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>> thanks, mr. chairman. let me just second the sentiment expressed by the chairman that has been lacking in many of these areas is enforcement. you have said you don't need new tools. i would submit that enforcement has been abysmal. this is a bipartisan failure. and it's not meant to be critical of you, as officials but i think the chairman is right that enforcement has been sadly lacking. let me begin by asking you just -- very straightforwardly, there's no doubt in your mind, is there, that russia interfered or sought to interfere with the 2016 elections. >> no, sir. >> no, sir. >> in fact, russia attacked the united states of america. in my view it committed an act of war, i made this statement along with the chairman of the armed services committee, john

mccain in other venues, this attack on our democracy will continue, will it not. unless the united states makes russia pay a price. correct? >> it warrants a strong response, senator, and i think in this area and others we have to find ways to raise costs of malicious and malign behavior by foreign states. >> it's not only -- i'm sorry, mr. masterson. >> go ahead, senator. >> it's not only a matter of protecting our systems, but also deterring that attack by proactively making russia pay a price, correct? >> i think you have to raise the cost of the behavior. correct, senator. >> the president's defense lawyers, in a recent memo, that was published widely, assert that it was, quote, corruption within the fbi and department of

justice which appears to have led to the alleged russia collusion investigation. in march. president trump also expressed a similar view when he tweeted quote, there was no collusion between russia and the trump campaign as many are finding out however there was tremendous leaking, lying and corruption at the highest levels of the fbi, justice and state. president trump also tweeted that president mueller's probe was based on, quote, fraudulent activities. are you aware of leaking, lying and corruption within the fbi and department of justice? >> no, senator. >> are you aware that leaking, lying and corruption led to the russia collusion investigation? >> no, senator. >> are you, mr. masterson? >> no, senator. >> president trump has alleged

that james comey apparently knew about lies and corruption going on at quote the highest levels of the fbi. and his defense lawyers have said -- quote, the firing of mr. comey has led to the discovery of corruption within the fbi at the highest levels, end quote. is it accurate so far as you know to say that mr. comey's firing led to the discovery of corruption within the fbi? >> i don't know what that refers to, sir. >> i have no knowledge of that or information on it. >> there have been statements about there being no evidence, of any collusion between the trump campaign and the russian attempt to interfere in our election of 2016. put aside whether collusion has been proved.

on the question of whether there is evidence, would you agree with me that there is some evidence that has been elicited and presented so far by the special counsel's investigation? >> senator, because as you've recognized it's an ongoing investigation, it's not appropriate for me to comment on what evidence may or may not have been discovered in the course of it. >> well, let's just talk about facts whether we characterize it as evidence or not. we know that candidate trump called for russia to hack his opponent's emails, correct? >> i'm familiar with public statement that i think you're referring to. >> which, in fact, involved his calling for that hacking. we're aware that his son in anticipating and asking for a

meeting with russian agents, said he would quote love to get dirt on hillary clinton from vladimir putin. correct? >> all i know about that, i know from media reports, sir, and i don't have them in front of me. >> if those facts were true, wouldn't it be evidence of collusion between the trump campaign and the russian interference? >> sir, i don't think it's appropriate for me to comment in any respect op a pending matter. >> senator harris, i hope -- you're the last one. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. i appreciate that. good morning. mr. masterson, this sunday, dni director coates said, quote, it is 2018 and we continue to see russian targeting of american society in ways that could affect our mid-term elections. and if you've -- you may have discussed this, i'm sorry i was at another hearing.

let me know if you have. i'll go on with my question. so russia obviously attacked the very heart of our democracy when they interfered in the 2016 election. this is why the secure elections act that senators langford, klobuchar, graham and i are working on, and we believe it is important. you may be familiar with that. >> i am. >> great. so we recently also -- actually, held a demonstration for my colleagues here at the capital. where we brought in folks who before our eyes, hacked election machines. those that are not -- those that are being used in many states, are not state of the art from our perspective. as a former eac commissioner and based on your current role, do you agree that funding should be prioritized for the states to upgrade their systems, based on need rather than based on the size of the population of the state. >> thank you, senator, for the question. i think there's a decided need for resources across the states

in a variety of ways, and the way to prioritize that funding can be done based on a number of approaches including risk-based decision-making like we approach it at dhs to help inform where the largest areas of risk are and how best to address it, short and long-term. >> can you outline some of the risks that you -- you review and analyze to determine the need? >> sure, as we've worked with state and local officials across the country we've looked at a variety of what i would say paradigms or structures that states use. so, for instance, web-facing systems, things like online registration portals, election night reporting systems, items like that certainly have a broader threat profile from the exposure side, but the risk to the actual integrity of the process may be less. so identifying those risks and what can be done to mitigate them to those sort of broader vulnerabilities on those systems that have less concerns about

the integrity of the vote are there and simple steps like putting auditability in place, is something that builds up the resilience of the process and ensures the ability to recover. >> have you published the list of risks for the states and also for the public to see? >> we have worked with the government coordinating council, which is the council with critical infrastructure. >> has it been published? >> state and local officials, there includes information around risk and mitigation. >> has it been published. >> i believe there's something on our website regarding that, but i can get additional information for you. >> please follow up with this committee and if it's not there. please follow up and actually publish a list of what you believe to be the risks of various election systems. in terms of vulnerability to hacking and other kinds of manipulation. and if you can get that done by the end of this month, if it's not already there. we'd appreciate that. >> thank you, senator. >> and then in march as you may know, congress passed an omnibus

spending bill that contained $380 million in grant funding to help the states improve their election infrastructure. do you know what is the status of getting the guidelines and the guidance that dhs official manafort came before homeland security and said that that would be produced. guidance for the states on how that money should best be spent, to be most effective. can you tell me what the status is of that. >> the government coordinating council approved that guidance two weeks ago and released it to the states and locals, it's been distributed through those channels. >> is that available to the public? >> it is. >> thank you. and will you talk a bit about what you have seen in terms of the risk assessments you've been doing around the country, i believe 14 states have been completed. is that correct, 14? >> i believe it's 17 states have been completed, thus far. as well as ten localities. >> and what generally have you seen as being the vulnerabilities of those assessments?

>> thank you, senator. generally speaking, within the elections infrastructure sector we're seeing the same typical vulnerabilities you would see across i.t. systems. so managing software updates, outdated equipment or hardware as well as general upgrades that need to take place as far as configuration management within systems to limit the damage that can be done if something were to take place. >> so -- >> their resilience? >> what's that? >> their resilience? >> yeah, exactly, their resilience, senator. and so this sector is no different in what we see and the work we're doing with them. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> we're done with this panel. but a lot of members don't come. so the record will be open for a week. and you'll get -- you'll get questions in writing. so please answer them as soon as you can. you want to speak? >> mr. chairman, i have another chairman, i want to reiterate what senator harris was saying and thank her for her work on the secure elections act. you notice senator coons brought

it up, i brought it up. we have this opportunity when you go back to the office to get this in as part of an amendment to the ndaa, it's currently being held up on the republican side. i want to get it done. it is a republican-led bill by senator lankford, and it simply cements some of the work that we've talked about today. and i just don't know how we can pass an ndaa bill for our defense of our nation and not include something like this. so we'd like to get it on and done. thank you. >> and also for mr. hickey, i want to correct something i said to you. that i'm probably inferred that the foreign agents registration act amendments that i have in, that they were in this committee, they're in foreign relations, and i've also been informed by my staff that your department is helping with that legislation. you're dismissed. >> thank you. >> now while the other group is

coming i'll start to introduce mr. weinstein is partner of davis polk and orderiwell. in 2008 he was named homeland security adviser by president george w. bush. prior to his white house service, mr. weinstein was the first assistant attorney general for national security, before that, he served as u.s. attorney in washington, d.c., he has served as general counsel also of the fbi. mr. goodman -- mr. goodman is the founding co-editor in chief of a publication just security, an online forum focused on u.s. national security and that forum is based at new york university school of law. mr. goodman is a professor of law policy and sociology at new york university.

prior to this, he served as special counsel to the general counsel of the department of defense. ms. janikowski is a global fellow at the wilson center in washington, d.c. she focused on eastern europe. focuses on eastern europe and russia. previously she served as a fulbright clinton public policy fellow. and worked in government relations at the national democratic institute for international affairs. we'll start with kenneth. >> thank you, mr. chairman, senator klobuchar. i very much appreciate the invitation to appear before you today. and i just want to say at the outset i believe you're doing real service by holding this hearing and pursuing this issue,

which -- and in the course of doing that, you're highlighting what has really kind of gotten lost in much of the political controversy about the 2016 election, which is that we are facing an unprecedented and growing threat to our democratic institutions, both here and around the globe. in january 217, the intelligence committee assessed that the russian government directed a campaign to influence our 2016 election. a campaign that included cyberintrusions in the state and local election board systems. penetration of the dnc and the release of and other groups and the release of material to influence the election. and the use of internet trolls to spread disinformation and amplify themes that supported the campaign narrative, the russians were propounding. with the intelligence community and several ensuing congressional investigations having established that we face a serious and growing threat, the question now is how we can most effectively respond to that threat. the government has a number of tools it can use. first it has all the national security investigative tools like fisa court, electronic surveillance orders and national

security letters, as well as the full range of criminal investigative tools to detect and investigate influence activities. second it has the ability to bring a criminal prosecution against perpetrators under the computer fraud abuse act for hacking into protected computer systems or under the foreign agent registration act for those who engage in political activities on behalf of a foreign party without registering themselves as foreign agents. deterrence can be achieved through the application of economic and trade sanctions such as when president obama and president trump imposed sanctions on russian organizations and individuals and deterrence can be achieved through the ejection of a country's official staff from the u.s. such as when both presidents subjected russian intelligence operatives and closed russian facilities in this country. another option is the enforcement of campaign finance laws to prevent foreign nationals from contributing to u.s. political campaigns. last year's reports of russian funding for the french far right party, presidential candidate

allegedly in part as a reward for supporting russia's activities in crimea, raises the concern that russia may make similar attempts to sway american politics with campaign funding and contributions. a final area of focus is on the protection of the electoral systems themselves, the purpose behind dhs' announcement last january that the election processes will be designated as critical infrastructure like the energy grid, telecommunications networks and other critical sectors that receive federal assistance and protection. >> so those are the tools and capabilities being used to meet this threat today. in light of recent events, we need to think of ways we can strengthen tools and i would like to flag several such recommendations. the first is to give the justice department statutory authority to give a legally enforceable injunction against operators of botnets, taking over networks of computers and launch disruptive attacks, and we saw that very clearly when russia attacked

estonia through botnets in 2007. a second proposal is to enhance the effectiveness of fara, foreign agent registration act. by giving the justice department attorneys the authority to compel suspected foreign agents to turn over records that show whether they are or are not acting on behalf of foreign interests. a third proposal is to consider a new statute that specifically addresses this threat. although as we've discussed or you discussed in the earlier panel, fara and other 2016, congress should consider crafting a statute that specifically targets foreign election interference and disinformation activities, highlighting the recognition of the severity of the threat and condemnation of such activity, as well as providing prosecutor as tool that can be used against these influence campaigns, which will become more prevalent as our adversaries continue to hone their skills and use new technologies for their subversive purposes.

another proposal draws from lessons learned in the run up to the 2016 he election when the obama administration struggled with the question of whether and how much information to provide the public about the russian interference efforts they were detecting, torn between a desire to inform the public and refrain from announcements that could be seen as an attempt to affect the outcome of the election. in order to avoid that dilemma in future election cycles, some have recommended that congress pass legislation recommending or requiring the dni to report at intervals leading up to a federal election, whether the intelligence community is detecting foreign interference with the upcoming election and the source and extent of that interference. there are ensuring that voters are on notice and on the lookout for misleading propaganda and disinformation. so to conclude, we have a number of effective tools and capabilities which can be bolstered to meet and defeat this threat. the real question for today is whether we have the focus and the single-minded will to do so.

all too often we as a country have been slow to mobilize in the threat of a looming threat in the face of a looming threat such as we were with al qaeda in the 1990s and the cyberthreat in the 2000s, it's my hope it will not be slow in responding to this threat. this hearing is an important first step. critical that we follow up with action that is sustained, decisive, and to use senator feinstein's word, clear-eyed. the threat is real, not an overstatement to say there's a lot at stake no less than the continuing viability of the democratic processes here and around the world. i want to thank the committee for having me here today and i look forward to answering your questions. >> thank you, mr. weinstein. now professor goodman. >> i want to start by thanking chairman grassley and ranking member feinstein and distinguished members of this committee for holding an important hearing such an important issue. it's an honor for me to be here to testify before you. the russian organization that used social media tools to interfere in the most recent presidential election called its mission quote information

warfare against the united states of america, end quote. like the terrorists on 9/11 our enemies used our systems against us. al qaeda used our commercial air transportation systems, the kremlin used our social media. and communications systems. moscow hijacked platforms such as facebook, twitter and youtube. in its attack on the united states. the russian operations wreak havoc in the u.s. election began long before donald trump or hillary clinton announced their runs for the presidency. code named or referred to as the quote, unquote, translation project, this specific russian operation to influence the 2016 election began around may 2014. it was initiated with a stated goal to quote spread disrust towards the candidates and the political system in general unquote. by 2015, the kremlin pared its social media influence operation with a cyberespionage operation. 2015 is an important time period to remember. although the dissemination of stolen emails during the general election is highly salient.

it's vital for the public to understand that the kremlin began its espionage activities during the primaries. favoring some primary candidates for president and undermining others in both major political parties. as the january 2016 intelligence report stated, russia's cyberespionage operation quote collected on some republican affiliated targets, and did not conduct a comparable disclosure campaign and collected against year's primary campaigns, think tanks and lobbying groups they viewed as likely to shape future u.s. policies. nbc reported that the kremlin's efforts to steal email and other data got under way in 2015 and included quote top republicans and staffers of republican candidates. for president, end quote. at certain point the russia operation included the oppive of favoring the trump campaign, and undermining clinton's candidacy. those objectives began before the general election. special counsel's three indictments of three organizations and 13 russians

for election interference states they engage in operations primarily intended to indicate derogatory information about hillary clinton to denigrate other candidates such as ted cruz and marco rubio and to then candidate donald trump. in addition to senator cruz and rubio, former fbi special agent clint watts who has testified before the senate intelligence committee also identified russian efforts to undermine the presidential campaigns of senator graham and florida governor jeb bush. the kremlin did not and does not hope to shape the outcome of a general election. the kremlin hopes to shape the outcomes of primaries, denying americans their right to choose. their own political leaders free of interference or coercion. the kremlin is interested in not only a candidate who stands the best chance of winning, it would be valuable enough for moscow if it could influence what campaigns are framed. what direction a party takes in formulating its platform, and

undermining public trust in those who win the election. the threat to future american elections is of course not limited to russia or even to state actors. the foreign threat is broader and the danger is greater if americans are willing to encourage support, coordinator conspire with these foreign agents. being willing is not a crime, but acting on that willingness could be. that raises the question, whether some americans did intentionally coordinate or conspire with russia's election interference, what we might ever know can be placed on a spectrum from no evidence to weak and moderate evidence. to strong evidence and proof. i've submitted a detailed analysis of the many pieces of information that are now publicly available, part of that analysis is an effort to show how current law does apply and where we still may need to fill in some gaps. i did not use the word collusion anywhere in the analysis. the real question is whether any americans engage in a conspiracy to work with the russians when intentionally supporting the russian operation in violation

of campaign finance laws, from the trump tower meeting to paul manafort's involvement with the russian oligarch, i think it's fair to say based on the publicly available record, there is evidence of violations of federal law, not proof, but evidence. how to improve our system of law enforcement to safeguard our elections from foreign adversaries, although we had a robust system of laws, i highlight some areas for opportunities, areas for opportunity for legislative reform. some of the most promising pieces of legislation are coming out of this committee, including senator grassley's and senator feinstein's bills, which both remove the loophole that allows foreign agents to register under the foreign agents registration act. other measures could bolster enforcement authority. which senator grassley's legislation does, as well. and using the mechanism of transparency to help expose foreign influence in our political system.

legislation introduced in the house last week takes an important step by requiring campaigns to disclose contacts with agents of foreign powers offering support. this hearing itself is another significant step forward to address future and national security risks. i want to thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak about these matters, and i look forward to answering any questions that you may have. >> miss jankowitz. i apologize for mispronouncing your name the first time. >> chairman grassley, senator klobuchar and distinguished members of the committee, it's an honor to testify before you this morning and heartening to see continued bipartisan interest in election interference as it is truly a challenge that knows no political party. throughout my career i've worked on the front lines of russia's information war, through work at the national democratic institute. strategic communications adviser to the ukrainian government and i work on a book about the development of and responses to russian influence operations. my experiences have led me to a conclusion that may surprise

you. even if we were to walk out of this hearing room today and secure beyond the shadow of a doubt the country's election infrastructure, even if we hermetically sealed our information environment from inauthentic users and false or misleading information. even if social media companies finally put forth a good-faith effort to put users and our democracy first, even then, we would still not successfully dispel the threat our democracy faces from malign actors, political influence operations if our democratic processes are to remain secure, we must think beyond knee-jerk reactions and punitive measures. the u.s. government must put citizens at the heart of our response to election interference and address the issues that make our society so susceptible to outside influence in the first place. european countries that have been most successful have in common one key point. their governments recognize that they cannot simply fact-check or label their way out of the

crisis of truth that they faced. for example, in estonia, despite a large russian ethnic population and a near constant barrage of kremlin sponsored media, moscow's message something finding fewer footholds than it did ten years ago when russia's influence caused riots. this is partly because the estonian government is conducting proactive outreach to the ethnic russian population, including russian language initiatives. in ukraine there's been a growing demand for media literacy training. in response, an american ngo trained 15,000 people in critical thinking, source evaluation and emotional manipulation. the program measured a 29% increase in participants who check the news they consume. while both countries' battles with russian interference are not finished, the these investments will be the future cornerstones of that i democracies. citizen-based groups must work in concert with measures designed to protect institutions

but they've been all but absent from our discussion of election interference. in addition to the stipulations provided in the honest ads and secure elections act which i support, congress must pursue and encourage citizens based solutions in its work related to election protection, both in the spheres of social media regulation and education. social media companies have played whack a troll in responding to russia election interference, they must move toward educating and empowering social media users, first, platforms should be require to obtain informed and meaningful consent from users to their terms of service. most users have no idea what they're signing up for. this ignorance is what russia exploits through its online influence campaigns. second, terms of service should be easy to understand. clearly define what content is permissible on platforms and should be actively enforced this is costly and will require human content reviewers and the

establishment of a complaint and appeals process, but civil discourse and democracy are priceless. third, social media companies have near ubiquitous access to americans' lives, they should embrace their role as educators and focus on practices that encourage behavior change rather than simply raising awareness. to that end, the investment that will best protect democracy for generations to come is decidedly more low-tech. education. first, we must invest in broad-based media literacy, civics and critical thinking programs to fight election interference. citizens who understand how government works are less likely to buy into the falsehoods and conspiracies that are harmful to democracy. second, congress should encourage cooperation and coordination across government. particularly between the national security community and departments of education. both at the national and local levels. finally, adults should also be i a target audience for these skills billing programs. moscow will continue to

influence our democracy. as it has done for decades. and now that the kremlin has a written playbook for how to do so, other actors will imitate russia. to prepare for these attacks and attacks from within, we must think beyond russia to the key actors in our democratic process, the american people. thank you. >> thank you. i'll start with mr. feinstein. is there anything in 18 u.s. 371 conspiracy charge thaw think needs to be changed or fixed to address this issue? >> red light on. >> there we go. thank you. so 18 usc 381 is the federal conspiracy statute and has a prong to it that provides that the government can prosecute somebody if they defraud the united states.

and that prong has been used as a basis for prosecutions against people and entities that mislead the government for their own advantage. maybe you know, mislead the government in about taxes and the like. one of the things that -- that's one of the statutes that's used by the special counsel. in his indictment. that alleging that the russian entities had defrauded the government by misleading them about the disclosure requirements for the state department, the justice department, et cetera. that is an effective tool to go after foreign parties who are pretending to be americans in order to get involved in u.s. elections. i can't think of a specific change to that specific statute. however the broader question goes to my earlier comments. which is, you know, this might be an occasion, and i understand the concern with not overcriminalizing things in the federal law. but the severity of this threat and the fact that we're going to have this threat with us in, you

know, increasing form for years to come suggests this might be an area where you might consider a statute or set of statutes focused specifically on foreign election interference and disinformation campaigns. and i can think of a number of different areas, burdens of proof, this kind of thing, which could be retooled to make it easier for prosecutors to go after foreign parties who are doing this work. >> let me also ask you that we understand the value of the criminal prosecution can bring, can be a deterrent to both federal government or foreign governments and their operatives charging individuals openly prevents those individuals from traveling. and of course, when we do get our hands on individuals, bring those actors fully to account. first question, despite these benefits, can you describe some of the limitations or down sides of criminal prosecution in this area? >> sure, i can do it briefly. i mean, start off, there are benefits, as you pointed out,

mr. chairman. one example is, go back to 2015 when doj indicted several uniformed members in china for trade secret violations. we actually -- that helped to push the chinese to reach an agreement, where they now have scaled back some of those efforts. so a criminal prosecution can have benefits in the context of going after foreign parties. but some of the problems, like adam hickey said in the last panel, are just -- you know, they're chronic. you go after foreign actors, often acting on behalf of foreign governments who are not incentivized to help you get those people. so you can't get them unless they happen to travel, for instance. you can't get some of the evidence, because it's in the hands of foreign government that doesn't want to be helpful. and oftentimes, it's a problem, because a lot of this activity takes place over the internet, and attribution of the wrongdoers over the internet is a difficult thing so sometimes it's hard to actually identify the person doing the key strokes that result in the activity over

the internet that's causing interference in our elections. >> ms. jankowicz. from your studies in other countries about russian disinformation, we have the estonia example, where it was diminished by a government outreach to its citizens. in ukraine, fake news was spread by russia. civil society groups launched factchecking. so in terms of equipping citizens to fight foreign election meddling, what approach has your research led you to believe might be effective in our country? >> it has to be a whole holistic approach, senator. and that's an excellent question, because it's not just about media literacy or teaching people to second-check sources. it's about critical thinking and engaging in discourse and debate, which i think, sadly, the social media has polarized us so much that we're not doing any more.

so it's about building these critical thinking and also more stuff like that happening in our schools, but also for adults, as well. understanding of the system is integral to trust in government. >> okay. senator klobuchar. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. thank you, these are excellent witnesses, mr. chairman. i want to thank you. and i'm glad that there's some general agreement here with republican witnesses and democratic witnesses, which i just think shows how important it is for us to act. meanwhile, i just learned the fec deadlocked again on an issue for the third time on foreign contributions, and i appreciate your words, mr. wiawainstein, at possibly going forward and our

elections act is hung up for reasons i do not understand, given that the intelligence committee has had five hearings. we've had several here with the chairman's leadership, white house leadership and others. and i just think we need to get this added to the bill. and i appreciate your words, ms. jankowicz, in support of that bill. and you want to talk about why this is so important we see this as a kind of warfare, which was so eloquently expressed, why we see it that way, and putting it in the nda to me is so important to the rest of the world. so -- >> yeah, absolutely. well, i think both of your bills are important steps toward getting on the record that this is a threat that we're serious about, which to this point, i don't think the united states has done enough of. i've heard conversations in europe over the past two or three years that our -- the conversations that we're having now happened there two years ago. we're very, very far behind. but in addition, those structural measures that you're putting forward send a signal to the american people that our systems are secure.

that we're taking care of them. and that rebuilds that trust that has been eroded over the past few months. >> right. because we've always been such a leader on elections and free elections across our world, and we need to get that back. the honest ads act, of course, is now picking up support, for some reason, by the social media companies. and i think right now what we're seeing is a patchwork of laws that are starting to develop across the states. i'm frankly glad, because that's going to push for action here. but you simply -- could you talk about the hazards of having different states regulate political ads without any kind of action on the federal government, and only having voluntary measures which creates another patchwork with facebook doing one thing and twitter doing another? while we're glad they're doing things, and google just decided not to do ads in washington state, any more, political ads, because they have a different standard there. so you have states doing different things, and then you have social media companies

having different standards, and you have washington doing nothing when it's projected that 3 to $4 billion is going to be spent on online political ads in the presidential election coming up. >> yeah, absolutely. that's a great point. and i would say not only do we have a patchwork of laws within the united states, we have a patchwork of laws within the world, with gdpr coming into force in the european union last month. the social media companies are responding in different ways. but i think they're doing it sloppily, frankly. we have seen some ads that are frankly, not political at all, being rejected, while others are allowed to go through. just last week, a facebook page governed by the ira was discovered. they have taken it down since then -- they do, they love to play whack-a-troll. but this enforcement is not uniform, and we do need that leadership at the federal level. >> could you -- anyone address this issue of the privacy laws? as you know, senator kennedy and i have introduced a bipartisan bill with the 72-hour required

notice and with allowing users to opt out of having their data shared, and how you think that could be helpful in this context of trying to protect people's information in elections? anyone? >> i'm happy to comment on that, as well. you know, i think this is -- it's a common sense measure. i would like to see more informed consent among users from social media companies. it's like, you know, when you see a commercial on tv that you don't want to watch, you can change the channel. we don't have that option with social media. and this is just putting power in the hands of customers, which is what they call them in europe, oddly. we call them users of social media. they call them customers, which i think is an interesting lexical choice that speaks to the relationship. >> very good. professor goodman. >> so i agree with the same comment, that i think this is an important area for the future in the sense of users' priority information being taken up by these companies. and if they self-regulate, i don't think we can trust what they'll necessarily do over the

long horizon. so that maybe even they're under great leadership with whoever is in charge of their corporations now, but we have no idea how they will react in the future, especially when there is not political pressure on them. just one example of it is the recent revelations with respect to using facebook information. facebook came before the congress in part because of that. and the idea there was that they were going to be fully transparent, but it's interesting that the reports from the guardian, which broke the story, said that facebook actually tried to threaten them with a suit before they published the story so that we would never have heard from that whistleblower. i just think that's an indication of why we need a kind of -- a better relationship between the companies and congress and congress being in it this area where it can regulate. and i think the companies are recognizing this value. >> and at that hearing, mr. zuckerberg actually said, he thought there would be a reason to start regulating and put in place. he said he was supportive of a 72-hour notice. and so i think that there are -- we're at a point now that if we

just have certain platforms doing their own regulation, self-regulation, then you'll have other ones moving in anyway that aren't doing it. and then you'll have all the slimy ads, leading me to ask about the voter suppression efforts in the hearings we've had in judiciary, we've had a number of ads displayed with african-american faces saying, hey, text this number during the trump/clinton election, and you will be able to vote without standing in line. to me, that was clearly criminal. it's voter suppression. and how maybe the russians have used this in the past. these were ads bought by rubles. >> senator whitehouse. >> i was asking a question. >> i thought it was a statement. >> no, i can maybe go back after senator whitehouse is done. >> go ahead, senator whitehouse. >> thank you very much. first of all, i would like to welcome ken wainstein back, a very helpful witness before this

committee before. in addition to the csis kremlin playbook, which is i think a very helpful and authoritative source on election and other interference by the kremlin and the kremlin trojan horse report, the atlantic council's parallel effort, there is a new report called moscow's gold, russian corruption in the uk, that was put out by the house of commons foreign affairs committee. and i'd like to ask that that report be put into the record. >> without objection, it will be. >> and i want to thank mr. wainstein for focusing on the botnet civil injunction legislation. senator graham and i have been working on that for a long time, hoping to get it into the nda bill also. it seems pretty obvious to try to shut these damn things down in the way that's been proven to work. but what i want to talk about in my time is the problem of shell corporations. because for all of the emphasis

that the witnesses have put on policing and prosecuting foreign influence in our elections, you can neither police or prosecute which you cannot find. and at the moment, we have both a shell corporation problem, which was emphasized by mark zuckerberg in his testimony when he said their political advertisement authentication program would only go to the first shell corporation, and not seek any information about who was actually behind it. i don't think putin is stupid enough to call it boris and natasha llc. it's going to sound more like americans for puppies and peace and prosperity. but it's a front group. and it's got putin or whomever else behind it. and until we can know that, we cannot enforce effectively, period, end of story. similarly, when our election system has these co lassal channels for dark money, none myselfed funding, if you can't

find out what special interest is behind anonymous money, darkness is darkness is darkness and it hides maligned activity, both foreign and domestic. and i'd like to ask each of you to comment on that. i think can you -- we're concerned about trolling. obviously, that's facilitated by shell corporations. you talked about general propaganda campaigns. obviously, facilitated by shell corporations. campaign finance laws, you called out for a need for effective disclosure. you can't have effective disclosure if the only thing you're disclosing is a front corporation and you don't know who is really behind it. so if i could ask each of you three on that. >> sure. thank you for your kind words, and good to work with you again. always is. >> we were good adversaries. >> we were. adversaries who were working for the same goal. >> yes. >> look, as a prosecutor, former prosecutor, looking at this issue, of course, you want to

know more about the corporations than less. there are obviously first amendment issues and other concerns out there in the lexicon text. but absolutely. there's no way to sort of resist your logic, which is we've seen the use of corporations in a variety of contexts, whether it's money laundering or otherwise. but we have seen them here in the election interference and disinformation context. and a lot of -- >> in fact, they're widely used in the criminal context for money laundering purposes and to hide the proceeds of criminal activities, correct? >> absolutely. >> so to the extent that what putin is running is essentially a criminal enterprise of himself and his oligarchs, why would they not look to what criminal enterprises do as a model. >> yeah, it's meat and potatoes criminal conduct. no question. and all intended to hide the fact of the source of this maligned activity. >> professor goodman? >> sir, i agree. i was struck by the opening comments by senator feinstein, who said for the 2016 election,

quote, unquote, we were so unaware. and mr. hickey for the justice department said, quote, exposure is one of the best ways to counter the threat. so i don't see how we get at those issues if we're operating with shell companies. and as you have said, i think it affects all of these areas of law enforcement across the board, including legislation. so as long as we have the lobbying act loophole, it accentuates that problem. >> it's incredibly easy to get around fara but not hiring a lobbyist and setting up a shell corporation, and now you're operating as if you were an american corporation. ms. jankowicz? >> i agree. the advisory that came out of the justice department yesterday about rt presenters, although rt was not named, said that rt presenters were exempt from fara because of the fact that rt itself is registered in the united states. that's a clear problem with that legislation. but regarding shell corporations and advertising online, i would also put forward the idea that's in my written testimony about

creating either through third-party or perhaps social media companies could do this themselves, although i have some reservations about this, a better business bureau type of list or register of trusted political advertisers. then we would kind of get around these issues of sloppy enforcement of political ads that are just saying, no, this has to do with president trump, therefore, it's political and we're going to reject this ad. if there are trusted advertisers that are listed, that could be a way to circumvent these issues. >> shell corporations is a real problem. >> yes, absolutely. >> thank you, chairman. >> thank you. i'll finish with one question for prefofessor goodman, and th call on senator klobuchar. it's my understanding that in addition to the federal agents registration act and the federal elections campaign act, you see a need for another change to entitle 18, particularly section 371. can you explain why you think a change to that section is

necessary, and what about the existing statute is insufficient? for example, are there cases that cannot be prosecuted unless the law is changed? >> thank you for the question. so i also agree with mr. wainstein's comment that in this area it might be better, even if it's for soymbolic purposes, to have a new offense, which is about foreign interference or foreign government interference in our elections. in some sense that would be redundant. i think the existing statute is robust as we see with special counsel's mueller's indictment. also what are the acts that americans might take that would expose them to liability for being involved in that conspiracy. that's an area you could imagine would be beneficial to have law that updates it to technology. so what would be the acts that expose an american to liability for coordinating or supporting the russian scheme to interfere

in the way in which they're being alleged or indicted for by the special counsel. that could be also helpful to prosecutors who would have something more specific as to whether or not to bring charges, rather than something broader. but otherwise the existing law still handles that. >> senator klobuchar. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. i was asking about the voter suppression efforts, and what you have seen historically with that. >> sure. well, i went through all 3,500 ads that were released by the house democrats a couple of weeks ago, and i can say the trend among those ads is certainly as it is with all russian disinformation, to divide among -- along societal fissures. a lot of the ads were targeted toward the african-american community. and as you said, clearly attempting to depress turnout. i think the way that they did this is really interesting, by putting forward positive messages first. things that were not disinformation. things about black identity, and things like that, to create

community, to create a trusted messenger, and then the i.r.a. pages would go for bigger asks, such assigning petitions or then putting through these disinformation messages about not turning out to vote or to v voter suppression and things like that. so it's hard to regulate that because it starts with things that's not disinformation. >> but when it ends up with ads that are criminal and when you don't know about it because there is no disclosure and, so, you can't immediately see it for what it is and the other campaigns don't see it, whether you are dealing on either political party. i have always believed the cam pai pains that have the most vested interest, if they don't see that kind of stuff, they are going to know what's what in addition to anyone in addition to press being able to see it. >> i would agree. i would say also it worries me

about ai doing this enforcement and early detection of these types of issues because how would artificial intelligence gather these positive messages and put out an identification that this is going to be a problem? i don't see that as a possibility. and i think that's why they really need to invest more on human content reviewers. >> and campaigns tends to say where is this message coming from, especially if you have disclaimers on it. they find out the group is a fraud. so, again, disclaimer disclosure immediately i think is going to be really important. mr. waynestein, i have a bill to stop foreign donations and require federal campaigns existing credit card verification protocols to help verify that donations come from u.s. sources. so could you talk just again about the importance of this

that people are going to start trying to find ways to get around this during this election? >> absolutely, senator. they already are, the russians are. and i mentioned in my earlier statement that a pretty blatant example of that was they made donations to the french far right candidate a year ago. it was a reward for her supporting their actions in crimea. and, so, that was a blatant example of them trying to fund their chosen candidate. no question they are going to try every avenue to do that here and they probably already are. >> one of the things, mr. chairman, i have liked about this hearing is that sometimes it is just about the general election and the -- what was going on with the hillary clinton versus donald trump campaigns. but the way that professor goodman and, really, all of you have directed your comments about the long haul here where

they're getting involved in primaries where senator rubio said this isn't about one party or one election. yet, you have interparty involvement where they're actually trying to hurt certain republican candidates to help others. i think the more we make sure the public understands that that is going on, the more this becomes what it should be, which is an effort to protect our democracy and just he said-she said on one side versus the other side. so i really appreciate you calling these witnesses. >> i say thank you for this panel and then to remind you that several members weren't here so you may get questions in writing. seven days to submit those questions and hopefully you can get them responded quickly. thank you very much for very important hearing we've had and very good information from this panel. >> thank you, mr. chairman.

second appearance on capitol hill today to talk about the ig's report on the hillary clinton e-mail investigation. he'll answer questions from the house oversight and judicial yar committees on how the fbi and justice department handled the case. the report said that the clinton investigation was plagued by leadership missteps but not tainted by political bias.

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