the committee will come to order. you had the patients we needed today to get the votes done on the floor particularly grateful that my fellow missourians are here and secretary of state ashcroft and the next panel as county clerk scholer from my home county both of them having to hold a job that i once held. it is good to see you here and the rest of you on the panel. as we begin the federal elections are in agreement that the best starting part is to start with you. the best starting part is to start with local officials due to the history of the country

have been responsible for election administration and they are responsible with people who choose them to do that job. the elections are the keystone of democracy. they are the election directors secretary of state and many others in on election day they are dependent on lots of people who essentially figure out how to volunteer for their job at the polling place. during the 2016 election cycle state and local and officials were tested like they haven't been before by cyber attacks and we anticipate that these attempts will continue. we want to be sure that we are doing what we can to help you to work these attempts state and local governments need access to timely and actual information and technical assistance when they need it. one of our goals is to find out more about the information

sharing that is occurring between federal state and local officials and to learn more about your concerns and your thoughts on that. january 2017 the department of homeland security designated our country selection infrastructure to be critical infrastructure. this designation began formalization of information sharing and collaboration among state local and federal governments. during the creation of a government coordinating council some of our setting on the newly formed counsel. more recently in the 2018 congress appropriated $380 million to the us election assistance commission to help states enhance their election infrastructure. as of this week 38 states have requested $250 million of that money and about $150 million has already been disbursed to the states. finally the 2016 elections have

spurred many calls for additional laws. i remain open to learning more about where those gaps are and how we approach those gaps in a way that continues to let local officials do their job but be sure that there is maximum confidence in what happens on election day. glad all of you are here and certainly it is a pleasure to get to work together on this and particularly for me to get to work with her and we have had a long history of working together but just this year starting to be the top two individuals on this committee and senator recognize you for your opening statements. >> thank you. this committee jurisdiction is clearly a jurisdiction of federal elections and there has been a lot of committees looking into this issue as part of the vestigation.

in the end if we want to get something done and make some changes i think it is important that this committee way in and be going through this committee. according to the department of homeland security you all know this 21 states election systems were attempted to be hacked into. this was established by the intelligence heads under president obama but also by the intelligence heads in sworn testimony under president trump and i think it was former senator coates now the director of intelligence for our country that he believes they are going to get bolder. i don't think we need to get more direction it to know that we must act pompeo said when he was the i director that he has exit -- every expectation that

russia will target the u.s. midterm elections. so those are the facts and rather than just admire this problem, we have to look at what we can do to make things better. one of the things that we have done and i appreciate the input from the secretary of state including my own steve simon who is here thank you i will note that minnesota has the highest election turnout in the country nearly every year. excuse me illinois. so we are continuing that record and a lot of that is the election laws that we have in place for the same-day registration and other things that have made that possible but are subject today is how to protect our elections. how to make them more's secure. with the fact that we have that we allow estate election officials to get information in real time about hacks across the country because hacks shame

on them hackers shame on us. if we don't do anything about it because we know it's happened and we know it will happen again. in fact in illinois they got as close as voters that information that we have a bill along with other senators it's a bipartisan bill act and we have been working to make changes to it along the way and introduce it as amendments but it really first of all improve information sharing between local election officials cyber security experts and national security. providing for development and maintenance of cyber security best practices we all know five states that don't have backup paper ballots in their something like nine more that have partial backup paper ballots and while we are not

main dating with each state has a we do not want each state to have the exact same elections equipment we think that would be a problem and we would actually lend potentially itself to more break-ins. we think it's very important that we have some standards that we set that be given what we know, don't think we would be doing the democracy any good if we didn't share that we didn't put in some [ indiscernible ]. finally focus on providing election officials with much-needed resources. as you all know we were able to get $380 million to be immediately distributed to the state not play money money that's going out right now. we did have some complicated grant process that would have slowed things down the money went directly to state election

officials as long as the state legislature authorizes it to get accepted and get to work. that's what we have been focused on and we want to thank you for your involvement and i think we know what the facts are what the evidence is and i will end with this, and remind you what is at stake in 1923, years before the internet joseph stalin and general secretary of the soviet communist was asked about a vote in the central committee of his party. he was unconcerned about the vote after hall he explained that who voted was completely unimportant. what was extraordinarily important he said was who would count the votes. now 95 years later, those words echo in this room. we realize that this country or

they would say not the people but the leader of the country vladimir putin was once again trying to influence who counts the votes and how they are counted by attempting to hack into our system. we cannot have that happen. i don't care who you are for, this is really about the integrity of our democracy. thank you. >> thank you. i want to thank the witnesses for joining us today. unfortunately a flight cancellation made it impossible for secretary lawsons attendance today but we are glad that she tried to come and we are glad you are here. let's turn to our panel. we have your comments for the record so you can use as much or as little of that is you want to and we will have it for

the record no matter what. secretary ashcroft we are glad you're here. >> thank you. it's important discussion of the security of our country. i serve as the 40 secretary of state. as a result this is an office administered at one time by the chairman of this committee. i decided to run for secretary of state because of my four children. michael was to ensure their voices and those of future generations will continue to be heard. one of the priorities in my campaign was to enact legislation to increase the security of our pets and need to make sure every registered voter convert. simply put a missouri it's a registered vote. your vote will count. elections are the bedrock of our republic. they are how we consent to govern. the candor in the of

the selections is of the utmost importance. every day when i go to my office and i know my fellow election officials across this country share that same concern. i welcome today's conversation to talk about election security preparations. before we move forward we should briefly looked back to the emphasis on why we are here today. allegations that outside actors set the integrity of the elections during the 2016 election cycle. these are serious allegations and it is vitally important to understand that after two years of investigation there is no credible and i could strike credible there is no evidence that these incidents caused a single vote or a single voter registration to be improperly altered during the 2016 election cycle. it was not our votes or systems that were hacked. it was the people's perception of our elections. secondly every reporter since

2016 was first detected by state election authorities not the federal government. in each case authorities brought the incident to the attention of federal authorities not the other way around this is not say that the elections are perfect that there was no fraud there were no unlawful corruptions votes the evidence indicates that voter fraud is exponentially greater threat. in 2010 well before elections being altered there was a race for the missouri house and decided by one vote. election authorities can determine in that election there were two voters who also happen to be family members of the victorious candidate. they voted illegally. despite the fact that the candidates admitted in a court of law pled guilty to illegal voting they are now serving in

the legislature. consequently moving forward any meaningful enhancement to security must take a comprehensive approach to ensure that every legal and registered voter is allowed to vote and that their vote is not deluded by any sort of voter fraud, malfeasance or [ inaudible ]. we must avoid knee- jerk reactions that would give a false sense of security. steps must be taken to improve communication between federal agencies and states regarding cyber threats and election security. states have and will continue to work with federal agencies regardless of any new legislation. however any new mandates must remedy the failure of federal agencies communicate and work with local election authorities. as one example since 2012 the national association of secretaries of state has passed multiple times a resolution calling on the federal

government to meet statutory obligations to share information with state election officials. while we wish to continue election officials wish to continue to work in partnership with federal agencies and one way in which they are doing that states have teamed up in september having a national election security summit in st. louis midori. we have requested federal officials including the secretary of dhs to join us at state officials vendors technology experts and officials get together to improve processes and make sure that people know that the elections are secure. as important as is information sharing is there numerous other ways for elections beyond information sharing. proposed changes should recognize valuable officials to remain in control of elections. i've learned winning an election does not make an elections expert any more than watching a fourth of july celebration make you a rocket scientist. i will close by noting an irony

just over 10 years ago similar individuals were here in washington dc explaining what happened in the federal election. we were told that the answer was to go electronic. to put it on computer. thou -- now we are back again but with utmost respect and will continue to work with local officials with government officials at the federal level but it takes us all working together and expertise of individuals who have won elections before. >> thank you. >> good morning. my name is jim condos and i'm vermont's 30th secretary of state. i'm also the president elect of the nonpartisan national association of secretaries of state. in addition i also serve as a member of the department of homeland security election infrastructure subsector government coordinating council.

on july 16, 2018 i will become the noon president and i have every intention of continuing the positive work of current president and secretary of indiana d those that served before her. i'm fortunate to have leaders outstanding leaders and am proud to be part of this association. thank you for the chance to appear before you today with my colleagues and for allowing us to address some of the things happening at the national level. with works the visit to vermont and the election infrastructure governing council primary election process across the country are well underway with states administering elections in a secure accurate and fair manner. state and local election officials and federal government have worked very hard to create a productive relationship since the critical infrastructure designation for election systems in january 2017. as you may know nasa and its members raised many questions

and expressed serious concerns about the potential federal overreach into the administration of the elections. clearly a state and local government responsibility. while we remain vigilant about possible federal overreach we will work together to ensure that the critical infrastructure designation functions in an effective way. that's we have chosen to actively focus on improving communications between the states and the federal government and to achieve our shared goal of securing elections. in particular we have utilized the election infrastructure subsector governing council with secretary lawson mentions in her testimony to open communication channels and guide future collaboratives election security endeavors. as i transition to the nass president in less than a month i will take the place of the executive committee. it is my objective to continue secretary lawson's vital work with his group on behalf of

them. in regards to specific state and preparations for 2018 and beyond i would like to thank you and your colleagues for appropriating the remaining vote act and funds to the states. we truly appreciate this money. whilour upgrades to equipment and cybersecurity will be an ongoing challenge for many state the federal funding we receive will be insufficient to all that we want. however we are very grateful for the boost that these funds provide. in vermont we have already requested and received our $3 million grant of how the dollar from the assistance commission. by the way the agency has provided this in a very quick way. i want to thank for providing a simple and quick method of getting that money to us.

in regard to specific plans and using these new funds impart our office in vermont plans to implement prior to the 2018 primary authentication for all of our local folks in the staff management system. we have already conducted an additional round of penetration testing on our election management system by an independent vendor this spring that will do so on regular intervals. we also will follow the 2018 general election and every general election going forward with a robust audit of our election results using state-of- the-art auditing technology. this plan is in addition to what we are already currently doing including mandatory election trainings to the municipal clerks holding the cyber summit which remains defending our democracy we convene state and local partners to inform efforts and build confidence in the integrity and partners included the department of homeland security msi from the senator

internet security state homeland security department of public safety and of course our town clerks. some of the acknowledged best practices that vermont is using include paper ballots postelection audits no internet daily backup of the systems daily monitoring of traffic to our site blacklisting problems periodic penetration and securing the human and we've actually installed a real-time albert monitor. i will end by just thinking this committee again for inviting me and my peers to testify after giving me the opportunity to speak about this important matter on behalf of nasa. i look forward to answering any questions. >> thank you. >> thank you. i appreciate the opportunity to be with you. thank you for your willingness to engage on this very important issue.

in my judgment election security in general and cybersecurity in particular poses the number one integrity both nationwide and in the state. i've been on the job for 3.5 years. i get asked once in a while whether it's a family gathering or somebody i bump into on the street what is your biggest surprise in the job? my answer is always the same my biggest surprise the secretary of state is the extent to which my time and energy is focused on cybersecurity or election security in general. it's something that came up to some people's mind quite suddenly in 2016 that was a big wake-up call that is now a central and essential part of the job. the good news is that in 2016 minnesota passed the test. we gauged a lot of different partners including our partners at the state and local level.

we passed the test. we kept out the folks who are trying to get in. -- from our vantage point we don't care who it is. we don't care what the politics art we don't care what candidates they support this is an about democrats or republicans this is about us as americans. we passed that test which is great but we know and we found out after the election that minnesota was one of the 21 states that was targeted. we know we have to be vigilant. now we have a lot more information and i think the good news is minnesota and i believe every other state is in a far better position going into this election than we were going into the last election.

minnesota is proudly old-school we have paper ballots and that is the bedrock of our system in minnesota. we feel that we have those in hand in terms of state law and some of the resources we need to attack those things. second we think that we have benefited from the infrastructure. with those votes dhs has put together a government coordinating council. although that's good i think it could be even better. finally we have the attention of colleagues in congress but the local and national media and other election administrators around the country. in minnesota we are number one

in voter turnout. we are eligible voters who voted in the last election. we appreciate the federal partnership that we have received so far and i want to say once again i want to thank everyone who were part of getting that $380 million for us. it is critical. it is crucial. we plan to use every penny of that money over the next five years. i would respectfully request that those in congress consider some ongoing way to provide some resources for us along those same lines and while we don't want to look horse in the mouth we are grateful this it's

expensive and the recommendations that we get from the department of homeland security are helpful they have a price tag but that's not in the budget so i ask that you consider that as well. on the policy side i would be remiss if i didn't put in a word for the secure elections act. i do think there is a legitimate federal interest in making sure that we do have some federal interest in ensuring the states are talking with one another that we are not just doing our own thing in our own way. we do maintain the authority to do that. there is an ierest in making sure that there is some coordination. if for no other reason than that i think that's very important but i thank you. we look forward to moving

forward. >> thank you. >> thank you. thank you for the opportunity to testify. those who earn and operate election systems with improving the resilience of elections across america. for over a decade i've worked with officials to advance the use of technology to better serve american voters. for the last three years i have served as the commissioner of the united states election commission working to modernize standard use of voting systems provide best practices drop support election officials and fix -- since 2016 respond to press against the system. now i serve as senior advisor at dhs focused on the work the department is doing to support the thousands of election officials across this country. in this decade of work i can tell you the absolute best part is working with the dedicated professionals like those seated

at the table with me. in the face of real and sophisticated threats these officials have responded by working with us state and local resources the private sector to mitigate risks and improve the resilience of the process. election security is a national security issue that our mission is to ensure that the system owners have the necessary information and support to assess risks and protect detect and recover from that. the support can come in many forms. dhs stands ready to help based on state and local needs. to these collective efforts we have seen significant progress. data local officials are act the table working with us. we created government coordinating council private- sector councils through collaborative working to share information.

we've created the election infrastructure information sharing analysis center. it is the fastest growing sector. we are sponsoring up to three election officials in three states which will allow officials to receive classified thread information. we have increased availability of free technical assistance across the sector. dhs offers a variety of services such as cybersecurity assessment intrusion detecting capabilities information sharing and awareness. the progress being made is clear as is evident by the testimony you have heard today. across the country secretaries of state estate election directors local election officials are taking the steps necessary to respond to this new and evolving threats.

take for example the work the secretary washington and indiana in addition to being an engaged and valued partner with us they've taken advantage of the information sharing services. ro their security ditional including increasing monitoring capabilities and tightening access. in addition they're working to better secure their counties through implementation of authentication and approve postelection auditing that this story is true across the country. we have seen firsthand the progress that's being made at the local level. recently undersecretary in orange county california briefed on comprehensive cybersecurity playbook plan including cyber practices more advanced network monitoring and intrusion detection implementation a more robust efficient postelection audits to ensure the accuracy of election results that combine these best practices and security services greatly enhance the resilience of orange county election system that i publicly communicating that the county is working to give voters the information they need to have competent --

confidence the votes will be counted. elections are run by state and local counties. across the 50 states and five territories there over 10,000 jurisdictions that are responsible for elections. the systems processes and procedures use very great is the local administration of elections empowers voters to engage directly with the process. it brings me to my final point. for those voters have questions or concerns regarding the security integrity of the process i'm for you to get involved. become a poll worker watch pre- election testing of the systems. check your registration information before elections. engaged with their state and local election officials most importantly go vote. the best response to those who wish to undermine our democracy is to participate and to vote. moving forward the department will continue to coordinate and support state and local officials to ensure the security of our election infrastructure.

we are committed to ensuring coordinated response from all levels of the government to help mitigate these risks. before i conclude i want to take a moment to thank congress for the legislative progress strengthening cybersecurity. we support the final passage of legislation to create the cybersecurity and infrastructure security agency at dhs. this change reflects the important work we carry out every day. i look forward to further outlining the work we are doing. i thank you look forward to your questions. >> thank you. we will have a five-minute round. stay close to that. we want to take full advantage of this panel but let me ask first from the three secretaries of state this is yes or no. so the federal government be required to share information with jurisdictions that are

being impacted by known threats? >> yes. >> yes. >> yes. >> and for the three of you again sure that also, should that include both the state chief state election official as well as the specific jurisdiction? >> i think that's yes or no also. >> i would say yes. >> i agree. >> yes. >> so mr. masterson how would you determine i know one of the things i believe you mentioned in your testimony was you would have to have some sense that someone was ready to receive that information in terms of cyber understanding or threat assessment, how would you really actually accomplish that? >> the goal within the department is to ensure broad notification.

that is why we work to create the election infrastructure and information sharing analysis center so that there is an avenue by which threat information risk information can be shared broadly. then engaging with the government coordinating council creating those information sharing protocols for the sectors of the number one priority within the coordinated council is to establish exactly the question you asked which is how fast share information down to the state and to the locals to ensure that they have what they need and that is done in a way that they can take it and it's an actionable. >> in terms of broadly sharing you mean you would also broadly share with some information with people that could potentially face this threat? >> yes. typical for how we share information. to try to boil down the nature of the threat and the

information necessary for systems owners and operators to protect their systems. >> again i'm not quite sure i'm clear on your view of what elected or appointed local official what kind of qualifications they would have to have if any besides having that job for you to share this information with them? >> in order to receive the information from the [ indiscernible ] the local election official or their support staff are eligible in fact we are working within the sector to craft this information sharing such that for executives like the secretaries that sit at the table they have the information they need to make good decisions from the policy and administrative sampling but that the it officials technical folks also have the information they need to respond and protect . >> is it possible that you would be sharing with the technical official person something you wouldn't be willing to share with the elected official? >> no. all information is available to

any of the election officials just a question of who can best use that rmio >> on the voter registration side for the secretaries, do you have any sense of how many attempts there are to get into that system secretary simon mentioned appropriate way it doesn't really matter who is trying to get in you don't want them to get in weather it's a local political operative or a foreign government or somebody just seeing if they can get in to that system and manipulated in some way is that something that you often see happen? >> yes. that is something that is known to happen. there are people who are poking and prodding and the analogy

that i have come to use in talking with homeland security is imagine a company facing a parking lot and maybe he goes there day to her in a row and there is a traffic pattern and he tries to figure out is there a way in. that's what goes on in can go on quite frequently in the case of all of the state represented here for whatever reason that piece does not go into the parking lot you like to think it's because of the protections that we put up but truth be told we might never know the real reason but we were able to keep them out that there are people chasing a lot of parking lots and it's up to dhs to tell us who they are what they are therefore and so far they have done that but in the election we didn't know until 10 months afterwards. they are doing a better job. >> is this a common thing? >> every day. we have, i can't speak specifically just for election management or the voter registration database but our entire operations we probably

received several thousand scans per day. >> i would say we average 100,000 scans on our systems a day. we cannot say which of those are targeted to elections we have to treat them all as if they are toward elections because of they find a way in they will go from there so we treat them as they are all attacks. >> i will come back later to you on this topic and others how do you think we narrow down which of those should be reported? >> we are pleased we are having this hearing and i will defer to my colleagues. i am glad they are here. i wasn't kidding i would defer to you. >> there was a lot of talk

about voter fraud reducing the time you would be allowed to vote sort of the hearing on the boat. we went to ohio cleveland ohio and we went down to florida we called election officials just like yourselves both parties republicans and democrats elected and appointed and i asked the following question. your states just changed the voter requirements to require the voters to prove that the voter id to limit the places where you can vote to limit the time that you can vote what has been the incidence of voter fraud in ohio and florida that led you to conclude that you had to put these new burdens on voters? the answer was nine. nine. so for the record i would like each of you if you would please pick 10 years. would you report

have to do it now but would you report to this committee in the last 10 years how many votes have been cast in your state and how many people in the same period of time? here's what i have concluded. the statement secretary half crushed that you made is has to be addressed. here's what you said. voter fraud isn't exponentially greater threat than hacking. exponentially greater. let me tell you what happened in illinois because we blew the whistle. we were one of 21 states hacked by the elections. they got into our voter files. somebody left a little wormhole in there they got in there. they had the capacity and thank goodness they didn't use it to change just a digit on each of our dresses.

exponentially. i'm willing to say that and i hope that we are ready. thank you for the 380 million. hoffa produced 10 times that amount. i think the russians are after us again. i hope i am wrong. i think other countries are after us.

if we spent all of our time worrying about making it more difficult for honest american citizens to vote, instead of worrying about what the russians and others are going to do to invade our election system shame on us. i hope that we take this very seriousland i hope that all of the states have a trail. hours does thank goodness and i hope every other state does. secretary simon, in your state of minnesota what are you going to use the funds for? >> thank you. we will use the funds we have put in a request to use the first 1.5 million of the 6.6 million to redo our what's called our statewide voter registration system. it is what it sounds like it's a primary database the very one that unfortunately in and will annoy suffered a breach and the very one that in most of the 21 states that i'm aware of was

the intended target. >> what they told me in illinois they said what happened? d the russians get in there and they said we let a little open up and they got in that wormhole and they were in our system. they had the capacity there is no evidence they changed a single registration or vote so i certainly agree. the potential was there for a dramatic change. did you see the same potential in terms of your voter information? >> without giving a roadmap to the back guys but what i would say i think every system has some vulnerability. we did our very best and successfully to make sure that we took care of those. we asked for people to probe and pry and find them so we can fix them which we did. as a result i think we managed

to rebuff or turn away those who tried to get in which is good but i like to say that there is no finish line and there is no end zone when you get to spike the football. you always have to stay one step ahead of the back guys and the bad guys get smarter every year. that race is something that takes effort, focus and it takes money. these are a big price tag. >> senator cortez. >> thank you. i want to thank you for this important hearing and let me just associate myself with senator durbin's comments initially i was attorney general of nevada from 2017 to 2014 and i can tell you i can count on one hand the type of voter fraud that we saw and

most portly not only did we see it we caught it and we prosecuted. this idea that somehow there it is widespread voter fraud occurring across the country that needs immediate attention which engages the voters question is false and i so think that we need to correct the record and use accurate data. let me open this up to the panel as well. in nevada the majority of the counties our world and we obviously play a significant role in conducting elections in the state the counties don't have the resources that the populace counties have and we don't have resources like a dedicated it support so in your state how have you addressed that unique challenge of election security faced by the world communities and what can we do to continue to help and support them? >> in vermont we don't have

county government so we vote directly from the state level to the towns. in vermont the state is responsible for paying for the equipment, the state is responsible for ensuring that it is working, that is maintained, we pay for the memory cards, we actually provide a lot of the resources to the towns, it's not a direct payment we do the work. that's how we approach this because of the way we are set up. >> in minnesota we have 87 counties. only nine of the 87 counties have full time year-round election staff. most of the counties which are world art lease nonurban or metropolitan those folks who run elections also where many other hats. they do property taxes, drainage and ditch work, other things, and they don't have the luxury of focusing on elections so that's where i think if i may the federal partnership

comes in. it costs money to hire people to have training to put up the defenses so the head of the county might have the resources in terms of money and personnel to erect these kind of defenses that other counties might not beso fortunate so that's where i think there is money and resources to make sure that everyone and every state regardless of where they live rest assure that the security in general is there. >> [ inaudible ] >> yes. i think we should have an even playing field. >> thank you. anyone else? >> in missouri we have 216 election authorities. we have counties with 2000 registered voters they do not have the ability [ indiscernible ]. we are holding

a conference for secretaries of state and officials and local officials on september 11th we are putting all of our efforts but most of our effort into making sure that they have actionable things they can do and the resources to do it. i would add one other thing when we passed voter id in missouri we actually increased accessibility to the ballot. we actually had individual who would've been turned away under the old law that were allowed to vote. understand illinois doesn't work as well as missouri but in missouri we can secure our pallets and make sure that every registered voter can participate and their voices heard. >> thank you. i think we can do automatic voter registration. let me also say mr. masterson i think we need to note i work

closely with the election officials and i think it's to everybody's best interest to volunteer on election day. when i was county manager but know this i want to convey to you that the officials in vada have told my office that dhs has been great to work with. extremely helpful generous with their services and knowledge so thank you for that. one of the things they told me however and i'm sure that you are hearing this, there is too much information. they don't have a way to process the updates. are you hearing the same thing? >> we have heard some of that and part of what we are trying to tackle as you establish a new sector, this is a new flow of information to officials, finding that balance of what is

the right amount of information tailoring it in a way that they need to know but then ensuring that the technical folks or it folks perhaps need a little bit more detail and more constant updates as well so i think we are finding that balance as we work with the governor needing counsel and some of the folks at the table to create that tailored information so we will get better as we build that relationship. yes that is something we have heard. >> thank you. >> thank you. >> thank you. let me just play out a couple of questions. we had a previous secretary of state by the name of diana durrant who made widespread accusations about voter fraud. our state very conscientiously went through thousands and thousands that had been reported and after a review came down to several just a

handful of unintentional minor errors there is no one who was ever prosecuted and never real fault that was found so i think we need to be very careful i mean she got wonderful headlines. for weeks there was all of this activity of all of this fraud and then when it blindly trickled out and everybody reviewed it there was nothing there so i want to focus again on the evidence indicates that voter fraud is exponentially greater threat than equipment. what studies or evidence preferably independent academic studies back up that claim? >> the senators actually in own words back that up because the senator said that the allegations show there were no

votes changed no registration was changed by hacking yet i gave concrete evidence of an election being changed by voter fraud. as far as i'm concerned if elections are changed by fraud through individuals in missouri and individuals overseas or by anything that's stopping the voice of the public from being heard and making a decision that's a problem. what i said in my remarks is still true. we should take a comprehensive approach to make sure that no votes are changed by fraud, malfeasance, criminal actions or ineptitude. we should make sure that every voter knows their vote will count. >> you didn't answer my question. my question was about your statement exponentially greater threat. what word, proof do you have independent studies to back up

your claim? >> it's exponentially greater and i will say that simply as possible your colleague admitted that no votes were changed, and voter registrations were changed, by the alleged hacking i gave you a concrete example that was proven in a court of law as individuals pled guilty of changing an election. no instances of votes being changed incidents of an entire election being changed. that's exactly what i'm speaking to i don't how you can make it more clear. >> this is for all of the secretaries here and mr. masterson if you have anything to add i would be happy to hear it. secretary lawson written testimony stated that only 59% of states have drawn down there funds and we know that every state election infrastructure is foldable.

-- for noble and we have also heard over the years that elections are under [ inaudible ]. it's a simple answer. >> [ inaudible ] >> vermont has already gone down to 3 million. >> thank you. >> do you want more? >> if you send it we will use it. >> same. >> i think what we really need is ongoing if you want to call it maintenance cybersecurity is evolving science and it's an evolving practice and we have continuous needs going forward. >> same. >> in your conversations with other secretaries of state, do you hear reasons why other

states aren't drawing down these funds? >> senator i would say that some of the states have to deal with legislative action that needs to be taken in order to accept federal grants. some of the states may be required to do that first. or it could be from their administration the governors might have to approve it before it can be drawn down. i think there are other states who are probably trying to plan out what they are going to be doing with the money just before they get the money. >> mr. ashcroft you have a comment? >> i would say you did a phenomenal job getting it out quickly. >> i just want to make a distinction between additional money that we have drawn down the latest challenge [ inaudible ]. because of

political fight in the legislature at the end of the session we weren't able to get access to that $6.6 million this year. that was an avoidable outcome an unfortunate one. i think we will be okay but the sooner we can get the money the better. >> thank you. >> thank you. just to clarify. you will be able to access that money in the future and the legislature and the government appears to want our secretary of state office to get the funding is that correct? >> that's correct. >> it was just part of a larger fight over something but as you described it was unfortunate. so you mentioned secretary simon accessibility the right balance in the government support of states this is a secure election can you expand on this? >> i along with my colleagues think regardless of parties will always emphasize the privacy of the role of state. i think i dare say you eliminate

on the floor among secretaries of state. what i like about the balance of the act is striking and i know it was in process but the realization that the floor is okay that even if it's just a question of a federal interest in making sure something is done regardless of how the states choose to do it is important. i highlighted in my testimony the communication process the government coordinated counsel is already coming up with communications protocol and my understanding of the latest version of this election act is an acknowledgme there so that communication can come in many different forms including and not limited to what they come up with but the important thing that there is communication and by the way not just up and down but up down and sideways local government state government federal government may be some nongovernment actors in some situations and i think that alone is a cause for the

federal government to research some interest in making sure this communication is going on. i think that communication is important. i think a recognition of the privacy of the state coupled with the very real and general federal interest in making sure things get done they can choose how those get done is the right balance. >> secretary condit you mentioned that the election assistance commission is a doing a great job appropriating money discussing what is your focus today could you comment on the role that they are playing in improving communication? >> they have been a very valued partner with us and they provide information obviously we have to submit an approved plan or plan to them on how we will

spend the money. i think i may differ from some of my colleagues but i think that there is an important role in our elections process across this country and it needs to have the resources to operate and also really badly needs to have congress appoint a full forum at least a form so they can [ inaudible ]. >> can you expand on the importance of conducting audits and out relates to voter confidence? >>

i believe should be included in a fair election. >> secretary simon, same question but about paper ballots . >> it is a huge advantage post 2016. minnesota is fairly old school and we have seen how many states who were once sold on a paperless future are now understanding that paper isn't good after all -- is good after all. it's hard to hack paper. in minnesota it is fed into a machine but under state law

that must not can -- be connected to the internet. >> and you have been able to get results fairly quickly? >> it also benefits those following the results on election night because the results are reported quickly and the counties and local governments are at ending partners to make sure we get the information. >> okay, i can turn to you. want to focus on some of the things that have come under. i will not go on about voter fraud but i will note a decision that came out yesterday in kansas where a kansas judge struck down a voting legislation law they were introducing that was restrictive. he made the case that there -- it was the tip of the off -- tip of the iceberg. people had

somehow fraudulently voted and the judge looked at the evidence and found it was a very small number and said, there was in fact no iceberg. it was only an icicle largely created by confusion and administrative error. this was a thorough review. it was based on my own experience as a county attorney in minnesota where we reviewed cases referred to us by the secretary of state. i asked a full-time investigator on the front lines looking at these and i remember civic cases where people referred to the couple who had a voting line go to their house and that decided that they could each voted each election. we did research and said it is where they sleep. the wife said, what if we slept and -- in separate beds on each

side of the line? this is serious stuff but the reasons i saw, and we did prosecute a few. we had some but they were so rare. overall we found that most of the cases where a dad and a son with the same last name and first name and it was confusing. we looked into it and found out they had a legal right to vote. i want to remember these decisions which encapsulate what we have seen in the studies across the country and that our efforts should be on trying to get people to vote which the secretary of state are in a unique position to do. to turn -- to encourage them to vote. that is what we should be doing and be honest about what is

going on here with these numbers. than the other thing we have to be honest about is not that the votes were changed but that they tried and tried hard and they got into the illinois databank and those things and tried in 21 states. and our own intelligence people under president trump are telling us that russia is involved and telling us we are at risk, we have to pay attention to it. that is why we are having this hearing. my question of the panel, yes or no, the 2018 primaries are happening across the country. general election is 139 days away and we are on the front lines. confirm, yes or no to you agree elections are a potential target and therefore you see this as a priority? >> primary elections are a very big priority and we have started. >> do you see election security as --

>> it is important and we have been working for a while. >> simply put, yes. >> yes. >> yes. >> okay, secretary ashcroft, do you believe the information sharing from the government to the state is important and should be improved? >> yes, there have been serious problems with prior individuals in dhs. we had a meeting last year where dhs reported that they told states about instances but they could not tell us who they told. they had not told chief election officials. they may have told the chief technology officials or a local election official. we had problems with things being classified far above what they should be classified. so they could not tell that to the authorities. >> at cnet and it is well put. it must be incredibly frustrating when you're trying to do your job and we discuss

-- discussed already the audit process and paper ballots and how important the money is. mr. masterson, in a recent article you read about the will -- the work that of election officials are doing. do you believe that they can benefit from the sharing that we talked about? this is not the immediate information about the threats that we need to have happen. but also, best practices. >> absolutely, yes. >> very good. i went through all of him because they -- them because they are part of securing our elections. and we are hoping to get this through. i know that senator langford is working hard on that. think you all. >> thank you senator klobuchar. let me go back to where i was. in this secure election act which is a work in product -- progress that we will take up

at some point, one of the requirements is that if an election agency has reason to believe that an election cyber incident has occurred, with respect to the elections system, they are to notify the department of homeland security. that was earlier defined as any incident involving an election system. so clearly from the numbers that were shared this would be an unreasonable thing to do. i think that may be in the interest of time we have to come back to you mr. masterson. the gcc and say how do we write that in a way it makes sense? you obviously don't need 1000 a day or 100,000 a day notices that someone is trying to get into our system. so we need to figure that out. >> mr. chairman i would agree completely. finding the balance is

something we have been discussing. none of the folks are noticing that there -- there microsoft passes are out of date. so we will work with that. >> on the audit trail, do all three of your states require an audit trail? do you require a paper ballot trail? >> yes, we do. >> yes. >> yes we do. >> yes or no, should the federal government make an audit trail a requirement to have federal assistance? >> i don't think so. >> i do think so. >> i think there is a federal interest in making sure there is some audit process. >> what i'm asking about is, should there be a way to re-

create the actual election itself? >> -- i don't know how to do that without paper. even with a machine that was not accessible to the web. >> i believe that states are moving to do that without federal legislation. that is why i don't think the federal legislation needs to cover it. >> and all three of these cases you have that? and on the audit requirement, how specific do you think that needs to be? in this bill there is a specific -- you have 5%, should that be left up to you? or should we tell you whether 5% is enough or not depending on how close the election was? >> that is a great question senator. and i think there should be some flexibility in the type of audit as well. we hear a lot these days about risk limited audits and they are a great way of doing it.

that is if you have the systems in place that allow you to do and right now there are only a handful of states actually do that. the system we use, as i said we are actually talking internally about increasing the 5% to maybe a percent or 10%. and we believe it is even better than a -- than a risk limited audit because it looks at 100% of the ballots that are cast and 100% of the races. your auditing the entire ballot bag essentially at that time. >> any comments from the two of you? >> what i was teaching -- when i was teaching statistics i thought the language should give confidence intervals as opposed to a specific percentage. for a close race you need to look at more. if it is 80-20 you don't need to look at as many ballots. >> i would say the more flexibility, the better. their estates, none are being

thrown under the bus and they are not represented here and they do not have a meaningful audit. there should be some audit process. >> when you do an audit you count the ballots the same way as on election day? >> yes. >> how about you? >> we use a different system and different heavy letters. >> you do not hand count them? >> no, in fact the hand counting is actually proved to be the most error. >> secretary ashcroft? >> we do not handcrafts -- hand count everything. >> would you give a direction in the postelection audit to election authorities locally and they do the recount? >> the local authorities to the reit count. >>, you? >> we do the audit. >> the ballots come to you and the state capital and you do

that? >> we do a public audit. we use the auditorium in the governor building and we have the ballots delivered to us by the local boards of civil authority from each of the towns random selected and they deliver the ballots to us. we do our work and feel the ballots back up and get them to fill of -- delivered back to the towns. >> how do you do it secretary simon? >> it is at the local level, not by our office. but we follow up weeks later and do a post election review. >> right. right. i think there will be more questions for the record and we are certainly glad that all the states have these great, good government traditions. our tradition is not that great and if you look at the 2000 governor's race in missouri, i think there is a postelection investigation that finds out

that lots of people voted that shouldn't have including a dog. and we don't know exactly how the dog voted. but it was the person who was the registered voter and the ballot was cast. so we are not -- the federal government is not about to do things to encourage voter fraud. and the discussion that voter fraud doesn't happen is not before the committee today but i look forward to your reports back of what voted fred -- voter fraud you have had. one election was set aside by a court, to election set aside by the court and they had to have the election again. was that absentee voter fraud or at the voter place? >> it had to do with absentee ballots. there were serious allegations of voter fraud. they did not have to prove the voter fraud, there was enough

smoke. >> we have courts in our state that say you have to have the election over again. so illinois or other states don't think this is ever a problem. >> it is a problem. it happens not to be the problem we are dealing with in this bill and hearing. i think all of you for coming. we have a vote coming up before too long so if our next panel will come up we will have questions for the local elected officials. one of which is from the illinois jurisdiction that somebody actually got into as opposed to the 21 jurisdictions of people that tried to get into.

>> we have two witnesses here, no up rates, the director of elections working under cook county clerk david orr. i'm not sure we will find out your jurisdiction or it was another one that someone got into and changed from springfield, missouri where i live and vote

and has the job i once had. let's start with both of you. >> thank you chairman blunt. i'm the director of elections in cook county, illinois and it is an honor to be here. as election administrators one certified results we instill legitimacy that comes from the essential american belief that our election reflects a trusted and true accounting of voter choices. that legitimacy must be secured . election officials have been working and securing votes and voter records for a long time. when i started in the business prior to 2000 we served as logistics managers like wedding planners making sure the right list of people came together in the right place with the right stuff. after bush versus gore and the help america vote act a new air of rules and voting technology

was brought in and we became legally compliant i.t. managers. but the 2016 election and advice shared sense shows sophisticated attacks are to be expected and we must become cybersecurity managers. spurned by the need to defend against foreign enemies, officials have been working successfully to find a good balance of federal involvement in elections without trampling on the authority that states zealously guard. good progress is being made. state officials protect statewide voter legislation this -- registration list everywhere and are defending the institution and they deserve great credit. however and at the risk of being overly broad i must say that local election officials are the one that control, secure and run elections. we locals, 108 in illinois and 8000 nationally are on the front lines of this

battlefield. we deploy a variety of network digital services such as voter registration systems, informational websites, unofficial election results displays, electronic poll books, command centers, not to mention the less connected county system. each is a target for adversaries. most of us are county officers and we are facing down powerful shadowy adversaries like andy of mayberry sent to repel any army. we need advice, support and resources. first for modern dependable technology and routine hand- counted audits that can give confidence that digital results are accurate. secondly, more critically today, we have a pressing need for top-notch security personnel with the skills to navigate the current cyber minefield. in cook county we study this and have undertaken significant ways to raise awareness

broadly. we conclude that to decrease the likelihood hood days likelihood of attack, each needs an officer. most officials do not have that today. we suggest this is handled by a brigade of digital offenders. cyber navigators. these navigators should adopt the nap -- the mantra of defense, detect and recover. they can help us improve defenses following the specific recommendations of the center for internet security. or the defending digital democracy program at harvard that will help us mature our reach detection technique and our recovery plans for when attackers penetrate the first and second lines. to accomplish this, the navigators will secure free support on -- and offered from homeland security, governments and companies like google. they will work with state and

county i.t. staff and with vendors to support locals and finally, build a culture of security that adapts with evolving threats. illinois lawmakers require that half of the hava funds that you release be spent on a navigator program and our election officials are acting aggressively to create one. voters across the country should feel confident that we have resilient systems and election officials are taking the problem seriously. voters should also understand that without continued investment in people and products, the possibility of a successful attack increases. some losing candidates are always -- already asked to call the feeds into doubt. no matter how far removed, is turn sore losers into disbelief, cynicism and revolt. that is what the enemies of the u.s. wants.

we cannot eliminate every chance of breach but we can make sure that successful attacks are rare and can provide assurances that we are prepared to recover quickly when they happen. we can do this with support at the local level. democracy is not perfect. as church hill noted, it's the worst form of government except for the others. we need to protect it. and we will regret it if our democracy is damage because we looked away and feel to support it at the critical moment. thank you, i look forward to your questions. >> mr. schuler. >> good morning. thank you for the opportunity to offer testimony. my name is a shame schuler -- shane shuler and i work in greene county, missouri. the county clerk has many demonstrated duties for the county. is texanna straighter, the board of equalization, licensing and artery, county payroll and benefits administration, retention

archival of county records, voter registration and election administration. election administration is clearly the most physical duty of all that i mentioned. it's a duty that me and other county clerks take seriously as we worked tirelessly to make sure that the correct the -- ballots are given and tabulated. is important in the context to recognize each state is unique and how their elections are administrated. it's an advantage to protect fraud and cyber attack on our election. the advantage is also a challenge as it relates to cybersecurity threats on data and results on election night. the majority of county clerks in missouri are depending on the efforts of the election service providers to provide

voting service, the secretary of state office and the court as well as the department of homeland security and election commission to protect against cybersecurity threats. i currently serve on the advisory board for our stay and i vitiate the efforts provided for the public information on security preparedness to state and local election officials. their work with the dhs and the national organization of secretary of state is welcome and we further believe that provisions will change the technical guidelines to protect. and that includes cybersecurity experts. i believe that changes are needed to build on the current information sharing that was not in place prior to the 2016 election. and to continue to improve how information is shared in a productive way to mitigate possible attacks.

i want to address something on page 23. it says, each election result is determined by the marked ballot and device. i recommend for postelection audit purposes the state marks a balance. i believe the opportunity for fraud and electronic ballots does not -- that does not have a paper trail is great. part of our code requires a manual call of the voting paper ballots aced on a random drawing with a bipartisan team. being able to share that the paper ballots that are cast are randomly selected to be recounted by hand earn confidence with the certified election results. it cannot be under a -- underestimated that to alter

electronic-based voter rosters that are used in place of paper based voter rosters -- is a convenience that voters appreciate as they see wait times reduced. it can be a real source of issue if voters have not voted and have been informed they have voted or their name is not found to be checked in. i'm sure you will agree this is a perfect recipe for voters to become angry and cast to ensue. as we think through the issues, it's evident that the majority of election officials that balance so many demonstrated duties and often have no resources need outside help from dhs and the secretary of state. it's for these reasons that i recommend that dhs in coordination with the

secretaries of state is a state- by-state where the weakest vulnerabilities are and based on the information i believe the necessary's habitat -- cyber defense can be detected and we can be protected before it's too late. i believe that elections are the cornerstone of our freedom. we must all work together to protect that freedom and its integrity every time a voter cast a ballot. we are up to the task if we do it together. thank you for holding this hearing to assessed -- assess preparation as we prepare for november. >> how many registry did -- registered voter -- voters do you have? >> a little over 89,000. >> 1.5 million. >> was your system penetrated? >> it was a statewide system. >> the state director of elections would have been the

person we would have seen on 60 minutes? >> yes, that was him. >> it was the statewide illinois system? >> that is correct. >> is it your view that more problems are likely created on election day by getting into the registration system then the likelihood of getting into the accounting system? >> we have a broad surface area and we rely on a number of different systems. the network connectivity of voter registration systems is certainly much greater than voting systems. therefore an easier target for adversaries. >> i would concur. certainly it is an issue that happened in durham county, north carolina in 2016 on a small scale. if you increase the scale you can see the issues that would be great on a day of election. >> with provisional voting as senator durbin suggested earlier it would overwhelm the

system if all kinds of people try to cast ballots? >> we are looking at a backup system if that occurred. clearly that will be fairly technical and hard but we are looking at it. >> in illinois we have election day registration which in and of itself is resilient that our lawmakers made. particularly for the event that an issue happens with a voter registration to the base. we have been modeling our election day registration that is 10 seconds longer than a normal check in. it is a policy decision that not only helps voters but makes the security of the system more resilient. >> i assume if you can register in 10 seconds you can also do what you need to to cast a provisional ballot quickly. >> yes.

>> it was designed to accommodate that? >> absolutely. and it is a 10 second marginal increase. i would love to get voters there in 10 seconds but that is not the case. >> right now arbella process would not allow for that to happen quickly. -- our ballot process would not allow that to happen quickly because of what happens along with that. illinois must be ahead of us in that regard. >> do you have a way to monitor how many people might be trying to access your system from outside? >> that would be through the information systems team and they keep that information close to the chest but we are fortunate in greene county to have that type of help available. clearly in the smaller counties, i was visiting with a county clerk before today and they said we are not prepared if something of this scale would occur and defend themselves. >> i was in a location in st. louis a couple of weeks ago

where they have -- they are the principal provider for the ipad voting day system. they were transitioning 51 counties in minnesota to that system. they had the entire country of canada as a client and one of the things they were doing while i was there, there were three summer interns and other people that were all the time trying to get into the systems they were responsible for. this is someone who spends all day, every day trying to secure a system by trying to penetrate a system and if they find those spots and you have people doing that. >> the attacks are a valuable effort to ensure that defenses are holding up as you expect. homeland security has offered it to all the states and local governments.

we had a vulnerability assessment to them and it was interesting what the good guys are capable of is well. >> the good guys have to be. the structure is that they have to be successful all the time. the bad guys only have to be successful wants to do great damage. you would like to see a paper ballot as part of the national requirement? >> i would in terms of, if you think about the measurement that is used in all of the different things. particularly with voters. a voter wants something tangible and the tangibility of paper will give them greater confidence. when it comes to federal elections, not just for the president but for congress, being able to give them the insurance -- assurance that we can go back and look at a paper trail versus something on the screen that is based inside a

system that we have to trust. i think that voters will appreciate that type of insurance. when i visit with voters i cannot think of one time that does -- that voters disagreed with me. >> when you audit, do you count those by hand? >> at no less than 5% of voting precincts we do bipartisan teams that are recounted by hand. one of the things that is important is that even if you do a post of the machine, how would you know that it was compromised if you cannot compare the results of the paper ballot? that is the assurance against. clearly the machine, when you have an accurate election does a better job of counting the ballots. i'm talking about in the case where clearly fraud has occurred and the pallet -- the paper ballot will be the evidence you need in terms of if the system is compromised. >> thank you. >> thank you, people were

talking about, why doesn't everyone vote from home? it would be great to mail in a ballot but voting from home from your computer would mean no paper records of anything. can you comment on that? >> i think that is 100% inappropriate for a civil election. >> i find it ironic because this is my first term and when i ran for the office in 2014 it was a common thing i heard. >> i was hearing it as well. i kept three -- i kept thinking about my state with a high voter turnout but that involved the paper ballot and is critical to an -- to integrity. but people could vote by mail and they had actual paper ballots that were fed into a machine. but the people were talking about doing it from the home computer with no backup. >> that is something that i had to disagree about when the

viewpoint was put forth. even when i was elected i went to a conference of elected officials and there was a peep -- a group of speakers talking about this. one speaker -- >> like boating from facebook. >> that is correct. i think i was the only election official that day they did not think it was a good idea. i think we have evidence from 2016 and clearly, it is a convenience we cannot afford. >> very good. so in your testimony you supported the secure elections act increase of cyber security expertise and what is currently the technical guidelines development committee. additionally support even more robust auditing provisions. we talked about that. do you think it is important to have this puts election? >> i do. and certainly one thing i want

to recognize is that when we do these audits it is transparent and open to the public. that is something you cannot put a value on. >> thank you for supporting the secure elections act in your testimony and it must be hard to give these examples frilled dates for illinois. -- for illinois but it must have hit home. and our people aware of this? >> our voters come to us and we are lucky in illinois because we can tell a strong story. we have a piece of paper that every voter has looked at and worst case scenario, someone can attack and make a full meltdown of the election. you want to keep talking about election security? most people walk away and will engage. if we were able to talk that way nationally, this would mean it would be the last hearing

this court would have. it is an effective narrative. >> do voters get word about having -- worried about private data being taken? >> luckily we have a data fence we keep on voters. it is certainly something we keep. >> we have been talking about homeland security not coming forward with the information. when did you find out about it? >> it happened at the state level and i know as much as everyone else from the 60 minute story. they shut down the statewide system sometime in the summer and we started asking question. we are a bottom-up state. each county has its own voter registration and we share data with the state board of elections which also is another resilient policy choice.

because even if the state board system was taken down we would all be able to operate seamlessly. >> it is a secondary concern that people are not focused on. that the hacking can result in removal of private voter information. people's addresses and stuff like that. we have been talking about dhs but you both mentioned eac briefly. could you talk about the role that the election commission has played in improving communications around cybersecurity? >> i said on the executive committee alongside the chairman of the eac and the president and this confederation is working really well to at -- address this and what is clear to everybody is

the vital role that e days eac has played for 15 years. they -- eac has played for 15 years. >> you discussed cyber navigators extensively. and not all election authorities have access that are dedicated to protecting them. how to -- to cybernet -- cyber navigators help local governments? >> the eac has information out there available and they do all they can. the issue, for the record is that often times the local election official is so overcast with various ministries of duties and do not have the budget to be able to

handle the duties they have. they don't have access to the information just by the way their job occurs every single day. that is why i think that if we can have programs that are there to help, like you mentioned this morning it will be the type of help our officials appreciate. because they are concerned and worried. they realize they do not have the capabilities, background or local help to get that protection they need. and one of the things i want to mention, the other issue is that sometimes they will go out locally for help but how do they know if the help being provided is what they need? that is how we educate officials to say, this is a product or a company can trust. we get a lot of information from companies telling us they will help us with security but what product is actually needed versus what are we spending

money on? and it doesn't protect us at the end of the day. >> thank you, both of you. >> lab -- my last question, do you see any potential for unnecessary duplication with the eac and the new involvement of homeland security? if you do, is there a way to thoughtfully deal with that? >> i have no concerns there. i think that homeland security has a broad plate of responsibility. i'm glad they are able to share some cyber-specific resources. it's critical to have an institution dedicated solely to elections that will not get pulled into other issues. >> i think the issues is broad enough that the coordination is good and the eac in terms of

the other areas that they help out with, those are the types of things they provide that dhs does not provide when it comes to protecting ourselves. i don't think we can do -- we can be too broad at this point. >> as an interface, the eac will report to homeland security if they decide? >> yes. >> that is correct. the information sharing protocol that has been developed is not the exact design but the officials at the dhs and eac are working on this and will share information appropriately with each other. >> thank you both. we have some votes to go to but i appreciate you being with us today. the record will be open for a week from today and there may be some questions that come to you in writing.

if they do we hope you will respond to those as quickly as possible. the hearing is close. >> thank you. -- the hearing is closed. >> thank you.

>> homeland security picked up on the complaints and the hearing we have seen is that they could not keep hyping the information from the secretary of state. you have seen some of this happen and you have heard that people are getting the right classification to get the information. the secure election act must not involve for those two share

data. -- to share data. the short answer is we got the money out and we would like more money out but we got them -- the money out immediately. >> a number of things -- what we heard this morning is most of the things that the act would require happen, appear to be happening right now. and we can improve on that and restructure that communication where it needs to be restructured. we are probably learning quite a bit by the effort to step forward and do these things and figure out how you define this. hopefully we get it done before the 2010 elections. what senator klobuchar just said that the responsibility of local officials to conduct elections and the determination that the dhs after the election

and the critical infrastructure are still important factors in moving forward. and i think there is heightened awareness because there is a focus on what needs to be done and we heard a lot of that today. >> could you talk about how this compares to 2016? >> i think we are in a much better place than 2016 because everybody is more aware and more notice is being given. you have to be pretty unaware of what's going on as a local election official not to have a sense that there are things out there that you should be concerned at a higher level than you have been in the past. >> senator fischer couldn't stay and we got accomplished what we need to -- needed to

accomplish. >> the fda would allocate federal funds? >> yes. i would love to get it done and we have tried to get it done by itself and the whole bill on the budget act. we are trying with appropriations not to see what we can do to get some of it done. but realistically, if we are unable to get it done within the next month, there is still reason to do it. the fact that we keep pushing on these issues makes homeland security and secretary of state's negotiate the language and in the end you don't want the next secretary of homeland security to not know what they are doing. look what happened last time. you want in law that they have to share the information with

the states. >> more money, more money. >> right. if you look at the major hacks into companies like sony and think about all the money they have put into security and the actual internet companies that were hacked. everything that happened with facebook, these guys with small companies all over the country are supposed to somehow think they are protected when you have major u.s. companies being hacked. that that isn't fair to them. that is why i don't think that just for fun they are saying they need more resources. including secretary of state's. is not just one angry person, these are national security attacks and the federal government has to play a role.

>> is it over resourced? >> not as much because we had the initial amount of money that we asked for. but it is more about, what is the floor. what should we allocate? even though we want to preserve individual systems so we do not have a nationwide attack. to figure out the floor that we expect of them and have debate about how much we ould be able to tell them they have to do. because we know what happened in one county. that is what russia is trying to do. even if they only picked one county it ruined the integrity of our democracy and the idea we should have a floor of what we expect it to do. >> is it your opinion on how

this -- restrictive the federal requirements should be >> we want an audit.

>> by expressing an opinion that people don't like, we have inflicted an injury. i found it very frightening. and frankly frightening and emblematic of the way that the left is responding. to any sort of scent and especially one that entrenches on identity politics. which of course is everywhere and has infected everything. >> university of hispania law school professor amy wax on the limits