yes, i think you're right. at the end of the war, ironically, they are not focused on than enough. they don't think that the russians, they don't adeely assess theok.

my pleasure to ask the museum's senior historian and executive director of the institute for the study of war and democracy to introduce our next speaker. aware of what new and important works are out there. i have heard him praising the title that we are about to discuss. would you like to take over? >> welcome back, everyone. we are here in the attrition all endurance phase of the annual international conference.

we now had into the home stretch. we have to keep going and we have to keep moving with a great amount of energy. speakers andstic authors before this event and the speed i'm really pleased to be up here to introduce my new an associate professor of history at boston university. dr. nolan is an award-winning teacher, a scholar of international history. his most recent book, "the own lower of battle -- "the allure of battle" has generated a buzz in historical circles. it's a very productive -- very provocative book. compelling, that it's

received this years prize for military history. that comes with a nice hefty cash allotment. it does mean he has promised to buy me a drink tonight. it recognizes the best book on military history in the english speaking world, distinguished by its scholarship contribution to literature and appeal to a general and academic audience. please join me in welcoming to nolanodium, dr. cathal here to speak on "the allure of battle." nolan: i have been asked to speak on a topic that's a bit broader than most of the speakers i have heard yesterday and today, so bear with me. and it's not a happy topic. let me start with a couple of comments about the state of the historical profession, which

many of the people in this room work. to many in my profession are today in different to military history. quite a few are openly hostile. or they redefine the history of war as a branch of social and cultural history that looks at its effects on the army's and societies it wages, rather than looking at war itself in the face. the trend is to dismiss the claims of older military histories, and this trend is reinforced in the wider historical profession by a broad turn. from the ideaway of large narrative decisions, he turned toward gentler history. yet, as everyone in this room knows, war remains hugely important in explaining world

history. i say this with no pleasure at all, it may be the most important thing. deep wars have altered the course of world history at least at critical modern junctures, the middle of the 17th century, the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, and of course the first half of the 20th. such war filled times show yet again that war is most physically,omplex, emotionally and morally demanding enterprise that we as humans undertake. accelerators, not the building of cathedrals or mosques or temples, nothing else we do receives even a fraction of the resources and moral effort we put into the making of war, the recovering of war, and the preparing to fight again. and yet i think we hardly control it at all.

militarys true in history, as well. too often we look to battles to decide wars and we point to genius generals who we say one the battle and therefore won the war. i think it's partly because we fear in and tragedy with no moral uplift in the trench mud and the acute relation of suffering over years of effort. perhaps responding to this broad public demand, we historians -- and it varies from country to country -- we historians have raised battles as examples of heroism and commanding generals to levels of identified genius that real history simple he does not support. winning decisively in war is of course the aspiration of all professional military. subject ofthe main concern to military historians. it is the single hardest thing

to do. to translate combat into lasting achievement. from at least the 17th century, perhaps across all history, the major powers -- far more than victory or defeat in the course of a red summer. they were long contests of endurance, in which early defeat did not necessarily mean final defeat. history, war results have been clouded. not a final triumph nor a final defeat. beenoften there have fogged arenas, great outcomes were a lack of resolution means they happen all over again, as your resolution encourages a new war and war begets more war.

we fight to for some great decision on an enemy, that we fall short. we pasta recover and to rearm -- we pause to recover and to rearm. much military history brush is that aside, i think, and focuses instead on failed campaigns that -- campaigns as evidence that wars filled with glory and by geniuses. france is beaten, and we name the age for louis the 14th. another age is called napoleonic. in 1945, andn ruin even today books are published arguing that the german generals displayed genius with panzers. we need to cast a colder eye on military history.

we need to look straight at the grim reality, that in the great power war's over the last several centuries, and certainly the 20th century, victory was achieved in the end in the biggest and most important wars by material and moral attrition. it, it me step right in mass slaughter. -- by mass slaughter. it takes far longer to win wars then those who have planned the opening battles ever hoped or expected. winning lopsided battles across history does not ensure victory in the wars of which they are the most famous part. won.bal henry the fifth won. napoleon won. hitler's won. france,land lost a

napoleon lost to the grand iniance, and hitler's lost the end, catastrophically, as his short war delusions ran into law -- into long war attrition, andthe allies capacity endurance for defeat. these baleful victories -- we ought to learn more about the american -- learn more from the american civil war. that's not the conclusion they made at the time. unfortunately the civil war ended in 65 and the austrians were decedent in seven weeks in 1866, and the french and seven months in 1870. infrench in seven months 1870. in other words, the german victories of the midcentury

point of the 19th century, i think did so much damage to military thinking and german military thinking and diplomacy, in particular -- and here on following in your footsteps -- but the almost entire officer corps and german political class ignored and dismissed the them when hehed to came around to the conclusion that what he had done could not be repeated. he specifically warned them in his retirement speech, is actually, he warned them, "my quick victories cannot be repeated. do not attempt it. -- it. -- attempt it." revising and re-revising the war plans that would be implemented in 1914. the general staff in 1914 took out of a lock states -- locked

on models based literally on what hannibal had -- hannibal had and when napoleon had done years earlier. who does that? germans. [laughter] millions of germans then slogged it out for four years in the mud and the trenches, having no wartegy to win the long they had started. men52 months 70 million plot at each other, murder and carnage increasing. brutality in a rising tide of hate, in whose wake we are

all still living. they fought through seas of mud and blood, through mutual slaughter and reckless mayhem. they fought for the dissolution of empires and an end to law. german leaders had succumbed to the allure of battle, to the delusion that their tactical and operational skill was sufficient to win, right at the outset, all at once. there's no need for strategic planning. were so committed to this that even after that failed could -- failed catastrophically they did it again and again and again. they looked for the annihilation battle in the east in 1915. they turned back to the west in 1916. -- finally defeated

and exhausted russia, then back to the west in 1918. wars, as hgnd all wells called the fight, wilson borrowed the phrase. the war to end all war in a real sense did not stop until 1945. the second greater war. a second and greater war filled with worse horrors went on to kill 10 times as many as the great war as it was called in the generation. intimatelys are so connected. 1914 through 1945. inside anre trapped

offensive culture that completely gripped their military imagination. and they were trapped even as a threefold large-scale global and military revolution was emerging and has been revealed. emerging and has been revealed. throughout the 19th century, culminating in the 20th century, defensive firepower had so defense that the offensive mass infantry attacks was so overmatched by the machine guns and artillery and fixed as a that any mass led to carnage. they kept trying it, because the ghost of napoleon was in the memos. defensethe ghost of napoleon we doctrine. it was locked into german operational thinking, the .nternal offensive secondly, a full course --

secondly, of course, everybody now had mass conscript armies. not even the thousands they had, or the quarter of a million in 1870. multimillion man's -- multimillion man armies. we could move masses of men with operational dexterity, we can maneuver around, we can find the flake -- find the flank. no you can't. knew, you can't move 2 million men with that dexterity that is required. to smashs are destined into each other, to bog down, and then to slug it out. these armies were in place from the very start. in 1914 the germans attacked with all of the reserves in the opening attack. because they thought this was going to be a short war.

we give everything, all at once, we win it. that meant reserves of entire nations and even of empires were rushed to the front at the very outset before the first units and scouts met literally millions of men. a crashed into each other like lumbering sumo wrestlers. they struggle in the traditional warfare until 3.5 years later they fell down exhausted. the third factor that made all was that thein german victories had provoked anti-german coalitions, permanent anti-german coalitions, which meant germany

cannot hope to isolate austria as it had done. now when the warm -- when the war began german he would be facing a great coalition from the first day. he explicitly said to the germans listening. they paid no attention. you will beyou try beginning a new seven years war. or even a new 30 years war. he tried it anyway, twice. did it because german civilian and military leaders knew they could not through to their ambition any other way. so they rolled what auto von

bismarck called the ire and dice iron base of four. we become a true world power, or we fall back into ruin. they struck, plans failed, they slogged it out. they lost. only looked up right in november 1918 to the veterans who comprise them, who said we are still unbeaten, we are still standing on foreign lands, and no foreign boots anywhere touch german soil. in fact it's a mirage. the kaiser was militarily finished. lives thending the

nazis told about the trail and denial that they have been defeated. morale had collapsed in the german army over the summer of 1918. with it german military effort began to flag. it took the form of what sometimes referred to as a military strike inside the german armies, the western field armies over those last months. german soldiers had done more for longer then i suspect any army could achieve. they lost even more and they lost virtually all the important ones. in the last summer of war they were totally exhausted by numbers of men, by volumes of material brought to fight them. empire, the french empire, the british empire, and by 1918 the american empire were all ready to rate against the germans. bet.sn't much of a

nothing abouted how to win long wars. immediately after in their planning and discussions, they focus instead as they always did and always have going back to frederick, on how to win short wars. how do we win short wars? if we -- anvolved in material war of material we lose. they double down, and they double down again and again. almost like a drunk rolling the iron dice in vegas. german fieldf the armies, basically comb military dictator from germany, was asked between the war. he was asked, what is the essence of german technical

doctrine? what is this german genius for war as some have called it? said, "we punch a hole and see what develops." they had no strategy to win world war i. whole,s the punch of the and what developed was attrition all -- attritional warfare. same day the germans are told, start retreating and looked for fixed positions we can defend. on that same day the order goes out, saying, essentially, scavenge everything. they were told to remove the uniforms from their dead. that and german -- dead german infantry was to be buried only in their underwear. take their boots, take their pants, take their coats. reason they gave the order was they had no production.

industries were not geared for a long war, and they had just lost the short war. win had no strategy to world war ii either. or a serieshat war, of smaller wars -- they start that war with a variation of their own fast war doctrine, with more delusions that road alongside the panzers. more racing through operational holes in search of impossible strategic outcomes. more death, more vanity, more defeat. talk -- i will talk -- i won't talk -- briefly a couple of words -- instead the elites were focusing on territorial swaps, colonial

adjustments. the british actually regarded -- and their policy was driven by countering and blocking the french. wilson was looking to a new security order based on a league of nations he could not persuade his own people to join. self-determination of nations and the idea that denied the history of europe. instead of empires around someny, the -- germany, new system of military containment perhaps? no. byy left germany surrounded temptation. they left germans open to another seduction by the allure of battle. the same short war delusion that leadhem to defeat in 1914

to a second world war in 1939. the defeats of 1939 to 1941 of the western plaque -- of the western powers cloud this issue i think it can be argued, i think the evidence supports that the allies drew the correct strategic conclusions from their defeats of 1914 to 1917. they concluded the only way to defeat a large power like germany was through a long war of attrition. they planned for it. certainly russia did, certainly france did. british and americans, maybe not so much. but in germany they did not plan for a long war at all. they plan for you rolled dice, you win short, or you lose everything.

the last futile driven offenses -- futile fences pointed the same way, that the army would lose the second world war in the end. dexterity on the one hand, from any syria strategy at all to win if the opening campaign failed. if the planned short war went along instead. just punch another hole and see what develops. they did it in 1914, make a big , andin flanders and france then attempting to swing eased to do it all over in russia in a matter of 45 days. trapped in awere long war even they knew they could not win. in 1939 it again against a minor power in poland. they won easily because it was a minor power. that only deepens the radical delusions of racial and

operational superiority. they did again against a great power in france. they got lucky. they did it again in 1941 in the soviet union. all they had learned from the defeat of 1918 was how to better use combined arms, how to better use aircraft and radio. temporaryem a advantage and they employed it smaller wars. noy had no idea and knowledge on how to win long wars. you have the panzers. they punch better holes and we can move through them. didn't they know that in a long war everyone would eventually have tanks? the germans build

something like 2200 tiger ponds and tiger twos. -- tiger ones and tiger twos. there was president for all of this. -- the great general staff of the prussian army and the great general staff of the german army -- they had a reputation of learning the history's -- learning the lessons of history. and they were fixated on napoleon during this period, much more than the french were. get that napoleon never really understood and never really had a strategy to win his wars, either. which is a good reason he lost. he never understood that winning a day of battle is not enough. campaign,o win the

then you have to win the year, then you have to win the decade. victory must usher in political prominence. napoleon thought his personal .alent was enough he always looked to the next battle. or at most, the next campaign. he never understood the role of attrition in spain and was .utfought by russia in 1812 again in germany and inside france. was not the moment of napoleon's decisive feet. was anti-climax. refused to accept that their defeat in battle meant defeat in the war. they came at them over and over again, wearing campaigns and attrition.

it was part of a coalition of deep strategic endurance. germans repeated napoleon's error, because they were so fixated on tactical and operational dexterity. they misunderstood the course and strategic cause of their ultimate defeat. because they won had a strategic capacity to absorb the first losses. to even hold on and grind down the lesser power over time. coalitions of the two world wars absorbs defeat after defeat. surprise, they overcame the first terrible setbacks. and in the end they crush the lesser military powers.

attrition is usually presented. it's presented to the public as an immoral strategy. -- as a moral strategy. it's a tale of lions led by donkeys. carnage over courage. we didn't have the maneuverability, we didn't have the forward artillery. i also think mistaking a tragedy -- forgive me for saying this, and forgive us all if we do it.

there's a moral argument to be made for strategies of attrition. we say it's wrong that attrition reduces soldier to a statistic. it does. that no more than a battle soldiers to numbers. aplenty onharacter both sides. and the sacrifices. small, those were mean, or morally useless acts, even though as i frame them here -- none of them where -- none of them were decisive. attrition does not ally a light -- does not annihilate all moral for those who carry it out. politics.t's our

it's slow and wasteful. we proclaimed that attrition is morally indefensible. the end is hown the union army uprooted slavery. attrition is how most big wars have been made. we better reese -- we better expect this reality. we should explain that it's coming, the heavily armed we send out in our place. if we decide together that the next war is just, we try to

resist the allure of battle. if we are honest about how wars are fought and won, how they really tend to last, and the real price paid by our youth, we may even practice war less. -- we may even praise peace more and practice war less, though i doubt it. [applause] >> best part of any presentation is the questions from the floor. imagine we have our folks with microphones. jeremy, do your thing. >> we will start to the left with tom, about halfway back on

the far left, please. >> my physical left or my political left. my question to you, in this day and age of nuclear weapons and, if you will, not nationstate war, but terrorism do your rules apply? i only have opinions on this. at 45.ing stopped iowa's get asked this question. i will preface this only with my view, not my study view. i think we are still subject to the delusion of the short war. some great power, thinking it has developed an emt first , launching it,ty thinking we are going to win the

war literally in a flash and then finding we are in a war. send to eventually you war. >> the center section to your right, please. >> what do you think it says about our country that three leaders of the biggest wars in our history, revolutionary, ii, arer, world war eventually elected president of the united states? >> more than that, i've sometimes done this with my students, count out the number of presidents that were generals paid washington, grant, jackson, -- generals. washington, grant, jackson, eisenhower. that the united states

likes to think like this more than other countries. [laughter] >> non--american exceptionalism? >> yes. we have a taste for celebrity generals. we look to people who solve major political and military problems. i have no problem with general eisenhower. >> it's commonly repeated in other countries. >> in the center section straight ahead. is youof your comments might think of the first half of the 20th century as another 30 years of war. another speaker said things were and world warll

ii might not have happened if we didn't have the economic collapse of the 1930's. >> it's a perfect will -- it's a perfectly reasonable and serious argument. i would come down on the side the fundamental outcome of the first world war was indeterminate. i, the germans were militarily and decisively defeated. to accept defeat. ofre was no occupation german territory beyond a few years in the rhineland. in that case, the first world absolutely indecisive on the only issue that really

which was what the german speaking people of europe would accept as their proper place and role. it took a second world war to say you are a middle power. word defeat in your last answer. more of a statement, but i would like the two of you to address it. "feet," -- word takes -- which william the fact that they handed over to stalin in 1945. i would like you to comment defeat inhe word military history. >> napoleon wasn't defeated in 1935, he was defeated in 1939. twice invaded

september of 1939. the two invading powers, the soviet union and nazi germany then issued a joint declaration, "poland is extinct." then they proceeded to try to wipe its population out in good measure. dealt with this kind of question before interestingly enough. it paid the consequence, the price of that the feet in horrific terms. i don't think these are disputable or controversial. >> it's the polish war of 1939, defending both side -- defending the homeland from aggressors on both sides.

>> extraordinarily moral heroism of the polls. they migrated through romania. they join the british in north africa. there is a large polish military cemetery in normandy. >> to your left at the very far back. them a great presentation. -- >> great presentation. my question is, general eisenhower, president eisenhower said in his farewell address is -- address that his deep concern is in the military complex. now oneral budget is half of ford's defense spending. how to you see the progress of this in world history as a

sustainable option for a republic? or a democracy? not getting into the politics of it, current spending levels are clearly not sustainable. you can sustain current spending levels by choosing to cut other desirable spending items. it's a choice that will have to be made. he lost the argument. that's closed. kansas.er, small-town we intervene only when we have to. that argument, that's 70 years ago, that argument is closed. the united states, whether it wants to be or not is a great power. and a superpower that is engaged in the world. now.ashes up on our shores

>> i hope we never conflate dispense spending -- defense spending with defense give abilities. we may be spending on it, i hope we are getting the bank for the buck. >> all the way in the back to your right. >> was there a lack of ofervision of the provisions the versailles treaty, or the with theconcern depression factor in this massive buildup by germany initiating world war ii? versailles, i think this is one of the most routinely missed hot items in the teaching of modern history.

hot --inely missed ght items in the teaching of modern history. either you have a hard -- a harsh piece that opposes defeat. or you go for a piece of reconciliation, like the congress of vienna. it was too harsh to succeed as a peace of reconciliation, and too indeterminate and two dang -- and too gentle. >> in democracies, that required rearmament. that required the diversion of large financial resources from the domestic to sector -- domestic sector to the military sector.

it's a tough time. we say depression, more like the great collapse of the global economy. inmployment level is 20% britain -- 22% in britain. 35% in germany. all over the world it seems like the wheels are coming off the economy. it's always easy to look back and say they should have been spending more money on arms. >> i would agree with all of that. i would add is a footnote one of the deepest ironies is the money spent on arms. that was not been spent as a deterrent, but -- >> gentleman to your left and front. >> interesting point about this warning. they kind of messed that up twice. very thought-provoking.

if you look at the british side, historyl had a 45 year of military. he had been in the service. he had a long-standing relationship with the military. one of the things he was famous for was firing, controlling -- cajoling his generals. on the german side, i would offer possibly the germans there -- the generals there -- unlike churchill, hitler's didn't listen. one of the things they told him not to do was going to russia -- >> i disagree with that fundamentally. generals, i think that is part of one of the most successful big lies of the 20th century. the general said that in the nuremberg testimony.

the two big lies they got away with was, "we had virtually nothing to do with the holocaust ." >> if you come later to my "why the germans lost" talk -- [laughter] >> i will defer to that. german generals agreed morally, politically, and strategically with hitler's then they vastly disagreed with him. >> to your right. , the u.s. has managed to stumble into several wars in the past century. korea, vietnam, and now we are stuck in a war with seemingly no end in iraq and afghanistan. what advice would you have given to george w. bush on september 12, 2001. >> i can't do that. i'm not qualified.

i can tell you 18 months ago i was at the army school in fort theenworth, chatting with committee. too cheeky.eeling i asked them if they thought we were in a new 30 years war. they didn't bat an eye. i asked, what about a 100 years war? -- they are in the year 18 of the ongoing 30 years war. take spectrum to be in afghanistan 30 years from now, which would make it a 50 year war. to, toop panel i talked them if theysked had learned any lessons. they're very short answer was, "we have, the politicians have not." >> i would throw one thing in

supplement to that. the political pressures in 2001 to do something were in on this. war --t dangerous dangerous words in washington, "do something." before you know it you are locked in 18, 19 years of combat in the middle east. you you say, what would advise the president? pits not a comment discussion, it's a pretty panicked discussion. discussion,a calm it's a pretty panicked discussion. to the fact we just lost president george h w bush, i'm not this a surly looking at what advice you would get his son,- you would give his -- i am curious about

whether the first president bush was correct in his assessment that he went in and started a war, and ended it and it was all done. or his son was correct when he began the second world -- the second gulf war and said, this is not a war that will end soon. >> you are asking me the same question in different words. , a wholesome presentation. -- >> a wholesome presentation. >> i was wrong at the time too. i thought they should have gone to baghdad in the first gulf war. on the other hand, the war was over in -- i concluded, like a lot of people, some people who should have known better, that the iraqi government could not have

survived the collapse in short order. most of us will -- of us were wrong. as for the second part of it, i guess -- i'm not going to psychoanalyze why the sun did it it, but theon did strategic thinking that he wanted to finish a war that we were still stuck in. the u.s. air force was committed, there were troops on the ground around the airbase. as a historian i have the luxury of hindsight. including majorities in both houses of congress, including the united nations. >> back left.

had a question for both of you, perhaps. -- john f.comment kennedy wrote a book, "why england slept." he study the decline in military spending in england prior to world war ii and the rise of germany and hitler's and the increase in military spending. -- was,lusion was, it in order to prepare for war -- to prevent war you need to prepare for war. things we haveny in common. perhaps the largest thing from the point of view of the french is that they have water between themselves and the germans. they have the channel and the atlantic. that has enormous political and

psychologic effects. you don't have to build a permanent fortification. you don't need to have a 100 division army in peace time on half the population base of germany. the french did. they were choosing to spend it on the navy and on the air force. to provide homeland defense. and something like 1935 come i think the american military ranks below portugal. >> we say romania here. >> one of those countries. and there were only 50 countries in the world at the time. you really and if want peace you need to prepare for war. it's neither an american or british innovation, it dates

back to the romans. on the roman context they are for war, so they got war after war after war after war. it was their national industry. the other one, those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it. can make entirely new mistakes. and those that do can make entirely new mistakes. >> we don't know what lessons apply to our problems. for example the lesson of the first world war that we should not allow an aggressor to get away with attacking a little country, czechoslovakia, he came known in the first years of the world war as the munich analogy. it was a correct lesson. >> i would like to take the

privilege of the presenter, the host privilege for a moment. >> i object. [laughter] >> you made a moral argument, very provocative for wars of attrition. let me bring it away from the moral context for a moment. that wars of attrition, we can't really talk about them because it's a political dead end? president ofne any the united states telling folks at the beginning of world war i -- at the beginning of any war that this is going to kill millions of us, and we hope in the end for the last man standing. >> it's impossible. that's why we are in a trap. we're trapped in the political impulse -- we trapped, and the political impulse is to provide weapon systems and trading systems to prevent the war, and

then we make mistakes and get one anyway, or will allow us to win it in short order. in the american case it has been -- delusion of i don't think there's any way around that. there is no way a recruiting officer can go out and say, give me your son, we are going to wage a war of attrition. we have an obligation to say regardless if people don't want to hear it. if you want to hear that world war ii was won by this battalion or that the italian or ory seals -- this battalion that battalion, or navy seals, it was a massive effort. >> decapitation strategy, shock and all, there has been one phrase after the other to promise a victory in 10 minutes.

the current military, if you look at the professional military literature, it is absolutely dominated with the terms that were invented by late medieval and early modern historians. everything is a military revolution. it's just constant. it's the same looking for the quick fix come on a fix, the strategic,ix to geopolitical, cultural problems. >> we have time for one,

possibly two questions. >> you guys are going to be as depressed as my students are. you talked about the long shadow of lessons that were cast on world war i and world war ii. there was a war of attrition involved over a major european power, trench warfare, machine guns. -- whythink the boer war do you think the boer war did -- >> the same reason it did not have the same impression is because you can dismiss it as an imperial power fighting the frontier for the campaign. the japanese war was harder to dismiss because it's two significant powers, the first time both sides machine guns -- both sides had machine guns for

the first time in military history. they did their best to dismiss it. they were locked into the short order. the reason the germans clung to war, we of the short must win the short war, is not because they were stupid. they knew if the war went along, they must lose. the only way they can win is the short war. the gamble. extreme, ite was was we win everything or we lose everything. world power ruined. tothank you both very much your conversation. [applause]

i would like to thank dr.

urmuring] good afternoon, welcome back. this is one i have been looking forward to for some time, given that this is almost like an army war college reunion at the front table. a number of great historians that i know you are truly going to enjoy listening to. i hope you had a nice lunch break. this session is an attempt to break away from the eisenhower, patents, -- patton,