ok, ladies and gentlemen, welcome back.

conferences, our we truly attempt to make them international, not just in subject matter but also in error presenters great one third of our speakers for this year come from outside of the united states. our next two panelists gained the most miles coming here. member of the national study of defense in tokyo. he contributed articles of his own and to others works on world war ii in the pacific. joining him is peter. at the professor

university of western australia. is the basis of this portion of the session where we look at how the end of the war in the pacific was fought and why the japanese continued to fight in what was obvious to most a losing war. to moderate these historians is existing wished scholar -- is a distinguished scholar. he came to the university of new orleans after decades at ohio state university. he is the co-author of a war to be won, he is also an advisor to the national world war ii museum. please welcome our distinguished panel.

[applause] it is always a pleasure to and lookout at allis i can't see because of darkness. i want to express my personal thanks to all of you who have chosen to attend this conference. i have been an advocate overtime of finding iconic ways to brand this conference. i decided today that i will propose from here on out the moderator should be armed with a clicker to remind people when to quit. [laughter] jeremy, i want you to notice that. however, i feel a certain giving aility in pacific war twist to this

introduction. i want to remind you if the speakers run long, i have a ensure cure that will their cooperation. [laughter] [applause] no, paul, you can't have my hat. between the remarks and the feel fori think a good professional expertise of error presenters. our presenters. undo -- let me introduce one of my former graduate students.

[applause] >> good morning, everybody. i would like to thank the organizers of this event for inviting me. i think it has been a very interesting conference so far. doesn't -- professor i will start right away. i will talk about japanese military strategy in 1943 and 1944 rate i will not go into 1945. i will talk about this middle. of the war. i will focus on military strategy of the japanese and

because of the time limit i can only give you an overview. i think this middle. thisimportant -- i think middle period is important because the decisions made or 1944ade from 1943 to cemented japan's road to defeat, so to speak. one of the features when you look at japan's military before and during the war is the interservice rivalry between the army and the navy. i realized interservice rivalries are not particular to the japanese. although terry's have them and some form. in japan's case, the interservice rivalry affected in many ways the strategy and the war effort. throughsee this in 1943

1944. and 1944,et into 1943 i would like to point out a few factors you have to keep in mind when you think about the japanese in world war ii. broadly speaking, the japanese they had clearly distinct areas of responsibility and hypothetical enemies and missions for it the case of the japanese army, their area of responsibility is the asian continent and more specifically northeast china. isre hypothetical enemy imperial russia and later the soviet union. their mission is to fight a ground war against the soviet red army on the plains of manchuria.

meanwhile,e maybe, their area of responsibility is the pacific ocean. there hypothetical enemy is the united states navy. the japanese navy's tradition -- traditional mission is to fight a fleet battle against the american navy. you have to keep these historical factors in mind when you think about the army and navy of japan because these factors really determined, for example, the equipment, the training, the focus of their planning, really everything. certainresults in a allrservice tension because militaries are bureaucratic institutions. in japan's case, you get many examples of where institutional interests drive their stances against each other and what

their -- what they are emphasizing at any particular moment. you have to keep these historical factors in mind. the army was going to fight a ground war and in the case of the navy, it is the pacific ocean. they are looking at the pacific ocean, it is the american navy edit is a decisive fleet battle. in mind, if you look , you have toc war think, what is the navy's strategy? the strategy is to fight a decisive fleet battle against the americans and in order to do that, the navy built up a fleet island.an

here we go. ok, -- [laughter] it is right here and you can see japan up there. i am sorry. truck is right here in the central pacific. it is right there. the japanese navy built this truck.leet base at

they built it up in the 1930's after the washington and london naval treaties have expired. the point for this naval base is to support their fleet battle against the americans, which the japanese navy expects to take place in the marshall islands. begins, theific war navy thinks about threats to their main fleet base. an area down here, right in here, it is just northeast of new guinea. it, it is theat proposeplace that could

a threat to become a major naval base. the geography is suited for making airfields. the navy thinks when they are planning for the pacific war that we have to take this in order to protect truck. in 1942.ally occupy it for at least the first half of the pacific war and into the. i will be talking about, the main interest of the japanese maybe in the pacific war is the decisive fleet battle, but also the question for them is out to severe -- secure truck. in the army's case, you look at what their interests are in the pacific war. the army was a latecomer to the pacific war. you recall the army's traditional focus on the mainland. in the pacific war, the army is

interested in the initial operations to take southeast asia. they called it the southern operation and it is to take over what they called the southern resources area. in the framework of the pacific war, the army is interested in great britain. great britain is their primary enemy in the pacific war. their primary objective after the pacific war begins in 1941 is to finish the war in china. asia,occupying southeast the army is interested in getting back to their war in china. as far as the pacific war is concerned, they are more interested in fighting the british rather than the americans. they are thinking of chasing the british -- they have pushed them out of singapore and they are thinking of pushing them out of burma and possibly india. as for the americans and the pacific ocean, this is putting

it simply but it is the navy's problem. even after december 1841. 1941.ember when the pacific war begins, they commit nine divisions and all of them are in southeast asia. the only ground force that the army commits to that the pacific ocean area, this is east of the philippines, is what they call a detachment. an infantrylly regiment with attached forces. that is their only commitment to the pacific ocean area in december of 1941. that cooperates with the navy in taking guam. the army is a relative latecomer to the pacific ocean example, the army only makes what they call a strategic level commitment to

the war in the south pacific in november, 1942. this is almost one year after pearl harbor. that is when they set up an area army headquarters. another example shows how late -- relatively late they were in committing to the war in the pacific ocean area, it is only in 1943 that the army finally recognizes that america is the primary enemy of japan in this war. warexample, the army college only start to seriously study american tactics and operations after 1943. even then, this conversion is not complete because the war college does not continue to emphasize and study operations and tactics against the red army. another example of how the army was late coming into the war in the pacific ocean against the americans is it is only in november of 1943 that the army

finally produces a manual -- they come up with a doctrine for contesting assaults. until then, they had no doctrine for fighting what they call the island for grade -- the island war. in the pacific war, at least in the first half, you have a structure where the navy is fighting the americans but the army comes in kind of late. you see this recurring pattern throughout the war -- again, this is putting it simplistically -- the navy wants to do something against the americans and they try to do it or the planet and then they get into trouble and the army has to try to bail them out. you see variations of this throughout the war and you will see it during 1943 and 1944. that is kind of the historical background of this time.

, and in the1943 first half -- we will look at the first half of 1943. in early 1943, the japanese are about to lose these long campaigns in northeast new guinea. we have lostthink the initiative, what are we going to do next? lullincidence, there was a in the fighting in the south pacific because this is when the americans were also thinking, what are we going to do next? that is when they do their planning for operation cartwheel , which is the neutralization. broadly speaking, from this. , the army and navy have different -- the japanese army and navy have different visions of what they should do next.

the navy insists on a forward dissent and what they call a forward decisive title concept. the navy's interest was to protect truck and ripoll. the navy is interested in keeping the fighting as far away from those two areas as possible. if they are in the front -- if they are part of the frontlines, they cannot function as major naval bases. in comparison, what the army wants to do -- they are completely disillusioned i previous experiences -- by libya's experiences. experiences.s the army starts thinking about pulling his forces back to areas

that can be more adequately supplied that are more within japan's with just the capability. this debate about whether to fight a forward defense or to pull back to a more reasonable area goes on between the army variations back to on from 1942, but in early 1943 they have this big debate about what to do and the conclusion is they cannot reach a decision. even within the army, at all and at armykyo headquarters, there is an agreement in principle for the need to pull the frontline back to where it can be more adequately and properly supplied. the army within itself, they cannot agree on when this pullback should take place or how far back as should go. 1943, staffune of

studies convicted -- conducted by the general staff said they should pull the line back but there is not enough shipping to pull the frontline back rate we can't do this now trade -- we can't do this now. in the first half of 1943, while there is a lull in the fighting in the south pacific, the army and navy can't reach a decision on what they should do next. the japanese are forced into a decision by the renewal of the american counteroffensive in the south pacific at the end of june and into july of 1943. offensiveng about the in new guinea and the us trillions had been keeping up -- llians had been

keeping up and the americans joined in. at bothting goes on places into july and august trade it gets increasingly desperate. the japanese army expresses the same problems. they can't supply either place or reinforce them adequately. they can barely send them enough to real to keep them alive. they cannot give them stop they need to build up for any kind of counter attack. this increasingly desperate military situation in the solomon islands and new guinea into july and august finally force the japanese into a decision. the emperor makes a comment in early august which may have helped push them into a decision . in early august, the emperor

takes a comment to the japanese army chief of staff. he says you have repeatedly promised me the you will to fight -- fight a decisive battle yet you never do it. when are you going to fight? in fairness to the army, the emperor was actually criticizing the navy because the navy keeps making promises and they never win a major battle rate there is no telling how much influence that remark of by the emperor had. situation in new really pushed the army and navy into making a decision and maybe the emperor's comment -- what happened in the second half of august, the army and navy finally a degree to withdrawal

the main defensive line to an area that is more sustainable with just a click for japan. this decision is formalized on september 24, when the army and navy adopt what they call a new operation policy. it is incorporated into a larger -- and a policy on september 30 in this document. it is called guidelines for future conduct of the war. this national policy has new guidance policy, but it also has a number of diplomatic initiatives. for example, improving relations with the occupied areas of the ,hilippines, indonesia malaysia. i won't get into those now, i will just look at the military part of it.

-- [laughter] ok, this new guidance policy as a number of features, it outlines this area than absolutely has to be held for victory for japan. that is the area to the left of the red line. forces to the outside of the online, which are fighting new guinea in this red circle, they will be called upon to fight what they call a delaying operation. their mission is to buy time while the main defense line is fortified and counter attacking forces are ready to along the line. for a bouncer

counter -- massive counteroffensive. the japanese switch from the decisive battle strategy and a change to the delaying strategy. fails rathercy easily in may of 1944. the defense line is breached in new guinea. in july of 1944 it is broken in another area. there is a number of reasons it failed. it was adopted too late. the forces that were supposed to fight, they were in better condition in the spring of 1943. by the fall, they were in no shape to hold out the enemy for an additional year. more importantly, the army and navy differences about how to interpret this new policy.

even after this policy is adopted, the navy insists in holding forward position. it is a broken redline and they want to hold to that -- hold the solomon's. it diverse forces that the army 20 use to defend areas along the redline, because the army doesn't like what the navy wants to do. they can't just ignore them. in early 1944, army forces that should have been sent elsewhere should -- and up being sent to the marshals. is it is basedn .n unrealistic premises these are clear from the beginning. the policy calls for the production of 50,000 aircraft in 1944. it is clear that the japanese

cannot import enough aluminum to build 50,000 plants, yet the whole plan is premised on the production of 50,000 planes in 1944. another example of an unrealistic ramus is -- unrealistic premise is -- [laughter] i will wrap this up right now. this red circle, the japanese call this -- the army was supposed to build 100 new airbases to use in the massive counterattack. the army doesn't have the manpower to build 100 air bases in this area. the new operation guidance policy is premised on the army's ability to build 100 airbases and this area. that is another unrealistic premise that leads to the

failure of the guidance policy. just to wrap it up, this policy delaying policy fails in the summer of 1944. there is a lot of confusion and high levels of japanese politics. the cabinet falls, so the japanese are unable to decide on their next new national policy. in july of 1944, the army and navy decided on a new decisive battle policy that they call the -- these policy. it is to fight it decisive their positionve at negotiations that might eventually take place. the strategy is what japanese followed through the end of 1945.

sorry about overrunning my time a bit, but that is basically what the japanese were doing strategically and 1943 and 1944. [applause] >> i am going to pick up the theme of interservice -- rivalry. i want to thank the museum for my invitation. i hold the record for the longest journey. it is 28 hours to get here from australia. buy enough of my books i will have to swim all the way back.

so, i'm going to start in october of 1943. they were holding meetings in their respective headquarters. there were 1300 miles that separated them. they had a common cause and role. american general chamberlain was the senior operations officer to douglas macarthur. the other was the debbie chief of the general star. -- deputy chief of the general star. that morning, berryman said there is a headquarters in new guinea force. his hecklers was about the change that was happening that day, berryman was focused on the australian army. from this day, he released the

getty force operation -- ruction and the role in this document, he laid out the reality for the australian forces in new guinea. berryman specifically noted that in two days time, the air force is would be diverted from new guinea and established to support operations in the south pacific. am the first of november, allied neighbor sources -- naval sources -- at the end of the month, thereafter the australians role was august on development and support of the u.s.. preparing. was back,

it was obvious that the command which fell under macarthur strategic direction will become a backdrop. made, thedecision was japanese fortress rebelled. within a month, the u.s. navy command -- the next reggie for macarthur to retake the philippines was about to unfold. -- the next strategy for macarthur to retake the philippines was about to unfold. concern to chime in with the allocation of forces for the operation. chamberlain pushed for isolation. to be undertaken under the current relationships. there was only one line of

operation to the poster new guinea. merged.es should be while all this was logical, tamblyn was also aware of the politics -- chamberlain was up where -- was aware of the politics of such moves. two gentlemen, the answer was clear. -- two chamberlain, the answer was clear. thus, the proper time has come to separate the elements of other nationalities along the role. chamberlain's plan remained a

complete reorganization of the theater. and clearing up japanese pockets cut off. ultimately, it was a plan to secure the philippines and two missed -- move australia. a critical moment had arrived. october of 1943 represented a turning point in the u.s.-ice trillion ---australian politician -- coalition. had 1942, the country reached mobilization on a racist eclipsed. 1944, -- ar that as when the allies regained the emission in 1943, the australians continued in the following months. force demonstrated

in october the theater -- by the time of the capture in 1944, the u.s. dominance had been cemented. it was clear. how did we get to this point in ? how did this coalition work? what was a serious contribution -- to -- withey came reticence. as such, during the show, there was little cooperation between the two countries.

>> the necessity to respond to japanese forces in the japanese provided a path to the strategic importance of communications. as a result, macarthur arrived in early 1942 to set up the southwest pacific command. it was a largely unforeseen part of the plans. it did have a profound affect on the course of the war. on arrival, macarthur told reporters the president of the united states wanted me to break through the japanese lines for the purpose, as i understand it, organizing against japan.

i came through and i shall return. this statement is fascinating because it reveals not only my poor impressions of douglas macarthur but also his intentions when he got to australia. it makes no mention of australia, the country he was standing in other than the fact the president ordered him there. an americany of offensive, rather than an allied one. macarthurhs later, said -- he records the following. deservesnder in chief distinctions between the united states and the united kingdom and the relationship and response abilities for australia. australia was a part of the british empire and was related to britain.

the united states was an ally whose goal was to in the world. it had -- when the war. it had no interest in australia at all. their purpose in building up forces was not so much from an interest in australia but rather its utilities. linkew of the strategic with japan, the military action would have been called irrespective of the american relationship. [laughter] got out in front about his intentions. this was a temporary coalition designed to achieve the interests of the united states. or, in particular, douglas macarthur. it was molded in the image of the supreme commander and had very few options. they had to surrender some sovereignty. and make macarthur --

senior advisor during 1942, the focus on communications with australia would bring the u.s. and japanese forces into focus. camemeant the operations in the south and southwest pacific. the military level, macarthur said -- set about and churning the dominance of himself. on one level, this seems straightforward. the isis was a much larger power than asked the united states was a much larger power than australia. march united states was a -- much larger power than australia. the chiefs running a two front which the standard brand

was -- japan was a second priority. complicating macarthur's mission was the fact that the pacific war was the main operational area. it was so far down the strategic priority list, macarthur was forced to rely on his australian coalition partners. period, the coalition between australia and the united states was central to the theater and of course, the whole allied -- u.s. chiefs recognize this fact. this made him the supreme commander of all allies in the theater. although, he was not eligible to command directly, any national

force. to carry out this mission, macarthur went to general headquarters. he planned an exercise in the theater and despite orders to three hadry, all but met with macarthur in the philippines. his refusal to appoint any australian officers was in direct violation to establish theater. it was also in direct opposition to george c marshall who urged macarthur. macarthur refused to budge which meant that his headquarters were in stark contrast to the way eisenhower set up his head quarters in europe. made itr's decision clear there was no joint theater. it exclusively remained american, his outset was reinforcing the dominance of the

u.s. over austria. best the.s. of the supremacy of the u.s. army over other services. and the u.s. supremacy of the u.s. army over other services. critical to this relationship was the fact that he was also the commander of allied land forces. point is considerable -- on a practical level, one of the greatest impediments is the fact that the u.s. and british commonwealth armies have a different style of command and structures. macarthur was influenced by the doctrine as well as his personal take on it. thisrt of his contract, also fit his personality.

from the time of his arrival, he sought to impose control from the summit. he is influenced in a way no other individual, except for george c marshall. there was no shared system as you can see, controlled coronation between the two armies. differences on command control, this was a temporary relationship. the focus on overcoming issues became centered on personalities. particularly commanders and their staff. individual initiatives have

mutually supporting and effective means of collaboration. systemic organizational systems were dependent on these individuals. understanding the coalition and the personalities are critical. , it was dominated by the challenging relationship between macarthur and blaney. these officers and a group of talented officers worked out the detailed components of this relationship. gotually, they things done. nature ofutset, the relying on personalities was problematic.

criticisms of the australian military came passed in 1942. this was not helped by the fact that the most senior officers were known as caustic personalities. one was despised by their own headquarters. undisciplined, undertrained and generally useless. [laughter] richard frank mentioned something yesterday and i could not let it pass. walter krueger, one of looked ups officers and remarked -- [laughter] senior bostonian officers were not immune to making criticisms.

officialsaustralian were not immune to making criticisms. ,e also believed the americans that was the fundamental problem with the u.s. civilization. , and douglas macarthur official historian said people want to find forceful things with the u.s., we are all secretly pleased when things go wrong. they may constant criticism of the us trillions. thelow point was reached in battle of brisbane. anti-american an rights. -- riots. resulting in a number of deaths of americans and australians. they were quick to point out the far removed from

what was happening at the frontlines. the struggle against the japanese meant they were to forge ways to find change. clarence martin, the original there was ample fighting for all hands and mutual respect between the australians and the americans developed. .espect the fighting this feature will respect increased and grew stronger as the operation progressed. coalition, led by these operationals such as chamberlain and government cooperated -- berryman cooperated rather than argue. both commanded the army --

australian navy respectively. the naval forces had developed a close relationship that predated the southwest pacific. both of the air force is improved remarkably. in 1942, the allied air forces were completely integrated, down to the individual aircrew level. after the split of this command into two separate national airports, the mutual respect was maintained property war. to someporation led amazing successes in 1943. the battle of bismarck, which was the watershed moment, was a genuine combined effort involving both countries air forces. operations against -- were conducted by the 41st infantry divisions. in 1943, this was followed by the assault.

my apologies to the people in the room. this was the assault on the main japanese position. the involvement operation consisting of a strange vision. securing an airfield with the seventh division to be following on an aircraft. this proved to be the largest in australian military history. over more than five divisions. it was a result of an outstanding organization -- orchestration of the land and sea of two countries. there was a number of flaws in macarthur system. one of the biggest was that senior leadership and regular

battlefront rotation at the divisional level and below had to relearn the fundamentals of cooperation with their allies. saw the coalition reach its apex in 1943. s champlin pointed out, the injection of u.s. combat power -- as chamberlain pointed out, they made a change in the balance of forces. australian ground forces would be absent or operations in 1944. the australian air force would be sidelined. it was only the australian navy who shipped. personnel was a pivotal part of the fleet. in 1945, the australian army would fight a series of magnificent tactical actions on marines. [laughter]

i have less than a page to go. [laughter] would5, the austrian army magnificentes of tactical actions in bonaire. unfortunately, this campaign had absolutely no strategic l purpose. it was a road to nowhere. it was a road in the wrong direction. it was because macarthur told the u.s. chiefs that the australian people demanded it. at the same time, telling the australian prime minister that it had to go because the joint chiefs had ordered it. the coalition in the southwest pacific area was dominated by thesehur's neglect of coalition partners. upon whom he had been so dependent in 1942 and 43. during the march of 1945,

mcarthur acknowledged the austrian success, but she said, in 1942, australian turned the tide in the southwest pacific area. it was the base of all future success. for many australians, this public acknowledgment was too little, too late. coalition had fractured in 1944 and 1945, at the end of the war. thank you. [applause] >> thank you, gentlemen. now, we will answer questions. we will start in the far right section, toward the front. ,> this question is for hero you said the strategy of the jeff zients -- japanese, the

americans i thought had a decisive sea battle. how did japanese -- the japanese use the midway campaign? >> how did the japanese view the midway atoll? did they see it as a decisive defeat in their regards like the americans viewed it as a decisive victory? or did not play in the grand scheme of their overall strategy? >> thank you for the question. the navy understood that it was a major defeat. and they did not view it extremely decisively. although it was important but it does not decide the outcome of the war for them. i think for the navy, it means that they lost the offensive. it stops there offensive momentum. as for the army, they are not fully informed of the losses at

midway for a wild. don'tmy is really -- they know about the true state of the navy after midway. this goes on through the war. after the philippine sea battle. the navy concealed its losses from the army. tojoafter the fall, thinks japan is still ok because he thinks the navy is stronger than they were current to get he thinks the navy is stronger than they were. to get back to your question, they were not extremely decisive. >> next question will be to your right. gentleman. >> first of all, i would like to that you seriously consider planning a future conference just on the topic that was raised today in this section. [applause]

when the united states, in the revolutionary war was greatly divided and benjamin franklin reminded them, gentlemen, if we don't hang together, we are going to hang separately. the admirals and generals in japan were highly intelligent, many of them wisely traveled. could they not see that there was no way that they could survive if the -- they continued to push their different objectives in china and in the pacific? your right, -- you are right, they were among the elite in japan at the time. strangely enough, they never

discussed it in those terms. they were talking about the survival of japan but they seemed unable to put aside their differences to the extent that they had to. japan ise problems in the structure of their system. they have no single commander in chief, as you may know. the emperor that is supposed to not ahis war, he is regular commander in chief, in terms of if he gives orders, he gives suggestions and makes his opinions known. there is nobody to make a final, overriding decision in the interest of japan itself. and so it is one of the mysteries of japan, during the war. it is an example of dysfunction at the highest levels. >> i'd like to add that we forget that when japanese generals and admirals disagree with each other, they sometimes assassinate one another.

that is a deciding factor. when you try to put together inner circles of cooperation. [laughter] -- moto >> if i could add one more point, the japanese army from the middle of the war do start talking about joint command. --the navy keeps resisting the navy keeps resisting because they don't have to to put their ships under army command. that is when japan had to finally come up with a joint command structure. it was because by then, it does not excess -- exist as an effective fighting force. >> before we get to our next question, i cannot have planted a better statement myself. thank you. february 9, we are hosting a one-day symposium on the canal in solomons campaign. richard frank will be featured.

robert will be moderating. we have flyers available for you. thank you, dale. the next question is to tom, on the left. hady maternal grandfather several missions in and around truck. he refers to truck as the place he did not want to go. -- did they sign -- suggest select the island of truck? >> i think it is mainly because it is geography. a large fleet is there. is centrally located. it is close to where they combined fleets that the japanese intended to fight. i think it is mostly geography and suitability as a large naval base.

that is the reason they focused on result in the south as well. i think it is the ability to build airfields in the surrounding islands. >> i think we're going to go about five minutes over our time. the next one is going to be in the center section, toward the front. >> i was going to ask you, what your opinion was of general macarthur? [laughter] i think i got a good sense of that. what australians think today, 75 years later, after macarthur, has he been treated better or do you all have the same opinion of him today as you did then? >> he has a complex personality. i have had many conversations.

every time i got around to writing to the book, he would then go and do something absolutely brilliant. damn, i have to give the man credit now. i think that is reflective of the way he is viewed. when he first arrived in 1942, the general was at the state department, saying the austrians napoleon ofhim the the south pacific. macarthurthey blamed for the deaths of new guinea in 1942. they also blamed the australian commander in chief as well. so, it is a mixed opinion about macarthur. on one level, he seemed as someone who was a great servant to the australian people and

helped against the japanese. for others, he is that general , -- along with the u.s. it is a real split. >> next question is to your left. gentlemen, toward the back. >> i was wondering if you could address the impact that japanese shipping losses had on the ability of the imperial japanese navy and army to execute their change in strategy. yes. that is why the issues i was not able to grasp. at to theng losses problems of the japanese to carry out the absolute national defense. theifically, for example,

buildup of forces. the reinforcement, if you remember, the red circle in the lower left, put the japanese call north of australia, it includes western new guinea and some of the islands to the west of that. in the absolute national defense concept, the reinforcement of that area is supposed to be critical. what happens is because of the the's insistence on holding army's need to reinforce first, , it is given area lower priority. ys we are told in earl january and pepper of 1944, not to expect any reinforcements. shipping really

interferes with the japanese's ability to reinforce areas that they needed to. they have to set of priorities and some areas that should have been reinforced, they have extreme delays. mentioned,ation i that was their main base in new guinea. they knew the allies would strike them. they planned to reinforce three divisions. they cannot get the shipping to bring it all the way and. -- all the way in. they did not have enough shipping and had to walk a couple hundred malls -- miles. way oft 1/5 of they building the road before the ally struck. it really hamper their ability to defend against the allied assaults. macarthur had developed an air

force and an amphibious force. >> gentlemen, to your right, toward the back. >> yes, on thursday, we learned about the lessons on world war i. we focused mostly on the u.s. and the europeans. learneduld have japan from world war i? and what did they learn? >> are you talking mainly about the army or other the army and the navy -- or of the army and the navy? >> it is more the approach. that the eraaware of total war had arrived. you may know that japan was not a direct participant in most of world war i.

they did not participate in the groundwork. they were aware of it. that they have to reform their army. to prepare for the next war, which is going to be a total war and that involves development of their national economy. at the same time, you may have heard of the factional infighting. that is a result of how do we repair japan for a total war? will -- thanks japan thinks never japan -- for ae to rely on others short, violent war. or we have to read -- rely on spiritual and emotional qualities. they are aware of the need of the lessons of world war i that

the next war is going to be a long, drawnout total war. they run into limitations of their ability. i don't know if that answers your question? >> gentlemen, two more questions. the first is in the very back. >> in your opening remarks, you commented that the japanese made a strategy -- main strategy in the pacific was to fight a decisive battle. paul was the strategy -- what was the strategy after the decisive battle? period youds on what are talking about. they did not have a strategy. they pictured repetition of the where theysushima would fight this decisive battle. and the americans would ask for peace. there was nothing.

that is why they used the term decisive battle. they expected one massive repeat of the battle of two shema -- tsushima. they did not have any concept, they did nothing about what might happen if the americans did not ask for peace. >> the final question is in the center, toward the front. >> thank you. this is a question for hiro. japan built three of the world's largest battleships. the show nonno was converted into an aircraft carrier. do you think japan would have been underserved by not building three large battleships and direct more of those resources to building aircraft carriers as they were key to any naval battles for the pacific? of 1945,ard to august soviet russia and stalin did not

declare war on japan until after the atomic bomb was dropped in august of 1945. didn't japan -- did japan not pay more attention to soviet russia, instead of its main adversary, the united states? >> regarding your question about the battleships, i think you are correct. deskshould not have played of the battleships. in fairness to the japanese, both battleships were complete by the time the pacific war began. s werehe american battleships oriented. i think it is easy to criticize the japanese navy for not being more aircraft oriented. it seems to be the trend in all of the nations as well. he could have made

-- if the japanese had made aircraft carriers, maybe it would have been better. you have to think about, where -- were they able to produce the aircraft and were they able to train adequate aircrews? maybe they should not have built the battleships. there are other factors in the the of japan to produce other assets you need to make these aircraft carriers. i think maybe in our next conference, we should address that situation more. russians, do you mean paying attention to them during the war or at the very end? >> he does not have the microphone but should they have been more mindful, with a more mindful, we need a quick answer which probably takes it on conference to address. >> certainly, the army was focused too much, considering

yes, overall situation, so i think you're right. at the end of the war, ironically, they are not focused on than enough. they don't think that the russians, they don't adeely assess the