critical part of that. dod law of war program in 1974 set out a requirement to make qualified legal advisers at all levels of command available to provide advice about law of war planning. so i walked you through how we have lawyers at every level from brigade up, in special forces units we have lawyers at the battalion level. when we send battalion sized task fo taskforces forward, they go with a captain, occasionally a major, but train. i will get to the training piece a little later. within that program we built that structure. then we ensured we trained that structure and so we train the

judge advocates, paralegal noncommissioned officers, train them at the basic course, in the graduate course, mid level educational course, we trained them in short courses, we trained them in home station training, and that's the academic piece. moved it to the operational training piece as we talk about how we train our forces. but in addition to structure and training, you've got to have action, judge advocates that are in there and willing to advise. you have to have judge advocates that can speak truth to power and tell a commander no when the answer is no. who can tell a commander yes when the answer is yes. and who when in that gray area in between can help a commander understand where the left and right legal limit is, and where the risk is, and allow the commander who owns the decision to make a decision based on an informed risk assessment of which that judge advocate and the rest of the staff plays a critical role.

so the judge advocates are tasked not only to address and identify legal constraints, it is not all about no, it is about counsel. it is about the should we when we get past the could we. peers report talked about training as lackadaisical, like a stack of cards in your pocket as a soldier that provides, pretend to give you guidance, again, once they're wet, nothing but pulp, how often do you sit and read them. having had them in my pockets on deployments, you largely don't. but now the army is at a point you don't need that daily reference because it is part and parcel of how we training. training begins like i said at the cradle. so whether that's ait for

soldiers or whether it is rtc at the academy or ocs for officers, it is comprehensive. at west point, it is a combination of philosophy, military law, military science, field exercises, organizations like leeber institute, who wrote general order 100, which was the framework for the law of war for our forces. and the modern war institute. proudly run by one of my west point classmates who takes a look at bringing all these components together, challenges of modern battlefield, how we have to fight, and provided it in an integrated fashion so they can understand it. when you open the soldier's manual of common tasks and subject number one is p individual conduct in laws of war. what it tasks soldiers to do is

to identify suspected or known violations of the law of war and noe notify appropriate authorities. that's a basic level task we now require of entry level soldiers to understand that process, something that was absent at the time 50 years ago when these events transpired. we integrated that training at training combat centers. whether you're in louisiana, whether you're at ntc at fort irwin, or mctp at fort leavenworth, wherever you conduct training, preparatory training at home station and training in each of those intense training environments all involve scenarios, woven through, that raise with and force commanders and soldiers to deal with these issues, to deal with issues of combatants on the

battlefield, treatment of sfi s civilians you need to remove to identify and engage the enemy. we do that. we train at every course, at precommand course f, and we tra at sergeant major academy. training is different in every one of those venues because the knowledge, base of knowledge those individuals are coming in with at that point in their career is different. the experience is different. but it all goes back to their ability to return to their formations and ensure the most junior soldier understands what is expected of him or her in combat or in any operation. and that's the rule for us. it doesn't necessarily have to be a combat operation. all of this applied in kosovo. any operation, however

categorized, is the language of the regulation governing us. we take it seriously in everything we do. so what does that get you? hopefully gets you a program, i submit it gives us a program today that ensures that soldiers understand they have multiple venues for reporting suspected allegations, whether to the chain of command or fear chain of command is involved, to alternate chain of command, to a chaplain, to a judge advocate, to an inspector general, all of whom are present on the battlefield, all of whom are present at various levels in various formations, but we give soldiers options, we give soldiers multiple ways to be able to do the right thing should the wrong thing have occurred. now, that begs the question if we solve the problem, how can wrong things occur.

we're an army that reflects the society from which each of us comes from. so guess what, we get bad apples and don't always weed them out in time. you take a case like june 2012. first lieutenant comes down to take over a platoon. clint lorance was an aggressive lieutenant and had his own ideas how the war in afghanistan should be fought. those ideas were not aligned with rules of engagement, and that's the fundamental fact that starts us off the trail here and off the rails. he gives his soldiers guidance that is not in accordance. motorcycles are allowed to be engaged on site. that's guidance given. not a lawful order, but soldiers don't necessarily know that,

change to ore would logically come through chain of command. what soldiers noknew was their rules. if they don't witness hostile intent, it is not a lawful target. so when he tells a soldier to go ahead and engage a motorcycle, that soldier does, fortunately he misses. but when he tells another soldier with a turk mounted weapon to engage the same motorcycle, that soldier is successful, kills two of three riders on the motorcycle. then the coverup begins. he tells soldiers what not to report back to headquarters. he lies about where sound of gunfire came from. but a young soldier is the one who immediately goes back to the company commander and reports this. and within a pretty quick turn, first lieutenant lorance is convicted to murder and sentenced to 20 years. we won't always get it right at

an individual actor level, but i submit to you, your army will get it right. the joint force will get it right. strict requirements about reporting, protocols that are followed, because a force is trained to understand and articulate what the requirements are, makes us a much better army than we were. and that's always the hope, that each and every day we learn from what we do. we may make a mistake once but we should learn from it and not make it a second time. i think back to when i was a brand new second lieutenant, it was july of '93. i'm in somalia, the two star commander of u.s. forces brought all of the lieutenants together. things were starting to heat up in somalia, he had concerns. he had been a company commander in vietnam at the time of this, and then moved to the staff on amer kyle division. he sat them down with 25 years of scar tissue, talked to us

quite awhile about law of armed conflict and about rules of engagement and about watching out for your soldiers and about things that happen in combat. 25 years later, i sit here today in front of you having had the experience of multiple combat zones around the world, different roles in each, whether platoon leader or senior adviser at the joint special operations command. really the full spectrum of combat operations and interaction at these levels. what i can submit to you today is the fears general montgomery shared with us 25 years ago are not the fears i have today. yes, i worry about the human nature and human element in all of this, but i am confident that your army and your joint force does a more than adequate task of educating, training, and where at all possible preventing

another massacre. thank you. >> okay. we'll have some questions. i would like to remark as i was listening to general berger speaking, we often teach an elective at staff college. i often tell students, most of whom believe me, some don't, that the most dangerous thing in the world is a 19-year-old american with m-16 or m-4, and what keeps to mix a metaphor, keeps rods and reactors is leadership, moral, ethical leadership as the general points out. that's the focus of every time we talk about something like my lai or lorance or anything else, it prevents everything else we do in the school house. i remember when reading about this, one of the soldiers said why did you follow on an unlawful order.

he said at the platoon, there ain't unlawful orders, are you crazy? i wouldn't tell my lieutenant i wouldn't do that. in situations like on this day in 1968. as i look at the questions, i will ask, fred, would you elaborate on fred thompson and what his role cost him in terms of his reaction within the division once he went back and made his reports. >> okay. well, hugh thompson, talking about the helicopter pilot, warrant officer hugh thompson. as i said when i made my remarks a couple of minutes ago, thompson was up in an observation helicopter with two crew men. he saw what was going on on the ground. he was so upset, he went down, landed the helicopter between some fleeing vietnamese and

pursuing soldiers and stopped at least that particular event. he went back and informed his squadron commander what he had heard. watke said he thought he was overdr overdrama advertising the event. he told this to the chaplain, creswell, said i can't believe this happened. and creswell said don't worry, mr. thompson, i'll take care of it. i'll make sure it's reported. so really in the end, no one paid any attention to thompson and in fact he became sort of a

black sheep for many years thompson was ignored. it wasn't until 1995 that because of efforts by historians who knew about thompson that the army finally came through with a soldiers medal for him, the highest award for noncombat heroism a soldier can receive, so i think the truth about thompson is that for many years ignored, considered to be not the hero that he was, and it is not until 1995 that he's recognized. he wrote a book about his experiences or rather authored by the name of trent agers. mr. agers is here? he wrote a book about it and certainly he is here and you can talk to him. but i think thompson in the end was recognized for his heroism.

sadly he is dead. he died of cancer i think ten years ago now. his co-pilot or crew chief is also dead, but i think thompson is one of the heroes and he was finally recognized for his heroism. >> thank you. mesmerized by machinery. during course of commitment, this is for gary, in vietnam, were there records of other atrocities committed in vietnam? >> very much so, all the time. marine corps had numerous trials. 26 marines were convicted of war crime charges in vietnam. there were a number in the army of course, probably more. but there was no requirement that war crime charges be reported to a central command so we can never know how many war crimes were actually committed, so when a reporter called fred

or myself and asks how many war crimes do we have in vietnam, it is hard for us to explain we don't know. there's no way to determine that. but there were other war crimes, marine corps had 24 civilians were murdered at point blank range, all women and children. no males, no adult males among them, but we don't know how many. but what we do know is there were prosecutions throughout the war. when we learned about these things, we took action. it didn't work so well in my lai, but my lai was really a one off in many respects. yes, there were other war crimes. they were prosecuted throughout the war. >> if i could add to that real quick, after the winter soldier protests, any of these soldiers back in the united states, protesting the war, talking about the things they had seen or heard about, atrocities and

war crimes, that spurred an army investigation into the claims. there's a thick stack of summary reports in the national archives, 250 approximately, that describe the allegations and results of the investigations. i actually found them after abu ghraib. our office started to look into treatment of detainees and pows after abu ghraib, and i went to the archives and found all of these summary files. most of them were dropped for lack of evidence, either people refused to testify or they couldn't be found or couldn't be substantiated, but there was a big -- about '70, '71, another big push to look at these allegations.

>> i want to give you one other point on war crimes. yes. i think the number 350 is what i have seen and gary is right, some were prosecuted, but at the time the legal problem was that once you were honorably discharged, there was no longer court-martial jurisdiction. in the case of private first class who admitted killing scores of vietnamese civilians, he could not be prosecuted because he had been honorably discharged from the army. the only sovereign that could have prosecuted, only country that could have prosecuted him was south vietnam. south vietnam was not interested in prosecuting any americans. remember also in this period, if you're a guy and you're drafted, how long do you have to serve. two years, right? by the time you get through basic and advanced individual training and go to vietnam,

boom. you're out almost as soon as you come back. in his case because it was covered up a year, many of the soldiers who killed were gone, were civilians and couldn't be prosecuted. >> the nature of this question comes from two different people, essentially it is, this is addressed to the panel at large. what were the political pressures that impacted the lawyers in putting the cases together and trying them? >> i wrote a history of marine carr lawyers in vietnam, so i talked to virtually all the living lawyers about their cases in vietnam. i know of zero instances of political pressure on the prosecution of any case in vietnam or in the united states. i know of no instances of political pressure. i would be surprised to learn of any substantiated case.

>> any other response on the panel? >> i agree with that, at least as a legal historian. let me go back to the callie case again. public opinion after callie was unbelievably opposed to the case. only 9% of the american public supported the conviction in the callie case. 9%. which is why president nixon interfered and when asked whether or not he was a scapegoat, 83% of americans said yes. so i agree with gary, there isn't any political pressure but on the other hand, politicians do pay attention to public opinion polls. >> this isn't, doesn't quite qualify as political pressure in a sense. the question was asked, but still it's related in terms of south vietnamese.

what was their government stake, their position about this. one would think they would be deeply concerned about the killing of up to 500 civilians. well, the fact is that was not true. the local district chief and province chief after allegations came out conducted what they said was investigation and basically said look, there's just vc in that area, and if you have allegations of a massacre, that's vc propaganda. i mean, they kind of wrote the whole thing off. you have to understand in this checker board sort of war situation, place like that eastern district has the name on operational maps, sort of term they used pinkville, it was a

red area, had not been under government control forever, so the government didn't feel any particular obligation to the civilians who lived there and in fact a number, i have this letter, a number of south vietnamese senators wrote to nixon in december of '69, said please, mr. president, do not pay attention to the allegations, it is all fake news. didn't use that term, but that was what they're basically saying. it is vc propaganda, is simply going to undermine american support for south vietnam at a critical moment. oh, and what about the way massacre, right? south vietnamese were upset as you would imagine of the 3,000 civilians vietcong killed after way, and in '69 a lot of the bodies were uncovered.

it was very much in their conscience, you can't trust the vc. in a sense there was political pressure from the south vietnamese just to move on. >> this question, was the my lai complex in a fire zone. goes on, ends up asking the larger question is there a problem with corporate culture and you can define it as command climate, search for the body count. i address that to the panel, whoever wishes to comment. >> fred and i have had this conversation a couple of times. the unique thing was, there were free fire zones then, they were pretty normal, they played a role in this case. the reality is you would i won't say never see that again but i

can't imagine the circumstances where i as legal adviser outside of pure, unpure competitor fight where i would look at a commander and say that's even remotely a good idea. and i don't think i would find a commander who thought it was a good idea to be honest with you. so what i submit to you is at the time there may have been a cultural problem with it but i don't think that's the same challenge today. fred? >> for those of you who study military history, you know there are various types of strategy. we like to maneuver strategy, for example. we talk about counter insurgency. west moreland is pursuing attrition strategy. if you know military, you know the enemy will give up if we kill so many of him that he finally doesn't have any people left and gives up.

there's nothing fundamentally wrong with attrition strategy. we used it in world war ii, but what is your metric then for measuring success in an attrition strategy. it's a body count. so i believe as a military historian that a contributing factor is the attrition strategy and the idea that success on the battlefield or success in a military operation is measured by how many bodies you have. presumably these are all the enemy. but the problem in vietnam is unless you're fighting the north vietnamese, no one is wearing a uniform. how do i really know if this is the enemy. i'm not saying it necessarily meant you're inflating body counts, although that certainly happened, but i think a contributing problem here is this emphasis on body count as a

reason for success and so after my lai, for example, it is trump eted as a big success because so many of the enemy have been killed. we never would today look at body count as a metric. general berger i think would agree that commanders today would be appalled if you suggested body count was a metric for success. >> add a couple of things to that. for example, i found the 11th infantry brigade newsletter for this period that has a news feature on the my lai operation. and it talks about how they came in and killed 182 vietcong

soldiers and captured three weapons. okay. were they sharing the three? i mean, similar problem, in the delta with general uel, killing a lot of folks, not finding a lot of weapons. now i argue in my book that west moreland actually had more nuanced approach to war. it was not just body count but things like weapons and chew hoys and rice and other things that go into war. one of the things struck me as bizarre about the operation, if indeed medina and callie and the rest told men before the operation. >> we will leave the american history tv programming here for a short time for live coverage of the british prime minister theresa may appearing before the british liaison committee, addressing foreign policy priorities and other issues.

>> we hope to raise russia with you in the aftermath of sa-- salisbury incident, have a discussion on brexit and i am going to hand over straight away to the foreign affairs committee. >> prime minister, thank you very much for coming this afternoon. many of us have been impressed with your diplomatic results in 23 nations supporting britain's position. i am extremely grateful for that. may i go straight onto an area i hope i can encourage you to do further work on, however, russian debt sanctions. you will be aware in what seems hardly accidental timing, the russian state itself issued a debt issue a week or so ago, half that money has been bought by uk investors, and has gone to

refinancing the foreign currency holdings of the vtb bank which is sanctioned. surely we can do more to stop sanction busting effectively done by the russian state. >> if i may, first of all, just to update on the number of countries who have now expelled, because i said 18 yesterday, the number is going up last night. it is now 37 countries that conducted expulsions. and they confirmed nato reduced from 30 to 20. further action that has been taken. i welcome the international support that we have garnered. as i said in the house yesterday, it isn't just a matter of the uk's position in working with the uk, i think it is in national security interests of the individual countries concerned. of course, as a government on the issue of financial sanctions we are fully committed to imposing sanctions where they support and protect foreign

policy and national security interests. and financial sanctions as you will know have been imposed and continue to be maintained by the eu and uk response to russia's actions in ukraine. and if the regulations are broken, we will take action to enforce them, including penalties and prosecutions where they're appropriate. you mentioned a specific incidence of how money is used in relation to a particular bank and i recognize you raised this in the house yesterday. i haven't had a chance to look at the details of that bank, but if it was helpful, i would be happy to write the committee further on that specific one. >> i would be grateful if you would, but it is on a generic point if you will, in order to raise foreign capital reserves, the russian state is helping by issuing the bond which is used by a sanctioned organization. i used one example. there are others. i would be grateful if you can look at this use of our capital market, clearinghouses, to see how we