>> i teach at the grand forks air force base. pubsay the most pressing issue ndth it's for infrastructure programs or if it's for public employees retirement funds. like a lot of states right now, funding is really tight in our state. >> voices from the states, part of c-span's 50 capitals tour and our stops in pierre, south dakota, and bismarck, north dakota. the center for strategic and international studies and the u.s. naval institute co-hosted a discussion on maritime security yesterday. we'll hear about how the military coordinates for potential maritime threats. this is 90 minutes. >> i'd like to welcome you all to today's event. i'm a senior adviser here at csis. the event is part of an ongoing

series, the maritime security dialogue, which is co-hosted by csis and the naval institute. the series seeks to highlight current thinking and issues facing the naval services, the navy marine corps coast guard. our event today is our first one of 2018,nd wlook forward to haou join us for future events. we thank huntington eng else -- engels for their support of the series. in the unlikely event of an emergency, i'll give instructions about what we'll do. we'll either hold fast or move out the front door or the rear. now to our panel. we're fortunate in having a distinguished panel with a broad set of experiences and

responsibilities. we have general robert walsh, a fixed wing aviator and now commanding general of the marine corps combat development command. we have general brian audrult, deputy commandant for plans, policies, and operations, marine corps headquarters. we have lieutenant general robert hedelund, a helicopr pilot and deputy commandant for plans, policies, and oermgss. notes arero. i apologize. i would have b you back up to washington. and dr. maren leed, formerly of csis, now a senior analyst at hns hopkins university in advanced physics. we'll have a discussion here among the panel, and then we'll open it for questions from the audience. so let me start.

as we were talking a little behind the scenes here beforehand, we have a new weave a newatnal security strategy. this highlights high-end competition. it talks about a long-term competition, particularly with russia and china, although it ao otes threats from north korea, iran, and globalti terrorism. i wanted to ask first, what are the challenges and opportunities that that brings at all levels? we can start, i guess, general walsh, and move down. >> i think the challenge, as we looked at it after many years of fighting counterinsurgency in iraq and afghanistan, the national defense straty clearly focused on stratic

competition against reay russia and china as major strategi competitors, not just from a military standpoint. the nds obviously focused on that, buto the nss. i think what it did for us as part of the naval force, it reallygrsts e navy marine corps team back to our title ten sp andow we would look at long-term strategic competition as a forward deployed force across the globe. i think the oorni there is toet back to our navy roots, back to working with the navy in partnership. that's been very exciting across the operating forces. general hedelund can talk about at. certainly fro headquarters marine corps standpoint, i also co-chair the naval board. there's a lot of things going on

to really drive towards bringing the two services together, as we were in the cold war, towards major strategic competition. so i would say that would be the main part that i would say the excitement of that opportunity. the other opportunity, and it's a challenge, is where have we been with our investments over the last 16, 17 years? at's been a real challenge. we, in fact, used to have.okme for example, we used t light anti-aircraft missile battalions. when i talk to our expedition warfare course and talk to our young capt, the lookt me like i have three eyes when i ta yes, the marine corps used to have anti-aircraft missile battalions. those are some of the portlenges, but i look at ities also as we now have to look at the force and go, how tome pac the that soe have the overmatch we need across the force. >> so first, thanks for t

opportunity. it's always good to be a visitor in d.c., not permanently assigned.reat to be from c lejeune to be a part of the panel. you mentioned this re-emerging strategy that we have really used as a forcing function for building readiness. as an example, we've recently returned to being a war fighting organization. the marine expeditionary brigade was the largest war fighting organization on the east coast. the expeditionary force was not

going to be assigned missions to go fight at that level. so this has really re-energized an effort with a nod to both the nss and nds that this is really telling us to build -- rebuild a capability on the east coast to have a war-fighting organizat at the force level. again, it creates some challenges, but i think there's far more opportunities to reinvigorate that war fighting fo outthe camp lejeune complex. we're very much excited about the opportunities to rediscover some of the things that w three in particular grew up with in the marine corps that have been nascent or dormant for the last 17 or so years. so we're having to plan again. we're having to look beyond the next deployment. we're having to think about,

okay, how do we recoup some time forarines and families and equipment to be better prepared for a larger fight, should that come. soe ve today's challenges, and then we've got these challenges that have been put out the by the nds and the nss and how do we really build the bridge between the two. the exciting things we'll , have to work with. >> thanks. good morning, everybody. it is a pleasure to be here. thank you for the invitation. i think the nds, the nss, and importantly for us, the defense planning guidance that preceded gives us a focus that we haven't had for a while. we've prioritized the threats, which now allows the institution writ large to focus on that threat. it means we have to look at what

we're studying in our schoolhouses and how we train officers for a high-end threat. what do we know about those adversaries and what don't we know? those coors,mpetit let's say. so this is more than just the operational forces preparing. this is an institualrefocus on high-end war fighting and all that comes with it. with a good strategy comes good resourcing. we're very pleased with the budget we've had in '18 and what portends for '19 in order to resource a strategy, to be able to mod zefoe, to maintain our competitive advantage that we do not want to losegainsthina ora. and this is not a whole of government or just a military approach. it has to be a whole of nation approach. everything from how our students study and what they study to the industrial base and our ability to have resilient capacity, should we have attrition in high-end warfare, we have an ability to regenerate a force. things like recruitment. you know, it does concerns that the american population is even eligible to come into the military. we need the nation to understand

that and to broaden those who could even come in and serve in a high-end warfare to replace and regenerate a capability should there be losses. i ink itlso gives us a thrust in a way we hen't had and reay shows the brilliance of the procurement of the f-35 and what it can do, anticipating this fight that was potentially to come in the future. let's hope not. but if it does, we have the right penetrating capability against an adversary who's got very sophisticated means to deny us or attempt to deny us. and for the first time, we have a threat-based strategy, not a capability-based strategy. our intelligence is laser focused on that. our marine corps training and operations group who trains staff is focused on that out at 29 palms and the way we train. the training infrastructure that

has to support preparation for high-end fight is an ient we're going to have to make. we have training ranges that allow our f-35s to do that. if we're going to get extended long-range precision weapon fires systems that go out to nearly 500 kilometers, we need ranges that supports anan ability a censer and shooter together. even something as seemingly simple as a rifle. with a higher caliber weapon. we have surfaced danger zones suort t ctain designed to degree. we have to look at all of our ranges when we enhance the lethality. with that strategy came the lethality task force. the secretary is committed on enhancing readiness and adding he that will lethality into the. we've already benefitted fro money from osd under the lethality task force. we've been able to speed up procurement in things like enhanced night vision goggles,

and more to come. there's been a galvanizing aspect to this. it's already been mentioned, the reinsthteritutio lk with t air force that went dormant for ten years. we've reinvigorated a naval board to talk about challenges in the pacific with a pacing threat that's out there. again, it's been a galvanizing effort inside the naval board for future development and capability. with the army, it's been about procurement. munitions, long-range munitions, long-range systems, grounds systems. we get economies inside of our budget by working closely with the army. so it's been a huge amount of opportunity built into this defense strategy. you know, the force can fight today. we can win today. there's no -- make no doubt in anybody's mind about that. maintaining this competitive advantage will allow us to ensure that doesn't change from now until the 2049 when xi

jinping will have 100th anniversary, so to speak, of what china has been after. so we know what path they're on in terms of their own development and capability. and we're not going to cede any ground in that regard. so rest assured of that. and i'll stop there, turn it back over to you. >> maren, last word here. >> thanks for the invitation to be here. saying tha -- whatever i mer on might say today, my personal views, are not those of apl. i think i'm going to take a slightly ctrary view. to me, one of the biggest challenges for the marine corps and strategy is how they constitutionally co institutionally come to grips with the challenge. one, the emphasis on dynamic

force employment in a more deliberate approach to husba readiness, whichug will be less of a more persistent presence that we've worked to hard to sustain in recent years. and you couple that with the access challenges, and that makes that problem a little harder. it's, again, i think most acute potentially for the marine corps becae of their forwa presence that would in theory enable the access. they've been working hard on concepts to try to exploit that. how you do that if the navy is not a present on a sustained basis as they might have been in the past is something i think is going to require som additional adjustments to the gwing

laip tt maybe suggest the marine corps needs to be taking more deliberate actions to colrate wh the other services. in particular,nk som. g to be inside the bubble from the get go, which i think at least to some degree would be expected, how do they work with socom to leverage that to maximum effect to help enable the access fromhe other services. so agn, i think while i'm a big advocate of the strengthening relationship between the navy and marine corps, i think it needs to -- the marine corps needs to think abou broadening that and new concepts that extend beyond that because i just think that dynamic suggests it's changing a little bit or should change.

be interesting to see how that guidance gets implemented, but again, i think it creates the biggest tension for the corps. i look forward to seeing how you guys are going to answer. >> let me build on your question here and give the generals a moment to think about their response, which is to pick upn this dynamicceloym empt that's in the nds. there's not a lot of description, but the outlines of that appear to be the idea of not being as forward deployed as much so that the force can husband some of its capability for surge requirements.

i wanted to ask the panel, how is that playing out? i realize this is stilln its very early stages, but do we expect to see it deploying in a different way as a result of this concept? >> thank you. i'll start with that. so, importantly as the nds tells us what to focus on in terms of threat-based capabilities that are out there, it soth defense planning guidance, tells us whatnot not to focus on, th areas we can accept risk, as we cus on preparation for major combat operations, say, rather than solely a cvo fight. the whole basis of our dynamic force employment is to remain operationally unpredictable. so we're probably not going to say a lot about that. to maintain our operational --

some degree of unpredictability. one might be able today to know exactly when a next carrier strike group is going to go, where it's going to go. those days are going to change. they'll change by year and change by focus area. it very much will be a tool at the discretion for the use of the secretary defense in consultation with the chairman and joint chiefs on how those deployments, those dynamic force employment -- deployments will be scheduled and where they'll go. it'll b -- it'll come from forward deployed forces as well as surge forces. we'll be able to conduct experiments within a force that's already forward deployed. in essence, that's what we're trying to get after, the very strategically predictable to our allies and partners and remain operationally unpredictable to those that take interest.

>> any other comments? >> i guess the one tng to counter a little bit, like you said, we've been a very busy force, the navy and marine corps team. with the strategic guidance we've got now and the strategic competition, focused like you said on the dpg where the marine corps' focused, much more so in the pacific than other aors, that allows t marine corps to set some of its capability back where we've been heavily focused on just the middle east. it does give us some space there to be able to reset some of that force to be able to focus much more so as we talked about earlier on higher end quipping and training and manning to go towards the guidance the nds is telling us to move towards.

>> i think it's -- i agree that focus is very helpful. i think the question then becomes there's also language in the strategies about thinking about more dynamic basin and posture, ways of approaching that challenge. it's easy to talk about and a lot harder to do, as you know better than i do. so what that ends up looking like -- and again, if you assume that's sort of going to be most of what you start with if the bubble goes up, if the balloon goes up, how then you maximize the flexibility and the combat power of that force around the theater to create conditions for others to come in is a real -- it's a significantly different way of thinking about things.

i think the corps' had to think about for a while. the degree to which you're going to be able to leverage the navy to do that, at least in the short-term, is sort of an open question in my mind. >> let me ask about picking up on another thing that maren had raised, which is a2ad environments. there's a lot of talk about that, particularly with china and russia and their ability to build defensive bubbles aroun their hola. i realize that the cno does not like a2ad because it sounds a little too restrictive, maybe, on our operations. but i wanted to ask about what that means for the training organization and doctrine, operating in that kind of environment as opposed to the permissive kinds of environments we've been living in in the

last, raeally, two decades. many of your remarks have already touched on that. wetartiteneral walsh and work our way down. >> i'll just start with the -- as general beaudreault said, the strategy is the most clear strategy since the reagan administration. clear strategy. the department is clearly turned in that dirtion. the clear strategy is telling us to move in that direction. i'll just start with the concepts. concepts drive where we go. it drives our training, our quipping, our manning, how we organize. with a clear guidance from the nds, things like lit operations signed by the commandant, base operations that is getting very close to be signed by the commandant and the cno. another one, multidomain battle

that we're working on with the army. the concepts will drive very much where we put our investments, where we exercise to, where we put our war gaming, where we put our snt. from inside my world, that's driving everything we do. the concepts are unifying for both the service w the army, socom on the multidomain battle side, but certainly the concepts with contested environment and exti base operations are driving everything we're doing within the department all the way down to the operating forces. i would just start with the concepts as a major driver. i would also say that our marine corps operating concept that we really signed in the fall of 2016 really put us on the route down this path looking at higher end conflict. >> none of this happens overnight, right. so where we have been for the

last several years, where we aspire to down the road, certainly secretary mattis would like us to get there more quickly. i don't want to say incremental change, but certainly we don't wait for cdni to hand off a perfectly formed concept before we begin to play with it. for instance, we are exploring ways to where we can at least table top in terrain that is different from what you might immediately identify as an eabo type of environment. how do we do that in other places around the globe? how would that look if we had to do it? and how might we contest those areas differently than purely a force-on-force type of

confrontation. so we are tryg to find slices of these concepts so we can put to work immediately and begin to learn from them now rather than waiting for everything to be perfected. we know that's going to take some time. it's the same thing with the force presentation. we have a lot of fks on the road, around the world doing the nation's bidding. i would like to have more of them at home, preparing them for a higher-end confrontation. we're working on all that. but you can't just flip a switch and say, everybody, come home, we'll retool you for a high-end fight, and next year we'll be good to go. that's certainly not the way it's going to happen. it takes a change in mind set, it takes a change in culture almost to get refocused on the things that are going to matter should we have to fight inside the bubble as an inside force.

l come backust a minute. i mean, i think what's recognized in the nds is different than in the past. we mayave to fight to get to the fight. you know, the idea that we have sea control and air superiority from the get go is an assumption we're not making anymore. so when we look at not just eabo, expeditionary advanced base operations, or the operations of a contested environment, from a joint perspective we're working very closely with the air force and navy. so when you take the marine operating concept and start to merge it with the joint concepts, we all recognize if you can be seen is to be targeted, is to be killed. so in a place like the pacific, it's about distribution of your force. it's the ability to rapidly aggregate en masse at the time

of your choosing when necessary. it's about decoys and deceptions. it's about low observable properties of modernization of our equipment. it's all of those things. it's about all domain access and assuring ourself across all the domains. space, cyber, surface, under sea, land. it's about a fle in being that can be land based to support asymmetry. it doesn't have to be naval against naval. we look at the procurement of a naval strike missile or a high-mobility artillery rocket system or any kind of multiple rocket system that we might be looking at, at extended ranges. we can do things in support of a naval campaign that we haven't been able to do in the past. that's the direction we're moving. you add an unmanned capability into that, an unmanned censor, an unmanned shooter, a network force, networked aegis systems, now we're talking about a very sophisticated, high-end fight

where we need to maintain dominancn the information space and dominance over the electromagnetic spect that will underpin everything else we need to do from command and control, from a ship talking to a land-based system, for a man sensor, being able to relay back to command and control apparatus in charge at the time. to include the incorporation of artificial intelligence into our systems, watson-like capabilities with the pace of decision making has to move as quickly as the opportunities reveal themselves. so there will be a lot of machine learning. there will be a lot of movement, a lot of investment in artificial intelligence. we know the chinese have made a lot of investments in that area and have some great capabilities. those are the things that are going to enable this force to fight in a high-end fight. lastly on the inside force. so you may see two different ones emerging, all within the same marine corps. there's the constantly

forward-deployed aspect othe marine corps on navy ships that's going to be inside the adversary's area. if they decide to light up their systems one day. we have to be the contact and blunt layer. someone's got to do the job. those marines in addition to the rest of the subsurface navy and air, cyber, is going to deny the adversary the initial capabilities. we will disrupt their plans. we will buy time and space for decision makers in washington that then can make a decision to be able to surge the force. so you're going to see it operating inside the contact and blunt layer. you're going to see the third layer, the surge force coming in, and of course the fourth layer is homeland defense. more geared toward north com, ensuring the ballistic missile defense of the united states, primarily. so you're going to see it

operating inside that has to be survivable and lethal, disruptive and a denying force. the rest is coming in from plac le camp pendleton or camp lejeune or okinawa, assembling at the right place to serve as part of the surge layer. >> i want to turn to the navy and the navy's plan for a 355-ship battle fleet. that would build them up to 38. even 38 isn't enough to meet all of the demands that are put on the amphibious forces. it's going to take quite some time to get there. so i wanted to ask first about the navy shipbuilding program and the fleet that is developing and how that meets the needs and the challenges that may be there. the second part is asking about

the use of auxiliaries to meet some of these amphibious demands en there aren't enough amphibious ships to go around. >> i'll go ahead and start with that. the first thing i would say on the increase in the money that we've got, the funding that came in '19 with a 7% increase, the navy did four structure assessments, determined that 355 ships was the right plan. now, how quickly we can get to that requirement is really the challenge, and how long is that funding going to be consistent. so if you looked at the 30-year shipbuilding plan, what the cno's got in there, is capacity at our shipyards, where we can increase capacity, where we can build more ships if we get more money to accelerate at a faster rate. that's one of the things that's out there. if congress can help accelerate

that, certainly we'd be fully supportive. we're on a path now that we're moving towards our large deck amphibs with our lha css ship with america, tripoli coming online now. we've also got our lpds and lxr coming online in that 30-year shipbuilding plan. all on a pace to get us towards that 38-ship requirement that we're looking for. the last few years prior to this new influx in modernization money we've had, we've been focused vy much on the readiness. the marines have been operating very hard. the readiness of the ships has been the first focus. now it's the capacity, the number of ships we need. closely behind that is part of the equation is the capability on those ships. we talk about distributed maritime operations. if it floats, it fights.

part of that is the amphib ships being part of that not only from a power projection standpoint but also a sea control standpoint. when you talk about dynamic force employment, part of it is gettgo the how do we use auxiliary ships in different ways. i'll give you one example, out in fifth fleet. out there in fifth fleet with task force 51, we actually have a marine general that is in charge of that task force. they took the esb, the expeditionary staging base, that chopped into theater and gave it over. they used that along with the epf, which is the joint high-speed vessel, or our fast transfort. put tse two together and put that in the equation with the other naval ships that we've got out there in fifth fleet. so that was, i think, the first time that i've really seen an operational commander bring

those new auxiliary ships in, whether it's the esb or epf, and use them in different ways for operational missions in the fifth fleet aor, which i think is a dynamic we're watching very closely and how that could operate in the pacific and also the mediterranean. >> so i think i'll carry that aucti auxiliary idea just a little further. we should be very careful how we characterize these ships and how we rely on them or operationalize them. we're going to spend a lot of time in norfolk looking at these platforms because just because as a htec doesn't necessarily mean it's capable of doing the things that an amphibious ship can do. so the options that it gives you is the exciting part, i think. the opportunities that are

availabl when you have more options are always a good thing. but i would be careful not to characterize these ships as more than they are or less tha they are, for that matter. any time that you can spend time with our navy brothers and sisters and learn more about their platforms and their capabilities is always good. i would kind of complete my remarks in this particular piece about relationships. that is the strongest part of, i think, this current time that we're in. the relatps with our navy brothers and sisters in norfolk have n beenr in a long, long time. we're looking forward to continuing that. they really do have an operational mind set, and they want to enable the naval force. so given the things that general walsh just talked about with

funding a plan and some options, we again look at great opportunity going forward. >> so it seems that with a 355-ship navy that we have a hard time breaking about a 10% threshold for amphibs relative to the size of the fleet. moving toward a 600-ship navy, we had 60. so i'm confident we'll get there. then it's a matter of what's on them. we need to build amphibs in the future differently thane' built them in the past. we can't always count that there's going to be a number of destroyers and cruisers to escort amphids or to tuck in. those warships in and of themselves need to have -- you know, what kind of defensive systems and offensive systems, vertical launch systems, for instance, that we may need to place on them in the future that we don't have today i think is important. to make sure they have resilient

command and control systems on board, this they have all that's required to be part of the larger network force. so everything from c2 to fires to defensive systems is something that we'll look at. the auxiliaries are necessary but not preferred. an amphib gives you more capability, but out of necessity based on the number of amphibs we have today, we use the auxiliaries. best suited for a low-end operation than high-end war fighting. they're great platforms for staging a force to do -- you know, countering violent extremists. they're wonderful for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, or perhaps to have a force go execute a neo and bring evacuees back aboard for some period of time. but they're not an lpd or an lhs. we recognize that, but we're going to take every advantage we can with the training opportunities allowed for them,

which could be command and control and in some ways looking at our connectors that operate with these ships. the other part we haven't really talked about beyond auxiliaries and the l class is what do marines do differently aboard cruisers and destroyers. what capabilities can we put aboard an lcs that we haven't fully explored? if we go with small craft and get some small craft on destroyers and cruisers, there's some capability we can put on those. always high end, butagain, just enough to give the adversary something different to think about when they see marines on the deck of a ship that they're not used to seeing in the past. so we're going to get creative with everything that floats and continue to explore and innovate with the navy in any way we can. >> i agree completely with what the other three have said. i think in all the work i've done on amphibs, it's the combination of the command and

control in one platform that you can get bits and pieces of in other platforms. that unique combination has a unique role to play. so i think the navy's commitment to distributed maritime operations goes exactly where general beaudreault was talking about, thinking about how you optimize across the fleet those responsibilities and the flexibility that you can get in those roles as, in theory, the network gets built out and the fleet gets built out, implies a lot of change for both forces in thinking about how they can really get the most leverage out of the full capabilities that they offer. i would also say that another major component of this is the increase in naval capacity around the world, right. other navies are growing, many of our friends are growing their navies substantially in response

to the same challenges we see. i was able to do a couple -- some work couple years ago with the australians as they started building amphibs. so there are lots of opportunities for other platforms as well that i think can bring real synergies with our marine corps. and i know the corps is looking hard at that as well. >> let me ask one last question, which is about modernization and acquisition. when many people think about innovation, they think about new systems. as the panelists have indicated, that really a much too narrow way to think about , but it is an important component. new weapons, new systems that are coming into the fleet. i was wondering if the panelists might want to comment about, you know, what's going to be in the future. >> i'll just start with the

priorities that we have in certainly -- if you look at the marine corps operating concept, the first thing we focused on is the information warfare side. that was -- so when it comes to funding, that's been our priority. that's where we see our advantage of operating in all domains. the marine corps is a maneuver force. we try to maneuver in all domains. we see lots of advantages that we see in that area. so a good bit of our funding increase has gone into areas like signals intelligence, electronic warfare, our command and control capability, how do we operate in a degraded area. so iw, along with our organizational change, our big organizational change we did in that area was standing up as general hedelund will talk on the information groups. so it's not only to put equipping in there in modernization, but we changed the organization significantly to move in that new operating

concept. our long-range precision fires trying to increase the rake nge just about everything we have. when it comes down to our cannon artillery, to our rocket systems, i'm looking at everything from a near-term, mid-term, and long-term perspective. some of the capabilities we're lacking, like in air defense capability or a long-range anti-ship missile capability, going out and procuring something right now that's available right now that we can integrate into our command and control system. a lot of cases like we've got with our gator radar and our command and control systems, we've got fifth generation sensors out there te have right now. that's the good news when you start talking about integrating into the joint force. we've got systems like that. we don't have the shooters that we need from an air defense standpoint or anti-ship long range capability. those are things we're going to focus on, air defense being our

third priority. c2 in a degraded environment is where we're putting investment and how formations of the future -- we see the intellectual capital we have with our marines, our high-end capability by tying that together with technology is where our real advantage is. that advantage allows them to operate in sometimes autonomous and indepeen independt manner than they've ever operated in before. it could be a reconnaissance unit out there. maybe its flanks aren't protected, but it's got the capability to maneuver on its own, to sense the battle space on its own. so things like our advanced reconnaissance vehicle that we're now putting money into, to be able to develop what the next reconnaissance vehicle is going to be of the future. finally, our ability to conduct protected mobility and enhanced maneuver. how do we get at things like active protection systems, vehicle protection systems, just like the aircraft have today on a fifth generation systems. we need those type of

capabilities tonhance maneuver and enhance our protection of our mobility systems. so i would say that those are the capabilities that we're really going after in the defense budget. just this year in year, in '19,a 7% increase in funding, and we increased our modernization accounts by 32%. so, the money does show where our investments are going, and a lot of it is all going towards the information warfare area, long-range precision fires, enhancing our ability to be able to maneuver, and certainly in our c-2 capabilities. >> so, a little bit more about the mig and the proximity of camp lejeune to quantico is helpful in that we get to play with some of the toys, quite often, that are being discovered out there. and in events like bold alligator, we get after experimentation into all of our exercises to ensure that we have a chance to put some of these

ids to work. but for the meig, for those not so steeped in marine corps organizational structure, the meth had previously a headquarters group that provided enablers and other capabilities to magtafs once they are trained and begin to work together so when they go long range, they have everything they need. the transitn to the mef information group still retains most of those enabling capabilities but also adds an information component that's pretty important. and what we begin to sort out now through a couple of exercises and kind of day-to-day learning is that you can't take a lethal capability and a non-lethal capability and expect them to play well with each other just by being in close proximity. the planning that goes into an information envirment that is

lethal to adversaries and is protective of those we want to protect has to be built from the ground up. it's got to be baked in, sewn into the fabric, not added as icing at the end of the day. and we have -- we're looking forward to opportunities coming up in the fall to continue to build ons thi work. for just one small example, signature management. we're going to be doing a signature management war game as the fall approaches that really is worked at. we used to be pretty good at signature management, when the threats that we were up against in the cold war were real. we have been, i wouldn't say lazy, but we certainly have not had to worry about that as much in recent years. now signature management is going to be a big deal. so, relearning or coming up with new techniques in order to manage our signature, both on the battlefield, at sea, in the

air, et cetera, is an important part of what the expertise in the mig will be able to help us with going forward. >> maybe just the last parts on this one. any technology has got to be sustainable. we have some exquisite equipment that we need to make sure that the parts are there, the spares are there, we can maintain it. and it's about the people at the end of the day. it's always about the people who put that technology into action, and then, what are the training programs? how long are the training programs? we know what it takes to develop a cyber warrior. we have clearance requirements. there's backlogs in clearance, you know, getting people to cleared to get them into those jobs so we can get them into the training. but the capabilities is coming. there's a couple things that we're looking at. general walsh had within his

subsets of priorities. one of those would be an armed uas that's operating from a ship. there are all kinds of armed uas today, but few that can operate from aship, so we're pursuing some technology in that way. then a real focus effort in the rest of '18 and into '19 will be logistics modernization. if we have this concept of expeditionary advanced bases across widely distributed areas, how do we sustain that force? what do we have in terms of logistics distribution and what do we need for the future, you know, how do we get there, what's going to be manned, what's going to be unmanned what type of surface connectors are going to moving logistics in which ways, at what volume. tremendous asset coming to the fleet is going to be the ch-53 kilo, an incredible machine that can lift 91,000 pounds, gross weight. it can lift loads upwards and probably in excess of 36,000 pounds. it can hit three separate independent zones because it's got three independent sling

loads that can resupply and sustain it over 12,000 pounds each. that's ammunition, that's fuel, that's, you know, whatever we need. hat's just one piece of several things that we're looking at and are already in development to help us get through the logistics challenges of resupplying and sustaining, quicklettingup breaking down, and relocating these forces that we'll have at these various advanced bases. may be up for 24 hours, break down and move, or 72 hours, break down and move. so again, operational unpredictability is h we're building this, and we need a log system that can support the concept. >> okay. and to wrap this last question up, i'm going to ask maren, who's worked at the usd level and think tanks what should the marine corps be thinking more about? >> so, i think i completely agree with the general themes that the generals have talked about this morning. in my mind, the focus on

information warfare and the spectrum warfare is i think overdue and well warranted. so, i think sort of the critical enabling capability that has to be considered. and so, don't think there is -- i don't think they're not thinking about the right things. i think the marine corps faces some fundamental challenges in that while you're able to leverage the other services' more significant s&t investments and things like that, that also helmes you into a certain extent which you don't have a lot of money to pursue new capabilities, significant, new capabilities in the ways the other larger svis do. i also think you're inherently dependent on the others so that you can come up with great concepts.

i think one of the challenges the marine corps has had is that they've had aot of good concepts and they haven't had as much of an impact on the palm as they might have if you had been one of the bigger services. so, within the constraints that you the focus is in the right areas. i woul ahat the magtaf, arguably, is relatively unchanged for some number of decades. people can debate how many decades you want to put into what you want "x" to be, but it's a lot, i think. so to me, there's a fundamental question about is that being explored fully enough. and again, i think given the dependence on the other services, i'm not sure broader investigation would get you anywhere differently,

necessarily. i do think there's a general consensus among the services about the problems and the challenges, and the real question will be can you collectively come up with joint answers and program to them. and you know, i guess we'll see. the proofs will be in the pudding. >> great, thank you. we'll open it up now to your questions. i'd ask that you wait for a microphone to come down to you. and i would also askhat there be a question mark at the end of your question. admiral, as our co-host, you get the first question. >> hi, pete talley, naval institute. thanks for the opportunity to ask this question. do we run a risk ife go to this dynamic force and general beaudreault saide'll have a magtf going forward, doing everything we expect and maybe a higher end group at home who's

been able to train to a higher level? do we run the risk that we're going to have compete for assets to move those marines and be more dependent on fixed bases, or at least land bases forward under that concept, and does that blur the brand? >> thanks for the question, admiral. i would say no. i don't think we're going to have to wait on lift, because the dynamic force employment of marines will be tied to the navy. the global force management decisions, how forces get allocated around the globe, is being looked at as we speak between the chairman and the secretary. what that looks like now and in the future. in terms of the drivers will be the readiness of those forces. back in the u.s., in those that are forward deployed we know

already are our most ready. so, the key is combat credibility. are they combat credible? we have all kinds of marines that are forward ployed but a small unit in south america, for instance, that's doing theater security cooperation at the platoon level is not really combat credible. they're there for a specific reason and purpose. however, we might have two muse afloat in the western pacific. you may have the 31st mu and you might have a west coast mu that togean combi wit a command and control out of okinawa that's a headquarters that could go over the top very quickly, aggregate, and now you've got a significant combat-credible force to do part of this dynamic force empyment that i mentioned. so, it's about readiness. it's about the readiness of the forces that may go forward and about the combat credibility of the formation. >> okay, sidney.

>> hi, do you mind standing up? >> sure. hi, gentlemen. sydney freedberg from breaking defense. it comes up to mind that said there'd be a difference between the surge force and the blunt contact force. the blunt contact force will be able to operate when sort of the balloon goes up, as it were. but it strikes me that you might be sort of an emerging bifurcation between the conis-based surge marine force and, you know, the patrolling marine force, the cop on the block, as it were, and perhaps a three-way bifurcation with those guys on the hatter missions, offering up auxiliary ships that may not have the same level of hardware or mass. to what degree are you creating different flavors of maf? we already have speal force magtfs. what degree can you entertain the interchangeability you have now?

nice, simple question. >> yes. so, not to try and make this too simp simple, because it's not. you know, the marine corps is a one mco force. so, if something breaks around the world, the forces you describe are the ones who are going to go. so, for instance, in the korean theater, there are forces that have trained specifically for that mission. there are forces at camp lejeune today that if it really comes to a full-blown conflict have not trained specifically for that mission. we have obviously done very well at training the corps mets, the corps essential tasks that are within their mission, but they may not be as steeped in the knowledge of the peninsula as the os who work there every

day. same goes for that force that is almost every conflict i can think of in recent history that the marine corps's been associated with, we did windows on the way to or on the way back from the conflict. so, whether it was desert storm, it seemed like liberia was always a stopping point on the way to or on the way back from, a conflict that was a little more serious. so, i agree that the perfect solution would be that those three forces that you describe will know each other, have trained together, have had the opportunity to do combined arms together, et cetera. that's optimum. we don't always have that luxury, i think. so, again, things like a well-known operating concept that has been tried out and exercised with and experimented with across the force is valuable. and then if you have to put

these forces together to do it, you have at least got a common ground to work from with the knowledge that being able to do that with the exact forces who might be called to do it is going ver difficult. i don't know if that -- thatay need some embellishment, if you will, from the other panel members. >> so, the only thing i'd like to add on to that is that it's really a matter of training focus, and it does very much get to the forward deployed force who's on its assign mission, and it might be focused on ct support. it might be afloat to do personnel recovery, quick-reaction force, primary missions, but it's going to be combat credible, but it might be the expeditionary unit which in and of itself may not be enough to do what's necessary. so, really it gets to the training focus and the training focus of those back at home versus those forward deployed should be on major combat

operations fighting at the mef level or at least a med level and higher. that's aiffent kind of training work-up for folks in conis than for a marine expeditionary unit getting ready to do 19 things in support of a combat and commander. when we talk about the surge force, we can't just think about the marine corps or navy itself. this is a joint -- you're talking that the nation is going to go to war -- probably if we're surging from the homeland, it's not just marines surging on amphibs to go forward. there will be army presence, unitsobilization units. who knows if it rees more, depending on the crisis of the day, but this is bigger. so where does the marine corps formation also fit into the larger campaign being put together in terms of a joint effort? that's the level of capability we're talking about is a larger marine corps that's able to plug back into a larger joint fight.

>> and i think that tension that i think both questionsuded to is the one that i tried to raise at the beginning of the session. in my mind, the other implicationf that is that coact and blunt force has to be able to leverage the other elements of the joint force that are also there, and there will likely be some, so how do you do that to match that extent, and then depending on geography, that's going to vary. and then the partners, wherever that may be. so, i think it's a very -- it's a different way of thinking about where, if there's a -- i won't call it a gap, but if there's a greater seam between forward and surge, or at least a different nature of a seam between forward and surge, what's that imply for the scenes we've allowed to exist, at least

to some degree, within that forward force -- how do we knit those together more closely to help? because the faster that contact and blunt force can be effective, the quicker the surge forces can reinforce. so, i think it's just different way of -- it just requires a slightly different lens, but not fundamentally different. but i think we have to think our way through that. >> another question. okay, right there. >> thank you. my name is veronica cartier. i'm focus on nuclear policy and strategic defense issues. most recently, as a matter of fact, it's last month, may 24, national defense authorization

at the are three provisions in maritime defense. i will q it -- a mandate, a new program to develop new space, intercept capability, including kinetic interceptor while continuing previous efforts to develop directed energy solutions. so, my question is how important it is, how crucial it is technologies and strategic speaking this program? would you please elaborate that? thank you so much. >> i'll just start on that. certainly, i an are ctly the marin corps on that. but what i would say is when you get into great power competition, you have to have a credible force. so, as you look across, you know, today we're just focused on our piece of that. but for a national capability, you have to have a credible capability. so, looking at the nuclear force, we haven't been putting a

lot of effort or a lot of funding into that for many, many years. so, to have a credible combat deterrent capability you have to have a credible nuclear capability. so, looking at that capability along with things like directed energy weapons, which could be applicable across strategic all the way to operational tactical, all those capabilities will come into but it's things that we have notut our resources against, because as general beaudreault said, we had not been focused on any strategic competition or threat. the threat is driving us to new capabilities that we haven't looked at in a long time. so, as we looked at our conventional training, that we've got to increase that against a higher end capability, so also do we have to do with our nuclear capabilities. brian, i don't know if you want to touch any more on that. >> i think you're referencing space. is that correct, on the inside the nda? and i'll just say that it goes to the strategic investment we're making. some comes off the top from every service to be able to pay for the common good. i won't get into any of the

things we're looking at, but ffice to say, it's really been a recognition just in the last couple years that space is now a war-fighting domain, and we need to protect our assets that are up there, and we have to be cognizant of wha the adversary has and can do. we have to look at what commercially available things can augment our own efforts that are up there, but it's got the laser focus of the united states air force and a whole bunch of people right now. and i'll tell you, the investments will be well made, and i'll just stop there. but the fact that we've recognized it as a war-fighting domain and not just, you know, that everything is going to be peaceful in space in terms of exploration, i think those days are behind us, in terms of assuring our ability to operate.

>> good morning. paul danfries. that was a sue into my question to kind of build on space a little bit. is not only a war-fighting domain, but in the last few years, since about 2011, we've recognized that it's competitive, it's congested, it's contested. so, with that, where m field is, is in commercial satellite communications. there are a lot of commercial systems that are coming online that are in geosynchronous, but we're looking at other planets and we have a constellation in medium-earth orbit. with low-earth orbit, with medium-earth orbit, the systems are inherently more resilient to both kinetic attacks, to jamming, things of that nature. so, my question is jus some thoughts on incorporating that into the magtf, incorporating that for ship-to-shore communications. marine corps is really good at

recognizing that space is a contested environment, but some of these new systems will help us work through that. thank you. >> i guess i would say is across th. joint force, we'rin e of our top modernization was this, and space is going to be contested. if it's going to be contested, or potentially, you've got a small number of military satellites, relatively so, the way to become more resilient in that is to leverage commercial capability or put lots more of them up there. or the other things we're looking real hard at doing or currently doing is developing mesh networks of our own capabilities. i think all those things are players, and what we're doing is we can't rely on the current structure. we've got to move in a new direction, and a lot of is that in space, there's lots of opportunities there, and i think a lot of the smaller commercial satellites, to be able to leverage them, to be able to move on and off those, along

with being able to put up more smaller satellites ourselves, and a lot of the technologies that we're putting up we can use with balloon capabilities, things like that, that we can put up for long duration, that are able to meshnet the capabilities we currently have. >> i had an opportunity to talk with general bolden, former nasa astronaut, just saturday night, out the manner with which the commercial space industry is just taking off right now. so, it's hard to envision today what may be available even three and five years and where spacex and others are going to take us. and then part ofhiss a training issue, right? so, if we do lose our ability to have satellite communications or something along those lines, then is the force prepared for that? do we force a unit to operate in a degraded environment and figure out what the work-around

are, be it mesh networks or loss of pnt, you know, how do we work around those things. so, some of this is inducing friction into our training, and try to overcome it and have a better realization of how dependent we are or not in some areas, and is there manual -- you know, is th sll some use of radios and manual work-around, and are we comfortable kind of flexing back to that, if we have to. >> okay, now on the end there. >> thank you. well, first of all, thank you all. griffin cannon. i had a question about, you mentioned multidomain battle earlier, and i'm wondering just about that inside force, the joint force. what role the army plays in that inside blunting force. thank you. >> what i would say is i find it

interesting, because we're working with the concepts that we're working on with the navy. and when i t that across the multidomain battle with the army, a lot of the concepts are those concepts of employment cross both. they're almost identical. one may be in the maritime domain, one may be more in the land domain. but i think as you look at that, what we're trying to do is, again, try to have those ability to maneuver where and when we want, be able to have overmatch where and when we nt, and it may be more in a much more distributed fashion than we have toy. so, our work with the army in that is we may be that contact or blunt force as we envision it, but they're going to be right there with us in many cases, because they bring a lot of joint capabilities that we wouldn't have, and you're going to be right there. but how do we enable them to come in more quickly and interface with us? so, again, as you start to drive the joint concepts and you start to develop things like

multidomain battle it really is bringing in a lot of the joint staff we're now bringing in to make this more of a joint capability on how all these different services' capabilities togher. >> okay,hi gentleman on the end of the second row there. >> good morning. otto with "receipt power" magazine. organizing, starting at the lower level, what you're doing with infantry squad, higher level with the magtag information groups, that sort of thing. but facin the kind of inside ops, distributed ops and other things, are you looking at other reorganizations of your magtf? do you have to change the kind of units that you're going to be ready to deploy? you know, the experiments with the company landing teams, rather than working on battalion, for those kind of inside ops, you know, low

visibility, are you going to have to look at smaller or erent organizational levels for your magtfs? >> i'll start on that one. i think the comment elier about the magtf hadn't changed in many decades. it is only part of the story. the magtfs that we deploy and eventual employ, they're constantly evolving. the marine expeditionary unit of today is not the marine expeditionary unit or marine amphibious unit of the past. the cabities that they have with them, information, operations, intelligence, signals, intelligence, all at the appropriate level and the appropriate mix changes each deployment, because the world changes each deployment. so, i think that's one thing

that's important. the other part of that is that we do believe that how we task organize these other concepts, where it is eabo, that it can be almost as big or as small as you can envision ito t accomplish a certain so, what are marines going to do? they're going to task organize to accomplish that mission. we can't kill all the bugs with a sledgehammer, you know. we have to be a little bi more precision and more specific about how we get after certain problems. so, i think as we always have done, we'll experiment with different organizational structures in order to see which one might bet able to get after a particular mission, but we rely heavily on the tactical commander, the guy or gal that's down there on the leading edge, to put together the right team to do the right job for the

right reason. and that should not be wed to any specific line in block chart. >> the lady at the end of the first row there. >> thank you. megan eckstein. i actually have a related question. so, within the context of dynamic force employment, we've heard a lot about new technologies being pushed down to lower levelsf thearine corps organization, whether it's unmanned or information warfare. but i was wondering if you're also seeing where specific mission sets are being pushed down. i guess another way of asking is, you know, can platoons and companies use that technogy to do their old missions better, or are they also using that technology to take on new missions that they couldn't do at that level before? >> about new missions, it's new methods to execute many of the same missions. at the end of the day, it's about locating, closing with and destroying the enemy.

how we find them and how we close with what we close -- it may not be a human at all that closes on that enemy. it may not be a human that even est enemy, but there's something that's going to locate, thereomething that's gog to close with, and there's something that has an ability to finish. or repel his assault by fire and close combat, thus getting into the close combat lethality task g to enable thearines and soldiers and special operators to have and cross pollinate all the good ttps -- tactics, techniques, and procedures that go with that, to include the cognitive skills of those individuals. so, i don't know if the mission changes, but the manner in which we can execute that mission at less cost to the human is really what we're after. >> i can give you two examples that are mbe a little bit different. we had, trying to give our infantry more capabilities in electronic magnetic spectrum. so, just recently

advanced -- our fifth-generation urbandvanced naval technology experiment, we gave kilo third battalion fourth marines a lot of esm and electronic attack capability. and what we noticed with them was they absorbed it very quickly. it was a new mission for them. this would be normally something even back in the cold war, when we had a lot of electronic attack capabilities, it would have been to a specific unit that conducted that mission for them. in this case, we pushed down to the infantry marines, and they used it incredibly different than i could ever have imagined on how they embraced the technology and used it where they were, in fact, maneuvering in electronic mag no suspect rums. they were operating non kinetically. and we talk about putting up rf walls at different phase lines. this was not something i'd seen infantry do in the past, but given that capability, they took a tool, put it into a task-organized unit, and used it

effectively. so, that was at the small unit level. can go back a little bit to otto's question, though, on are we organizing differently, which kind of reverse. on the side, in marine corps force 2025, we had really over e years become more decentralized with more direct capability down -- detached units down to lower levels. we've kind of actually brought that more back and gotten more functionally organized in a marine logistics group back to more the way we did things in the past, some ways maybe the air combat element does it with our maintenance supply and transportation battalion. so, that was almostin of reverse back through functionally organize ourselves and be able toush those detachments back down, which is a lot of the way that we're going to be doing it into the mef information group. if you look at thatmef information group, a new domain, new capability, i'd look at it a lot more like our air officers, our jtacs, our facs that are down at lower levels, be able to augment those capabilities in a

magnetic spectrum and e.w. capabilities they'll be bringing. >> okay. let's see, we'll go to the back there. one of our own here. >> good morning, captain. i'm a fellow here at csis and also the naval institute. there has been a lot of discussions between the navy and marine corps about moving into the east coast, specifically to mayport. where are those discussions? and if it's not moved what risk does that pling to marine corps employment and erations? at a you doing to poibly mitigate those? >> so, the discussions on the tenth arg specifically i think is going to be -- there is a common desire to do it. it's the year in which we can execute is what's up for maybe even further discussion.

we wanted to start sooner. there are valid reasons that the united states navy would like to maybe postpone tt out by a few years. so, i think that's kind of it is, is that we wanto get the laydown, you know. we want to do it in conjunction with the navy's overarching plan within their strategic laydown. i think that's probably n going to happen within theex year or two. but the idea of why we want to do it, which would actually increase presence and actually clos ruce the number of days required to aggregate a force against any one of our major plans is there. so, without waffling too much on that question, it really -- i think we finally have an agreement between the commandant and the coo that, yes, we'd like to do it. realistically, it's probably goingo have to wait a couple years, on the tenth arg specifically. what's the second part?

>> in the meantime, what are the mititions you're taking to propose employment and corporations in the gap that's created? >> i think it's constantly evolving. so, it was really driven by trying to posture the force and get them the optimal, youknow, the optimum amount of transregional effectiveness from any single deployment of where we might want to put it. say the easter med. we know you can service ucom, africom and centcom from the eastern med. i think we're going to be able to do that just based on where we're headed on dynamic force deployment and what's already regularly scheduled through the global force management press. so, at the end of the day, though we would like to see the arg come to the east coast, in effect, we'll get much of it just based on what gfm portends and what the secretary's thinking about on dynamic force employment. so not a lot of additional risk being accepted or anything like that because it's not going to happen immediately. >> okay, we have time for one last questi

ay, the lady tre who got her hand up first. >> good morning. leah hurley with booz allen. we've talked a lot about multiple aspects that are changing. do you as leaders feelhat the department's current readiness metrics serve you well whll of this change, or do you think that they need to evolve and modernize as well? >> well, i think first, we lik e currt trend in readiness profile across the board. it's taken us a while, but both aviation, uien et cetera, personnel, it's going in the right direction. as far as the metrics, whether or not they are useful and helpful in the way we describe our readiness posture, there are

challenges with any snapshot of readiness. you know, literally, the change of a flag from oneand to the other can change your readiness profile from one day to another and move you readiness needle, if you will, in a direction that may be good or bad. so, i think if we are going to entertain readiness met or readiness reporting or readiness discussions, we have to acknowledge that it's the commanders assessments piece of that that we really need to pay attention to, the over-time trends and wha that communicates to the institution aboutneed. so, if i have as an operational commander, if i have the confidence that my readiness reporting is being received and acted upon by the institution,

then i'm pretty happy with that readiness reporting regime. the point at which that no longer helps me communicate my readiness concerns, then we need to talk about whether or not we need to change it. i know at the service level and above, there is lots of tential concern or cllenges with readiness reporting, but from our perspective, it's the discussion that it generates that is really important at the mef. my opportunity to engage with my commanders about where their readiness is, is one thing. where it's going and why it's going in the direction that it's going is really the more important discussion. >> so, as the guy who's responsible to the commandant, and ultimately, the commandant to the secretary of defense for readiness of the marine corps, in our reporting, my views, it's been very, very collaborative with osd, particularly working with dep sec shanahan and how the needle is moving based on the funding that we're receiving. we had a lot of say in the

metric that's been, you know, viewed for the marine corps, in rmof what are, kind of what are some of the obstacles that areut the thatee to be leapt over, in terms of where do we want to apply the funding to move the needle in readiness. we've had a lot of say in that. and then once we've made the declaration of here's the best way that we can use the funding the department has given us to enhance our readiness, then we're accountable to that, you know? so, it's been very -- i think it's been very collaborative, it's been very fair, and we've had a huge say whether it's moving the needle on aviation readiness or preparation for major combat operations or how our major defense acquisition programs are going, you know, in accordance with the funding that's there, and are we on schedule, et cetera, and on cost. so, we've got -- i think it's been very collaborative. i have no issue. i think they've got the right metrics. why? because i think we've had a huge say in what those metrics are. >> before we break, maren has encouraged me to allow one last

question from one of the mihipmen who have been patiently waiting. so, i believe the midshipman in the middle has been trying to get his question in, a quick question, and then we'll break. >> midshipman f program, member of the naval institute's internship program. i have a question from a currently former deployed marine who's watching on the livestream, so i apologize i'm reading off a phone. where do you see the future of land-based special purpose magtfs like those for crisis responsibility who quick stage action forces often become a menu of capabilities that are picked on and taken to adjacent forces, thus degrading the magtf of the unit? is it realistic to try to maintain the whole magtf units in these fully deployed land-based environments? sorry for a complicated one. >> i planted that question. no, i didn't. >> you on your phone? >> that's right. that really is a great question

that was covered broadly earlier on about how we deploy the force, how we prepare the force and then what for. and i would say that at the time, the idea that we would ed a special purpose magtf for a particular part oe pt in oer to tackle problems was absolutely, and to this day, still fulfills a great capability and function for the cocom that it happens to be allocated to. so, they have -- we have over time, again, kind of evolved those special purpose magtfs to be more fine tuned to what they were really assigned to do, with a very keen eye toward guarding against mission creep, that the point at which you have prepared and deployed a force for somebody else's use and the mission begins to change, you're always going to be a little

disappointed with what the end result is, fretheither from a readiness perspective or just what that unit is really doing. so, i think that as long as they are useful to the nation, and as long as the marine corps is able to put them out, then they're important. now, if you look at the nds and the nss, those types of things are being de-emphasized. so, if i need to recoup equipment, aircraft, and people in order to build readiness for a higher priority mission in the nds and the nss, those special purpose magtfs are a place i'm going to go and begin to talk about how do we get those back and prepare a different force for a different conflict or a different crisis. >> okay, well, thank you very much. wrapping up -- oh, go ahead. >> one more thing, mark. so, we have three. we have one that we put down in

south america during the storm season, primarily, different purpose, organized differently, different focus in its training. the one in the central command region, organized and equipped differently, different focus. then the one that we have in europe, supporting africa is also different in its own right in ter of organization and focus and its own challenges in terms of time-distance. but primarily, and i justan to reinforce the point that general hed eelund had, which i that, yes, we work these elements up. i would say the one in south america is not designed combat credible. it's down there for humanitarian purposes, primarily for theater security engagement. the central command region one is combat credible. the one in europe is also combat credible but would need augmentation from the joint force in terms of fixed wing support, for instance. and then it's the real world. so, then the idea that we would need to employ it in total would be desirable, but then the real world gets in the way of having

to really provide small elements and detachments to soft, to protect u.s. personnel and facilities. and they are making an enormous difference in both, really in all thr locations. the one just got down to south america recently, but the one in the central command region has been incredibly and vitally important to the execution of operation inherent resolve. conversely to ensure we don't have any additional benghazis and to support the soft we've had working throughout the africom region, there's been support with an lpd up there for some time. so, there's the ideal, then there's the real, and the real has been otrus value to the nation and to those combat and commands. >>'s okay, in closing, i thank huntington eagles, our sponsor for making this possible, and thank me in joining our panel. [ applause ]

later today here on c-span3, former usa gymnastics president

testifies before congress about handling allegations of sexual assault by larry nassar, the former usa gymnastics team doctor and former physician at michigan state university. he's now in prison for possession of child pornography and sexual assault. that hng of theate mmerce subcommittee on consumer protection is at 3:00 p.m. eastern. you can see it live here on c-span3. and tomorrow, health and human seices secretary alex azar testifies before the house education and workforce committee, live starting at 10:00 a.m. eastern here on c-span3. c-span, where history unfolds daily. in 1979, c-span was created as a public service by america's cable television companies. and today we continue to bring you unfiltered coverage of congress, the white house, the supreme court, and public policy events in washington, d.c., and

around the country. c-span is brought to you by your cable or satellite provider. the white house briefing with press secretary sarah sanders is coming up this afternoon, scheduled for 2:00 p.m. eastern, and we'll bring it to you live here on c-span3. until then, some of this morning's "washington journal." >> reporter: dinesh d'souza is an author, filmmaker and recently in the ns for receiving a pardon from president trump, joins us from houston, texas. good morning. >> good morning. >> could you remind our viewers quickly about the situation that caused you to get that pardon in the first place? >> yes. my college friend, wendy long, was running for the u.s. senate in new york. this is in 2012. we've been friends for 25 years. i gave her $10,000, which is the