top official told lawmakers today, this would represent the first public product to study foreign government efforts. and uld come nearly 5 months after attorney general jeff sessions set up a task force to assess the threat landscape. up next, adam hickpue assistan general for the justice department national security division testifies before the senate judiciary committee. this hearing is over two hours. i think everybody for being here today. i am sorry about the long lines outside.

i hope my staff has accommodated some ways. for many months now we have been aware thatforeign actors attempted to interfere in our democracy by spreading false and inflammatory rhetoric to the electric. and by attempting to hack our electoral system ourselves. we will focus on what actions we can take to help prevent that from happening again. particularly what tools we can provide law enforcement to investigate and prosecute those who seek to interfere with our elections. the great threat posed by foreign meddling in our elections has led to many respse is from within our government. first and foremost homeland security has been on the frontlines trying to bolster state and local election infrastructure. january 2017, and dhs

signated our electoral system as critical infrastructure. that designation supported cyber security related purposes. one election officials upon request woulbe a top priority for the receipt of dhs services. and election infrastructure would receive the benefit of various domestic and international cyber security protections. moreover, department of homeland security has worked to feed classified and unclassified cyber security risk information. with state and local officials. dhs has formed several working groups and task force. developing plans for election infrastructure security. working not only with state and unlawful election officials, but also the private sector to help generate best practices

and solutions. the department has continued to work to strengthen partnerships with state and local election officials. nevertheless, elections are controlled by states. that means these partnerships are completely voluntary. thuts thus upon states to seek lp from and cooperate with our federal government. if they do not, it is impossible for the department to step in. other responses from government include president trump's decision to levy sanctions against russia, and organizations that participated in march of this year treasury department targeted five entities and 19 individuals. including the internet research agency, and the individuals associated with it.

in april the administratn imposed addial sanctions on seven russian oligarchs. and top government officials for interference in the 2016 election d otheessions. among the individual sanction was -- an individual who had close ties to former trump campaign manager pa manafort. also in march of this year president trump expelled 60 russian diplomats from the u.s. i am told from history that is the largest explosion on the criminal front. this past february, special counsel charge seven russian entities with an effort to interfere in our election process. congress has devoted substantial attention to the issue. some have complained about the

alleged in action. particularly within our own committee. so you would expect me to say to the contrary in the diciary comme alon we have held no less than fi hear addressing this issue. ill regarding russian or other foreign interference in our elections since the last election. on the legislative front there have been no fewer than 18 pieces of legislation proposed, to combat different angles of the foreign election meddling issue. in this body alone. meeting this entire senate. however on one has been referred to the judiciary committee. i have cosponsored the disclosing foreign influence act . as well as the show company abuse act with senator whitehouse, urban and graham.

the second bill if it acted in law would criminalize concealing activities of a foreign national in connection with contribution or donations to campaigns or an election inddition to the bi offered in the senate 16 have been offered in the house. there have been many hearings and many other committees. the homeland security and our justice department havebeen working hard to formulate the best response to is challenge. and to investigate and prosecute those targeting our elections. experts and academics have also weighed in with thoughts of how best to protect our elections as we move towards this midterm election this year. we will hear from some of those people. as i mentioned earlier are hearing is focused very

squarely on this issue. are there additional steps that we can take within the jurisdiction of the judiciary committee that winingll meally assist law enforcement to deter , prevent, to investigate, and to punish foreign actors who seek to metal in our elections. it is important to note that the federal election campaign act, which is not even within our jurisdiction of this committeeis a comprehensive framework designed to address illegal campaign and election related activities. this act provides many of the answers to enforcement, and title 18. as a mueller indictment suggests many of the existing statues already addressed this behavior. we can name wire fraud, bank

fraud, aggravated identity theft , the fair act, and the computer fraud and abuse act. just to name a few. new problem sotimes call for new solutions. sometimes they can be addressed by existing all. ultimately the answer may be that no new laws need to be created. or that only a few small changes are necessary. these are perfectly acceptable answers. that does not mean that we should not ask the questions. here we are today. senator feinstein? >> thank you very much mr. chairman for holding this hearing. we know that russia orchestrated a sustained and coordinated attack. that interfered in our last presidential election. we also know there is a serious threat of more attacks in our

future elections. including this november. as the united states intelligence community unanimously concluded, the russian government's interference in our election, and i quote, blended covert intelligen operations. such as cyber acti with over efforts by the russian government agencies, state- funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or trolls. over the course of the past year and a half we have come to better understand w pernicious these attacks were. particularly unsettlingis that we were so unaware. we were unaware that russia was sowing division through mass propaganda. and working with malicious actors to tip scales of the election. 13 russian nationals, and three organizations including the

russian internet research agency have now been indicted for their role in russia's vast conspiracy to defraud the united states. these defendants bought political advertisements on social med. they taged political rallies inside of the united states. they did this all while posing as united states persons. and without revealing the russian identities. from special counsel ment, we know that unwitting americans assisted in these efforts. we still do not know however whether any americans knowingly helped the russians. this is extraordinarily sobering. our country is built on free and fair electi we are a government of the people, by the people, and for the people.

when our elections are called into question our government is also called into question. this was russia's goal. to attack the very foundations of our democracy. is the intelligence community's report later stated, and i quote , russian efforts to influence the 2016 u.s. presidential election represent the most recent expression of moscow's long-standing desire to undermine the u.s. led liberal democratic order, end quote. we must do all we can to prevent future attacks on our elections. have to be out the threats that we face. we have to put aside politics and act decisively. to be clear there are already laws on the books to prosecute those who interfere in our

elections. indeed as i mentioned a moment ago special counsel mueller has indicted 13 russian employees of the ira, the internet research agency. these individuals were charged with defrauding the united states, in violation of section 371 of title 18 of the united states code. this is a valid charge against those who interfere in our elections. in fact, there are questions whether the same charge can be brought against americans if they are found to have accepted election assistance from foreign entities who are coordinated with kiaks abt when to releails stolen from the democratic national committee campaign manager, john podesta. i hope these witnesses today will be able to offer their own assessments about whether those

charges could be validly brought. special counsel mueller has also charged former trump campaign chair, paul manafort wiud and violations of the foreign agents registration act. commonly calle for up. the purpose of this is to ensure that the united states government and its people are informed of the source of information and the identity of people seeking to influence united states public opinion, policy, or law. by failing to register as a foreign agent, mr. manafort allegedly concealed his efforts to affect u.s. foreign policy, including while serving as campaign chairman for the republican candidate for president. in fact, the special counsel's office has now charged mr.

manafort with obstructed -- obstructing justice by trying to conceal the true nature of his work for the ukrainian government. to avoid conviction mr. manafort has allegedly urged pastssociates to out his lobbying for ukrainian government interest. this is yet another example of how there are laws to address collusion. i hope the witnesses today can tell us how to make these laws better. in particular i am looking forward to hearing from the witnesses today about the scope t problem the steps that are currently being undertaken by the government. to hold malicious actors accountable. and third, ways that we can act to prevent future attacks.

mr. chairman thank you for holding this important meeting. several members of the committee have requested a ke this d ve intruced legislation to deal with foreign interference in our elections. i know that all of us on this committee have a very strong belief and commitment to act before our democracy is undermined again. i hope g will lead to this committee, passing legislation and conducting the relevant oversight to protect our future elections. thank you very much. >> thank you senator feinstein. introduction of our two witnesses from the first panel. mr. hickey is deputy assistant for national asset protection in the department of justice. mr. hickey was the acting deputy chief for cyber and national security divisions. before that he served as

deputy, chief of appeals in the southern district of new york. second witness, mr. masterson is a senior cyber security advisor within the national protection and programs director that the department of homeland security. prior to this role mr. masterson served as commissioner of the u.s. election assistance commission. along with veral her positions in that agency. and also he served as chief of staff for the ohio secretary of state. both of you probably know that if you have a very long statement beyond your five minutes that statement will be put in record. we will start with mr. hickey. and then mr. masterson. then we will have a round of questioning for anybody that wants to ask questions. mr. hickey? >> good morning chairman grassley, and distinguish

members of the committee. thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the department of justice concerning our efforts to combat election interference. the depa appreciates committee's interest in making sure that law enforcement has the tools that we need. i know the committee has my written testimony. i will not repeat it here. instead i will cover a few key points. himself identified this issue ed a cyber digital task force earlier this year. he directed the task force to direct -- our report is due to him by the end of this month. i anticipate the department will then issue a public report in mid july. i expect that report will provide additional insight into how the department intends to apply long-standing principles and policies and the sensitive

context of foreign influence operations. when i say forms influence operations i am referring to covert actions by foreign governme. intended to affect u. political sentiment and public discourse. the divisions in our society or undermine confidence in our democratics -- democratic institutions. these can run the gamut from cyber operations that target election infrastructure or polical organizations and seek to alter the confidentiality, availability or grity data. to covert influence operations, design, or assist or harm public officials. the department's principal role in combating electric -- election interference is the investigation and prosecution of federal crimes. form input -- influence effts -- they require more than law enforcement responses alone. recognizing that we approach this national security threat

the same as any other. with an eytoward supporting not only our own legal tools but the tools and abilities of others. first, as a threat driven organization and member of the intelligence community or the ice, the fbi can pursue tips and leads and investigate legal -- illegal foreign activities and share information from those activities with others. to help them detect, prevent, and respond to computer hacking, espionage and other criminal activities. the fbi can also she information with social media providers. helping them with their own initiatives to track foreign influence activity and to enforce terms of service that prohibit the use of their platforms for such activities. last fall the fbi formed a foreign influence task force. to ensure that this kind of information -- did of course our investigation makes the conduct that warns criminal charges, when they do we will

work to holdthe defendants accountable. including to our relationships with other nations. and ose who seek to avoid justice in u.s. courts will find thtravel significa restricted. our investigations can support action by other u.s. government agencies. using diplomatic, military and intelligence and economic tools. for example, in several recent cases the secretary of treasury has imposed financial sanctions on defendants abroad. under executive orders targeting malicious cyber enabled activities. finally, in opate cases information gathered during our investigation can be used to alert victims, other affected individuals and the public. reign influence activities. exposure of foreign operations might be one of the best ways to counter them. victim notifications, defensive counter intelligence briefings and public safety announcements are traditional department activities. they must be conducted with particular sensitivity in the context of elections to avoid the appearance of partiality.

in taking these actions we are alert to ways in which current law may benefit from reform. we welcome the opportunity to work with congress to combat foreign influence operations. by clarifying or expanding our laws to provide new tools or sharpengexisting ones if appropriate. the department plays an important role in combating foreign efforts to interfere in our elections. there are limits to the departments role and the role of u.s. government more broadly. in combating foreign influence operations. doing so requires a whole society approa that relies on coordinating actions by federal vemee, and local go es suppt from the prat sector, and the active engagement of an informed public. i want to thank the committee for providing me this opportunity to discuss these important issues on behalf of the department. i am happy to answer any questions that you may have. >> thank you mr. hockey -- hickey.

>> thank you for today's opportunity to testify regarding the department of homeland security's ongoing efforts to assist state and local officials. those who own and operate election systems with improving the resilience of elections across america. for over a decade i've worked with state and local officials to advance the use of technology to better serve american voters. for the last three years i served as a commissioner and chairman of the united states election commission. working to modernize the standards used to test voting systems and provide best practices to help support election officials and since 2016 responded to the threat against our nation's election systems. i now serve as a senior advisor at dhs. focused on the word the department is doing to support the thousand of election officials across the country.

in this decade of work i can tell you the best part is working with a dedicated professionals that administer elections. in the face of real and sophisticated threat, these officials have responded by working with us, state and local resources, the private sector and academia to mitigate risks and improve resilience. election security is a national security issue. and a top priority for the department. our mission at dhs is to ensure the election --'s system owners, in this case the local officials across the country have the necessary information and support to assess risk and recover from those risks. the support can come in many forms. dhs stands ready to help and offered taylor support based on state and local officials needs. through these efforts we have made significant progress. state and local officials and those private sector partners who support them are at the table working with us to improve the resilience of the process. for example we have created private councils who work to

share information and promote best practices, and develop strategies to reduce risk to the nation's election systems. this is our fastest growing sector. we are sponsoring up to three election officials in each state for security clearances. it allows officials to receive classified information if and when it is necessary. we have increased the availability of free technical assistance across the sector. dhs has been leading an inter- agency federal effort to support state and local efforts. this task force brings together our federal partners, the fbi and doj and the intelligence community, dod and other dhs partners and has modeled our work and other critical infrastructure sectors. the purpose is to ensure that

information is timely and actionable he shared broadly across the sector. the progress being made is clear. as i traveled across the country working with election officials it is evident. last month i traveled to iowa. to meet with secretary of state. level of engagement and coordination happening at all levels of government. from the secretary of state's office engaging th aa memberhe elecons task force and upgrading the statewide voter registration system. to the state oh cio providing training to the county auditors. to the local auditors themselves. iowa serves as a model of a whole government response. we have seen the progress that is being made at the local level. recently undersecretary chris krebs, in cook county, illinois. where he walked through the comprehensive framework for eltions.

through this framework cook county has systematically mapped every system. identified no bolindale -- known vulnerability points. elections are run by states and localities across the 50 states and five territories. there are over 10,000 jurisdiction -- jurisdictions in the united states. what works for the voters of florida may not work for the voters of california. the local administration of elections empowers voters to engage directly withthe process, and those who run it. my final point, r those voters who have questions or concerns regarding the integrity of the process i implore you to get involved. become a poll worker. watch pre-election testing. check your registration information before elections. engage with your local election officials.

most importantly, go vote. the best response for those who wishtoundermine faith in our democracy is to participate and vote. before i conclude i want tok co legislative progress thus far and strengthening dhs's cyber security and critical infrastructure authorities. we strongly support final passage of legislation to create the cyber security and infrastructure security agency. which would rename and reorganize mpd. i look forward to further outlining our efforts, and work with the state and local officials across this country. i look forward to your questions. thank you mr. chairman. >> we will have questions. start with mr. hickey. title 18, rte includes several tools for law enforcement to target individuals who are attempting to illegally influence american elections. including but not limited to wire fraud laws, bank fraud, identity theft, computer fraud and abuse, federal agent registration act violations.

money laundering, and our own review does not suggest any holes. what if anything needs to be fixed oradded to the criminal toolbox. that would refer to title 18. to allow law enforcement to investigate and prosecute those who attemp influence our election system. >> as you pointed out we have a fairly robust set of tools. we are committed to using all of them as well as we can and addressing the threat. at the moment i am not here today to call for any additional tool.

on an ongoing basis the department and all of its investigations consider the limits of those authorities. we are always looking, or examining whether there might be statutory gaps. >> what are the specific authorities, typically th investigations? >> i think it will depend on what we mean by these investigations. as i alluded to in my written testimony. activities can run the gamut. all the way to other covert influence efforts which could implement -- implicate the foreign registration act.

it depends on the flavor of foreign influence operation. >> mr. masterson march of this year congress approves 380 million to help save card u.s. voting systems. participation in the program offered by the department of states is completely voluntary. and depends on the cooperation of state and local governments. two parts to this question, what level of cooperation are you receiving from individuals, secretaries of state? let me add to it the second part. how does it compare to cooperation received in previous elections. >> thank you mr. chairman. the level of collaboration and cooperation with the secretary of state is fantastic.

it is at a high level. we are engaged with every stay in some way. we have the ability to share information with all 50 states should we need to. with point the contact available. the secretaries are appropriately skeptical of a federal role in this space. we continue to engage with the secretaries and engage with the local election officials so they see the value of the services. and the information that we are providing. >> i do not think you touched on t comparison -- maybe there is nothing to compare. >> in my prior role, we experience the same skepticism. from secretaries of state. again, secretaries and state and local election officials appreciate those who support and bring value to the process. to help them do their jobs. the secretaries and prior iterations have expressed their role. they have also engaged

with us. >> february this year, the special counsel indicted the research agency and others interfering in last election, the charges in the ecial counsel's indictment considered -- included conspiracy to defraud the united states. these are the kinds of nuts and bolts charges that we would see and a lot of garden-variety. is the nature of the election interference conduct that we have seen in the past unique or different from other investigations? in other words is the conduct such that we need to think about a new way to prosecute these cases, and design a new framework to do so. >> i see my time has expired. we look to leverage the framework that exists now.

we should always be alert to ways that the framework could be improved. election interference and activities by foreign governments have a lot of investigations. they have a lot of the same challenges. one example, offices located abroad. as our target. they are in jurisdictions who are unwilling to assist us with the investigation. investigating and getting evidence is a challenge. apprehending the defendant can be a challenge. >> senator feinstein thank you both for answering my questions. >> thank you very much mr. chairman. mr. hickey i would like to talk to you about what your department justice is doing now to prevent or investigate so that the upcoming election will not be affected?

>> i think one of the most important things we are doing is ensuring that there is coectivity thin the department and to -- between the departments and the private sector to make sure we identify the information that matters, and that we open and investigate cases where we learn of potential threats. that we put others in a position to defend and protect themselves. we have done that in part by last fall -- >> do you have any open investigations relating to the upcoming election? >> i cannot confirm or deny if we did. i'm speaking programmatically to what we are doing to make sure that we can react appropriately. >> are you working with the igence community? and examining this and looking out for it? >> the fbi has an ongoing relationship as a member of the

intelligence community. the tyof information that you are referring to, and the types of information, one of the highest priority types of information we could be watching out for. and ensuring that we are sture to act on it, share it, as appropriate high priority for the department. >> three months ago the directors of the cia, nsa, od and i and fbi warned the american public to refrain from using products or services from the chinese telecom company cte. chris ray stated we should be deeply concerned about the risks of allowing companies gaining positions of power inside of our telecounications network. he said doing so, and this is a quote, provides capacity to

exert pressure or control over our telecommunications structure it provides the capacity to maliciously di or steal information. it provides the capacity to conduct undetected espionage. do you agree with this assessment from three months ago? regarding the threat provided by -- excuse me, posed by zte products? >> i agree. >> wcan you tell us about what the department is doing? >> we have a pending matter, involving zte. that is public in texas. or generally we are alert to ways that authorities like team telecom allow us to investigate transactions or licensed applications. and either make recommendations to the fcc or recommendations to the president to prohibit

transactions. those are the kind of tools that we have at our disposal. >> senator cornyn, i happened to be his cosponsor. led an effort to change -- to make it more inclusive as you know. is not going to be helpful? >> yes, the department supports that. >> can you tell us anymore about this one situation with zte? >> there is a pending matter so i do not want to characterize it outside of the record. >> let me ask you, do you think justic should be involved with any trade negotiations that have a direct bearing on zte? >> the justice department forcement authority acrding to the law. independently we seek to enforce the law that is written. and hold folks accountable based on the evidence. >> was justice involved in

these negotiations? >> i cannot comment on that. there is a pending prosecution. zte pled guilty some time ago. and resolve that case. it is an ongoing matter. we are involved in that obviously. >> thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you to you for being here. any interference with our electoral process is a matter of grave concern. to all americans. it seems like the russians have been attempting to interfere with our elections for some time. this isn't new. they've attempted to do that presumably in an effort to undermine public confidence in our electoral system. and the voting process here in america. we should be ncerned about

that. and always looking for appropriate ways to guard against it. as i see it, there are a few important questions before us that we need to address. one involves the concern with the integrity of our election infrastructure. or the machines that we are using and the eqpment that we are using. are those secure? second foreign bad actors seeking to disseminate false information in an effort to affect the outcome of elections is also of great concern. also there is the question of remedies. what do we do about each of these things? first let's talk about the integrity of our election infrastructure. we will start with you mr. masterson. were there any known breaches of our election infrastructure in the 2016 election? >> thank you senator. yes, there was some publicly discussed known breaches. specifically with voter

registration database. >> are their confirmed instances from votes being change from one candidate to another? >> there are no coircases of that. >> were any voting machines hacked? >> no, not that i know. >> prior to the 2016 election cycle the department of homeland security saw preparations being made. preparations for hacking by the russians. can you explain to us what procedures the department of homeland security undertakes once it has identified a potential threat to a states election for structure? >> sure. thank you for the qution senator. from the department hd security perspective our number one goal is to ensure the timely actionable sharing of that information. in the case of 2016, going forward we ensure that we got

indicators, and specific technical information down to those owners and operators to look for possible issues or incidents. and respond and recover from that. >> in your opinion, how best can the federal government help here? elections are primarily a creature of state and local governments. typically it is obviously there is a national interest in protecting the integrity of our system. particularly against those who would try to interfere from outside, and foreign powers was certainly be cause for concern. how best can the federal government try to help state and local governments to ensure the integrity of their systems? >> there are three primary focuses for us. one is the timely sharing of actionable information. ensuring whether we get information from states or locals of activity ey are

seeing or from the fbi and others that were able to share that information down. in order to allow the system owners and operators to protect them. two is to provide service. and to coordinate the federal government's response to the targeting attacks on election infrastructure. our election task force helps to coordinate fbi, doj, eac, and others to ensure that any information we have at the federal level is used and provided those who have to run elections. >> reporter: some states have gravitated to go low-tech.

some states have made moves back toward paper ballots. so that they cannot be hacked. is that helpful? is that something that is necessary that more states should consider? >> audible paper records is critical. to the security of the systems. those states thathave non- paper systems have indicated a desire since pennsylvania to move to an audible system. >> you mean paper ballot system or a system that creates a paper trail? >> correct. >> thank you mr. chairman. >> i agree with senator feinstein. for having this hearing.

i was worried about the president refusing to criticize president putin st about anything. weatherby crimea -- whether it be crimea or our elections. the real problem is the 5 million fraudulent votes were cast in the last electn accordintoredent trump. do we have a threat? have we seen million of fraudulent votes? >> from where i said, my focus is on foreign states and terrorists.

from my perspective the department, the attorney general has indicated that election security is a priority. >> do you consider there is threat ofhostile ren actors? >> dni has said there are reasons to be coerned. avnot seen any evidence of noncitizens voting? >> that is not within my portfolio served. >> you are at the dertment of justice. if millions of noncitizens had voted with the department of justice be investigating that? >> i expect that would violate laws. >> i think it might. it is easy to say. does

ap thatthhave ha the intelligence community, mr. masterson, a threat to foreign interference in our election. the commission currently has only two commissions. until recently you were committed by the former house speaker. you were highly regarded by state officials.

it has been very professional. your seat remains vacant. how does thelection assistance commission have only two commissioners? >> thank you senator. i refer you to the eac for specifics. from my experience, they are able to carry on many of the functions without a quorum -- for him. the key item that i know i worked on, it continues to progress and would need a quorum. 's approval of the new

voluntary system guidelines. >> the department of homeland security to the hackers is believed to be linked to russia. a small number successfully penetrated. most of them had no idea. are you concerned these states are not moving fast enough? >> i am not. in my experience, every state i travel to is taking this riously. they are working collaboratively with multiple levels of gover well as the private sector. and other resources. in order to respond. it's incumbent on us at the department to build those partnerships and ensure they have the support they need to do that. >> i appreciate the comments made about the paper trail. we do that in vermont.

i hope we have used some of the money to the appropriations comme. >> thank you to the witnesses who are here today. if i were in moscow thinking about engaging in more election interference in the united states and the coming election, i might consider the following factors. you spend 19 months since the last election which russia interfered in. it has been 17 months since every major intelligence agency in the united states reported on this interference. it's en 12 months since there was an appointment of the ecial counsel. >> i understand mr. hickey that you promised two months from now a task force that your return tish referred to by the attorney general will give us a public report on what they

recommend. how seriously are americans taking this threat? is it worth it to come after this coming election that is 19 weeks away? we do not that special counsel mueller has aggressively gone after russian interference. he has indicted 13 russian nationals and three russian corporations in addition to seven others who might have been complicit in this effort. when we look at the money given to states, $380 million for the united states of america. illinois share something like $13 million. and we were hacked. by the russians. i wonder if we can really point to a record. where we have progressively gone after russian interference. set up defenses, and deterrence so they will not do this again in november. esther hickey are you confident that we have been under this

administration aggressively pursuing this russian interference in our last election? >> senator i think we have been trying to raise costs on russia. in so doing we have brought charges againstffd officers. sanction -- individuals and entities have been sanctioned. diplomatic officers have been kicked out of the united states . russian facilities have been closed. we have been clear and public in attributing malicious cyber activity to the russian government. we have done so, sometimes in a coordination with our allies. i think we continue to look for ways to raise costs of maligned behavior, and including influence operations that are illegal. >> for a complete record we

have the president of the united states who has referred to the mueller investigation as a hoax and a witchhunt over and over and over again. just this last weekend he called for recognition of russia and the g8 again to give them full partnership back into that organization. it is a mixed message at best. let me go to a specific. i agree with the chairman. it's a senator's job to produce new laws. in one particular area senator graham and the bipartisan bill, to try to deter russians who are seeking visas to come into the united states. for these maligned purposes. we know from the indictment a special counsel mueller of these 13 russians in february of this year. that there was specific activity by several of them. mr. trey lobo, that they came

to the united states and started casing the joint. looking is over and getting ready for the attack on the last election. even visited my state of illinois which they did in fact hack. to believe the bipartisan legislation which we propose wouldter people from receiving visas that they are coming to the united states with the purpose of election interference is a good idea? >> senator i cannot take a position on any particular legislation today. it's important to look at indictments and other cases and measure them against the authorities and look for ways that we might improve or sharpen the tools that exist. that is an ongoing efrt at the department. >> i was put off by your statement. we need no additional tools, i quote you in saying that. if you found any statutory gaps you would let us know. i hope you would be more

aggressive in terms of the department of justice looking at tools that would discourage the next generation of russian trolls trying to interfere in american elections. to know that we are serious, in terms of deterrence and prosecution, and we are serious in terms of defense. $380 million for a nation of this size in its elections. we had $38 billion that was given to help america vote. we made the investment a few years back. i just do not think we have shown an intensity of focus and purpose. to look the russians or any other country know that we are serious when it comes to this next election. we are only a few weeks away. >> thank you chairman and thank you both for being here. i concur that there is a risk of cyber hacking and interference with our actual election and voting mechanisms. doree in the last election the primary vector of russian influence came through

information operations rather than technical cyber election hacking? >> it seems to have been a broad campaign. i agree that this information is one of the principal threats. >> mr. masterson do you agree? >> i would agree with that. >> one of the ways in which the russians or any other foreign actor could obscure their role in information operations is by operating through corporate shells that do not look like the government of russia. is that not also correct? >> that seems fair senator. >> it is pretty obvious isn't it? mr. masterson do you agree? >> honestly i don't have enough background on that to way in. i would have to refer to the doj on that one. >> when we had facebook's ceo here we discussed their

authentication procedure, for determining who was buying political advertising time on facebook. the ceo disclosed that they were only going one hop with authentication. so that if a delaware llc, or a nevada llc was the nominal buyer of the political time of looking behind it to see if it was inact putin or oligarchs or somebody associated with foreign election mapulation. how big of a liability is our present inability to know who the actual true beneficial owners are shell corporations window shell corporations engaged in election influence operations?

>> senator the perspective i take on that is from being responsible for fair enforcement. e we are very engaged in trying to determine whether an entity is actually a legitimate commercial entity or is a proxy for foreign government. that which makes that more transparent and easier for us enforcethat which obscures. >> that only applies to very specific sarah activities. at the moment would you not agree that it is a u.s. vulnerability, that foreign actors are able to take advantage of particularly american shell corporations and ctobscure their hands in information and campaign finance operations? >> i would agree that ansparency and ownership, or control was helpful to me. >> that is in part why the department supports the grassley white house bill to provide for more shell corporation

transparency, correct? >>founi in a position to take a position on legislation today. the department would be eager to work with you and your staff. >> i think that's critical to our enforcement in a variety of areas. >> and at moment, it is far from and -- adequate, correct? >> i don't know that i know the answer to that, sir. >> well you ought to. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. thank you for being here today.

obviously, we learned we were not prepared for the last election. and we were not prepared for what russia did. do you believe that following what we saw in 2016, the administration is prepared for what could happen in 2018? >> i think we know a lot more now, senator. and i think we have organized ourselves to respond to what we better may know now and what we will learn in e future. >> do you think you will continue to see this foreign interference? and it may not just be from russia, but from other countries. >> i defer to the intelligence committee on that but i know the d&i has said that it has remained an active c anoncern he has reason to believe that at a minimum operations will coue. >> i believe it was done -- director coates that in response to russia, he had said russia would get even bolder in this next round of elections. so, senator langford and i have

introduced the secure elections act. two members of this committee, senatod ser ahtor harris were involved in this, and cosponsors. we were able to get $380 billion in the last budget and that money is not going out to the states to help them shore up their election infrastructure. both leaders supported this and we were able to get this done. we have a number of states that don't even have backup paper ballots. linois has had issues inthe e. past and hackers got as far as their voter files. do you think these resources would be helpful? >> yes, thank you, sena absolutely, i think they have already been helpful. the department worked with our government coordinating council an create guidance for state local election officials to use, to help inform the use of that money on a short and long- term basis, focused on

addressing possible and known vulnerabilities, as well as long-term important issues like auditability, training for state and local officials, as well as defensibility. i think money is an important step. >> now we have the secure elections act which we have put in the form of an amendment on the ndaa. i'm the lead democrat on it. we've worked very hard with the secretary of state's. we have met with them from all er the country and have gotten some agreement to get this through and supported strongly by senator burns and senator warner. it allows and makes it clear the information sharing, some of the work you're doing with homeland security. and, along with local election officials and the like. just wondering your thoughts on that. right now on the floor this is unfortunately being blocked. we are surprised by that.

he and i are working to get it attached to the ndaa. could you talk about that work that senator langford and i have done and how that could be helpful? i'met wi senator langford's staff and your staff as well, to talk about the department a key . i will in to do so to contribute to the bill. moving forward, the department is focused on provisions in the bill like establishing a communications protocol and having a means by whicwe can insure the actual timing and sharing of information with state and local s. we are moving forward and will continue to work with staff on your bill. >> do you have any idea why this is being held up? it's on the republican side. >> i don't, senator. >> okay. be honest ads act is something we are working to get done and we are getting increasing support from the tech community, especially after the major hearings that this community had along with commerce. i think the two leaders for that. you know that $1.4 billiowas spt on online ads in 2016. and, there is the need as you look at how bad actors can use

a system where there was no transparency, no disclosures, and no disclaimers. do u e a way where more transparency would be helpful to catch bad actors? >> from my standpoint, respble fotheir enforcement, yes. understanding who is controlling or directing an actor in the united states is critical to our enforct. >> very good. that's helpful. and the last thing i bring up is, just the way this cash flows, and what happens. senator blunt and i she and by the way, we are going to start a series of hearings, mr. chairman, on the elections with the rules committee. we are back in business. and, taking back some of our jurisdiction. not from you. but i'm very pleased that we are going to be starting to work on elections with the rules committee and we are having two hearings i think coming up. senator blunt and i have introduced the stop for

donations affecting our elections act along with feinstein and warner, to strengthen disclosure, credit cards, to help verify that online credit card donations come directly from the u.s. could you comment on the measures that foreign actors take to conceal the source of money they used to undertake activity in the u.s.? mr. hickey? >> i can't comment on pending legislation. i know would be happy to work with you and your staff on legislation. >> the last comment i have made to my friends across the allied. you, mr. chairman, is the only one here right no but, this secure elections act, which senator laford and i have been working on for a long time. we have an opportunity with the new work that we are seeing. this is the ndaa bill. as you see people moving, other countries are moving as modus operandi, when it comes to warfare, to not update laws to me, seems like a very big and lost opportunity. i hope that we are able to get this amendment on the bill.

>> thank you. senator klobuchar and senator langford did terrific work on this secure elections act. i want to commend senator klobuchar for your hard work on this, and for advocacy for the authorizing state. i also work with senator langford on the senate appropriations chair, to make sure that the grants the election commissions system got out and are being distributed. mr. masterson, given your role, helpe understand. what are the most urgent reforms you think states should be implementing? and you mentioned there is a need for additional resources. every state will get $3 million. my low state of delaware will get million. we have some of the oldest election machinery in the country. we've got dozens of states that i ink arnot fully prepared for an election that as senator durbin pointed out is less than six months away.

i'm concerned about the sense of a lack of urgency. give us insight into how you think the eac grants are being distributed and whetr you think there is more resources needed, and where you would put those if made available federally. >> thank you. this was the focus of the work that we did with the government coordinating council, in looking at the funding. we were asked by councilmembers, state and local officials primarily, to help provide insight, as far as where the money could be used, both short and long-term, to address riskto the process. we focused first on addressing those common i.t. vulnerabilities that exist across i.t. systems, regardless of elections. things like patching, and training for fishing campaigns, as well as just manpower. several states, illinois, florida, as well, have looked at cyber navigators to the local level to provide a level of expertisoni.t. support that sometimes is not

available to county election officials. and so, those are short-term improvements that is states are looking at usinth money for. that was included in the gcc guidance. longer-term, it's improving overall resilience. insuring auditability. entering the defensibility of the systems are a variety of mechanisms. long-term investments in training, and i.t. management. one of the things i do regularly is travel the country to do training with state and local officials on i.t. management, understanding the rest of their systems. >> mr. masterson, forgive me. i only have 2 1/2 minutes left. do you think $380 million from the federal government is sufficient? how big of a gap do you think there is, given the assessment of intelligence committee and others that russia and ot foreign actors will interfere again in our impending elections? >> in my experience in over a decade in elections, resources,

whether it be money, expertise, or support, hard to come by for state and local officials. an investment at the local and state level certainly, where elections are run, is necessary. i know the $380 million was viewed by state and local officials as an important step by the federal government as well to communiwhat they do to provide services. >> thank you. i look forward to following up with you on this important work and thank you to senator klobuchar. mr. hickey, if i might, based on special counsel robert mueller's investigation, we know that three senior trump campaign officials failed to register as foreign agents in violation of an sting law. national security adviser michael flynn, paul manafort, and rick gates. given russia's interference in the presidential election in 2016, and the statements of several senior intelligence officials, they will attempt to interfere again. are you concerned about undisclosed foreign agents attempting to interfere with our democracy going forward? and if so, what steps are you taking to make sure the

department has the tools you need? >> thank you, senator. in fact, increased and improved enforcement are one of the department's priorities over the last 2 years. we've been aggressive in educating agents and prosecutors about how to educate and prosecute fair violations. we've stepped up our efforts to identify potential research -- registrants, to open criminal investigations where appropriate, to compel or urge the registration of entities and individuals who should have registered, and one example relevant to this hearing is the agents of rt and sputnik, russian sponsored media organizations who recently registered as agents of a foreign principal. >> i appreciate your focus and urgency on this. i only wish our president conveyed a similar level of focus and urgency on protecting our election. last question. in your prepared remarks, you know how the department of justice maintains relationships with social media providers. but it's those providers, and i'm quoting, who are the

primary responsibility for securing their platform's services and products along this threat. do you think companies like facebook and twitter are doing enough? are they still vulnerable? do we need to provide the department with more tools to combat interference on social media platforms? >> i would describe this as an evolving relationship. it's trending in the right direction. i think there is more work to begun. at the moment, we are following a little bit of the model with respect to the internet, where we as a society are comfortable with social media, making decisions about content dissemination, and more comfortable with at the end we are the government based on content. what we are trying to do is identify situations where we think the users are violing their terms of service, and bring that information to their attention for them to take with the faction they view is appropriate. whether they are taking the right action or not is still be on the department's expertise. i think that is a society,

congress question. >> my closing question is that we fail to grasp how big of a potential threat there is to our elections through social media. and, i've been profoundly disappointed with what we've heard and testimony from leadership with facebook, twitter, youtube, and others, about their response. i'm concerned that withthe next ectionx months awa wee unresolved work to do here together. >> before i: senator blumenthal, in regard to the last point that was brought up in this question, we have legislation before this committee. improving the foreign agents registration act. and, we are running into some -- i'm not asking a question. i'm just asking you to look at something. we are running into some opposition, i should say, from some business groups in this country, that i don't think have a legitimate reason for opposing it. and i wish you would take a look at our bill, and see if you can help us move that along.

i don't know whether the administration would ask you to take a position on it or no and i'm not asking you now. but there is a lot of shortcomings. most of it has been lack of enforcement. going way back to 1938. very little enforcement. i know you said it's a top priority and i'm glad to hear that iis but we need to get addial legislation passed. senator blumenthal? >> thanks, mr. chairman. let me just second the sentiment expressed by the chairman, that what has been lacking in many of these areas is enforcement. you have said that you don't need new tools. i would submit that enforcement has beenabysmal. this is a bipartisan failure, and it's not meant to be critical of you as officials. but i think the chairman is right, that enforcement has been sadly lacking. let me begin by asking you just

very straightforwardly, there is no doubt in your mind, is there, that russia interfered, or sought to interfe with the 2016 elections? >> no, sir. >> no, sir. >> in fact, russia attacked the united states of america. in my view, it committed an ac of war. i've made this statemenalong with the chairman of the armed service committee, john mccain, and other venues. this attack on our democracy will continue. will it not? unless the united states makes russia pay a price. correct? >> it warrants a strong response, senator. i think in this area and others, we have to find ways to raise costs of malicious and maligned behavior in foreign states. >> i'm sorry, mr. masterson. >> go ahead. >> so it's not only a matter of protecting our systems, but also deterring thatattack by proactively making russia pay a

price, correct? >> i think you have to raise the cost of the senar. >> the president's defense lawyers, in a recent memo that was blished dely, assert that it was, quote, corruption within the fbi and department of justice. which appears to have led to the alleged russia collusion investigation. in march, president trump also expressed a similar view when he tweeted, quote, there was no collusion between russia and the trump campaign. as many are finding out, however, ere was tremendous leaking, lying, andcouption at the highest levels of the fbi, justice, and state. president trump also tweeted that president -- that robert

mueller's probe was based on quote, fraudulent activities. are you aware of leaking, lying, corruption within the fbi and department of justice? >> no, senator. >> are you aware that leaking, lying, and corruption led to the russian collusion investigation? >> no, senator. >> are you, mr. matheson? >> no. >> president trump alleged that james comey knew about lies and corruption going on at, quote, the highest levels of the fbi. and his defense wyers have said conley has led to the disruption at the highest level of the fbi, end quote. is it accurate, to say at mr. comey's findings led to the discovery of corruption within the fbi? >> i don't know what that refers to, sir. >> i have no knowledge of that,

or information on it. >> there been stts about there being no evidence of any collusion between the trump campaign, and the russian attempt to interfere in 2016. put aside whether collusion has been proved. on the question of whether there is evidence, would you agree with me that there is some evidence that has been elicited and presented so far by the special counsel's investigation? >> because you recognize, it's an unavailing investigation and is not a program for me to comment on at evidence may or may not have been discovered. >> well, let's just talk about facts. whether we characterize it as evidence or not.

we know that candidate trump called for ss thack his opponent -- his opponents' emails, correct? >> i'm familiar with the public statement that i think you are referring to. >> which in fact is calng for that hking. we are aware that his son, in anticipating and asking for a meeting with russian agents, said he would quote, love, end quote, to get dirt on hillary clinton from vladimir putin, correct? >> all i know about that i know from media reports, sir. and i don't have them in front of me. >> if those facts were true, wouldn't it be evidence of collusion between the trump campaign and the russian interference? >> sir, i don't think it's appropriate for me to comment in any respect on a pending matter.

>> senator harris, you are the last one. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i appreciate that, good morning. mr. masterson, this sunday, director coates said, quote, it is 2018 and we continue to see russian targeting of american society in ways that could affect our midterm election. and, you may have discussed this. i'm sorry, i was in another hearing. let me know if you have. i will go on with my question. russia attacked our democracy when interfered in the 2016 election. and, this is why the secure elections act of senator laying ford, klobuchar, graham, and i are working on, and why we believe it is important. you may be familiar with the act. >> i am. >> okay, great. i recently held a demonstration for my colleagues here at the capital, where he brought in the folks, who before our eyes, hacked election machines.

those that are being used in many states, but are not state- of-the-art from our perspective. as a former commissioner, and based on your current role, do you believe that funding should be prioritized for the state? to upgrade their system, based on need, rather than based on the size of the population of the state? >> thank you, senator, for the question. i think there is a decided need for resources across the state, in a variety of ways and, the way to prioritize that funding could be done based on a number of approaches including risk-based decision be midocean making. like we approached it at dhs, to help inform where the risks she and how to best address it t and long-term. >> can you outline some of the risks that you reviewed and analyzed to determine the need? >> sure. as we worked with state and local officials across the country, we looked at a variety

of what i would say are paradigms or structures that states use. for example, web facing systems, online portals, items like that certainly have a broade reat profile from the exposure side, but the risk and actual integrity of the process may be less. and so, identifying those risks and what can be done to tigate them to those, sort of the broader vulnerabilities on those systems that have less concerns about the integrity of the boat are there. and then simple steps like putting auditability in place. that is something that builds up the resiliency. >> have you published the list of risks for the state and for the public to see? >> we worked with the government coordinating council, which is a counsel of critical infrastructure. >> has it been published? >> there includes information about both risk and mitigation. >> has it been published?

>> i believe there is something on our website about that but i can get further information. >> please follow up with this committee. and if it's not there, please follow up and publish a list of what you believe to be the list of various elections systems, in terms of vulnerability to hacking. and if you can get that done by the end of this month, if it's not already there, we'd appreciate that. and in march, as you may know, congress passed an omnibus spending bill that contains $380 million in grant funding to help states protect their election infrastructure. do you know, what is the status of getting the guidelines, and the guidelines that dhs officials can be for homeland security and said that that would be prod? a guidance for the states on how that money should best be spent, would be most effective? can you tell me what the status is of that? >> the coornal approved that guidce weeks ago and released it to the states and locals.

it has been distributed through those channels. >> and is that available to the public? >> it is. >> okay, thank you. and will you talk about what you have seen in terms of the sk a census -- risk assessments you been doing around the country? i believe 14 states have been completed, correct? >> i believe 17 states. >> and, what, generally, have you seen as being the vulnerabilities of those assessments? >> generally speaking within the elections infrastructure sector, we are seeing the same typical vulnerabilities you to see across i.t. systems. managing software updates, updated equipment door hardwa, as well as general upgrades that need to take place, as far as configuration managent within systems, to limit the damage that could be done if something were to take place. >> they are resilit? >> yes, the resilience, exactly. thank you, senator. this sector is no different in

what we see in the work we are doing with them. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> we are done with this panel but a lot of members don't come. so the record will be open for a week. and you will get questions in writing. so, please answer them as soon as you can. >> mr. chairman, i have another question. i just want to reiterate what senator harris was saying and thank her for her work on the senate elections act. you know that senator coons brought it up, i've course brought it up. we have this opportunity when we come back to the office to get this in as part of an amendment to the ndaa. it isurrent being held up on the republican side. and i really want to get it done. it is a republican-led bill by senator laying phil -- langford, and simply ments some of the work we've been talking about today. i don't know how we can pass a ndaa bill for the defense of our nation but not include something like this. we'd like to get it on and done. thank you.

>> and, i want to cot something i said to you. i probably inferred that the foreign agents registrati act amendments that i have in, that they were in this committee. they are in foreign relations. i've also been informed by my staff that your department is helping with that legislation. you are dismissed. >> thank you. >> while the other group is coming, i will start to introduce. esther wayne stein is a partner . in 2008, he was named homeland security advisor by president george w. bush. prior to his white house service, he was the first assistant attorney general for national security. before that, he served as u.s. attorney in washingtd.c. he has served as general counsel also of the fbi.

mr. goodman is the founding editor in chief of publication, an online form based on u.s. national security. and, that form is based on university school of law. mr. goodman is a professor of law, policy, and sociology at new york university. prior to this, he served as special counsel to the general counsel of the department of defense. ms. jankowski is a global fellow at the wilson center in washington, d.c. she focused on eastern europe, focuses on eastern europe, and russia, and previously, she served as a fulbright clinton public policy fellow and worked in government relations at the national democratic institute for international affairs. we'll start with kenneth.

>> thank you, mr. chairman and senator klobuchar. i very much appreciate the invitation to appear before you today. i want to say at the outset, i believe you are doing a real service by holding this hearing and pursuing a real issue. which in the course of doing that, you're highlighting what has gottlost in in much of the political controversy in the 2016 election. which is that we are facing an unprecedented and growing threat to our institutions around the globe. in january 2017, the intelligence committee assessed that the russian government directed a multifaceted campaign to influence our 2016 election. a campaign that included cyber intrusions in the state and local board systems, penetration at the dmz, -- dnc, among other groups, and release of material influence the

election, and use of internet trolls to spread disinformation and amplify teams that supported the campaign or narrative the russians were propounding. with the intelligence community and several ensuing investigations hav't finitively established that we face a serious and growing threat, the question is how we can respond to that threat. the government has a number of tools it can use. first, it has the nasa ineffective -- effective courts, like fisa and national security level -- letters, as well as full range of tools they can use to detect and investigate influence activities. second, it has the ability to bring a critical prosecution under perpetrators, under for example, the computer fraud protection and abuse act, or under the foreign registration eight act, for those who engage in political activities on behalf of a foreign party without registering themselves as foreign agents. they can also be achieved through the application of trade policies, such as when president trump and president

obama imposed sanctions on individuals, and the tariffs can also bean objection to the country to get official staff such as when both president's subjected -- and close russian facilities in this country. another option is the enforcement of campaign finance laws, to prevent foreign nationals from contributing to u.s. political campaigns. last year's supports a russian funding for the french far right party residential candidate, allegedly in part as a reward for supporting russia two activities in crimea, raises the concerns the russians may make similar temp to sway american politics with campaign funding and prosecutions. and final area of focus is on the protection of electoral systems themselves, which is the purpose behind dhs' announcement last january that the election processes will heeforth be designated as critical infrastructure, like the energy grid, telecommunications networks, and other critical sectors that receive federal assistance and protection. so, those are the tools and capabilities being used to meet

this threat today. light of recent events, however, we need to think of ways we can strengthen those tools and i'd like to flag such recommendations. the first is to give the justice department statutory authority to get a junction against operators of botnets. botnets take over networks and computers and launch disruptive attacks. and, we saw that very clearly when russia attked esnia through botnets in 2007. a second proposal is to enhance the effectiveness of the foreign agents restriction act, by given authorities though she suspected agents to turn over records that show whether they are or are not acting on behalf of foreign interests. a proposal is to consider an altogether statute that specifically addresses this threat. although as you discussed in the earlier panel, these statutes provide a basis for prosecuting much of the russian misconduct we saw in 2016, congress should consider

crafting a statthat specifically targets foreign interference in election activities, thereby highlighting both our severity of this threat and condemnation of such activity, as well as providing prosecutors a tool that can be directly and effectively used against these influence campaigns, which will bom only more prevalent and insidious as our editors continue to hone their skills and use new technologies for subversive purposes. another proposal in the lessons learned in the run up to the 2016 election, when the obama administration struggled with the election to provide the public -- they were detecting. torn between a desire to inform the public and need to refrain from public announcements that could be seen as an attempt to affect the outcome of the election. in order to avoid that dilemma in future election cycles, some have recommended that congress passed legislation recommending the requiring d&i to report intervals leading up to the federal election whether the

intelligence community is detecting any foreign interference with the upcoming election and the source of the interference, thereby ensuring that voters are on those, and on the lot fomisleading propaganda and informaton to -- the most influential way. so to conclude, we do have a number of effective tools and capabilities which can be bolstered to meet and defeat the threat. the real question is whether we have the focus and single- minded will to do so. all too often, we as a country have been slow to mobilizing the threat in the face of a looming threat, such as where we were with al qaeda in the 1990s and cyber threat in 2000. it's my hope we will not be slow in respondi th threat. fit step but it's critical we follow up with action that is sustained, decisive, and to use senator feinstein keywords, clear eyed. it's not an overstatement to say there's a lot at stake. no less -- democratic processes

here and around the world. thank you to the committee for having me here today and i look forward to answering questions. >> thank you, mr. wainstein. now professor goodman. >> i want to start by thinking chairman grassley and ranking member feinstein and distinguished members of the committee for holding such an important hearing on such an important issue. it's an honor for to be here to testify before you. the russian organization that used social media tools to interfere in our most recent election called its mission, quote, information warfare against the united states of america, and court. like the terrorists on 9/11, our enemies used are systems against us. al qaeda use commercial air transportation systems, the kremlin used our social media and communications systems. moscow hijacked platforms such as facebook, twitter, and youtube, and the attack on the united states. the operations wreaked havoc on the election that began long before donald trump or hiary clinton announced their runs for the presidency, code-named,

or referred to as the translation project. this specific russian operation to influence the 2016 election began around may 2014. it was initiated with a stated goal to quote, spread distress toward the candidates in the political system in general. by 2015, they. the social media operation with ber espionage operation. 2015 is an important time period to remember. even though the dissemination of stolen emails during the general election is highly salient, it's vital for the public to understand that the common began this espionage be r the primaries, favoring some primary candidates for president and undermining others in both major political parties. as a january 2016 election stated, collected on some disclosure campaigns and collected against u.s. primary campaigns, think tanks, and lobbying groups debuted as likely to shape future u.s. policies. nbc reported that the kremlin's efforts to steal emails and

other data had gotten underway in 2015, and included, quote, top republicans and staffers who were republican candidates for president, and court. at a certain point, the russian operation also included the objective of favoring the trump campaign and undermining clinton's candidacy. those objectives also began before the general election. special counsel robert mueller's criminal indictment of three russian criminal organizations and 13 russians for election interference states quote, they engaged in operations primarily intended to communicate derogatory information about hillary clinton to denigrate other candidates su acruz and marco rubio, and to support bernie sanders and then candidate donald trump. in addition to senator cruz and rubio, former fbi special agent clint watts, who has testified before the senate intelligence committee, also identified russian efforts to undermine the presidential campaigns of senator graham and florida governor jeb bush.

he ensure the kremlin did not and does not simply help to shape the outcome of a general election. the kremlin also hopes to shape the outcomes of primaries, thereby denying americans their right to choose, their own political leaders, freof interference or coercion from foreign powers. the kremn is interested not only in a candidate who stands the best chance of winning, it would valid for moscit can fluence how campaigns are framed, what direction a party takes in from letting its platform, and undermining public trust in those who win the election. the threat to future america elections is of course not limited to russia, or even to state actors. the foreign threat is broader anthe danger is even greater if americans are willing to encourage support, coordinate, or conspire with foreign agents, being willing is not a crime. but, acting on the willingness could be. that raises the question whether some americans did intentionally coordinate or conspire with russia's election interference, what we might ever know could be placed on a spectrum from no evidence, too

weak and moderate evidence, still strong evidence to prove. i'm summoning for the record in my written testimony a detailed analysis of the many pieces of information that are now publicly available. part of that is an fo to shcurrent law does apply and where we still may need to fill in some gaps. i do not use the word collusion anywhere in the analysis. the real question in my mind is whether any americans engaged in a conspiracy to work with russians who intentionally supported the russian operation in violation of campaign finance laws. from the trump tower meeting to paul manafort's involvement with the russian oligarch, and an operative for the fbi assesses has actities to russian intelligence, roger stone, and wiki leaks. i think it's fair to say sed on the publicly available record, there is evidence of violations of federal law, not proof, but evidence. moving forward, a key question is how to improve our system of law enforcement, to safeguard our elections from foreign adversaries. although we have a robust

system of laws, in my written testimony, i highlight areas of opportunity for legislative reform. some of the most promising pieces of legislation are coming out of this committee including senator grassley and senator feinstein's bills, which both removes the loophole that currently allows foreign agents to avoid registering under the foreign agenregi ration act. the measures can also enhance our law-enforcement regime by bolstering enforcement authority for senator grassley's legislation as well, and using the mechanism of transparency to help expose foreign influence in our political system legislation introduced in the house last week takes an important step by requiring campaigns that require contacts with agents of foreign powers offering illicit support. this hearing itself is another significant step forward, to address future national security risks. i want to thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak about these manners and look forward to answering any questions you may have. >> i apologize for mispronouncing your name the first time. >> that's okay.

chairman grassley, senator klobuchar and distinguished members of the community, it's an honor to testify before you, and heartening to see continued bipartisan interest in the election interference, as it is truly a challenge that knows no political party. throughout my career, i worked on the front lines of russia's information war, through work on the national democratic institute, as a communications advisor to the ukrainian government and most recently as i work on the book of the deponent and responses to the russian influence operations. my experiences have led me to a conclusion that may surprise you. even if were to walk out of this hearing room today and secure beyond a shadow of a doubt the country -- country's election structure, even if we feel the -- from false or misleading information, and fiput foh a good faith mpanies effort to put users and our democracy first, even then, we would still not successfully dispel the threat our democracy paces from the line actors political influence operations. if our democratic processes are

to remain secure, we must think beyond knee-jerk reactions and punitive measures. the u.s. government must put citizens at the heart of our response to election interference and address the issues that make our society so susceptible to outside influence in the first place. european countries atav been most successful in countering malign influence have in common one key point. their governments recognize that they cannot simply fact check, or label their way out of the crisis of truths that they faced. for example, in estonia, despite a large russian ethnic population and near constant barrage of kremlin sponsored media, moscow's messaging is finding fewer footholds an it did 10 years ago, when russian influence caused riots in the center of the capital. this is probably because the estonian government is conducting proactive outreach to the russian population including russian language, educational, and media initiatives. similarly in ukraine, since 2014, there has been a growing demand for media literacy training. in response, american ngo trained 15,000 people in

critical thinking, source evaluation, and emotional manipulation. the program measured a 29% increase in participant to double check the news they consume. while both countries battle with russian interference and they are far from finished, the long-term investments will be the future cornerstone of their democracies. solutions based responses to election interference are not a panacea. they must work in concert with structural measures, designed to protect our institutions. so far, they have been all but absent from our discussion of election interference. in addition to the stipulations provided in the honest ads and secure elections act which i support, congress must pursue and encourage citizens based solutions and its work both in the -- social media regulation and dedication. social media companies have so far played whack-a-troll and must move toward empowering social media users. first, platforms should be required to inform -- most

users have no idea what they are signing up for. this ignorance as well as emotion is what russia exploits through its online influence campaigns. second, termof service should be easy to understand, clearly defined what content is permissible on platforms, and should be actively enforced. this is costly, of course, and will require human content reviewers, and the establishment of a complaints and appeals process. but, civil discourse and democracy are priceless. thir social media companies have near ubiquitous access to americans' lives. they should embrace their role as educators and focus on practices that focus on behavior change, rather than simply raising awareness. to that end, the investment that will best protect democracy for generations to come is decidedly more no -- low tech. education. first, we must embrace broadband literacy, civics, and critical thinking programs to fight election interference.cit

government works are less likely to buy into the falsehoods and conspiracies that are harmful to democracy. second, congress should encourage cooperation and coordination across governments, particularly between the national security and department of education both at the national and local levels. finally, adults should also be a target audience for these skill building programs. moscow will continue to attempt to influence our democracy as has done for decades. and now that the kremlin has written a playbook for how to do so, other bad actors will undoubtedly imitate russian act to prepare for these fure attacks, and indeed even an ta om within, we must think beyond russia, to the key actors in our democratic process. the american people. thank you. >> thank you very much. i will start with mr. wainstein. is there anything in 18

371, conspiracy charge, that you think needs to be changed or fixed to address this issue? >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> red light on. >> there we go. thank you. so,usc 371 is a federal conspiracy statute and has a prong to it that provides that the government can prosecute somedy if they defraud the united states. and, that prong has been used as a basis for prosecutions up against people and entities that mislead the government for their own advantage. maybe mislead the government about taxes and the like. that is one of the statutes that is used by the special counsel and his indictment. alleging that the russian entities had defrauded the gornment by misleading them about the disclosure requirts the state department, the justice department, et cetera.

that is an effective ol to go after foreign parties who are pretending to be americans in order to get involved in u.s. elections. i can't think of a specific change to that specific statute. however, the broader question goes to my earlier comment which was, thismight be an occasion, and i detand the concern with not over criminalizing thingsin the law, but, the severity of this thread, and the fact that we are going to have this threat, with this increasing form for years to come, suggests that this might be an area where you might consider a statute or set of statutes focused specifically on florida election interference and disinformation campaigns. i can think of a number of different areas, burdens of proof, that kind of thin which might make it easier for prosecutors to go out and do this work. >> let me also ask you that we understand the criminal value of prosecution can be a deterrent for both foreign governments, and their opportunities, charging individuals openly, prevents

those individuals from traveling . and of course, when we do get our hands on an individual, we bring those actors fully to a count. first question, despite these benefits, can you describe the limitations or downsides of criminal prosecution in this area? >> sure. i can do that briefly. to start off, there are benefits as you pointed out. one of the examples goes back to 2015 when doj indicted several members over in china, for trade secret violations. actually, that helped to push the chinese to reach an agreement where they have now scaled back some of those efforts. so, prosecution can have efforts going back to -- parties. some of the problems like we said in the last panel are chronic. you laugh at foreign actors were often acting on behalf of foreign governments o are not incentivized to help you get

those people. so you can't get them unless you have to travel, for instance. you can't get some of the evidence because it's in the hands of a foreign government that does not want to be helpful. and often times it's a problem because this activity takes place over the internet. and, attribution of the wrongdoers over the internet is a very difficult thing. so, sometimes it's hard to tuallythperson who is doing the keystrokes that results in the activity over the internet causing the interference in our elections. >> ms. jankow i'm sorry. jankowicz. from your studies in other countries, about russian disinformation, we have the estonia example, wherit was diminished by a government outreach to its citizens. fake news has spread by russia, civil society groups, fact checking. so, in terms of pp citize tfight foreign

election meddling, what approas your research led you to believe might be affecting in our country? >> it has to be a holistic approach, senator. that is an excellent question. it's not just about literacy or teaching people to second check sources,it's abt critical thinking and engaging in discourse and debate which i think sadly, social media has polarized us so much that we are not doing anymore. it's about building these critical school thinking, and also civics. i was a member of the debate team in high school. i think that led me to the work that i'm doing today, and gives me a greater understanding of the world. we need more stuff like that happening in our schools, but also for adults as well. an understanding of the system is integral to trust and government. >> senator klobuchar? >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. thank you. these are excellent witnesses. i want to thank you and i'm ad there is some general agreemwith republican

witnesses and democratic witnesses, which i just think owhow imrtant it is for us to act. meanwhile, i just learned fee at ccc is deadlocked on an issue yet again for the third time on foreign contributions. and i appreciate your words, . possibly going forward with legislative changes, and our secure elections act is hung up as an amendment on the ndaa for reasons i do not understand, given that the intelligence committee has had five hearings. we've had several here with the germans leadership, center white house leadership, and others. i think we need to get this added to the bill and i japreciate your words, ms. owicz, in support of that bill. do you want to talk about why it's so important that we see this as a kind of warfare which professor goodman so that way, and by putting it in the nda to me is so important to the rest of the world? >> absolutely. i think both bills are important steps toward getting

on the record that this is a threat we are serious about. to this point, i don't think the u.s. has done enough of. i've hed conversations in europe over the past 2 to 3 years, the conversations that we are having now happened there 2 years ago. we are very far behind. but, in addition, the structural measures that we are putting forward send a signal to the american people that our systems are secure. that we are taking care of them. that rebuilds the trust that has eroded over the past few months. >> right. because we have always been a leader on elections and free elections across the world and we need to get that back. the -- act is now picking up support for some reason, by the social media companies. and i think right now, what we laws starting to develop across the state. i'm glad because i'm going to push for action here. and you simply talk about the hazards of having dierent states regulate political ads,

without any kind of action on the federal government? and only having voluntary measures which create another tchwk facebo doing one thing and twitter to another thing. google decided not to do as in washington state anymore, political ads. because they have a different standard there. so, you have states doing different things, and then you have social media companies doing different standards, and you have washington doing nothing, when it's projected the $3 billion to $4 billion is going to be spent on online political as in the presidential election coming up. >> absolutely. that's a great point. i would say not only do we have a patchwork of laws within the united states, but within the world with just coming into force in the european union last month. the social media companies are responding in different ways. but, i think they are doing it frankly, and, we have already seen some ads that are frankly not political at all being

rejected, while others are allowed to go through. just la wk, a facebook page governed by the ira was discovered. they have taken it down since then. but again, this enforcement is not uniform, and we do need that leadship on the federal >>can you,nyaddress this issue of privy laws? as you know, senator kennedy and i introduced a bipartisan bill with the 72 hour require notice, and with allowing users to opt out of having their data shared, and how you think that could be helpful in the context of trying to protect people's information in elections? anyone? >> i'm happy to comment on that as well. this is a common sense measure. i would like to see more informed consent among users from social media companies. it's like when you see a commercial on tv that you don't want to watch, you can change the channel. we don't have that option with

social media. this is just putting power in the hands of customers which is what they call them in europe, oddly. we call them users of social media, we call them customers which is an interesting choice but speaks to the relationship. >> i agree with the same comment, that i think this is an important area, with the sense that users information is being taken up by these companies, and if they self regulate, i don't think we can trust what they necessarily will do over the long horizon. so that even if they are under the great leadership with whoever is in charge of the corporations now, we have no idea how they will react in the future, especially when there is no political future on them. one example is with respect to cambridge analytica using facebook information, facebook then came before congress in part because of that. the idea was that thwere going to be fully transparent. it's interesting that the story from the guardian said facebook try to threaten them with a suit before they published the story, so that we never heard

om that whistleblower. that's an indication of why we need a better relationship between the companies in congress, and congress being in this area where we can regulate. i think the companies are recognizing this value. >> and at that heg, mr. zuckerberg actually said he thought there would be reason to start regulating, and put in place. he said he was supportive of the 72 hour notice. and so, i think that we are at a point now, where if we just have certain platforms doing their own regulation, self regulations, we are going to have other ones moving in that are not doing it. and then have all of the slimy ads going to one thing, leading me to voter suppression efforts, you know, in the hearings we've had in judiciary. we've had a number of ads displayed with african-american faces saying, hey, texas, during the trump-clinton election, and you will be able to vote without standing in line. to me, that is clearly criminal and is a voter suppression. and how maybe the russians have used this in the past. >> senator --

sorry. >> that's okay. >> i can mae go back after senator whitehouse. >> go ahead, senator whitehouse. first of all, i'd like to welcome ken wainstein back who has been a very distinguished public servant, and also a very helpful witness before this committee before. in addition to the csis kremlin playbook which is a very helpful and authoritative source on election and other interference by the kremlin, and kremlin trojan horse report, the atlanta council's parallel effort, there is a new report called moscow's gold, russian corruption in the uk, that was put out by the house of commons fornes affairs committee. i'd like to ask that that report be put into the record. and proceeding. and, i want to thank mr. wainstein for focusing on the

botnet civil injunction legislation. senator graham and i have been working for a long time. we've been hoping to get it in the nda bill also. it seems pretty obvious to try to shut these damn things down in a way that has been proven to work. but what i want to talk about in my time is the problem of shell corporations. because, for all of the emphasis thatthtnesses have put on policing and prosecuting, foreign influence in our elections, you can neither police, or prosecute what you cannot find. and at the moment, we have both a shell corporation problem, which was emphasized by mark zuckerberg in his testimony, when he said the political advertisement authentication program would only go to the first show corporation, and not seek any information about who was actually behind it. i don't think putin is stupid

enough to call it -- llc. it's going to sound more like americans for puppies and peace and prosperity. but it's a front group. and it's got putin or whoever else behind it. until we can know that, we cannot force effectively, period, end of story. similarly, when our election systems has these colossal channels for dark money, anonymous funding, if you can't find out what special interest is behind anonymous money, you can't find out if there is a foreign interest behind that money. darkness is darkness is darkness. and it hides malign activity, both foreign and domestic. and i like to ask each of you to comment on that. we are concerned about trolling. obviously, that's facilitated by shell corporations. you talked about general propaganda campaigns. obviously, filitated by shell corporations. campaign finance laws, you called out the need for effective disclosure. you can't have a disclosure if

the only thing you are disclosing a front corporation and you don't know who is behind it. ifi could ask each yo threon that and that will be the end of my time. >> sure, i will go first. thank you for the kind words. good to work with y again. it always is. >> we were good adversaries. >> we were. adversaries working for the same goal. as a former prosecutor, looking at this issue, of course, you want to know more about the corporations than last. there are always the first amendment issues and other concerns on the election contexts. but absolutely, there is no we have seen the use of corporations in a variety of contexts, whether it's money- laundering or otherwise. we've seen them in the election interference and disinformation context. and, a lot of that -- >> they are widely used in e criminal context. for money-laundering purposes, and to hide the proceeds of criminal activities, correct?

>> absolutely. >> so to the extent that at putin is running is essentially a criminal enterprise of himself and oligarchs, why would they know look to what they do with as a model? >> meat and potatoes criminal conduct. absolutely. and, all intended to hide the th o this line activity. [ captioners transitioning ] -- i don't see how we get at those issues if we're operating with these. across the board, including legislation, so as long as we have the lobbying act loophole, it accentuates that problem, but even if we close the loophole, we still have the problem. >> it's a incredibly easy to get around it by not hiring a lobbyist and setting up a shell dorpgs and now you're waiting -- corporation and now y'r

operating. >> even the advisory that came out of the justice department yesterday about rt presenters although rt was not named in the advisories, they said that rt was exempt because of the fact that rt was registered in the united states. but regarding shell corporations and advertising on line i would also put forward the idea that's in my written testimony about recreating through third party or perhaps shell companies could do this themselves although i have reservations, a better business type of list or trusted political advertisers. then we kind of get around these issues of sloppy enforcement of political ads that are just saying, no, this has to do with president trump. therefore it's political and we're going to rejec this ad. if there are trusted advertisers that are listed, that could be a way to circumvent these issues. >> and shell corporations is a real problem? >> yes, absolutely. >> thank you. thank you, chairman. >> thank you. i'll finish with one question

for professor goodman and then all on senator klobuchar. it's my understand that in addition to the federal elections campaign act, you see another need for a changeo particularly section 371. can you explain w you think a change to that section is necessary and whatbout the existing statute is insufficient? for example, are there cases that can't be prosecuted unless the law is changed? >> thank you for the question. i also agree with mr. wainstein's comments that in this area, it might be better even for symbolic purpos to ha a new offense which is about foreign interference or foreign government interference in our elections. in some senses that would be redundant with the existing statute.

as we're seeing in the indictments with special counsel mueller's investigation. that's an area in which you could imagine it would be beneficial to have law that updates it to technology. so what would be the acts that would expose an american to liability for coordinating or supporting the russian scheme to interfere in the way in which they're being alleged or indicted for byhe special counsel. that could be also helpful to prosecutors who would have something more specific as to whether or not they're going to bring charges, rather than something that's broader. but otherwise the existingaw still handles that. >> senator klobuchar. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. i was asking about the voter suppression efforts and what you've seen historically with that. >> sure. well, i went through all 3,500 ads that were released by the house democrats a couple of weeks ago and i can say the trends among those ads is certainly, as it is with all

russian disinformation, to divide among societal fissures. a lot of those ads were targeted toward the african-american community and, as you said, clearly attempting to depress turnout. i think the way that they did this is really interesting, by putting forward positive messages first, things that were not disinformation, things about black identity and things like that to create community, to create a trusted messenger, and then the ira pages would go for petitions or then puttingng through these disinformation messages about not turning out to vote or other types of voter suppression and things like that. so it's hard to regulate that because it starts with things that are not disinformation. >> but it ends upit ads that are criminal? yes. >> and when you don't know about it because there's no disclosure, and so you can't immediately see it for what it is, and the other campaigns don't see it, whether you're dealing on either political party, and i've always believed

that the campaigns that have the most vested interest in winnibai believe in competition, if they don't see that kind of stuff, they are going to know what's what better than anyone, in addition to the press being able to see it. >> yeah, i would absolutely agree, and i'd als t worries me about what mr. zuckerbaid about ai doing this enforcement and early detection of these types of issues because how would artificial intelligence gatr, you know, these positive messages and put out an identification that this is going to be a problem? i don't see that as a possibility and i think that's why they really need to invest mo in human content reviewers. >> exactly, and, again, campaigns tend to say, well, where is this positive message coming from? what is this group? especially if you have disclaimers on it. they think well, maybe i can work with this group and then pretty soon they find out the group is a fraud. so then disclaimer, disclosure imdiately i think is going to

be very important. mr. wainstein, i have a bill with senator blunt co-sponsored with senators feinstein and warner to stop donations, to choose existing credit card verification protocols to help verify that online credit card nations come from u.s. sources. so could you talk just again about the importance of this, that people are going to start trying to find ways to get around this? >> absolutely, senator. they already are, and the russians are, and i mentioned, i think, in my earlier statement that the pretty blatant example of tt is they made donations to the french far right candidate a year, year and a half ago. it was as a reward for her supporting their actions in crimea, and so that was a blatant example of them trying to fund their chosen candidate. no question they're going to try every avenue to do that here and they probably already are. >> i think one of the things, mr. chairman, that i've liked

about this hearing that hasn't always come out in the other hearings, sometimes it's just about the general electionsnd what was going on with the hillary clinton v. donald trump campaigns, but the way that professor goodman and really all of you have directed some of your comments about the long haul here where they're actually getting involved in primaries, it was senator rubio who once said this isn't about one party or one election, and next time it's going to be about the other party and the other election. you have interparty involvement where they're actually trying to hurt certain republican candidates to help others. and i think the more we make sure the public understands that that is going on, the more this becomes what it should be, which is an effort to protect our democracy andust he said/she said and one side versus the other side. i really appreciate you calling these witnesses and the content of their testimony. thank you. >> i say thank you for this panel and then to remind you that several members weren't

here, so you may get questions in writing. seven days to submit those questions, and hopefully you can get them responded quickly. >> thank you very much for a very important hearing that we've had. very good information from this panel. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you.

. senate agriculture member tweeted the bipartisan farm bill makes vital investments in rural economic growth. tomorrow we'll work in the senate ag committee to improve the bill and provide certainty to the communities nationwide. the committee meets to review the amendment line by line tomorrow morning starting live on c-span3 tomorrow. and looking ahead to thursday, democratic and republican members of congress face off in the 57th annual congressional baseball game for charity. live coverage starts at 7 p.m.

eastern on c-span3. and an important issue to me in the state of utah is our use of water being desert ste, we need to really focus on how we use our water and with some of the drier winte we've had, it's been really important to me to focus on conserving water and passing legislation that helps conserve water. >> i live in salt lake city, utah, and one of the most important issues for us is air quality. we live in a basin and what we need to do is more public transportation so that we can reduce emissions. an important issue to me is wage inequality. there's lots of jobs out there, but some are part time, and i've actually been getting part-time jobs, and the wage is low and they keep you part time. i was a manager for eight years and they're always keeping wages low. i've been full time, but i see

that wages for the wealthy are continually increasing and increasing, but those of us down at the bottom are low. being a college graduate nnow week, i will now beoing into a job market where there's not a lot of jobs for me and the congress just doesn't seem to care about that. i'm a librarian here at salt lake community college library, and an important issue for the state of utah is overpopulation. i feel like overpopulations the root cause of many of our societal problems. i don't know that there are easy solutions to the problems, but i do feel like that is probably the most important issue facing our state as well as our city on a global scale, all o that. voices from the states, part

c-span's 50 capitals tour, and our stop in salt lake city, utah t faith and freedom koea ligs gathered for its 2018 conference here inu can watchllr coverage from the conference at c-span.org but over the next few hours you can see the speakers like vice president pence and mitch mcconnell and steve scalise, and scott pruitt on some of the changes taking place at his agency. he does not address allegations of improper spending or ethics violations. thank you. thank you very much. it's good to be back at faith and freedom, and i really appreciate rob's kind words and all that he does to advance religious liberty and all that you do. we saw how important that was this week when jack phillips and a great victory that took place at the