nationwide. >> what i appreciate with c-span, it's 40 years old and much older than me, but what i appreciate -- that's a joke, by the way. you can laugh. what i appreciated about c-span is that it's not partisan. you watch the sparring that takes place. you watch your delegations talk back and forth. it's extremely informative and very educational. one of the best things on the bus and i'm a technogeek, so i hope they take them with me on their tour and i would just spend hours in that bus, and if you go in and look at the video screens, they are interactive. people can learn and kids can learn about government. i mean, government doesn't have to be a bad word. >> be sure to join us july 21st and 22nd when we feature our visit to alaska. watch "alaska weekend" on c-span, c-span.oral or listen with the free c-span radio app.

up next on c-span3, a discussion on climate change. manhattan institute senior fellow orrin cass presented his recent study on climate change to a group in new york city. he formerly severed as a domestic policy adviser to the romney 2012 presidential campaign. his presentation is about 45 minutes. >> if i could have your attention, please. thank you. thanks very much, very much for coming here today. i'm brian anderson, the editor of "city journal." [ applause ] it's my great pleasure to introduce today's speaker, orrin cass. he's a senior fellow at the manhattan institute where he focuses on a range of vital topics, including energy, the environment is his topic today and anti-poverty policy. and he has become a regular and

welcome presence in "city journal." in fact, we've just released a new video featuring orrin discussing environmental policy with john stossel, the first of several broadcasting city journal films we're doing with stossel-tv. since posting yesterday, this first video has achieved 300,000 downloads already, so it's getting a lot of attention. [ applause ] now, whatever he's writing or speaking about, orrin does it with authority and imagination which helps explain why politico calls him one of the 50 thinkers, doers and visionaries transforming american politics. his reputation will only grow with the arrival this fall of the brilliant book on the future of the american labor market and how we can build an economy in which workers from every

background can flourish. it's called "the once and future worker" and encounter books will be publishing it. before arriving at mi, orrin was domestic policy director for mitt romney's presidential campaign and a management consultant for bayne & company in the firm's boston and new delhi offices. he holds a b.a. in political economy from williams college and a jd from harvard where he was an editor of "the harvard law review." orrin's talk today is based upon his much-discussed paper for the manhattan institute will show how faulty discussions this dramatically overestimating its potential costs. he's written about this topic, about climate policy in general for leading publications, including "the wall street journal," foreign affairs. he's testified before the house and senate committees on the subject. he's briefed the epa and the white house, spoken at m.i.t.

and the university of texas on this topic and appeared on npr and the bbc. "the wall street journal"'s marry kissel describes orrin's work in this area as an absolutely brilliant evisceration of climate catastrophism. now, for the question period after the talk we'll have a mike. i will field the questions, and please ask concise questions so we can get several of them in and identify yourself once the mike arrives. there will be a mike circulating, so, in other words, no long-winded statements before you ask a question. so with that let me hand things over to orrin cass. [ applause ] >> all right. thank you very much, brian. that was the official first plug for the book, so we can get 300

do ,000 downloads of that we'll be off to the races. thanks for coming for a rescheduled event and thanks for scheduling it for today and not tomorrow because i got enough e-mails from the first your climate talk was cancelled for weather announcement that i didn't really need it a second time. i want to talk about the paper that came out just over a week ago that looks at the way that climate costs are actually estimated, and so it's important to distinguish. this is not a talk about climate science. i think most climate science is actually quite good if you actually read the scientific literaturech, the u.n. isn't seize, tend to be conservative and couch their language well, and they are doing a lot of important work. the problem comes when people interested in advancing a particular agenda choose to take those findings and attempt to translate them into things that sound very scary. and that is the field of what i would call climate economics.

to do climate economics, you have to start with greenhouse gas emissions. you have to translate that to a temperature increase. you have to translate that to actual changes in our environment. you have to translate that to an actual effect on our society, and have you to translate that into an actual cost in dollars. now, that's not to say dollars is the only way we should be measuring climate costs, but it's certainly ones the economists focus on and the ones that a scary sounding newspaper headlines hand policy proposals focus on and critically if you want to do this right you have to apply a lens of human progress. climate change happens over a century, multiple centuries, so when you're talking about these environmental changes and the effect on society, it won't really do to imagine that they happen tomorrow. you have to ask what is going to happen as the temperature changes gradually over a long period of time? as humans evolve independent of climate change and in response to any climate change that might

happen. climate science versus climate economics. i want to talk about climate economics, and i want to talk about a particular trend in climate economics which is to ignore the hard steps in the middle. most of the recent and most headline-grabbing studies that you may have seen in passing don't actually consider environmental changes or human progress and the effect on society. they simply do what's called a temperature impact correlation study. i will call these temperature studies, but the idea is essentially let's study today what happens when we see minor variations in temperature from year to year and what the effect is on human mortality, on economic growth, on labor productivity, and let's imagine that that exact same relationship will hold over 100 years and multiple degrees of climate change. so if we find that in a year that is, you know, that has one extra very hot day we see 40 extra deaths in a city. let's assume that if at some point in the distant future we get 100 such days, well, then,

obviously 4,000 people will die. if you take that approach you get very large numbers. laughably large numbers in some cases, as we'll see, but they are not actually frankly in any way related to reality. they describe an alternative university verse in which people don't adapt. most of the studies will say we assume no adaptation face that makes the assumption an okay one. i could, of course, write a study that says this study assumes that martials land on earth and in process fix climate change, but the costs that i extrapolated from assumption would not be good ones, and likewise the costs extrapolated from an you a sumas that people don't adapt doesn't tell us anything useful about climate change so this is a quit sensing example of that. it's headlined in "the washington post." sweeping studies claim that rising temperatures will sharply cut economic productivity at the

world economic forum congratulating the authors for bringing a breath of fresh air and deep insight into a critically important topic, and here's what they did. i apologize. this chart is complicated, but it's important to understand how these studies are actually done. they looked at each country over the last 50 years, and they said how does growth change in years that are hotter than average or colder than average for that country? and what they tried to do is establish a relationship if you looked down at bottom here. here is that country, and they found that cold countries actually do had a little bit better on growth in warmer years, so over there is iceland, and you can see that upward slant. warmer years, slightly better growth, and on the other side they found very hot countries do slightly worse in very hot years, so over there in mali hotter year, lower growth and from this they extrapolated a curve that's valid for all countries at all times and that shows that the ideal temperature for economic growth is 13 degrees celsius.

if you are colder than that, the closer your temperature is to 13 degrees celsius the better off you'll be and if you're warmer than that and the temperature gets further from 13 degrees celsius you'll have more growth every year and as the world gets warmer every year the number will get lower and lower. this is how it happens for the united states. so they take, okay, look at that. in 2010 we're at just about optimal growth. our average temperature is 13 degrees celsius so let's assume that that's where we're growing in an average year now. in 2100 we'll be four degrees warmer so how much growth are we going to lose? we're going to lose about two degrees of growth, excuse me, two percentage points of growth every year by 2100 so if we apply that to forecasted growth rates, the black line is growth rates without climate change and as it gets warmer the distance between average growth and our

climate growth gets bigger and bigger so that by 2100 we're not really growing at all because it's gotten warmer. and so that produces this change in our per capita income over time. without claim the change our black line keeps going up. with climate change the red line of per capita income flatlines. now, the united states, it's hard to say is that plausible? is that wildly implausible? but let's take a look at what they did for iceland. iceland starts very cold. as they get warmer growth goes up, so in the middle panel you can see instead of having regular developed country growth they come up with a projection that iceland will be growing at more than 6% -- more than 5% a year by 2100 and growth will be accelerating, and if you look over on the right, you can see that instead of kind of standard developed country growth gd per capita surges past $1.5 million per person per year, making iceland by far the wealthiest country in the world, thanks to

climate change. so this is the output for a whole bunch of countries. china and india, because they are very hot, essentially never grow. by 2100 i believe india's economy is contracting at about 4% a year. you can see the united states gets to maybe about 100,000 in per capita income. there's mongolia, 400,000 per capita and there's iceland. now, and, again, i want to emphasize partly just to not take credit, i didn't do any analysis. can you go to website for this study and download these figures and put them into this chart. i've asked the authors to -- to respond and would like to better understand their perspective, have not heard a response, but hopefully this is the start of a longer conversation about how exactly we should think about climate economics. so, yes, if -- if you think that

these kind of relationships might hold, you can find very dramatic costs for climate change. overall they say, you know, economic output will be about 20% lower than it otherwise would be globally thanks to climate change, burks again, to believe that you have to believe that we are embark on the mongolian century. iceland and fin land world's richest economy and canada and china shrinking. it's one thing to laugh at it but we need to think about which assumptions are wrong. one assumption that i would say is incorrect is the assumption that other things are equal. most regression analysis, the way economists do analysis, is to run these regressions and saying assuming things are equal what is the effect of this one thing? let's understand what is the effect of getting a college education on your earnings today? it would make no sense to run that analysis and use it to

project the effect of a four-year college degree in the year 2100, but that's essentially what we're trying to do here. second, it assumes that the response to small random changes in weather from year to year will be proportionally comparable to the response to large gradual changes. so whatever the effect of a tenth of a degree change is that you might be able to find, let just assume if the temperature change is going to be 40 times bigger the effect will be 40 times bigger, and then finally it assumes extremely weak correlations have extremely predictive power p.you won't be surprised to learn that the actual statistical significance of trying to prove the effect of warmer years on economic growth is not very good. it in fact fails badly with every statistical test that i'm aware of for checking whether you found a significant result, so when your correlation that you're starting with is not an especially strong one and you then magnify it this way, you're likely to end up especially far off.

if we want climate change to be more constructive we have to start thinking about adaptation. adaptation is isn't something to throw out there. it's a very real phenomenon that we can study that has a lot of important effects that we want to understand and will in fact have policy implications that we should care about, so there's a lot of different kind that we know about. there's biophysical adaptation. you feel different after a place that's hot for a while on a hot day than on a cold day. behavioral, if you see pictures of how atlanta deals with an inch of snowfall -- [ laughter ] -- i'm a bostonian, you new yorkers don't do great either, but obviously as you get more accustomed to a given condition, you actually get better with dealing with it. there's technological. you very much technologies that help you cope with these things. there's social adaptations. we don't play baseball in the winter. here they do play baseball in the winter in florida. some places have a siesta in the

middle of the day. a lot of different ways that you cope with your local climate, and there's economic. the very things that we produce in different parts of the country, the kinds of jobs that people choose to do and where they do them and prices, everything changes. that's in a sense the entire point market. if you recognize that the market is going to be acting over this period, then have you to recognize that one. things that it will do quite well is respond to some of these changes. so if you -- if you believe these things are happening, then have you to recognize adaptations that are cost effect pitch for large-scale climate shifts may not be cost effective in response to much smaller shifts so one reason you can't extrapolate from the little change to a big change is that people won't respond to one extra hot day the way that they would respond to 40 extra hot days. and likewise, adaptations that are cost effective in response to permanent changes might not be cost effective in response to random variations so if i told you next year the average temperature in new york in the

summer was going to be ten degrees hotter, there are some things you can do differently, but it wouldn't make sense to reconfigure new york to be a ten-degree hotter place because the next year it might be right back down again. have you to aim for your average temperature or expected temperature and only as that changes does it make sense to adapt at all. this has made it well into the u.s. government policy making process as well, and so i just want to run through finding a bunch of quick exam tolls show how pervasive this is in the analysis that's done of climate change or how pervasive the adaptation for failure is. this is a recent gao study that came out a few months ago attempting to highlight potential costs in the u.s. it went and found the two studies that had been done that were sort of large isnsynthesisd

one was done by the obama epa and another by a group called rhodium. you'll see virtually all of the cost are in the blue shaded buckets, and they come from three things. they come from deaths from heat-caused, decline in air quality. if it gets hot her, we have more smog, and that might be related to more deaths. it comes from deaths frequents team temperatures. it's literally so hot that more people die, and it comes from lost work hours from extreme temperatures. people don't work as much when it's extremely hot, and so those are -- account for essentially 80% of costs and come from the same set, very small set of studies, and so here's how these studies are done. effective extreme temperature on working hours. these authors i think actually did one of the bert analyses. they looked at do people from the time use journals so it

tracks what people do for a day. in various counties with very hot days, do people report working fewer hours on those days and found overall, no, there's no effect, but if you focus specifically on at-risk industries and people doing intensive manual labor often outdoors you can find an effect when the temperature gets above about 100 degrees and people work as much as an hour less on those days. now, one thing you could conclude from that is, well, if we had more 100-degree days people are going to work less, and that's going to be an enormous cost to the economy. the problem is that something else that they found was this. if you actually look in the summer at how much people work in these at-risk industries, people in the warmest third of u.s. counties actually work more than people in the coolest third of the counties, so while it's true that on a very hot day they work less, it's not true that once you take into account adaptation to a local climate you actually find any effect at

all that's discernible. now what, people who like this study would respond is but there could be other factors, right, that we're not taking into account? there could be other things about these warm counties that make them places where people work more to which the response is yes, that's exactly the point. yes, everything is always different in all places and how it looks 100 years from now. we'll respond to all of those things, and so one thing we might expect it more variability. there could be economic costs to needing to have more days when people work fewer hours. just as in the north of the country we frequently have days when you can't really make any work on your construction project because the ground is frozen and it's 3 degrees below zero, and these are all things that we cope with. but evidence here would not suggest that as more of the country looks more like our warm counties, people will actually work less. similar phenomenon with respect to mortality, so you can find if you look at what happens on very hot days or in years when there

are more hot days, there's slightly higher mortality, and so what the authors of this study did well, actually, thanks to fewer cold days from climate change we'll get fewer deaths but hot days will cause more death and the net effect is 60,000 extra deaths by the year 2100 each year. the problem is they looked at two studies. one is this one which looked at effect between 1960 and 2000. they also had a second study which said, wait a minute. i wonder what happened between 1960 and 2000 as people installed air conditioning. now, again, the people who came up with this chart also cite this study which finds the impact of days with a mean temperature of 80 degrees has declined by a 75%, and at the 2w50 2004 rate of ac adoption, that hot days have no impact on mortality cannot be rejected. it's apparent the air conditioning has helped the u.s.

to be more adaptive to the mortality effects of climate change. they said what from we ignore the adaptation component and instead use only the view that -- that acknowledges no progress over time, so if you do that you get a big number. if you put in the revised heat deaths based on air conditioning, you actually find that you've saved lives from climate change. now, that is my very rough back of the envelope. that's not at gold standard. you want to go back and take all of the data and reanalyze it properly to understand what happens with adaptation, but the no adaptation view is certainly not the right one. one more study that i especially enjoy, this is the epa's approach to mortality. what they did is looked at each individual city and they said we have a distribution of days in the city. let's look, pittsburgh being my favorite example. what happens on extremely hot and extremely cold days so this is a day with a low temperature

of 71 degrees, so that's a very hot day. the hottest 1% of days, and what they found was that, yes, you see increased mortality on those days. well, as pittsburgh warms, you would expect its distribution to look like that, so what if pittsburgh warms but we don't move the dashed lines? now there are many extreme heat days. now, why that dashed line wouldn't move over 100 years given that there are many places in the country that regularly experienced much hotter days is never explained, but if you assume that now you have many, many times more extremely hot days, then you can produce this. you can say that in 2100 pittsburgh's fatality rate from extreme heat will be about 75 times higher than what phoenix or houston or new orleans experiences today, even though phoenix, houston and new orleans are hotter today than pittsburgh

will be in 2100. interestingly these guys actually did do a test for adaptation. that's not their mine finding, but they said, all right, it we want to take into account adaptation we so those are the cost estimates that contribute to our understanding that climate change will be huge to the cost in the united states. the last big dark blue box which you'll see didn't even bother to include, but epa thought was the most important thing about climate change ends up amount tog this. these are two pollutants, ozone and particlate matter. you can see we've made a lot of progress then you can see if nothing else changed between 2015 and 2100, the effect of pollution of heat causing higher pollution concentrations would cause those to bump up a little

bit. those little bumps epa says is worth 50,000 lives, or $930 billion of year per costs. that's roughly, this right here. this is the cost of climate change according to the epa. everyone's going to adopt air-conditioning in response to heat, we need to take into account we're going to immediate nor air-conditioning. we may have slightly high pollution levels than we'd otherwise have. we need to take into account we'll have more hot days that will affect manual labor outdoors, but turns out we know how to do it and we know how to do it because we have built most of western civilization in areas of the world that completely freeze over every year.

there are days, weeks, in chicago and boston, can't spend much time outside. that's not ideal. certainly it would be wonderful if everywhere was like santa barbara. but it's not. so we can recognize those costs and we want to understand them and cope with them without believing and seeing this is the end of the world or warrants far more costly economic interventions that will do more than good. thank you very much. >> i'm sure there are a bunch of questions so let's ask them. no yes questions at all. >> i should know. you said you asked the authors

for their response. didn't say what happened. i say sum since "the wall street journal" published your op-ed, they just ignore your request? >> they know these studies better than i do. anywhere that any of this might misunderstand something they've done, but both from reading all the third party coverage of their studies at that they endorsed at the time, i'm also from from corresponding, my sense is that generally speaking, this is what it says, but would like to hear what they think about it. >> we'd like to get some people from the back as well. >> jean epstein. institute contributor.

what is your assessment of the literature about sea level rise and the economics of it and the potential ris potential risks? >> it's interesting because it's one of the areas where we have the best data where we know something the happening an the worst projections of what that will look like. the evidence that sea level has risen and continues to rise is very good. what that will look like in se 2100, the gold standard u.n. report, their best estimate is about two feet of sea level rise. in the years since then, 2013, 2014, since then, several states have come out and said that's on the low side because we think we might see more activity in a place like antarctica. then you here people say four, five feet of rise over theory. is estimating thing about the

cost is that it doesn't tend to show up much in study. some look at sea level rise and the reason it didn't show up is because it's a one-time cost. if it's hotter, you get this number. you say that happens every year forever. with sea level reyes rise, you have the value of all the coastal property, but you can only wipe it out once. tough take that then divide it by 100. we're closer to 2020. start saying divided by 80. you can say we have trillions of dolla dollars assets, but when you take into account how much they're going to appreciate, the actual per year cost doesn't turn out to be very high.

where we make investments, how we ensure property, those things matter. so far, beyond sort of waving your hands and yessing water world, there isn't a lot of good connection at least in the united states to really be. >> in the back. what about droughts interfering with food production. i guess i would keep those on two different discussions. there's the concern about food production. the most part of food production that i haven't seen people be concern ed about is more of the effect of the gradual shifting underlying climate. our farms are in places that

might be warmer. in particular, you tend to see yields dewhen temperatures get above a certain level. as with the sea level problem though, the thing you find when you dig into the estimate ss that the time frame over which we might adapt is wildly longer than the time frame we need to adapt. but what i mean is that say you say 50% is going to have to shift because of climate change. if that's true, i'm not aware of any evidence that says that's true, if it were that large, youth say it's adding about a half a percent a year of new capacity. that's cig nantly smaller than the amount we add every year any way. so as long as we have an understanding as we are add capacity to a normal food system, there's no reason to believe that the climate change

is going to catch up with our infrastructure faster than our infrastructure relative to climate change. >> over here. thank you. i'm wondering if these models have been tested over time, say 1950. applying the data and seeing if we're now given what those models predicted where we would be back then. economic models. one of the challenges that you can't really test them going back because you don't have large swings in climate going back. what the models do is use the day try to find correlations, but the nature of that behavior that you can measure don't look like the behavior you goiyou're trying to map. the one interesting data point that should be more relevant than it is is that we have 150

years of population data. people prefer to live in warmer climates. in the united states, the trend is to move out of the northeast. which is the area that is supposed to benefit most from climate change. into much, muff hotter places. thai go they're quoing to die m u.s. productive when they do that. i would say either those effects probably and when you get that motion, you get a swing. when i move from new york to arizona or florida, i'm getting more than full effect of climate change. you could say they're fools. you could say there are so many other things they care about that they wash out. so i think it's hard to look at within the u.s. at least, where we see population moving and say

gosh, things are getting warmer. it's a catastrophe. that does remind me of a caveat is that all of this is about the united states. the effects look different if talking about the world. and starts from a much hotter baseline. it's a constructive way to extend a new better verresearch not to take this kind of analysis. but to recognize there's important analysis to be done for that. they look at the u.s. and say you know, doesn't mean there aren't other places that this rule is different from. right up here. >> why are catastrophes so

invested in catastrophe and therefore resist the flows that you point out in their estimation? what do they have to gain by this? >> that's a very loaded question. >> one argues is that it's a matter of political self-interest in given agendas. i find that doesn't get us far enough. it's their agenda and what they've chosen to be b about. one thing i've done research and writing about is is understanding what are the actual differences in how someone might mean, someone who might worry more about these costs think about this. what are the different asumgtss we're making and why. i think what you fipd most often if you work down the ladder of a

here the we're going just apply all these things that happen like if if they happen. that's one effect. and the second one is the same thing we've with environment environmentalism for a long time. which is a fundamental discomfort with the effect of industrialization on the natural environment. i mean the air that i'm talking about here are the same one that is led to the population bomb and those fears in the '60s. they are the same ones that led to the limits to growth in the '70s and oi you know climate change is in a sense, the next argument like that. like those, the underlying facts under them aren't necessarily wrong. you can go back to what paul wrote and see what he's write

writing about, how many people are going to be born and how much food reproduce, there is a disconnect. if you look at how much oil reseves we had and how much we're consuming, there's a real disconnect. the question is, how do you feel about that disconnect? you look at that and say this is a catastrophe or do you say actually given everything i know about human society and markets and so forth, these feel like they will be problems. wait for the mike. >> a follow under the previous question. what's one big thing al gore got right and what's one big thing he got wrong? >> i'm going to have to answer in vague terms because i don't pay much attention to what al gore says.

the things he says that are inaccurate encourage people from the other side, seeing signs as a joke. i'm sure he knows something, but he is not doing climate science. folks on that kind of communication, something they got right is they can be very effective with their climate communication. i mean, the climate that has risen up to find ways to make climate change is very

impressive. you can go to seminars and al gore climate core commune kart. learn about the way to and you'll see this with the thanksgiving columns. how to talk to your drunk uncle about climate change. this is now a real thing. there's an entire generation of people that are distraught and given what the facts look like, impressive thai blood pressure ab able to do that. what he gets wrong is everything i've been talking about which is the idea and uncle, discover climate change and decide to be an environmentalist. al gore was deeply focused back

to the late '80s on these narratives and they make for compelling documentaries. but the math behind it doesn't usually match up well with reality. >> we have time for a few more questions. >> thank you. if you look from say 75 to 95, there's been a net migration in the united states, very clearly from north to south. in that period, there's been a significant increase in average temperature. so do we need to cop collude that people move to the position. there will be a worse climb. >> it's a great and question the right way to look and try to discern something. you know, it's funny. i was changing e-mails with an

author who does this kind of research and he was pushing me a little bit fairly to say it's fine to criticize these study, but how should we be studying it. look, just because economists learn a lot about statistical regressions in graduate school doesn't mean it's the right way to study climate change. it may mean the right way to study and aside from the earth science side, it's more of a soes logical study. it's understanding in this country, how, what are the kinds of a dapations people make. what is the cost of that. it's compare iing across-countr, how dus manufacturing in singapore compared to germany. those kinds of insights i think would be much, much more powerful than some of this.

>> i'm interested in the time frame. we've talked about people living in the deep south versus living in new england. they've developed economies of that. little shorter time frame was the air-conditioning. that's maybe decades that we're talking about. we have a given time frame for the climate change. it's going to be 50 years or something like that. and as tom was on his high horse now, the problem with our stoet now is everything is changing faster and faeser and we have to learn how to adapt on shorter and shorter. which is why i can't use my iphone and things like that, so if question is how do you distinguish the things that can have is a dapation in the time frame as opposed to the ones that were going to be left behind. >> i think that's a perfect question to illustrate the way we should be doing climate

research and policy. let's start with a list of all the effects we think climate change might have. the time periods we think they might occur over then the types of a dapations then the time frames of those. what you would find is is that well, i haven't done the full exercise, but you know, from some prominent dpam principles, things like adopting air-conditioning. was not a big problem. something like sea level rise. and 80 year, that's long time for cities to be b in different places. on the other hand, how different does manhattan looks. subway, for instance, not a lot of progress in 80 years. so you know, public transportation might be an example of something that you don't have a lot of confidence

that a city is going to be able to adapt so. at least on its own. the response isn't to say well therefore it's impossible. it would be to ask okay, but would it take to have a public transportation system that was a adapting on the time thyme frame we need right and so i think n generally, it's in terms of economics, it come downs very much to the capital cycle. how long are investments being made for and are we going to have time, with something you know, are we going to have time to make the next round of investments in response to what we see on the climate as it's happening or are we going to make investments now. climate change isn't all economic. there are other ways to say you're going to have disruptions to social traditions that people really value.

but it's actually interesting that at least from the u.n. report finds the disruption from climate change should be on par with the disruption humanity has created from land use change. so we've seen, we sort of have a sense of what that looks like. it's not the end of the world, but it's some real tragedies. and so i think it's important not to only talk about in the dollar context, but to also sort of force anyone to think about what they're talking about. they tell me it's expensive and warrants an extensive response or are you telling me this is one to have the million things that's going to change about our society that we should be aware of. >> time for one more question. back of the room. >> vo have you spoke b b on campuses and what has been the

reaction? >> i speak a lot on campuses. one of my favorite things to do because their reactions are very interesting. they are hearing one message and they perceive the other side to be climate change isn't real. they don't hear why there might be something in between those two extremes. i don't think that listening to these 12 slides would persuade someone that they should stop thinking about climate change, but my experience have been has been that it forces them to realize that there are reasons, that it isn't the one that is actually being pursued. and the most interesting question that i get and typically this happens is it

comes with a prelude of i'm super active on this or that. campus and what you're telling me is really distressing because you're kind of saying is why climate policy isn't effective. just given what the developing world is going to do, we are going to see climate change. it's going to happen. it feels like all that activist work i'm doing and you're te telling me i shouldn't be doing it. i say, well yeah, sorry. no one said life fair. people have if their heads that this idea on climate change, we can solve everything if we feel strongly about it. you know what else is a big problem like cancer, that's big problem, but you don't create like a cancer club on campus to feel like you're solving cancer.

if you want to be one of the people that's solving cancer, get your degree in ma lek lar bo biology. we need those. you can make a difference that way, but that's what these problems take. your campus car pool isn't going to get it done. i don't know if that makes them feel better, but it's something for them to think about. it makes me feel i've answered their questions. thank you very much. >> thank you all for coming. this morning, ben carson

testified in an oversight hearing by the house financial services committee. you can see the entire hearing tonight starting at 9:30 eastern here on cspan 3. also available online at cspan dost org and you can listen with the free app. fbi drirector and rod rosenstein testified thursday before f the house judiciary committee about actions taken by the house committee during the 2016 elections including the clinton e-mail investigation. watch live thursday at 9:30 a.m. eastern on cspan 3 or list b b b b with the free app. the bus traveled alaska m it b continues to our next stop in fair banks.

>> cspan is especially value for alaskans. for most of us, it's the om way to get to see our delegation hard at work in washington. it's a proud to carry cspan for a number of reasons. especially for their emphasis education. from lesson plans and handouts to timely teachable videos and educator conferences, the cspan classroom program offers so many resources to teachers and has a great deal of value today's classrooms. >> i heard stories of driving up from the folks who brought up the bus and the things they saw on the way coming to alaska was a nice trip from what i heard an i understand. i've driven it a few times myself and it's an awesome trip and we're so glad your bus came here and using it as a tool to bring fair banks nationwide. >> what i appreciate about

cspan, it's 40 years old. much older than me, but -- that's a joke, by the way. you can laugh. what i appreciated about cspan is that it's not partisan. you watch the sparring. it's extreme ly, the best thing i'm a tech geek. so i hope they take me with them on their tour because i would just spend our hohours on that . if you look at the video screens, they're interactive. people can learn and kids can learn about government. i mean, government doesn't have to be a bad word. >> be sure to join us july 21st and 22nd when we'll feature our visit to lalaska. watch alaska weekend ond cspan,