campaign 2018 coverage continues tonight in pennsylvania's redrawn 17th district race. as republican congressman debates the democratic congressman. live coverage is on at 7:00 p.m.. beto o'rourke and senator ted cruz debate happens at 4:00. you can listen on the c-span radio app. c-span is your source for campaign 2018. earlier this month, mitt romney, who is running for the senate, spoke about the trump administration's policies, and the future of the republican party. watch that tonight at 8:00 p.m. on c-span 2. you can watch it online and on the app. tonight, american history tv and our history series takes viewers inside of college classrooms. these programs this evening are on the civil war, starting with

judith gettysburg, and her student speaking about how northern middle-class women volunteered during the civil war. american history tv begins at 8:00 p.m. eastern. state and defense apartment -- department official testify on the monitoring and future of arms control agreements between the united states and russia. such as the 2011 stark treaty. the foreign relations committee held his hearing last month. i want to thank everyone for being here. because we need 11 people to vote, we will give the opening statement to start everything off. as soon as we get to 11

folks, we will stop about. i want to thank everyone for their cooperation. first, want to thank our witnesses for being here. we are fortunate to have a distinguished panel. this is the fourth in a series of meetings. this is the current status of arms control efforts. the current situation is not encouraging. at -- the inf treaty, the open sky treaty, and the chemical convention, we have significant problems with russian compliance of three of them. it should come as no surprise to any of us that russia has been cheating on its treaties. vladimir putin's government has annexed things, interfering with elections, used chemical weapons to poison individuals, and hacked u.s. utilities.

given that record, he is not likely to let treaty commitments get in his way either. the question we need to ask is what are we going to do? some argue that we should walk away from the inf treaty, since russia has been in blatant violation for several years now. some things -- think that's exactly what putin wants. the last time we deployed missiles was in 1983. 1 million people protested. that is exactly the kind of division the russian information operations are designed to exploit and intensify. as we discussed at the meeting on nato, it's crucial that we remained unified with the european partners on defense and deterrence issues. on the open skies treaty, we are at an impasse with the russians. we have not had a flight all year. we can live without that data,

but it hurts the 32 other countries that do not have the same alternative resources that we do. even with new start, which has succeeded so far, we should be realistic about the expectations of where we will be with russia in 2021 when the treaty expires unless and -- extended. we need to think about new weapons and technologies on strategic stability between the united states, russia, and other nations. putin is good about the hypersonic vehicles, nuclear power, ballistic missiles, nuclear torpedoes, and russia advances in cyber warfare, space, and artificial intelligence. each of these developments introduces new uncertainties, and calculating adversaries. none of these are easy to address from an arms-control verification and compliance perspective.

as we devote our own research and development into these areas, we must consider the potential to encourage risk- taking by any country with access to them. i hope our witnesses today cannot only provide an assessment of the status of current agreements, but authorize -- offer us some assurance that the defense apartments -- departments are considering these challenges. i hope we can gain a better understanding of any arms- control discussions that took lace at the helsinki summit, and what the prospects may be for future control agreements. with that, i would like to thank you for being here. i still don't think we have 11, so i will turned to -- turn it over to our distinguished member. >> today is part of a series of hearings towards the russian federation. this is the arms-control efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war and limit their nuclear forces to maintain u.s. national security. despite a number of inquiries to the secretary, and others,

more than two months after president trump's helsinki meeting, we remain largely in the dark as to what the leaders agreed to during their to our closed session. we do know that russian ambassador to the united states told reporters that, important verbal agreements were reached at the helsinki summit on arms- control issues, including preservation of the new start and inf treaties. we are finding ourselves in an incredible situation. the american people, the elected officials in this body, and members of the president's own administration hear more from russian officials about alleged agreements that the president is making about critical national security issues. what constitutes an important verbal agreement? what does that mean? did he reach key decisions on treaties? if so, why hasn't congress been informed about this decision?

along with many others in this body, i have strongly supported policies to confront russia for its multiple, and ongoing transgressions including military aggression, malign influence, and repressive policies. i believe we need comprehensive strategies to confront our adversaries. we need to prioritize the safety of the united states and its citizens. this requires being clear eyed about the threats we face, and all the tools that they can wield against us. constraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons must be a core component of our strategy. given the reality of their nuclear capacity, we must collectively use every diplomatic tool in our arsenal to achieve our goals. the stakes could not be higher. we have historically negotiated and entered into agreements with our advertisers, recognizing we are dealing with hostile powers that cannot be trusted. we build in metrics that account for probability of

efforts to deceive and dodge. and high-stakes agreements, these are essential. in the universe of arms control agreements with russia, we conduct on-site inspections of military bases and facilities. we require data exchanges in order to track the status and makeup of their nuclear forces. today, we know russia is violating the intermediate range and nuclear force treaty. if we have evidence that a country is violating international commitments, we must be unequivocal in working to the construction of the agreement to bring them back into compliance. we must never lose sight of our objectives with any arms- control agreement. we could risk catastrophic war. we had to constrain their ability to threaten us and our allies. in assessing the value of an arms-control agreement, who must consider whether our participation further advances our goals. what it strengthen our hand walk away, or leave us without a seat at the table? we have insight into her adversaries stockpile? is that

safer or less secure? we have to remind you of the ramifications of the new treaty. when the senate deliberated new start in 2010, some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, including our chairman, made it clear that they were willing to vote for the treaty, but only as part of a deal that modernized our nuclear forces and infrastructure. neither and unconstrained nuclear arms race, nor a blind faith in arms-control agreements serve u.s. national security interests. american security is best served with a strong, rentable determined that operates within a stable and constrained arms- control environment. i have the trump administration fully understands this. diminishing the value of arms- control and placing all faith in one dimensional conceptions of increasing nuclear strength, to bring the russians and the chinese to heal will result in a far more dangerous strategic environment. i want to remind the administration the bipartisan

support is tied to maintaining an arms-control process that controls, seeks to reduce their nuclear forces. that does mean promoting military and fiscally responsible policies on ourselves. we are not interested in writing blank checks for nuclear arms race with russia. we don't want to step off the path of stability to wander down and uncertain road, filled with potentially dire consequences. the final note i would make is i hope that as part of our oversight, which i applaud you for having conducted with these hearings, we will get to an opportunity to markup nafta and related bills. it is important for congress to speak about russia's violations of the international order, and the undermining of our election. since we have very often taken up sanctions as part of our overall foreign policy tools, i would urge you, chairman, to

make sure that we also keep a jurisdictional opportunity as it relates to that. then we can have a markup that says united message to the russians that we will not tolerate their actions at home and abroad. with that, i look forward to the witnesses. thank you. i think everyone understands that, depending on how you write the bill, and what key phrases you use, that determines what committee he goes to. we are not giving up jurisdiction. every committee member has to understand that if they want come to foreign relations, they have to write it in a certain way. i know everyone has mastered that art. i know you did on your bill. it's a bill in the committee. thank you for referring to that. with that, thank everyone for their cooperation. what i would like to do is

recess our hearing, and move to a quick is meeting if we could. i know doesn't mean much to many of us here to confirm the nominees. it does mean a lot to them. it means a tremendous amount to the countries that they are going to. i would like to thank you. the business meeting at the senator foreign committee will come to order. we have nine nominees. this is senator menendez. >> i just will reduce my comments for the record, i support the nominees. a >> i received a letter to holdover the nomination of mr. francisco louis to be ambassador to honduras. he did his written answers. i know one of our members was not able to read those yet. we will consider him next time. we will now consider all of the other items on the agenda, including the following. ms. linda blanchard to be ambassador to slovenia. the honorable earl robert

miller to be ambassador to bangladesh. mr. daniel rosenblum to be ambassador to [ indiscernible ]. mr. jeff tom to be u.s. representative to the united nations agencies for food and agriculture. ms. karen williams to be ambassador to the republic of surinam. mr. kevin sullivan to be ambassador to nicaragua. mr. mark rosen to the u.s. executive director of the international monetary fund. is there motion to favorably report these nominations on block by voice vote? >> it has been moved and seconded. the court favorably pushes the nomination. everyone say i. with that, they have it, the nominations are agreed to pick that complete the committee's business. i move that they have their

technical changes done. with that, without objections, the business meeting will adjourn, we will begin again the hearing. i think all of those for being here. you have completed your opening statement, i think. let me move to another part. the first witness today is andrea thompson, under secretary of state for arms control and international security. we had a chance to speak in the back. thank you for being here. thank you for sharing your expertise with us. the second witness is david trachtenberg, deck 80 undersecretary of defense for policy, i shared the same with you. thank you both. if you could summarize in five minutes, any written materials you have, without objection, it will be entered into the record. thank you for being here. it's an important hearing. if you could begin in the order

introduced, i would appreciate it. >> good morning, thank you for hosting this hearing. welcome here today to discuss arms-control with russia. this is a topic that central to security in the world. the 2018 review states that progress in arms-control is not an end in and of itself. it depends on the security environment, and the participation of willing partners. the value of any arms-control agreement is derived from the treaty partners maintaining compliance with their obligations. they avoid actions that resulted mistrust and the potential for miscalculation. russia continues to violate a series of arms-control obligations undermine the trust that we can place entreaties, including some that have used -- serve u.s. allies for years. as reflected in the administration national

security strategy, and echoed in the defense strategy, great power competition is reemerging. we can no longer be complacent in the face of challenges by competitors. we need to be creative and flexible in how we approach and manage the strategic competition with russia. that includes an evaluation of where we stand with respect to our arms-control agreement, and the interrelationship with the deterrence and defense requirements. i will begin with the new start treaty. in february of this year, both countries confirmed compliance with the treaty central limits. we are committed to implementing the treaty and ensuring russia stays in compliance. i know this committee has sought the administration's view of extending the treaty. no decision hasn't made at this time. in the meanwhile, rush has persisted in violation of the inf treated through their ground launch missile program. this administration is utilized diplomatic, economic -- economic to have the return to compliance. the lack of any meaningful steps by russia to do so

diminishes the hope that it wants to preserve the inf treaty. as we have said, many times, the status quo is unsustainable. our patience is not unlimited. on chemical weapons, russia has blocked every effort to compel the asada regime to use chemical weapons. they are perpetrator of chemical weapons used with its raise an assassination attempt against folks in the uk using a chemical agent. we recently imposed the first round of sanctions on russia, required by the warfare elimination act. we have been cleared with moscow that we will continue to execute our mandate under this law. in the meantime, our nato allies , as reinforced in the declaration of 2018, remain committed to preserving, strengthening, and modernizing the existing regimes. where confidence and security building mechanisms. the department of state also continues to lead efforts to push against their troubling behavior in space.

a particular concern, russia lost experiment satellites that conduct sophisticated on orbit activities. some of them are expected to advance counterspace additives. this is an important tool in maintaining pressure on masco to abandon its malign activities. we do assess the global campaign [ indiscernible ], has denied russia's defense sectors several billion dollars in lost sales estates abandon arms deals with masco. and all, russia's destabilizing actions include significant transgressions in the adherence to their obligations, namely arms-control treaties and agreements. this has created a trust deficit that leaves the united states to question russia's commitment to arms-control as a

way to manage and stabilize our relationship to promote greater transparency and predictability. russia must take its commitments more seriously if we are to find ways to shift the relationship to whom -- a more stable path. i look forward to your questions. thank you for the opportunity to testify on the current state of arms-control with russia. i will not repeat much of what undersecretary thompson has already said. the bottom line is, arms- control with russia is troubled. the russian federation apparently believes it need only abide by the agreements that suited. as a result, the credibility of all international agreements with russia is at risk. united states is committed to it's a long-held arms-control nonproliferation and nuclear security objectives. a

particularly the goals for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. arms-control can contribute to u.s. security. it can help to manage strategic competition amongst states. we are committed to meaningful arms-control, that decreases the chance of misperception, miscalculation, and conflict. the nuclear posture review acknowledges the arms-control is not an end in and of itself. the current security environment makes arms-control extremely challenging in the near-term. any future options must include the participation of willing partners. it is difficult to envision progress in the security environment that is threatened by russia's continuing noncompliance with existing arms-control obligations and commitments. in this regard, russia has a series of challenges that do not lend themselves to conditions suitable for the greater trust necessary to engage in a prudent arms- control agenda. it would be irresponsible to ignore these infractions, and

not hold them responsible for its violations. as reliable ally and partner, the united states must advocate for arms-control agreements that make the world more secure, include the willing participant -- participations from all parties. united states assesses that russia's in compliance with the new start treaty, both sides met the central limits in february of this year. i can assure you that the united dates will faithfully implement and verify russian complaints with the treaty. moving forward, the united states will consider extending new start treaty beyond its expiration date. any decision on extending the treaty will, and should be, based on a realistic assessment on whether the new start treaty remains in our national security interest, in light of their behavior. on inf, the russian federation remains in violation of its obligations under the inf treaty. we have been more than patient.

we have provided russia with ample opportunities to come back into compliance. this administration's determination of russia's violation is no different than the one announced in july 2014. we reviewed the intelligence, and came to the same conclusion as our predecessors. the evidence is conclusive. violation is a real. it goes against the core purpose and restrictions of the inf treaty. this administration sought to preserve the viability of the treaty by applying pressure on russia to return to compliance with its obligations. we believed it was in the national security interest of the united states, and in our allies and partners interest to pervert -- preserve the inf treaty. we did recognize that russia would determine whether it remains viable. one thing is certain, we cannot allow the treaty partner to continue to violate the treaty indefinitely. we will not let the action or inaction occur at the expense of our security or that of our allies and partners.

for the last year, the department of defense reviewed and evaluated systems that could develop if it were not constrained by the treaty. the identification of these capabilities speaks to our minds -- remind the russians why they came to the treaty in the first place. we appreciate the efforts of congress to help the department of defense implement the research and develop in efforts. regardless of whether they return to compliance or not, there are broader implications for the future of arms-control, due to the lack of trust that's being created by russia. it is difficult to envision a way forward for the united states and russia to rebuild the trust, and achieve a level transparency that could lead to a brighter future and arms- control. we need to create the conditions for this trust. that falls on the united states and russia. moscow will bear the burdens as russians -- russia's actions created the violation and trust.

we appreciate the opportunity to testify. we will keep you informed of developments. i look forward to your questions. thank you both for your opening comments and your service. i will turn this over to the ranking official. before i go to questions, want to make a comment. the question of how we road that was not just for jurisdictional purposes, it was written and a way to be comprehensive enough to deal with all of russia's malign activities. i don't want you to think it was just a strategic purpose. let me ask, both of you, on the topic of arms-control, what was discussed during the two-hour closed meeting with president trump and president putin? >> i cannot tell you the specifics of what was discussed in helsinki. i can tell you arms-control was a topic of conversation.

we have since had dialogue with our russian counterparts. last month in august, and is able to and met with his counterpart. the foreign minister of pompeo had multiple discussions. i have had discussions as well. arms-control remains an open dialogue. to make as a russian ambassador said, verbal agreements, did they get entered into? if so, what are they? >> i'm not aware of any agreements. >> it was discussed, and you know by virtue of what? >> i know it was discussed based on feedback through senior representatives and the state department. to make can you define that for me? >> the discussions of those that were in attendance at the debrief with ambassador huntsman . >> is or anything different you can add to that? >> no, senator, i'm not aware of any agreements. a >> do you agree that congress

was given a directive that links the nuclear modernization program with creating a strategic arms-control process? >> i do agree that both of them are important. >> do you agree that congress is basically said that fourth as a link? >> i agree that that was part of the discussion and the ratification debate over the new start debate. >> if the limit on russian forces labs, what would that mean for national security? >> i'm sorry? do not give new start disappears, and the limitations on russian forces labs, what would be the implications for u.s. national security? >> from the department of defense perspective, i would say that's one of the issues that we are currently considering, both interagency and with our allies and partners. >> you do not, you cannot give us any sense of the consequences? >> i would say, the issue of new start, which runs until 2021

, is an issue that we are very much engaged in in terms of consultations and implications. you are exactly correct. >> would we require more expensive force? >> i cannot say that at this time. >> this worries me. the department of defense is the one that always plans ahead. you to wait for a situation to happen and then figure out what you are going to do. you must be thinking, as a contingency, that if new start lapses, and there is no follow- up, clearly what do we do then? are you going to tell us, you don't believe it will require a larger and more expensive nuclear force? >> the implications of whether new start continues, or whether elapses are still under discussion. the department of defense lands for all kinds of contingencies.

>> i find it incredible that you cannot tell this committee at this point time what the possibilities would mean? it's not a rocket scientist to figure that out. >> let me go through a series of statements. senior military officials, such as the air force general, and a commander of the u.s. -- they voiced enthusiastic support for the new start treaty. let me go through a series of questions, and you can give me a simple yes or no. can the united states meet all of our current deterrent requirements with the force at or slightly below the current levels of the new start treaty? >> we are meeting our obligations. we are currently meeting our obligations. >> so, the answer is yes. we can meet our requirements with the force at or slightly below the levels of the new start treaty. >> yes. the reason why we have

witnesses here is to give us answers to the questions that we pose. that's not the question i posed you. does the new start treaty force the united states to cut back any of our current nuclear modernization efforts? >> no. >> does the new start treaty limit, and anyway, our missile defenses? >> i would defer to the department of defense. >> no. is >> does this meet the standard brought forward in the arms- control? it fosters transparency, understanding, and predictably with regards to russia? it reduces the risk of miscalculation? to make the transparency and verification requirements of the new start treaty our benefit. >> let me try one more time. my time has expired. do you believe that it meets

the standard put forward in our nuclear posture review? >> i believe it meets the requirements we have today. >> i will use the first minute my time to say, having written the two amendments myself with missile defense a modernization, there was a connection in the resolution of ratification. we did make sure that while we are going to reduce the amount of warheads, and our ability to deliver them, we wanted to modernize. there was a huge savings and not keeping a massive inventories read throughout our country, and not knowing whether they operated or not. there's a huge savings in modernizing. these two things worked hand in hand. we did pass the amendments on the floor.

i gave other people's names on them, trying to draw them onto the treaty. in some cases i was successful and others i it has been very important, the essence of this is that the modernization piece, and the reduction in warheads piece go hand in hand. i do think that self-evident. it is central to the entire agreement. >> thank you for your testimony. miss thompson, you mentioned there are ongoing discussions with the russians, do we also have some kind a permanent organization? did they set up a structure where there is ongoing negotiations where they can discuss contention? is there an actual body of people who meet regularly? >> there are. for example, with inf treaty,

we had one experts meeting during the course of the administration. now we have had 2 of those meetings. we had the bilateral consulting commission that gets together on new start. each treaty has an organization of experts with in the governmental representatives that meet. >> the separate agencies or entities, do they have one for disputes? are they different from new start? >> the representatives come under micro view. they are experts. >> you have met once in the last year? >> for the inf experts meeting. >> there's another meeting coming up? >> yes sir. they are regular in the sense that the treaties are annual. some of them are biannual.

some of them are in conjunction with other conferences. we have an open line of communication. >> we believe them to be in violation. they complain and say that our launchers are in violation as well. do you think this can be worked out through discussions? can we get to that point where there could be a resolution of these things? both sides my had to give a little bit of this? do we just acknowledge that there is no way we are in violation? >> we have not had progress of our. we have an interagency process to see what options we have. >> a lot of this is very detailed, whether something is in violation are not. it seems like an openness to having an ongoing discussion is important. both of you acknowledge that the new start treaty that we are in compliance with, and both of you seem to be concerned. can we go forward, because they are in violation of so many other treaties. my only concern is, with the

iran agreement, they said they were in compliance. we were still unhappy about other things that they were doing. there is similarities here. many of us think the new start treaty was an advantage. it brought down the threat of nuclear weapons. we have less nuclear weapons. there were good things that came from new start. my concern is that we could be throwing all that out and saying, they are violating the inf, or these other treaties, we don't like all the stuff they are doing. i worry that we throw out the new start treaty because of that. i hope people will think about, we try to get the best that we can. we negotiate from a position of strength. i'm concerned that we would simply say, just start over. it's not that easy. iran agreements will be difficult to start from the very beginning. instead of starting with what are we complying on and going to the differences, let's not throw out everything. if new start is working, maybe we look at inf. that's the only caution i would

have in looking at this. i would also like to say, we are very interested in what goes on with these. we would like to have you come in and speak with us about how the meetings are going and what the differences are. >> thank you senator. i would like to thank our witnesses. mrs. thompson, i think the understatement in your written statement about russia's taken action of the last few years that have posed real challenges to our bilateral relationship, and widened the deficit of trust. all of us would say that is a major concern. we look at the relationships with russia on the nuclear front. we look at new start. it gives us the opportunity to do inspections. is not only on active sites, but the sites that are not

active. we really do get to see, with our own people, what's going on in russia. that is extremely valuable. we also the fact that russia is in compliance and we are in compliance with the new start treaty. as senator paula said, we know that russia is in violation with inf. they developed land-based missiles. you are using enforcement mechanisms under inf. i strongly agree. we are not withdrawing from the inf. i think that would be a disaster. it would only isolate us more from what they are doing. we have taking countermeasures through a submarine base defense system in regards to what they are doing a land. we are taking our steps in compliance with inf, in order to make sure we are secure. in response to senator menendez's question, i was

surprised i didn't hear stronger statement as to the national security importance of both the new start and inf. we know north korea has a nuclear program. what we don't know are the specifics, because we don't have inspections. we don't have eyes on the ground. we don't know what's going on in that country. and yes, we have international inspections of iran, but not with arab dissipation. we are somewhat limited in understanding what's going on in iran. in russia, we have the capacity to understand the program, because of the new start treaty. we know the administration has a way of surprising us at times with statements made by the president. that's why we have this hearing. i would like to get both of your views as to the national security importance to the united states, in these tough times with russia. we have to get our inspections

in russia. we have to understand the nuclear program. the importance of that to the united dates public and national security. if i could, as i stated, i do believe the verification and monitoring, and on-site inspection provisions provide a level of openness and transparency that is useful and beneficial. it it is beneficial not only to us, but our allies as well. that said, what i find particularly troubling is the overall nature of russians arms- control behavior, and what they seem to be doing in terms of electively complying with various provisions of treating's -- treaties. it is the overall type of behavior that i think, from a national security perspective, we need to consider. >> i agree with what you're saying. my concern is, sometimes we do

a knee-jerk reaction in this administration. if we give up our ability to have the inspectors in russia, because of violation in inf that leads to the end of new start. is not in our interest to do that. i was hoping to get a broader response to you as to the importance of our current relationship with russia on nuclear, as it relates to transparency. this is clearly in our interest. we can counter their violations without pulling out of the agreement. we have already done that with inf. we have done that with the modernization program. we can still do that. we can do that with missile defense. we are not in violation of either treaty. we can stay in compliance with the treaties, without pulling out. yes, we are not satisfied where they are today. we have mechanisms to try to counter that through direct enforcement and mechanisms within the

agreement, and our own nuclear program and defense program in order to counter what they're doing, isn't that a fair statement? >> yes, you are exactly correct. we do indeed have the mechanisms. where we may differ, i believe we are taking a deliberate approach to our assessments of all of the treaties, including the new start treaty. i do not see this as a rush to judgment on the part of the administration. it is perfectly legitimate, and appropriate for us to weigh all of the potential and look at all of the implications. >> i do agree with you. we have a specific responsibility, as an independent branch of government on foreign policy. i think people need to understand how important these treaties are to national security. i do respect that you're going

through a deliberative process. i really do. we have seen this administration do things that have not been under a deliberative process. decisions have been made by the president. it's important that we have a publicly established record as to the importance of these treaties, as relates to national security. i wish you would be more bold as to the importance of us maintaining these relationships. >> i would like to follow up on what he just said. this is an important point. when i came to the senate, and i came to the foreign relations committee, the first legislation was the new start treaty. i got very involved, because of the responsibility put on me. everything else we dealt with, this was the most important thing we could do. this is arms-control verification between us and russia. i got very much into the weeds.

i probably got too deep for real estate salesman to get into, but i did it anyway. i did vote for it. it was clearly evident that there was no other agreement that we were into with any other adversary or potential adversary, or ally in the world that had better verification, and better mandated access. am i correct on that? >> i would agree with that. >> the information with iran was not verifiable. it had gaping holes. that's why he voted against it. i wanted to vote against it, because it did not add anything to our country security. it did diminish it, in comparison with what we were involved in in russia.

understand you don't want to give away negotiating positions with the russians. when you answer his question or my question, about the start treaty, you don't want to say anything that would cede a point that you would have to negotiate. i do agree with what he said. we ought to be more pro-on this. we don't want to get out of it. knowledge and access is tremendous. we have russians in the united states that have access to inspect us. we have a unique hologram system on the warheads, so we can count them and where they are. we can catch them. they can catch as. if we were to insist on this at the table with iran, we would have it treaty with them. we would have the 2 largest nuclear powers in the world, we want but those verifications in our agreement with them.

we want to come inspect yours and you can inspect hours. it was a perfect predicate to do that. the secretary decided not to do it that way. it would've been a great way to get that for the door. all i'm trying to say is, when you get worried about compromising your future by talking about what you might get out of if you don't like it, you run the risk of letting them think they can get out of the responsibility put on them. they would be much more willing to take advantage of it than we would. i would like to make that point. i would like both be to answer this question. on the space force, when the vice president announced the space force, and you acknowledged some of the experimentations that the russians it done in space of a defensive nature. would you equalize the space force enthusiasm that you have seen so far?

is it equal to what the missile defense system was of the reagan administration? >> i do not think we are currently considering a missile defense capability similar to what was proposed during the reagan administration. in terms of the base force, the department of defense is committed to going forward and implementing the vision expressed by the president and vice president. we are moving out expeditiously and appropriately to develop those capabilities. given the importance of national defense, where to do that. and >> i hope that would be your answer. when you did address that in your remarks, the space force is the modern-day answer to the missile defense system that reagan used. use missile defense is an idea for the future. is scared the health out of the russians. in fact, led to their spending on defense. and put them in the

difficulty they fell into in the early 1990s. i think having the space force recognized as a future addition to our defense or offense both diplomatically and militarily is a great tool as missile defense was in its infancy, and has been since. i do applaud the administrations boldness and doing that. i hope it's something that will be a meaningful tool and not a paper tiger. >> thank you for being here to testify. i want to go back to the nine of treaty. you both pointed out russia's violation. this is not in our interest to withdraw from the inf treaty. i don't think it helped to solve the russia problem. what other options are being considered to try and push the

russians to comply with the inf treaty? are there things that you can talk about that have been looked at that we might not yet have tried? >> i can assure you we have used diplomatic means. we've used economic means. sumat can you discuss specifics of what the diplomatic and military means are? >> i would prefer to tell you that we are an interagency process now. we are looking at it holistically throughout the russia strategy. i would not want to get into specifics, because we are still in development stages. >> to i take from that, that we are considering options that have not been tried yet? >> yes ma'am, that is a fair assessment.

>> this is for you. this claims the other nuclear armed states have modernized their nuclear arsenals far more extensively than the united states, so that both china and russia have done this. do you share that view?

u.s. monetization program. over the years we have reduced the levels of our nuclear stockpile by some 85% since the height of the cold war, but we do need to pursue the modernization program that has been referred to earlier. the united states has not built a new nuclear weapon in many years, russia we know has, china has, other nuclear weapon states have. so, i do see a discrepancy there. i would completely agree with the conclusions reached in the nuclear regime. >> one of the things that senator cork pointed out was that part of the agreement around new start was the modernization piece, but the idea was that we would continue to modernize and i think there is some funding and the current appropriations, and authorization in the nda a bill that would allow us to look at

some other modernization capabilities. but, they were also supposed to go hand in hand with continued efforts to reduce the number of nuclear weapons. can you talk about what's been done in the last 20 months of this administration that would point to efforts to further reduce nuclear weapons? >> i can tell you senator, that we have reduced to the point where we are in compliance with all of our arms-control obligations, in particular, the new start totals which have put of course limitations on three systems, the number of deployed strategic weapons and the number of deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, as well as the total number of deployed and nondeployed systems. what we have taken is those obligations seriously. >> can you talk about how much of that has been done since the current administration took office? >> i don't have the figures in

front of me. i would be happy to take this for the record and get back to you. >> that would be great, thank you. if you would share with the entire committee, that would be helpful. last week it was reported that the united states refused to certify the new russian tu 214 aircraft, for flights under the treaty on open skies, we were the only one of 23 nations to vote no, can you talk about why, i think this is probably for you, miss thompson, can you talk about why we took that position? >> yes senator, we had technical experts, over 20 other countries and the certification for the russian sensor, we didn't fail to certify, we came back and had to consult with some additional technical experts and i can anticipate we will have a decision on that within the next 24 hours. we have not not certified, and we will probably, we will have a decision in the next 24 hours. >> i am out of time, but if we think we should not certify this aircraft, will we not also

argue with some of our allies and those other 23 nations that they also should not certify it? >> yes ma'am. there is a subprocess, but within the next 24 hours, you will have an answer for the certification. >> thank you. >> thank you, the senator. >> i think both of you for what you do. it has been said several times today, that what you do is some of the most important work that our country does, as far as our nations security and keeping us safe. having said that, trying to negotiate with people who aren't negotiating in good faith is a problem. you both have a heavy lift ahead of you, i was one of the ones, indeed i led the effort to not ratify the new start, not because i don't believe we should deal with the russians, i think we have to deal with the russians. as i think a lot of us today don't have any confidence

whatsoever, that they are dealing in good faith. they are serial cheaters, they are serial liars, and you have to look at the other things that they are doing in the world, to judge what kind of a mind these people have, as far as whether they are acting in good faith. having said that, the reason i oppose the original new start, was simply because i believed it didn't give us the inspections, the confidence that we needed to get to where we wanted to be. i thought there was more we could do. obviously we can't talk about it here, but there are things that we can do to verify in addition to the things that are included in the treaty, and they do the same thing. having said that, as we move, as we look forward to renegotiating the treaty, when it expires, are there

preparations being made, as to how we could ratchet up our game, as far as being able to verify the things that we suspect and probably know in some instances, that they are doing, but we can't even tell them that we know, because it would disclose methods, and sources. but, is there a thought process going into this as to how we will up our game, miss thompson? >> yes, there is a rigorous process ongoing, all options are on the table as we bring in technical expertise on what we know and what we don't know, and how we can fill the gaps. diplomatically from our end, materially from the defense department, economically from her agencies as well. on what are things that haven't been tried before, what are some options in that process is ongoing. >> do you have anything to add to that? >> i would agree with that, i would also agree with your

earlier comments as well, in terms of the new start treaty, and i would make this point. of course when the new start treaty was negotiated in 2010, at the time, we had hoped that it would sort of represent a new relationship with the russian federation, and would lead to broader cooperation. on a number of funds. since that time, what we have seen is a clear deterioration, of our relationship with russia. though we would like the situation to be different, we are in fact i believe, to use ... we must be clear eyed of the threats we face. and looking at arms-control, in the context of our overall relationship with russia. >> thank you, i am glad to hear that that is the view, you're

absolutely right about the deterioration. and that deterioration should make us think about how we are going to approach this as we go forward in trying to renegotiate. in addition to the other things that they have done, the poisonings and everything else that they have done, watching them manufacture excuses as to why they are not complying, manufacture accusations against us that we are not complying on certain things, really, cries out to have us up our game with how we will approach this on a new start treaty. again, thank you for your work and i hope we will approach it differently than we did last time. thank you mister chairman. >> think getting -- thank you. >> thank you both for being here. secretary, part of the support

for ratifying the new start, i want to focus a little on that. that others have talked about was it allowed certain weapons to be updated, while also achieving overall reduction in the number of arms, both united states and russia, possess. the national labs located in my home state of new mexico play a vital role in fulfilling these updates, or life extension programs, president trump has said he wants to strengthen and expand the u.s. nuclear also. while certain life extension programs are allowed under new start, building new weapons, and not drawing down the overall number of weapons that the arsenal would go against the treaty, can you clarify the president's position on what he means by strengthen and expand? >> senator, i believe the best articulation of our policy with respect to our nuclear arsenal going forward, can be found in a nuclear posture review that was released in january.

and i think what we are talking about, as i mentioned previously, ... >> could you focus on the strengthen and expand? if it was in the nuclear posture review ... >> what is that specifically was what we are looking to do is have a modern resilience and capable nuclear force that is capable of effectively deterring attack, or aggression against the united states or our interests. i want to be very clear about this. what we are looking at, in connection with our nuclear forces, is to prefer -- to preserve the efficacy. this is all about deterrence and the nuclear posture resume -- posture regina makes that clear. -- posture regime makes that clear. with a view toward maintaining

the efficacy of our overall nuclear deterrent, that is job number one. >> we talked earlier about the meeting between president trump and russian president, putin. was specific arms-control issues were discussed there? >> senator, i know the topic was raised, my belief is as i have been briefed, the specifics were not addressed. it was in general terms, the importance of two nuclear capable countries that we need to remain open to dialogue between our respective teams to ensure that the obligations are met. >> in august, the russian document listing arms-control topics for discussion, at the july summit, between president trump and president boudin was leaked to the press. according to the document, putin spoke with president

trump about extending new start for five years, and about reaffirming commitment to the inf treaty, can you confirm whether or not putin raised these topics with president trump? >> i cannot, senator. >> can you? >> no, i cannot. >> when you talked about knowledge you had was from the briefing that the ambassador had, you weren't given any instructions with regard to those? >> correct, senator. and there weren't any tasks that came out from the meeting, the ambassador to say these are the things we have to do, going out of the summit? >> i didn't receive any specific. >> what is the status of dod's research and development on conventional ground launched intermediate range missile systems? >> senator, we are continuing to work on the research and development based on the

congressional guidance that we received, which we very much appreciate, i believe there has been about $48 million that has been set aside, for research and development of a conventional ground launched cruise missile. the research and development portion of that is entirely compliant, with the inf treaty. if we were to go forward, and actually deploy such a system, then that would not be compliant with the inf treaty and no decision of course has been made at this time. >> how much money is dod spent on this effort today? >> i would have to get you the exact figures. >> could you do that for the record please? >> thank you very much. >> thank you, thank you very much. >> thank you. thank you both for being here. in that speech, putin unveiled these weapons, he referred to them over a dozen times, strategic. at least in the english translation.

and these new kinds of nuclear arms include hypersonic nuclear cruise missiles, nuclear power missiles, nuclear torpedoes, submarines, undersecretary thompson i am glad you acknowledged in your testimony that the u.s. has to reckon with, and i quote whether or not russia has recently announced strategic weapons will be held accountable under the new start treaty. let me ask, just to clarify, is the position of the united states, do we consider the weapons that were previewed in the speech that are under development, and may be announced in march, the hypersonic cruise missiles, the ballistic missiles, the 100 megaton nuclear torpedo shots and drum submarines, do we consider those to be strategic weapons covered under the new start treaty? >> senator i would defer to my technical experts for the firm answer on that, my initial read as they would count as strategic weapons. >> can i ask have the russians notified any of these new kinds of strategic nuclear arms, featured in that speech to the

bilateral consultants, consultative commission? >> have we asked them to do so? >> not to my knowledge but i can check again on what occurred, and i read to the results from the technical experts meeting, that wasn't raised, we have had discussions on specifics. >> as far as you know, no one has raised on our side. we saw your speech, we saw you are talking about developing, we believe that needs to be noticed and notified. >> those were not notified, the only way we have seen those is in the open press. >> has anyone from our government asked them, expressed to them are beliefs that it is their obligation to notify, based on what we saw them describe? >> i have not done so. >> why not? >> we have not had the engagement with my counterpart but i will take that back, >> your counterpart on the russian side? >> correct. >> you are saying there has been no engagement at all,

whatsoever. even through a public statement of some sort? >> we have had engagements but because it was an unofficial press report, we still have some intelligence together on that to confirm or deny as we see. >> that is pretty efficient. >> as we have seen before, from president putin, what he says isn't necessarily ground truth. >> i am not saying that, whether or not some of this was poor -- some of this was built on hyperbola or not. he gave asa speech -- he gave a speech, he unveiled these weapons. if that is true, you need to notify that, that would violate start. >> we are taking action on it, we haven't done it through the formal new start process with our counterparts. >> okay it didn't sound like any action has been taken yet. >> we have taken action, within our own community, not through the formal process. >> you have talked to each other about it? >> the former intelligence

officer of 28 years, we have a practice of information it isn't necessarily intelligence until it is confirmed. we are working with the agencies and partners and allies to confirm if that information ... >> i am not saying we should tell him we know you have something. all i am saying is he gave a speech, he described a series of weapons, if they were developed at any point in the future, would fall under the start treaty as a strategic weapon and you would think someone would say hey, we saw your speech. we are not saying we think it is real or not real, but if that is real, you understand that needs to be notified and you are saying we haven't yet done that. >> i am saying we had looked at it internally. i will take that back for consideration. >> let me ask about inf real quick. the treaty puts limits on of -- limits on us and other theaters outside of europe. with other competitors in particular, special -- especially china that are not

covered by a. i don't know who this question is to, but does it begin to put us at a strategic disadvantage to china? >> you raise a good point and i think that is indeed one of the questions that we are looking at in terms of the overall implications of remaining in compliance with the treaty in which the russians are in clear violation of. >> i guess my last question is violating the inf treaty should not be surprising. it should not be surprising, hasn't not been widely reported now that the russians have openly displayed in exercises and three straight months -- through statements ... practical nuclear weapons in the battlefield. and essence in order to elevate, in order to exacerbate a crisis, everybody would stop and it would allow them, so the

violation of the inf treaty and the use of intermediate weapons would be fully consistent with that new doctrine, would it not? >> i would believe it would be, senator. absolutely. that is why i believe it is important that we consider by the russians are violating the inf treaty in the way they are. because they must see some advantage to doing it, either military, politically, or otherwise. >> thank you. >> senator murphy. >> thank you very much. thank you both for being here today. following national security, john's meeting with his russian counterpart, in geneva at the end of august, he stated the administration was in the very early stages of review regarding the extending the treaty. any further comment was that there were several options available, one was extending the treaty and another was

renegotiating a. a third was jettisoning it, and pursuing a different kind of approach and he made a specific reference to the 2002 moscow treaty. of course the moscow treaty, only limits deployed warheads, and it doesn't include verification provisions. and so, to some of us, there is a concern about the specific reference to the moscow treaty given that it doesn't have verification. a lot of the administration suggest that the moscow treaty may be an option for the path forward on renewing new start. >> senator, i can assure you, the undersecretary and one of my bureaus is the arms-control verification and compliance bureau. that whatever treaty that we engage in, with our counterparts , has the verification with in it that is an important part of

the treaty. i would never want to speed for master bone, but i can assure you that verification is integrated. >> i would agree with those comments, and also share your view of the importance on verification, i would say i was in the working in the defense department at the time of the moscow treaty. and the reason why that treaty did not contain verification measures like most treaties, is because we were still operating under the verification provisions in the original start treaty, which did not expire until the end of 2009. they were still fully in effect. >> thank you both for those answers. stay with you, i wanted to come back to the issue of open skies and i appreciate the senator, separate and aside from this pending issue of this one certification issue, secretary mattis wrote a letter to senator fisher, here. indicating that open skies, compliance with it is in

national security interests. do you agree with the statement, despite the fact that we have these ongoing russian compliance issues, even with the russian compliance issues, is this treaty still with the national security interest for the united states to remain an active part of? >> i think the open skies treaty has been in the united states interest, and certainly, because of the transparency it provides, the openness, the level of visibility, of what other states are doing, that it provides not only to us, but to our allies as well, we would much prefer to see the russians get back into compliance with its provisions. >> i asked the question because this administration has been in the business of pulling out of several important multilateral security agreements, and i think it is important to understand that even given these russian compliance problems, we can work through them, we hope to

be able to work through them, within the construct of the existing treaty. >> i would agree with we would hope to be able to work with russia. what i do find it disturbing and troubling, senator, is the fact that as i mentioned, it does seem to be sort of a pattern of behavior here, and part of the russian federation, that does not bode well, i think in terms of our desire. to take arms-control, to take arms-control to the next level, so to speak. until russian behavior changes, or at least even if it doesn't, we need to factor that into our overall consideration of all of these treaties, as we look at them to determine what the united states should do going forward. >> thank you, switching topics, the administration began talking on a civilian nuclear cooperation, i wondered if you would give us an update on the progress with these negotiations

, including the last time that the two sides met, and a confirmation that the administration continues to seek an agreement that contains the gold standard, this committee passed a resolution just a few weeks ago expressing our interest that that standard be met to the extent that we eventually reach an agreement with the saudi's. >> thank you, senator. i can confirm there are ongoing negotiations between the united states and saudi arabia. i can't address the specifics of the negotiation since those are ongoing. what i can assure you, as under the secretary again, that oversees that portfolio, i always seek the strongest hundred. >> before this committee, we have told saudi arabia we wanted a gold standard section 123 agreement from them, so can you just confirm that that remains the bottom line for the administration? >> yes, the longest standard

possible. >> we have a sense of what a gold standard is, and a fast resolution, making sure that there are no enrichment or reprocessing abilities for the saudi's, is that, as the gold standard still the bottom line? >> yes or. committed to ensure that the enrichment reprocessing those technologies not get proliferated. >> thank you. >> before turning to the senator, i will take a couple minutes. in this conversation with senator murphy. you were talking about taking things to the next level, and what all is happening in the relationship and i might not have heard you clearly, but if the start treaty is being complied with, and it is yielding the benefits to us, of not having to have so many nuclear armaments, not knowing where they work or not but focusing on the ones we have, and making sure that they do, so that they are reliable.

if it is working for us, we would not consider undoing the start treaty, because other treaty years are not being adhered to, would we? >> i think wherever something is a benefit to u.s. interest, and then the u.s. should continue to adhere to it, or seek to move forward, in that respect. the point that i was trying to make, was that we are looking at the individual treaties, it does appear to be a pattern of russian behavior, overall in terms of its arms-control compliance, and russia's willingness to abide by agreements that have already been signed, that i think speaks to sort of how the russians view their approach to arms-control, and general. and all i meant to argue was that in our consideration of what is or is not in our interest, we should try to at least take into account, how the russians are viewing omsk

-- viewing arms-control and how they are looking at our responses to their violations. in terms of determining the overall future. for arms-control, going forward. >> thank you, mister chairman. >> for both of you, listening to the senator, you talked about russian behavior. my concern as a member of this committee and an american citizen is more can they or can't they would rather then will they or won't they. i want to make sure they don't have the capacity to do something, whatever their intentions are, which brings us to the question that senator rubio had talked about when he talked about this new strategic nuclear weapon, that is reported , i read about it in march, and vladimir putin said the weapons include a nuclear power cruise missile and underwater drum that could be armed with a nuclear warhead. a hypersonic missile, and the

headline in one of the papers said high-tech weaponry, russia's new nuclear weapons are technically plausible. this is something that they could potentially have, and payton did his boasting and whether it was just an idle post or real, i am concerned what is our government's assessment of the level of maturity and accuracy of these weapons? for either of you. >> senator, i cannot speak specifically to the individual systems that president putin announced, there were probably some of those that may be more mature, than others. i do think it is a worrisome development, that he announced these so publicly, and made such a presentation of this, which has led us to wonder why the russians need to do this, given the fact that they have already extensively modernized their strategic nuclear arsenal, so i would look at that, in the context, to some degree it may

be aspirational, to some degree there may be a practical element for the systems, but i do find it troubling, further standpoint, not only from the standpoint of arms-control, specifically but from the standpoint of our overall relationship with russia which i think we would all like to see improved. >> again along the same line, of can they or can't they, can we order can't we defend against such things, the question is do we have a current perspective missile defense system to intercept the possibility of these weapons? >> we do not have a missile defense system capable of defending against the russian strategic nuclear arsenal, nor has it been our policy to do that. the russians have a tremendous number of nuclear weapons, systems and for a variety of reasons, that we have not pursued an active defense,

against the full range of restaurant -- full range of russian strategic weapons. >> at this point we don't have any specific actions that we are taking in response to what they are doing as opposed to a deterrence? >> we do believe that proceeding with the nuclear modernization program, that we have by modernizing all three legs over nuclear triad, the land base, airbase, and c, is critical in order to continue the deterrent effect, that we rely on. >> and secretary thompson, as the country continues to face threats from around the world, i think we should not take any action that will hinder our own missile defense systems. we need to always remain in charge, i think of our missile defense, not russia or any other country, telling us where we can put up and what we can

put up in terms of defense. i have concerns about the efforts of russia to limit our missile defense, and actions that a previous administration took on this issue. can you commit to me that in any arms-control discussions with russia, for which you are responsible, that the united states will not agree to limiting our own missile defense programs? >> yes i can assure you i will stand up for what is in the best interest of the united states people and our partners and allies when appropriate. >> thank you. anything you would like to add from this? >> i would agree with that statement, senator. i was also present at the department of defense when president bush made the decision to withdraw or to exercise the withdrawal clause, on the abf treaty, because the world had changed we faced a variety of threats and felt the need to move forward, with at least an initial deployment of initial -- with missile defenses. i believe they cannot only

defend but can be used for deterrence, and devaluing the currency. >> thank you mister chairman. >> thank you. >> thank you to both of our witnesses for your long service to our country, and for the chance to explore these important issues with. something we haven't talked much about is chemical weapons. let me move to that if i can. >> the trump administration's recent national security strategy claims we are in an era of renewed great power competition, in particular with russia. i am wondering whether this is an area in which you expect that to reemerge, the state department has long claimed that russia has not yet declared all its chemical weapons and production facilities to the organization for the appropriation of chemical weapons. and russia continues i think a despicable practice of supporting or defending the murderous regime and the repeated use of chemical weapons.

does the administration believe you lateral measures are the best way to counter the weapons production, or should we instead work through international institutions like the op cw, that is for you. >> i think both are appropriate. we have worked with the op cw. she was in the with the conference and we had a rigorous engagement with partners and allies to ensure not only u.s. voice, but a voice of the global partnership, and we have been very consistent on that, and look forward to continued emphasis both bilaterally, and to the multilevel engagements when it comes. you can reference in my statement where we stand with russia's actions. >> uss that russia makes the to reconstitute a large-scale chemical weapon production

capability, or do you think it's goal is the smaller scale program that allows it to carry out a tax like the one that recently happened in the united kingdom. i would be interested in both your opinions. >> i don't anticipate they will continue. as we saw from the attacks, continue to expand from technologies as well. >> would you agree that there is a distinction between a large-scale production in terms of capability, to improve and deploy chemical weapons as opposed to the ability to carry out small-scale attacks? >> i would agree. >> i would agree with that as well. i would also think that anything that the russians do in the area of chemical weapons, they will do with a clear intent to try to hide what they are doing, from detection. and i think the results of the attack in saulsberry earlier this year, was an absolutely atrocious demonstration of regardless of whether they had large or small arsenals, the willingness to actually employ

such weapons or to support regimes that employ such weapons, is really a atrocity. >> i will echo what senator isaac said about the importance of having robust for james and the way in which ... because of the threats and sophistication of the verification regimes involved. i will simply speak for myself and say that is a key part in my supporting the new start. i want to revisit a question cinder murphy asked earlier. about comments made by the national security advisor, john bolton back in august, after meeting with his russian counterpart, where he was suggesting in the early stages of the review, that one option in consideration of new start, was pursuing a different type of approach such as the moscow treaty, which only limits deployed warheads and does not include verification, you gave

an answer about there being a continuing verification regime that made that not necessary. let me just ask directly, is the administration considering in this process, a new arms- control agreement that does not include verification provisions? >> no sir. >> not to my knowledge. >> would you support or recommend arms-control agreements or reductions that can include verification procedures at least as robust as new start? >> i would not. i would want to ensure that verification measures are integrated into any treaty we seek. >> it is my view given public statements by putin and others that russia is seeking strategic weapons that would allow them to restart, a great power competition and it is just my hope that you will consider congress a partner. as we try to push russia back into compliance with the inf treaty, and consider how, when,

and whether to extend the new start treaty, something that i think is of great concern. >> thank you both. >> thank you. >> thank you. senator booker. >> i know that some of this has already been covered with the senator but i would like to go through a little bit again. there is obviously the compliance with the russians on the inf treaty. a collapse would open the doors, i would assume towards further development of arms, in terms of the intermediate-range missiles, and a negative repercussion, can you help me may be briefly restate the benefits of the inf treaty, not just to the united states but also the nato i was -- nato allies? >> senator booker, i think the inf treaty was negotiated, it was a major arms-control accomplish but, we have had it completely eliminated in the tire -- in the entire class of nuclear systems. systems that threatened the nato allies. so, there was great value to

the treaty at the time. i would also note that the russians were initially reluctant, you may recall to engage in any negotiations along those lines, until the united states demonstrated a willingness to at least counter what they were doing, with deployment of their ss 20s in europe. we have no plans to deploy missiles in europe, the reason i raise the point however, is to make it clear that russian behavior occasionally is determined by how they view the united states reacting to their behavior. >> we are in a sense of violation clearly right now. and in terms of our allies, what would it mean if we could have a material breach. what the implications be? >> senator, the implications of

the material breach, those have been laid out in the treaty. there are various options with the treaty. and those discussions would be in collaboration with our technical experts here and partners and allies. we are not there yet. >> there is obviously an important and continuing that dialogue, especially we have, this is just land-based. obviously we have the other two prongs. and i guess, so then the bombast of the of some of the statements on behalf of the administration, seem to be wearing me about the willingness to go forward and continue strategic stability talks. can you give me any understanding of what the administration tends to do -- intends to do. >> the dialogue is incredibly

important. that was an example that the president, president putin, that was one example of dialogue. again, master bolton and his counterpart, secretarial -- secretary pompeo, so we have seen despite their rhetoric, despite their breach of their obligations, we continue to keep that door open. and remain committed to the obligation. >> is there going to be some kind of formal ... are we going to have some efforts to really have a more formal discussion coming up? >> we have had formal discussions, there are dialogue , i don't think it gets much press. but when we have the inf technical experts meetings, we engage in the weapons piece, among others, so it doesn't get as much press that there are lines of dialogue. from the state department, doe, secretary period was in the

country yesterday so we continue to have those discussions. >> is there disagreement in the white house within the administration? >> not to my knowledge, senator. know. >> lastly, what would the goals be for those continued conversations? >> does pens on the treaty, quite candidly. we have raised they are not in compliance and we showed in the example upon example of that. as the president addressed, the fact that we both are new pickle -- both are nuclear capable countries ... >> thank you very much. >> thank you. >> thank you very much, both for continuing to keep us briefed on developments in these very important nuclear conversations. the new start does the united states -- under new start, does the united states have access

>> to my knowledge, it is both. candidly, i will have to take that back to the experts. >> i do believe it is only declared facilities. under the jc poa, the iea has the power to request access to suspect facilities, and mandates i believe a 24 hour response period. is that correct? >> yeah. >> as of this time, we have heard report after report, that iran is in compliance, is that your guises understanding from all of your examination of the issues? >> they are in compliance as the iaea report, not in compliance with the additional

line activities. we will address that later. >> but those are not poa activities that you're talking about. they are an appliance -- they are in compliance, in your opinion? >> they are in technical compliance. yes. >> but in your opinion? >> the technical portion, senator, they are in compliance. >> okay. thank you. we have the challenge between a vision, and the details of an arms-control agreement. this is the new start agreement, pretty hefty package. it has been a career probably studying it. and this is the jc poa which is also a pretty hefty package. and this is the press release regarding the u.s. and north korea for denuclearization, and this is all we have. there is no, am i wrong, there is no package like this, any

set of details? between the u.s. and north korea regarding north korea's program. >> i could bring in a stack of the intelligence but i don't think that would be appropriate for this hearing, senator. >> these are public agreements. these are treaties. there is no such treaty worked out. am i correct that there is no detailed inventory of north korean assets, that have been examined and developed with agreement on both sides? >> that is correct. >> am i correct that there is no schedule for eliminating these nuclear assets that has been agreed to on both sides? >> that is correct. >> am i correct that there is no verification regime that has been a good -- has been developed and agreed to on both sides? >> not in agreement. >> while it is hard to have a

complete verification regime as we haven't worked out what you are actually eliminating. >> that is correct. >> this particular statement says the united states and dpr came in north korea. commits to work toward the complete denuclearization of the korean peninsula. that wording, to work toward, is a far cry from what the standard, the secretary pompeo set out for, which was i believe he used the words complete irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons. why wouldn't north korea agree to language, or did we insist and try to push language that would be a commitment to complete irreversible elimination, whether then simply to work toward denuclearization? >> senator, the administration stands firm that the final is

fully verified, denuclearization and those discussions are ongoing. >> at the time of this statement, north korea was unwilling to reach the language we wanted, the complete irreversible elimination. >> they have committed to denuclearize the peninsula. >> i am reading from the document, it says they have committed to work toward, that is quite different. it reminds me actually of the npt language, the nonproliferation treaty language, where the large nuclear capable or nuclear states pledged to, and they used very similar language, undertake to pursue, negotiations. on complete disarmament. in other words, it is those inserted words, that say no, we really don't have a commitment yet. north korea is just saying it will work toward that effort. i stress this, because quite a bit of time has passed, and we

don't even have the first leg of the journey. the first base is getting to a complete inventory of their program. and north korea hasn't even agreed to that. and there was actually no language in this one page document that committed them to it. so it is a real concern. the other thing is, is that one thing we said in this document, which was a little unusual, as we specifically called out that we were committed to hold follow-up negotiations, led by the u.s. secretary of state, pompeo, and a relevant high level north korean official, to implement the outcomes. but the outcomes only to work toward something. because there is no verification regime to implement, there is no inventory

of their nuclear program. and there is no schedule or plan for how that will be eliminated. what is there exactly to implement? >> we talked final and fully verified, i would say that is the last step of prep, i know you are aware based on your arms-control background, that once we get these agreements, they will get access to the country and then there is a series of steps -- we have done this in multiple areas, we have the technical expertise in the state department, dod, department of energy and partners and allies. i am confident when secretary pompeo reaches the agreement on behalf of the president, that we have the steps that are necessary, to final and fully verified. >> i was trying to understand what there was to implement. it was to implement the outcome of the summit it says. i am just a little puzzled by exactly what that meant. given that it says that we were fully committed to having secretary pompeo do these

follow-up negotiations, why was his second trip to hold those negotiations canceled, by the united states? >> that the north koreans had not taken the appropriate action to justify a visit, that said the discussions are ongoing, with secretary pompeo, with our envoy, and through senior leadership. >> thank you. >> thank you. >> senator menendez. >> thank you. just a couple follow-up questions. returning to the start treaty, has the united states been able to verify russia's meeting the limitations of the treaty? >> we did both countries met the limited february senator. >> and assuming that the united states continues to verify russia's in compliance, can the united states meet all of our deterrence requirements for the next five years if extended? >> i would defer to department of defense. >> for the next five years, it

is a bit speculative. i know we can't meet those requirements today. but, petitions occasionally have a change and change quite rapidly. i would be reluctant to say whether we could or couldn't. five years. >> while the question is, if russia continues to meet, its obligations and is in compliance, you can't tell me whether we can meet our deterrence requirements under the new start treaty? >> our deterrence requirements may be variables, senator, and not only directly related to the russian federation, there are other countries out there, with nuclear weapons. so again, that would be speculative on my part. >> let me just say that the more i hear the answers to your questions, i don't understand if we can meet all of our current deterrence requirements.

if we are not forced to copy back, if we are not in any way limited in terms of our missile defenses, if this meets the standard put forward in the nuclear positive review, for arms-control, if we have been able to verify russia's meeting the limitations of the treaty, it seems to me that all of the foundational building blocks of that aspiring to a follow on this treaty would be in place. but if i listen to your answers, i get a sense that may be administration is headed a different way. >> i am not intending to imply senator, that the administration takes a different view. you may be absolutely correct, and what you say. all i am suggesting is that five years, much can happen in five years. >> let me turn to the chemical weapons question. obviously, saulsberry, that attack directly ...

which is a fundamental pill of international attempts, to limit the use of weapons of mass destruction. now that you have imposed a first round of sanctions, has the russian federation taken steps to avoid additional sanctions required under the chemical and biological act? >> not that we have seen as yet. >> so assuming that that goes, then there should be more consequences, is that a fair statement? >> that is a fair statement. >> let me finally turned to the inf treaty. it appears that the russians have consistently said that they value the inf treaty, and would like to preserve it, we will see. in addition it appears that russia and the united states have at least agreed on the missile, the 9m729, which we have identified as violating the treaty. on the other hand, in march, the congressional testimony,

general high into the commander test divided russia -- testified russia had increased, compounding russia's violations and further threatening european security. let me ask you a few questions about the next steps in our attempts to bring russia back into compliance. has the united states asked russia to halt production of the nine and the 7 to 9, so that the military situation doesn't further deteriorate during our discussions? >> we have had discussions with the russian counterparts, in our meeting on what is there obligations and how they are violating the treaty. >> how we specifically asked them to halt production of that? >> we have told him to get back into compliance and showed them examples of what that looks like. >> okay. >> wouldn't halting production begin the process of getting them back into print -- getting them back into compliance? >> hiding behind things that

are not classified and calling them classified are beyond you know, the pay. me ask you this has the united states asked russia to provide an exhibition of the missile so u.s. experts can review its technical characteristics and determine whether it can fly more than 500 kilometers which would violate the treaty? >> i have not, i don't know if other agencies have. >> do you know of any? >> not to my knowledge. >> what steps does russia need to take to bring itself back into compliance for the treaty? >> the fill the obligations set forth in the inf treaty. >> which are what? >> 41, senator, is they would have to get rid of the ssa, that blows the compliance. they have battalions of the object they would have to stop production among other things. >> let me just close on this, secretary thompson, you mentioned section 231, the fiscal year 19 national defense

authorization signed into law on august 13 included a provision which requires the administration to submit a report on whether the president has made a determination that significant transactions have taken place with the russian defense and intelligence sector, can we have your commitment of this report that it will be submitted to the committee on or before that date of november 13? >> you have my commitment. >> i want to thank you both for being here. i know that secretary thompson referred to some of the rhetoric that come out of that russian on -- leaders mouth pick some of times -- sometimes that is word, and not reality. are there things out there, right now that cause either one of you concerns about strategic stability? >> senator, i am concerned

about the overall state of the u.s. russian relationship. to the extent that affects stability, absolutely. i am concerned, not just from an arms-control perspective. but my concern goes beyond the arms-control realm, looking into some of the other things that the russian federation is doing, some of it is actions, that sort of span a range of activities, that i would find counterproductive to american interest across the board. >> those are all things that we can visibly see and are aware of. are there other things that you are aware of, that they are developing, that cause you to feel concern about this strategic stability, either one of you? >> senator, if i may, particular to russia, but other countries as well, as one that oversees the arms-control. the emerging technologies.

i talked to some of the staff of late, artificial intelligence, the hypersonic's, soever -- cyber. we need to give our arms around, with responsible nationstates activities and what that looks like. i see that it is maybe the future of arms-control if some of these emerging technologies and how they are integrated into the arms-control treaties. >> are you sensing that we are losing an edge in those future technologies, or that someone is gaining advantage? >> i am confident in our technologies, we have some work both international as well and what that means as these technologies develop. >> do you want to make any comment? >> yes, i would agree with that, and i would say with the support of the congress, that the department of defense has had for which we thank you very much, we believe going forward,

and investing in these types of technologies, and under secretary thompson has talked about, are essential to maintaining the united states military advantages, going forward. otherwise, we do run the risk of falling behind. and having that negatively impact our overall national security objectives. >> we thank you both, the record will remain open for written questions through the close of business thursday. if you could respond to those fairly quickly, we would appreciate it. we thank you both for being here. with that, the committee is adjourned.

>> tonight american history tv and our electors in history series which takes viewers inside college classrooms. programs this evening are on the civil court, starting with villanova university professor, judith ginsberg.