>> good morning. the committee on government oversight and reform will come to order. authorized to declare recess at any time. i recognize myself on opening statement and then the gentleman

from maryland and then i'll recognize each of today's witnesses. the right to vote is fundamental in a functioning democracy. in fact, the ability to pick our own leaders defines democracy. it's the essence of self governing. everything we do in congress or any legislative body, every bill passed, every hearing conducted, every witness summoned, every document accessed, all of it derives its power and legitimacy from an election. so the legitimacy of what we do is intertwined with a legitimacy of the underlying election. the power to vote is likewise contingent of that vote being counted. no more or no less than anyone else's and the legitimacy to govern therefore flows from the reliability of the underlying election process. further adding to the uniqueness of this idea called america is the duality that elections are

governed by and conducted by state and local officials. and sometimes volunteers. even though many elections have decidedly national implications. the stakes are national. the threats are sophisticated and international. the process is state and local driven. but the states can and do ask for assistance particularly given the nature of the attacks we now seem to face. today's hearing is focused on security, advancing the collective beliefs that the legitimacy of our work and the work of others in elective office is in direct proportion to the reliability of our own elections. today's hearing is broader than what happened in 2016. but what happened in 2016 must be addressed because the malefactors will attack us again. i personally am convinced beyond any burden that russia interfered with the 2016 election. i'm convinced russia attempted to undermine the democracy and

impugn the 2016 election and so sow the seeds of discord among americans. the intelligence community both past and present concluded this as did the house intelligence committee report as i'm quite certain will the senate intelligence committee report. and equally importantly, as did our fellow americans who served on the two grand juries which returned true bills just ten days ago, the current deputy attorney general announced russians engaged in cyber operations to interfere in the 2016 presidential election. they hacked into computer networks and installed malicious software that allowed them to spy on use earls. captured key strokes, take screen shots and remove data from these computers. they also discussed the timing of the release and in an attempt to enhance the impact on the election. this was not just his opinion. it was the consensus of average, every day americans who were

called in to service on what we call a grand jury. the department of justice said in both indictments there is no allegation that this interference changed the vote count or affected any election result. but that was likely not for a lack of trying. what better way to undermine confidence in every derivative function of government than to cast doubt on the election results as a whole? last week, many of us were in a skiff meeting with inspector general michael horowitz. there were no cameras. it was just us and colleagues from judiciary. and my suspicion is all of us who were there left with a renewed understanding of what happened both in 2016 and even before that. we left even more fully cognizant that every election henceforth will be subject to attack and therefore we must be prepared not as partisans but as fellow citizens.

russia attacked many institutions in our country. some were successfully attacked like the dnc and the dccc. but many others were targeted and i'm sure my colleagues were struck as i was last week again and am struck every time i have access to relevant information by the reality that all of us are actually victims. some were impacted more than others but the target was america. which is why those aforementioned indictments allege the united states of america versus -- not a political party or a group or an individual. it is the united states of america versus. i am sure someone will correct me as they are kind enough to do from time to time. i think it was none other than the greek philosopher solan who said and i'll get this partially right. the place we want to live is a place where even those of us who

are not victimized by crime, even those of us who are not injured, even those of us who are not agrieved feel the pain of the injustice just as if we were victims ourselves. 2016 it was one political party that was successfully accessed and the materials disseminated. those who seek to do us harm will be back at it again in 2018, perhaps with a different target. so we must take every precaution to safeguard our electoral process and here to ensure no vote count is ever affected and discuss how to protect the election process start to finish. it is our responsibility to ensure no election is ever successfully interfered with. it is likewise our responsibility to ensure when our fellow citizens place their ballot in the ballot box by whatever means their vote is recorded accurately and counted correctly. there will be efforts to affect us. there will be attacks.

there will be efforts to sow the seeds of discord and con content and efforts to call into question the legitimacy of our electoral process. but americans are uniquely good at coming together in the aftermath of a tragedy or a loss or an attack. or at least we used to be. it's one of the most endearing and unifying qualities. the challenges is can we come together even in an environment like the one we find ourselves in now? and repel the attack before it happens. whether we win or lose we need and want to have confidence every valid vote was counted and nothing interfered with the will of the american jury. americans are free to quarrel about who should be elected. we will have a hard time sustaining this gift of self governance that we have been given if we begin to quarrel about who actually was elected. with that, i'll recognize the gentleman from maryland.

>> i want to -- want to first thank the chairman for this hearing and as the chairman was talking i could not help but feel chills because one of the last things that my mother said, a 92-year-old woman who had fought for the vote and who has seen people lynched and harmed trying to get the vote, one of the last things she said on her dying bed is don't let them take the vote away from us. chilling. and so, this hearing means a lot to me personally and i know it means a lot to every member of this body. after all, we wouldn't be here

if people did not have the right to vote. and so, i dedicate these words to ruth alma cummings. i want to thank the chairman for calling this very important hearing. candidly, however, it is not enough. it's not enough. it's not enough. words are cheap. this is the first time since donald trump was elected in 2016 that the oversight committee has held a full committee hearing on russian interference in the election. it took us a year and a half to finally hold today's hearing. this hearing comes less than four months -- hello -- four months before the 2018 midterm

elections. and most states have already held their primaries. in addition, the chairman denied our request to invite the office of the director of national intelligence to testify today. congress needs to understand how russia attacked our states in order to help states defend -- to help states defend against these attacks in the future. and i'm so glad that the chairman acknowledged the fact that we are under constant attack. this ain't nothing new. and they are prepared to do it again and again and again and they are probably learned some things from what they have done and do it even better and try to do it more effectively, that is interfering with our elections the next time.

dan coats, the director of national intelligence, recently warned that -- and i quote. listen to what he said. the warning lights are blinking red. he compared these warning signs to what we saw before 9/11. let me repeat that. president trump's own director of national intelligence compared our situation now to the month leading up to the attacks of september 11, 2001. yet chairman gowdy would not send an invitation to ask anyone for odni to testify. we understand we may get a classified briefing at some later date. but a closed door briefing is no substitute for a public hearing to inform the american people

about what is going on. we have dhs here. we should have the intelligence community here, as well. we held a subcommittee hearing in november on election cyber security but it was also inadequate. at that hearing we asked him for documents showing how russia attacked our states. doing our duty. as the check on the executive branch. at first, mr. krebs gave us only a single document. later, he gave us 50 pages, much of which was already public.

thank you very much. we sent a letter asking chairman gowdy to subpoena the documents dhs is withholding but he ignored it. we sent another letter asking him to let us vote on a subpoena but he denied our motion. because this issue is so important we join with the ranking members of other key committees and sent a letter to speaker paul ryan. we implored him to help us get from the trump administration these documents about how russia attacked our states. but all we got was silence. silence. radio silence. it was not until special counsel robert mueller indicted 12 russian military officials on

july 13 that we finally learned something more about the specific attacks russia had launched against our states. the trump administration withheld this information from us. we should not have been forced to read about it in a press release. dhs and other agencies should have provided that information months ago. again, that is our job. to check the executive branch. we can't even get the information. both classified and unclassified. so we have worked with states to help secure their election systems. it is clear that the house republicans do not want information about russia's attack our states in the last

election. which seemed like a pretty basic first step. pretty basic. just getting the information. when you are trying to help these very states defend against russian attacks in the next one. but even worse, the house republicans are taking active steps to hurt state efforts to protect their election systems. just last week house republicans blocked all attempts to provide additional funding to secure state election systems. they argued that states do not need more money because they could cover these security upgrades on their own. i have a letter here that we just received yesterday. completely contradicting that republican talking point. and i ask unanimous consent to

make it a part of the official hearing record, mr. chairman. >> without objection. >> this letter is from a bipartisan group of 21 state attorneys general, both republican and democrat. they expressed, and i quote, grave concern over the threat to the integrity of the american election system. end of quote. and they ask for additional funding. we are concerned that many states lack the resources and tools they need to protect the polls. additional funding for voting infrastructure will not only allow states to upgrade election systems, but will also allow for comprehensive security risk assessment. let me conclude with this. some republicans have recently begun to issue more critical

statements about president trump and russia. chairman hurd wrote an op-ed in "the new york times" asserting that our committee must conduct vigorous and public oversight and this is his quote. now, i didn't say this. hurd, chairman hurd said this. i believe that lawmakers must fulfill our oversight duty as well as keep the american people informed of the current danger. as a member of the house oversight and government reform committee, i strongly believe in the importance of congress's oversight responsibilities and will work with my colleagues to ensure that the administration is taking the russian threat seriously. end of quote.

i agree with every syllable chairman hurd wrote. i think it's telling the truth. but it would be much more powerful with action to back it up. we need all of our republican colleagues to conduct oversight. not just use strong words. support our request to subpoena the trump administration for documents it is withholding about the russian attacks. support our request for director of national intelligence to testify in public. vote in favor of additional funding for states that desperately need it. we don't need talk. we need action. this should be a bipartisan issue. and, mr. chairman, you are absolutely right. this must be a bipartisan issue. this must be an issue where we

put our party hats to the side. and we have less than four months to help our states before the next election. and with that, i yield back. >> gentlemen yields back. i'm pleased to introduce today's witnesses. i'll introduce you and recognize you individually for the opening statements. undersecretary for national protection and programs at u.s. department of homeland security. mononorible thomas hicks, assistant commission. honorable maggie toulouse. i knew i'd get that wrong. so my apologies. my south carolina upbringing. i think i'll just go with oliver and not try to pronounce it within more time. secretary of state of arizona, ricky hatch of weber county, utah. welcome. pursuant to committee rules, i will have to administer an oath and ask you to please stand and raise your right hand.

do you solemnly swear or affirm the testimony you'll give will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you god? you may rest assured the opening statements are in the possession of every member. and they will be read so to the extent you're able to summarize your remarks in five minutes that would be great. with that, mr. krebs, you are recognized. >> thank you. chairman gowdy, ranking member cummings and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify recording the department of homeland security ongoing efforts to assist state and local election officials, those that own and operate election system. today's hearing is timely as primary elections are winding down and officials have time to reflect and get ready for the november elections. in fact, less than two weeks ago

secretary nielsen and the dhs leadership team met with officials as they gathered in philadelphia for the summer conference. let me state plainly and clearly. the 2018 midterm elections remain a potential target for russian cyber and influence operations. as described in the 2017 intelligence community assessment, we know the russians engaged in a multi-faceted campaign to meddle in the last election including tactics they have used for decades. based on this prior demonstration of capability and intent, we are planning and preparing as if they'll try again this fall and beyond. in terms of current activity, the intelligence community has observed continuing malign, operation into 2018. while these recent activities are designed to exacerbate divisions, there does not appear

to be an effort at the same scope or scale directed at the midterms that was observed in 2016. nor have we seen russian cyber operations directly targeting state and local election systems infrastructure. having said that, there's little doubt that some adversaries and nonstate actors view elections as a target for cyber and influence operations. having been given a road map we're certain some cyber actors are interested in identifying and potentially exploring vulnerabilities. some driven by prior malicious actions and global dialogue about risks to election infrastructure. additionally, cyber activity of various actors is regularly observed against u.s. infrastructure. including during the 2018 primary season. often common types of activity seen by many internet connected systems. due to that threat landscape, we remain vigilant and met with consequences. in the meantime, we'll continue

to work with our election partners to strengthen the relil yens of our election systems. as i have traveled across the country in primary season, it's clear to me that secretaries of state and other election officials are not sitting back. they take cybersecurity and security in general seriously. our mission is to better understand and manage the risks they face. through concerted efforts in part by building relationships, establishing trust and understanding what it takes, what it is that the stakeholders need to manage risk we have made significant progress over the last year and a half. with strong partnership with the election assistance commission we are working with state and local officials as well as those private sector partners who support them. we have created government and private sector councils who work to share information, promote best practices and develop strategies to reduce risk to the nation's election systems. we have created the election infrastructure information sharing and analysis center with almost 1,000 members including

all 50 states. we are sponsoring security clearances for multiple election officials in each state. we have increased the availability and deployed deployment of free as is tans and offered cybersecurity and physical security training in exercises and in fact later this summer we'll conduct a three-day table top exercise with a number of election officials. we'll continue to refine and update the suite of services as the requirements identified by the stakeholders mature. this will take time and deliberate effort of both sides is across the 50 state and 5 territories, over 10,000 jurisdictions responsible for elections. the systems processes and procedures used vary greatly. what works for the voters of florida likely don't work for the voters of california. by each state and territory. this effort known as our last mile initiative is focused on tailoring awareness of the

threat, security mitigation, best practices and election security checklist to the local level. we understand the only way to deliver a resilient lix system to work collaborateively with the officials including partners at the eac and those on the front line running the process. before i conclude, i want to take a moment to thank congress for legislative progress thus far and strengthening the cybersecurity authorities and strongly support the passage of the cybersecurity and infrastructure security agency act. i look forward to further outlining the efforts to enhance the security of elections. our progress to date and our sfraen strategy moving forward. thank you. >> mr. hicks. >> good morning, chairman gowdy, ranking member cummings and members of the committee. i'm pleased to testify before you today to support election leaders in the efforts to conduct efficient, accessible and secure elections. when congress passed the help

america vote act of 2002 it established the eac as an independent, bipartisan commission for guidance to immediate the requirements adopting voting system guidelines and certifying election systems, serving as national clearinghouse of information on election administration as well as dispensing and auditing funds. i'm pleased to report that our capable team continues to fulfill the mission day in and day out. and election officials across the country constantly affirm our work does indeed help america vote. the eac is only federal entity focused solely on the administration of elections. we serve as the central hub for other federal agencies that spend only part of they time working on this information issue including those who specialize in technology and cybersecurity. our partners ranging from dhs and the fbi, to the u.s. postal service and dod rely on the eac to provide deep knowledge about

how elections work and a clear line of communication to those in the field who administer the vote. election security is not new to those election officials or the tens of thousands of election administrative staff members and election workers that support that work. that said, you can see from this diagram it is not our only responsibility. the work described for the election officials encompasses everything from the compliance and voter registration to election mail management and human resources. this is why it's so vital that congress and federal agencies especially the eac provide election administrators with resources and tools they need to help succeed. the establishment of election systems is part of the nation's critical infrastructure was one way that the federal government sought to improve the mechanisms it uses to accomplish this goal. following former secretary johnson's announcement, the eac worked actively to provide state

and local election officials with a voice at the table during discussions of the sector to function. dhs is often stated that the sector's government coordinating council formed faster than any other sector council to date and the eac takes pride in the role we played to make that happen. it is proof of how state, local and federal governments can effectively work together for a common goal or protecting the nation's infrastructure. i serve on the gcc's executive committee which has worked diligently to ensure the critical infrastructure designation as tangible, meaningful impact across the nation. but we all know that many other solutions to security challenges take resources and we are pleased that members of this committee and your congressional colleagues recognize this reality with the act of 2018. that legislation contained $380 million in security funds for

state and territories to improve the administration of federal elections. just four months after the appropriation bill was signed into law i'm proud to report that we have received disbursement requests for 100% of the funds. that demonstrates the eac's responsiveness and the state's territories urgency in aaddressing ways to improve election systems. less than two weeks after president trump signed the appropriation bill into law the eac personally notified each eligible jurisdiction and issued notice grant award letters to every state and territory. just one week after that. the first state missouri requested funds in the weeks the follow the eac conducted a web cast, public forum to explain the funds and work with the national association of secretaries of state and the national association of state election directors to share information. the eac also conducted webinars, published faqs and other resources on the website

educated nongovernmental groups including those focused on issues of accessibility and security about the funds. our expert grapts team has also helped states navigate hurdles. to date we know the states plan to spend a vast jortd of the money, nearly 75%, on cyber protection, new voting equipment, updates of registration systems and audits. these are all investments that reflect congressional guidance and priorities for those of you who have specific questions about how you state are investing the funds or programs overall, the eac would be happy to establish a time to provide additional details about those plans. the eac has broad spectrum of work to compliment our vital role as the administer of hava funds including the testing of systems and broad spectrum of activities, production of new research, convening public events that bring together

election administrators, security experts, academics, federal government officials and many others to discuss the approach of election systems to better serve american voters. the commission continues to release new resources conducting training, participation in a series of events including security, our staff was involved in the establishment of harvard university's centers table top exercise that is conducted across the nation. and our all staff traveled to nearly a dozen states to conduct election officials as i.t. management trainings for state and local election officials, ongoing and work with dhs to put the trainings online. while election administrators at the state level which is yet another layer of security to protect the vote those who administer elections are grateful for federal support and use the resources to be sure to

be resilient. the eac proeshts support of the efforts and your commitment to provide resources to the states that we and territories we serve. i look forward to providing additional details about the commission's work and answering and all of your questions. thank you. >> ms. toulouse-oliver. >> good morning. thank you for the chance to appear before you today and address some of the things happening at the national level and some work specific to new mexico and the national association of secretaries of state. i'm the new mexico secretary of state. prior to this serving as secretary of state i was county clerk in the county that's the albuquerque metropolitan area. i ran elections in the largest jurisdiction in the state of new mexico for ten years. i'm also the treasurer of the national association of secretaries of state known as nas and a founding and current member of the election infrastructure sub sector government coordinating council.

nas founded in 1904. provides secretaries of state, chief election officials and other public officials across the united states with opportunities to share public policy ideas and best practices. this collaboration is important because it gives election officials access to information beyond what is available in our own states. helping us find innovative solutions to common election administration issues. during the recent nas summer conference held in philadelphia, pennsylvania, over 80 our of sessions, workshops and discussions revolved around elections, cybersecurity. election officials like myself are taking the possible threat of foreign actors meddling in our elections very seriously. in addition, during the conference, department of homeland security secretary nielsen delivered remarks to members of nas and to the national association of state election directors. during which secretary nielsen

emphasized the fact that election security is national security. she also highlighted the positive progress in working relationships of dhs and the states to protect elections infrastructure. while state and local officials have always been focused on election security, the focus of our national organizations and the federal government has increased significantly since 2016. it is clear that election security will be a top priority for state, local an federal officials as well as the general public moving forward. what is also clear is that the federal government and state and local election officials must keep the lines of communication open when it comes to election security. and must continuously work together to harden our nation's election systems. now, to a little bit about my state. new mexico is a leader in election best practices. i am proud to say. we utilize paper ballots in all elections and have robust pre and post-election testing,

accuracy and auditing practices just to name a few. in fact, new mexico was one of the first states in the nation to conduct post-election audits. additionally, the vote tabulation systems that we use are never connected to the internet and include other important security mechanisms that reduce the ability for a bad actor to change votes. these practices are important election security safeguards that are now being adopted by states all across the country. in regard to specific state preparations for 2018 and beyond, i would like to thank you and your colleagues for appropriating the remaining help america vote hava funds to states in the recent omnibus bill. according to the assistance commission as of july 16th, 2018, all of the funds have been requested by the states and eligible u.s. territories as we heard from mr. hicks. in new mexico we recently requested the portion of over $3.6 million in hava dollars.

we plan to use these funds to ensure that new mexico's election systems continue to be resilient and secure. some of the funds will be used purchase more robust voting systems for additional security features for the counties. we have a brand new security program within the bureau of elections with a portion of the funds earmarked to fund a full-time staff position through 2023. the program administrator will be responsible for implementing security best practices the safeguard new mexico's sensitive election data and systems at the state and county level and to provide training and support to county clerks and their staff on cybersecurity issues. this is particularly important in new mexico's smaller, more rural counties that may have limited technical support available to assist with security issues. we will also allocate some of the funds to assist counties with various system upgrades that they cannot afford on their own. we are excited to have the

opportunity to put this program into effect and appreciate the support of congress and dhs in these efforts. thank you again members of the committee, mr. chairman, for inviting me and my colleagues to testify before you and for giving me the opportunity to speak about this important matter on behalf of nas and the state of new mexico. i look forward to answering any questions you may have. >> thank you. mr. hatch. >> chairman gowdy, ranking member cummings, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning on how we can ensure the safety and security of our election system. my name is ricky hatch and i am the elected clerk auditor for weaver county, utah. i'm here on the national counties with 369 county governments across the country. in addition to running elections in my county, i serve as an appointee to the board of advisers. i am on the government

coordinating council and i am the division direct forfor election officials for the international association of government officials. as elections are the foundation of our democracy, election officials across the country embrace our duty to ensure that elections are secure, fair and trustworthy. all elections are local. and i'm here today to underscore the importance of including counties in federal and state discussions to strengthen our national efforts to secure elections and to offer suggestions to improve collaboration among all levels of government. counties play a key role in the election systems and work to states to ensure the integrity of the process. counties run to day-to-day operations of elections. almost 9,000 dedicated local election officials like me throughout the country that oversee the allocation of voting machines, print and mail ballots, recruit and train poll workers and ensure the integrity

of the process. in the 2016 election, counties managed over 100,000 polling locations and hired and trained over 800,000 poll work earls. but elections are not just a one day event for counties. from a cybersecurity standpoint alone we work year around to protect against direct hacking attempts that seek to improperly access voter rolls, remove information from county websites or alter voting data. we also work to protect voting machines, computers and other equipment used to cast, record, tally and certify veets. the integrity of the elections process is our main goal. and security is a key component of that goal. fortunately, coordination of the federal government and localities has improved dramatically in the past 18 months. these partnerships have been invaluable to help protect us from cybersecurity attacks and this is from the council of the department of homeland security

which has been open and refreshingly responsive to our frank and frequent feedback during this process. they include the $380 million in the 2018 omnibus. many states including my home state of utah yoocoordinating w the governments to use this funding. throughout this process, the eac has been the glue in coordinating and promoting all of these new efforts. while all of these are positive changes, we suggest three items to further improve the collective election security efforts. first, we encourage congress to support a dedicated, predictable federal funding stream to help local governments protect elections. resources often get stuck at the state level which can be problematic for us on the ground. we upgrade aging equipment shore up the defenses at great cost to county governments and often do not have the luxury or ability to increase revenues to offset the costs. while the funding was helpful,

we need more at the local level to combat the cyber threats we recommend coordinating especially those that are more remote and rural as miss oliver mentioned in her testimony. for a variety of reasons such as limited staff only a small percentage of local election officials are accessing the valuable free technical resources provided by the federal partners. we urge our federal and state partners to help us reach the jurisdictions. and finally, congress and federal agencies should undertake a robust federalism consultation process with states and local governments when considering any changes to election cybersecurity protocols. local election officials have the most complete understanding of the elections process. we want to hair that understanding with lawmakers. to help ensure that any federal legislation or programs are fully effective on the ground. the best way to safeguard the elections and shore up the cyber defenses is to communicate and work together.

we stand ready to work with you with federal agencies and with our states to strengthen our nation's elections process and retain the public's confidence. sharm gowdy and ranking member cummings thank you again for inviting me to testify today. i'm happy to take any questions. >> thank you very much. >> mr. chairman? >> for what purpose? >> i have a motion. >> reserving a point of order, the gentleman from virginia's recognized for five minutes for -- to state his motion. >> i thank the chair. mr. chairman, like so many of our colleagues, on both sides of the aisle, i was very concerned by the president's statements last week in helsinki but it is to our one on one meeting with vladimir putin. president trump capitulated to mr. putin on nearly every point of contention in the bilateral relationship with russia. he publicly cast doubt on russian interference on our election. he praised as an incredible

offer an unprecedented proposal of mr. putin to hand over american officials including the former u.s. ambassador to russia for russian interrogation. according to the russians president trump even made agreements with mr. putin on syria and russian aggression in the ukraine. president trump refused to allow senior staff to attend the meeting and the president has so far declined to provide congress or the public with any details about what occurred in that private meeting. our committee must act swiftly to determine what would cause president trump to act in this way and to what extent president trump is being manipulated by mr. putin. to do this, we must immediately hold a hearing with the director of national intelligence and others who can inform the committee and the public about the extent of the russian threat to our country. i'm joined in my concern by subcommittee chairman mr. hurd who wrote an op-ed stating that

he had seen russian intelligence manipulate many people as a cia undercover officer but he said, and i quote, i never thought i would see the day when an american president would be one of them. unquote. mr. hurd explained that our committee must work to, quote, ensure that the administration is taking the russian threat seriously, unquote and to fulfill our oversight duty and keep the american people informed of the current danger, he went on. even you, mr. chairman, said on fox news sunday that the evidence of russia's attack on the country is overwhelming and that the president needs to say that and act like that. i couldn't agree more, mr. chairman. in contrast, however, so far the chair's declined our request to invite the director of the office of national intelligence to testify. we appreciate your agreement to

hold a classified briefing with odni. but we think the briefing albeit helpful needs to be accompanied by a public hearing. closed door briefings are not a substitute for public testimony from the top federal intelligence official on how states were attacked by russia in 2016 and the current threats to our election security. mr. hurd again said, and i quote, lawmakers must fulfill our oversight duty as well as to keep the american people informed of the current danger. certainly a public hearing would help accomplish that goal. for all of these reasons, i here by move to subpoena the director of national intelligence mr. dan coats to testify in a public hearing before this committee and the public about the extent of the russian threat involved. i make this motion, mr. chairman, pursuant to house rule 11 clause 2k6 and i believe the motion is in order.

a written copy of my motion and the subpoena is at the clerk's desk. i ask that we dispose of this motion immediately. >> second the motion. would the gentleman yield? >> of course. >> mr. chairman, i want to second the motion and associate myself with the eloquent words of mr. connelly. as you know, i ask for you to invite a representative of the office of the director of national intelligence to come testify here today next to dhs. so that our committee members and the public could hear directly from the experts about the threat that russia poses to our country and our electoral system. director coats won recently that, and i quote, the warning lights are blinking red, end of quote. he compared these warning signs to what we saw before 9/11. our country is under attack. and we must understand that

attack in order to protect ourselves. we must make sure the public hearing directly from director coats about the attack. we have to ring the alarm bell and we need to ring it loud. i know, mr. chairman, that you believe that director coats because i have heard you say it and just ask this past weekend i heard a quote from you and it says, quote, the evidence is overwhelming, it can be proven beyond any evidentiary burden russia is not our friend and tried to attack us in 2016. you said, and going on, the evidence is overwhelming and the president needs to say that and act like it. if i just may add one more minute, mr. chairman, but the simple fact is that the president is not saying that and he's not acting like that. and that makes it all more important that we here in

congress keep ringing that alarm bell and ringing it loud. that we make sure that the public understands that we hear clearly, directly from the experts that we make the evidence public and that we put our money where our mouths are and fund these solutions. mr. chairman, we should have director coats here testifying at this hearing today. but you did not invite him. and so, i join my distinguished colleague mr. connelly in his motion to bring director coats before this committee on another day to testify about the threat that russia poses to our national security and our electoral system and i want to thank the gentleman for yielding. >> gentleman from maryland yields back. the gentleman frr virginia, for what purpose to seek recognition? >> i move we table that motion and the absence of a quorum.

>> gentleman is correct. the motion to table is made and the motion to table and the motion are held until sufficient quorum is present. out of respect for our witnesses, i would and with that -- >> mr. chairman, may we hear the motion? >> i understand the lack of acorum, but i think it would help the members to discuss the motion. >> i do understand the gentleman's concern. since the motion at the table is made, i would ask my friend from massachusetts, you're welcome to discuss it, but i want to vote on it later on given the fact that the motion at the table has been made and given the fact that we have our witnesses here. but i'll be happy to give you a chance to speak on it at the appropriate time.

>> all right, thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> with that, the gentleman from north carolina is recognized for his five minutes of questioning. mr. walker. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i thank our panel for being here today. just for record notice, secretary of state of mexico, would you mind pronouncing that name one more time? i'm going to try here in a second just to get it right. >> thank you, mr. chairman member. it is maggie talouse oliver. >> talouse. okay. mr. hicks, congress appropriated $380 million in grants for state election security expenses that were intended to update voting equipment and improve cyber security practices overall. mr. hicks, how much of these funds or how many of these funds have been dispersed to states? >> all the money is going to be going to the states. so it's -- >> would you repeat that? you said all the money will be going to -- >> right. so about $335 million has been

dispersed right now, but 100% of that money has been requested. >> do you have a timeline when the other $50 million or so will be? >> we should have money out within the next couple of weeks. >> all right. so secretary talouse oliver and mr. hatch, how much did your state request and how much have you received so far? i will start with the secretary of state. >> mr. chair, mr. walker, our state requested the full amount of $3.6 million to which we were entitled based on population. we decide request that full amount and received that full amount. >> utah requested the same amount, not the same amount, but it came to $4.1, $4.2 million. >> and have you received it as well? >> yes, we did. >> good to hear. the security protections are the majority of states using the funds to pursue. do you have any information? >> yes, sir. most of the states are looking to either do cyber security upgrades or purchase new voting equipment. about 75% of the money is going

towards voter registration or cyber security or purchasing of new voting equipment. >> okay. mr. cribs, from your view, how do you maintain the integrity of elections? can you zoom in with only taking 30 to 40 seconds at most what you see the view as? >> so as secretary nielson said several times, election security is national security. dhs plays a supporting role to state and local officials. and it is important that we provide our cross-cutting cyber security expertise to help fill in some gaps at the state and local level where they may not have in-depth cyber security expertise. so what we can bring are broader learnings throughout the infrastructure community. we can help at the local level. >> let me fellow up there, if i could, what do you say congress's role supporting the electoral and securities administration.

would you speak to that? >> yes, sir. it will continue to enable me to do my job in state support and provide, if necessary, additional support including resources. >> ms. toulouse and mr. hatch, what do you see with this? >> i con cur with mr. krebs. to utilize particularly as we get down the road with regard to our local entities. for example, states utilize centralized statewide voter registration databases, so while i'm managing that and overseeing it from my office, it's being utilized by 33 counties across the state of new mexico. so much of which may not even have full-time i.t. staff. so it is really important to conduct risk assessments and provide the tools already provided at the state level. so we'll continue working with dhs and would love to have the assistance of congress with

regard to that. >> mr. hatch, you want to follow-up with that? >> i agree with secretary oliver. the best way the federal government can provide is to provide assistance through resources, consulting as well as dedicated and predictable funding to identify with our needs how much we will be able to meet those needs financially. >> yeah. the first two years i was here i served on homeland security and was amazed at how many times on a daily basis that there are attempts from the russians and their cyber hacking, that is nonstop, in fact, it was all the way back in 2012 when i believe a former presidential candidate pointed out the concern as far as the geopolitical threat that russia is. mr. hicks, i have a question for you. what advice does the election assistance committee have when looking at vendors for cyber security? >> providing vendors? we operate under the voluntary system.

if a vendor wants to submit a system for certification, then we would give them guidance on that. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> the gentleman is recognized. >> thank you for calling this vital and important hearing. this week i went on a faith and politics pilgrimage led by congressman tom reed to upstate new york. the home of the two vital human rights social justice civil rights movements in our country, the right to abolish slavery and the fight to abolish slavery and the fight to grant women have the population the right to vote. and we went to the graves of harriet tubman, susan b.

anthony, all the people that dedicated their lives to freedom and the right to vote for american citizens. i cannot think of anything more important than this hearing. and i must say it is a national scandal that we have been asking for it ever since the election to find out what happened with the tampering of trying to interfere and prevent people from having their vote. the evidence is absolutely clear that the russians tapped into our elections. what is more important, mr. chairman, this is the first of three hearings focusing on preserving the integrity of our votes and the election system. i don't think anything is more important. and i would like to start first by asking mr. krebs, have you read the indictment from mr. mueller? yes or no. >> yes, ma'am. from the geo officers, yes,

ma'am. >> and on the conspiracies that i'm quoting from the indictment, was to hack into the computers of u.s. persons and entities involved in the 2016 u.s. presidential election, steal documents from these computers and stage releases of the stolen documents to interfere with the 2016 u.s. presidential election. do you believe there's any reason to doubt this statement in this indictment, mr. krebs? >> no, ma'am. >> okay. and also, mr. krebs, the indictment goes on to say that in july 2016 the russian spies and i quote, hacked the website of a state board of elections and stole information related to approximately 500,000 u.s. voters, including names, addresses, partial social security names, dates of birth and driver's license numbers. do you have any reason to doubt this information, mr. krebs? >> no, ma'am. >> and also, the russian spies,

quote, hacked into the computers of u.s. vendors, not just voters, but the vendors that supplied software used to verify voter registration information for the 2016 u.s. election. do you have any reason to doubt this information, mr. krebs? >> no, ma'am. and then furthermore, the object of a second conspiracy was, quote, gained from the indictment to hack into the protected computers of persons and entities charged with the administration of the 2016 u.s. election in order to access those computers and steal voter data and other information stored on those computers. do you have any reason to doubt this information? >> i do not. >> okay. i would like to ask every member of the panel whether or not you doubt any of these information, mr. hicks, do you doubt this indictment in any way? >> no, ma'am. >> and ms. oliver? >> no. >> mr. hatch, do you doubt this

in any way, any of this information? >> no, ma'am. >> you know, now, many people have called this, including the president of the united states, a witchhunt. just within the last few days, mr. krebs, do you consider a witch hunt, this data, this information? >> ma'am, this is a dually authorized investigation, authorized and overseen by the deputy attorney general. >> and do you have any reason to doubt this information or to call it a witch hunt, mr. hicks? >> no, ma'am. >> ms. oliver? >> no, ma'am. >> and mr. hatch? >> no. >> well, nobody, really, and i have no reason to doubt it either. and this president and administration and congress need to take this threat seriously. and i would say this committee needs to take this threat seriously. no fight was harder, no more blood and suffering was shed in this country than the fight for liberty, independence and the

right to vote. and i would like to give to the great state of new mexico the last word, ms. oliver, i have just a few seconds left, your statement on this. how does your state feel about it? how do you feel about it? >> i'm deeply concerned, mr. chair member maloney. that is why we are taking this so seriously and working so closely with our federal partners. >> i thank you and i yield back. >> the gentlewoman yields back. and now the gentleman is recognized. >> i'm concerned how many discuss how there's no hearings on this. but mr. herd, we had a hearing of the 2016 election. a number of the folks came in and asked specifically, was there any evidence that the votes in the 2016 election were altered? we have multiple states there, not one, not at the federal level reporting, not at the state level indicated that votes were altered.

there's no quarrel that outside entities, including russia, attempted to interfere with our election. conflating the two gets in the way of doing the job we're trying to do here. which is identify the resources we need to protect the integrity of that system. but i'm apalled at the ongoing conflating of the two and suddenly the world has come to an end. let me ask you a question, mr. hicks, are you aware of the amounts of money put through the states to assist with the elections? i have michigan's. michigan received $11.42 million to upgrade their systems. all of their voting machines will be replaced by the august primary of august 2018. have you received any further requests from michigan for funding or support beyond that, sir? >> i am not aware of any funding in any other additional request from michigan or beyond the request from the 300 -- >> so michigan has not raised a major crisis that our election system in michigan is suddenly

about to come down around our ears at this point. >> i'm not acquire. >> i didn't think so. i have talked to the secretary of the state and know him well. are you aware, sir, of the city of detroit's administration in 2016 journal election? >> i am not. >> let me give you some data on that. 392 precincts in the city of detroit were out of balance. 26% of them said absentee voting could not be verified. one precinct was missing over 250 balled los. they made six recommendations. all of them related to training and staffing of the precincts, not one, not a single recommendation related to either the voter registration file, the electronic records or the actual ballots. the actual voting. how are we going to support that given the fact that despite the concerns of some of my colleagues have, that the russians are coming, the major to of the mistakes happening are

human errors that just multiply and they fail to reconcile? the city of detroit, if there was a recount in michigan, by the way, the president won by 12,000 votes, the city of detroit could not sustain an awe did or sustain a recount because of these problems. how do we support that? >> the eac remains focused, laser-focused on all aspects of elections, whether or not that's voter registration, whether or not that's voting equipment, whether or not that's poll worker training, whether or not that's election night reporting. there are about 8,000 jurisdictions across the country and each jurisdiction has different aspects of it. and we try our best to help each of the jurisdictions function well with the elections through the federal process. >> due to the current need for additional resources to support training, personnel systems for voting, what would that be? >> i don't have a specific number, but there's always need for additional resources. states are very tied to the fact that they have other things they

can focus in on, whether or not that's roads, schools, police and so forth. the elections is usually looked at as a last. as mr. hatch talked about, there are additional ways that congress can look at providing additional funding to the states. >> okay. ms. oliver, let's switch to you because you're nodding your head. however, we still want to maintain a system that is -- that our elections are state and local and not a federal election system. i don't think we want to federalize them, do you? >> no, sir. and speaking on behalf of mass, the secretaries of state, they don't have a position on this issue. speaking for myself personally, my experience in new mexico, a state which has truly suffered ever since the economic decline, we can always use more funding. and i personally view conducting our federal, state and local elections together on one ballot as a partnership. states have always done this issue. we would love to have more

resources in that regard from my perspective. >> has you group identified what the resources would be? >> certainly we can provide you a list, but i agree with you, i think not only do we have to make sure we have the resources to protect in terms of cyber security, but we also -- we have continuing and ongoing needs with regard to training, with regard to resourcing in other ways. so happy to provide you any details you would like. >> thank you. any feedback you have would be appreciated by the committee and ask that you provide that. at this point in time, we have not had any requests and want to support that partnership. i yield back, mr. chairman. >> thank you, the woman from the district of cloum by ya olumbia recognized. >> thank you, mr. chairman. it may not be enough but it certainly is important to have this hearing. and mr. krebs, i want to ask a series of questions to clarify how the russians are going to be so proficient at what they do.

can i ask you whether it is true as i believe the president has implied that the united states also edngages in hacking or trying to get into the election system of other countries? >> ma'am, i have no information on that. my job is to help folks like mr. hatch to protect their system. i'm a defensive homeland security, homeland defense operation. >> so you don't have any information that would indicate that the tit for tat as we do, for example, in spying, also goes on with respect to other countries. >> i do not. no, ma'am. >> mr. krebs, you testified before the house committee on homeland security, and i'm interested because i want to

know how the russians got to be such experts. you used words saying the russians had, quote, scanned all 50 states. and then you said 21, you were not able to see. what is scanning? what does it mean that they scanned all 50 states? >> yes, ma'am. thank you for the question. if i can back up, what we have his or the you cannily said dating back to last summer is based on network visibility, so it sensors on state networks that were using dhs indicators of russian activity. we were able to determine 21 states. in some sense -- >> scanning meaning what? >> so scanning can be a number of things. it can literally be a russian officer getting on his computer and in moscow or elsewhere and visiting a county or state

system. just browsing, going through, whatever his research or search engine is of choice. >> now you saw 50 -- you say they scanned 50 but you were able to see only 21. so why weren't you able to see -- you certainly had 50, but you had your own information on only 21. >> yes, ma'am. so written in my opening, i referenced something called an albert sensor. the albert sensor is a -- a network detection -- it's an ips, i'm sorry. intrusion protection system. it sits on a network and looks for certain traffic, i.p. addresses. so an actual internet connected device somewhere else trying to come in or go out of their system. >> so you were able to see for 21 states but not all 50, but

you think all 50. >> so we assume because we only saw 21. and given the fact that we only saw 21 because that's where we had the albert sensors deployed, we were able to see those 21. i did not have visibility over the rest of the states. now, since february of this year, we have quadrupled our visibility. so when we come up to 2018 in the midterms, ma'am, i suspect we'll have closer to all 50 states. >> so albert sensors will be -- >> yes, ma'am. >> -- used for all 50? >> that was in the fy18 omnibus to be provided additional funds to purchase. >> the russians seem to be more interested in, seem to be targeting more than other things, or were they just looking at the system to see what they could find? would you give us some information? >> i believe to a certain extent they were performing recognizance where they had landed and what functionality the systems had.

it's important to note that what they were able to see or scan n one case, access the system of a voter registration database, that was all on the administration side. that was on the kind of information management side. it wasn't in the vote tallying or vote counting. >> so what do you think they ultimately want to do after scanning -- what are they looking to do? >> it's hard to tell based on their demonstrated capability. we do know that they attempted to interfere in the overarching election, that they intended to interfere in the election. >> and did so. thank you very much, mr. krebs. >> the lady from the district of columbia yields back. before we recognize the gentleman from georgia for his question, the committee will resume consideration of the gentleman from north carolina's motion to stay, to table while the motion is not debatable. i did tell my friend from massachusetts that he would have an opportunity to be heard. so i'm going to keep my word.

and i'm going to ask him to consent despite the fact that the motion is not debatable, but the gentleman from massachusetts be recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and i do appreciate the courtesy being extended to me. i want to initially associate myself with the remarks of the ranking member. he did correctly point out that it has been a long, long time. and i was at the hearing that the chairman heard on the general issue of elections in this country, and that -- that subsumed issue such as auditing and voter files and the element mechanics internally of the domestic elections, the domestic elections, it did not precisely attempt to discern the level at

which the russians interfered with our our attempted to interfere with our election. but i have to say that there is a wide gap between the opinions of many members of congress, both democrat and republican, regarding russian interference. and opinions they think are harmonized with our intelligence agencies that russian interference did occur. and that is not what we hear coming out of the white house. and i respect my friends on the other side of the aisle when they say they acknowledge there was interference by the russians, but then they talk for ten seconds about that and four minutes and 50 seconds about detroit and how the voting files are inact ralt. a

-- inaccurate. and we need to train our election workers. that's not the point. if we had enough concern about hillary e-mails to do nine investigations in the house and two in the senate and had hundreds of hearings on that issue because we thought a u.s. official mishandled their e-mails, hundreds of hearings, and we have two when every single intelligence agency in this country tells us that the russians hacked our election. two hearings. two hearings. that's it. after a year and a half, this used to be the oversight committee. this is the running away from oversight committee. since trump took office. we do zero. i'm surprised we're having this hearing today. i'm shocked. because the republican effort has been to rally around the

president. even when he is wrong. even when he puts down publicly our intelligence agencies. even when he disses us and sides with putin. are you kidding me? are you kidding me? this is where we're at now? this is a disgrace. a disgrace. that was a national embarrassment in helsinki. i was embarrassed that our president was siding against our intelligence agency. and those people worked hard. you all work with them. you work with the nsa, you work with cia. you know the good work that they do. and our president threw them under the bus in front of the world. she will decide with putin.

we stand with the gangster in moscow. do you stwand yoand with your po have a clean and honest election? you want to cozy up with the president to make them look bad? i can understand when there's gray issues, but this is black and white. come on. i know there are colleagues on the other side of the aisle that feel the way i do, and you're exasperated about this. but the time has come on this issue. you can be a good republican and still patrrotect the electoral process in this country. you can do both. that's all i'm asking here. we can get at this, fix this problem and you can still be a good and loyal republican. it's not a question of this role. i know that. on this issue, can we deal with the issue?

can we deal with it? can we fix it? on both our behalves? red states, blue states, all americans? that's the goal here. we shouldn't let the president's quirks on this issue divide us. we can work on this problem as americans. thank you, i yield back. >> the chairman yields back. the committee resumes consideration of the gentleman's motion to the table. those in favor will signify by saying aiy. those who are opposed say no. >> no. >> the aiys have it. >> mr. chairman. i would ask for a recorded vote. >> the gentleman from maryland and the gentleman from virginia ask for a recorded vote. the court will call the role.

>> mr. gowdy? >> yes. >> mr. gowdy votes yes. mr. duncan. mr. issa. mr. jordan. mr. jordan votes yes. mr. sanford. mr. amash. mr. gossar. mr. gossar votes yes. mr. dejarlet. ms. fox. ms. fox votes yes. mr. massey. mr. massey votes yes. mr. meadows. mr. meadows votes yes. mr. desantis. mr. desantis votes yes. mr. ross. mr. walker. mr. walker votes yes. mr. blum. mr. blum votes yes. mr. heiss votes yes.

mr. russell. mr. grossman. mr. grossman votes yes. mr. herd. mr. herd votes yes. mr. palmer. mr. palmer votes yes. mr. comber. mr. comber votes yes. mr. mitchell. >> yes. >> mr. mitchell votes yes. mr. gianforte votes yes. mr. cloud. mr. cloud votes yes. mr. cummings. mr. cummings votes no. ms. maloney? ms. maloney votes no. ms. norton? ms. norton votes no. mr. clay? mr. clay votes know. mr. lynch? mr. lynch votes no. mr. cooper? mr. connolly. >> nay. >> mr. connolly votes nay. ms. kelly. ms. lawrence. >> no. >> ms. lawrence votes no. ms. watson coleman.

ms. watson coleman votes no. mr. christian morthy. >> no. >> mr. christian morthy votes no. mr. race kin votes no. mr. gomez votes no. mr. welch. mr. welch votes no. mr. cartwright. mr. desonye votes no. ms. plaskett votes no. mr. sarbanes. mr. sarbanes votes no. >> have all members who wished to vote voted? clerk will report the tally.

>> mr. chairman, on this vote there are 17 ayes and 15 nos. >> the ayes have it. the motion is tabled. the ga from georgia is recognized for his five minutes of questions. >> thank you, mr. chairman. you know, i don't think anyone here denies the fact that russia attempted to meddle in the elections. they have done so in the past. they have attempted in 2016. i don't have any reason to believe that they won't attempt it again in the ones coming up. when we talk about the witch hunt that involves over a year of investigation by mueller were not one bit of evidence has come forth that president trump colluded with the russians to try to influence the election. and when mr. chairman is dealing with all of this, this has been

going on for a long time. obama administration, as early as 2014, there was meddling. and we did nothing about it. the issue of meddling and the issue of the president colluding is another. and that is indeed a witch hunt. i want to go back to the topic here today. our whole election involves states, not individual states. we have over 8,000 jurisdictions, 110,000 different polling places throughout all 50 states, and for the most part, it's a state issue, not the federal government. and i know in the omnibus that was passed in march there was over a merely $400 million that was granted for states to

improve the election frux. and one of the big concerns that comes along with those kind of moneys and funding is states and people know when there's federal funding there are always strings attached to it. and states are leery of getting involved in accepting that kind of funds. i know in my home state of georgia that has certainly been an issue. mr. krebs, i want to start with you. how has the department of homeland security overcome some of the strings attached to the funding to try to help with election security? >> thank you, sir. i can't speak specifically to any of this the strings attached to the funding and would have to defer to commissioner hicks, but we have done at dhs working with the eac, working with secretary toulouse oliver, we have worked to develop a set of investment

guidance on things that state and local election officials can do to improve their cyber security. and that information is based on a range of factors including the risk and vulnerability assessments that we have conducted doover the last year so on state networks. so what we have done over the assessments, we have identified clear trends. there are a number of things that we're finding consistently across state networks. frankly we are finding these across any other i.t. system. so that is what bakes into the guidance of the recommendation. and we are there to help from a technical perspective, help states implement that guidance. >> let me ask you this, i know the georgia secretary of state applied for a security clearance with dhs to try to access some of the shared classified threat information. do you know whether or not that has been approved yet? >> sir, generally speaking, with

don't discuss security clearance issues in public due to the operational security nature. that could make secretary kemp a target of foreign intelligence collection. i am happy to follow-up on that. >> i would like to follow-up on that. because again the integrity of the state elections is at stake here. ms. oliver, i would like to ask you and mr. hatch regarding homeland security, how prepared are we, do you believe, going into this next election? >> thank you for the question. i believe that we always want to be more prepared. i feel fairly confident about where we are in new mexico. chief election officials are taking this issue very seriously. we're as prepared as we can be. and more important than prepared, we're also ready to be able to respond to any issues as they arise.

>> i agree with secretary oliver. counties, county election officials really have always had security first and foremost. and not just cyber security but physical security. we are prepared and grateful for the additional funding and resources provided by the dhs and the eac and our states. it's a great partnership between the locals and the states. we enjoy sharing information and preparing together and feel confident. of course, the attacks will come and up wouldn't be surprised if there's a breach somewhere. it just happens with that many localities and that much attention. the key is to be prepared and also to be resilient in the case of a breach. >> thank you very much. i yield back. >> the gentleman yields back. the gentleman from maryland recognized. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. i want to associate myself with the words of mr. -- in my 21 years of congress. that has been one of the most

moving statements i have heard in congress. and i want to thank him for that statement. secretary oliver, yesterday a coalition of 21-state attorneys general both republican and democrats sent a letter to congress that contradicts the republican claims that additional funding is not needed to help protect state election systems. the attorney general wrote in a quote, and the undersigned attorney general's right to express our grave concern over the threat of the integrity of the american election system, end of quote. and i have heard your answers to other questions, but have you seen that letter? >> yes, sir, i have. >> the ag also wrote, we are concerned that many states lag the resources they need to protect the -- i heard you say that what you ask for is based

on a formula. is that right? >> yes, sir, that's correct. >> but do you agree with the ags and state that is do not have the funding needed to protect their election? >> i won't be speaking on behalf of everyone on this question because we don't have a formal opinion as a group. but speaking on behalf of myself and my state, yes, i do strongly believe that ongoing funding is necessary. and that there is a consistent source of funding. election security is not a one-time issue. as i mentioned multiple times during a hearing, interference happens. before 2016. it will continue to happen after 2016. the 2016 really brought a level of awareness to all of us about the issue there truly is. i truly do believe that the elections are severely

underfunded with regard to their significance. and so any additional help in terms of tools, resources and funding that the federal government can continue to provide is important. for example, this funding just provided through the omnibus bill wouldn't be a match to replace systems in the state that don't have paper ballot systems that are still using dre machines, for example. >> in the letter they just referred to, this is what they said, ms. oliver. additional funding for voting for infrastructure will not only allow states that rig the election systems but will also agree the security risk in existing election assistance commission grants that are

sufficient to upgrade the technology, meaning more funding is essential to adequately equip states with the financial resources we need to safeguard our democracy and protect the data of voting members of our states, end of quote. senator oliver, do you agree with that statement? >> again, speaking for myself personally -- >> you can speak for yourself. >> yes, i agree. >> and how would more funding help new mexico conduct comprehensive risk assessment? >> so for example, mr. ranking member, we have worked together with dhs to conduct our state risk vulnerability testing. what we don't have is a good sense of where each of our 233 counties in the state stand -- 33 counties in the state stand. many of them are in good shape, but a giant question mark remains over the rest. so what we want to do is do the

same vulnerability testing to get a baseline to see where we are. if we continue to work with dhs in that process, which we would like to do, it will take a while because their resources are limited. if we were to try to contract with the outside entity to do that privately, that is going to cost significantly more funds than we have available, even through the most recent grant. so these are the types of challenges that were working within, mr. ranking member. >> the ag closed the letter with the following plea and i quote, the integrity of the nation voting infrastructure is that bipartisan issue that affects not only the national political landscape but elections in state, county and municipal local levels. it is our hope that you'll agree and take swift action to protect our national legacy of fair and free elections, end of quote. mr. krebs, last week the republicans refused on the house floor to approve another dime

for states to protect their election systems. what is the trump administration's official policy on this specific question? and do you support additional funding in state election systems or not? >> so thank you for the question. in terms of additional funding, there's certainly some laid out in the attorney general level as well as to secretary toulouse-oliver and to what mr. hatch laid out. that is going to take money, whether it comes from the state or the federal government, i don't have an official opinion on that. it is going to take money, we are going to have to identify where the risk is, we're going to have to focus money on that risk as secretary toulouse oliver said, there are still five states that have equipment that does not have a voter verifiable paper trail. from a risk management perspective, that is where i would prefer that we focus resources and assets. >> as i close, i hope my republican colleagues will reverse the opposition and join us in helping these states.

these 21 ags are from states, many of you represent north carolina, michigan, and dr california. let me quote by reading from their letter. it is imperative that we protect the integrity of our elections. we have to ensure that the upcoming 2018 midterm elections are secure and untainted. accordingly, we ask for your assistance in shoring up our systems so that we may protect our elections from foreign attacks and interference. let me ask you this, do you agree with that, mr. krebs? >> sir, i tell you what, if you could repeat that. >> i'm not going to repeat it. basically what they're saying is that we want to make sure that our electoral system is protected.

and that people will know that their votes are going to be counted and that the process is untainted. and i would guess that the system is what you are in office for. >> yes, sir. that's why we are important to have this hearing right now. so the american people can hear about the efforts that dhs is leading, the election assistance committee is leading, that state secretaries are leading. this is a partnership working right now. we are improving security practices across the electoral system in this nation at great pace. there is a lot of work to do. thereis a marathon. >> speaking of the marathon, mr. krebs, you listed a lot of things that you look at. the one thing i noticed that you did not mention is voter suppression. you aught to look at voter suppression. because that is a booger bear. >> that's not one of the functions. >> that's why you didn't list it. okay, thank you. >> the gentleman from florida is recognized. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you to the witnesses.

mr. secretary, for the 2016 election, was there any cyber activity that influenced any of the vote totals in any jurisdiction to your knowledge? >> so very specifically drilling down to the cyber-enabled hacking we'll call it of state election systems, we do not have information or evidence that suggests they had access to vote tallying systems. and that is why i made that distinction earlier. there's the administration piece and the vote tabulation counting side. >> the other stuff is obviously still important. in fact, with the registration, like the registration database, if that were to be compromised, how would that have a negative effect? or what would be the problem? >> so on the specifics with deferring to secretary toulouse oliver, but the way the nation's laws are built up, there are checks and compensating controls in place that, in fact, that state election or that registration database had been compromised to a point where

information was deleted or changed and such that a voter had showed up to vote and their information was not there or otherwise not consistent. and there was an abnormality at the poll. there are processes across the country including provisional ballots that would allow that american voter to cast their vote and subsequently that vote would be counted correctly. now, i have to emphasize that the outcome here is not security, 100% security, it's rejuly yent. so we can take a hit and keep functioning and that there's confidence in the system. yes, that would create some challenges on election day if that had not been detected. i do think it would probably be detected beforehand as we saw in 2016 where that compromise was detected. nonetheless, there are checks in place, there are compensating controls in place for resilience in the system to sustain those sorts of access in compromise. >> what's the breakdown roughly between states that use

electronic poll books and states that use paper? >> so electronic poll books, i defer to the voting experts on those numbers, if i can. >> okay. mr. hicks? >> we would have to get back with you on that information, but there are a number of states that are going towards more electronic poll books as opposed to paper poll books or registration things. but as mr. krebs talked about earlier, there is a resiliency in terms of things the states do. so if the voter registration list is compromised, those should be backed up and also having some form of paper form available so that folks can ensure that they are eligible to vote. but also with provisional ballots, no voter should be able to leave the polls without having the chance to cast their ballot. under federal law. >> in an age of where the cyber stuff is always going to be a threat, is it just better for confidence to have paper

ballots? >> as long as we continue on with security and accessibility, and right now paper ballots are audible. and as long as folks can still cast their ballots who are disabled, then i would say, resoundingly, yes. >> what about election night reporting? what threats is there? is there vulnerability at the local and state level, mr. secretary? >> so when you think about the election night reporting, basically you're talking about the unofficial election results being reported either to the media or in some cases on a website. keeping in mind, again, that is on the administration side, it is not the official data. and what we have seen recently were some either technical glitches in election night reporting or perhaps cyber actor efforts to disrupt election night reportings. so it's important here because it's on any i.t. system. much like your own congressal web page, it's a web page.

there are vulnerabilities in any web page. so what we're trying to do is work with election officials, state and local election officials, to communicate clearly to the voting public that, hey, this is unofficial data. if there's a problem, we're still going to get you the official results or a read-out. it just may take a little more time. but the integrity of the official election data is intablgt. there is no connection backed between the website reporting and the official data. >> i yield back the balance of my time. >> the gentleman yields back. the gentleman from missouri is recognized. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and mr. krebs, i would like to discuss some documents about russian attacks on state election systems in 2016. documents that dhs and the administration have refused to provide to this committee, you are familiar with the october

2017 letter to dhs requesting these documents from ranking member cummings and subcommittee ranking member kelly, correct? >> yes, sir. in fact, i reviewed that letter this morning, yes, sir. >> and you are familiar with the official questions for the record requesting these documents accompanied by a letter signed by i.t. subcommittee chair will herd following your testimony at the joint subcommittee hearing last fall, is that correct? >> yes, sir. >> okay. back in late january, all oversight committee democrats wrote to chairman gowdy seeking a season for these documents. we were ignored. ranking member cummings along with five other house committee members wrote to speaker ryan asking for his assistance in obtaining these documents. they were ignored.

mr. chairman, i ask you then, the consent for the four letters to be made part of the official record of today's hearing. thank you, sir. now mr. krebs, back at that november hearing, you stated and i quote, if you'll permit me to go back and i commit to you that we will have a more wholesome answer for you, on february 6, 2018, dhs provided approximately 50 pages of documents, most of which were already publicly available. the production did not include any classified document, nor did it include documents about the precise nature of these attacks. the number of times that these states were targeted or when they were targeted. and this has been eight months. that is not a mere wholesome

answer to our request. it is just more documents that we did not ask for and that do not answer our requequestions. why are you with holding from congress documents about how russia attacked our state? >> sir, i don't believe i'm with holding any information. i need to go back and review the answers we provided to those letters. it has always been my commitment to approach this manner a bipartisan manner or a nonpartisan manner. because i see this as a matter of american security, national security. so if you'll permit me, i would like to go back and look at the answers and also the range of briefings, as i understand with my staff, we provided close to 30 if not more classified briefings. i personally provided in the housewide classified briefing earlier this summer, late spring, and provided information on what we were doing and what we saw. so, you know, if you're not satisfied with the information, certainly, we can go back and

look at what we provided previously. >> well, we are asking what you asked the department of homeland security to determine about exactly what the russians, how they attacked us. >> yes, sir. and i think that information is in the intelligence assessment. the intelligence community assessment. the unclassified version provides a significant amount of detail. the catch here is that on the classified side in terms of the tactics and techniques, that they used against our state networks, it's not highly classified information. it is technical. in fact, the recent indictments provide additional information. >> well, how about you initiating the inner agency process to obtain clearance to give us these documents. can you do that? >> sir, i will once again commit to you that we'll go back and take a look at this and make sure you get what you need. >> you know, in fact, we learn

more about what happened in illinois from reading special counsel mueller's indictment of the 12 national -- we are asking for cooperation here. and for you to actually share with us what you know. that's our function. as mr. lynch said, we have the oversight function and we really need some cooperation. mr. herd signed a letter asking for the document. i will yield -- well, i don't have time to yield. thank you anyway. >> you timed that out perfectly. >> thank you, i yield back. >> the gentleman from alabama is now recognized. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i think my colleague may have asked this question, mr. krebs, but did russia determine the

outcome of our election? >> sir, based on the cyber security technical hacking aspects of state and local election officials, we don't have any information that suggests theyed a ha ed ed hade tallying or any ability to change votes. >> one of the ways to influence the outcome of the election is not necessarily the vote tallying on the day of the election but about registration. is that accurate? >> it could be. well, if i'm understanding your question, which is by the registration process? >> or by manipulating the voter registration by registering people not eligible to vote? >> so coming at it from the angle of disrupting the registered voters in their ability to vote, we have already talked a lit bit about the resilience of the system. but in terms of adding additional people to the vote, i'm not sure what the question is. >> my point is this, that there

is more than one way to influence the outcome of the election. we saw this in 2008 and 2010 with a group called acorn. and their voter registration efforts in nevada and colorado and florida and other places where they were registering people. there was in indiana about 2,100 voter registration forms that were invalidated because they were filled out by the same person. there was another 5,000 that were set aside because of that. you had a lady who was leading the 2010 effort in nevada. a project vote program for acorn that was under indictment, amy lucifink. and the situation in colorado where they pressured the colorado agencies with people who were on public assistance, and their fraudulent registration rate was four times the national average. so there are other ways to influence the jut come of an

election -- outcome of an election other than manipulating the vote tally on election day. is that a fair assessment? >> sir, i don't have experience in that side of the process. i would have to defer to the election officials at the table. >> anyone want to respond to that? mr. hatch? >> there will be an attempt to med until the elections, whether through a cyber security attack or through influencing social media or trying to get additional people to register to vote. as an election official, as a local election official, i have to focus on things i can control and things within my domain. and so we -- we recognize that there are all sorts of influence out there. and there will be always. what we do is we make sure that the public is confident in the election process itself. and we do that by outreach to

candidates' parties orders. >> can you protect our election from threats, foreign and domestic, is that fair? >> yes. >> i just want to direct your attention to a report from the research center like acorn center. when we talk about protecting the elections, we are not just protecting them from foreign influence but from domestic influence. and that's critical. i agree with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle. that it's absolutely critical that people have confidence that the vote count is accurate, it reflects the will of the people, and it hasn't been ma nip plated. manipulated. so when we talk about that, i hope every state is taking it seriously. it is not just making sure we are protected from the foreign influence but by domestic attempts from any group on any side of the aisle that would try to influence the outcome of the election. is that part of what we're doing

here? you're nodding your head, ms. toulouse oliver? >> absolutely. and i think this examples that you just gave with regard to acorn, we had similar situations happen when i was a county clerk in new mexico. questions of voter registration, we referred them to law enforcement as appropriate, and that goes to what we have been talking about all along, which is to not only protect our systems, but we can never have a 100% secure system. so it's also -- it's also important to remember that our systems are resilient. so identifying, finding, rejecting fake registrations, being able to identify a fake registration that could come in through an online portal as well. that's all part of what we are doing. and absolutely, it doesn't matter who is trying to interfere with our elections, foreign or domestic, that's what we are all focused on. >> mr. chairman, i appreciate the response of the witnesses. and i would just like to say

that each one of us are outraged that the russians made an attempt, but we should be equally outraged whennen in makes an attempt to deny the american public their our elec commend the public for their well thought out fighting for what they want. i yield back. >> the gentleman from massachusetts is recognized. >> i thank the chairman and the ranking member for his kind words. i want to thank the witnesses for your willingness to be so truthful and blunt and honest with your assessment of the fact that the russians have interfered with our elections in the past and are likely to do so in the future. i'm actually the ranking democrat on the subcommittee on national security, so with my colleagues across the aisle, you know, we travel quite a bit. we spend a fair amount of time in afghanistan.

we probably got 20 trips to afghanistan, pakistan, iraq, nigeria, egypt. ironically, we look very closely at rule of law issues, elections and all of these countries, afghanistan, pakistan, iraq, nigeria, egypt, among others, have had problems with their election. and i have to say i think it has a corrosive effect on democracy in those countries. you look and there is no independent judiciary. there is a decided and pronounced lack of respect for the rule of law in those countries because it's not seen as endorsed or supported by the general public. sort of a top-down system with a lot of corruption. it's oftentimes anemical to minority rights and human rights in those countries. so i just worry. i worry that if we allow our

electoral process, if we allow doubt to creep into the minds of the american people that the elections are not legitimate, then our laws are not legitimate, our leaders are not legitimate. it's just a corrosive effect that happens, and i'm just very concerned about that. and i think we ought to be all over this with much more gusto than the president has invited. mr. president, i want to start with a couple easy questions. a while back we had fbi director christopher wray testify before congress, and he said that he was not specifically directed by the president to address russian interference. i'm just curious, has the president directed you specifically to address the russian interference? >> thank you for the question. >> i think it will be a yes or

no. i don't have a whole lot of time here. either he did or he didn't. >> i have been in a policy meeting where the president made it very clear that it is a priority. >> russian interference? >> he made it clear that russian interference is a priority. >> dni, the director of national intelligence, dan coats, said there was no single agency in charge of our sort of countering russian interference. is that still the case, or do you think we have -- do we have a single agency that's taken that over? >> sir, given the range of authorities and capabilities across the federal government, this is a team effort. this is a whole government effort. >> okay. is there a specific white house guidance on the issue? >> the guidance to secure the election, yes, sir. >> oh, that's it? okay. i'm just curious. now, since john bolton came in as national security adviser, he

fired rod joyce who was the cyber security coordinator at nfc. he said he wanted to streamline things, but a lot of people feel that rod joyce was one of the smartest people we had on cyber security. as a matter of fact, he didn't just fire him, he eliminated the position. we don't have an adviser on cyber security anymore at the white house. do you think that's helpful, or do you think we should use somebody? >> sir, i don't mean to contradict you, yet i think mr. joyce was on a detail from the nsa and he returned to the nsa on his detail. so he was not fired, he's still in the federal government. >> his position has been eliminated, though. >> the cyber security coordinator position has officially been eliminated.

there are cyber security directors and senior directors in the national security council. i think the important thing to note here, though, is that operational responsibility resides in the technical agencies. so i have a very clear job and my work is to work -- my job is to work with these folks with me at the table to provide them the resources and capabilities they need to secure the election. so, again, i have clarity of mission, clarity of purpose. we know what we're doing every day. >> everybody feels that way? mr. hicks, mr. louis oliver and mr. hatch? we're all on the same page and we're going to secure the election? >> that's my sworn duty. >> yes, sir. >> okay. i have exhausted my time. i thank the gentleman for his courtesy and i yield back. >> the gentleman yield back. the gentleman from north carolina, mr. matos. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. krebs, thank you for articulating how clearly you feel the mission is for you and your team. we have all kinds of narratives that are out there, but will you

reiterate for this committee and perhaps for the american people your primary responsibilities to make sure that our election process is secure and that every vote is counted, counted accurately, not double counted and not interfered with, is that correct? >> yes, sir. >> so -- and you've had that articulated from the administration to you and that you feel empowered to do that? >> i have a very clear guidance from my secretary. i have received guidance from the white house. i am empowered to do any job. i have clarity of mission, clarity of purpose. i spend 40 to 50% of my day focused on the 2018 midterms and beyond. >> i appreciate you reiterating that, because i talked to the secretary, and she has articulated that very clearly to me. and it's good, because sometimes it doesn't get transferred to those that actually do the work. what you're saying is you have a clear vision. do the people that work for you have a clear vision? >> sir, i would actually have to

defer on answering that question. i would actually ask secretary toulouse oliver if she feels my folks that work with her on a daily basis are able to do their jobs. i think that would be the best way to get that answer. >> very well. go ahead. >> yes. and i actually wanted to make a comment earlier as mr. krebs was describing the provisional balloting process and some of the other technical processes that we undertake. i am so proud that dhs has learned elections from working closely with us, and maybe not completely, but yes, i absolutely do believe so, sir. >> all right. thank you, both. let me give you a to-do, because one of the concerns i have is really that paper trail. obviously we have a bill that is a bipartisan bill that looks at a paper system. but here is the problem on elections and part of why we're seeing this. we need, from a security standpoint, really a level of

this is what we do. kind of like a password. you know, the longer the password the better it is, but i'm talking about systems. i represent 16 counties and we have multiple different ways to vote within my own congressional district. so i've got paper ballots in part of it, i've got electronic ballots in another part. we have the typical bubble in and scan in one county, and we have all electronic. and yet they're making individual purchases many times on voting systems. so it's not necessarily handled at the secretary of state level in some states. so it would be very good to have a resource where they come and they said, okay, if you're looking at upgrading your system, here are the five things you need to do, and this is most secure, this is -- because i don't find that. do we have that currently? >> so i would -- i can speak very briefly and then we'll kick

it over to commissioner hicks here, but we work closely with the eac, we work closely with the coordinating governing council. every county is going to be different in terms of resource, population, the quality of the infrastructure -- >> you're preaching to the choir, i get that, but the real problem is there is not a resource at this point at the federal level. mr. hicks, with all due respect, is a commissioner. this is the first time i've ever heard of the u.s. election assistant commission, and when we see that, when you google that, it doesn't come up. you're not in the top 10 in terms of search. how do we make sure that states not only are aware, not just our witnesses today, but there is a real criteria? >> that means we're doing our job because we don't want to be known. we want to make sure that we work with the states to make sure that they get the resources they need to ensure the process functions correctly. we were down in your state of

north carolina about a month ago with a testing and certification class, and we do certify voting systems, but it's a voluntary basis. states come to us and they say, these are the systems we want to have certified through the manufacturers and those systems are certified. right now we don't have a quorum of commissioners, so we can't do the next iteration of those voting system guidelines that haven't been updated since about 2007. >> so is there a federal guideline on what you would recommend to states in terms of how to secure their system? is there that? >> on how to secure their systems? there are guidelines on that. >> and are there priorities in terms of if they're going to replace equipment, what are the recommendations you make? do you have any? >> it's in our voluntary voting system guidelines 2.0 which we can't vote on because we don't have a kwquorum. >> okay, i yield back. >> the gentleman yields back.

the lady from michigan is recognized. >> the "new york times" article targeted ngsdinside a three-yea russian campaign to convince voters to not only divide our nation along party lines but also along socioeconomic and racial lines. in mid-october, an instagram account ran by the internet resource agency carried the message "hatred for trump is misleading the people and forcing blacks to vote for killary." we cannot resort to the lesser of two evils. we'll surely be better off without voting at all. then just days before the americans went to the poll, another instagram account controlled by