the nomination and majority leader mcconnell has said he will hold a final confirmation vote this week. follow the senate live on c-span2. later tonight, c-span's 2018 campaign coverage continues with an oregon governor's debate from portland. incumbent democrat kate brown faces republican knute buehler and republican pat starnes. people age 12 to 19 will ask the candidates questions. see that debate live at 10:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. up next, state and defense department officials testify on the status and future of arms control agreements between the u.s. and russia. they answered questions on current relations between the two countries and the status of mornlting under agreements such as the 2011 stark treaty. the senate foreign relations committee, this is about an hour, 45 minutes.

>> i want to thank everybody for being here. i think because we need 11 people to vote, we're going to go ahead and give the opening statement. as soon as we get to 11 folks, we'll stop and vote on the noms and i want to thank everybody for their cooperation. but first, i want to thank our witnesses for being here with us today. we're fortunate to have such an experienced and distinguished panel. as our members know, this is a fourth in a series of hearings on russia since july with today's hearing considering the current status of and prospects for arms control efforts. current situation is not encouraging. out of four agreements, new start, the inf treaty, the open skies treaty, and the chemical weapons convention, we have significant problems with russian compliance of three of them. it should come as no surprise to

any of us that russia has been cheating on its treaties. vladimir putin's government has annexed crimea, occupied parts of russia, interfered with elections, including our own, used chemical weapons to poison individuals on british soil, and even purportedly hacked u.s. utilities. given that record, he's not likely to let treaty commitments get in his way either. the question we need to ask is, what are we going to do? some argue that we should just walk away from the inf treaty, since russia has been in blatant violation for several years now. some think that's exactly what putin hopes for. the last time we deployed intermediate range missiles to west germany in 1983, a million people protested. that is exactly the kind of division that russian information operations are designed to exploit and to intensify. as we discussed at our meeting

on nato, it is crucial that we remain unified with our european partners on defense and deterrence issues. on the open skies treaty, we are at an impasse with the russians. we haven't had a flight all year. we can live without that data, but it hurts the 32 other countries that do not have the same alternative resources that we do. even with new start, which has succeeded in its objective so far, we should be realistic about our expectations of where we will be with russia in 2021 when the treaty expires unless extended. nevertheless, we need to be thinking carefully about the effects of new weapons and technology on strategic stability between the u.s., russia, and other nations. putin has boasted about the hypersonic glide vehicles, nuclear powered ballistic missiles, nuclear torpedos and russian advances in cyber warfare, space, and artificial

intelligence. each of these developments introduces new uncertainties into the deterrence calculations of adversaries and none of them is easy to address from an arms control verification and compliance perspective. but as we devote our own research and development into these areas, we must consider their potential to encourage risk taking by any country with access to them. i hope our witnesses today cannot only provide an assessment of the status of current agreements but also offer us some assurance that the state and defense departments are considering these emergency arms control challenges. i also hope we can gain a better understanding of any arms control discussions that took place at the helsinki summit and what the prospects may be for future arms control agreements. with that, i want to thank you, again, for being here. i still don't think we have 11 so i'll turn to our distinguished ranking member, senator menendez.

>> thank you, mr. chairman, for convening today's hearing. arms control efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war are vital for maintaining u.s. national security. two months after president trump's helsinki meetings with president putin, we remain largely in the dark. we do know that russian ambassador to the united states told reporters that important verbal agreements were reached at the helsinki summit on arms control issues, including preservation of the new start and inf treaty. we continue to find ourselves in an -- the american people, the elected officials -- administration hear more from russian officials in alleged agreements that the president is making about critical national

security issues. what constitutes an important verbal agreement? has the president reached key decisions with russia on key arms control treaties? if so, why hasn't congress been informed about this decision? along with many others in this body, i have for many years strongly supported policies to confront russia for its multiple and ongoing transgressions including military aggression. i believe that we must develop comprehensive strategies to confront our adversaries that ultimately prioritize the safety and security of the united states and its citizens. this requires being clear-eyed act the threats we face and all the tools our adversaries can wield against us. constraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons must be a core component of our strategy. given the reality of russia's current nuclear capacity, we must collectively use every diplomatic tool in our arsenal,

economic, political, and military to achieve our goals. the stakes could not be higher. negotiated and entered into agreements with our adversaries, recognizing that we are dealing with hostile powers that cannot be trustsed. we build in metrics that account for a probability of efforts to deceive and dodge. in high stakes agreements, provisions outlining u.s. verification and compliance are essential. in the universe of arms control agreements with russia, we conduct on site inspections of military bases and facilities. we require data exchanges in order to track the status and make-up of their nuclear forces. today we know russia is violating the intermediate range nuclear force treaty. if we have evidence that a country is violating international commitments, we must be unequivocal in working through the construction of the agreement to bring them back into compliance. we must never lose sight of our objectives with any arms control agreement. to reduce the risk of catastrophic war and to constrain our adversaries' ability to threaten us and our

allies and in assessing the value of an arms control agreement, we must consider whether our participation in the agreement further advances our goals. would withdrawing or walking away from an agreement strengthen our hand or ultimately leave us without a seat at the table, without insight into our adversaries' stockpile. safer or less secure. finally i want to remind our members of some of the history surrounding the senate's ratification of the new start treaty. when the senate deliberated in 2010, some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, including our eschemed chairman, made it clear they were willing to vote for the treaty but only as part of a deal that modernized our nuclear forces and infrastructure. neither an unconstrained nuclear arms race nor blind faith in arms control agreements serve u.s. national security interests. american security is best served with a strong, credible deterrent that operates within a legally binding, stable, and constrained arms control environment. i hope the trump administration fully appreciates this vital

linkage. diminishing, for example, the value of arms control and placing all faith in one dimensional conceptions of increasing nuclear strength to brink the russians and the chinese to heel will result in a far more dangerous strategic environment. i also want to remind the administration that bipartisan support for nuclear modernization is tied to maintaining an arms control process that controls and seeks to reduce russian nuclear forces, which inevitably means promoting military and fiscally responsible policies on ourselves. we're not interested in writing blank cheksz for a nuclear arms race with russia and we don't want to step off our current path of stability to wander again the uncertain road filled with potentially dire consequences and the final note i'd make, mr. chairman, i guess we have enough people now to vote is that i hope that as part of our oversight, which i applaud you for having conducted with these hearings, that we will also get to -- an opportunity to mark up dasca and similar related bills.

i think it is important for the congress to speak about russia's violations of the international order, certainly the undermining of our election, and since we have very often this committee taken up sanctions as part of our overall foreign policy tool, which is one of the critical tools of peaceful diplomacy, i would urge the chairman to make sure that we also keep jurisdictional opportunities as it relates to that and that we can have a mark-up that sends a hepfully united message to the russians that we will not tolerate their actions, both at home and abroad. and with that, mr. chairman, i look forward to the witnesses. >> thank you, and thank you for that statement. i think everyone here understands that depending on how you write a bill, and what key phrases you use, it determines which committee it goes to and we're not giving up jurisdiction jurisdiction on anything but every committee member has to understand if they want to come to foreign relations, they have to write it in a certain way and

i know everybody's mastered that art. i know you did on that bill and it's a bill that's in that committee so i thank you for referring to that. with that, thank everyone for their cooperation in being here. and what i'd like to do is recess our hearing and move to a very, very quick business meeting if we could and thank all of you. i know it doesn't mean much to many of us here to confirm these nominees. it means a whole lot to them and it means a tremendous amount to the countries that they are going to and so i thank you and so the business meeting of the senate foreign relations committee will come to order. on the agenda today are nine nominees, senator menendez, would you like to make any comments. >> i support all the nominees. >> anyone else? seeing no comments, i have received a letter to hold over the nomination of mr. francisco louis palmeira to be ambassador to honduras. he did just, by the way, his written answers just did come

in, but apparently -- i know that one of our members here was not able to read those yet so we'll consider him next time. we'll now consider all the other items on the agenda, including the following. ms. linda blanchard to be ambassador to slovenia. the honorable earl robert miller to be ambassador to bangladesh. mr. daniel rosenblum to be ambassador to uzbekistan. mr. kip tom to be ambassador to the united nations agency for food and agriculture. ms. karen williams to be ambassador to the republic of suriname. the honorable donald to be ambassador to somalia. kevin sullivan to be ambassador to nicaragua. mark rosen to be u.s. executive director of the international monetary fund. is there a motion to favorably report these nominations? >> second.

>> so moved and seconded. the questions on the motion to report favorably the nominations, all in favor will say aye. >> aye. >> opposed? with that, the ayes have it and the nominations are agreed to. that completes the committee's business. i ask unanimous consent that staff be authorized to make technical and conforming changes. without objection, so ordered and with that, without objection, the business meeting will adjourn and we will begin again the hearing and i thank all those for being here. you completed your opening statement, i think, so let me move to another part. our first witness today is the honorable andrea thompson, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security. we had a chance to speak in the back, but thank you so much for passenger here and sharing your expertise with us. our second witness is the honorable david trachtenberg,

deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. i shared the same with you. thank you both. if you could summarize in about five minutes any written materials you have without objection will be entered into the record. we thank you again for being here. it's an important hearing and if you could just begin in the order introduced, i'd appreciate it. >> good morning, chairman corker, ranking member menendez, and distinguished members of the committee. thank you for hosting this hearing and welcoming me here today to discuss arms control with russia. a topic that is central to our security and indeed the world's. the 2018 nuclear posture review states, quote, progress in arms control is not an end in and of itself and depends on the security environment and the participation of willing partners. the value of any arms control agreement is derived from our treaty partners maintaining compliance with their obligations, and avoiding actions that result in mistrust and the potential for miscalculation. russia continues to violate a series of arms control

obligations that undermine the trust the united states can place in treaties, including some that have served u.s. and allied security interests for years. as reflected in the administration's national security strategy, and oechoed n our national defense strategy, great power competition is reemerging. wuk no longer be complacent. we need to be creative and flexible in how we approach and manage our strategic competition with russia. and that includes an evaluation of where we stand with respect to our arms control, our interrelationship with our deterrents and defense.

skripals. chemical agent. we have been clear with moscow and will continue to execute our mandate. meanwhile, the united states and our nato allies -- the

department of state also leads efforts to push back. of particular concern, russia has experimental satellites that conduct sophisticated activities, at least some of which are intended to advance counterspace capabilities. and finally, i would also note that our sanctions policy is an important tool in maintaining pressure on moscow to abandon its malign activities. we assess that our global campaign to implement section 231 -- several billion dollars in lost sales as states abandon pending arms deals with moscow. the department of state remains committed to the ongoing full implementation of section 231. in all, russia's destabilizing actions include significant

transgressions in its adherence to international obligations, namely arms control treaties and agreement. this has created a trust deficit that leads the united states to question russia's commitment to arms control as a way to manage and stabilize our strategic relationship and promote greater transparency and predictability. russia must take its commitments more seriously if we are to find ways to shift our relationship to a more stable path. thank you for the opportunity to discuss these critical issues with you and i look forward to your questions. thank you. >> thank you. >> chairman corker, ranking member menendez, and distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the current state of arms control with russia. i will not repeat much of what undersecretary thompson has already discussed. bottom line is that arms control with russia is troubled, because the russian federation apparently believes it need only abide by the agreements that suit it. as a result, the credibility of all international agreements

with russia is at risk. united states is committed to its long-held arms control nonproliferation and nuclear security objectives, particularly our commitment to the goals of the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. arms control can contribute to u.s. security by helping to manage strategic competition among states and we are committed to meaningful arms control that decreases the chances of misperception, miscalculation, and conflict. nuclear posture review acknowledges that progress in arms control is not an end in and of itself. the current security environment makes arms control extremely challenging in the near term. any future arms control arrangement must be pursued in the context of the broader security environment and must include the participation of willing partners. it is difficult to envision progress in a security environment that is currently threatened by russia's continuing noncompliance with existing arms control obligations and commitments. in this regard, russia poses a

series of challenges that do not lend themselves to conditions suitable for the greater trust necessary to engage in a prudent arms control agenda. it would be irresponsible to ignore these infractions and not hold russia responsible for its violations. as a reliable ally and partner, the united states must advocate for arms control agreements that make the world more secure and include the willing participation and compliance of all parties. with respect to new start, united states assesses that russia is in compliance with the new start treaty. both sides met the new start treaty central limits in february of this year, and i can assure you that the united states will faithfully implement and verify russian compliance with the treaty. moving forward, united states will consider whether to extend new start treaty beyond its february 2021 expiration. any decision on extending the treaty will and should be based on a realistic assessment of whether the new start treaty remains in our national security

interest in light of overall russian arms control behavior. on inf, the russian federation remains in violation of its obligations under the inf treaty. we have been more than patient and have provided russia with ample opportunities to come back into compliance but to no avail. this administration's determination of russia's violation is no different than the one first announced in july of 2014. we reviewed the intelligence and came to the same conclusion as our predecessors. the evidence is conclusive. the violation is real and it goes against the core purpose and restrictions of the inf treaty. this administration has sought to preserve the viability of the treaty by applying pressure on russia to return to compliance with its obligations. we believed it was in the national security interest of the united states and in our allies and partners' interests to preserve the inf treaty but we recognize that russia ultimately would determine whether the inf treaty remains viable. one thing is certain.

we cannot allow our treaty partner to continue to violate a core tenet of the inf treaty indefinitely and we will not let our actions or inaction occur at the expense of our security or that of our allies and partners. for the last year, the department of defense has reviewed and evaluated systems you could develop if it were not constrained by the inf treaty. the identification of these capabilities seeks to remind russia of why it entered into the inf treaty in the first place. we appreciate the efforts of congress to help the department of defense implement these research and development efforts. regardless of whether russia returns to compliance with the inf treaty, there are broader implications for the future of arms control due to the lack of trust that has been created by russia. it is difficult to envision a way forward for the united states and russia to rebuild that trust and achieve a level of transparency that could lead to a brighter future for arms control. the onus to create the conditions for this trust falls

on both the united states and russia but moscow will bear the burden should these efforts fail as russia's actions created the situation we currently find ourselves in. mr. chairman, we appreciate the opportunity to testify. the attention of this committee and the rest of congress to these issues and we will keep you informed of development. thank you again and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you both for your opening comments and your service. as the norm, i'm going to turn to our ranking member, withhold my time for interjections, thank you. >> mr. chairman, before guy to questions, i want to make a comment. the question of how we wrote this was not just for jurisdictional purposes. it was written in a way to be comprehensive enough to deal with all of russia's malign activities so i don't want you to think that it was just a strategic purpose. let me just ask both of you, on the topic of arms control, can you tell us what was discussed during the two-hour closed

meeting with president trump and president putin? >> thank you, senator. i can't tell you the specifics of what was discussed in helsinki. i can tell you that arms control was a topic of conversation. we've since had dialogue with our russian counterparts last month in august, nsa bolton met with his counterpart, the foreign minister lavrov and secretary pompeo have had multiple discussions and i've had discussions as well. arms control remains a dialogue. >> so as the russian ambassador said, verbal agreements, did veshlg agreements get entered into and if so, what are they? >> i'm not aware of any agreements other than continuing the dialogue, senator. >> so it was discussed and you know this by virtue of what? >> i know it was discussed based on feedback through senior representatives in the state department. >> senior represents. t can you define that for me? >> discussion of those that were in attendance at the debrief with ambassador huntsman.

>> let me ask, is there anything different that you can add to that, mr. trachtenberg? >> i'm unaware of any agreements that were reached. >> do you agree that congress has been given a directive that links our modern program with maintaining a arms control process. >> i agree that both indeed important. >> but do you agree that congress has basically set that forth as a link? >> i agree that that was part of the discussion and the ratification debate over the new start treaty. >> new start disappears and the limitations of russian forces lapse, what would the implications be for u.s. national security and that of our allies? >> i'm sorry, senator. >> if new start disappears and the limitations on russian forces lapse, what would be the implications for u.s. national security and that of our allies? >> from the department of defense perspective, i can tell you that is one of the issues that we are currently considering, both within the interagency and with our allies and partners as well.

>> but you don't have any -- you can't give this committee at this point in time any sense of the consequences of that? >> i would say, senator, that the issue of new start, which runs until 2021, is an issue that we are very, very much engaged in, in terms of consultations, and in terms implications. >> would we require a much larger and more expensive force? >> i can not say that at this time >> wait a minute. this worries me. the department of defense is the one that always supposedly plans ahead. don't wait for a situation to happen and then figure out what you're going to do. so, if the, you know, you must be thinking, as a contingency, that if new start lapses and there's no follow-on, clearly to say that -- what do we do then? are you going to tell us -- you

don't believe that it would require a larger, more expensive nuclear force? >> senator, the implications of whether new start continues or whether it lapses are still under discussion. the department of defense plans for all kinds of contingencies and considers -- >> i find it incredible that you can't tell this committee at this point in time what the possibilities would mean. i mean, i don't think us it takes a rocket sign tois figure that out. let me ask you, ms. thompson, let me go through a series of statements in congressional testimony, senior military officials such as the commander of the u.s. strategic command responsible for all nuclear forces and vice chairman general paul of the joint chiefs of staff voiced enthusiastic support for the new start treaty. let me go through a series of questions if you can give me a simple yes or no. can the united states meet all of our current deterrents requirements with a force at or slightly below the levels of the new start treaty? yes or no. >> we are currently meeting our obligation, senator. >> i'm sorry? >> we are currently meeting our

obligation. >> so, the answer is yes, that we can meet our requirements for the force at or slightly below the levels of the new start treaty. >> again, senator, we have met you are central limits and so we're meeting our -- >> but you know, the reason we have witnesses here is to give us answers to the questions that we pose. that's not the question i posed you. let me try another one. these are relatively simple. does the new start treaty force the united states to cut back any of our current nuclear modernization efforts, yes or no? >> i would say no. >> thank you. now, does the new start treaty limit, in any way, our missile defenses, yes or no? >> >> i would defer to department of defense, sir. >> no, senator, it does not. >> do you agree that the new start treaty meets the standard put forward in the nuclear posture review for arms control treaties and that it fosters transparency, understanding, predictability in relations with russia, thereby reducing the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation. >> i would say the transparency and verification environments in

the new start treaty are a benefit. >> okay. let me try one more time. my time's expired. do you believe that it meets the standard, the new start treaty meets the standard put forward in our nuclear posture review? >> senator, i believe it meets the requirements we have today. >> thank you. >> i'm going to use the first minute of my time to say that having written the two amendments myself, with both missile defense and modernization, that there was a connection in the resolution of ratification, we made sure that while we were going to reduce the amount of warheads and our ability to deliver them, we also wanted to modernize because it was a huge savings and not keeping this massive inventory spread throughout our country and not knowing whether they

actually operate or not. a huge savings in going ahead and modernizing so the two worked hand in hand and we passed those amendments on the floor. i actually gave other people's names on them, trying to draw them on to the treaty in some cases successful, no some cases not, but there was no doubt a tie between the two, and it's been very important. it's been very important, the essence of this is that the modernization piece and the reduction in warheads piece go hand in hand. i think that's self-evident and it's central to the entire agreement. with that, senator paul. >> thank you for your testimony. ms. thompson, you mentioned that there are ongoing discussions with the russians both at your level and the level of the national security council director as well as the secretary of state. do we also have some sort of permanent organization? do the treaties set up some kind

of structure where there's ongoing, where each side can express their contention that the other side is in violation of the treaty? is there an actual body of people who meet regularly? >> there are, senator. for example, with the inf teaty, we've had one experts meeting. during the course of the administration, there's been two experts meeting. we've had the commission that gets together on the new start so each treaty has an organization of experts within our respective governmental entities that meet. >> when we brought forward -- are these separate sort of agencies or entities? did the inf treaty organization have one for disputes and new start has one? >> for the state department, those representatives all come under my purview and different bureaus, but they're experts reside within the state department with partners with d.o.e., department of defense as well. >> you've met once in the last year. >> for the inf experts meeting. >> and then there will be

another meeting coming up scheduled or what. >> yes, sir, fairly regular, regular in the sense of some of the treaties are annually. some are biannually. some are in conjunction with other conferences but we have an open line of communication for each of these. >> we believe them to be in violation of the inf treaty. they also complain and say our launchers are in violation as well. >> that's correct. >> do you think that this can be worked out through discussion, that we are at a point where there could be a resolution of these things that boath sides might have give a little bit on this or do we just acknowledge there's no way we're in violation of anything. >> we haven't had progress thus far. i would say that we have an interagency process that's looking through that now on what if some of the options that we have available. >> it seems to me and a lot of this is very detailed whether or not something is technically in violation or not but it seems like an openness to having discussion and ongoing discussion is important. now, both of you acknowledge that the new start treaty we are in compliance with, and yet both of you seem to be the tenor is

you're very concerned. i guess my only concern is that, you know, with the iran agreement, everybody kept saying they're in compliance with the iran agreement, iran's in compliance, but we were still unhappy about other things iran was doing, and i think there's some similarities here that many of us think the new start treaty was an advantage and that it brought down the threat of nuclear weapons, we have less nuclear weapons, and that there were good things that came from new start. i guess my concern is that we could be throwing all of that out and saying, well, they're violating the inf or this convention of war treaty and we don't like all the stuff they're doing, which is true, but i worry then we just throw the new start treaty out and i hope that people will think about, we try to get the best that we can and we negotiate from a position of strength, but i'm concerned that we would just say, simply, just start over and it's not always that easy. i think the iran agreement will actually be very difficult to start again from the very

beginning, you know, instead of starting with what are we cl complying on and going to our differences, let's don't throw everything out. if new start is working, maybe we look at the inf and that's the only caution that i would have in looking at this and that also just to say that at least our office, we're very interested in what goes on with these and would like the have you come in and talk some more to us about how the meetings are going, what the differences are, and what the possibilities of resolving things are. thank you. >> thank you, senator cardin. >> thank you, mr. chairman. let me thank our witnesses. ms. thompson, i think the understatement in your written statement about russia has taken action over the past few years that have posed real challenges to our bilateral relationship and widened the deficits of trust we have with russia, i think all of us would say that that is a major concern. and we look at our relationship

with russia on the nuclear front, and we recognize that new start gives us the opportunity to do the inspections, not only on active sites but also those sites that are not active, so we really do get to see with our own people what's going on in russia. that's extremely valuable. we also have the fact that russia is in compliance, we're in compliance with the new start treaty. and then, as senator paul said, we know in inf that russia is in violation with the development of land based missiles and you are using the enforcement mechanisms under the inf and diplomacy, which i strongly agree and not withdrawing from the inf, which i think would be a disaster. because it would only isolate us more from what russia is doing, and we have taken countermeasures through a submarine based defense system in regards to what russia is doing on land, so we've taken -- we're taking our steps.

in kplicompliance with the inf order to make sure that we are secure. my point is that in response to senator menendez' question, i thought -- i was surprised i didn't hear a stronger statement as to the national security importance of both the new start and inf. we know north korea has a nuclear program, but we don't know the specifics, because we don't have inspection. we don't have eyes on the ground. we don't know exactly what's going on in that country. and yes, we have international inspections now of iran but not with the united states participation so we are somewhat limited in understanding what's going on in iran. but at least in russia, we had that capacity to understand their program because of the new start treaty. so, i just really want -- and we know this administration has a way of surprising us at times with statements made by the president, but that's one of the

reasons we had this hearing. i would like to get both of your views as to the national security importance to the united states in these tough times with russia to be able to get our inspectors over in russia working with theirs, understanding their nuclear program, the importance of that to the united states national security. >> senator cardin, if i could, as i stated, i do believe that the verification and monitoring and on site inspection provisions provide a level of op openness and transparency that is useful and beneficial not just to the united states but to our allies as well. that said, what i find particularly troubling is the overall nature of russian arms control behavior and what the russians seem to be doing in terms of selectively complying with various provisions of treaties and selectively

noncomplying with others when they feel it's not in their interest. it is that overall kind of behavior that i think from a national security perspective we at least need to consider. >> i don't disagree with that at all. i agree with what you're saying. my concern is that sometimes we do knee jerk reactions in this administration, and that if we give up our ability to be able to have our inspectors in russia, because of a violation of the inf leads to the end of new start, i think it's not in our national security interest to do that and i was hoping to get a little bit broader response from you as to the importance of our current relationship with russia on nuclear as it relates to more transparency that you referred to, which is clearly in our interest. we can counter their violations without pulling out of the agreement. we've already done that in the inf. modernization programs, as the chairman pointed out. we can still do that. we can do our missile defense and we're not in violation of new start or inf. so we can stay in compliance

with the treaties without pulling out. yes, we're not satisfied where russia is today. we have mechanisms to try to counter that through direct enforcement and mechanisms within the agreement as well as our own nuclear program and our own defense programs in order to counter what russia is doing. isn't that a fair statement? >> i think you're exactly correct that we do have mechanisms indeed. where i might differ somewhat, senator, is i believe we're taking a deliberate approach to our assessment of all of these treaties, including the new start treaty. i don't see this as a rush to judgment on the part of the administration's perspective on this, and i think it's perfectly legitimate and appropriate for us to weigh all of the potential -- look at all of the potential implications. >> i agree with you, but we have

a specific responsibility as an independent branch of government, this committee particularly on foreign policy, and i think the american people need to understand how important these treaties are to our national security and i respect that you're going through a deliberative process, i really do, but we have seen this administration do things that have not been under a deliberative process, decisions made by our president and it's important that we have a publicly established record as to the importance of these treaties as it relates to measuring's national security and i wish you would be a little bit bolder as to the importance of us maintaining those types of relationships. >> thank you. senator isakson. >> i want to follow up on what senator cardin just said and senator menendez ago because i think this is an important point. it is for me. when i came to the senate, came to the foreign relations committee, the first legislation of any import at all was the new start treaty, and i got very

involved in it because of, i think, the responsibility put on me of everything else we dealt with, that was the most important thing we could do, arms control verification, limitation of arms with us and russia so i got really into the weeds. probably too deep for a real estate salesman to be able to kprend but i did anyway and i finally voted for it and i did so because it was clearly evident there was no other agreement that we were into with any other adversary or potential adversary or ally in the world that had better verification, better mandated access for the united states of america and better access for them than us. am i right on that? >> i would agree with that, senator. >> well, i want to carry that forward. we did this -- the mess we did with iran here. it's been said. did not have any verification or the verification -- we couldn't verify on military bases and things of that nature. it had gaping holes in it, which is why i voted against it or

wanted to vote against it because it just didn't add anything to our country's security whatsoever, it diminished it. my point is, and i understand, secretary, you don't want to give away negotiating positions to the russians. when you answer his question or my question about the start treaty, you don't want to say anything that would beat a point that you would have to negotiate but i too agree with what he said. we ought to be a little bit more pro containing the benefits the start treaty gives us rather than giving us the idea we can get out of it because i think knowledge is access is tremendous. we have no notice access. the russians in the united states who have access to inspect our sites, us and russia, we have unique hologram system to -- on the warhead so we can count the warheads and what they can do and where they are. we can catch them, they can catch us. if we just insisted at the table with the iranians, we have a

treaty on nuclear weapons with russia, two largest nuclear powers in the world, we want to put those verifications in our agreement with you, iran, we'll let you come and inspect ours and we want to come in and inspect yours, unfettered. it was a perfect predicate to do that. secretary kerry decided not to do it in that way but it would have been a great way to get that foot in the door. all i'm trying to say is, when you're worried about compromising your future by talking about what you might get out of if you didn't like it, you run the risk of them saying, they can get out from the responsibility it puts on them and they'd be a lot more willing to take advantage of it than we would. i just wanted to make that point. second point, and i would like to -- both of you, ask this question. on the space force, when the vice president announce the space force and the president's announced the space force and you acknowledge some of the experimentation the russians have done in space of a

defensive nature but potentially offensive as well, would you equalize the space force enthusiasm that you've seen so far in our government today to be equal to what was the missile defense system for the reagan administration? >> senator isakson, i don't think we're currently considering a missile defense capability similar to what was proposed during the reagan nrgs but in terms of the space force, department of defense is certainly committed to going forward and implementing the vision expressed by the president and vice president also in terms of moving out, moving out expeditiously and appropriately to develop those capabilities given the importance of space to our national defense. >> i was hoping that was going to be your answer because when you had addressed it in your remarks and i've seen some of the other pieces and read some of the stuff about it, the space

force is the modern day answer to missile defense systems of the reagan years. reagan used missile defense as an idea for the future. it scared the hell out of the russians. and in fact, led to their spending on defense, which put them in the difficulty they fell into in the early 1990s when they did it. so, i think having the space force recognized as a future addition to our defense or offense militarily and diplomatically, is equally as good a potential tool as missile defense was in its infancy and has been since and i applaud the administration's boldness in doing that and i hope it will be something that's a meaningful tool, not a paper tiger. i yield back. >> thank you. senator shaheen. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you both for being here to testify this afternoon or this morning. i want to go back to the inf treaty because you both pointed out russia's violation.

i agree with senator cardin's point that it's not in our interest to withdraw from the inf treaty. i don't think that helps solve the russia problem. but what other options are being considered to try to push the russians to comply -- to again comply with the inf treaty? are there things that you can talk about that have been looked at that we might not yet have tried? >> thank you, senator. i can assure you that we've used diplomatic means, economic means, through d.o.d. we've used military means to get trade -- will them back into compliance, fulfill their obligations that they set out when they signed the treaty. >> can you discuss the specifics of what those diplomatic and military means are? >> i would prefer to tell you that we are in interagency process now and looking at w

wholistically throughout the strategy. i wouldn't want to get into specifics yet because we're still in the developmental stages of that. >> do i take there from that that we're actually considering options that haven't been tried yet? >> yes, ma'am, that would be a fair assessment. >> okay. the nuclear posture review, and i guess this is for you, mr. trachtenberg. it claims that the other nuclear arms states have modernized their nuclear arsenals far more extensively than the united states so that both china and russia have. do you share that view, and what do we need to do in order to be able to catch up to both of them if we're behind? >> i do, senator. certainly in the case of russia, which is the focus of our discussion today, the russians have for years been engaged in a very extensive strategic modernization program, not only of their strategic nuclear forces and systems but of their

nonstrategic nuclear weapons and systems as well. that has, i would argue, far outpaced what the united states has done to date. i agree with the earlier comments that were made in terms of the importance of the u.s. modernization program. over the years, we have redulsed the levels of our nuclear stockpile by some 85% since the height of the cold war but we do need to pursue the modernization program that is referred to earlier, the united states has not built a new nuclear weapon in many, many years. russia, questiwe know, has. china has other nuclear -- and other nuclear weapons states have. so i do see a discrepancy there and i would completely agree with the conclusions reached in the nuclear posture review. >> so, one of the things that senator corker pointed out was that part of the agreement around new start was the modernization piece. but the idea was that we would

continue to modernize and i think there's some funding and the current appropriations and authorization in the ndaa bill that were passed that would allow us to look at some other modernization capabilities. but they were also supposed to go hand in hand with continued efforts to reduce the number of nuclear weapons. can you talk about what's been done in the last 20 months of this administration that would point to efforts to further reduce nuclear weapons? >> well, i can tell you, senator, that we have reduced to the point where we are in compliance with all of our arms control obligations, in particular the new start totals, which have put, of course, limitations on three systems, the number of deployed strategic weapons, and the number of deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, the icbms, bombers and submarines as well as the total number of deployed and nondeployed systems, so we

have taken those obligations seriously. >> and so can you talk about how much of that has been done since the current administration took office? >> i don't have the figures in in front of me. i would be happy to check that for the record. >> that would be great. if we could share that with the entire committee, that would be helpful. last week it was reported that the united states refused to certify the new russia air flat -- air flight. we were one of 23 nations devoted no one that. can you talk about why. this is probably for you. and you talk about why we took that position? >> we had certification for the russian sensor. we did not fail to certify, we came back and had to consult with them and technical

experts. we will have a decision on that within 24 hours. we have not, not certified it. we will have a decision in the next 24 hours. >> i am out of time. if we think we should not certify the aircraft, will we not argue with some of our allies and the other 23 nations that they should not certify it? >> there is a process on those deliberations. within the next 24 hours, you will have an answer to the specifics. first of all, thank you for what you do. it has been said several times here today, what you do with some of the most important work that our country does as far as a national security, and keeping us safe. having said that, trying to negotiate with people who are not negotiating in good faith, is a problem. you both have a heavy lift ahead of you. i was one of the ones do not

ratify the new aircraft. it's not because i don't want to deal with the russians, i believe we have to deal with the russians. i don't have any confidence whatsoever that they are dealing in good faith. they are serial cheaters and liars. what you have to look at is the other things they're doing the world, to judge what kind of a mind these people have. having said that, the reason i posed the original new start was simply because i believe that it did not give us the inspection, or the confidence we needed to get to where we wanted to be. there was more we could do, i felt. obviously, we cannot talk about it here, there are things that

we can do to verify, in addition to the things that are included in the treaty. they do the same thing. having said that, as we look forward to renegotiating the treaty, when it expires, are there preparations being made into how we could ratchet up our game as far as being able to verify the things that we suspect, and no, that they are doing that we cannot tell them that we know, because it would disclose methods and sources? is there a thought process going into this as to how we will up our game? >> yes, senator, there is a rigorous interagency process going on. all options are on the table as we bring in technical expertise on what we know, and what we don't know, and how to fill in the gaps.

diplomatically, from the defense department, and economically, from agencies as well, what are things that have not been tried? what are the options? that process is ongoing. >> you have anything to add to that? >> i would agree with that. i would also agree with your earlier comments as well, in terms of the new start treaty. when it was negotiated in 2010, we hoped that it would represent a new relationship with the federation. it would lead to broader cooperation on a number of fronts. since that time, what we have seen is a clear deterioration of our relationship with them. although we would like that to be different, we should have

clear eyes about the threats that we face. this administration is trying to be just that in far of arms control. >> that's good to hear. i'm glad that is the view. you are absolutely right about that configuration. that deterioration should make us think about how we will approach this as we go forward to renegotiate. in addition to the other things that they have done, the poisonings that they have done, etc. watching them manufacture excuses as to why they are not complying, and manufacturing accusations against us that we are not complying on certain things, it really cries out to have us up our game in how we will approach this on a new start treaty. thank you for your work.

i hope we will approach this differently this time than we did last time. thank you mr. chairman, and thank you both for being here. part of the support for ratifying the new start, i want to focus on that. others have talked about that it allowed certain weapons to be updated, while also achieving overall reduction in the number of arms that united states and russia possess. the labs in new mexico play a vital role in fulfilling these updates, or life extension programs. president trump says he wants to strengthen and expand the u.s. nuclear arsenal. while certain life extension product -- programs are allowed. building new weapons, and not drawing down the overall number of weapons would go against the treaty.

you clarify the president's position on what he means by strengthen and expand? >> i do believe the best articulation of our policy, with respect to our nuclear arsenal going forward can be found in the nuclear posture review that was released in january. what we are talking about, as i mentioned previously, -- >> if it was in the clear posture review, can you focus on the expand? >> what it said specifically is that what we are looking to do is have a modern resilience and cape will nuclear force that is capable of effectively deterring attack or aggression against the united states or our interests. i want to be very clear about this. what we are looking at in connection with the nuclear forces is to preserve the efficacy of our deterrent capability. this is all about deterrence.

this makes that clear. all of our efforts are related to monarch -- modernization of our capabilities while we have the older systems. this is done with a view toward maintaining the efficacy of our overall nuclear deterrence. >> we talked earlier about the meeting in helsinki between president trump and russian president putin. what specific arms-control issues were discussed there? >> senator, i know that, as i have been brief, the specifics were not addressed. in general terms, this was the importance of two nuclear capable countries that we need to remain open to dialogue between our respective sites to ensure the obligations are met.

>> in august, the russian document listing arms-control topics for discussion at the july summit between president trump and president putin was leaked to the press. according to the documents, putin spoke with trump about extending new start for 5 years, and reaffirming commitments to the i.n.f. treaty. can you confirm whether putin raised these topics with president trump? >> i cannot. >> can you? >> no sir, i cannot. >> when he talked about the knowledge you had was from the briefing that the ambassador had, you were not given any instructions with regard to those? >> that is correct. >> were there any tasks that came out from the meeting with the ambassador to say, these are the things that we have to do going out of the summit? >> i did not receive specific

tasks. >> what is the status of dod's research and development on ground launch an intermediate range miss -- systems? >> we are continuing to work on the research and development based on the congressional guidance that we received, which we appreciate. there are $48 million that has been set aside for research and development of the conventional ground launch cruise missiles. the research and development portion of that is entirely compliant with the i.n.f. treaty. if we went forward and deployed such a system, that would be noncompliant with the i.n.f. treaty. no decision has been made at this time. :how much money is -- has dod spent? >> i would have to get you the exact figures. >> will you do that for the record? thank you very much.

>> thank you both for being here. vladimir putin unveiled new weapons, you referred to them over one dozen times. at least from the kremlin's english translation, these new types of nuclear arms include hypersonic missiles, nuclear torpedoes shot from drones and submarines. undersecretary thompson, i'm glad the record acknowledged in the prepared testimony that the u.s. has to reckon with that. this is right and of your statement, whether or not the new nuclear weapons will be held accountable under the new -- new start treaty. just to clarify, is that the position of the united states that we consider the weapons that were previewed in the speech that are under development, announced in march, hypersonic, the nuclear powered ballistic missiles, the 100 megaton nuclear torpedoes shot from drones submarines, do we consider those to be strategic nuclear weapons covered under the new start treaty? >> i would defer to my

technical expert for the firm answer on that. my initial read is they would qualify as strategic weapons. >> have the russians notified any of the new type of arms featured in that speech to the bilateral consultative commission? >> they have not been raised through the formal process. >> have we asked them to do that? >> not to my knowledge. i can see what has occurred. i read the results from the technical experts meeting, that was not raised. we have not had discussions on that. >> no one has raised it. we saw your speech, we thought he talked about developing it. we believe that needs to be notified. >> they were not notified. the only way we saw those is in the open press. >> is anyone from our government asked them, or express to them it's our belief that they need to notify it? >> i have not done so.>> why

not? we have not had engagement on that. >> that's a counterpart on the russian side? >> that's correct. >> there are no other questions i have been raised on this? >> we have had engagement on this. it was an unofficial press report, we still have intelligence together on that to confirm or deny it. student that's pretty official. >> we have seen before from the rhetoric from president putin, what he says is not necessarily ground truth. >> i'm not saying whether this was hyperbole. my point is, he gave a speech and describe these weapons. you would think that someone in the united states government would say, hey we saw the speech by president putin, if that is true, you need to notify that. that would violate new start treaty. >> we are taking action on

that, we have not done it through official channels yet. :it doesn't sound like any action has been taken. >> we have taken action, within our own community, not to the formal process. >> you have talked to each other about it? >> as a former intelligence officer 28 years, we have access to information that isn't necessarily intelligence until it's confirmed. we are working with the agencies, partners, and allies to confirm if it's true. >> i'm not saying we know you should have something, all i am saying is, he gave a speech and described a series of weapons, and if they were developed, at any point in the future, it would fall under the new start treaty as a strategic weapon. we thought someone would say, we saw your speech, we are not saying it's real real, but if it is real, you need to notify that. you're saying, we have not done that. >> i say we have discussed internally, i will take it back

for consideration. >> let me ask about i.n.f.. the treaty puts limits on us, and other theaters outside of europe. with other competitors, especially china that are not covered by it, i don't know who this goes to, but as it is currently structured, doesn't put us at a strategic disadvantage with regards to china? >> you raise a good point, that is one of the questions that we are looking at in terms of the overall implications of remaining in compliance with the treaty in which the russians are in clear violation of. >> my last question is, as far as violating the i.n.f. it should not be surprising. it is our official position that they are in violation ? >> that's correct. >> it's not surprising, it's been widely reported that the russians have displayed, and exercises and statements made by military officials, a doctrine of escalation and de-

escalation. they use this in a doctrine, of tactical nuclear weapons in the battlefield, to elevate, or exasperated crisis to escalate it to have a nuclear strike in the battlefield. the violation of the i.n.f. treaty would be fully consistent with that new doctrine would it not? >> i believe it would be, absolutely. that is why believe it's important that we consider why they are violating the i.n.f. treaty in the way they are. they must see some advantage to doing it . >> thank you very much. thank you both for being here today. following national security advisory meetings with the russian counterpart in geneva at the end of august, he stated

the administration was in the early stages of a review regarding the present extending the treaty. he further commented there were other options available. one of them was extending the treaty, or renegotiating it. a third was jettisoning it and pursuing a different type of approach. he made a specific reference to the 2002 moscow treaty. of course, the moscow treaty only limits deployed warheads. does not include verification provisions. to some of us, there is a concern about the specific reference to the moscow treaty, given it doesn't have verification. why did the administration suggest that the moscow treaty may be an option for the path forward on renewing new start treaty? >> i can assure you, the secretary in one of my bureaus

is the arms compliance bureau representative. whatever treaty that we engage in, with our counterparts, has the verification within it. that's an important part of the treaty. i would never want his beak for somebody else, but with my team, that is under compliance. >> am i just agree with those comments. also, i want to share your view on the importance of verification. i was working in the defense department at the time of the moscow treaty. the reason why that treaty did not contain verification measures like most is because we are operating under the verification provisions in the original treaty which did not expire until the end of 2009. they were fully in effect. >> thank you both for those answers. let me stay with you. i want to come back to the issue of this.

aside from the pending issue of this one certification, secretary madison wrote a letter to secretary fisher indicating that open skies compliance with national security interests, do you agree with the statement, despite the fact that we have the ongoing russian compliance issues? even with these issues, is the treaty still with the national security interest for the united states to remain an active part of? >> the open skies treaty clearly has been in the united states interests. certainly due to the transparency it provides, the level of visibility, of what other states are doing, it provides not only to us, but to our allies as well. we would much prefer to see russians get back into compliance with its provisions. >> i do asked the question because the administration has

been in the business of pulling out of several important multilateral security agreements. i think it's important to understand, given the russian compliance problems, we can work through them. we would like to work through them within the construct of the existing treaty. >> i would agree that we would hope to be able to work with russia to get through these compliance issues that we have. what i do find disturbing and troubling is the fact, as i mentioned, there does seem to be a pattern of behavior on the heart of the dutchman on the part of the russian federation that does not bode well. we desire to take arms control to the next level. until their behavior changes, or if it doesn't, we do need to factor that into our overall consideration of all the treaties to determine what

united states should do going forward. >> switching topics, the administration talked about civilian nuclear cooperation with saudi arabia. i wondered if you could give us an update on the progress with the negotiations? including the last time the two sides mats, and a confirmation that the administration continues to speak in agreement that contains a gold standard of the committees passing a few weeks ago, expressing our interest that the stander be met to the extent that we eventually reach an agreement with them. >> thank you. i can confirm there are ongoing negotiations between united states and saudi arabia on civil-nuclear agreements. i cannot grant -- address the specifics since they are ongoing. i can assure you, overseas portfolio, we keep the strongest standard and those

agreements. >> we have told saudi arabia that we want a gold standard section 1, two, three agreement from them. can you confirm that that remains the bottom line for the administration? >> yes or, the strongest standard possible. >> we have a sense of what a gold standard is here, we passed resolutions, making sure that there are no enrichment or reprocessing abilities for the saudis, is that the bottom line? >> yes sir. we are ensuring that the technologies don't get pilfered. >> thank you very much. >> before turning over, i will take one more minute. this conversation with senator murphy, you talked about taking things to the next level, and with all that's happening. i may not have heard you clearly. if the new start treaty is being complied with, and it's

yielding benefits to us, of not having to have so many nuclear armaments, not knowing whether they work or not, but focusing on the one we have, making sure they do so they are reliable. if it is working for us, we would not consider undoing that treaty, because other treaties are not being it here too, would we? >> wherever something is a benefit to u.s. interests, we should continue to adhere to its , or seek to move forward in that respect. the point i was trying to make with -- was, what looking at the treaties, there is a pattern of russian behavior with regard to compliance, and their willingness to abide by the agreement set up already been assigned. i do think that speaks to how the russians view their

approach to arms control in general. all i meant to argue was that in our consideration of what is or is not in our interest, we should take into account how the russians are viewing arms control, and how they are looking at our responses to their violations, in terms of determining the overall future going forward. >> thank you mr. chairman. you talked about russian behavior. my concern, as a member of this committee an american citizen, i want to make sure they don't have the capacity to do something, what ever their intentions are. that brings us to the question that senator rubio talked about when he talked about this new

strategic nuclear weapon in march. vladimir putin said the weapons include a nuclear powered cruise missile, and underwater drone that can be armed with a nuclear warhead. they have hypersonic missiles, and the headline in one of the papers said high-tech weaponry, russia's new nuclear weapons are technically plausible. this is something they could potentially have. putin did his boasting. whether it was idle or real, what is our government's assessment of the level of accuracy on these weapons? >> senator, i cannot speak specifically to the individual systems that president putin announced. some of them may be more mature than others. i do think it is a worrisome development that he announced these so publicly, and made such a presentation of this.

that leads us to wonder, why the russians believe they need to do this, given the fact that they have already extensively modernized their strategic nuclear arsenal. i would look at that additional context, to some degree of it being aspirational, and to some degree there might be a practical element to some of the systems. i do find it troubling, from the standpoint, of our overall relationship with russia. i think we would all like to see that improve. >> along the same lines, can we or can't we defend against such things? do we have a current or prospective missile defense system that could intercept these weapons? >> we do not have a missile defense system capable of defending against the russia strategic arsenal.

it is not our policy to do that. the russians have a tremendous number of nuclear weapons systems, for a variety of reasons. we have not pursued an active defense against the full range of russia strategic weapons. we prefer to rely on deterrence capabilities when it comes to russia. >> at this point, we don't have any specific actions that we are taking in response to what they are doing. we are utilizing deterrence at capacity? >> we do agree that going with the modernizing the nuclear triad, it is critical in order to continue the deterrent effect that we rely on. >> secretary thompson, as the country continues to face threats from around the world,

i think we should not take actions that will hinder our own missile defense systems. we need to always remain in charge of our missile defense, not russia, or any other country, telling us where we can put up, and put up in terms of defense. i have concerns about the efforts of russia to limit our defensive actions that a previous administration took on this issue. are there any discussions for which you are responsible that the united states will not agree to limiting our own missile defense programs? >> i can assure you i will stand up for what is the best interest of the united states people and our partners and allies. >> is there anything to add to this? >> i would agree with that statement. i was also present at the department of defense when president bush made the decision to withdraw, or exercise the withdrawal clause.

we faced ballistic missile threats, we felt the need to move forward with an initial deployment of missile defenses. i do believe that missile defense not only defends the country, but it devalues the currency that others place on ballistic missiles as a threat. >> thank you mr. chairman. thank you to both of our witnesses for your long service to our country, and the chance to explore these important issues with you. something we have not talked about in today's hearing is chemical weapons. somebody -- i want to move to that if i can. we are in an era of renewed great power competition with russia. i'm wondering if this is an area in which you expect that to reemerge. the state department has long claimed that russia has not yet declared all of its chemical

weapons and production facilities for the prohibition of chemical weapons. russia continues a despicable practice of supporting or defending their murderous regime and the repeated use of chemical weapons. does the administration believe , in unilateral measures are the best way to counter chemical weapons? should we work through international institutions? >> i think both are appropriate. we have worked hand and glove with partners and allies to fix this. we were in conference, and we had a rigorous engagement with partners and allies to ensure the u.s. voice, the voice of the global partnership, and we have been consistent on that. we look forward to continued emphasis, bilaterally and through multiple engagements

when it comes to chemicals. you can reference a my statement, where we stand with russia's actions in syria. do you see that russia will look to reconstitute a large- scale chemical weapon production? you think their goal is a small- scale program that allows it to carry out attacks like the one that recently happened in the united kingdom? i would be interested in both of your answers. >> i think they will build on the program. they will continue to expand through new technologies and that as well. >> would you agree there's a distinction between a large- scale production, in terms of capability to improve and deploy chemical weapons, as opposed to the ability to carry out small-scale attacks?>> i do agree with that. >> i do agree with that as well. i think anything's -- anything that the russians do with regard chemical weapons, they try to hide what they are doing

from detection. the result of the attack in saulsberry earlier this year, was an atrocious demonstration. whether they have large or small arsenals, the willingness to actually employ such weapons, or support regimes that deploy these weapons is an atrocity. >> i will echo what was said earlier, about the importance of having robust options to support the new start treaty. it was one over due to the breadth and sophistication of the regimes involved. >> i will speak to myself, that was a key part in me supporting new start treaty. i want to revisit the question that was asked earlier about comments made by the national security advisor back in august after meeting with his russian counterpart. he was suggesting, in the early

stages, that one option inconsideration was pursuing a different type of approach to the moscow treaty. that only limits deployed warheads, does not include verification. you gave an answer about there being a continuing verification regime that made that not necessary. let me ask you directly, is the administration considering, in the interagency process, new arms control agreement that does not include verification provisions? >> knows her. -- no, sir. >> i would not, want to ensure verification measures are integrated into any treaty. the maggots my view, given public statements by putin and other that russians are seeking

strategic weapons that would allow them to start a power competition with us. it is my hope that you will consider congress a partner as we try to craft a way to push russia back into compliance with the i.n.f. treaty, and consider whether to extend the new start treaty. i think that is a great concern. thank you for your testimony. i know some of this was already covered. i want to go over some of this again. [ indiscernible ] a collapse of the treaty would open the doors toward further development of arms in terms of the intermediate range missiles. can you help me, briefly restate the benefits of the i.n.f. treaty, not just to the united states, but nato as well. >> the i.n.f.

treaty, when it was negotiated, was a huge accomplishment. it eliminated an entire class of nuclear systems. these systems threatened our european allies. it was a great value at the time. the russians were initially reluctant. there were called to engage in negotiations, along those lines, tell the united states showed a willingness to counter what they were doing. we have no plans to deploy a missiles in europe. the reason i raise that point is to make it clear that russia behavior, occasionally is determined by how they view the united states reacting to their behavior.

>> incense, they are in violation right now, in terms of allies, what if we determined them in breach, and pulled out. what would the implications be? >> the implications have been laid out in the treaty. there are various options with security. they would have to be in collaborations with technical experts, and allies. we are not there yet. >> we need to continue the dialogue. this is just land-based. we have a triad at our disposal. >> [ indiscernible ] this makes me worry about the willingness to go forward and continue with

strategic stability talks. can you give me any understanding of what the administration is attempting to do? what are the important dialogues going on? >> the dialogue is incredibly important. that was an example with the president. president putin in helsinki was one of the dialogues. >> i have had discussions as well. despite their rhetoric, and breach of obligations, we are keeping the door open. we are committed >> are we going to have some efforts to have more discussions coming up? >> we have had formal discussions. there is a dialogue going on on

this. it does not get much press. when we had the i.n.f. meetings, we talked about chemical weapons. it does not get as much press, but there are lines of dialogue going on. various departments were in the countries, as we continue to have those discussions. >> is there disagreement within the administration about whether to resume talks on the specific date and time? >> not to my knowledge. >> lastly, what with the goals being for those conversations? >> it depends on the treaty. with i.n.f., we are treating it as noncompliance. as the president addressed in july, the fact that we are nuclear capable countries, we have an obligation toward peoples and partners to keep that dialogue open.'s former -- thank you very much. thank you for keeping us

briefed on these very important nuclear conversations. under the new start treaty , does the united states have access to only declared facilities? >> >> i do believe it's only declared facilities. they have the power to request access, with a 24 hour response period >> i believe we can request access as of this time, we have heard report after report that

iran is in compliance is that your understanding from your examination of the issues? >> they are in compliance as far as the iaea reports. they are not in compliance with the other malign activities. >> there and compliance, in your opinion? >> with one, they are in compliance. >> and talk about your opinion. a >> with the technical aspect, they are in compliance. >> they are in compliance, thank you. we have a challenge between a vision, and the details of an arms control agreement. this is the new start treaty. that's a hefty package.

this one is also a hefty package. this is the press release regarding the united states and north korea for d nuclear is asian. this is all we have. am i wrong? is there any package like this, any details, or plans between the united states and north korea? >> i could bring in a stack of the intelligence, i don't think that would be appropriate for this hearing. >> these are public agreements. these are treaties. there is no such treaty worked out. am i correct? there is no detailed inventory of north korean assets that have been examined, or developed with agreement on each side? >> that's correct. >> there is no schedule for eliminating these nuclear assets that has been agreed to by both

sides? >> not yet. is >> there is no verification regime that has been developed and agreed to by both sides? >> it has been drafted from our side. >> it is hard to have a complete verification regime if you have not worked out what you are eliminating. >> that is correct. >> this particular statement says united states, and north korea commits to work toward the complete d nuclear is asian of the korean peninsula. that's wording, to work toward, that is a far cry from the standard that secretary pompeo put out. i believe use the words complete, and irreversible, elimination of nuclear weaponry. why wouldn't north korea agreed to language? did we insist, try to push

language that would be a commitment to complete, irreversible elimination, versus just to work toward the nuclear station? >> the administration stands firm, that this is confirmed d nuclear station. the discussions are ongoing. >> at the time of the statement, knuth the -- north korea was unwilling to confirm the language about that? >> they have committed to denuclearize the peninsula. a magazine they have committed to work toward, that is very different. a reminds me of the npt language , where the large nuclear capable countries pledged to this. they used similar language, to pursue negotiations on complete disarmament.

it are the inserted words that say we don't really have a commitment yet. north korea is saying that they will work toward that effort. i do stress this, because quite a bit have -- of time has passed. we don't have the first leg of the journey. we need to get to a complete inventory of their program. north korea has not agreed to that. there was not any language in this one page document that committed them to it. this is a real concern. the other thing is, one thing we said in this document, which was a bit unusual is we specifically called out that we were committed to hold follow- up negotiations,, with high

officials, to implement the outcome. the outcome is only to work toward something. there is no verification regime implement. there is no inventory of the nuclear program. there is no schedule, or plan on how that will be eliminated. what is there to implement? >> when we talk fully and final verified, that is the last step . i know you are aware of that based on your background. once we get the agreement, we get access to the country. then there are a series of steps. we have done this in multiple areas. we have the technical expertise within the ranks of the state department and department of defense, and allies. i am confident that when secretary pompeo reaches the agreement on behalf of us, we have the steps necessary to

fully verify it. a:i just wanted to understand what was to implement. this was to implement the outcome of the summit. i was puzzled by what that meant. given that it says that we were fully committed to having sex -- to having secretary pompeo do the negotiations, why was his second trip canceled. that said, the discussions are ongoing. >> thank you. [ indiscernible - low volume ]. has the united states been able to verify russia meeting the limitations of the treaty? >> they met the limits in february.

>> assuming they continue to verify that rushes in compliance, can they meet the deterrence required for the next 5 years? i would defer to the department of defense. >> it speculative the question is, if russia continues to meet its obligation and is in compliance, are deterrence requirements may be variable.

that would be speculative on my part. >> the more i hear the answers your questions, i don't know if we can meet the requirements, with all of the levels of the new treaty, we are not forced to cut back any of our current efforts. if this meets the review, all of the building blocks would be in place. as i listen to your answers, i get a sense that the administration is heading a different way. >> i am not intending to imply that they take a different view

of that. you may be absolutely correct in what you say, all i am suggesting is that a lot can happen in 5 years. >> let me go to the chemical weapons question. the salisbury attack goes against the chemical weapons. now that you have imposed a first round of sanctions, does the russian federation take steps to avoid additional sanctions required under the chemical and biological act? >> not that we have seen. >> assuming that that goes unabated, there should be more consequences, is that a fair statement? >> that is a fair statement. >> let me turn to the i.n.f. treaty. it appears that the russians have said that they value the

i.n.f. treaty, and would like to preserve it. has -- have agreed on them violating the treaty. and congressional testimonies, others testified that russia increase the production and deployment of other mission -- missiles. let me ask you a few questions about the next steps in our attempts to bring russia back into compliance. has the united states asked russia to halt production of these missiles? that way the military situation does not deteriorate? >> we have had discussions with the russian counterparts, whether obligations are with compliance, and how they are

violating the treaty. >> have we specifically asked them to halt production? >> we have told them to get back into compliance and show them examples of what that looks like. >> wouldn't halting production begin the process of getting them back into compliance? >> and discussions, i prefer not to talk about open dialogue on negotiations in an open setting. >> hiding behind things that are not classified and calling them classified are beyond the pale. does united states asked russia to provide an exhibition of the missile? that way u.s. experts can see as technical characteristics and determine if it can fly more than 500 kilometers, which would violate the treaty? >> i don't know, i don't know if other agencies have. >> not to my knowledge, senator. >> what steps does russia need to do to bring themselves back into compliance? >> they have to comply with the i.n.f. treaty. >> tell me what that means. >> they would have to get rid

of [ indiscernible ]. they have battalions of them. they would have to stop production, among other things. >> let me close on this, secretary thompson, you mentioned section 231 in your opening statement. the fiscal year 2019, they signed into law on august 13, including a provision which required the administration to submit a report on whether the president has made a determination that significant transactions have taken place with russians defense. that report is due on november 13. can we have your commitment that this report will be submitted to the committee on or before that date? >> you do have my commitment on that, yes or. >> i would like to thank you both. out to ask a closing question. i know secretary thompson referred to the rhetoric that came out of the russian leaders . sometimes that is information, not reality.

electors up a lot of room when it came to the treaties. are the things out there right now that called either one of you -- causes either one of you concern about civility? >> i am concerned about the overall state of the united states and russian relationship, to the extent that it affects stability, absolutely. i'm concerned, not just from an arms perspective, my concern goes beyond that realm, looking into some of the other things that the russian federation is doing. some of it is actions, and they span the range of activities that i would find counterproductive to american interests across the board. a >> those are all things that we can visibly see, and are aware of. are there other things that you are aware of that they are developing, the cause you concern?

>> if i may, particularly desperate particularly to russia, and other countries, one of them that oversees arms- control at large are emerging technologies. apart from some of the staff of late, artificial intelligence, the hypersonic, those of the types of technologies that we need to get our arms around. we need to see what it looks like. i seen the future of arms- control, or emerging technologies, and how they are integrated into the treaties. >> are you sensing that we are losing an edge in the future technologies, or that someone is gaining advantage we have to work in the international forms as well, as far as what it means to be in adherence as these technologies develop. >> you have any comment?

>> yes, i do agree with that. i would say with the support of congress, the department of defense has had, for which we thank you very much. we believe, going forward, and investing in these types of technologies, these are essential to maintaining the united states military advantages going forward. otherwise, we do run the risk of falling behind, and having that negatively impact our national security objective. >> thank you both. the record will remain open for renting questions until the close of business on thursday. if you could respond to those quickly, we would appreciate that. thank you for being here and sharing your knowledge and insight. with that, the meeting is adjourned.

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commerce faces his democrat a challenger. find coverage on c-span, your primary source for 2018. up next, the wilson center hosts a discussion on cooperation between u.s. and canada. good morning. i hope everyone has enjoyed the dialogue so far. this is a very timely event. it is going on in washington and ottawa. this is a good opportunity to talk about both space and the