a discussion on efforts to report antitrust laws around the world. after that, a forum on the role of the infects are -- inspector general. now, a house --

ensure nasa is being a good stuart managing the -- stewart managing the resources and

we'll touch on oversite topics including acquisition mechanicians, cost methodologies, and nasa program management. procurements represent over 90% of nasa's annual budget. in fiscal year 2016 nasa secured over $46 billion with 41 active procurements. that's a tremendous amount of work. unfortunately nasa has been plagued for years with contract management issues, which have result inside substantial cost overruns and schedule slips. it gets the most scrutiny because of time of the procurements. however, there's other documented issues many of which can constitute and warrant a dedicated hearing. in may, the accountability

office released assessment of the nasa projects, those exceeding $250 million in appropriations. this covered 26 major projects. i'd like to note the subcommittee will have a dedicated hearing about the james web space telescope next month. but this project's long history of cost and scheduled overruns is relevant to today's discussion as well. gao reported an overall deterioration in the major program portfolio primarily due to the fact that nine out of 17 projects in development are experiencing cost and schedule performance growth as a result of risky program management decisions, significant technical challenges and issues beyond the control of the projects. last year gao assessed that nasa projects were continuing a generally positive trend of limiting cost and scheduled

growth, maturing technologies, and stabilizing designs. however, gao also noted that many of the more expensive projects were approaching the phase of their life cycles when cost and schedule growth is most likely. the subcommittee will also investigate specific nasa cost estimating methodologies such as joint cost and scheduled confidence level. the jco process. nasa management techniques related to projects scheduled determination and use of headquarters resource funding. we are particularly interested in the nasa inspector general's recommendation in improvements of cost methodologies, especially if there's a need to continue using jco process or adopt another cost estimating technique. furthermore, the subcommittee will investigate these and other questions.

what acquisition mechanicians, cost plus, price award fee, space act agreements, et cetera are most appropriate for various types of procurements. next, how do these acquisitions tool incentivize the provider to perform safely and efficiently? what are the pros and cons? then our existing appropriation funding authorities consistent for congressional oversight or major nasa projects and lastly do current agency approaches hold both the agency and provider accountable for overall performance. this is a very timely hearing today. in their report last month, gao noted that nasa is planning to invest about $61 billion over the life cycle of current portfolio of 26 major programs. that doesn't even account for thousands of other procurements and a significant portion of nasa's spending authority.

whether large or small, all of nasa's business decisions matter. decisions made now have long lasting implications on nasa's mission success and leadership. i want to thank the witness for being here. sorry i was a bit late and didn't get a chance to show each of your -- shake each of your hands but we're looking forward to your testimony on the challenges that nasa is facing in controlling program costs and schedules. now i'd like to recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee from california. mr. bar row. >> thank you, mr. chairman and thank you for the timely hearing. when you think about nasa, nasa is a unique agency and source of national pride for us but a cutting edge agency that serves to inspire and, you know, when those of us who grew up here during the space race certainly

understood that inspiration and motivated many of us to go into the sciences. you know, i want to also acknowledge, you know, it's not that often we walk into a hearing and we see a line of folks waiting to get in here and, you know, i think we're joined by nasa's interest and that next generation that will inspire and discover and move us forward. you know, thank you to the interns that are here. you are the future. in terms of thinking about congress' role here, we have a role of fiscal responsibility and oversight and those at nasa don't have an easy job. we're reminiscent of the future and we're trying to put projects together and i appreciate that check and balance as you're doing things that were never done before. you often encounter the unexpected and i think.

resolving cost and scheduling issues are hard and there really is no simple fix for these types of situations. the contractors collaborate with international partners, provide greater funding certainty and cost estimation tools and techniques. today's discussion of scheduled delays and cost increases and search for corrective action cannot take away from the accomplishments and discoveries made by programs like hubble, the international space station, and mars curiosity. these accomplishments and discoveries would not have happened had the nation nod made the hard decision that enabled these projects to carry through inspite of scheduling delays and cost growth. we've been well rewarded thanks

to work by nasa and supporting contractors and nags' colleges -- nation's colleges and universities. one area of improvement is a better agreement on the baseline of cost growth and schedule is determined. inconsistent measurement of cost growth across programs was noted in the national economy's review of earth science and space missions in 2010. some characterize the cost growth of the web state telescope using a initial baseline project cost of $1 billion to $3.5 billion. well, this was the initial range cost estimated in 1996. that estimate was not based on details analysis. detailed analysis needed to establish a baseline from which nasa makes a commitment to congress that it can design, develop, and build the project at the cost specified.

in closing, mr. chairman, this time line is timely and nasa needs to effectively manage its programs and we have an increasingly strained fiscal environment and sending humans far away from earth. i look forward to robust discussion after these hearings. >> thank you very much. now i'd like to -- in fact, before i recognize our next speaker, i also want to reiterate thank you for saying this, in the hearing room, i met some of you outside in the hall when i walked up but we're elated that we've got all these nasa interns in here and we really appreciate the good work you're doing and just want to pat you all on the back.

you're our future in the space program. thank you for being here. now i'd like to introduce the chairman of the full committee. >> thank you, mr. chairman, this committee demonstrated time and again. nasa organization back in april and it demonstrates that. nasa once again received one of the most favorable authorizations and appropriations of any agency. they have oversight to make certain taxpayer funds spent well. this cost deadline the congress of the american people support and recently held here and

pressing forward with the highest profile programs. the subcommittee about the jwst program and north of brumens ceo agreed to testify. the report identified cost and all four of these high interest programs. they were identified as having deteriorating cost and scheduled performance due to risky decisions involving technology. significant delays in the nasa test flight programs and the cost flight baseline. jso assessed other nasas this year as well. the wide field infrared telescope remains a serious concern for congress. this committee requested but not received w first life cycle

cost estimate that required by the fiscal year 2018 omnibus. congress has a responsibility to authorize and appropriate necessary to accomplish the task to direct nasa to carry out. congress also has a responsibility to not let cost overruns detract from other nasa priorities such as research and small to medium class missions. it's time for nasa contractors to deliver. 2018 nasa authorization act takes important steps to impose a contractor responsibility watch list. this watch list would penalize poor performing contractors by restricting them from competing for further nasa work. the on contractor watch list nasa should continue to explore additional options for the cost perhaps. surpluses, early stage cost caps, firm fixed price

contracts, and public private partnerships that benefit taxpayers. anything short of that will undermine congressional contracts to deliver on promises as a reasonable cost. space exploration has got to continue to earn the public's trust and contractors will have to deliver on tiesm and on -- time and on budget. if they cannot, then they should face sanctions. again, i look forward to our witness' testimony today. >> thank you very much. now i'd like to introduce a gentlewoman from texas, ranking member of the committee, miss johnson. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing and thanks to our witnesses for being hear. this morning we hope we're going to get a status update on nasa's management and its

programs, particularly cost and schedule status on it's large nations and i hope it provides answers to some of our key questions. is nasa's ability to provide cost and schedule on programs improving or is it getting worse, is the government actable office seems to indicate in its recent report on nasa's major content . it's getting worse, what should be done, particularly by this committee. it's difficult projects that push the state of the art in science and engineering. challenging missions and transformational signs of what we expect. our space programs are worthy of this great nation. that said, mr. chairman, we can do bert. in particular, we need to improve our ability to identify

early on when we can still make design decisions where the project runs the risk of exceeding budget constraints and what options we have at our disposal to make sure the program meets those budgets constraints. the infrared survey telescope is a good example. the stake holders, including the national academies, expressed concerns that the w first could run into potential cost and schedule growth. nasa established expert groups to rigorously review the cost of engineering and science objectives for the mission. i commend nasa for taking this action. there's still time to reconsider the scope and approach by the nations that

preclude the possibility of exceeding cost and scheduled expectations of development. mr. chairman, i look forward to discussing learning opportunities such as this one and determining where the future nasa missions would benefit from incorporating similar processes to minimize the future schedule delay and court increases. one thing i learned early on while serving on this committee is that nasa is a unique engine of invasion. a force for bushing new advances in space technology and operation. i'm anxious to hear from witnesses on cost and schedule models that are based on the past, traditional approaches to nasa project development are being updated to reflect the changes in today's manufacturing, operations, and

technology environment. rnd on cost and schedule models needed and other tools to help improve nasa's cost and schedule aquisition of space systems. we do have a lot to discuss this morning and i look forward to hearing from my witness. >> thank you very much. now i'd like to introduce our witnesses. our first witness is miss christina chaplain, director of contracting in security carver hawkeye wiselings at u.s. accountability -- contracting at u.s. accountability division. we have ryan with commercial cargo and crew projects at nasa. they received bachelor's degree at boston university and master's degree in journalism from columbia university. we welcome you.

our second witness today is mr. steven jersic serving as associate administrator at nasa and highest ranking career and civil position. prior to this appoint, mr. josey served as administrator of the mission director and served as space technology program and he's a graduate of the university of virginia where he received a bachelor of science and master of science in electrical engineers. thank you for being here. our third witness is honorable paul martin. inspector general of nasa. prior to this appointment, mr. martin served as deputy inspector general of u.s. department of justice in the office of inspector general. mr. martin owns a bachelor of arts in journalism from

pennsylvania state university and doctor from georgetown university law center. thank you for being here. our final witness today is mr. daniel dumbocker, the executive director of the american institute of aeronautics and astronaut icks. >> he served as associate administrator of systems development division of nasa's human exploration and -- he earned degree in mechanical engineering from purdue and masters in business administration from huntsville and completed senior manager's in government program at harvard university. i'd like to recognize miss chaplain for five minutes to

present her testimony. >> thank you for inviting me today to discuss the cost and schedule performance of nasa's largest project. since we began our assessments of major projects ten years ago, we have zenanas make progress -- seen nasa make progress but we've found it worsened after following a general project of trends. specifically as shown is in the graph, average launch delay increased from seven months and 2017 report to 12 months in this year's report. this was the first year we could not determine the extent of cost grove because nasa does not have a current estimate for the orion program. it accounts for 22% of $30

billion of development projects. even without including orion, the overall development cost growth increase to 18.8% up from 15 pleasant 6% in 2017. we expect this number to increase further once orion is factored in and even more large projects including jaips web, space launch system, and exploration space launch ground system. in regard to the graph, i'd also like to point out when we started our assessments in 2009, cost and schedule growth was more problematic than depicted. maybe baselines have been set just a couple years prior to hold congress accountable for years. also in 2012, you can see the impact that james web had on the overall cost growth when it

increased from 4.9 billion to 8.8 billion. next graph depicts some of the reasons why projects experience cost and schedule growth. they're not so different than what we've seen in the past but nasa and across space programs. light blue circles which might include a delivery, a late delivery in delay of launch vehicle. other times the dark blue circles, it was due to risky management decisions. for instance, human space flight programs operating for low cost and un-forseen technical challenges and other cases, problems encountered can sometimes be avoided and sometimes not. james web reporting delays due to workmanship errors that delayed the program.

unanticipated complexities and the sun shield which is unique to the telescope. we're looking at whether more could have been done to avoid the workmanship issues. since mid 2000s, nasa made strides in tools and approaches to reduce the cost and schedule growth. as shown in this graph, projects increasingly more knowledge about technologies early so they do not have more expensive and fit. they're bidding nor knowledge -- building nor knowledge and design about integration. the processes and oversight processes. we recognize nasa's processes and more can be done. for example, as mentioned earlier, the human space flight program should not be operating with low cost and schedule reserves. projects should also update regular cost estimates but more often reluctant to do so. for james web, updated estimate

may have forecasted current schedule delays if done a few years ago. we find some projects do not manage projects as well and they're becoming overwhelming. we saw that workmanship errors with the smallest components with dramatic impacts. nasa should take steps needed to ensure cost growth to a large project does not overwhelm a portfolio. nasa did this for astrophysics portfolio when it undertook the telescope when the process began. this type of assessment should continue. in conclusion, we recognize nasa projects are complex. they face inherent technical challenges and scheduled growth are inevitable with technology and more to be done to limit risk that exacerbate problems. this concludes my statement and

i'm happy to answer any questions you may have. >> thank you, ma'am. i recognize mr. jersey for five minutes to present his testimony. >> mr. chairman and members of the committee, i'm pleased to have the opportunity to discuss nasa's program management, accomplishments, and challenges. nasa is focused on mission of science and exploration. in support of this mission, agency that has developed a rigorous process for program formulation, approval, implementation, and evaluation. 2345 sa's challenge is to -- nasa's challenge is to develop and improve the management capabilities. you must execute and deliver on cost and on schedule. we have to execute in an environment that includes significant risk and we're focused on identifying and characterizing risk as quickly as possible. you must take corrective actions promptly, whether mitigating, accepting, evaluating, monitoring an

identified risk. products received and the project within a established baseline cost and schedule. this agency baseline commitment is a baseline against evalwraithing performance -- evaluating performance. nasa adopted a joint level of producing estimates and this resulted in improved performance. jcl employs problematic risk assessment for confidence level for an estimate. nasa establishes baseline for major projects around 70% confidence level. since the agency established the jcl policy, problematic -- programmatic performance at the

baseline. nasa committed to applying set of available authorities to accomplish missions officially and effectively. the acquisition process utilizes multiple authorities to meet objectives including but not limited to federal aquisition regulation or far based contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, international agrypts, and space act agreements. nasa has expanded use of fixed price contracts where appropriate. with a percentage of funds nasa spends on contracts, increasing from 26% in 2013 to 35% in 2016. the jcl approach has certainly improved our performance and look forward to building on success for ongoing challenge for major projects. nasa working to strengthen program planning and control through series of initiatives and application of industry standard and processes. nasa began the process of

applying in-house evm capability in 2013 and broadened its use in step wide fashion overtime. it's leading in a scheduled initiative to strengthen scheduled management to build a community and reinforce scheduled management in practices. our decision to conduct independent reviews of both w first and jwst missions along with continued support for regular jao reviews and audits illustrate commitment to transparency and identify risk as early as possible and immediately take action to mitigate them. nasa will continue to accept the big challenges to the committee and nation place before us. our missions will continue to incorporate cutting edge technologies and pursue the challenging goals that can only be accomplished in the hostile environment of space. nasa's missions do things that have never been done before. the parker solo probe will dive

into the sun's corona. the james telescope will unfold itself almost a million miles from earth and operate at minus 380 degrees fahrenheit. space launch system or sls will allow humans to travel deeper into space than ever before. they'll deploy technologies that must be developed and tested on earth but only demonstrate inside space. nasa must accept a risk, bower committed to managing the risk and executing within our cost and scheduled commitments. thank you for the invitation to testify before you today and i look forward to answering any questions you may have. >> thank you, mr. jersey. i would like to now recognize mr. martin for five minutes to present his testimony. >> thank you, sir. members of the subcommittee, over a 60 year history, nasa has been responsible for numerous scientific discoveries and tech any logical invasions and -- techny logical invasions and they cost more to complete

and longer to launch than originally planned. our office examined nasa's projects and failures by understanding the long challenges the agency faced by meeting cost and schedule and performance objectives and the tools it's developed to address the shortcomings. we identified four factors that present the greatest challenges to successful project outcome. one is nasa's cultture of optimism, two, underestimating technical complexity, three, funding instability and four, development of new project managers. my remarks this morning address the first two of the challenges: optimism. democratly fied by the -- exemplified by the aaluminums and returning them to the moon. -- achievements and returning them to the moon.

this attitude contributes to development of unrealistic plans and performance baselines, particularly with respect to the largest programs. tech any logical success often reaffirms the mindset of cost and adherence to schedule concerns. several people offered a name for the phenomena calling it the hubble schooling or expectation -- psychology or expectations that failed to meet cost and scheduled goals that receive additional funding and subsequent scientific success will overshadow budget and schedule problems. the hubble space telescope was two years late and about a million more than initial estimates. but most people don't remember that. instead, they rightfully remember it is stupendous images of the universe.

while a few projects in nasa's recent past have been canceled because of poor cost and schedule performance, it comes to nasa's larger and most important missions. while understandable, given the investment of agency resources, cost overruns in these projects can result in delays to other missions as funding is re- prioritized. technical complexity, the technical complexity inherent to nasa projects remains a major challenge to achieving cost and schedule goals. with project managers attempting to predict the amount of time and money needed to develop one of a kind and first of their kind technologies. we found that nasa historically has underestimated level of effort needed to develop, mature, and integrate such technologies. to help projects managers avoid

cost overruns, nasa developmented a number of initiatives. jcl. required since 2009 for all nasa projects with life cycle cost exceeding $250 million, a jcl analysis calculates likelihood a project will achieve objectives within budget and on time. the process uses software models that combine cost, schedule, risk, and uncertainty to evaluate how expected threats and unexpected events may affect a project's cost and schedule. our examination of nasa's use of jcl found mixed success with a tool unevenly applied across agency projects.

nasa looks increasingly to the private sector to leverage resources, it must ensure the contracting mechanisms it chooses are best suited to maximize the agencies significant investments. in sum, to meet cost and schedule goals, agency leaders must temper nasa's historic culture of optimism by demanding more realistic cost and schedule estimates, well defined and stable requirements, and ma sure technologies -- mature technologies early in project development. in addition, congress and nasa managers must ensure that funding is adequate and properly phased. finally, the agency must be willing to take remedial action up to and including termination when these critical project elements are not present. in our judgment, meeting these project related challenges can only be accomplished through

leadership that articulated a clear, unified, and sustaining vision for nasa and provides the necessary resources to execute that vision. thank you, simplet. >> sir. >> i'd like mr. boom backer to present his testimony. >> may want to push your button there. i'm sorry. thank you for this opportunity to address you today. your support for the nation's space program is to be commended. before you is the nasa program manager and former educator of world's largest air space professional society. let me first say the work nasa employs is challenging and the nasa industry team commended

for accomplishment strength. and execute a successful mission. the nasa industry teamworks hard to address issues, develop solutions, and incrementally and planning takes place and how well thought out the plan and difficult to estimate the cost and schedule and one of a kind project. accordingly, nasa updated guidance for implementation and robust cost estimating and design and key decision points. former requirements and guidance. especially during implementation phase of projects, nasa has processes to ensure that rigorous cost assessment is performed. program progress is tracked through the periodic performance review process. since nasa instituted joint confidence level, policy nearly

a decade ago, nasa's cost and schedule performance improved. from my perspective, the issues experienced in the nasa projects can be assessed in two categories. one: the need for stable, predictable, and consistent funding and work force development. simply stated, project management has three basic knobs: content, schedule and cost. a change in any one of the three directly affects the other two. cost and schedule issues do arise when there's unanticipated changes to a program or when development challenges arise particularly during first time production and technical capability being pushed. disruptions to the process and funding stream along with major policy and priority shift affect schedule and contracts leading to the cost.

a key issue is a flat line under a budget. it requires project managers to ea realign the case and resulting in hard priority and inefficiencies that explicitly link across programs and budgets. it moves scheduled to the right and we learned this lesson with the international space station and repeating with orion. the continuing use of regulations and appropriations and government shut downs result in endless multiple planning scenarios. as stated in october 2015 testimony before the subcommittee, the need to have backup plans for various potential appropriations, definite planning levels and work force blueprints is miscommunication and related issue is inability of nasa to include appropriate budget and schedule margin in program planning due to con stephons.

planned mar sin -- constraints. planned margin becomes first target for budget reduction in the budget and appropriations process. separate but related issue that must be addressed is the work force challenge with the aerospace community as a whole. that remains a nationwide shortage for jobs, engineering, arts, and mathematics. aviation weeks 2017 work force study, nearly 30% of nation's aerospace and defense work force over the age of 55 and 22% are younger than 35. more concerning is the lack of development program experience. vast majority of the nasa space flight is after space shuttle develop m. space station -- development. space shuttle on orbities and launch experience is minimal. nasa expertise that developed a space shuttle mostly retired or

passed away. united states to have the long held leadership and investments must be made in the work force development via hands on real world programs and research. key technical challenges for the space exploration and on or bit assembly and human survival should be addressed. such investments would mean key research and engineering needs while providing valuable experience. well developed leadership bench is also necessary for a program's mission success. this ensures the appropriate expertise for balanced risk and priorities. this committee for the opportunity to talk today and look forward to your questions. >> thank you. we appreciate it. now, i would like to recognize myself for five minutes for questioning and i have a bunch of questions and i'm sure everybody else does too.

if you could get right to the point after these things because we want to cover as much of this as we possibly can. nasa has a history of overrunning cost and schedules for development. some of these programs have even suffered cancellations as a result and this is simply got to stop. when a performance not excuses from the agency as well as providers and with that in mind of nasa's options, what acquisition mechanicians such as cost plus, price, or space act agreements are most useful in promoting performance and holding the provider as well as agency management accountable for immediate acquisition rierpts. ask you first -- requirements. ask you first, mr. dunbocker. >> congressman, i think the appropriate acquisition tool depends on the objective of the program and the scientific

engineering issues and risks associated with that. we have a lot of experience with the contract in this country. nasa usings that a lot for major programs and discussion of private partnerships that can be valuable and tried in the past. some successful and some not. when we consider all of this, we need to consider the objectives that are for the program. what are the incentives and the motives that are necessary for success both in terms of how it would apply in a public private partnership as well as cost plus arena and we need to sort through those and make valid, conscious objective decisions. >> thank you. ask now the same question, miss chaplain, if you'd answer that. i don't need to repeat it; right? >> right. >> okay. >> so with fixed price contract, the contractor bears

the most risk for meeting cost and scheduled goals. that's your main aim. that's a contract but it's not really appropriate when you're facing a lot of unknowns at the beginning. if you're really stretching technology, don't know how long it'll take and how much it'll cost, in that case, the government needs to bear the risk of the contract and that's where cost plus comes in. >> okay, thank you. we're talking about this cost plus contracts providing any incentive for the provider to complete the project on time and on schedule? >> typically incentives built into the contract and they come through the award fees. and'res can be tied -- others can be tied to constant schedule. >> thank you. >> just to add a bit to that, when we have done award fees,

cost plus award fee and incentive fee in the past, we do and can make schedule performance and cost performance part of the evaluation criteria and that is typically included. >> okay, thank you. to mr. martin and miss chaplain as well, acquisition encompasses a great deal including strategic planning and processes and development years the dod implied a robust training and certification program for defense acquisition professionals. what institutional improvementings such as career -- improvements or gressions are necessary? >>-- progressions effectively. >> nasa has conferences every year for example but i think more could be done in that area in certain techniques and

especially more program management issues related to managing contracts. >> mr. martin, attracting and retaining the project managers is a real challenge for the agency as he suggested within nasa, 50% of the work force is over 50 years old and with a diminishing number of small projects for the project managers to get the experience and cut their teeth on, it's a real concern. >> then do you think nasa can gain from dod's experiences? >> i'm not as familiar with these experiences. >> okay. miss chaplain? >> the defense university is a good model for training programs and all kinds of issue. it's also something that you could look forward. >> mr. jersic. nasa took steps to control the cost of the clipper and w first missions while in formulation.

>> yes, on w first we had an independent review board and looked at project early and made scopes that they'd grown and had $2 million budget and management agreement and recommendations and project adjusted the scope and replanned. the chair and based on estimated replan that they have a solid estimate going into phase b. that similarly for clipper side is a way to be in the program. >> i had several more questions but thank you very much. i like to recognize the general

from california ranking member. mr. bear. >> thank you, mr. chairman. each of you in your opening statements obviously touch on the complexity of budgeting and scheduling when you're trying to do something that you may never have done before. i have to imagine when we started on apollo mission, lots of cost server and delays but as you got further down the road, understood what we had to do, that started to produce and more predictability and we think about future missions and let's put it in the project. where he don't know the technology and the sciences and everything like that.

we are encountering more complicated projects. where he look at balance of the commercial sector, the entrepreneurial sector and more reliant on external factor and science mission 345eu be a bit more control as you think about working with outside contractors and new startup companies that may be a bit more unpredictability and that adds another variable as international committee becomes more engaged as you see countries like india and japan and the sciences and complicated variable as opposed to schedule getting easier. reasonably accurate spot and i guess miss chaplain. >> i wrawled like to note --

would like to note in the apollo era, a lot of things have never been done before and difficult to estimate ma it -- in the past three decades and nasa have been working very closely together to kind of gain the historical perspective and cost for data bases so there's more knowledge there that gives you an advantage but, yeah, those other complexities make it hard. >> as we think about that learning from what we've done in the past, trying to create more predictable models of budgeting schedules, chairman's

question, as my profession as a doctor, we'll have a certain fee for things but we'll take care of the population of patients. if we do really well, we improve health, et cetera, there's a reward on that end. if on the other hand we do a bad job taking care of patients, we share some of the risk and i don't know if in contracting, you touched on the shared risk award fees et cetera, have you noticed in that type of contracting that you actually get better predictability when the -- again, not doing something that we know how to do and is pretty predictable and something with some risk involved. miss chaplain or mr. martin if you want to take that. >> other the last ten years, nasa moverred to new pro-- moved to new procurement act and particularly this development capability of cargo and cruise services for the

international space station. nasa contributes billions of dollars to the space act agreement but commercial companies have a financial stake in the game and having them have their skin in the game as well to develop private capabilities which nasa will procure them as a service, i think is an interesting and has been relatively successful. has it increased cost schedule and timing? not particularly. >> yeah, as i said before, we choose kind of partnerships where there's shared strategic partners that makes a lot of sense and therefore we try to share the risk and we did do a reimbursable space act

agreement and fund agreement for cargo, we kind of moved away from that approach because of our ability to have incite managed and our latest partnerships have been through fixed price contracts with cost sharing where we use the far rules to the relationship and allow the contractor to contribute resources and share the risk. >> i'm out of time, sir. >> thank you very much and i'd like to recognize the chairman of the full committee. mr. smith from texas. >> thank you, mr. chairman. miss chaplain and mr. martin, a lot of nasa contractors seem to not be able to stay on schedule, they fall behind, they hepped up with -- end up with cost overruns and fail to perform as we're expecting to do. in 2018 nasa authorization act, we have a watch list for

contractors that don't perform well. before i get to my specific question. let me say the american people are rightfully sometimes frustrated by the federal government when funds go wrong and projects end up not being performed as they should and are remised. somehow no one is held accountable and no one is responsible. it just happened. that is frustrating for the american people when they see projects that cost millions if not billions of dollars than expected. who would be good candidates for that watch list and it's just that and these are contractors that need to be watching more closely. contractual obligations and who are contractors we consider putting on a watch list.

miss chaplain. >> it's a difficult question because in some cases there's a shared responsibility between nasa and contractor and even when it comes to a workmanship issue. there could be shared responsibility there. if you look at the provision you were talking about, there's a couple projects in our list where performance has been bad consistently overtime and nasa has actually canceled or proposed canceling the project or is looking atd whether to do that because contract performance. >> who were those contractors? >> one is for the sgs project that would be general dynamics and that's being looked at, performance on strewments which

is a weather satellite for determination in more extreme cases and ultimately like nasa's decision and have to see it. >> try to avoid the too big to fail syndrome. >> what are other things you're doing on time and on budget? >> one is the oversight. one is the focus on issues specific to jwst and jao and iga is important and just a general sense that folks need to be held accountable for human failure and we all fail but there's avoidable human mistakes on some of these

projects. for instance, the improper use of solvent on the jwst. inadequate welding on sls core stage by the boeing is the prime contractor and we have individual avoidable mistakes and we have issues where our international partnerships which are key to the future of nasa. 14 months blind schedule and that impacts. it is very unlikely that nasa's going to see a significant increase of 25% any time soon. it's not the nature of their spending and various constraints in the agency and fortunate to have nasa's budget

and others cut. and go back to the moon and then onto mars and seem to be able to think we're going to do everything all the time. i think that in my opinion, it's not very cost effective and very naive to think we can do everything all the time. is there a way to be at some of these and even ones like the space station and others like the moon and mars? >> no, you're not missing it. it's all about joyces. there's a fine amount of resources in nasa and it's been fortunate in the budget it's received over the years and cost and schedule estimation is realistic and come up with it to put before the decision

makers at nasa and congress. had they been able to say that the james web space telescope would cost $8 billion ten years ago when proposed, it's a decision. do james web and not suggesting it should or shouldn't have been done, but make a decision based on that but say yes to james web, saying no to a lot of other things.

to decentralize, is this an assessment function, deploying this to the center. in part to that with program management and cost estimation. they reported the change could pose for a product oversight stating it was too early to assess this effort and its effect on these agencies. the robustness of these reviews and information sharing. so now, one year later, are you able to tell us whether the decentralization was

successful?>> we have not seen a visible impact either way, we are very concerned about this but i think it is beneficial to the agency to have centralized expertise in these areas, it could really leverage that a lot. >> do you have any comments?>> yes, i think we moved to a model where we are putting the responsibility and accountability from the mission director to do the independent assessment. so far, they've stepped up to the job, they've done an effective job in implementing the project management processes including the reviews, we have a cadre of exports in the offices of the chief financial officer that have scheduled and cost the assessment expertise, the review board can draw on this. we've given stewardship control

to the office of the chief financial officer, this has been beneficial not only for the cognitive people to schedule the cost estimation but, improving the skills and processes in the capabilities for the cost scheduled estimating in the management.>> okay let me ask you this, one of the most important things that nasa could do to minimize the cost and schedule the growth, when nasa is faced with this unexpected cost growth, what are the trade-offs that nasa could make? give me some examples of the successful trade-off.>> yes, so, i think, we continue to mature, and effectively apply this process, it's going to be really important, i've seen since 2009, the value of that. the budgeting projects that the agency baseline community at the 78 % competence level. we could do better in maturing

the process, i think we could continue to focus on the develop and of the project management workforce, it's been noted including, hiring and developing the talent, hands on project management and project experience and training. 15 years ago, we identified the shortages of skills and project planning and control, we've taken on the effort to hire and train people in the area, cost estimating and scheduling management. when that's paid off we need to continue to do that. we talk about independent assessment so we continue to strengthen the independent assessment. capturing in communication with lessons learned and looking for the systemic issues and challenges across the programs including the effective action plans in place like the

shortage of funding for the staff. we need to continue to do that. this could lead to improved project performance. >> thank you very much. my time is about up, but would any other witness like to come in and comment on this?>> i had a couple more things i would like to list, one thing would be to update the cost estimate of the risk change over time. we see programs that are reluctant to do that, focusing more on the quality management, the work -- the work issues come up all the time. there's been effort to focus on that but i think more could be done.>> congressman i would like to add, there's the need to recognize, you will need appropriate skills for the proportion of the program lifecycle you are in. development skills are needed upfront in the development program, operational skills at the end, we need to make sure we are working for the right skills at the right time.>>

thank you very much. >> i would like to recognize the gentleman from oklahoma. mister lucas.>> thank you, speaking of the question that my colleague had, let's discuss for a moment in january 2018, gao founded the commercial crew program contractors for the boeing and space x experience these delays jeopardize the ability for nasa to maintain access to the international space station. will there be gap?>> know there will not be a gap. we've taken actions and have other actions we could take to minimize the risk of the gap. the first action we have is to buy three more seats which extends the ability to access the capability and risk the gap between our contract to teach the ending and the crew coming

online. a couple of other things we are looking at, adding a third crewmember to the boeing crew flight, that will be important, the other is extending missions from 140 days to 190 days. this is other actions that we can take to further mitigate the risk of a gap.>> but you are confident the direction of the contractor is going, we won't have to use these measures? >> this summer we are engaging in an assessment of the schedule for this and bowing and we will have a better handle on whether or not we need to take these additional measures at the end of this summer, we would be glad to report back on that.>> fair enough. as the chairman answer -- that answers my question.>> i would like to recognize the gentleman from virginia. mister myers.>> chairman, thank you very much. the chaplain, you mentioned that, it would be helpful to

have much more frequent updates for cost and timelines, on these days it sporadically, we update the projections at least once a month. we are getting monthly reports on new home sales and unemployment claims and jobs created. why are nasa and the contractors stopped in on a regular basis when it would be easier to tolerate?>> it would be easier for them if they continually did it because then it would not be such a chore to do it after a couple of years but right now, they have the baseline when they really start their program, they do not read this, and in some cases i think they don't want to be specific or show to the world what the const -- with the cost truly is. you would have to ask the program, i think this is the healthy thing to do, the

conditions change. in the program, there were a lot of things that had changed in the last few years, for example, it took way longer to manufacture them and -- than anticipated. this would be a good time to reassess the projects but they did not do it.>> moving forward, looking at the requirement much more frequent updates on the costs,>> this may be more of a rhetorical editorial comment, you write that the current budgeting process included the regular use of the continued resolution, threats of government shutdown resulted in endless multiple planning scenarios that resolved -- that resulted in issues, accurate flight dates, it's difficult when the budget is in flux. is it incredible to say -- is it credible to say congress plays a role in the problems nasa has with the budget and timeline?>> yes, i would say that. you don't need to say any more

than that. so making that -- so thank you for making that clear. why not under promise and over perform? that's what my children do with me.>> our job on any given program area is to optimize the portfolio and deliver the most science expiration mission that we can for the budget given. we have taken an approach, having the portfolio of the small, medium, and large missions, and an approach, we budget the missions at the 70 % competency level. given the imitation against the opportunity costs, of budgeting more than at the 70 sent -- 70 % competence level and delay starting remission.

this is a matter of optimizing the portfolio and delivery science and exploration content we can for the budget we've been given.>> part of optimizing, the expectation that the people, these expectations you have.>> we could definitely do a better job on managing expectations.>> i think another realistic thing, you're in greater danger of not getting your project started. in the first place, attracting enough excitement and attention to get this project funded. i think what nasa's problem is, often they overpromise obviously, overpromising the technology, going over the footnotes, on page 3 of the written statement, there's a quote from the former administrator, i think we at that time, talking about the proponents of the individual mission, downplaying the technical difficulty and risk. i think this has been a

historic problem for nasa.>> you raise an interesting piece, one is that there is this was a sense of two optimizing -- too much optimism. the dilemma with accountability, there's the shortness of talent that we need.>> they are over 50 years old, there's challenges,>> how do you ratchet up the accountability and not depress the enthusiasm, the extensive that it was. how do you dampen the optimism in the agency that has to be so optimistic?>> you are dancing on the edge of a knife when you do that, as you point out, you have to have the optimism, the freethinking to really think of things that have not been built before, to conceptualize and put them -- and to start

pending on them. if it was easy, nasa would do it. it is rocket science after all. it's a very difficult thing. nasa has brought in a lot of its contest techniques. other processes, they need to force adherence to those requirements.>> thank you, mister chair you are back.>> yes sir, thank you.>> i'm from alabama. >> thank you mister chairman. i am concerned by the perceived transition process way from the current operational format for the international space station. there's no end in my judgment, substituting public debate on what the transition involves. this is a backdrop. i got a question directed at the director of contracting national security acquisition, and the search administration. first, as nasa -- has nasa come up with a definition for what commercialization for the

international space station and what that means? >> we have not been doing work in that area and i do not believe that they have yet.>> let me tell you where we are with that. with the station transition, we released a solicitation not too long ago for studies, studies on transitioning the space station to some sort of, some sort of collaborative or commercial enterprise. we were getting the proposals in this week and i will evaluate them. what we ask for in the study, the capability that the commercial thinks they can provide us, compared to what we need and what we had when we need in the future. the technical approach to achieving the capability, the third is the business plan. what is our business plan?

although we don't have a rigorous definition, nasa should be maybe 20-30 % user capability than other entities and commercial entities, they should also use that capability. we shouldn't be the 80 or 90 %, with that capability. i would not define us as commercial. we will get those studies back in december. that will inform a more detailed transition plan. and it would be ready to come to you all and present that plan. to get your feedback and input.>> anticipating having the more detailed plan, that you could present to us, so we have a better understanding of what the commercialization means.>> we look at the results from the studies in december of this year. bubbly some number of months. probably know, the first half of the next calendar year. we will be able to come back to you to lay that out. informed by the initial studies, what looks feasible in the mid-20s timeframe.>> so you would be in a position to answer the question of the first six months of 2019?

is that my understanding?>> yes and i could take a question to get back to you on the exact date if you like.>> fine, thank you. mister martin? your honor commercial resupply services, dated april 26, 2018, space x average price per kilogram will increase approximately 50 % under crs-2. while orbital 80 kay's average per kilogram price, decreasing by roughly 15 %". the major difference between these contracts on the usability. >> my question is this, are you concerned about whether taxpayers?

>> steve could probably answer this more specifically, i believe there's a slight reduction in the area, 3-7 % for the use of the reuse rocket. at -- it's happened once this month, twice so far for the commercial cargo, there's this slight reduction. this is a safety issue, the launch services that people need to assess the specific rocket, and the series of rockets before they authorize the launch. >> well, since mister martin pointed the finger at you, what would your insight be? >> the insight, i think he is right with respect to the marginal cost reduction, the usability of the first stage of the falcon nine and working toward using, the recently are looking at purchasing the upper stage.

operationally with this system they gained experience with reuse. there's opportunity to further produce the rest. and reduce this cost. by understanding the condition of what this is and by how much effort it takes. so there's the opportunity there. i am not able to predict what they might achieve through the use of it at this point.>> could you expound on the increased risk factor, using a novel approach, reusable rocket?>> thank you mister chairman.>> i now recognize the gentleman from pennsylvania mister lamb.>> thank you mister chairman. everyone, i appreciate you highlighting the ethical

position you are in when this comes to unpredictable funding streams, threatening to shut down the government, funding by crs, that kind of thing. i'm trying to learn more about how this actually can affect you on the ground, day-to-day. this is a question for anyone, could you share some more ask -- specific examples of how this might affect a particular project? >> i will be happy to take that. i've lived it for a while. what happens, congressman, when you are working on a program and trying to put the plan together for the future, what is my workplan for this year over a five-year budget horizon? working through the appreciations -- appropriations budgeting process, i have to plan for a different number every time. that means i'm going to go back through the planning iteration process.

at a time when the president's budget request was significantly different from what was typically coming from the appropriations process, it was necessary to do the plan that was supportive and inclusive in the budget request and i had to be ready as a program manager, if additional appropriations came in, i had the ability to plan and be able to react to that.>> what type of program were you managing?>> this was at the beginning of the orion programs.>> so that was a program that was supposed to take how long from start to finish?>> at the time i was there, we were looking at the first launch in 2017-2018 timeframe. during my tenure as the program director, we had to deal with the government shutdown, continual negotiations, on both ends of pennsylvania avenue,

and then, in addition to that, while i'm doing all of that planning, the teams focus is pulled away from the day to day management of the technically complex jobs. we were working through all of that, we actually had to deal with the government shutdown and work through that and the multiple planning cycles. >> thank you. miss chaplain it seems like you had something to add.>> i think i've heard similar things from other agencies i've overseen like missile defense, the constant replanning, the chaos and time that it consumes. another example of the impact of the shutdown, a cryo- test at the end of the program, it might take a couple of weeks to get the facility ready for the test and two weeks to cool down, a shutdown i think, the way we do that test, we are

worried, if we have to shut down we will lose the whole month of time.>> okay, thank you very much. again, a question for anyone. i think this is pressing. some of you have highlighted the workforce development issues you've had with the nasa. i think it was one of you who talked about the young people leaving nasa for higher-paying jobs in the private sector, that is a challenge obviously, across the government. is happens in the military as well. if there was one reform you could suggest or something we could improve or strengthen to retain some of the talent and attract new talent, what would this be?>> as i stated in my testimony, the one thing i would recommend is good, real, hardware programs. to address those technical needs we need for the space

exploration and the nasa mission. to give the students and young professionals real hands on hardware experience. >> the worse project i worked on was a spaceflight instrument development project in house that the nasa research center, they designed, they build it it, does make the bill did it, that experience was critical. with the systems manager and line manager. without that experience, i do not know how i would be able to be as corrective -- effective.>> if i may give you a little bit of a story two, there's a group of people of which i was one, we had the ability and were asked and required by mentors to test shuttle main engines in-house.

we tested the technology that became the final flight configuration for the shuttle. the hands on experience, our mentors and leaders, it forced it into that. they knew this would be a long-term career.>> echoing the same thing, we heard from a number of project managers, they spoke about their frustrations. engineers are spending most of their time overseeing contractors efforts which is frustrating.>> thank you. >> i would like to recognize the gentleman from louisiana, mister higgins.>> thank you mister chairman. the young americans here today, the interns, i hope you young men and women are paying attention, the budget discussions, we are a nation, $20 trillion in debt. should this body ever managed to produce a surplus, say $1

billion, it would require 20,000 years of $1 billion surplus to address $20 trillion debt. i'm prayerful that nasa has the spirit of doing more with less because not only are individual projects at risk but certainly, anyone could recognize a $20 trillion debt puts the entire stability of all programs at risk in every government agency. but i'm hopeful, you young americans are paying close attention to the conversation. mister martin, i am concerned about the cultural optimism that he referred to and the -- the one attitude amongst project managers. >> the projects are too great

to fail because in every case, these things have been invested in the project. therefore, it's quite logical. to have this cavalier attitude of too big to fail, what could this committee do, what could congress do to ensure projects have been developed and managed within budget constraints? including, the falsehood regarding accountability, toward contractors within the projects? >> again i think more frequent conversations with members of congress about the status of individual process, more fidelity to the process admitting -- submitting what

nasa does right now, the occasional example that projects large or small will be terminated if they go too far over the cost of schedule. and in preparation for the hearing i think the last project i remember being canceled was something to jim's. it was a telescope that was supposed to look for evidence of black holes and it was a small program for nasa speak camped at $105 million, partway through the formulation realized the cost assessment would be 20 or 30 % over the $105 million camp. nasa canceled it. that got people's attention. >> generally speaking the contractors, that are involved in cost overruns, for nasa projects large projects, these are the companies are they not? >> they are, sir.>> has this ever been addressed within the leadership at nasa? you know, most americans, we

received a bid from a professional contractor to perform a particular service and we expect that service performed for the price that it was bid and held accountable he. there's a certain expectation of performance when you are given a bid but within the federal government, certainly within nasa's large project, there seems to be this attitude of well, we are not really accountable for the actual bid we presented and won't be forced to perform. >> he stands for leadership.>> so, a lot of the time, we are doing things, building systems for the first time no one else has done before, and so in these cases, we use a cost reimbursement -- reimbursement contract, the incentives, to hold the contract accountable, three performance evaluation, plan, they are tied to an award

fee, that is their profit. if they don't perform and they should get a low score, a performance evaluation plan, either they will see much less profit or no profit depending on how we are, how the incentives are scored. given the high risk nature, the nature of what we do, the complex systems, high risk technology, we take this approach, we hold them accountable, the ultimate price to pay for them if they don't perform is the complete loss of profit. >> thank you for your response, mister chairman my time has expired, if there's a second round i have a question for mister chairman.>> yes sir, thank you very much. now, mister foster.>> thank you. i would like to start by making an observation about the amount of funding you could think

about having in the next decades, last week the federal reserve made the historic announcement that the household network and the united states, the wealth of americans went over $100 trillion. this is up $45 trillion since the president signed the stimulus reverse for the economic plans and triggers the unit -- the economic growth. when people tell you there's not enough money to do the event, the skill for that is one fraction of 120 -- $100 trillion, might we think about you know, whatever we used to travel to mars or wherever you do this. and we also want to say that i resonated -- resonated as a product manager and someone doing the technical component of the large federal projects, resonating with the desire to

retain in-house expertise, it's very difficult to manage a project if you've never done this yourself. when i decided i had to manage a group doing a large number of integrative circuits, i learned the integrative circuit design control tools and made the integrative circuits myself before deciding that i could sit at the top and meet these specifications for other engineers. this is crucial. we have to look carefully when we see this rush to privatization. it runs the risk of losing the expertise that will ultimately cost more money because you have projects that are not managed as well as they could be. we have to be cognizant of that as we contemplate this transition. when i think about the cost overruns, there are two big general classes. the first one is an enthusiast cost estimate. the scoping of this projects, always done by people who are advocates for the project, then you have to get adults in the

room with experience to actually pull back and say, okay how does this compare to the actual cost? the other one is legitimate technical risk. i would like to say, i hope my colleagues in congress would be more tolerant of the technical risk. it's okay to take significant technical risk. if you assemble a group of experts that say success is not assured but this looks like a good bet, then it turns out you lose the bet, congress should be very understanding and tolerant. but much less tolerant when the project is approved and everyone in the room knows the, i don't want to point pictures -- i don't want to point fingers, but you know of several projects where they've been approved you knew that the large amount of people weren't going to get up to the project cost. this happens within you know, everywhere within the government. and so, i was just wondering, are there ways to identified retrospectively the time when you had enthusiast cost estimates?

sociological red flags? ones that might allow you to say, okay, i'm suspicious this is not a real cost estimate? >> i always, i can tell like, when i am suspicious, it's usually when there are very grand statements made of the program, the achievements that it would get, they seem overly exaggerated, that's when you start wondering, are those estimates real? i would say in this case, i trust the process that they have, they review the estimates carefully. they have standing review boards. they look at them before they make their decisions. they could have more

independent estimation to compare, that's one thing. i believe that the process now, opposed to a few years ago, they are rigorous in assuring that the estimates are complete. one thing you said about taking a risk, that you need to still do that, and there's the concern within nasa and other places within the government that weren't taking enough technical risk that were too afraid to do that.>> i concur .>> with respect to science missions, nasa relies extensively on the findings of the national research council the surveys identified specific projects. i think that is another check.>> they don't do cost estimates. they are sort of given the external estimate, that is my understanding.>> they don't do very good cost estimates but they do cost estimates.>> that's where you need the expertise and judgment for that stage. >> if i may congressman, when i think on my career and some of the places i'd seen the problem occur the most, one key thing stands out. have the people doing the cost estimate be those who will be

held accountable for the program execution. i've seen a couple of instances, the people making the initial estimate, putting the plan together, they knew they were going to be moving on to something else than they brought the new person in and that new person was like, what is this? if there is an air of accountability and they know that they are ultimately accountable for the cost for executing, that starts to change things and get the behavior where i think you would want it sociologically.>> thank you, and there's a whole set of questions going to this external contractor model, who does the cost estimate and who takes the responsibility in that model. i guess i'm out of time here. >> the chair recognizes congressman john from florida.>> thank you mister chairman. i'm going to jump right in. the canadian space agency last month canceled its participation from its first

project for budgetary reasons, in your assessment what would the impact be for the technology development and the cost which results from the decision to do that?>> the decision was factored in from the replanning after the independent review and factored into the plan going forward to move from phase a-phase b. they've been able to adjust the scope. within the $3.2 billion. still without the canadian contributions.>> how does this defect -- affect the technology development?>> i think that, the project has a really good plan, early on, developing a perfect type of hardware, reducing the risk of the element as well as other elements.>> how about the mission itself? does the capability, did they

change that?>> the level science goals do not change and will meet the requirement of the mission defined in the survey from last year.>> that is great news. they still required a life cycle cross assessment. that is behind us. when will this be submitted?>> we will get you that within the next couple of weeks. it's been done and they are wrapping up documentation. it will be here hopefully within the next two or so weeks.>> many people here on the panel called the assessment, you would eventually need a stable and predictable amount of funding to plan. let's close our eyes, let's imagine that congress might provide multi-year funding. is a pleasant notion. in this scenario, how would the authority change or planning?

>> i think this would allow us to only plan once and execute that plan and deal with the challenges that they had articulated previously. an example we have of getting the multiyear funding, it was ovi-105. there was the multi-year funding for the project, they were successful in executing on schedule and on budget with a profile that ramped up and ramped down like any project plan should and having the money , the adequate money when they needed it. that's an example of what we are talking about.>> so that might be good for a lot of different agencies right? >> for any large complex program that could take multiple years, i would think so. let me, i know i'm on a limited amount of time.>> i think we

are all disappointed that the james webb cost of run missed deadlines. what programmatic changes would you make to the program to prevent this in light of this failure? >> could you answer that?>> i can tell you what we have done. >> the first is a series of actions we worked on. first of all, we completely restructured the organization, in order to be able to more clearly hold people accountable for getting to the integration desk program. that has allowed them to identify and resolve these issues in a timely manner. in order to minimize the impact of these issues. and we've also added staffing to the itt man at norfolk and we really, i would say, we strengthened the mission assurance function and personnel out there to deal with

the workmanship and quality issues mentioned by miss chaplin and others. they tried to avoid the errors that have caused schedule delays, as was mentioned, a small error or problem, it's got a large effect on the program,>> in the 30 seconds remaining to have anything to add these comments?>> we've not done the significant oversight of the -- of this?>> yes i believe the actions we've taken have been reasonable, we would like to note that they were already having an on-site presence, we will be looking to see how effective the actions are as we do the next preview .>> here is wishing you multi- year funding, that mister chairman thank you.>> the chair recognizes representative mcglocklin from california.>> thank you mister chairman.>> i think this is an important

hearing. most questions have been asked. i would like to think about, what further congress could do in addition to, avoiding the kind of situation mister lamb addressed, to shut down the issue with the inconsistency between the presidents requested budget and what is appropriated which led to uncertainty for the planning process, what could congress do, in order to limit the uncertainty, and the funding other than those two issues? the idea of the multi-year funding program for the watch projects. it's valuable, but could you give us further guidance to stem the losses for our own actions? >> i will start, i would say, avoid over specifying your

expectations, avoid setting dates for the program, for choosing how they are going to do it, that fair choice limits more on what they could do.>> yes i would echo that. we seem to be getting more and more direction through the appropriations process which could lead to the report. we expect to see that followed direction, that constrains the ability to manage sometimes. to echo what mister chaplin says, that as additional things -- that is one additional thing i could think of.>> with respect to the funding issue, it's not just the dollar amount but when it comes to the proper phasing of the appropriation, it's impacted the nasa program. >> i would add, work to make sure that the environment in which we have these discussions is less punitive and more

objective and more willing to hear the risks and understand the issue. i think we've got to be careful, that a lot of, leads to more oversight, it keeps going in a circle. this subcommittee could do, because of the oversight activities, helping to establish an environment that allows more open communication on these kinds of issues.>> i think the point mister foster made, all scientists know, failure is a learning experience. science is testing and not knowing the answer before you start. we need to foster that sense of discovery and willingness, to take risks if we will be successful. let me close with sort of a parochial question. i represent part of santa clara county, it's no located in

santa clara county. -- it's located in santa clara county. thinking of the rings we face in nasa with the workforce being over 50 years of age, nasa is a facility, it's located in a key portion of the country in the silicon valley. there is a lot of synergy between what's going on in the tech community and although it's expensive, to live in santa clara county, they just build housing for nasa employees , it's possible to maintain that synergy. i'm wondering, in terms of that facility as well as others, the once co-located with technology centers, what can we further do to move top scientists away from better paying jobs? into the eight -- into the

agency to make young people smart and good scientists want to work in nasa? >> take a try at it. i think, what the young people want now, it's similar to what they wanted when i was getting out of school. they want exciting work, they want to know they've got an opportunity to make a difference. they want to solve today and future problems. i think, providing those, in addition to the infrastructure kind of options that you've described, would be extremely beneficial. i think they want to from my experience, teaching at purdue for a few years, if you hit the first three ones, the students will come. that's why they go to space-x and blue origin, they see exciting work, that's why they

want to come to nasa. there's that cachet, it's always had that. it's exciting work, it can help make a difference to do something quick, i think you will be a long way down the road.>> thank you, i see that my time has expired.>> thank you for your questions and participation, mister chairman, i apologize for being late to the hearing. obviously two important hearings have to happen at exactly the same time. this perhaps leads me to the first point which is, we need to make sure that we hold nasa accountable, i have to assume that congress isn't doing its job all that well either. i mean, we are talking about continuing resolution this is a reflection on the fact that we aren't doing our job here as well.

please do not think, if there is any criticism here coming from this and that we don't realize, at least some of us do not realize that there's justify criticism on the way congress is doing its job. let me ask you a couple of questions here about the crossover runs. they seem to be around, they've been around as long as i've been around, me ask you this, is a lot of this intentional low bidding on part of companies in order to achieve a contract? is this part of that? and whoever can answer that question. >> you know, we've got a pretty rigorous request for proposal and proposal evaluation process. including independent scheduled estimates by the government which were what's being proposed is actually executable

>> so it's not to say that you don't see this as a scheme by some big corporation to intentionally bit larger and realize we will have to pay for it later on?>> i do not.>> thank you, that helps our understanding of this of these companies, throughout the crossover runs, they are companies worth billions and billions of dollars themselves. if, what penalty does this company have that goes through the major crossover and doesn't meet its commitments to the contract? what is the punishment?>> so to take these actions to punish the companies through the award and sent awesome -- also in

terms of what you can do, the ultimate thing is to cancel the program if you feel like.>> but what about the next program? can a company that didn't meet at contract he denied the next contract or contracts down the road because they haven't met their obligation?>> i think it's possible. the proposal that is in your bill about the contractor watchlist, it could go on that list if they are performing well. that nasa won't deal with them in the future. for the period of time. that is an option. >> maybe you could expand on that?>> we've got a very robust acquisition integrity program within the agency they look at the contract performance and they use the process for suspension and debarment.

so, we use the process. the other thing we do, we have contract performance assessment reporting systems to evaluate the contract on a regular basis, the assessment goes into the system as well as the assessments of the department and agencies. not only nasa but the other department agencies to be drawn on that. to use that in assessing the past performance for the contract to determine whether or not to reward that in the future.>> it's things we have to be more diligent in that area. once we have accountability and responsibility for these things, we can expect to have more problems. i have to assume that we do not have the amount of disciplinary systems and accountability that will deter companies, perhaps maybe, companies that make bids , they should be held responsible for that. meaning that the money that's

lost perhaps, it should be absorbed by the company, as i said, these are multibillion- dollar companies. and they are going to be taking taxpayer money and failing and what they're claiming to do. why should the taxpayer pick it up? as we mentioned, we have $20 trillion debt, this gentleman mentioned, if there's anything that will keep us from going into space it's going to be the total disintegration of our economic systems to where we can't afford any of this stuff. i would also, let me note, we will have to, we got a $20 billion budget for nasa. we should be able to do a lot with $20 billion. let me note, when i first got involved, i realized the budget was not enough to accomplish the mission, that is why i

tried to focus totally on international cooperation and private sector investment. let's hope that that is one avenue to make more revenue come in. we also have to make sure that we pay attention to what the hearing is all about, we need to make sure that we are managing the actual project themselves, in such a way to minimize loss, loss of very scarce dollars. so, thank you very much mister chairman.>> certainly. thank you gentlemen for your participation. we are nearing the 12:00 our. we will finish by 12:00. there may be a member who wishes to ask a second set of questions. so long as we are able to do that within the timeframe, mister higgins, did you want to follow up?>> thank you mister chairman, >> one second, the chair recognizes representative higgins from louisiana for the follow-up.>> thank you for allowing me to ask that

question. as well as the competence level analysis from the beginning stages within the implementation phase large project it was recommended that the project was updated. according to the report, they concurred with the recommendation, yet no steps were taken to implement. the further analysis indicates if implement it, and updated project may have prevented schedule delays. nasa encounters regarding the costed schedule the cost of schedule, can you elaborate on why the recommendation was purposefully overlooked. >> at the time they did concur as you said, forever the

official reasons, they were reluctant to, we recommended they at least do something similar to do the cost scheduled risk analysis and take a deep look, and we will do that ourselves, working with a contractor. since that was rejected by the contractor, then it wasn't until they were getting ready to work with the launch agency that they actually did a schedule risk analysis by themselves, they realized how far behind that they were. >> thank you for your candid answer. mister chairman, thank you for allowing me to ask the second question.>> certainly, any other member wish to ask any other the question?>> i see

none, i think the witnesses for their valuable testimony in the members for the questions. the record will remain open for two weeks. for comments and written questions were members, the hearing is adjourned.

>> washington journal live every day, news and quality issues that impact you, coming up friday morning, minnesota republican congressman and deputy chair for the natural republican campaign committee, talking about the campaign 2018, then congressman paul reviews the opioid crisis. be sure to watch the washington journal, live at 7:00 eastern on friday morning. joined the discussion. -- joined the discussion.

sunday in american artifacts. tour the library of congress exhibit on the centennial of world war i, showcasing the american ideas about the war through artwork, posters, photographs, films, and documents.>> the idea of cultivating to workforce labor, growing your own food, to conserve larger quantities with a less effort. a prominent illustrator, again, another individual, you would see her also, the food conservation, this is, you know, we make everything out of corn today. but technically we didn't. this is kind of new. in world war ii we would ration. we believed, if you encouraged people they would ration food. you just need to impose this on

them.>> watch american artifacts sunday at 6:00 p.m. eastern on american history tv on cspan3. sunday, filmmakers discuss the documentary, hit and stay. a history of faith and resistance. about the actions of catholic activists who protested in the vietnam war. >> here were the middle-aged clergy. the public, maybe we should consider it ourselves. that was the turning point for the antiwar movement.>> their action clearly didn't end the vietnam war. i do not see how you could argue that it did not help and the draft. the head of the selective service, they said publicly