wholesome foods and corn. i know we make everything out of corn today, but back then, we didn't, so this was new. again, one thing that's worth note about this, too, is that in world war ii, we were rationed. >> watch sunday at 6 clk p.m. eastern on american history tv on cspan 3. >> next, adam hickey testifies before the senate judiciary committee. the committee also hears from former defense and homeland security officials on strategies and recommendations aimed at protecting election infrastructure and social made area platforms from attacks.

>> i thank everybody for being here today. and i'm sorry about the long lines outside. i hope my staff has accommodated some ways. so they can all participate in this. for many month now, we've been aware that foreign actors attempted to interfere in our democracy by spreading false and inflammatory rhetoric to the electric and by attempting to hack our electoral systems themselves. our hearing today will again focus on what actions we can take to prevent that from happening again. particularly what tools we can provide law enforcement to investigate and promise to keep those who seek to interfere with our elections. the great threat proposed by foreign meddling has led to many

responses within our government. has been on the front lines try ing to bolster election infrastructure. january 2017, dhs designated our electoral system as critical infrastructure. that designation supported two cybersecurity related purposes. one, election officials upon request would be a top priority for the receipt of dhs's services and election infrastructure would receive the benefit of various domestic and international cybersecurity protections. more over, department of homeland security has worked to feed classified and nonclassified cybersecurity risk information. with state and local officials. dhs has formed several working groups and task force,

developing plans for election infrastructure security. working not only with state and locate election officials, but also the private sector to help ten or eight best practices and solutions. the department has continued to work to strengthen partnerships. election rs controlleded by states. that means these partnerships are completely voluntary. that puts the o niehaus upon states to seek help from and cooperate with our former government. if they don't, it's impossible for the department to step in. other responses from government include president trump's decision to levy sanctions against individuals that participated in the election interference.

in march this year. treasury department targeted five entities and 19 individuals including the internet research agency. in april, the administration imposed additional sanctions on seven russian oligarchs and top government officials for interference in the 2016 election. and other aggressions. among the individual sanctioned was oleg deripaska, an individual who had close tied to paul manafort. also on march this year, president trump expelled 60 russ russian diplomats from the u.s. and i'm told from history that the largest expulsion on the criminal front. this past ferks special counsel

charged seven entities with crimes associated with an effort to interfere in our election process. congress has devoted substantial attention to the issue. some have complained about the alleged inaction, particularly within our own committee. so you would expect me to say to the contrary in the judiciary committee alone, we have held no less than five hearings addressing this issue. this will be our sixth hearing regarding russian our other foreign interferences since the last election. on the legislative front, to combat different angles of the foreign election meddling issue. of the entire is that the,

however one has has been referred tothd judiciary committee. i've disclosed the act as well as a shell company abous act. with senators, white house, durbin and graham. this second bill if enaked into law would recognize conceal iin activities of a foreign or donations to campaigns or election communications. in addition to the bill bills offered in the senate, 16 offered in the house. homeland security and our justice department have been working hard to form late the best response to this challenge and to investigate and prosecute those targeting our elections. experts and academics have also weighed in with thoughts of how best the protect our elections

as we move towards this midterm election this year. we will hear from some of those people today. as i mentioned earlier, our mission is is focused very scare scarily on this issue, are there additional steps that we can take within the jurisdiction of the committee that will meaningly assist law enforcement to deter, to prevent, to investigate and to punish foreign actors who seek to meddle in our elections. it's important o note that the federal election campaign act, which is not even within our jurisdiction of this committee is a comprehensive framework designed to address illegal campaign and election related activities. this act provides many of the

answers to enforcement in title 18 as and as the mueller indictment suggests, many of the veexisting statutes addressing behavior. we can name wire fraud, bank fraud, aggrevate d identity thet and the computer fraud and abuse act. just to name a few. sometimes call for new solutions. sometimes, they can be addressed by existing law. ultimately, the answer may be that no new law is created or that only a few small changes are necessary. that does not mean that we should not ask the questions, so here we are today. senator feinstein. >> thanks very much, mr. chairman, for holding this

hearing. we know that russia orchestrated a sustained and coordinated attack that interfered in our last presidential election and we also know there's a serious threat of more attacks in our future elections including this november. as the united states intelligence committee unanimously concluded, the russian government's interference in our election and i quote, blended covert intelligence operations such as cyber activity with over efforts third party and paid social media users or trolls. over the course of the past year and a half, we've come to better understand how pernicious these attacks were. particularly unsettling is that we were so unaware. we were unaware that russia was

sewing division through mass propaganda, cyber warfare and working with malicious actors to tip scales of the election. 13 russian nationals and three organizations including the russian backed internet research agency have now been indicted for the role in russia's vast conspiracy to defraud the united states. these defbought -- and staged political rallies inside the united states. they did this all while posing as united states persons and without revealing the russian identities. from special counsel mueller's indictment, we know that unwitting americans assisted in these efforts. we still do not know however whether any americans knowingly helped the russians. this is extraordinarily

sobering. our country is is built on free and fair elections. we are a government of the people, by the people and for the people. when our election rs called into question, our government is also called into question. this is russia's goal. to attack the very foundations of our democracy. as the intelligence communities report later stated and i quote, russian efforts to influence the 2016 u.s. presidential election represent the most recent expression of moscow's long standing desire to undermine the u.s.-led liberal democratic order. end quote. so we must do all we can to prevent future attacks on our elections. we've got to be clear eye d abot

the threats we face and we've got to put aside politics and act decisively. to be clear, there are already laws on the books to prosecute those who interfere in our elections. indeed, as i mentioned a moment ago, special counsel mueller has indicted 13 russian employees of the ira, the internet research agency. these individuals were charged with defrauding the united states in violation of section 371 of title 18 of the united states code. in fact, there are questions of f whether this same charge can be brought against americans if they are found to have ak cemented election assistance from foreign entities or coordinated with wikileaks about

when to release e-mails stolen from the democratic national committee campaign manager. i hope these witnesses today will be -- special counsel mueller has also charge d paul manafort with fraud and viole e violations of the foreign agent's registration act called fara. the purpose of fara is to ensure that the united states government and the source of information and identity of people seeking to influence united states public opinion, policy or law. by failing to register as a foreign agent, mr. manafort alleg

alleged alleged alleged allegedly concealed effort to affect foreign policy while serving as campaign chairman for the republican candidate for president. in fact, the special counsel's office has now charged mr. manafort with obstructing justice by trying to conceal the true nature of his work for the ukrainian government. to avoid conviction, mr. manafort has allegedly urged past associates to lie about his lobbying for ukrainian government interests. this is yet another example of how there are laws to address collusion. but i hope the witnesses today can tell us how to make these laws better. in particular, i'm looking forward to hearing from the witnesses today about the scope of the problem. the steps that are currently being undertaken by the

government to hold malicious actors accountable and third, ways we can act to prevent future attacks. mr. chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing. i know that several members of the committee have requested a hearing like this. and have introduced legislation to deal with foreign interference in our elections and i know all of us on this committee have a very strong belief and commitment to act before our democracy is undermine ed again. so i hope this hearing will lead and conducting the relevant oversight the help protect our future elections. thank you very much. >> thank you, senator feinstein. now, i'll give a short introduction of our two witnesses on the first panel. mr. hickey.

the acting deputy chief. before that, we served, he served as deputy chief of appeals in the southern district of new york. mr. masterson is the senior cybersecurity adviser within the national protection and programs director at the department of homeland security prior to this role, he served as commission of u.s. election assistance commission along with several other positions in that agency. and and a also served as chief taf for the ohio secretary of state. both of you probably though that if you have a very long statement beyond your five minutes that that statement will be put in the record and we'll start with mr. hickey, then mr. matherson then we'll have a

round of questioning for anybody that wants to ask questions. mr. hicky. >> good morning, chairman grassley, ranking member feinstein and distinguished members of the committee m thank you for the opportunity to testify concerning our efforts to combat election interference. the department appreciates the committee's interest in hamakin sure law enforcement has the tools we need. i know the committee has my written testimony, so i won't repeat it here. instead, i'll cover a few key points. first, the attorney general himself identified this issue as a priority. when he created a cyber digital task force this year. he specifically directed the task force to address quote efforts to sbeinterfere with ou elections and our report is due to him by the enof the b month. i anticipate the department will then issue a b public report in mid july.

i expect it will provide additional insight into how department plans to imply -- in the sensitive context of foreign operations. when i say foreign influence operations, i'm referring to covert actions p by foreign governments intended to affect u.s. political sentiment and public discourse. sew divisions in our society or undermine confidence in our democratic institutions to achieve strategic ge oh, political objectives. these can be cyber operations that target election infrastructure or political organizations and seek to alter the confidentiality, validity or integrity of data. to covert operations designed to assist or harm political organizations or public officials. the role first is prosecution of federal crimes, but fortune issues go beyond and they require more than law

enforcement responses alone. recognizes that. we approach this national security threat the same as any other, with an eye towards supporting not only our own legal tools, but the tools and abilities of others. first, as a threat driven organization and member of the intelligence community, where the ic, the fbi can pursue tips and leads, investigate illegal foreign influence activities and share information with others to help them detect, prevent and respond to computer mack ihacki espionage and other criminal activities. the fbi can also share information with social media providers, helping with their own initiatives to enforce terms of service that prohibit the use of their platforms. last fall, the fbi formed a tas in -- more nimble and effective. of course, our investigations

may x pose conduct that weren'ts criminal charges. when they do, we will work to hold defendants accountable and those who seek to avoid justice will find their freedom of travel restricted. our investigations can also support action by other u.s. government agencies using diplomatic, military intelligence and economic tools. for example, in in several cases, finally in appropriate cases b, information gathered during our investigations can be b use today alert victims other individuals and the public to form influence ak hits. exposure may be one of the best ways to encounter them.

they must be conducted with particular sensitivity in the context of election to avoid the appearance of partiality. in taking these actions, we are alert to ways in which current law may benefit current reform. by clarifying or expanding laws to provide new tools or sharpen existing ones where appropriate. the department plays an important role, but there are himts to the department's role and the role of the u.s. government more broadly in combatting foreign influence operations. doing so requires a whole of society approach that relies on coordinating actions by federal, state and local government agencies support from the private sector and the active engagement of an informed public. i want to thank the committee again for providing me this opportunity to discuss these important issues on behalf of the department b, i'm happy to answer any questions you may have.

>> thank you, now mr. masterson. >> thank you chairman. to testify to assist state and local official, those who own and operate election systems with the resilience of elections across america. for over a -- for the last three years. i served as commissioner and chairm chairman, for my best practices to support officials and respond to the threat of the nation's election systems. now i serve as senior adviser at dhs. in this decade of work, i can tell you the absolute best part is working with the dedicated

professionals maryland administer -- to mitigate rigat- it's to ensure officials across this country. to protect, detect and recover from those risks. at no cost to military technical assistance -- and ransom and directive malware. dhs stands ready to help and offer tailored support. through these efforts, we've

made -- to improve improve the resilience of the practice. we've created counsels who work to share information, promote best practices and strategies to reduce risks to the nation's election systems. we've created the election infrastructure, information sharing and analysis center with members from every state and hundreds of local jurisdictions. this is our fastest growing sector. we're sponsoring up to three election officials for security clearances which allow us to receive information if necessary. we've increased free technical assistance across the sector. also, dhs has been leading an effort to support state and local officials efforts. this brings together our partners at the election assistance commission, the intelligence community, dod and other partners and is modelled

on our work in other critical infrastructure sectors. the purpose is to ensure that information is timely and action bly shared across the sector. the problgress made is clear an as i've traveled across this country, it's evident. last month, i traveled to iowa to meet with secretary of state peyton. we provided training to county auditors and building a resilient election process. wha while there, i was impressed by the level of coordination to secure iowa's elections. from the secretary of state's office engangs with us and upgrading the voter registration system so include things like two fakctor awe thentification and providing training to the auditors them and their preparation and implementation of best practice. iowa serves as a model of whole of government response.

we've seen progress at the local level. cently under secretary krebs was in cook county illinois wohere e walked through the framework for elections. through h framework, cook county has systemically mapped every system, identified known vulnerability points and built defenses and recovery plans. elections are run by states and localties. there are over 10,000 in the united states. the systems and procedures used vary greatly. what works for the voters of florida may not work for california. the local administration of elections empowers voters to engage with the process and those who run it, which brings me to my final point. for those voters who have questions or concerns regarding the security of integrity of the process, i implore you to get involved. become a poll worker. watch preelection test iing the

systems. check your registration information before elections and gauge with your local election official and most importantly, go vote. the best response to those who wish to undermine faith in our democracy is to participate and vote. before i conclude, i want to thank congress for the le legislative congress. specifically to create is agency or sisa which would reorganize and ppd. i look forward to outlining our efforts and work with the firms in the country. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. masterson. now we will have five rounds of questions. start with mr. hickey.

attempting to influence election, including but not limited to wire fraud law, bank fraud, identity theft, computer fraud and abuse, federal agents registration. act violations, money laundering. our own review doesn't suggest any blaring holes in authority. investigate and prosecute these crimes. two questions for you in your opinion, what if anything needs to be fixed or added to the criminal tool box and worth specifically referred to title 18 to allow law enforcement to investigate and prosecute those through fraud ar cyber attack. >> thank you, senator. as you just pointed out, we have a fairly robust set of tools and

are committed to using all of them. so at the moment, i'm not here today to call for any additional tool, but it's important that on an on going basis, the department and all its ves investigations consider the limits of those authorities, so we're always look iing nand thi context, are examing whether there might be gaps and if we identify them, we'll be pleased to work with congress in bringing them your attention and likewi likewise, be willing to work with this committee and its members and taf as you seek to explore additional authorities. >> second to you, what are the specific authorities typically guide these. they run the gamut in which case we'd like to the computer fraud

act first all the way to other efforts which could implicate the foreign registration act. campaign law violations or the like. so it depends on the flavor of foreign influence operation or foreign operation senator you're referring to. >> approved 280 million to help safeguard u.s. voting systems, participation in the program offered by, depends on state and local governments. what effort and cooperation are you receiving from individual secretaries of state? let me add the second part.

how does it compare to previous leches? >> thank you, mr. chairman. the level is fantastic. it's at a high level. we're encaged with almost every state in some way. the secretaries are appropriate ly continue to engage the secretaries. engage with the local election officials. we see the value of the services we're providing an and role in the process. >> thank you, mr. chairman. in my prior role, we experienced the same skepticism from secretaries of state. but again, secretaries and state and local election officials

across ko across this country appreciate who bring support and value to the process to help them do their jobs. the secretaries in prior it rations have expressed their role in respect for federalism to the federal government, but also engaged with us. >> last question to mr. hickey. february this year, the special counsel dieted the interfete research agency and others interfering in last election. the charges in the special counsel's indictment including conspiracy to defraud the united states, wire fraud, bank fraud, identity theft. these tr kinds of nuts and bolts charges that we would see in a lot of garden variety criminal cases. is the nature of the interference conduct we've seen in past unique or different from other criminal vest gass. in other words, is the conduct such thoo that we really need to think about a new way to

prosecute these cases and design a completely new framework to do so? >> i see my time is expired. i'll answer briefly. we look to leverage the framework that exists now. it's robust, but we should be alert to ways that framework could be improved. i think election interference have a lot of veinvestigations that. have a lot to have same challenges or pose a lot of the same challenges, as our cases. to take one example, the evidence is often located abroad as our targets and they are in jurisdictions who are unwilling to assist us with the investigation, so investigating, getting evidence is a challenge and apprehending is a challenge. but it's the challenge we work through in a number of cases across the pecht rum of cases we handle. >> senator feinstein, thank you both for answering me fi quy qu. >> mr. hickey, i'd like to talk

to you about your department justice is doing now to prevent and or investigate so that the upcoming election will not be affected by wrong doing. >> we're ensuring there is connectivity in the department and between the department and others and the private sector to make sure we identify the information that matters. that we open and investigate cases where we learn of potential threats. that we put others in a position to defend and protect themselves. and i think we've done that in part by last fall setting up the -- >> do you have any open investigations relating to the upcoming election? >> i couldn't confirm or deny if we did. i'm speaking programmatically to act appropriately. >> you working with with

intelligence community in examining this and working out for it? >> in terms of threat information, one of the highest types we could with be watching out for. >> three months ago trk director of the cia, nsa, odni and fbi warned the american public to refrain from using products or services from the chinese telecom company, zte. chris wray stated we should be deeply concerned about the ris b ks of allowing companies beholden to foreign governments gaining positions of power

network. he said doing so, this is a quote, provides capacity to exert pressure or control over our telecommunications infrastructure. it provides a capacity to maliciously modify or steal information. and it provides the capacity to conduct undetected espionage end quote. do you agree with this assessment from three months ago regarding the threat provided by excuse me, posed by zte? products. >> i agree with the supply chain threats, yes. >> could quou you tell us bt what the department the doing? >> we have a pending matter. we're alert to more ways that

our authorities like team te telecom allow us to -- the fcc or recommendations to the president to prohibit a transaction. those are the kinds of tools. senator concernyn. i happen to have been his cosponsor led an effort to change it to make it more inclusive as you know, is that going to be helpful? >> yes, the department suppor supports -- >> can you tell us any more about this one situation with zte? well, let me ask you, do you think justice should be involved with any trade negotiations that have a direct bearing on zte?

>> i think the department seeks to exercise or authority according to the law and independently, we seek to enforce the law as written and hold folks accountable based on the evidence. >> was justice involved? >> i can't comment on that. there's a pending prosecution with zte pled guilty some time ago and revolved that case, but it's on ongoing matter, so we're involved in that obviously. >> okay. thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thanks for being here. obviously any interference with our electoral process is a matter of grave concern to all americans. it seems like the russians have been attempting to interfere with our elections for some time. this isn't new. they've attempted to do that

presumably in an effort to undermine public confidence in our electoral system. we should be very concerned about that. always looking for ways to guard against it. as i see it, there are a few important questions before us that we need to address. one involves the this concern with the integrity of our election infrastructure. bad actors seeking to disseminate false information in an effort to affect the outcome of elections is great concern and there's also the question of remedies. what do we do b about each of these things. first, let's talk a little bit about the integrity of our infrastructure. we'll start with you, mr. masterson.

in the 2016 election -- >> yes, there was some publicly discussed known breaches of infrastructure. >> are there confirmed instance of votes being changed from one to another? >> no confirmed instances of f that. >> were any individual voting machines hacked? >> no. not that i know of. >> it appears that prior to the 201 election cycle that the, or at least prior to the election itself, the department of homeland security saw preparations being made. preparations for hacking. but bithe russians. can you explain to us what procedures the department of homeland security makes once it has identified a potential threat to a state's election infrastructure? >> sure. and thank you for the question, senator. from the department of homeland security's perspective, our number one goal in that instance

is to ensure a timely and actionable sharing of that information to the system of owners and operators. so in the case in 2016, moving forward, we enshoord we got indicator specific information down to the owners and operator to look for possible issues or incidents and respond on that. then we offered responses. if necessary. >> so in your opinion, how fast can the federal government help? we have elections are aprimaril a creature of states an local governments. typically it's not the federal government that's running elections. but the national interest in otecting integrity as against those who would try to interfere from outside and foreign powers would certainly be cause for concern. so how best can the federal government try to help to ensure

the integrity of their system. >> sure. from the department's standpoint, there are three primary focuses for us. one is that timely hairing of actionable information. so ensuring whether we get information if states or locals, activity they're seeing, the fbi, and others that were able to share that information down in order to allow the systems owners and operator to protect them. two is to provide services. so across the spectrum, we provide a variety of free services on a voluntary bases to allow system owners and operators to identify risks, mitigate and improve the resilien resilience. the ability to respond and recover. then the third is to coordinate the federal government's response to the targeting attacks on election infrastructure. and so our election task force helps to coordinate fbi, doj, eac, ni srknist and others to e any interaction we have at the

federal level is used and provided to those who run elections. >> what about the threat and possibility of infrastructure being hacked from the outside is to go low tech. some states have gravitated towards that. some states have starteded making moves back toward paper so that they can't be hacked. is this something helpful? something that's necessary that you think more states ought to consider? >> yeah, senator, the audit ability and having an audible voting system is critical to the security of the systems and those states that have moved in that direction have implemented means by which to audit the vote in order to give confidence to the public on the results of the election and those states that have nonpaper systems have indicated a desire for instance. pennsylvania, to move to audible systems so at this point, resources are necessary to help them move that direction. >> by that, you mean a paper ballot system or system that creates a paper trail.

>> an audible paper record, sir. >> thank you. >> senator. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i agree with senator feinstein. having this this hearing. i am worried, as many vermonters are, about the president refusing to criticize president putin on just about anything, whether it's the invasion of crimea, or what concerns us, the blatant attack on our elections. he has an soon said the attack on the elections is the real problem is the five million fraudulent voests were cast in the last election, according to president trump. now you have the national security division, mr. hickey, do we have a threat, and have we seen millions of fraudulent votes?

or do we have a threat of interference from hostile foreign actors? >> senator from where i sit in the national security division, my focus is on foreign states and terrorisstates. and so from my perspective at the department, i know the attorney general has indicated that election security is a priority. that's why he tasked the cyberdigital task force. >> do you consider there is a threat of interference from hostile foreign actors? >> i think the dni as recently as friday said there are reasons to be concerned, yes. >> and have you not seen any evidence of millions of noncitizens voting? >> i, that's not within my foifr, sfoif portfolio, sir. >> if millions of noncitizens had voted, wouldn't the department of justice be investigating that and bringing prosecutions? >> i expect that would violate laws and it would be the province of other components of the department to investigate it. >> i think it might. especially if there were

millions. it's easy to say there are millions. but there are millions that at least a few hundred thousand be prosecuted but we haven't had a few thousand or a few hundred or a dozen or -- four or two or -- one. so -- this is where we are with the five million. now the it does appear to be everything we've had from the intelligence community, mr. masterson, a threat of foreign interference on our elections. the election assistant commission currently has only two commissioners. two other spots vacant. until recently, you were a commissioner recommended by the former republican house speaker, john boehner. i believe you brought about the

cybersecurity experiences position, you are highly regarded by state officials, certainly jim kongle, the secretary of state of state in vermont, who has been there both republican and democratic governors, praises you. as being very professional, very nonpartisan. but the seat remains vacant, denies the commission a kwoerm at the time that the security of our voting system is facing unprecedented challenges.quorum at the time that the security of our voting system is facing unprecedented challenges. how does the election commission, imhaving only two commissioners, impact the ability to secure election security? >> thank you, senator, i would refer you to the eac for specifics, but for my experience at the eac, they're able to carry on many functions without a quorum, including the testing and certification of voting systems, that the distribution of funds that was recently appropriated by congress, as well as sharing best practices

and information with state and local election officials. the key item that i know i worked on when i was at the eac, that continues to progress and would need a quorum is the approval of the new voluntary voting system guidelines. >> the department of homeland security hackers believed to be linked to russia targeted 21 state board of registration rolls in 2016. a small number of successfully penetrated. most of them had no idea they were being been penn traited until dhs notified them. we have another major election coming up in five months, are you concerned that these states are not moving fast enough to protect their -- >> senator, i'm not. in my experience, secretary condus is a terrific example. every state i talk to is taking this seriously, working collaboratively were multiple levels of government as well as the private sector and other resources in order to respond.

so it's incumbent on us at the department to build those partnerships to insure they have the support they need to do that. >> i appreciate the comments made about paper trail. of course we do that in vermont. even with the voting machines. >> senator durbin -- >> but i hope that we use some of the money, use more of the money that i got through the appropriations committee. >> thank you to the witnesses who are here today if i were in moscow, thinking about engaging in more election interference in the united states in the coming election, i might consider the following factors. it's been 19 months since the last election, which russia interfered in. it's been 17 months since every major intelligence agency in the united states reported on this interference. it's been 12 months since there was an appointment of a special

counsel. and i understand mr. hickey, you promised two months from now, that a task force that you refer to by the attorney general is going to give us a public report on what they recommend in terms of this interference. i guess the question i would ask is, how seriously are americans taking this threat? is it worth it to go after this coming election that is 19 weeks away, 19 weeks away? we do know that special counsel robert mueller has aggressively gone after russian interference. he has indicted 1 russian nationals and three russian corporations, in addition to seven others. who might have been complicit in this effort. but when we look at the money given to states, $p 380 million, for the united states of america, i think illinois shares something like $13 million, and we were hacked by the russians. i wonder if we can really point to a record where we have

aggressively gone off russian interference set up defenses, and deterrents, so that they will not do this again in november. mr. hickey, are you confident that we have been under this administration, aggressively pursuing this russian interference in our last election? >> senator, i think we've been trying to raise costs on russia for a range of its malign activities worldwide and here and in so doing we have brought charges against fsb officers not related to election interference, but in connection with hacks of yahoo and others. individuals and entities have been sanctioned by this administration. diplomats, dozens of diplomatic officers have been kicked out of the united states, russian facilities have been closed. we have been clear and public in attributing malicious cyberactivity to the russian government. we have done so sometimes in a coordination with and in a chorus with our allies.

i think we continue to look for ways to raise costs of malign behavior. and including influence operations that are illegal. >> in fairness, mr. hickey and for a complete record, we also have a president of the united states 0 who has referred to the mueller investigation as a hoax and a witch hunt over and over and over again. just this last weekend, called for recognition of russia in the g-8 to give them full partnership back into that organization. it's a mixed message at best. let me go to a specific. i agree with the chairman, it's not our job to produce new laws if current laws are sufficient. but in one particular area, to try to deter russians seeking visas to come into the united states for these malign purposes. we know from the indictment of special counsel mueller of these 13 russians, in february of this year, that there was specific

activity by several of them. mr. crilova, mr. bogacheva, mr. bovda that they came to the united states and started casing the joint, looking us over, getting ready for the attack on the last election. they even visited my state of illinois. which they did in fact hack. do you believe that the bipartisan legislation which we have proposed. which would deter people from receiving visas if they are coming to the united states for the purpose of election interference, is a good idea? >> senator, while i can't take a position on any plr legislation today i think it is important to look at indictments in other cases and measure them against the authorities that exist now and look for ways we might improve or sharpen the tools that exist. so that is an active ongoing effort at the department. >> i was put off by your statement, we need no additional tools. i quote you in saying that. and that if you found any statutory gaps, you would let us know. i would hope you would be a

little more aggressive in terms of the department of justice looking at tools that would discourage the next generation of russian trolls trying to interfere in american elections. to know that we are serious in terms of deterrence and prosecution and we're serious in terms of defense, $380 million for nation of this size and its elections, we had some $38 billion that was given to help america vote. you know, we made that investment a few years back. i just don't think we've shown an intensity of focus and purpose to let the russians or any other country know that we're serious enough when it comes to this next election and we're only a few weeks away. thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator whitehouse. >> thank you, chairman, thank you both for being here. i concur that there is a risk of cyberhacking and interference with our actual election and

voting mechanisms. but do you not both agree in the last election, the primary vector of malign russian influence came through information operations rather than through technical cyberelection hacking? >> it seems to have been a broad campaign. but i agree that disinformation is one of the principal threats that we face. >> pras the principal one. >> mr. masterson, do you agree? >> i would agree with that, yes. >> one of the ways in which the russians or any other foreign actor could obscure their role in information operations, is by operating through corporate shells, that don't look like the government of russia. is that not also correct? >> that seems fair, senator. >> it's pretty obvious, isn't it? mr. masterson, you nodded your

head. i want to make sure it's on the record. >> i don't have enough background to weigh in i would refer to the doj on that one for sure. >> when we had facebook's ceo here, we discussed their authentication procedure. for determining who was buying political advertising time on facebook. and the ceo disclosed that they were only going one hop with authentication. so that if a say delaware llc or a nevada llc was the nominal buyer of the political time, they would have no way of looking behind it to see if it was in fact the fsb or putin or oligarchs or somebody associated with foreign election manipulation. how big a liability is our present inability to know who the actual true beneficial

owners are, of shell corporations, when those shell corporations engage in election influence operations. >> i think the perspective i take on that is being responsible for fair enforcement. where we are very engaged in trying to determine whether an entity is actually an arm's-length commercial legitimate entity, or in fact is a cut-out or proxy for a foreign government or foreign political party that which makes that more transparent makes it easier for us to enforce fair. that which obscures -- >> that only applies to very specific fara activities. and at the moment, would you not agree that it is a u.s. vulnerability, that foreign actors are able to take advantage of particularly american shell corporations. and effectively obscure their hands in information or campaign finance operations? >> from a law enforcement

perspective i would agree that transparency and ownership or control are certainly helpful to me in the statutes i'm responsible for enforcing. >> that's in part why the department supports the grassley white house bill to provide for more shell corporation transparency, correct? >> unfortunately, i'm not in a position to take a position on legislation today. but i do know the department would be eager to work with you and your staffs and any, with respect to any pending legislation. >> because it is a serious vulnerability, whether it's the vulnerability to money laundering, to international klepotcrats and criminals being able to hide their resours in the united states of america, or for election interference, correct? all of those are vulnerabilities from impenetrable american shell corporations. >> i think law inforcement's ability to understand who stands behind a corporate entity is critical to our enforcement in a variety of areas. >> at the moment it's far from

adequate, correct? >> i don't know that i know the answer to that, sir? >> well you ought to, thank you. >> thank you very much. mr. chairman. thank you for being here today. obviously we've learned we were not prepared for the last election. we were not prepared for what russia did. do you believe that following what we saw in 2016, the administration is prepared for what could happen in 2018? >> i think we know a lot more now, senator. and i think we have organized ourselves better to respond to what we know now and also what we may learn in the future. >> do you think you're going to continue to see this foreign interference and it may not just be from russia, but other countries? >> i defer to the intelligence community on assessment like that. but i know the dni has said it remains an active concern and that he has testified that there's reason to think that at a minimum that information operations will continue. zpli think it was director coats

in reference to russia has said that russia would even get bolder in this next round of elections. >> so the senator langford and i have introduced the secure elections act and two members of this committee, senator graham and senator harris were also very involved in this and co-sponsors and we're able to get $380 million in the last budget and the money is now going out to the states to help them to shore up their election infrastructure. and both leaders supported this. and we're able to get this done and we have a number of states as you know that don't even have back-up paper ballots, we're hoping that can change. illinois of course has had issues. in the past and the hackers got as far as their voter files. you think these resources will be helpful? >> thank you, senator. absolutely. i think they've already been helpful. >> department worked with our government coordinating council

to create guidance for state and local election officials to use to help inform the use of that money both on a short and long-term basis. focused on addressing possible and known vulnerabilities, as well as long-term important issues like auditability, training for state and local officials, as well as defensibility. so i think the money is an important step. >> now we have this secure elections act. which we've put in the form of an amendment on ndaa, senator langford is leading that and i'm the lead democrat on it. and it, we've worked very hard with the secretary of state, we've met with them from all over the country and we've gotten some agreement to get this through. it supported strongly by senator bur and senator warner, it allows for, makes it clear the information sharing some of the work that you're doing with homeland security. but puts it into law about the clearances for local election officials and the like. and just wondering, your thoughts about that. >> because this is right now on the floor it's unfortunately

currently being blocked and we're surprised by that. and he and i are trying to work to get it attached to the ndaa. so could you talk about that? >> senator langford and i have done and how you think that could be helpful. >> senator i've met with your staff and senator langford's staff as swell as members of the rules commit toy too tuck about the department's role and will continue to do so to contribute to the bill. moving forward, a department is focused on some of the provisions in the bill like establishing communications protocols and having a means by which we can insure the actionable and timely sharing of information for state and local officials. we're moving forward and certainly will continue to work with your staff on the bill. >> do you have any idea why this is being held up, it's on the republican side? >> i don't, senator. >> the honest ads act is something we're also trying to get done. we're getting increasing support from the tech community, especially after the major hearings that this committee had along with commerce, i think the two leaders for that.

and you know that $1 .4 billion was spent on online ads in 2016. do you think there's a need on how bad actors can use the system where there was no transparency and no disclosures and no disclaimers. do you see a way mr. hickey where mr. transparency would be helpful to catch bad actors. >> from my standpoint, as responsible for fara enforcement. understanding who is controlling or directing an actor in the united states, is critical to our enforcement. >> very good. it's helpful. >> and the last thing i just bring up is, white house had mentioned, is just the way this cash flows and what answers and senator blount and i, we're going to start a series of hearings, mr. chairman, on elections with the rules committee. we're back in business. and taking back, our jurisdiction. not from you, i'm very pleased

that we're going to be starting to work on elections with rules committee. we're having two hearings i think coming up. senator blount and i have introduced the stop foreign donations aking our election act along with senator feinstein and warner to strengthen disclosure by requiring federal campaigns to use existing credit card verification protocols to verify the online credit card donations come directly from the u.s. could you comment on the measures that foreign actors may take to conceal the source of money that they use to undertake activity in the u.s. mr. hickey? >> i can't comment on pending legislation, i know we'd be happy to work with you and your staff on that legislation. >> i made to my friends across the aisle. you are the only one here right now. senator langford and i have been working on this for a long time. we have an ideal opportunity, with the new kind of warfare we're seeing, the ndaa bill. as you see people moving other

countries are moving towards this as their m.o. when it comes to their warfare and for us to not update our laws to me seems like a very big lost opportunity and i hope that we're able to get this amendment on the bill. >> thank you. chairman grassley. ranking member feinstein. senator klobuchar and senator langford did terrific work on this secure elections act and i want to commend senator klobuchar for her hard work on this and for her advocacy. i also worked with senator langford and to insure that the $380 million in grants to the elections assistance commission got out and are being distributed. mr. masterson, given your former role as chair, the election assistance commission, help me understand what are the most urgent reforms you think states should be implementing. you mentioned there is a need for additional resources. every state will get $3 million. my little state of delaware will get $3 million. we have some of the oldest

election machinery in the country and we've got dozens states that i think aren't fully prepared for an election that senator durbin pointed out is less than six months away. i'm concerned about the lack of a sense of urgency. please give us some insight into how do you think the eac grants rk distributed. and whether you think there's more resources needed. to what you would put those resources, if made available federally. >> thank you, senator, this was the focus of the work we did with the government coordinating council in looking at the funding. was we were asked by the council members, state and local election officials, primarily to help provide insight as far as where the money could be used, short and long-term to address risks to the process. so we focused first on addressing the common i.t. vulnerabilities that exist across i.t. systems regardless of elections, things like patching and training for phishing campaigns as well as just manpower. several states, florida,

illinois as well have looked at deploying cybernavigators down to the local level to provide a level of expertise on i.t. support that sometimes is not available to county election officials. a short-term improvements that several states are looking at using the money for. that was included in gcc guidance. longer-term it's improving the overall resilience. insuring the defensibility of the systems slew thru a variety of mechanisms, long-term investments in training and i.t. management. one of the things i do is travel to the country to state and local officials, understanding the risks to their system. >> do you think $380 million from the federal government is sufficient? how big a gap do you think there is given assessments by the director of national intelligence and others in the ic community that russia and other foreign actors will interfere again in our pending

elections. >> in my experience in over a decade in elections, resources, whether it be money or expertise or support are hard to come by, for state and local officials, an investment at the local level, state level, several, where elections are run, is necessary, i know that the $380 million was viewed by state and local officials is viewed as an important step by the federal government as well to continue to support what they do and provide resources. >> i look forward following up further. thank you again to senator klobuchar about the real leadership. based on special counsel mueller's investigation, we know that three senior trump campaign officials failed to register as foreign agents in violation of existing law. trump campaign manager paul manafort and rick gates. given russia's interference in the presidential election of 2016 and the statements of senior intelligence officials they will attempt to interfere

again, are you concerned about foreign agents attempting to interfere with our democracy going forward and what steps are you taking to make sure that the department has the tools you need. >> thank you, senator, in fact increased and improved fara enforcements has been one of my priorities over the last two years. we've been more aggressive in educating agents and prosecutors about how to prosecute fara violations, we've stepped up our efforts to compel or urge the registration entities and individuals who should have registered, one example i think relevant to this hearing is the agents of rt and sputnik, russian sponsored organizations who recently registered as agents of a foreign principle. >> i appreciate your focus and urgency on this. i only wish our president conveyed a similar level of focus and urgency on protecting our election. a last question.

in your prepared remarks, how the department of justice maintains relationships with social media providers, it is those providers, who i think i'm quoting bear the primary responsibility for securing their products platforms and services from this threat. do you believe social media companies like facebook, twitter and youtube are doing enough? are they still vulnerable and do we need to provide the department with more tools to combat foreign interference. >> i would describe this as an evolving relationship. i think our relationship with them is trending in the right direction. i think there's more work to be done. at the moment given the authorities we have, i think our focus, we're following the model we respect to terrorist use of the internet. we are comfortable about media companies making the decision, than we are with the government interceding based on content. what we're trying to do is identify situations where we think their users are violating their terms of service, and bring that information to their

attention for them to take the action they view as appropriate. whether they're taking the right action or not. is a little bit beyond the department's expertise, that's a society congress question. >> my concern in closing mr. chairman is we fail to grasp how big a potential threat there was to our election through social media and i've been profoundly disappointed at what we've heard in testimony from leadership, facebook, twitter, youtube and others about their response. i'm concerned with the next election six months away we've got some unresolved work to do here together. thank you, mr. chairman. >> before i call on senator blumenthal, in regard to the last point. senator coons brought up in his improxd foreign registrations act. i'm not asking a question, we're running into some opposition i should say, from some business

groups in this country that i don't think have a legitimate reason for opposing it. i wish you would take a look at our bill and see if you can help us move that along. i don't know whether the administration we've asked you to take a position on it or not. i'm not asking you now. but there's a lot of shortcomings, most of it has been lack of enforcement over going way back to 1938. very little enforcement of it. i know you said it's a top priority of yours. we need to get some additional legislation passed, senator blumenthal? >> let me just second sentiment expressed by the chairman what has been lacking in many of these areas is enforcement. you have said you don't need new tools. i would submit that enforcement has been abysmal. this is a bipartisan failure.

and it's not meant to be critical of you, as officials but i think the chairman is right that enforcement has been sadly lacking. let me begin by asking you just -- very straightforwardly, there's no doubt in your mind, is there, that russia interfered or sought to interfere with the 2016 elections. >> no, sir. >> no, sir. >> in fact, russia attacked the united states of america. in my view it committed an act of war, i made this statement along with the chairman of the armed services committee, john mccain in other venues, this attack on our democracy will continue, will it not. unless the united states makes russia pay a price. correct? >> it warrants a strong response, senator, and i think in this area and others we have to find ways to raise costs of malicious and malign behavior by foreign states.

>> it's not only -- i'm sorry, mr. masterson. >> it's not only a matter of protecting our systems, but also deting that attack by proactively making russia pay a price, correct? >> i think you have to raise the cost of the behavior. correct, senator. >> the president's defense lawyers, in a recent memo, that was published widely, assert that it was quote, corruption within the fbi and department of justice which appears to have led to the alleged russia collusion investigation. in march. president trump also expressed a similar view when he tweeted quote, there was no collusion between russia and the trump campaign as many are finding out there was tremendous leaking,

lying and corruption at the highest levels of the fbi, justice and state. president trump also tweeted that special counsel robert mueller's probe was based on fraudulent activities. are you aware of leaking, lying and corruption within the fbi and department of justice? >> no, senator. >> are you aware that leaking, lying and corruption led to the russia collusion investigation? >> no, senator. >> are you, mr. masterson? >> no, senator. >> president trump has alleged that james comey apparently knew about lies and corruption going on at quote the highest levels of the fbi. and his defense lawyers have said -- quote, the firing of mr. comey has led to the discovery of corruption within the fbi at the highest levels, end quote. is it accurate so far as you know to say that mr. comey's

firing led to the discovery of corruption within the fbi? >> i don't know what that refers to, sir. >> i have no knowledge of that or information on it. >> there have been statements about there being no evidence, of any collusion between the trump campaign and the russian attempt to interfere in our election of 2016. put aside whether collusion has been proved. on the question of whether there is evidence, would you agree with me that there is some evidence that has been elicited and presented so far by the special counsel's investigation? >> senator, because as you've recognized it's an ongoing investigation, it's not appropriate for me to comment on what evidence may or may not

have been discovered in the course of it. >> well, let's just talk about facts whether we characterize it as evidence or not. we know that candidate trump called for russia to hack his opponent's emails, correct? >> i'm familiar with public statement that i think you're referring to. >> which in fact -- involved his calling for that hacking. we're aware that his son in anticipating and asking for a meeting with russian agents, said he would quote love to get dirt on hillary clinton from vladimir putin. correct? >> all i know about that, i know from media reports, sir and i don't have them in front of me. >> if those facts were true, wouldn't it be evidence of collusion between the trump campaign and the russian

interference? >> sir, i don't think it's appropriate for me to comment in any respect op a pending matter. >> senator harris, i hope -- you're the last one. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. i appreciate that. good morning. >> mr. masterson, this sunday, dni director coats said quote it is 2018 and we continue to see russian targeting of american society in ways that could affect our mid-term elections. and if you've, you may have discussed this, i'm sorry i was at another hearing. i'll go on with my question. so russia obviously attacked the very heart of our democracy when they interfered in the 2016 election. this is why the secure elections act that senators langford, klobuchar and i are working on. you may be familiar with that. >> i am. >> great. >> so we recently also actually held a demonstration for my

colleagues here at the capital. where we brought in folks who before our eyes, hacked election machines. those that are not, those that are being used in many states, are not state of the art from our perspective. as a former eac commissioner and based on your current role, do you agree that funding should be prioritized for the states to upgrade their systems, based on need rather than based on the size of the population of the state. >> thank you, senator for the question. i think there's a decided need for resources across the states in a variety of ways, and the way to prioritize that funding can be done based on a number of approaches including risk-based decision-making like we approach it at dhs to help inform where the largest areas of risk are and how best to address it, short and long-term. >> can you outline some of the risks that you, you review and

analyze to determine the need? >> sure, as we've worked with state and local officials across the country we've looked at a variety of what i would say paradigms or structures that states use. web-facing systems, things like online registration portals, election night reporting systems, items like that certainly have a broader threat profile from the exposure side, but the risk to the actual integrity of the process may be less. so identifying those risks and what can be done to mitigate them to those sort of broader vulnerabilities on those systems that have less concerns about the integrity of the vote are there and simple steps like putting auditability in place, is something that builds up the resilience of the process and insures the ability to recover. >> have you published the list of risks for the states and also for the public to see? >> we have worked with the government coordinating council, which is the council with critical infrastructure. >> has it been published?

>> state and local officials, there includes information around risk and mitigation. >> has it been published. >> i believe there's something regarding that on our website. >> please follow up with this committee and if it's not there. please follow up and actually publish a list of what you believe to be the risks of various election systems. in terms of vulnerability to hacking and other kinds of manipulation. and if you can get that done by the end of this month, if it's not already there. we appreciate that. >> and then in march as you may know, congress passed an omnibus spending bill that contained $380 million in grant funding to help the states improve their election infrastructure. do you know what is the status of getting the guidelines and the guidance that dhs official manafort came before homeland security and said that that would be produced. guidance for the states on how that money should best be spent, to be most effective.

can you tell me what the status is of that. >> the government coordinating council approved that guidance two weeks ago and released it to the states and locals, it's been distributed through those channels. >> is that available to the public? >> it is. >> thank you. >> and will you talk a bit about what you have seen in terms of the risk assessments you've been doing around the country, i believe 14 states have been completed. is that correct, 14? >> i believe it's 17 states have been completed, thus far. >> and what generally have you seen as being the vulnerabilities of those assessments? >> generally speaking, within the elections infrastructure sector we're seeing the same typical vukts you would see across i.t. systems. so managing software updates, outdated equipment or hardware as well as general upgrades that need to take place as far as configuration management within systems to limit the damage that can be done if something were to

take place. >> so -- >> their resilience? >> their resilience. and so this sector is no different in what we see and the work we're doing with them. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> we're done with this panel. but a lot of members don't come. so the record will be open for a week. and you'll get, you'll get questions in writing. so please answer them as soon as you can. >> mr. chairman, i have another chairman, i want to reiterate what senator harris was saying and thank her for her work on the secure elections act. you notice senator coons brought it up, i brought it up. we have this opportunity when you go back to the office to get this in as part of an amendment to the mdaa, it's being held up on the republican side. i want to get it done. it is a republican-led bill by senator langford and it simply cements some of the work that we've talked about today. and i just don't know how we can

pass an ndaa bill for our defense of our nation and not include something like this. so we'd like to get it on and done. thank you. >> and also for mr. hickey, i want to correct something i said to you. that i'm probably inferred that the foreign agents registration act amendments that i have in, that they were in this committee, they're in foreign relation the and i've been informed by my staff that your department is helping with that legislation. you're dismissed. >> thank you. >> now while the other group is coming i'll start to introduce mr. weinstein is partner of davis polk and orderiwell. in 2008 he was named homeland security adviser by president george w. bush. prior to his white house service, mr. weinstein was the first assistant attorney general for national security, before

that, he served as u.s. attorney in washington, d.c., he has served as general counsel also of the fbi. mr. goodman, is mr. goodman is the founding co-editor in chief of a publication just security, an online forum focused on u.s. national security and that forum is based at new york university school of law. >> mr. goodman is a professor of law policy and sociology at new york university. prior to this, he served as special counsel to the general counsel of the department of defense. ms. janikowski is a global fellow at the wilson center in washington, d.c. she focused on eastern europe. focuses on eastern europe and russia. previously she served as a fullbright clinton public policy

fellow. and worked in government relations at the national democratic institute for international affairs. we'll start with kenneth. >> thank you, mr. chairman, senator klobuchar. we, i very much appreciate the invitation to appear before you today. and i want to say at the outset i i believe you're doing real service by holding this hearing and pursuing this issue which, in the course of doing that, you're highlighting what is really kind of gotten lost in most of the political controversy about the 2016 election. which is that we're facing an unprecedented and growing threat to our democratic institutions, both here and around the globe. in january 217, the intelligence committee assessed that the russian government directed a campaign to influence our 2016 election. a campaign that included cyberintrusions in the state and

local election board systems. penetration of the dnc and the release of and other groups and the release of material to influence the election. and the use of internet trolls to spread disinformation and amplify themes that supported the campaign narrative, the russians were propounding. with the intelligence community and several ensuing congressional investigations having established that we face a serious and growing threat, the question now is how ecan most effectively respond to that threat. the government has a number of tools it can use. first it has all the national security investigative tools like fisa court, electronic surveillance orders and national security letters, as well as the full range of criminal investigative tools to detect and investigate influence activities. second it has the ability to bring a criminal prosecution against perpetrators under the computer fraud abuse act for hacking into protected computer systems or under the foreign agent registration act for those who engage in political activities on behalf of a

foreign party without registering themselves as foreign agents. deterrence can be achieved through the application of economic and trade sanctions such as when president obama and president trump imposed sanctions on russian organizations and individuals and deterrence can be achieved through the ejection of a country's official staff from the u.s. such as when both presidents closed russian facilities in this country. another option is the enforcement of campaign finance laws to prevent foreign nationals from contributing to u.s. political campaigns. last year's reports of russian funding for the french far right party, presidential candidate allegedly in part as a reward for supporting russia's activities in crimea, raises the concern that russia may make similar attempts to sway american politics with campaign funding and contributions. a final area of focus is on the protection of the electoral systems themselves, the purpose behind dh s's announcement last january that the election processes will be designated as

critical infrastructure like the energy grid, telecommunications networks and other critical sectors that receive federal assistance and protection. >> so those are the tools and capabilities being used to meet this threat today. in light of recent events, we need to think of ways we can strengthen tools and i would like to flag several such recommendations, give the justice department authority to get a legally enforcement injunction against operators of bot nets, they take over networks of computers and launch attacks and we saw that very clearly when russia attacked estonia through bot nets in 2007. a second proposal is to enhance the effectiveness of fara, foreign agent registration act. to compel foreign agents to turn over records to show whether they are or not acting on behalf of foreign interests. a third proposal is to consider a new statute that specifically addresses this threat.

although as we've discussed or you discussed in the earlier panel, fara and other 2016, congress should consider crafting a statute that specifically targets foreign election interference and disinformation activities, highlighting the recognition of the severity of the threat and condemnation of such activity, as well as providing prosecutor as tool that can be used against these influence campaigns, which will become more prevalent as our adversaries continue to hone their skills and use new technologies for their subversive purposes. another proposal draws from lessons lurned in the run-up to the 2016 he election when the obama administration struggled with the question of whether and how much information to provide the public about the russian interference efforts they were detecting, torn between a desire to inform the public and refrain from announcements that could be seen as an attempt to affect the outcome of the election.

some have recommended that congress pass legislation recommending or requiring the dni to report at intervals leading up to a federal election, whether the intelligence community is detecting foreign interference and the source and extent of that interference. insuring that voters are on notice and on the lookout for misleading propaganda and disinformation. so to conclude, we have a number of effective tools and capabiliti which can be bolstered to meet and defeat this threat. the real question for today is whether we have the focus and the single-minded will to do so. all too often we as a country have been slow to mobilize in the threat of a looming threat in the face of a looming threat such as we were with al qaeda in the 1990s and the cyberthreat in the 2000s, it's my hope it will not be slow in responding to this threat. this hearing is an important first step. critical that we follow up with action that's decisive and

clear-eyed. the threat is real, not an overstatement to say there's a lot at stake no less than the continuing viability of the democratic processes here and around the world. i want to thank the committee for having me here today and i look forward to answering your questions. >> professor goodman? >> i want to start by thanking chairman grassley and ranking member feinstein and distinguished members of this committee for holding an important hearing such an important issue. it's an honor for me to be here to testify before you. the russian organization that used social media tools to interfere in the most recent presidential election called its mission quote information warfare against the united states of america, end quote. like the terrorists on 9/11 our enemies used our systems against us. al qaeda used our commercial air transportation systems, the kremlin used our social media. moscow hijacked platforms such as facebook, twitter and youtube. the russian operations wreak

havoc in the u.s. election began long before donald trump or hoyle ohio announced their runs for the presidency. koetd named or referred to as the translation project this specific russian operation to influence the 2016 election began around may 2014. it was initiated with a stated goal to quote spread disrust towards the candidates and the political system in general unquote. by 2015, the kremlin pared its social media influence operation with a cyberespionage operation. 2015 is an important time period to remember. although the dissemination of stolen emails during the general election is highly salient. it's vital for the public to understand that the kremlin began its espionage activities during the primaries. in both major political parties. as the january 2016 intelligence report stated, russia's cyberespionage operation quote collected on some republican

affiliated targets, and collected against year's primary campaigns, think tanks and lobbying groups and is likely to shape future u.s. policies. nbc reported that the kremlin's efforts to steal email and other data got under way in 2015 and included quote top republicans and staffers of republican candidates. at certain point the russia operation included the oppive of favoring the trump campaign, those objectives began before the general election. special counsel's three indictments of three organizations and 13 russians for election interference states they engage in operations primarily intended to indicate derogatory information about hillary clinton to denigrate other candidates such as ted cruz and marco rubio and to then candidate donald trump. former fbi special agent clint watts who has testified before the senate intelligence

committee identified russian efforts to undermine the presidential campaigns of senator graham and florida governor jeb bush. the kremlin did not and does not hope to shape the outcome of a general election. the kremlin hopes to shape the outcomes of primaries, denying americans their right to choose. their own political leaders free of interference or coercion. the kremlin is interested in not only a candidate who stands the best chance of winning, it would be valuable enough for moscow if it could influence what campaigns are framed. undermining public trust in those who win the election. the threat to future american elections is of course not limited to russia or even to state actors, the foreign threat is broader and the danger is even greater if americans are willing to encourage support, coordinate or conspire with these foreign agents, being willing is not a crime. but acting on that willingness could be. that raises the question, whether some americans did

intentionally coordinate or conspire with russia's election interference, what we might ever know can be placed on a spectrum from no evidence to weak and moderate evidence. to strong evidence and proof. i've submitted a detailed analysis of the many pieces of information that are now publicly available, part of that analysis is an effort to show how current law does apply and where we still may need to fill in some gaps, i did not use the word collusion anywhere in the analysis. the real question is whether any americans engage in a conspiracy to work with the russians when intentionally supporting the russian operation in violation of campaign finance laws, from the trump tower meeting to paul manafort's meeting with a russian oligarch, i think it's fair to say there are evidence of violations of federal law, not proof, but evidence. how to improve our system of law

enforcement to safeguard our elections from foreign adversaries, although we had a robust system of laws, i highlight some areas for opportunities, areas for opportunity for legislative reform. some of the most promising pieces of legislation are coming out of this committee, including nor zbras grassely's and feinstein's bills that allows foreign agents to register under the foreign agents registration act. other measures could bolster enforcement authority. and using the mechanism of transparency to help expose foreign influence in our political system. legislation introduced in the house last week takes an important step by requiring campaigns to disclose contacts with agents of foreign powers offering support. this hearing is another significant step forward to address future national security risks, i want to thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak about these matters and i look forward to answering any questions that you might have.

>> i apologize for mispronouncing your name the first time. >> chairman grassley, senator klobuchar and distinguished members of the committee, it's an honor to testify before you this morning and heartening to see continued bipartisan interest in election interference as it is truly a challenge that knows no political party. throughout my career i've worked on the front lines of russia's information war, through work at the national democratic institute. strategic communications adviser to the ukrainian government and i work on a book about the development of and responses to russian influence operations. my experiences have led me to a conclusion that may surprise you. even if we were to walk out of this hearing room today and secure beyond the shadow of a doubt the country's election infrastructure, even if we sealed our information environment from inauthentic users and false or misleading information. even if social media companies finally put forth a good-faith effort to put users and our democracy first, even then, we

would still not successfully dispel the threat our democracy faces from malign actors, political influence operations if our democratic processes are to remain secure, we must think beyond knee-jerk reactions and punitive measures. the u.s. government must put citizens at the heart of 0-election interference and address the issues that make our society so susceptible to outside influence in the first place. european countries that have been most successful have in common one key point. their governments recognize that they can't fact-check or label their way out of the crisis of truth they faced. for example, in estonia, despite a large russian ethnic population and a near constant barrage of kremlin sponsored media, moscow's message something finding fewer footholds than it did ten years ago when russia's influence caused riots. this is partly because the estonian government is conducting proactive outreach to the ethnic russian population,

including russian language initiatives. in ukraine there's been a growing demand for media literacy training. in response, an american ngo trained 15,000 people in critical thinking, source evaluation and emotional manipulation. the program measured a 29% increase in participants who check the news they consume. while both countries' battles with russian enter feerns are not finished, the these investments will be the future cornerstones of that i democracies. citizen-based groups must work in concert with measures designed to protect institutions but they've been all but absent of with our discussion of election interference. in addition to the stipulations provided in the honest ads and secure elections act which i support, congress must pursue and encourage citizens based solutions in its work related to election protection, both in the spheres of social media regulation and education. social media companies have

played whack a troll in responding to russia election interference, they must move toward educating and empowering social media users, first, platforms should be require obtain informed and meaningful consent from users to their terms of service, most use verse no idea what they're signing up for. this ignorance is what russia exploits through its online influence campaigns. terms of service should be easy to understand. clearly define what content is permissible on platforms and should be actively enforced this is costly and will require human content reviewers and the establishment from a complaints and appeals process, but civil discourse and democracy are priceless. third, social media companies have near ubiquitous access to americans' lives, they should embrace their role as educators and focus on practices that encourage behavior change rather than simply raising awareness. to that end, the investment that will best protect democracy for

generations to come is decidedly more low-tech. education. first, we must invest in broad-based media literacy, civics and critical thinking programs to fight election interference. citizens who understand how government works are less likely to buy into the falsehoods and conspiracies that are harmful to democracy. second, congress should encourage cooperation and coordination across government. particularly between the national security community and departments of education. both at the national and local levels. finally, adults should also be i a target audience for these skills billing programs. moscow will continue to influence our democracy. and now that the kremlin has a written playbook for how to do so, other actors will imitate russia. to prepare for these attacks and attacks from within, we must think beyond russia to the key actors in our democratic process, the american people. thank you.

>> thank you. i'll start with mr. wainstein. is there anything in 18 u.s. 371 conspiracy charge thaw think needs to be changed or fixed to address this issue? >> red light on. >> there we go. thank you. so 18 usc 381 is the federal conspiracy statute and has a prong to it that provides that the government can prosecute somebody if they defraud the united states. and that prong has been used as a basis for prosecutions against poem and entities that mislead the government for their own advantage. maybe you know, mislead the government in about taxes and the like. one of the things that, that's one of the statutes that's used by the special counsel. in his indictment. that alleging that the russian entities had defrauded the

government by misleading them about the disclosure requirements for the state department, the justice department, et cetera. that is an effective tool to go after foreign parties who are pretending to be foreign partie who are pretending to be americans to get involved in u.s. elections. i cannot think of a specific change to that statute, over the broader question, i goes to my earlier comments, which is -- this might be an occasion, i understand the concern, not over criminalizing things, for federal law, but, the severity of this threat, and the threat that will be with us -- in an increasing form, for years to come, suggest that this might be an area, where you might consider a statute, or set of statutes, focus specifically on election interference and campaigns. i can take of a number of different areas, which could be retooled, to make it easier for prosecutors to go after foreign

parties who are doing this work. >> let me also ask you, do we understand the value of the criminal prosecution, can it be turned to federal government, or foreign governments, and their operatives? the charging individuals openly, prevents those individuals from traveling, and of course, when we do get our hands on the individual, we hold them to account. the first question, despite these benefits, can you describe some of the limitations, or downsides, of criminal -- criminal prosecution in this area? yes, briefly, i can do it. as he put it, mr. chairman, go back to 2015, when the department of justice indicted several members in china, for, trade secret violations. we actually -- that pushed the chinese to reach an agreement, where they have now scaled back some of those efforts. to the prosecution -- they can have benefits in the process of

going after foreign parties. these problems are chronic, you go after foreign actors, who are not incentivized to help you get those people. you cannot get them unless they happen to travel, for instance. you cannot get the evidence because it is in the hand of the for government, that does not want to be helpful. oftentimes, it is a problem, because a lot of this activity takes place over the internet, and, the wrongdoers of -- over the internet is a hard thing to do. it is hard to identify the person that is doing the keystrokes, that result in the activity over the internet, that is causing the interference in our election. >> miss jankowski. i am sorry. genco bits. from your studies and other countries -- -- jenkoqitz, the example, where it was in

ukraine -- fake news, being spread by civil society groups, so -- in terms of equipping citizens, to fight these foreign elections, and meddling, what has your research led you to believe might be effective in our country? >> it has to be a holistic approach, senator, that is an interesting question, it is not about media literacy, or getting people to second check sources, it is about critical thinking, and discord and debate, social media has polarized so much, that we are not doing anymore. it is about building these critical pools of thinking, and, also -- i was a member of the debate team in high school, i think that led me to the work that i am doing today. it gives me a greater understanding of the world. we need more stuff like that happening in our school, but also for adults as well.

an understanding of the system is integral to trust in government. >> senator? >> thank you very much mr. chairman, excellent witnesses, mr. chairman. i want to thank you, i am so glad that there is some general agreement here, with republican witnesses, and democratic witnesses. i think that that shows how important it is for us to act on this. fcc deadlocked again, on an issue for the third time, in foreign contributions -- i am appreciating your words, mr. wayne, about possibly going forward with some legislative changes, and, secure elections. as an amendment, for reasons i do not understand -- given the intelligence committee had five hearings, several here, with the chairman leadership, white house leadership, and others. i just think that we need to get this added to the bill. i appreciate your words. do you want to talk about why it is so important that we see this as a kind of warfare, which professor goodman so eloquently expressed?

why don't we see it that way, why don't we put it in the nda, it is so important, to me and the rest of the world. >> both of the bills are important, to getting on the record. this is a threat that we are serious about. to this point, i do not think the united states have done enough to prevent this. i heard conversations in europe over the past few years, that, the conversations that we are having now, happen there two years ago, we are very very far behind. in addition, those structural measures that you are putting forward, send a signal to the american people, that our system is secure. we are taking care of them, that rebuilds i trust, that has been eroded, over the past few months. >> three elections across the world, -- a free elections across the world.

these social media companies, what we are seeing, is a patchwork of laws, developing across the state, i am frankly glad, because, it has been a push for action here. they use -- the hazards, can you talk about the hazards of having -- any kind of action in the federal government? only having voluntary measures, which create a another patchwork, with facebook doing one thing, and twitter doing another, we are glad that they are doing things, and google just decided not to do ads in washington state anymore, political ads, because, they have a different standard there. so, u.s. states doing different things, and then you have different standards, in the social media, and washington has no standards when $3.4 billion are going to be spent on political ads in the presidential election coming up. it >> absolutely, that is a great point, i would say, not only do

we have a patchwork of laws within the united states, we had a patchwork of laws within the world, the social media companies are responding in different ways, and, i think they are doing it sloppily, frankly, and we have already seen ads not political at all, while some are able to go through it. that is still being -- again, this is not uniform, we need that leadership at the federal level. >> can you address the issue of the privacy laws, senator kennedy and i have introduced a bipartisan bill, with the 72 hour required notice, and, allowing users to opt out of having their data shared, and how that could be helpful, in this effort to protect people's information in elections. >> i had a comment on that as well, i think this is a common

sense measure. i would like to see more informed consent among users, from social media companies. it is like -- you know, when you see a commercial on tv, that you do not want to watch, you can change the channel. you do not have that option with social media, they are putting power in the hands of customers, which is what they call them in europe, we call then users of social media. that is an interesting -- in europe, they call then customers. i think that is important. it >> users a private information being taken out, by these company's -- do they self regulate? i think if they self regulate, we cannot trust what they do in the long horizon. maybe if they are under great leadership, whoever is in charge of the corporation now, we will not know how they will react in the future, especially when there is no political pressure on them, one example is the recent revelations with respect to cambridge analytic using facebook information, and

because of that -- the idea there was that they would be fully transparent, but it is interesting, that reports from the guardian which broke the story said that facebook actually tried to threaten them with a suit, before they publish the stories, so that we never would have heard from that whistleblower. that is an indication of why we need a better relationship between the companies and congress, congress being in this area, where it can regulate, and i think that companies are recognizing the value of that. >> mr. zuckerberg actually said, there would be, there are reasons to regulate, and, he was supportive of a 72 hour notice. i think that, we are at a point now, where, if we have certain platforms, if we have regulation -- self-regulation, you will have other ones moving in any way, and then, you will have all the fun things leading to voter suppression efforts, and hearings that we have had in judiciaries -- we have had a

number of ads displayed with african-american faces, saying, hey, check this number during the trump clinton election, and you will be able to vote without standing in line. that is clearly criminal, it is voter suppression. russians have used this in the past. >> thank you very much. >> i can maybe go back, after senator ray off -- rayov >> i would like to welcome you back, a very helpful witness before this committee, before. in addition to the csi criminal playbook, which is a very helpful and authoritative source on election and other interference by the kremlin, and the trojan horse report, the parallel efforts -- there is a new report called moscow's gold, russian corruption in the uk, that was put out by the

foreign affairs committee. i would like to ask that that report be put into the record. i want to thank mr. weinstein, for focusing on the botnet civil injunction, i have been working on that for a long time, we are hoping to get it into the nda bill also, it seems pretty obvious, to try to shut these things down, and the way that has been proven to work. what i want to talk about, in my time, is the problem of shell corporation. for all of the emphasis of that the witnesses have put in policing, and prosecuting foreign influence in our elections, you can neither police or prosecute what you cannot find. at the moment, we have both a

shell corporation problem, which was emphasized by mark zuckerberg, and his testimony when he said there, their political advertisement authentication program would only go to the first shell corporation, and not seek any information, about who was actually behind it. i do not think that putin is stupid enough to call it a russian company. it is a front. it has put behind it, and until we know that, we cannot enforce effectively., and of story. they have colossal channels for dark money, anonymized funding, and if you cannot find out what special interest is behind anonymous money, you cannot find out if there is a foreign interest behind that money. darkness is darkness is darkness, and, it hides malign activity, both foreign and domestic. i would like to ask each of you to comment on that, can you

talk about trolling? that is facilitated by shell corporation, and, you talked about propaganda campaigns, and, facilitated by these shell corporations. you cannot have effective disclosure, if you are disclosing a corporation and you do not really know who is behind it. if i could ask you about that, that will be the end of my time. >> thank you for your kind words, it is good to work with you again. >> we were good adversaries. >> yes, adversaries working for the same goal. >> yes. >> as a prosecutor, former prosecutor -- looking at this issue, of course you want to know more about the corporation, than last. the first amendment issues, and other concerns got there, and, there is no way to resist your logic, which is -- we have seen these corporations, money laundering -- or otherwise, we have seen interference in the elections.

>> they are widely used, and criminal context, for money laundering purposes, and to hide the proceeds of criminal activities, correct? >> absolutely. >> the extent of what is running, it is a criminal enterprise, him and his oligarchs -- why would they not go after that? >> it is all intended to hide the fact that this is criminal activity. >> mike? >> i was struck by the opening comments, by mr. feinstein, who said in the 2016 election, we were so unaware -- mr. hickey

from the justice department said exposure is one of the best ways to counter the threat, i don't see how we get at those issues if we are operating with shell companies. as you said, it affects all of these areas, law enforcement, across-the-board, including legislation, so, as long as we have the lobbying loophole, it accentuates a problem. even if we close the loophole, we still have a problem with shell corporations. >> just don't hire a lobbyist, then, you are operating if you are as legitimate as an american corporation. >> rt was not named in this advisory, but, the presenters were exempt from this, because, the fact that rt itself is registered in the united states. that is a cure -- a problem with that legislation. with shell corporations advertising online, my testimony -- creating through third party, or perhaps a social media company -- even though i have reservations about this eyelids is a better business bureau type of list, or register of trusted

political advertisers, then, we kind of get around these issues of sloppy enforcement of political ads, that are just saying no, this has to do with president from, therefore it is political, and we will reject this ad. if there are advertisers that are trusted, and listed, this could help these issues. >> shell corporations are a real problem. >> yes they are. >> thank you. >> professor goodman, i will have one more question, and then we will move on. it is my understanding, that in addition to the federal agents registration act, and the federal elections campaign, act, you see a need for a another change to change section 18? can you explain why the change to that section is necessary, and what about the existing statute is insufficient, for example, are there cases that cannot be prosecuted unless the lies changed? >> thank you for the question, i also agree with mr. weinstein's comment, that in this area, it might be better -- even if just for symbolic purposes, to have a new fence

between government interference, in some sense, it would be redundant with the existing statute. i think that the statute is robust, as we are seeing with special counsel mueller's indictment of the russians. i also think that there would be a question as to what is an act that americans might take, that would expose them to liability for being involved in the conspiracy. that is an area in which it would be beneficial to have law that updates technology. what would be acts that expose americans to liability, who are coordinating or supporting russian schemes to interfere in a way that they are being alleged or indicted for? that could also be helpful, to prosecutors who need something more specific on whether or not they will bring forth charges.

>> i was asking about the voter suppression efforts, and what you have seen, historically, with that. >> i went through all 3500 ads, that were released by the house democrats, a couple of weeks ago, and i can say, the trend among those ads, is, as it is with all information, to divide societal fissures. as you said, clearly, they are attempting to suppress turnout, and, i think the way that they did this is very interesting, by putting forward positive messages first, things that were not this information, things about black identity, and things like that, to create community, a trusted messenger, and then, it would go for bigger asks, such as signing petitions, or, putting through disinformation messages, about not turning out to vote, or, other types of voter suppression, things like that. it is hard to regulate to that, because, it starts with things that that are not easy to find

out. >> when you do not know about it, because there is no disclosure -- you cannot immediately see it, for what it is, and the other campaigns do not see it, whether you are dealing with political parties -- either political party. the political parties that has the biggest vested interest, and winning, if they do not see that kind of stuff, then, they are going to know what is what's better than anyone, in addition to the press being able to see it. >> i agree, i also would say, it worries me about what mr. zuckerberg said about ai doing this enforcement, and early detection of these issues, how would artificial intelligence gather these positive messages, and put out a justification that this is going to be a problem? i do not see that as a possibility, i think that is why they really need to invest more in human content reviewers. >> the calm pain -- the

campaign says, where is this message coming from? maybe i can work with this group, and then soon they find out -- the group is a fraud. again, disclaimer, disclosure, immediately, very important. mr. weinstein, i have a bill with senator blunt, cosponsored by feinstein. this is going to stop foreign donations affecting our elections, and starting credit card verification protocol, to make sure that it comes from u.s. sources. can you talk again, about the importance of this? people will start trying to find ways to get around this? >> absolutely senator, they already are, the russians have. in my earlier statement, a very latent example of that, is donations to a french far right candidate, a year and a year and half ago -- and then, as you know, as a reward for her

supporting the actions in crimea -- she received funding. no question, they will try every avenue, to do that here. they probably already are. >> mr. chairman, one thing i would like to say, is, sometimes it is just about the general election. what was going on, with hillary clinton, versus a donald trump's campaign -- the way that professor goodman, and really all of you have directed some of your comments, about to the long haul, here, where they are actually getting involved in primaries, with senator rubio, he also said this is not about one party, or one election, but next year it will be about interparty involvement. where they are trying to hurt certain republican candidates to hurt others. the more that we make sure that the public understands that that that is going on, the more

this becomes what it should be, which is an effort to protect our democracy, and, get rid of the he said, she said. i appreciate you calling these witnesses, and the content of their testimony. thank you. >> thank you for this panel, and i would like to remind you that the general members were not here, so you might get questions within seven days, so, thank you very much for a very important hearing that we have had. very good information from this panel. >> thank you mr. chairman.

coming up tonight, a congressional oversight hearing for energy regulatory committee. this weekend, on c-span,

justice and homeland security officials testify in defending against foreign interference and, in u.s. elections. sunday at 10:30 am, highlights from the u.s. and north korea summit, between president trump and the leader of north korea. saturday at 9 pm eastern, former house speaker newt gingrich grinned -- gingrich talks about our nations come back. also, francesca ramsey shares her experience in becoming a social justice activist, in her book, that escalated quickly. saturday at 8 pm eastern, lectures and history, duke university professor laura edwards on public lands and the law. examining westward expansion, and the law involved in taking over native american land. 4 pm eastern, unreal america,

the 1944 film the dentist for, a flying fortress, that documents one of the first bombers to complete 25 missions in europe without being shot down. watch the c-span networks, this weekend. tore the library of congress exhibit on world war i, which showcases american ideas about the war, through hard work, posters, photographs, film, and documents. >> the idea of growing your own food, to conserve larger quantities for the war effort, this is -- another individual kind of issue rising to the service in world war i. you can see, also, through conservation,

i know -- we make everything out of corn today, but, this is due -- one thing that is worth noting, is that we will ration. the government will ration food, and, if you just encourage people to act correctly, they would ration food -- they did not to impose it on them. >> watch american artifacts, sunday, at 6 pm eastern, in american history tv, on c-span three. >> israel ambassador to the u.s., ron, speaks about the freedom coalition conference. the coalition's founder, interviewed him, about they u.s. withdraw from the iran nuclear agreement, the moving of the u.s. embassy, to jerusalem, and war in syria. >> he did not say, that we are