the landmark cases pod cost at cspan.org/landmarkcases. next weekend n the festival of books. starting saturday add 1:00 p.m. eastern with a journalist and the book "stranger the challenge of a latino immigrant in the trump era. ♪ the author of "loaded". a book, the view of fly overcountry. dispatches from the forgotten america. on sunday our live coverage continues at 1:30 p.m. eastern with a journalist with "russian roulette". black lives matter co-founder with her book "when they call you a terrorist".

and political commentator roger same within his book "i know best how moral narcissism is destroying our republic if it hasn't already". watch the festival of books on book tv, on c-span2. next a discussion on the future of the iran nuclear deal ahead of president trump's may 12th deadline to revise or pull out of the agreement. panelists looked at possible implications if the u.s. were to withdraw from the deal and how that discussion would impact the upcoming talks with north korea. held by the hudson institution, this is an hour and a half. i hope everybody is having a good day. thank you for coming to the hudson institute today. thank you c-span for being here, and today we should have an

interesting panel talking about the implications of walking away from the jcpoa, the impact on allies and adversaries. if you see the photo that we used here at hudson for the event, mr. president, that the not our doing. that's iran. that's the regime. the regime picked that photo. don't hold that against the hudson institute. all right. i'd like to introduce the panelists. i'm mike. i'm here at the hudson institute and moderating the panel and participating. to the right is michael ladine, freedom scholar. also the co-author with general mike flynn for "a field of fight". great to have you here. next to him is amik a aladodge. her focus is on nuclear weapons and nuclear defense policy. and then to her right is uba y

shebander. we both worked with general petraeus and h.r. mcmaster and looking at iranian maligned influence in iraq. he's a fellow at the international security center at new america. and it's great to have him here. and, of course, we have richard goldberg's senior adviser, foundation for defense and democracies. what's interesting is he was a lead negotiator in the senate for sanctions against iran, the toughest sanctions that brought them to the table that may likely go back into effect. thank you for being here today. so we'll just quickly talk about what's happened over the last two to three weeks. we have incoming secretary of state, former cia director pompeo and also bolton going

into the position on monday. and pompeo may be in his position as early as two weeks from now. probably closer to the first week of may. hopefully before the may 12th deadline. the president has his iran team in place. we're looking forward to hearing from the panelists on what that means the day after may 12th, the implications, again for u.s. foreign policy for iran and our allies and for iran's allies, our adversaries specifically russia and china. so with that, i'm going to give it to rich. he's going to give us a scene setter. what's likely to happen in the next month. >> thank you so much. thank you for having me and all of us. i think it's a time i will panel. i'll try to make this relatively quick. i think the coverage of this is pretty widespread. i think people know what we're

talking about. don't need to rehash all the debate over the iran nuclear deal itself. most of us lived through that for a couple of years. but when we started at the beginning of 2017, with the new president who during his campaign for presidency called the iran nuclear deal the jcpoa, the joint comprehensive plan of action, one of the worst deals ever negotiated in his words, you knew there was going to be some sort of change in policy. the administration underwent a year-long review of what iran strategy would look like. and then in october finally some announcements, some action. now, up until then from the administration's perspective, and just an objective view, we've seen the iranian regime use the cover of the nuclear deal to expand a lot of its nonnuclear elicit activities. under the nuclear deal itself, obviously they were allowed to

continue certain r&d missile program we'll talk about. it was not covered by the nuclear deal, and we saw at least 23 tests of ballistic missiles since the nuclear deal was adopted. great advance on their missile program. we've seen them move throughout the region with physical presence of the irgc and others whether it's with the houthis in yemen that are receiving direct training from iran and missiles that are now raining down on riyadh. destabilization efforts in b bahrain. we see leading up to the iraqi election, in syria obviously doubling down to save the asaad regime. both through hezbollah but more importantly through the advancement of both shia militias but commanders and troops on the ground. we see irgc missile production

facilities popping up in lebanon. it's raised alarm bells in jerusalem as far as the security to israel's north and the future of an indigenous iranian missile report in syria or lebanon. we've seen iran trying to form the shia crescent starting from lebanon and going around to the mediterranean in lebanon. the president in october did something that was controversial on capitol hill and elsewhere among our allies. that is used a provision of a u.s. law that required regular review of the nuclear deal. and triggered something called decertification. it meant that he sent a letter to congress saying that in his view, the president's view, the iran nuclear deal was not worth the sanctions relief we were

providiining for our national security. that combined with the irgc identified as a terrorist entity, we saw destabilization inside iran and the currency. it started plummeting. we realized despite a couple years of economic stability, increased in trade. now there was a chilling effect from the decertification and beneath the surface, a vulnerability inside the regime. that led to the next phase that we've seen. around new year's and ever since people taking to the streets in iran and protesting against the government. and now we see the president in january 12th making a statement that he has waived sanctions for the last time against the regime. the central bank of iran sanctions that have to be renewed with the waiver in order

to be compliant with the u.s. obligations under the nuclear deal, every 120 days came up january 12th. the president said this is the last time i'mwaying these sanctions and if i don't see a change to the nuclear deal to account for iran's long range missiles inspections of their military sites which has not happened yet, and also the elimination of the so-called sunsets of the deal, that is prepro visions of the deal that go away within eight to ten years and making those provisions permanent, that he would reimpose the central bank of iran sanctions on may 12th. ongoing negotiations in europe right now to see if the e-3 uk france, germany also italy, maybe an e-4, can come to common ground with the u.s. on those conditions. all reports so far is that they are well short of being able to meet the president's goals, and so with the two new personnel

decisions that mike talked about, we set the stage now for the likely exits of the u.s. from the nuclear deal. and the position for resanctioning on may 12th and perhaps much more. >> thank you for setting that up. so the panel wants to focus on what happens the day after we walk away and what's being put in place already. what the jcpoa allowed iran to do since 2015 is continue to destabilize the middle east and develop the ballistic missile program under the jcpoa, if it doesn't change, they become an economic power, a military power, and while continuing to develop their ballistic missile capability. at the end of the sunset clause, be able to put a nuclear warhead on top of one of the missiles.

with the jcpoa, their six months away from breakout. taking it away, it takes away the protections. i'd like to ask ubay to talk about some of the destabilizing events that have taken place since it went into effect, specifically about the position before the jcpoa and also the position after. >> i think we can certainly say with confidence that in many ways syria is both iran's achilles heel and the battle field where iran has achieved perhaps the most success in the region in addition to not including iraq. but the question here is will a major recalibration of the so-called iranian nuclear deal or a negation of it in the entirety lead to a new massive regional conflict in on one hand while i think the iran nuclear

deal more than likely averted a major all out war at the time, i think it's also equally true that the -- this deal has more than likely set the stage for an even more devastating regional conflict, and we can see that playing out in syria today. on one hand the iranian revolutionary guards with suffered their greatest amount of casualties in syria to include the overall commander that was appointed directly for the forces in syria so the iranians have borne a significant amount of damage in syria. because of that, they're certainly not going to leave any time soon, and they're not going to -- they view as having sacrificed the most in that fight in syria on behalf of their proxy bashar al assad and to advance their strategic objective which is to build an

uninterrupted line of supply from tehran through iraq into eastern syria and then into the mediterranean sea and lebanon's valley. >> is that in effect right now? >> i think that is absolutely in effect. that is absolutely in effect. having that land rout through iraq and into syria and the baka valley enables them to move more personnel and ammunition for their proxies in syria which number around 10,000 mall ga mated shia forces from the arabian gulf of afghanistan that are all trained by the iranian revolutionary guards and fighting in syria. what does this have to do with the nuclear deal? impunity. we've seen a significant amount of impunity by iran's actions in the region in syria. we have a horrific humanitarian situation where over 10,000 syrians have been displaced or forced to become refugees.

a million migrants forced into europe. humanitarian disaster not seen on the scale since world war ii. and this is not only going to have regional implications but international ones. you can't contain what's happening in syria despite that containment policy being the de facto obama policy for at least three years while they were covertly negotiating the nuclear deal with iran. so that's looking at what's happening in syria today, we can say that it is a byproduct, if not a consequence and a casualty of the nuclear deal. will we see something much worse if the nuclear deal is recalibrated significantly or negated? well, the question is how much worse can it possibly get? right? let's -- even if, i mean, let's take under assumption that a

political solution was negotiated in syria. do we believe that the iranian revolutionary guards and their proxies in syria and iraq are going to go home? do we believe they're going to disarm or demobilize? absolutely not. they're going to constantly look for other fronts in syria -- in israel. in jordan. looking to target american assets, allied assets. they're never going to stop. the irgc has never demobilized in its history. so while on one hand i do agree with the analysis that when the deal was signed, it did avert a regional conflict. but that doesn't mean that another regional conflict on a much wider scale is going to become inevitable because of the sense of immunity has now been imbued with. they believe they're winning. they believe they have the winds at their back, and that's a very

dangerous situation for the entire region to be in. >> thank you. >> nobody knows the region better on this panel than michael ladean. how has the regime been empowered and how will it change if we walk away? >> i don't think the jcpoa is very important. i think that iran honors it when it feels like it. and cheats on it when it doesn't. there was a recent article i wrote about. it really caught my attention, about the israeli bombing of the syrian nuclear reactor. and it was written, and they went through how the israelis found out about this nuclear reactor in syria.

right? as the head of asaad is quoted as saying in the article, this wasn't on the far side of the moon. this was in a country next to us where we had access and good information and so forth. and they found out about it by accident. i mean, it took a series of lucky events so that they could actually be sure what was going on there. if the israelis who were very good at this sort of thing and finding this kind of information couldn't find it, then my estimate, our ability to monitor iranian nuclear project is very pessimistic. i think they hide things all the time. i think there are things going on there that we don't know about. i think our intelligence on iran over the years since the revolution has been awful.

awful. we are surprised at every eruption of hatred of the regime, even though we ought to know just reading the newspapers not having access to clandestine covert resources. we see it all the time. there are riots every day, all the time, constant, nonstop. troops going in, people being shot. people being arrested and so on. do we follow it here? is it a component of policy? does it get factored into what we're thinking, planning, doing and so forth? i think not. so to me whether there's a treatyish meeting as we used to say when i was a kid, i don't think it matters. i think they're going to do whatever they think they can get away with, and i note for the record, as we used to say, that this is an unsigned treaty.

nobody has signed it. >> it's not a treaty either. >> right. whatever it is. but nobody has put their name on it. it's not a formal agreement. it's something that people say when it feels good, yes, we honor what we're doing, and so what's the situation? the situation is that iran is at war with us. iran is part of an international alliance which is trying to destroy the united states at a minimum drive it out of the middle east, but basically kill us, destroy us. and that goes on worldwide, and that alliance runs from north korea to korokus. it's a big deal. that's what we have to worry about. that's the war that's being waged against it, and that's the war that we're going to have to win. >> that war also sounds

expensive, and sanctions could actually limit a lot of the activity that iran is behind in order to further destabilize iraq, syria, lebanon, beirut and also the things they're trying to do in bahrain. when you talked about the mossad not know about the nuclear reactor in iran. they said they're 100% iran is working toward a bomb. in this case, 100% iran has the goals in sight, and with you, mikella, with the ballistic missile program and what they've been able to develop and what they've been able to calibrate and make better since the jcpoa, do you see walking away from the jcpoa, eliminating any of that? >> no, not really.

i think it's very interesting that you can use the ballistic missile program and one of the litmus tests of the iranian intentions because you would not be spending so much political technology and money capital on a ballistic missile program if you were not thinking about putting payload on the top of that missile. so the fact that we were told that somehow jcpoa will make dealing with the ballistic missile program easier and needs to be done separately as opposed to comprehensively in the context of the deal, we are now seeing that that has not come into fruition. there is nothing easy about negotiating the iranian ballistic missile program partly because the deal does not change underlying intentions why iran would want to have a nuclear weapon.

and so the -- having means to deliver that weapon, it is just a critical component in the iranian strategy, aside from iran utilizing ballistic missiles in regional contingencies as first outlined. the administration is well aware of the importance of the ballistic missile program. and it was one of the conditions that the president wanted to see or one of the flaws that he wanted to see fixed in the context of congressional law. in the context of european negotiations with iran, and there was some discussion as to how broad the scope of the fix should be. should it be just long-range missiles? should it be shorter range missiles that can target the u.s. troops and u.s. allies in the region? one of the aspects that also is not quite emphasized is the

iranian north korean corporation on both nuclear and ballistic missile programs. so today if you say missile defense, the next thought is north korea. and we need to defend ourselves from north korean ballistic missile capability and by the way, north korea can now reach almost entirety of the united states including washington d.c., potentially all the way down to miami to florida. well, north korea and iran have close cooperation on these types of programs. so if we are worried about north korea but not about iran, we are missing a big piece, and we are opening ourselves to sort of vulnerability in our thinking about protecting the homeland and u.s. allies, and how to go about fixing these things. >> right. everything each panelist has talked about so far has taken place under the jcpoa.

iran's ability to deploy forces to syria, to set up the missile factories and develop precision guided missiles and rockets focussed on israel. again, the first launch being the dummy rockets to deplete the iron dome and have the precision missiles come in. again, all of this has taken place under the jcpoa. the protests are ongoing. they're not asking for government reforms. they're asking for regime change. they're asking for regime change, and they're wondering where the $150 billion or the $100 million went, and as mikell, said, it's toward missile develop. . and the land bridge. and, again, to reemphasize, an egg in tehran costs $0.50. that's a $5 egg here. that's paying $60 for a dozen eggs in the united states which none of us would do. so even under the jcpoa with

sanctions relief, iran is squandering their assets on this adventurism and the protests highlight that. and what happens the day we walk away from the iran deal and we impose sanctions back on the central bank of iran? how does that impact everything that we talked about from -- i'll leave that to you. how does that impact everything we talked about. the adventurism, ballistic missile technology? >> it's a potential game changer. truly. when we look at right before the jcpoa, one of the tragedies of the nuclear deal was the increasing amount of leverage the united states had over iran and it was increasing rapidly. the iranians wanted to talk. they wanted a deal. they wanted sanctions relief fast. the combination of the central

bank sanctions which include the oil reductions along with going after insurance and reinsurance and the tankers of iran down th exchange reserves overseas, they were having a balance of payment crisis, and all their banks had been disconnected including the central bank in the swift disconnection in europe, those two together got their attention very fast, very fast, and combined with the existence of a credible military threat, especially at the time from israel, they were looking for a way out to stabilize and to continue their program under legitimate international means. and that's what they got. rather than keeping the pressure on and dealing with all of these issues at once, like mikayla is talking about, we gave away the pressure way too soon, came to the table already having given up the toughest sanctions.

and, you know, veto threats from the president against prospective sanctions to try to give them some sort of edge at the table, the iranians are frayed of those sanctio afraid of those sanctions and regime. and if we see what's going on right now the plummet from record lows from october. right now going on, there is something going on inside that regime, that country that is not clear to us in the west. but if you look at all the signals, this would be the most fragile time to bring back the central bank sanctions, to completely destabilize the life blood of the regime financially. and after that you've completely flipped the leverage that we have lost that have led to all these other things we are talking about. >> thanks.

accelerator for regime change, what you just talked about, talks about pressure on the regime, you even have iranian protesters now saying the jcpoa was a bad deal because of the way the regime actually squandered the money, squandered the opportunity, lost goodwill with the united states, day one lost good will with the united states. but what i want to ask michael are the steps the president take on may 12, maybe before that, again macron is coming hoor ere the 24th, they are meeting mid-april, not likely to meet the president's goals. macron is the last best chance to save the nuclear deal if he's able to convince the europeans to do this. if we walk away on may 12 and put sanctions in place like richard talked about, are those accelerate ors for regime

change? or what would be in your opinion? >> i don't believe that desire for regime change is necessarily linked to economic mel lays. i don't believe revolution, just what we are talking about in iran, i don't think revolution is one last desperate throw of the dice before everything fails and the society goes under. i think that revolution is an act of hope. i think that people who carry out revolutions think they can change the world for the better. that's why revolutions are typically the actions of young people, not older people. older people know it's hopeless and more of the same and so on. and so i don't think that's the linkage. and i say to my colleagues, especially the younger ones, you

don't need sanctions to bring down iran. iran will bring down itself. they'll wreck it all by themselves. they are quite capable. look what they do with the money, whatever money they get, whether it's sanctioned, not sanctioned, so on. they steal it. i mean most of that stuff, yes, a lot of it goes to the forces. but a lot goes into bank accounts wherever, the far east, increasingly, some of it still in switzerland, i'm told, and so on, it goes into their own pockets. they are stealing it. and that's what the people hate. the people hate not just that they don't get anything to eat, but they hate that not only are they not eating, but they are eating fillet, the very best,

living lives of luxury, so on. and they want to change that world. when we brought down the soviet empire, which is the real apt comparison, it wasn't so much sanctions, yes, we had sanctions on the soviet union, but they wrecked it all by themselves. totalitarian fails. they say tyranny is wonderful in the face of all of human history. so acts that increase the chances of regime change support the iranian people, support the dissidence, call for the release of political prisoners. talk to them.

so far as i know, and iran is very hard country to know, easy to be wrong. so as far as i know, we in the west have not talked to the leaders of the iranian domestic opposition movement since 2003. we haven't talked to them. i mean, there was this uprising, there was then a communication, which nobody ever talks about, where they communicated with obama and tried to answer his questions about what was going on in iran. and then when the clamp down started, contacts stopped, and i don't believe there has been contacts ever since. that's a fundamental mistake. we have to talk to them. and we have to talk to them both directly. people have to go there or meet with them elsewhere and find out

what they want. and, also, we have to talk to them by radio and television. and i have to say that the most startling thing to me about the trump administration and iran is that they have not completely redone voa, rfa, rl, so forth, it's the same people, it's the same programming, not very effective, and they need better people in there. it was really important with the soviet union. worked very well. would work very well in iran. but it's not happening. they are not doing things. and i have my doubts, frankly, whether the trump people really have in mind an effective plan. i don't think that making it the lives of the iranian people more miserable will do it. i don't think that's good enough. no where near good enough.

because i don't think they get what revolution is, how it happens, what our role is. we are the one revolutionary society in the world. that's why people come here. so we have to lead that revolution by doing it. i haven't heard all along from the national security counsel, from the state department, from the defense department, from the white house, i haven't heard it. what i have seen so far, and this is one of the few things in which we disagree, mike, the people in favor of revolution in iran have all been fired from all three of those places. and the people who have been hired by the trump administration are by and large people not in favor of that kind of policy. and i'm curious to see whether

bolton and pompeo have different ideas. but i haven't seen them yet. >> all right. so you had a comment. >> yes, i was going to say unfortunately revolution doesn't have a great track record in the middle east. and especially someone who has been following the revolution so quickly. you also have to remember there are always spoilers when it comes to these revolutions. and in 2012, quick antidote here, it's in directly related to the nuclear deal. when the commander of the kuds force in 2012 made the decision, sorry, came to the conclusion that the fall of bazar as sad is going to be imminent in the irc do not increase their support to that regime. now, remember, this is at a time

when iran was still economically was hurting, it was still suffering from the sanctions. they did not have the spare cash and personnel to all of a sudden just make that decision and surge their forces to what even their own accounts this could more than likely be a losing battle. but compare that mindset, right, to the western mindset, they believed that his ally was about to fall. but he didn't cut the rope. he doubled down and he tripled down at a time when it seemed all but impossible that ba share assad would somehow survive the revolution. but he made it happen. and he was able to bring supplies, material, the fighters in record time into syria to shore up the assad regime and he is still there today. so when we look at the potential

scenarios of the day after, a situation where either sanctions are reimposed on iran where the puck lar deal is significantly reforpd, recalibrated or potentially negated, always remember that when he viewed desperate situation, his in tint w insti instint was to double down. but i think it's very telling what the reaction would be if the iranian regime believes that the united states is bent on regime change and bringing down the regime by reimposing crippling sanctions and essentially neutralizing the nuclear deal with iran. >> michael, you wanted to follow up on something. >> yeah, two things. revolutions is not only a failure in the middle east.

it's a failure everywhere. i'm a professional historian. human history is history of failure. that's why we are more inclined to do evil than good. so generally revolutions fail. all right. we don't have to credit the middle east for this. and, secondly, on your last point, quite right, but you left out the hero of the story. when salman ee was desperate, what did he do, he went to putin. and putin saved him. putin never gets credit for the great things he does, like saving assad and so forth. but putin is the man in charge of that situation and he's the one who bailed out the iranians. and that's why when row hani goes to talk to putin he gets humiliated. he gets five minutes and that's it. >> so does assad by the way.

>> right. >> let's remember the time line when he went to see putin it was after the jcoa put in place and after the $150 billion was released when iran could secure military contracts from russia, when russia could secure oil rights in iran along with china. i wanted to go back to what you said about north korea and iran working together. because the iran deal here, if the president walks away, a lot of the critics of the president and supporters say that will weaken that with north korea. i don't believe that. i believe the kim jong-un wants something heavily with incentives, allows him to keep his nuclear program. what's your take? how does this hurt north korea if we walk away? >> i mean, considering that the jcpoa did not really have any kind of provisions with teeth that would prevent iran from

expanding nuclear programs and potentially working towards nuclear weapons technology, you know, north korea would have loved a deal like that. and it got it. and, by the way, it was negotiated by very similar people who negotiated the iran deal. so no wonder that north korea is where it is today. in a way, that's a glimpse into iran's future regardless whether you have a deal or not. because, again, the deal does not fundamentally change iran's intentions. iran's desire for why it wants to have nuclear weapon capability. >> right. kim jong-un's father got an iran deal under clinton, that's why north korea is where it is today. talking about the protests, so these protests are built for western support. you have female protesters in iran, with regards to the ha

jad. these protesters are leader less. they are built for western support yet you don't hear that support here in our media or politicians. and i credit it to obama being able to wrap himself around the iran deal to make it to where if you criticize the iran deep, you were somehow criticizing obama. if you criticize the regime, you were somehow criticizing with iran. and again these protests are built for western support. rich i want to ask you, what kind of package would you put together the day we walk away from this that would impact iran's propaganda machine? regimes propaganda machine, that would highlight the supreme leaders fortune that at the uses to skirt sanctions now? the people are looking for things like that. what kind of package would you put together? >> that's a great question. and it ties into response i wanted to have to michael anyway. i think he had a great

comparison and analogy that we should look at. and that is it what u.s. policy the evolution of u.s. policy towards the soviet union all the way to the eventual demise of the soviet union. a lot of comparisons. a lot of people have done a lot of writing on that. three key elements of the reagan administration in their strategy to bring down the soviet union to see a change come about in end communism. number one was political warfare, ideological warfare. number two was economy warfare. and number three is strong military returns. you have to have all three of them. you can't rely on one. with respect to iran, the jcpoa itself, if you think about it, again with analogy to the cold war, we went through three different ideas of how to relate to the soviet union. one was detant, one was containment and reagan administration was victory.

jcpoa is detant. that's really what it is. and the same criticisms of what we saw under da tant soviet union is what we see playing out with iran under jcpoa. and at it's cori think you are right, the reason why there is this hesitancy, especially in europe, to impose even nonnuclear sanctions, which are allowed under the deal, we haven't seen europe do that on human rights or anything like that, it's because the crux of the deal was about to legitimacy about the regime. it's about the leg mayization and normalization of doing business and talking to and being friends with the islamic republic and thinking that's possible and somehow it will normalize the regime and bring it into the world. it hasn't happened and it's not going to happen. so you are right in addition to economic war far strategy that starts with the central bank, and by the way, the idea of economic warfare is not to punish the iranian people, that is not the goal of our

sanctions. it has never been. humanitarian exceptions have always been made to sanctions for food and med citizen and cul toural products. the goal is to target the regime and life blood. and with the central bank, this is the same central bank that's funding all the regime active knees in syria and yemen, missile program, irgc, funding the oppression of the iranian people. and when the iranian people go into the streets and say stop it with syria and yemen, focus on me, focus on iran, it's the central bank that's doing that. and so there is a total correspondence between our actions and economic warfare and sanctions and supporting the demonstrators and protesters and what they are saying. but in order to really wage ideological warfare and political warfare, you do need to couple a direct targeting of the regime and its core up shun, where they are hide gs saetd sz.

one of the easy sanctions designations that plays into them, two of them i'll give you, one is the supreme leaders business empire, which was delisted of sanctions under the nuclear deal, eiko, that is outrageous. after seeing what the repression has looked like in iran, the worst human rights with protesters in the streets, the fact we have not reassessed sanctions on supreme leaders assets is crazy, that should be redesignated today. and number two we have the islamic broadcasting satellite provider that is basically the hub, the government hub of their propaganda machine. irib and some of the subsidiaries, press tv, others, what they do they is record, force confessions under pressure and put them on tv for

propaganda purposes. yes, i've committed crimes against the regime, they do it outside of iran and international broadcasting as well. and we allow it to happen because as some sort of side deal with the iranians and nuclear deal we waived sanctions on irks rib. those sanctions should come back. that will be a huge sign of sol dairy with the people. and as much as oil is the life blood of the iranian economy, irib is the life blood of the iranian propaganda. those should come back. >> do you see them coming back? >> so far they have that, but we shouldn't on may 12 reimpose sanctions in a way where this is about just tearing up the nuclear deal. there is a way to do this combined with political warfare, ideological warfare that says this is about standing with the iranian people and against the

islamic republic. >> right. did you want to say something? >> yes, really quick point on that. one of the arguments first brought out by obama administration and frankly still being made under some in this current administration is that we are -- that united states and its assets and military assets in iraq and syria and a rabian gulf would be extremely vulnerable if they felt their back was to the wall and no other recourse to lash out in massive way, using its proxies, not necessarily directly against military assets, bases and personnel. and that's still very much a worry for this administration. i mean, we have marines that are surrounded by iranian backed militia. in syria we forget just last year president trump for the first time ordered air strikes

against iranian backed militias in eastern syria. >> militias. >> yes, it exactly. them and others. that included advisers on the ground. that happened on spree separate occasions after the air strikes in april last year against the assad regime due to continued use of chemical attacks against the syrian people. which by the way are enabled by iran and iranian scientists and know who via north korea. but there is no easy solution to this. >> wouldn't iran lose european support if it started lashing out? don't they have to couch that in their response the day after? we looked at worst case and best case scenarios with the memo that rich drafted that went to them. worst case ballistic missile escalation to reactions in iraq

and syria. but i would think that tehran would hold back on showing europe what we already see. again, tell me if i'm wrong here, i think the jcpoa, in this case u.s. assumes all the risks, along with allies, while they reap the benefits of the new deal. so that is i think that would anchor tehran and reactions. but having said that, what would you see salmon ee doing the day after in baghdad? >> that's the million dollar question. thus far he hasn't done anything. >> he hasn't. >> despite the air strikes and pressure, thus far. >> right. and again the iraqi elections are may 12th same day we are supposed to walk away with the iran deal. and i think it's the day we get leverage with baghdad. again you want to pit yourself with $400 million economy where

egg costs 50 cents or go with economy allies and bulwark against iran? >> but it's a big risk. >> for who? >> well, if you think about it, i mean there are some, you know, what's the u.s. willing to absorb? right. now the iranians through asymmetric warfare say they wipe out a training post in the syria. now the u.s. reaction is more than likely disproportionate. but big game of blink man ship on the battlefield. >> none of these problems can be addressed the way we want them addressed, as long as that regime is in power in tehran. even "the washington post" some years ago said you want to deal with the iranian nuclear program, regime change in tehran. it's the only way.

>> it is. >> how do we get there? >> well, we know how to do it. we did it -- >> i'm sitting here 56 minutes and still trying to figure it out. >> just replay what you did with the soviet union. >> right. >> if we can defeat the soviet union empire. i mean, tiny fraction of that with the soviet method start of the domestic population willing to side with us was maybe 5 or 10%. oz were against us. >> right. >> in iran we got maybe 80% of the population or maybe more willing to side with us and take to the streets. but we have to lead it. >> right. >> i would just note, because it's very timely, and in the news, one thing we should not do, if we actually have an intention to try to roll back the regime in the region, is prematurely withdraw u.s. forces

from syria. our presence there, our leverage that gives us is critical. and it would be tremendously catastrophic iran roll back strategy to bring people home from syria very quickly and see that territory to iran, to russia, to hezbollah, that would be catastrophic regardless what the president does on may 12. >> right. how do you see sanctions impacting iran's ballistic missile program? do you see them accelerating it? do you see them being provocative with what they would do the day after or curtailing it? >> no, we've already imposed sanctions in iran in january. so i think there continues to be room to cherry pick and target iranian ballistic missile program entities that provide materials for ballistic missile would work. i also think there is further

room to foster our missile defense cooperation with missile, our missile defense with other countries in the persian gulf. but we do have options. we've been working on these options. and i don't see the iran deal kind of fundamentally altering the dynamics, perhaps regardless, whether it stays or it doesn't. what the iran did for iran's ballistic missile program is it gave opponents of missile defense an argument that now that we have this agreement, iran is no longer a threat. >> right. >> so we don't have to worry about missile defense. we don't have to twworry about e iran ballistic missile. and that's false. because they have been continuing the program and ballistic missile proliferation

and used ballistic missile as instruments of state power and they will continue to do so. so, you know, it would be -- it would be good if the jcpoa isn't excuse or evidence of iran's good intentions went away. but if you've been watching iranian activities and you don't realize that iran is a hostile power to the united states, that's such a self dell lugs it doesn't matter if there is or not. >> and i want to jump in. there is it a key point we heard today that chancellor merkel coming later in the month after macron is here all out last dish effort to get the president flot to reimpose sanctions. one of the key elements that the president outlined on january

12th is regarding missiles. as you mentioned earlier there is this question what kind of missiles are we talking about and what is the penalty for iran continuing the development of those missiles. the conversations that the europeans want to have is only on futuristic intercontinental ballistic missile which we know iran is working towards, its in their future, it's not here today. but they would not even want to talk about all the other nuclear capable ballistic missile that are already there and ready and continuing to be developed and advanced, precision payload, things that can wipe out u.s. bases saudi arabia and certainly wipe out israel. and the question that you'd have to ask the european leaders, if i was the president, is why is it that you are willing to tia snap back of all of our sanctions to fuseist rick test

of a ballistic missile. but you chancellor merkel germany is doing the same to create the second hol ho cauoca. that's outrageous. all of iran's ballistic missile and cruise missiles should be covered by snap back of sanctions if you are truly going to fix the nung lar agreement. if you are unwilling to do that, then i would stay in berlin and not bother coming to washington. >> that's a good point. so i want to ask this question to both of you. so you talked about the current fight in iraq and syria what iran is doing with land bridge, with the geo crescent, and talked about the upcoming fight, and that talks about israel, what iran wants to deal with israel. and what i'd like to ask both of you is, a lot of us believe it's an upcoming war between israel and iran, and iran is going to demonstrate capability to actually punish israel. and to your point they have

learned from north korea. the north korean response to anything we do militarily has been to punish south korea. so they have a deterrent in place. and if you have a deterrent in place that con strans u.s. actions you get what we have now, a nuclear north korea. iran has learned this. and i'd like for you to talk about iran's deterrent with hezbollah with their rockets and missiles and what they've been able to do, if you can. because i think iran has learned a valuable lesson from north korea, if you have a deterrent, if u.s. military decision makers are saying what will iran do in response to uss attack or israel attack on nuclear facility, and the answer is they will decimate israel with rockets and missiles from hezbollah fixed sites. so i'd like for both of you to talk about where iran is now with their proxy, where they are now with ballistic missile capability, and again to rich's

point why is europe okay with allowing rockets that can range israel, 2,000 kilometer threshold, right, as long as the rocket doesn't go beyond 2,000 kilometers, and you can range israel, and saudi arabia and european countries with that. so i know it's a long question, but basically where is iran now in its deterrent? and where do you think it will be if jcpoa stays in place, and if it goes away how that impablgimpacts it? >> so in the case of north korea, north koreans see nuclear weapon as sort of ultimate guarantee of the regime survival. i'm sure that's one of the intentions and one of the desires of the iranian leadership to have that same sort of guarantee. because what we have done with u.s. policy, and this goes back to libya, is we have sent a

message which effectively says if you give up your nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program, eventually we are free to come and get you. but if you have nuclear deterrent, our options are much more constrained. now, the other component of that is, you know, my mentor, keith paine, one of the for most thinkers on nuclear deterrence, he would always say big ideas are too big to hide. and what that means in the case of iran is we know what their big idea is. they want to destroy israel, they want to destroy the united states. big ideas are too big to hide. and, you know, he always gave an example of hitler in which he very systematically outlined what his plan was. and he would look at it in 1922, and say this guy is crazy, he can't possibly mean that.

yet he managed to enact that plan into action. so, you know, iran having a nuclear weapon would be very dangerous situation for the united states, obviously for the region, but not only because of the deterrence aspect, but also because countries have different definitions of rationality, because they have different motivations, and they have different goals. and that's something that we kind of lose focus on. >> that last point is very important. iranian regime may also be convinced that the united states and israel are bent on the destruction of not irans country but iranian regime. they equate the two. survival of the regime and

islamic republic 1979 revolution means for him continued existence of iran as the state. so he equates the two. now, this is regardless, to be completely bipartisan here, this perception maybe regardless whaf actions the united states takes, now, president obama in 2014, at least according to reports, this was first revealed by "the washington post" "wall street journal" sent a letter that u.s. was going to begin air strikes in syria but only against them and not going to threats in his proxies in syria. not going to threats in assad regime. this is per tt reports of what the letter that president obama sent to him. >> so full print of advisers. >> now the question is did this

convince him that the united states had only limited objectives in the region and were not directly threatening iranian's resistance to the regime itself? i'm doubtly. it may have enhanced his paranoia of u.s. intentions. so my point here is regardless who is in office, both the iranian regime, and by the way this goes for the russians, believe a continuum in american policy. whether or not you have a republican or democrat, whether it was president obama or president trump, interestingly enough. so that's sort of through the looking glass of what terrain perceives american intentions to be. so we may be stuck in a vicious cycle here, right, of brinkmanship based on misspear

exceptio -- misperceptions on the other side. again, this did regardless of whether bush or obama or prutru they are building on proxies on the ground, through missile production facilities, and syria possibly in the back up valley and lebanon. so it's not farfetched that iranians would be similarly invested in build ago covert nuclear production facility that we are not aware of. or may not even be -- may be a contingency plan that hasn't been operational yet by the iranians. going back real quick on a relevant world war ii analogy here is that if the middle east today is a series of

geopolitical brinkmanship and bluffs, now remember when hitler was first coming to power, when he moved it into the then demilitary arized ryhine valley they overlooked it, still back in the mid 1930s, still very weak. but there is this general psychological dislocation by the allies because they believed that the german air force would react, would be able to fire bomb paris, and london, again at a time when the german air force did not have the capability then. so europe was partly lost for six years because hitler was able to bluff his way gradually to expanding his territory at a time when he militarily would

have lost any conflict at that time if the allies had decided to react early enough. so this goes back to my earlier point that while the nuclear deal may have averted the conflict at the time, it may very well be set egg the stage for much wider conflict flt region at a time when the iranians have 20,000 battle hardened proxies in syria, well equipped, who are very well motivated, who have, you know, scored many battlefield victories, right, so this is a very dangerous and combustible situation, both for u.s. forces in syria and iraq, and for their ally zbls i do want to give a little bit of a counter point. i think that's right on some of the possibilities. but two important things to think about, as far as may 13th, not in october or in a year, but may 13th. number one, historically the iranians do not want to face off against the u.s. directly in a

military conflict. that is not in their interests. they have shied away from that. there have been incidents from reporting on the ground within iran, i'm sorry within syria, where the mere threat of such a direct escalation has changed iranian behavior. so that is why reliance on proxies on asymmetric threats is what iranians like to do more. secondly, there is a tension here in day after strategy of the iranians that people need to kind of think about and understand in how that plays out. on the one hand, there are a lot of different things that the iranians could do to raise the costs and try to deter the u.s. from continuing down a path of reimposing sanctions and really trying to role them back in the region. but at the same time, they want to play a victim card. right. they want to say, oh, we have been wronged here.

we were in this great nuclear deal and uss walked away, and ilts so wrong and they are violating the deal. europe, you should be with us, let's still stay in the deal together and try to get around u.s. sanctions. so we are still good actors here, you can trust us, we want your money, we want your investments. so there is a tension there. so we see it already playing out in the threats premay 12th from the iranians. on the one hand talking about how they are going to stand with europe and stay in the deal and we are going to get around u.s. sanctions and trying to encourage you did you mates to say the same thing, which they are. at the same time, you have this nuclear blackmail threats that we see of you leave the deal, we are racing to the bomb. well, which one is it? and by the way i thought there was a thought against building a bomb, how are you threatening it? >> it's a new replacement. >> just one thing.

over and over and over again, the war is on. we are in the war now. so all these people who keep on saying, well, if we sign or if we don't resign or if we renew or we don't renew, and so on, then war. that's all crazy. because the war -- we are in the war. war is happening today. >> right. >> and has been all along. they have killed an awful lot of americans. and, by the way, so far as i know they are still pay tg big rewards for kidnapping americans. >> yes. >> iranians i'm talking about. >> yes. everything they are doing requires money. the sanctions in washington limit a lot of that. but support of the jcpoa we see warnings as well. brian ross "new york times" in the if we walk away from iran deal, iran will use proxies to

destabilize them. they are doing that. if iran walks away, they will move towards ha ba. they are already doing that. they can either get one in ten years or if they cheat get one in six months. so one of the other things is, you know, under the jcpoa, and i'd like to ask you about this, rich, europe has been hesitant to invest in iran. why would it change when we walked away? why all of a sudden would they feel it's okay to do it? with threat of secondary sanctions what the u.s. could do. what would change if we walked away? >> so i think if you look at the recent history, there was an up tick in investment going on in iran from europe led by germany. they are by far and away the number one going both ways from iran and to iran. you have the italians. you have the french. you have the spanish and the dutch sort of leading the way in europe, whether it's increasing imports of iranian oil or trying

to export into the iranian market. that sort of hit the sort of pause button in october when the president decertified the deal and started making his threats of maybe i'm going to get out of this deal, worst deal ever, i'm not going to have the sanctions anymore. th that -- going to wave the sanctiothe -- waive the sanctions anymore. that has led to the currency collapse that has led to a lot of the destab lags we saw in the last few months. but in the business communities those european countries they want the assurance to go forward, they want to sign contracts, they want to go in. if there is some sort of mechanism allowed after may 12th, ap report this week that one of the possibilities being considered is to not waive the sanctions, bring back the

central bank sanctions, but then create exceptions for europe. well, that's worse than the status quo. because that would give a go sign to europe, at least until such time as the iranians decided they no longer want this deal. and you would see economic stability, stabilization of the regime, and president would enriching iran instead of doing the opposite. whereas if there is a true reimplementation of the sanctions regime, despite the european threats of blocking and trying to evade, the way that our sanctions work today as opposed to how they did in 1996, is such where if you are a private corporation, if are you a financial institution, and you are being told that you face possible cutoff from the u.s. financial system entirely, not just some fines, i mean you can't have a business relationship with a u.s. bank, nobody can go to their atm and

get their money from your bank account when you are here, you can't do transactions, you are going to be siding against trying to violate u.s. sanctions no matter what sort of blocking regulations and diplomate tells you is on the books. just not going to happen. now, over the long term do they look for ways to try to evade? maybe. but the high likelihood is that at some point the iranians are going to do something that reminds the europeans these are bad people. and it's not worth it to look for and use all of our capital to try to evade sanctions. by the way the council is not going to be unified on this. just because paris and berlin and rome want to get into iran doesn't mean that the eastern europe even block feels the same way in that they are the ones primarily targeted by the increasing range of iranian missiles. so it's not such an easy picture for europeans despite their bluster. >> i want to talk a little bit

about the syrian scientific center because telling case for the hybrid military and unconventional weapons program in iran. syrian the ssrc was the center that was in charge of the nuclear not weapon but plants that was bombed, that was about six months away from becoming operational we discussed earlier that was subsequently struck by the israel air force. now this is also in charge of ballistic missile production research and design in conjunction with the north koreans and with the iranian revolutionary guard. so when we talk about the instances when the israel air force has hit ssrc facilities, these facilities are sprawling complexes that don't just include ballistic missile storage, research, and production, but could also potentially include wmd, usually

chemical weapon production and storage. so it's a very telling case for iran at a time when the iranian revolutionary guards are refusing to give access to search sites which are considered conventional military use and exempt from international inspection. no such thing. the ssrc is modeled based on the iranian model. in fact, iranians and north koreas helped build the ssrc. and the reason why these facilities are continuously struck by the israel air force is because hezbollah also has a role here to play. so when we think of what's necessarily a military, a purely ballistic missile or military conventional military site and what's connected to nuclear program, the way that the iranian assen syrians and north

koreans, that makes verification in the long-term very problematic. >> right. what i'd like to do now, we started a little late, so we are going to extend seven minutes for more questions of the i'd like to open it up to the audience. but then i'd like to have each panelist take about two minutes to close after those series of questions. sound good? all right. great. let's see here. all right. here are the rules. i'd ask you to identify yourself, wait for one of our presenters with the microphone to come up, and then ask a question. try to keep it to questions as less so statements. all right. thank you. >> thank you. my name is ruth bloom. i'm a writer and living in israel. in the last three weeks, the saudi crown prince called him worse than hitler then opened up the air space for direct

commercial flights between tel aviv and india that has to go over saudi air space. and john bolton was appointed. does this indicate to any of you that there may be a covert military operation underway? >> well, i would say this, i would say that, you know, it was -- the man tear from that administration that or war. i'll say something to panelists. based on michael point iran deal and war. we are already fighting iran with proxies. setting back iran nuclear decade is 8 hour air campaign by the united states and israel. the problem is russians are now putting in s 400s in syria. iraq is now looking to buy s 400. that's not for iraq. that's to defend iranian air

space. and iranians are looking to get s 300s. but again those in place in hezbollah those would have to be part of any campaign as well. if the iranians are smart, tan they are, they are looking at everything you just mentioned as indicator what's to come, at least intelligence officers are advising their generals that these are the things that are taking place now. decision makesers are being put in place, air space cleared, and starting to see a russian response with allocation of s 400s to syria, turkey forma matter and also iraq. and i would leave it at that. as intelligence officer i would brief those things that you mentioned. whether we do it or not, as loening as they think it's a capability going back to richards point, where you have to have the top deposit matic engagement, also a serious military threat on the table. >> and i'll just say i think what you are seeing is that accidentally several years later

president obama has earned his know mel peace prize and he did so by signing one of the worst deals in history. what i mean by that, by going ahead and entering the jcpoa and seeding the middle east to iran and all the things we've talked about that are happening, the reason why we think on may 12 the president may reimpose sanctions, the moderate zusunnyn the mid dle east we have more i common than the region, and what divides us is far less than what brings us. the issue of the pal es citizenians. and in order to have a new

architecture that encircles iran, and also at the same time takes on sunni extremism which is something that the crown prince has pledged to do and is doing, that is something that could lead to a very new dynamic in the middle east. one hang up is this thing called islamic republic and they are sunni extremists. and in order to have the new world order in the middle east where there is ar ash peace and normalization of ties between pt saudi arabia and urks ae and bahrain and israel, there has to be continued dialogue, has to be continued work on that. they are moving in the right direction, but i think that jerusalem and riyadh see the world similarly right now with the threats they face. and the crown prince has taken a lot of bold steps and that should be encouraged. >> the problem here is that while iran and she shah allies

are aligned, they are still bickering amongst each other. very much divided. iranian are bleeding out saudi and ally ns yemen, by being able to use the proxies, iranians are out flanging the sunni states. and at the same time they are divided among the arabian gulf between the crisis between qatar and saudi access, and between the sunni arab states and turkey. so within this division iran is able to successfully unify its forces and play off the in fighting amongst the counter balance. when ayatollah gives an order, it doesn't matter if they are afghan, on the battlefield they

follow the orders as though it was a direct order from the lord itself. in the case of sunni whole different story. so i think now when it comes to leaning more on the sunni states to counter balance iran, rather than depending on a perpetual forever american military preference in iraq and syria, yes, i think that is the right way to go, and i commend personally as an analyst the trump administration to place more pressure on the sunni states to do so. but let's be real here, there are a long, long ways away from the type of unity of action and interaction iranians have been able to establish over the past three decades from iraq to syrian gulf and iraq and lebanon. >> i sure hope we have covert operations going ton has we speak. and i sure hope that they will be successful in what their objectives are. >> yes, keep in mind that self

proclaimed smart people in both israel and western capitals always will tell you, if you only knew what was really going on, then. and they are doing it today. >> right. and everything that we just talked about is happening under the protections of the jcpoa. so i want to take a series of three questions here. this lady here. then i'll get to you. >> thank you. this is fame member of islamic council and iranian council. my question is my mind was bob link listeni goggling listening to them. but this was the most comprehensive nuclear deal united states had made in historiment and for the iranian people this was a goodwill

gesture and hoping economic pros expert for iran. and think that united states is not complying with that is probably why 57% of the iranians went to the pollen elected mr. row handy instead of operating for regime change. my question to you is if the u.s. is not going to honor this deal, which was a goodwill gesture from the united states, initial step for iran and the united states to develop a relationship, why would they even bother to ask you guys for help for regime change? all they had to do is look at the neighbors countries and see that every country that the united states had tried to change the leadership, it's like asking me, a doctor, asking all the patient died in the hospital, could you please operate on me? i mean, why would they want united states to aide them for any sort of a help in the regime

change? thank you. >> that's one. and we'll take the gentleman here. >> wait for that, please. >> dr. ledeen, my name is it louis i'm currently unaffiliated. you said that iran is at war with us. obviously, iran lacks the capability to occupy the north american land mass. what would victory look like for them? >> okay. >> and then this lady here. so that's attack on the u.s. question. >> hello everyone i'm a student currently here in east coast. i just have a question for richard and open for all the panelists. how would you impose or reimpose sanctions on the regime but not impose that on the people since especially considering their reaction after the jcpoa went into effect in 2015, and we were rejoicing in the streets and all

that. >> so how would you impose that on the regime and flot the people? >> and the gentleman snt hat. >> yes, simple question. nobody mentioned this united nations in the discussion. but the ballistic missile testing that's been going on in iran, doesn't that violate some kind of an agreement with the u.n.? and has the u.n. ever done anything? i don't expect it to. but has it ever done anything? has it taken any action? or is it just totally silent in letting iran test ballistic missile missiles along with the ally north korea? >> all right. so we have four questions. one from nyack, why are we betraying iran by thinking about talking away from the jcpoa. the other also for ledeen was what kind of threat is actually on the united states for

sanctions. and last question, we'll go with you michael the first two. >> well, i mean, the question over here from this woman is not a question, but a wasted your t coming here today to voice the lines of your friends. we are not the ones -- the reason why the -- >> i will send an e-mail later. >> the reason why the iranian people look to us for help and guidance and carrying out a revolution against the regime is because they hate the regime. it's not -- now you've spoken. so please sit there quietly for a moment. >> that never works. so we'll go to the next question. the question, what does victory look look? the united states wl drawing from the world arena and

becoming an isolationist country and stop speaking out -- and stop challenging whenever they set foot and the so forth. that's what it looks like and eventually, physical domination of the north american land mass. right? just what it has always been. what victory always looks like and one final line. peace which we all desire. peace is not the opposite of war. peace is the result of war. and peace happens when war is fought and one side beats the other and the winning side imposes terms on the loser and those terms are called peace and hammered out at a peace

conference and sometimes take the form of a peace treaty. so the language tricks us into thinking that it is something more. >> and again, i think rich talked about the sanctions package about the it being that. >> i will take two questions at once. i have been honored to work and support democracy efforts and relative humidity -- human rights for a decade. i have worked with political pl prisoners and -- for many years. you and i don't speak on their behalf. i have heard their voice and they ask for our support. i will never forget a time in

the congressional office working in preparation for the appropriations bill which we appropriate money for programs in support of the iranian people and this was almost 10 years ago and nyack came in my office and saying you have to zero out the program in foreign ops because it is bad to provide funding, you are going to hurt the people. just go from 40 million down to zero. and all i could think about was having studied the soviet movement, how many people said don't help the human rights community because the regime will take it out on them and they will suffer for it. if he thought that was the right

thing to do, i ask you to do that, he will tell you absolutely not. in respect to the sanctions policy. the iranian people are our greatest asset. we don't target them. we have no quarrel with them. based on the youth of the iranian people and the connections to the west, this is a society that should be and wants to be friendly to the united states but for their leaders. so our policy when it targets the central bank of iran and government banks. when it targets the supreme leaders empire, this is about the life blood that keeps the islamic republic in business of the people. this is the bank that is paying the people coming out in the streets to shoot you. if we are going to go after the supreme leader's assets, we are

doing that because they are stealing from your pocketbooks. this is about the corruption and repression and all of the activities coming from that. we talk about missiles and terrorism, we talk about regional expansion, a nuclear program. these are symptoms of a disease and it is called repression and the islamic republic. >> great. we had -- we had the jcpoa under the trump administration and i had him on the stage and there was a lot of protest about having him there. i'm a football fan so he accused me of being pro-isis because i was anti-irgc. i can be br can uconn democr--

democrat the regime? by mohammed and his predecessor, the person that took his place and not be able to condemn that. >> go ahead. >> when we speak of normalization and good will, we have to look at -- >> we have two minutes. >> especially in syria as a result of the deal and the process of negotiating the deal. one of those consequences is the legit myization of the plausible deniable use of advanced chemical weapons. remember, since the deal was signed between president obama and president putin to allow bashar al-assad to get away with the weapons in 2013 against his

own people. those weapons are used again time and time again. and the assad regime has applausable story every time. imagine the worst case scenario here. let's look at a scenario where he is baa la using a rocket to launch a chemical weapon strike into hyfa and they blame it on dash. and they have a deniebl story and have a confession video of dash. they will set it all up. this is extremely dangerous and unforeseen by-products of a desire to reach a deal with iran regardless of the consequences and the hedge monic aspirations in syria. >> did you want to -- >> just to close -- >> so the problem with the u.n.

security council is that it cannot agree on anything when you consider who sits on it which makes perfect sense. there are u.n. security council resolutions about the iranian ballistic program but the enforcement is non-existing so to speak. >> would you like to wrap up? >> time always gets away from us and i would like to be respectful of everybody's time. thank you for coming to the hudson institute today. [ applause ]

next weekend live coverage on book tv of the 22nd annual l.a. times festival of books. with the author and the book "stranger" roxane with "loaded" a disarming history of the second amendment. her book "the view from fly over country" on sunday our live coverages continues on 1:30 p.m. eastern with the book "russian roulette" the inside of putin's america. with her book "when they call you a terrorist" a black lives

matter memoir. >> and the book" i know best." watch our weekend long coverage of the 22nd animal festival of books live on c-span 2, book tv. next, fema administrator brock long testifies before a house committee on his agency's 2019 budget request. and ohio senator brown talks about the solvency of pension plans. after that a house appropriation hearing on the budget request for immigration and customs enforcement and later, the minnesota state of the state address. now, federal emergency management agency brock long testifies before the house appropriation committee about the 2019 budget request for the agency and reviews