authors look at the vietnam war from the american, north and south vietnamese perspectives. topics include south vietnamese nationalism, why american intervention failed, and how the north vietnamese accomplished their goal of reunifying the country. this discussion was part of a day-long symposium on the vietnam war posted by the national archives in washington, d.c. >>, good morning ladies and gentlemen. how are you today? allould like to thank you l because of the storm into the c.- into d., i figure this morning at 8:00. the second person i want to thank is miss jackie brown. i could not believe we had a big crowd today and everybody is here. i am honored to be the

chairperson of the first section, about the vietnam war revisited. america left vietnam for 43 years. what happened and what you can do for the future. i am honored to be here today with all of you. the more people that come here in 1975, and training in america to be a doctor again. america, thank you. today i would like to introduce our first speaker. at sanor of history diego university. is the author of three books, very famous. the vietnam war. another one, "100 roads to the vietnam war." helplso the topic today,

north vietnam won the war. thank you to be here. -- giveet out of a hand him a big hand. >>[speaking foreign language] i wanted tohat extend my thanks to the organizing committee. i am really honored to be here today. it is a really wonderful introduction. thank you very much for that.

i feel like them in the presence of some really great and fascinating people. it is a real honor for me to be here. i have been tasked with discussing why north vietnam won the war. i don't mean to offend. some of you feel very strongly about this. i'm just relating my perspective, which is based on research. mostly in vietnam and specifically in the archives in hanoy. i have no personal investment in all of this. as jackie was explaining, it is interesting to try and figure army,actly how this small this small country that existed in the north and some degree in the south managed to overcome the united states. capable south vietnamese

ally and a coalition of other countries. what i will present today effectively is drawn from more than 20 years of research in vietnam, mostly in the archives in hanoi. -- i don't want to self promote but as for research for a latest book. the title might be misleading to some. it is really hanoi's american war, but "vietnam's american war" is a much more catchy title. how is the story of one, of hanoi we proceed to win the war. just a bit of background information. as you may be aware, of the war thes up in 1965 following

direct intervention by the united states. i have argued elsewhere the so-called vietnam war actually began before the u.s. joined in 1964. mostly as a result of hanoi decision to escalate combat activity in the south starting in september, october of 1964. by that time the u.s. joins the war, we already have a big war in vietnam. the consequence of johnson's decision to intervene was to americanize a war up to that point that was primarily a south vietnamese affair. following the onset of the american intervention, hanoi remains as committed to what he calls total victory. then wants nothing short unmitigated triumph in south

vietnam over the united states and its allies in saigon. hanoi is doing this not simply because it seeks to reunify vietnam under at some aegis, of leadership consists of committed .nternationalists , tohese guys want to win liberate the south and inspire other revolutionaries, specifically leftist revolutionaries around the world. that commitment to these goals there is no desire whatsoever to even contemplate a negotiated solution, although publicly for the sake of looking good hanoi will claim to be in favor of a compromise settlement.

'se of the keys to hanoi was not justory the pursuit of political and military struggles in the south, but i would argue of a very, very aggressive and ultimately quite effective diplomatic struggle internationally. which effectively consisted of costs as hanoi's own a legitimate cause while attacking constantly the american and south vietnamese cause, which ultimately was meant to diplomatically isolate both american and south vietnamese policymakers. this was for hanoi a means of neutralizing the obvious superior military might of the americans and of saigon. offensive, recognized by

many historians as a turning point in the war, when we was reallyat hanoi trying to achieve based on materials from that side. the tet offensive was arguably the biggest mistake made by the leadership in hanoi. nothing went according to plan. a key component of the offensive was the so-called general uprising which never came close to materializing. it was an abject disaster in hanoi. years as it was, four afterwards, hanoi and its allies would suffer another really form of thek in the easter offensive, followed shortly thereafter by the christmas bombings.

when we look at the history of the war one thing that is striking is how often the leadership in hanoi turned out to be wrong in pursuing certain policies. particularly in southern vietnam. i will get back to this idea in my conclusion, i probably the most remarkable thing in all of this is that hanoi manages to prevail. not only by losing most major military engagements, but by losing big in those engagements. sum of that would compel them to accept the paris accords of 1973, which is something they never wanted. even a piece of paper to intervene with this. he understood based on the geneva experience how such complications could come from

paper. it would complicate the road to victory for hanoi. photos are from the archives in hanoi. it is a really, really stunning collection of pictures. i found that mccain photo in the archives. it was one of the first photos ever taken after he was captured. it was in the archives. i sent it to the senator. he was grateful for the photo. the picture at the bottom, le aou. and m if you're not familiar with some of the recent scholarship, coaching men -- ho chi min has nothing to do with what is going on. he has been sidelined. other than no role

being the public faces of the revolution. in terms of decision-making, it is all le duan and a handful of other individuals, many who are from the south or fought in the south during the war against france. here is another picture of le duan in china. -- had ase were really critical role in all of this. the vietnamese david defeating the american goliath. the north vietnamese army was as professional, well-trained, well-equipped as any army in the world. those are not peasants who against their will go and fight the big bad americans. these are professional soldiers.

the guys from the north are very well-trained. above all, thanks to china and the soviet union, very well-equipped. their allies in the south tried a different situation, those guys similarly are very capable for the reasons i have just mentioned. the chinese will be especially instrumental in allowing hanoi to prosecute the war effectively in southern vietnam. they mainly with toward theecting -- protecting north from air attacks. the soviets would contribute mostly because of their dispute with china. that reluctance would become obvious in the nature of the assistance they would provide to hanoi. role duringhi min's the war. he talks to foreign journalists, talks to regular men and women, combat and's that combatants,

noncombatants. he is an affable looking man, a nice-looking man. he is effectively used by the hanoi toes in sell the war and revolution. that goes a long way towards ultimate allowing le duan and these other, more secure individuals to meet their objectives. aftersure you all know, 1973 nothing much changes except for the fact that the war de-mes de-in unicast -- americanized. vietnam toected abide by the paris agreement and it would significantly reduce military aid after the war. this is one element that would contribute to the break in the relationship between hanoi and beijing.

it is certainnts the americans with never come back, hanoi resumes the war to the great displeasure of the allies, particularly beijing and ultimately wins that more. which brings me to the conclusion and the main points i wanted to underscore. looking back upon the whole thing, was remarkable is the fact that hanoi wins the war. there is no question it won more, and it did that despite many tragic and very, very significant errors committed by the leadership. by le duan in particular. ultimately hanoi prevails because the leadership is stubborn, incredibly resourceful, and has a remarkable ability to organize itself, organized party members and organize its army.

one of the things that stands out looking at the documentary thatd is the emphasis communist authorities placed upon organizing. even long before the war against the americans begins, the leadership is constantly emphasizing this need to be well organized. andave unity of thought, those elements are central in accounting for hanoi prevails in the end. beyond that, other key considerations -- number one, ability to present itself as the only community -- and saigon's inability to do the same. miserably in

presenting itself, even domestically, as a legitimate body. and that, in the long term, would make things easier for hanoi, take things more problematic for the south vietnamese authorities and their american allies. another key to hanoi's victory to dissent. there was an opposition to the war in northern vietnam, where the authorities did a much better job of suppressing it, at the emptying it -- at preempting it than the americans or south vietnamese could do. hanoi madeystem in that a lot easier. don't ever assume if we don't hear or read about oppositions through hanoi's efforts in northern vietnam, because everyone was behind the war true., that is absolutely at the onset of the american war, that may have been true. 69, 70, 71, people in north

vietnam were getting tired of war. they are human beings, they were like people in the south, people in the u.s., and they want this to end. inre is increased dissidents the north, but hanoi effectively deals with them. element that is quite significant, which i intimated and presents a key to hanoi's ability to triumph. triumph, this capacity to bounce back after an absolutely devastating defeat. another 40,000 killed or so. presidential election years in the new -- in the u.s., hanoi will bounce back and prevail.

along those same lines, it prevails because it does a wonderful job at exploring this ongoing dispute by beijing and moscow. you think this conflict in the communist camp would be hurting hanoi. it allows them to take advantage of the dispute. more the dispute escalates, the more hanoi will benefit, particularly in terms of material support and to a lesser degree political and moral support. kind of connected to what i was talking to earlier, another key to hanoi's victory, this capacity to controlling information. long before the war becomes hanoi recognizes

the significance of information, the importance of controlling information and hanoi will create a narrative even before and continues publicizing that narrative, sustaining that narrative. it ultimately allows hanoi to internationally by and large. successful narrative that even to this day when we teach about the vietnam war, too many of us effectively recycle the narrative that hanoi created, that we were the real nationalists, we weren't really communists, we won because this wasn't our country and we were puppets of the americans. worse,, for better or hanoi prevails in the end

because his closest associates really don't care how many have to die for them to prevail. are highly dogmatic, committed to ideas which would be considered sacred. no price is too great for them to ultimately realize their ambition. this ability to tolerate significant bloodletting, including the loss of members of their own families. understandingto why the war turned out to the way it did. mayor c beaucoup -- merci beaucoup. our next speaker is the author of the book "the vietnam communist -- the power and limit

of ideology." [indiscernible] [laughter] -- [applause] >> we are just waiting for that before i start. >> you got it. >> good morning. i can't speak vietnamese, nor can i speak french. but i speak english. oregon, which is south of canada. >> north of california. , oh, yeah, sort of. it's great to be here. i would like to start out by thinking the organizers and archives for hosting us. ,'m presenting a paper today

which is the introduction to -- and my colleague and i are editing to be published. nationbuilding, the republican experience from 1975. the republic here refers to the republic of vietnam. the paper aims at telling the experience of nationbuilding. vietnamese as the main agent of the history. why are we doing this? what is the significance of this? wayisagree with much of the

the republic appears an existing scholarship in the u.s.. the republic appears as a play a supporting role in the war that america lost. republic [indiscernible] that doesf america not have its own capacity of independent action. republic ist of the very closely in line with propaganda from hanoi. how it is taught in classes throughout the country.

if much of existing scholarship or lies and experience having to war -- the by the failure is the main motive of most accounts about the republic. failure is often seen as inevitable or predetermined. fortunately this has begun to change in the last decade or so. in 2012i had the fortune to withcipate in a symposium a vietnamese scholar and vietnam vet. --ause the symposium including leaders of opposition party, the symposium resulted in

the book titled voices from the republic of south vietnam, and it was translated into vietnamese and published, so you can order it now from amazon. in 2016 they were two symposium that i know of, one where my organized at uc davis, --using on the army of and the other symposium was held at the university of california, which i had the author of being the co-author of. together with scholars who are of rbn will be

published within a year. and my colleagues, which i'm presenting now, is the introduction to this volume. that's not all, because we are organizing and other conference in eugene oregon. studying will be republican vietnam issues and , trying to think systematically about how to .pproach a topic that ranged from scholars between the communists and rbn. that is the colonial.

period, as the enemies into virtual storage adopting -- there was already prevention between them at the time. -- you can praise the between theay government in vietnam and the community abroad as well. it's a broad topic that has to be taught about in broad terms. covering modern vietnam. it was the symposium, you see the list of figures who contribute to the symposium. you could recognize the few

professor who is the central bank governor of the rbn. otherwise -- many of these figures were very young in their 20's and early 30's back in the day. people who held very important positions, the minister of .ndustry , who wasneralist barely 30 at the time. let's turn to this republican

project of nationbuilding. in our paper we ask you if the republic experience of nationbuilding must be taken seriously. as a collective project that was championed by the elite and support by millions of ordinary people. the goal of this project was to create a new and viable nation. modernization under the colonial rule. and in part of the ideas about the separation of powers. there was disagreement, to be sure come among republican elite over the specific ideas and the ways they could realize and protestsremember many during the rbn period. in general from the beginning to the end of the norms in the

republic were holistic politics, an economy based on private enterprises, the existent -- existence and development of a society with tolerant culture. you can appreciate these norms by comparing it to the system in north vietnam that year mentioned earlier. there was only one political party there, there was no private enterprises, there was no civil society, and a culture in tolerant of difference, a culture of the military institution. that.ll recognize even though it lost the war it has its own values. finally the republican project was infused with nationalist ideals. the idea that vietnam should be a unified country free from

foreign nomination was shared among the elite and the people. and they resisted american military intervention. this was a violation of these nationalist ideals, which is why he opposed it. it is not microsoft the south vietnam had to rely on the u.s. for support that they all wanted for american military intervention. if we study the republic not as the battlefield but at the nationbuilding project, the story becomes very different. would discuss the specific activities in the next life. summarize the complex nationbuilding project. and its aftermath.

there was a war going on for most of the life of the republic to be sure. the nationbuilding activities never stopped and even thrived. the project mission building involved building a new nation , an its own states independent economy, a national entertainment system, national media and culture. this project made significant achievements. it was going strong in 1975. the communist regime tried systematically to destroy it by force. did,ow what they imprisoning not only government also religious leaders, cultural leaders, actors and directors by the thousands, seeing tens of thousands leaving the country. is suchmost interesting

systematic and violent suppression did not succeed in destroying the goals and values underlying the nationbuilding project. vietnam, theay in rise of a private economy, a civil society, a nationalist movementt, a democracy received the application -- advocation.-- that is an overview of the complex of this nationbuilding project that began. it was implemented in the republicans period, then suppressed by the communists but went on to today.

despite the loss of the republic. let me turn to the topical subject of the paper. go briefly through because, how much time do i have? >> four minutes. >> i only have a few slides left. a critical part of this republican project -- a dependent economy from the french. discussed theon difficult initial conditions, how they set up a national economic institution such as the national bank and the banking system. during this period there is an

interesting story about the implementation of the vat. which is value after-tax. it was a very innovative and controversial idea at the time. and the communist government actually reimplemented that tax code in the 1990's. it was a lot of interesting stories to know about that period in terms of economic policy. -- and thisblic reform was wholly the initiative of the vietnamese government, unlike the reforms in taiwan and south korea that had contributed to the initial state of the pressure on american advisers. this particular reform was

carried out at the initiative of the government. they carried with them the idea reform thatted a allow them to play the support of the peasants and of the communists, which carry out a very bloody reform. in politics and security, we discuss how the republic hoped, with initial conditions, to be a law,ioning state based on contribution, and the separation that is republican ideas. this was a notable achievement, especially in comparison with communist state of north vietnam

, where the communist leaders reign supreme. the chapters discuss for the first time -- >> one minute. >> we heard a lot of the story from the secretary of state, henry kissinger. time i wroteirst down this part because he was advisor to the president at the time and he was in the circle the secretarywith of state when they had this issue. he resisted what would become the paris agreement. what we know what happened subsequently, the agreement failed to stand. it must be admitted that the republican project failed to win

the country off the dependence of the u.s. time, so i'm just .assing through education and the media. we have a lot of parts about .iterature if you have an interest that you can check out the book that we check out the book that we will publish shortly in a year. and also make sure to sign up for the conference. thank you very much. [laughter] [indiscernible] had been involved in vietnam

in 1980. he went in 1954. kennedyed president about the community. today it's very important. american engagement in vietnam, the great disconnect. [laughter] >> thank you. >> thank you very much for this opportunity. importantis is really to revisit the vietnam war with a different perspective. when i agreed to take on the subject of america in the asia's in vietnam, my immediate

reaction was there had been volumes published about this. then i thought as an active struggle,t in that particularly from 1954 to 1968, with a lot of time spent out there in vietnam and having personal contact with people all the way from president kennedy -- i reflected on a key aspect of my own take away. is how i arrived at characterizing our engagement. it's a great disconnect. not long before his death general taylor summed up our failure this way. said we first didn't know ourselves. we are going into another korean war. secondly we didn't know ourselves in these allies.

never understood them and we knew even less about north vietnam. then there was this from the vietnamese side by an anti-communist vietnamese nationalist. emphasizing anti-communism rather than revolutionary goals and for lack of a better understanding and adaptation of the local situation, the u.s. has reduced anti-communist efforts in vietnam to the maintenance of administrative machine and an army. the way out, to our mind, is by going deep in the local revolutionary problems and , using solve them principles of justice and freedom, infusing them with a revolutionary spirit of 1776. this morning i won't be addressing the dissonance

between the americans and vietnam as a key but underrecognized factor in the tolure of our engagement ensure this is liable of the free south vietnam. there were many factors at play. clearly an uphill battle. however, highly significant among them was our failure to understand the vietnamese context and to support and not undermine the south vietnamese need to find a compelling film -- compelling political cause beyond survival. recognition lack of that the north was willing to sacrifice as they pointed out. in listen numbers of people the bureau itself in order to conquer the south.

there was also an inability to understand the need to adapt our needs to aiding and ally to confront what was clearly an unconventional war. not korea. a war only the vietnamese could win. in the long run on the battlefield and particularly at home was more political and psychological than purely military. mind i will take a look at five turning points in the conflict. >> what it did produce was a mission which i became a part of. arrival ofnt was the special representative jay s in november of 1964,

proposing drastic cuts to the vietnamese army when the toosite was necessary incorporate some of the forces of the religious sects into the army itself. on collins, but somehow was never sent home. and then, there was an attempted coup plotted by the vietnamese rebellion ond by a sectsrt of the religious who ordered diem to replace his government with the coalition that they could control. french -- by by the french decides that it needs

to be replaced. so we goes to washington and persuades the eisenhower administration to abandon diem. however, the war in saigon d in cables from lansdale, for whom i worked. he persuaded secretary of state dulles not to abandon support. defeated.were became president, and the republic of south vietnam was established. have i run out of time already? [laughter] >> the second turning point was the eisenhower administration's to treatin early 1956

the security and development needs of south vietnam as essentially those of a developed country, a country whose suppose it primary security challenge was reminiscent of an invasion from the north, and whose government was supposedly well enough established to make effective use of conventional top-down economic and social assistance, or as someone put it, treating saigon as if it were stockholm. the imageappened was, of diem's rise had a mesmerizing effect. to convertn was made the south vietnamese army into a regular force to face an open invasion from the north taken out of its internal security role. turn, a guard was

supposed to be developed to replace it. never trained, never equipped, and never advised properly. it was done under a contract through michigan state, who sent out retired u.s. police chiefs as advisors, who had no idea what kind of internal challenge south vietnam faced. and then there was american support for a secret political party to control the civil , and his ownarmy political party against lansdale's advice. he was taken out of his predominant role. this promoted disunity, and it a paranoiac rise of

brother. it was a mission failure to promote civic action, which was a vietnamese idea to connect the central government with the the rural areas within south vietnam. i was part of that. in fact, i was an informal advisor. it was turned down by the even though anr, agreement had been reached in washington to do this. focus was on industrializing south vietnam so that the imports could be replaced locally, and the aid program could be cut.

all of this was completely out of focus. time and effort was lost. next was the intervention by the kennedy administration beginning coup61, culminating in the in november, 1963. -- and ending with kennedy's assassination in november, 1963. then, we ramped up a regular military advisory force whose approach was contradictory to what we were trying to do with civilian pacification out in the hamlets of vietnam. this kind of schizophrenic approach to the war would continue.

then, the crisis arose. there was a move away from conciliation. at the same time, the ambassador went on leave. then there was a raid on the pagodas just before new ambassador henry cabot lodge arrived. this convinced state department officials in washington and lodge that the only solution was to get rid of him. coup, which a quick stalled. then there was a key meeting in washington with which i was involved to decide what to do with competing points of view. made to sendation .ansdale back failed

attempt to tryst to convince thieu. the disparate political forces were set loose by that act. the 1960 -- the 1963 coup came the 1964 disintegration of the vietnamese government. the 1965 u.s. direct intervention. the military took over. scenes, general con executed a bloodless coup. general harkins and secretary of defense mcenery were delighted -- mcnamara were delighted by the exhibit of complete ignorance of the political

situation. 1964, the north vietnamese appear on the road to cutting the country in two. so then came the decision to bomb north vietnam on systematically along with direct intervention with our own troops, initially to protect our own airbases. that stopped any north vietnamese takeover, but as a totallyal action it had disastrous longer-term consequences. such as, mobilizing the north vietnamese population is pointed out by the doctor. it became a war of attrition. another was that we simply took over the war from the south vietnamese, with the idea that we would win and give the country back. we ignored pacification.

another was the severe economic and social dislocation of the vietnamese army and population due to the fact that our soldiers in the first year in equivalent ofthe the whole south vietnamese national budget. wasanother turning point the u.s. domestic reaction to cong tettnamese-viet offensive in 1968. the reaction became the mother of all disconnects between reality and the mistaken impression that the conflict had become a stalemate. on theame can be placed sensational aspects of the press and television reporting. i think what really tipped the scales with what the public was seeing -- was what the public

was seeing in contrast to what they had been told by general west moreland in 1967, that the successful end of the war was in sight. the last tragic turning point consisted of events leading up to the 1970 defeat. -- the 1975 defeat. there was a gap between public opinion, the old arbiter of foreign public policy and reality. nixon was advised to adopt a ization.f vietnam i from 1968-1973, the south b vietnamese showed they could repel an invasion. accords forced

inside of vietnam, all american advisers were withdrawn, the vietnamese army was never trained work ripped with enough airpower, our aid was cut. nixon's promise to come to the rescue was the most moot. so as we sit here more than 43 years after the tragic , there is no consensus about the war. this will probably continue if the arguments about our own civil war is any indication. one of the problems was our general inability of the higher command to understand what some of us on the ground were talking about.

framed by the question asked by lansdale back in 1966. getting a guy go about folks to understand the nature of the problem they are trying to solve? ranges fromsually very difficult to impossible. the recital of miraculous absolveings does not our south vietnamese friends from their own responsibility. wereany leaders, not all, distrustful of each other. involvementf our helped to expose those weaknesses rather than to overcome them. to denyhere any intent the ultimate sacrifice that so many americans made. just one last sentence. [laughter] the human factor continues to

play an outsized role. i hope this modest contribution makes the case and shows with a reasonable degree that there was a road that might have been taken which would have brought things to a better conclusion for the vietnamese people and ourselves. unfortunately, it called for a much more complex understanding of people, policies, actions, and leaders to match, then we were able to muster. [applause] >> thank you. thank you. the professor of george madison university and professor in vietnamese matters will wrap up everything.

thank you. [applause] >> thank you. i think all of the speakers for their excellent presentation. i have the benefit because time , so i would short like to take this opportunity to summarize my point before opening it up for questions. this paper highlights the importance of ideology and explains how marxism, leninism,

and the influence of maoism vietnamese policy from 1954-1960. part of the paper focuses on a valuable foundation for understanding the cause of the because to fight to the end is the ultimate sacrifice. limitan historians would a "long understanding" of communist ideology as a motivating force of vietnamese efforts. they were really nationalists.

for him, ho chi minh is not a nationalist. but a true communist who, along fomentedcomrades, classism before the 1964 geneva accord -- the 1954 geneva accord. he was chiefly responsible for popularizing marxism and and that novietnam, single person played a more important role than ho in spreading these ideas. not as liberation is important as the communist revolution. the americans and their collaborators in south vietnam was less for the sake of

the specifican for goal of annihilating imperialism and capitalism to fulfill vietnam's moral obligation before the international movement. my question is, if documentary evidence clearly proves that the ultimate goal of the vietnamese leaders was to establish a leninist state and serve as the vanguard of revolution and a soviet outpost, then why did many americans and media reject ?he authority could this exception be only to the elect for some reason or motivation?

how would one explain the cause of the vietnamese model of war 1954?9 and 19 fifth was part ofreement the numbers that show by american aid to south vietnam being drastically cut from china and it actually increased. says -- also also speaks about the war in north vietnam. successfullye to end the escalation to the war. my question is, was there, ?ndeed, antiwar sentiment

the international landscape changed drastically in 1972 with rapprochement. that culminated in the bombing of 1972. vietnam was a process of nationbuilding from 1955-1975. it serves as an introduction to of aume about the views variety of south vietnamese officials, and open elections. maybe a achievement of nationbuilding in south vietnam can argue that. the republic of vietnam involving nationbuilding agenda of their own. the republic was not fond of the

conclusion. they refute a u.s.-centric approach, and give rise to arguments that the vietnam war was not up proxy struggle but a war that started long before american intervention. a fight that tends to be obscured by scholars who exaggerate the american importance on the one hand, and over assume support for the communists on the other. the professor brought up the issue of nationbuilding in south vietnam. it is one of the most important factors identifying -- underlying nationalism. if this is the case, and a newding institution applies for

postcolonial africa. without regard for ethnic differences. it applies less well to old civilization, two south china and vietnam, for whom this already existed. all institutions -- old institutions were replaced with fighting western imperialism. this is not a modernization process. in this context, the war is about destinations and motivation. republicanism. long before american involvement, the revolutionary youth league succeeded by the indochinese. the continuation of this

conflict leads to the prospective revolution in the part of vietnam after 1964. do you want me to stop? [laughter] >> do you want me to stop? >> i think we have many things to share but the time is short. >> you want me to stop, right? >> maybe a few more minutes. three minutes. do you want me to go to billups? i will go to phillips. [laughter] dr. phillips, unlike many american authors, does not engage in these liberties. he provides a critical analysis of u.s. policy. it is actually due to lack of knowledge about our self and our north vietnamese enemy. number one.

confront an unconventional war with an unconventional mindset. two. he did not have the right people or appropriate policy. three. he was the only person who understood the nature of the war and had the presence of mind to carry out the necessary plan. and now i have a few questions for mr. phillips. >> yes. first, butyou talk now we are on question and answer. you're the first one to ask questions. answer.tion and >> i have seven questions. very -- be very brief.

ok? so let us let him start first. >> you want me to? >> yes. >> and all of the people can line up on both sides. >> excuse me. i think the persons should ask only one question. question will be 15 seconds. the answer will be one minute. >> to be fair, i had three questions. 341 issue.

yes, you have two questions. >> let me choose my questions carefully. my first question to professor philip and other speakers. what were the chances of of appointing an ambassador to vietnam by president kennedy? righter of people on the 1962, what were the most important factors contributing to victory over defeat? infiltration? cia groups? kennedy policy?

three, instead of focusing our attention on the attention ton our the war in the south and limit our attacks on the north to see action only. in other words, which of nationbuilding as our primary relegated military expedience to secretary consideration -- to secondary consideration. give me just a second. the question needs to be not longer than 15 seconds. and the answer is one minute. people with different questions, thank you.

>> i will try. giving another hour's talk in an attempt to answer. that had we sent lansdale out there in an important position, what he wanted to do was to go out as an assistant. not as ambassador. kenneth young did not know or understand the problem in vietnam. overcome what in my opinion and others who lived through it was a very disastrous influence by his brothers. i believe that that could have been possible. and certainly, it was something

i did the best i could to try and bring about, but failed. what were the most important factors? i think that the rise of the buddhist crisis was absolutely critical. the initial conciliatory approach was the right one, but the ambassador went home on leave thinking that the crisis had been resolved when it had not. it eventually -- >> excuse me. one question. one minute. >> oh. all right. ok. >> the second question. he was actually answering the

second question with the most important event leading to defeat in 1962. but at this time i am not going to say anything. >> i am sorry. >> you can have my minute to finish. >> no-no. i am sorry. [applause] >> you have two more minutes. >> oh my goodness. i have to figure out what to do. the key was the right kind of american assistance, which would've been key to the political situation that he was facing. understanding of what was going on underneath the surface, we simply were not able

to help the vietnamese address that problem. and then, we have in washington -- this almost automatic reaction as a result of the raids on the pagodas that he himself ordered. this was such a simplified approach that to those of us on know,ound, we saw, you what became u.s. policy and pursued to the end. it resulted in the removal of an administration without the replacement of any of effective government, and with an increasing dissidence between religious groups and political

between various generals in the army itself also suffering from the hangover of this suspicion aroused due to the party and the way it operated. so there was a heavy inheritance there, and no effective response after he passed away. >> so please, a very friendly reminder. seconds for the question, and then please step aside. thank you. >> hello.

american.tnam ease american.amese you said the south was not able to advocate for its legitimacy. thankst statement is to all of the vietnam veterans who fought in the war against communism in vietnam. that is our legitimate reason. ackerman, youdr. started from 65 -- from 1965 after the americanization of the war, and one of the key issues is that the republic of vietnam lost its legitimacy. do you think there is a connection there? should that be a lesson for americans, and also, would you kindly talk about the final

american relationship started by ?issinger's visit the agreement where kissing er intentionally left north inside of t south vietnam? those communists did not win the war. --singer >> please. >> thank you. [applause] just to be clear, i am not saying south vietnam was illegitimate. i am saying it was never able to kind of gain the legitimacy. the point you make is very good.

the way the u.s. goes in goes a long way toward validating the image of the south as a puppet of the u.s.. so yes. er anduick, kissing china. difficult as that was to accept for the americans and south vietnamese, this was an element that could not be changed. would never have accepted an agreement without those guys staying in the south. so in a way you can see kissinger betraying south m, but he accepted it. >> excuse me? yes. -- i mean, the question will be one minute, and then the answer.

we can commit more time. we gave two minutes for the answer. i think that is fair. ok. >> going on to the next one. >> thank you. my question to you. was the vietnam war preventable, and if it was, who or what party initiated the war and should bear the consequences for the destruction and loss of life due to the war? thank you. >> to whom do you want that addressed? >> who? >the whole panel. >> ok. the whole panel will answer that. preventablet was only under certain conditions, and was preventable.

but the risk was high that the communists would take over. that was probably the risk that, you know, that the government of south had pursued the course it would have to take. >> anybody want to add? >> yes. it would've been preventable if we had decided to withdraw then in 1955. the coalition had taken over, and the elections had gone ahead because they were too weak to and total control of the population, which was greater than that in the south so that the result would have been inevitable. but it would've been the peace

of the grave. please.gentlemen, >> i would like to ask you something. what is the state of research on north vietnamese and viet cong war crimes? obviously we know all about the totals in terms of incidents, but it strikes me that there is no comparative account. so yes, thank you. [applause] i will tell you, there were no war crimes committed by communist troops. that seriously it is not something i looked into because of the source material. i have not found anything in the archives suggesting that. at a minimum, this was deliberate policy. war crimes did take place. was always careful to

entrust its operatives and soldiers in the south to be very careful when they go after innocent civilians because that would imply losing hearts and minds. we always hear about the americans emphasizing this. it was very near and dear to hanoi. there were soldiers that had very hard punishments. if you still from people or harmed them for no justifiable reason, that was policy. on the battlefield that was a different issue, but it was the same for americans in vietnam. >> even though i am not the speaker, i have a comment. there were more than 10,000 incidents reported by hanoi. village, they killed anybody who worked with the enemy. i do not know why you say that, but as it vietnamese-american i

take deep offense. i want to say that. you had to be a witness and had to see that war crimes were committed. thank you. i am not saying no crimes -- i know crimes were committed. i am saying it was not policy as far as -- >> no. no. it was a policy to kill innocent people. we know that. go ahead. >> next question. >> can you hear me? >> yes. >> louder. >> closer. the would like to thank organizing committee for getting all of us together and thank the people who died in the war, especially our allies.

i will get to my question quickly. in the spirit of conciliation i would like to knowledge all of the deaths from civilians and the soldiers from north vietnam as well. we all united with the desire to see our motherland free and democratic. i strongly believe only the vietnamese citizens can get out and conduct a comprehensive revolution to get rid of the yoke of communism. what we should do is use economic levers, because we have sent billions of dollars to vietnam. to all ofmy question the speakers whoever can give an answer, how do we mobilize the state department to put vietnam on the list? that is the most pragmatic question right now.

thank you. >> please. i guess we may say that question for the afternoon sessions when there are knowledgeable scholars. >> yes. >> so you can have another question, but remember we have just one minute. the question you just asked is better for the afternoon session. thank you. >> we need to do something. >> yes. thank you. >> good morning. this question is open. of the perceived legitimacy of the south korean government -- i mean the south vietnamese government in the area you're speaking of, what role did a lack of accountability or perceived or

actual corruption play into that lack of credibility in the world view? >> so yeah. he himself did not set up a particularly good example. work with them. you are more knowledgeable. i will let you answer the question. the question is about the legitimacy of the south vietnamese government abroad. >> yes. to what degree any lack of accountability or corruption may have played to that. >> there was certainly corruption and lack of accountability, and i mentioned in my talk about the tendencies generals toers and act in a pragmatic way.

it certainly frustrated their own people, their own activists, people in society and so on. it caused problems with the u.s. and south vietnamese allies. those problems existed. but the fact i was trying to thatnt in my paper was there was a vibrant civil a livelyand privately-owned media who would stand up against those while asians of republican norms and ideas of separation of powers, of sovereignty. i hope i answered your question. >> but you cannot put all of this on the americans. the americans fully undermined the legitimacy of saigon. there were errors that contribute to that perception again. >> thank you. >> next question.

>> my name is tai. the republic of vietnam project, which is a worldwide project that looks back to the past for lessons to be learned. i would like to use a term. how about, back to the future? that means you have to learn from the past to apply to the future. veryave not mentioned the outstanding performance of vietnam in foreign relations. in theg the war evenpelago, south vietnam according to the geneva conference that entrusts the administration of the two

hasipelagoes, south vietnam sovereignty. -- has no sovereignty. the government now has to recognize the battle as legitimate. your question is over. thank you. sorry. >> it was one minute. >> excuse me. you did not mention foreign relations of south vietnam. >> right. >> forgive me. another reminder that when you please bringphone, it closer so people can hear you. so that everybody can hear. another thing, questions only one minute. sorry about that. >> thank you for that question.

i will write that down for my upcoming symposium in oregon, because that actually is not been researched. and certainly, the south vietnamese government contributed to the befriending of claims of vietnam and the south china sea. they really contributed, that is why hanoi was totally silent on 1970's,e until the late when it had the war with china. so south vietnam actually performed that role very well. it actually strengthened my acumen about the nationbuilding project. and you. >> this side. >> good morning everyone. i have one question for all of the people here. only talk about the vietnam war,

we talked about battle after battle. lost, who made tragic errors. we do not realize it is part of the game called the cold war. the first world war and second world war brought about the cold war. it goes against all communism, so my question is that if america wins the cold war -- did america win the cold war? anybody? for most of the rest of the world, the vietnam war was never about vietnam. with the vietnamese it was about vietnam. this is really about the cold war. vietnam becomes important because of the cold war. as to who won it, i thought it was the u.s. but --

[laughter] >> identity say canada. [laughter] -- i'd care to say canada. >> it was one because of the collapse of communism. won because of the collapse of communism. but looking at the context, it was not just the cold war. it was the fear that communism was spread throughout southeast asia. precipitated a deeper american involvement in my opinion because i was on the ground at the time. the opinion was that it was fully justified because of the political vacuum that existed to the west of south vietnam. [applause] >> ok. >> 1, 2, 3. test. with the big topics of

the vietnam war, it looks like the discussion so far is up to with the claim75 that the vietnamese communists won the war. my question for the speakers is, have the vietnamese communists won the peace since 1975 up to now? in 43 years they are the only party that ruled vietnam, and they had nearly a half decade to rebuild the country -- nearly five decades to rebuild the country. ho chi minh in 1945 took over the country with the slogan, freedom, ande, rea

happiness." thank you. they are the things that tried to protect since 1945-197 5. thank you. >> anyone answer? read my recently published book in which i argued tragedy is them tragedy that confronts the vietnamese today in vietnam. that the revolution that promised them a lot failed to create a better society than the one they destroyed. that is kind of a profound tragedy today, and that is why you see the resurgence of republican values and a movement inside of vietnam today. [applause]

next question. i. h the greatest lesson is that you cannot win a war unless you invade and attack the enemy. there is really no reason -- why would hanoi ever surrender? they were safe. they could send their people down there for years. my question is this. the reason not to invade north vietnam was lbj, or was it west moreland? mark moyers said documents came out after the war stating that china had no intention of invading -- i mean, of sending troops to vietnam. it makes sense because of the cultural revolution going on. also just a quick comment. i am working with two nonprofit organizations, and we are going to be releasing or producing and

releasing a new film on the true history of vietnam, and we are also developing two films that will be distributed to teachers nationwide on a free basis. i will be in the lobby during lunch, what we're doing is a series of 10 minute interviews in the green room. if you are interested, a 10 minute question of what we want is specific messages that they want delivered. the website is usavn.org. where planning on making a big difference. i hope everyone still are members my question. >> -- still remembers my question. >> even before the war became were tens of there thousands of chinese troops inside of north vietnam just for the purpose of countering an american invasion if it comes. so that decision failed two

american presidents, and no american president contemplated invading the north because of what the chinese response would be. the chinese never wanted war with america, but troops were there and helping north vietnam for that express purpose. sure enough, we now know that as ach as mao never wanted second war in vietnam, he would've been compelled had the u.s. pursued that particular contingency. >> there was an alternative strategy, which would have been to close down the ho chi minh trail, which would've involved aos but notuse bu vietnam. that was never followed because we had signed the laos peace

accords. we then engaged in the fiction that we were not intervening during the so-called secret war in laos, but the vietnamese themselves admitted that the one thing that could've defeated them was to close the ho chi minh trail. it would've involved putting our troops squarely into laos. diplomatici suppose reasons, we decided we could not do that. [applause] >> a quick comment to that. from the north vietnamese sources i read, another strategy was for the u.s. and south vietnamese to take one of two provinces over the 17th parallel, which was the critical provinces that could allow americans to spot the ho chi minh trail and also to punish

the military leaders in hanoi. authorized the tet offensive, and that was a total military failure for them. if not for them, the chinese would not intervene because it shows that we did not threaten china. >> sorry. next question. >> thank you. as one of the organizers of this event, i just want to apologize to the panel. him to be the timekeeper, we had no idea he had this vicious streak in him. [laughter] >> here's my question. i have long felt and i believe that many in this room feel that

south vietnam has been given a very raw deal by history. i think that some of you, all of you probably, are doing things to address that. s that.think -- to redres do you think that it is going in the right direction. years from now when scholars look back on this question, what do you think will be the conclusion that will prevail worldwide? think increasingly, the consensus is that the vietnam war was more of a civil war than an american war. i think that consensus will keep getting developed as more and more young people engage through the archives of the former southern regime, which your colleague is done really well. >> yes.

i hope that with time, a better perspective will develop -- although i suggest because we are still arguing about the american civil war, that a considerable argument will persist. but i do hope that the political particularlywar, the south vietnamese, does emerge as one of the really important aspects of what happened out there. >> next question. >> hello everyone. citizen whoamese came from north vietnam. actually, i arrived in america more than two years and then i

just learned english, so please pardon me if my english is not good. ok. i am a vietnamese citizen. i am a former political prisoner. i came here directly from a vietnamese prison. now, i would like to have a question. a question was raised about religion during the vietnam war. wanting to go to the final war.

[indiscernible] >> i do not really agree because i know very well the mentality -- of enemy's leadership vietnamese leadership. fought under ho chi minh. he was a signer of the declaration of independence of vietnam. i have a special relationship.

[indiscernible] >> whether or not they are they do not have a real trust toward china. when chinese, they are either communist or not communist. so ho chi minh and other had trust communists in china. chinanew very well that wanted be at to win during the vietnam war. ok? what about the soviet union at the time? kruschev wanted a

peaceful coexistence with the united states. he wanted to help vietnamese communists to win the war. especially in 1965. provided to the enemies communists too, 5000 pistols. 5000 pistols. again u.s. combat troops in vietnam. know who said that the echo -- said that? adler and ho chi minh. nationalbasically

common units -- communists and not international communists. . likehen -- i would explain aboutn to the north vietnamese coming as leader at the time. just to achieve the national goal. thank you.

i'm sorry, as a moderator. i would like to say something. i'm sorry about breaking the rules. question.k we got his thank you. i would also like the answer for this question. please. morethink ho chi minh was a communist nationalist. the indication is he's a committed internationalist. consider the fact is. he also wants to liberate laos and cambodia. ofprovides all kinds assistance.

1847 a 75 we end up with and m-16s from vietnam in latin america. it's a very significant history. these guys are not concerned stickley about the and him. whenever castro comes to represent in latin america, -- what le lays one xuan wants. in 63, 64, recognize 65, your best friend in the world is china. they are very close for all the right reasons. 56 it starts to change. usee was a compatibility of

that no one can deny. vietnamesethe north are firing, much of that comes from the soviet union. bulletsot more than coming from pistols. wasantiaircraft system largely funded and provided by the soviets themselves. >> when vietnamese communists held a laos and the cambodian their kind of revolution, the kind of colonial legacy -- thank you so much.

it's only one minute. we break the rule. additional have an answer about the question. and we agree without that -- agree about that. >> i would like to comment on , talk about the vietnamese communist leaders. basically the nationalists communists -- because of that the nationalists have a different connection to others. , theyetnamese communists are not nationalists. why you go -- why? a two-state follow

revolution. after 1975 day equipped them differently. but they moved away from the north. the difference was in the populace, and the people who joined the revolution. like -- theyay be joined because they were patriotic. , but are not communists the leaders are communists. and they follow the communist line and they apply that to the situation they are in now. >> next question, please. follow.a hard act to i'm not going to try to be long. question, ining always considered myself a

student of history. perhaps mr. phillips or mr. -- i wonder why the , i wonder ifune they are the ones to overthrow -- i read parts that people were behind the general. the question is how do you explain america was so gung ho coming into vietnam and thervene in that and do

freedom and democracy and noermination of vietnam quicker than their involvement out asnam, they pulled they came in. when you already caused this -- for the war, how do you -- when the war was started in the 1930's between the nationalists and communists. how would they win if you come in and take them away? we need to keep the question to one minute. i think we just go ahead to the question.

thank you. >> does someone want to take the question you go -- question? >> to address the question, americans came in faster than they left. i think it's interesting. i find some reason for that. 1960 through 1963, there were three very well-known american reporters. they first of all supported the war. they came in and said america is lost, there needs to be an american intervention, and that's why america interfered. they have to come in and fight their way, not the vietnamese

way to win the war. they came in and they couldn't fight the war. 1965 he wrote an article about the americanization of the war. they wanted the vietnamese to get out read they lost, simple like that. >> high. can you hear me? i am a medicine educated nurse. --you can see now i'm a victim of these communists. i have a question.

century ago, what do you think of the rule of the media -- the role of the media in helping the coming this invading and destroying south vietnam. now the subject is very sensitive with current events. what do you think of the role of the media in adding to the frustration of the so-called socialists, which they know nothing about the communists, unless you live with a communist. that's my question. [applause] >> when you talk about the american media, you have to understand the influence of and the direct intoting of the war

american households. we had no idea what was going on. they see the worst part of the war. it is known popularly as the bloody thumb approach. which is you have a camera, you are focused on something, and someone sticks a bloody thumb right in front of it, and that's the impression you get. the terrible aspects of it really affected the american view. themit became apparent to that what they were hearing accuratetory was not they began to no longer believe in the american.

some of the media were too superficial. they never went behind the stories. photograph took the thehe general executing , he regrettedssin later on that he had taken it because of the way it was , killing police officers and their family. the nuances of the situation to thet susceptible immediate reaction you get from television. i don't think it's right to

blame the media, per se. to understand this war is and the real aspects that made a difference were never adequately communicated. to was it possible communicate them in just a few visual images or just a few visit words. >> thank you very much. >> can you hear me echo -- hear me? thank you very much. i'm a social scientist, i've conducted fieldwork in different parts of asia. i want to ask you about the archives that you access in north vietnam. i'm particularly curious as to how they covered the pentagon papers. did people comment on that?

who compiled the archive's? what didn't get in that you think they may have somewhere you can elaborate as you wish. i'm happy, but my standards are very low right now. vietnam communist state, there is no law governing the release of archival materials. after 30 years in the u.s., pretty much everything comes out. at the archives, technically everything is there. or you pull the files out. that file you requested on ainese assistance, that's great file, it's so interesting, but i can't give it to you.

it's a very partial record. i work in the government archives. those, but iinto don't think they're going to help. off-limits even to the defense ministry. in 20 years stuff comes up here and there. i see top secret stuff, i'm not supposed to see my accident. in that way i got a good image of things. there was one summer, i ask about all these documents that were filed about western information, and it's all new -- all newspaper clippings. archive's? in the and as i'm talking to people from the foreign ministry, they

say that's why our deval patrick struggle -- our diplomatic struggle was so good. overseas, every single publication was sent to us. and that became key to their victory. >> thank you very much. after 43 years we talk about the vietnam war. i'm very touched and thank you for all of americans who listen to us. after three years you know now the goal of communists is corrupt. dictatorship kill people. i know what job we had to do. we had to be engaged. we had to be ambassadors,

distress to the world how bad it is in vietnam. and to unite together. mount against china and become free again. and askr your support that you go home today, engage in politics, engage in the media . to educate, to share information. i cannot believe that. die afterof people 75. and their professors. home, work, engage, and spread the word.

>> thank you. question. among that what was best about the vietnam or it was the remarkable capability of the hanoi government to rally. we have a lot of people from south vietnam who were sent to hanoi to train and sent back to south vietnam. my question is where is the rallying point that the -- what is the rallying point that the hanoi government used? was it -- --as him, was it fighting up was it to? was it fighting foreign invaders in our country?.

agree the way hanoi would use history for its purposes, rallying the northern masses, the use of history was something they did remarkably well. helped thehat hanoi's propaganda machine was the amerco's decision to bomb the north. thehe average that was american -- was the american's decision to bomb the north. bombing americans start , for the average person in the north, this is clear unprovoked aggression. that gets people going, which is great for hanoi. as of 64, hanoi feels if it starts a war at that point, it might mix into the south. it would be difficult to get the northern population to support another war. people don't really care in the

north about the situation in the south. they care about land, they care about farming. when the american start bombing, that is a real boom for hanoi. manipulationuse of that use and manipulation of history where really key in terms of rallying people behind hanoi and giving it that legitimacy that i feel saigon always tries to get but could .ever muster >> i also study the propaganda of north vietnam, and they invited people to different groups. thosey were mobilized to to fight on the front, they will be mobilized based on identity. there the workers, we are teri at -- the proletariat.

level of thethe kind of audience that they tailored the messages, a very high-ranking party office. they got different messages. the propaganda is very sophisticated. >> i had the privilege of from 1967 to 1969. twoounterparts asked questions. why aren't the americans doing more to stop corruption and why aren't we correcting the leadership? >> first of all the question was too simplistic in the sense that

we cannot simply tell the vietnamese what to do. better toave worked influence the way the regime behaved. tackled the correction problem in directly in a more effective way. the administration in washington want its ability because with stability hopefully the government would continue to support our own unilateral efforts to negotiate with the north vietnamese. that became a predominant factor ,ver the problem of domestic

south vietnamese domestic politics. too often we behaved as if we could go in and tell that the enemies what to do. i don't understand how you could influence them. i worked with a guy who understood them and influence to discussion, through talking, through understanding their problems, through suggesting solutions. and encouraging them to live up to their own ideals. this is the way you influence people. we didn't have too few operating at the top who are willing to engage in it. you for the thank information you shared today.

i think my stomach says it's time for lunch. thank you very much. have just one thing. being a moderator i don't have a --nce, i have one wish was relievednd from camp, he was paralyzed. old.n was one month when we unite the country he's 10 years old. my wish is if we have another -- the most important part to me is after 1975. who wins and who failed by the country? thank you.

>> thank you. >> this weekend, on american history tv on c-span3, tonight at 8 p.m. eastern on lectures in history, wake forest university professor a vid lubin on 19th-century artist winslow homer. then on sunday at 8 p.m. eastern, a look at how the fashion choices of pat nixon and betty ford reflected the politics and culture of their times. eastern, the ceremony marking the 25th anniversary of -- the. capitol anniversary of the u.s. capitol cornerstone. during a ceremony they used corn, oil and wine. watch american history tv. this weekend on c-span3. uss bowfs both in --

the summaryi and was nicknamed the pearl harbor avenger. at --look where the japanese signed document's of unconditional surrender, ending world war ii. >> the battleship missouri -- 50 flagship, marking the complete and formal surrender of japan. tokyo, the united states destroyer comes alongside, bringing representatives of the allied powers