new congress, new leaders. watch it all on c-span. >> next, author of allure battle a history of how wars are won and lost looks at ways historians evaluated war victories and defeats and challenges many conclusions. this one-hour talk was part of a conference hosted by the national world war ii museum. >> it's my pleasure to ask the senior historian.

>> we're here in the attritional endurance phase. there is equal parts of exhilaration and exhaustion but we have to keep going and we have fantastic speakers and authors and events for you before this ends. i'm really pleased to be up here now to introduce my new friend dr. nolan, an associate professor of history at boston university. dr. nolan is a scholar of military and his recent book has generated a real buzz in historical circles.

i have opinion carrying this book and quoting it to him since it's come out. it's received this year's guilder prize for military history of. that come was a nice, hefty cash allotment allowing to you look up online and does mean that appeal to both general and academic audience. i read it. and every word is true. here to speak so it's not a

happy topic, let me start about the state of the historical profession. and too many are indifferent to military history. and that looks at it's affects on the armies and societies that wage it. this is reinforced by a broad turn underway now several decades from idea towards gentler histories of smaller

folk and daily living and domestic materials. car remains hugely important and this may be the most important thing. major wars have altered major wars of history. and first half of the 20th. war filled times have shown war is the most expensive, complex, physically emotionally and morally demanding enterprise we collectively undertake. nothing else we do, nothing else

receives a fraction of the resources and moral effort putting into the making of war and preparing to fight again this, comes through in military history. we look to battles and point to genius patels and i think partly it's because we fear to find tragedy over years of effort and of endurance. we historians, it varies but i think the pattern is there have commanded levels to identified

genius. and winning in war is the aspiration of all professional military. and it's the single hardest thing there is to do. translate combat into lasting political achievement. from 17th century, wars among major powers have been far more than a tale of decisive battles and and victory or defeat during a hard day over the course of a red summer. most often in history results have been crowded.

often they have been fog add renas and gray outcomes in a lack of final resolution means they happen all over again and war begets more war. we fight the force on great decision and fall short. and much military history brushes that aside and focuses on failed campaigns, as evidence that war is filled by glory and geniuses. and france is beaten and we named age for lieu eye 14th. it's beaten again in another

age. call call called napoleonic. and we need to cast a colder eye on military history and look at the grim reality that in the great power of wars over the last several centuries and 20th century, victory was achieved in the end in the biggest and most important wars by material and moral attrition and by mass

slaughter. henry 5th, napoleon won and hitler won at kiev. and capacity for endurance of defeat. there are exceptions. we look back at the american civil war and see it was a precursor of what was still to come. the civil war ended in 65 and

awes streel strooeins defeated in 68 and 66. and german victories did so much damage to german military thinking in particular and the german officer core and he warned them my quick victories can not be repeated and do in

the expect it. and they planned and revised and rerevising a lan proposed to invade prance, a great power. working as models and what in a polen had done at 105 years earlier. who does that? germans. millions slogged it out four years in the mud and 52 months,

1700 men they fought to see the hud and blood through reckless and german leaders succumbed to the allure of battle and delusion their skill was sufficient to win at the outset at once. there is no need for strategic planning beyond beyond winning the opening as they called it, battle after nileation and so committed that after that failed catastrophically for them along the marn, they did it again and

again. and turned back to the west in 1916 and east again in 1917. they lost it all in 1918. didn't stop there. the war to end all wars as gh wells called the fight did not stop until 1945. it was this second and greater war commemorated in this two

wars so intimately connected we can begin to call them as charles dpchlt aulle called them 30 years war of the 20th century. it was emerging and being revealed. culminating at the beginning of the 0th century, defensive firepower have enhanced defense that offense of mass infantry attacks was so overmatched by artillery and defense that any mass attack almost inescape bli led to carnage.

secondary of course, more materially, everybody has mass armies. and huge armies mill tated against the plans that said we can move masses of men with operational dex tear ti. you cannot move if the germans knew it.

germans tacked with reserves in opening attack. that before the first outset met literally millions of men they struggled in attritional warfare until four and a half years later one great army fell down virtually exhausted. just before most of the others were about to and as it had done

in 1870. now, germany would be facing a massive power raid against it from the first day. he said to the germans listening they paid no attention. he said if you try he warned, and i'm paraphrasing. they tried it anyway.

twice. they did it because german civilian they could not win any other way. they rolled what fittingly enough a german had called the iron dice of war. what is the best? we strike while the window of opportunity is open. we strike now. we become through power or fall into ruin. they struck. plans failed and they shrugged it out and lost. they lost. said we're unbeaten and no

foreign boots anywhere touch german soil. and it's a mirage kaiser here was militarily finished. notwithstanding lies generals told or the lies that nazis told about betrayal and denial they'd been defeated. moral had collapsed in the german army over summer 1918 and with it german military effort began to flag and took the form of what is referred to as a hidden military strike inside of the german armies. in the summer of war they were exhausted by numbers of men, volumes of material, being brought to fight them by this

grand global coalition of empires. the russian empire and american empire a raid against germans. it wasn't a bet. and they learned nothing. they learned nothing about how to win long wars. and immediately afterward in their general studies and planning and discussions, they focus as they always did and had going back to frederick. they doubled down again and again. almost like a drunk rolling dice in vegas. they might work for it.

commander of the german field armies in 1918 basically co-military dictator of germany from 1916-18 was asked between the war, once asked what is the essence of german doctrine? what is the german genius for war? as some people have called it? he said, and i quote, we punch a hole and see what develops. it's remarkage, on september 10th an orderer goes out to the germans they're told turn away from paris and on that same day, order goes out saying scavenge

everything. they were to be buried only in their under wear. take everything. they had no production. in line they had no -- war industries just lost short war and they knew it. and they had no strategy to win world war ii either. they started that war or what they thought would be a series of smaller wars but merged into a war, too. they started that war with a mere variation of class war doctrine with more delusions that now rode alongside and more death or defeat. i won't talk just a couple words

about the paris settlement. that is different talk. and as you know stability and recovery should have been a center stage in 1919 in paris. the elites were focusing on adjustments. withrow wilson looking to a new security order paced on a league of nations paced on idea of self determination of nations, an idea denying history of europe. some system left weak and

quarrel some states and left germans open to another said beings but the allure of battle and it happened the same that led them into a second world war in 1939. defeats cloud this issue. and their victory they concluded that the only way to defeat a large power is to a long war of attrition and they planned for it. russia did. france did.

british, and americans maybe not so much. in germany they did not plan for a long war at all. again, they planned on world power and world ruin pointing to the way armies would lose second world war in the end through separation of german doctrine from any serious strategy at all to win if the opening campaign failed. they did it in 1914. made a big hole with a plan intending to swing east and do it in russia in 45 days. instead they're trapped in a

long war they knew they could not win. they did it again in 1939 against a minor power in poeland and that deepened their radical delusions of rarely and operational superiority. they did it again against a great power in 1940 france and they learned how to combine aircraft and radios and tank and gave them a temporary advantage and they employed it to win several smallish wars against smaller enemies.

no idea of war and they have panthers. they have larger holes and russians built 80,000234s. and americans what? 50,000. stallion said quantity has a quality all it's own. mr. is precedent for this. they have a reap yu tags for learning history and so you have

to win the year and decade. and victory must usher in. and he looked to the next battle. he was yult thought by russia in 1812. and waterloo was in the the moment of napoleon's defeat.

he came at them in long wearing campaigns in spain and russia. and britain hardly fought a big battle in the napoleonic wars, yet, it won. the defeat was the cause of their own. to loose campaigns and to hold on and dpriend down a lesser power over time. winning coalitions of the two world wars absorbs defeat after

defeat. they crushed lesser powers and i have more comments on attrition. attrition is usually presented, i've done it myself. to the public as an immoral strategy unless we can inflict it on the enemy. we didn't have whatever it was.

i think that misses the point and i think we may be mistaking trat ji and -- tragedy. there is a as much room as there is in any battle. there is character apresenty on both sides have been done.

they took part inside attrition and slaughter. attrition does not anile nate all gening and we pro claim adirection is morally indefensible, yet how the union army uprooted slavery and allied armies broke the nazis. we should explain it's coming to the heavily armed teenagers we

send out to kill in our name and in our place and only choose to fight the wars we deem worth that awful price. if we decide together the next war is just the real price to be paid by youth we might praise peace more and practice war less thank you. >> thank you.

>> best part of the time is questions from the floor and i see hands raised. germany? what do you think? any question to nuclear weapons. if you will, not nation state war. terrorism if you want to use that word for a moment. i get asked this question. it's a fair question.

and we're subject to the delusion of the short war. i can see great pou yes thinking it's developed an emt first strike cape yinlt launching it, thinking we're going to win the war in a flash. and then, finding they're in a war. did i answer it? >> center right, please. >> what do you think it says about our country that three leaders in history are elected president? of the united states? >> more than that. i have done this with my students. count up the number of american

general who's have been generals. washington, jackson, grant, and then, i left out --? right. and there are all of the others in the middle captains or majors or kol mels. >> american monday exceptionalism? i have no problems and didn't both parties want it?

>> center section? straight ahead? >> this is reasonable. doned mental outcome was indeterminant. and al guys did defish yens to

bring home the back of the defeat. and in that case took a second world war to say you're in middle power. >> dr. nolan used the word defeat in the last answer. this is jeremy. do you use the word defeat?

with maybe poles in general? >> it was defeated in 1939. two poland is extinct and they wiped it off the map. poland paid the price in horrific terms and paid a different price for being on the wrong side of the victorious

division line in 1945. >> there is poles fight and land alongside canadians.

how do you see a sustainable option for a republic? >> current spending levels are hot sustainable.

brass p, so that is war washes up on our shores now. >> that is how it's trazed but whatever we may be spending on it just hope we're get pang for the buck. >> was there a lack of supervision of the provisions of

the pilled up. >> this is is one of the routinely missed items taught. treaties neither cause, nor end, wars. and makes defeated side recognize it lost the war or you go for a piece of reconciliation. t

two gents who succeed m in oo in 930s we have to take a strong and fence hitler. it's a tough time. the great collapse, unemployment levels 20 in britain. 22% in britain. and 35% in germany. around the world seen the wheels coming off the economy. so this is a huge need for the time. >> on a scale never before known. >> one deep irony is finding spending of money on arms. >> that is gentlemen if to the

front. >> they missed that up twice. very thought provoking. he he had a longstanding relationship there with the military, one thing he was famous for is firing and harassing his generals but it was noted he never overruled his generals. i would never possibly generals there were just as, they had learned something but unlike churchhill, hitler didn't listen of. so he overruled them.

maybe they've learned and one thing they told him not to do was going into russia. >> they wrote it in their memoirs. the lies were we had nothing to do with the holocaust and if. >> to your right? >> to your right, yes. >> u.s. managed to stumble yoo self wars. and now stuck in a war with seemingly no win in iraq and

afghanistan. my question, doctor is what plays mrais would you have given george w. bush on september 12, 2001? >> no. i can't do that. i'm in the qualified. about 18 months ago i was at the army command school and in chatting with their they ran it. they're in year 18 of the ongoing 30 years war. i was told they expect to be in afghanistan 30 years from now. and the lessons learned

committee writes lessons learned for the army. and we have and politicians have not. >> something before you know it, you're in a lock in 18, 19 years of combat in the middle east. you know? you say what would you have advised saying this is a pannaged discussion so i'm not

looking about what advise you would have given his son. >> you're asking me the same question? different words. >> yes. yes. i thought they should have gone to baghdad in the first gulf war.

and there are speck tar lar triumph. i concluded like a lot of people that i will be back. most of us were wrong. it's a popular war. people forget we have a no fly zone. u.s. air force is committed and there are troops on the ground and so forth. so that -- as an historian i have the luxury of hindsight.

so there is wide support. history will judge that war as a catastrophic mistake. confusions in order to i don't know if you had a comment on that. >> there are things britain and

american have in common. perhaps largest thing is that they have water between themselves and germans you don't have to build a permanent fort yi fiction line. you don't have to have a 100 division army on a half population base. french did. british could sit back and say well, you know. they didn't -- not that they're not spending. and 1935.

>> one of the countrys. >> that is the league. >> right. right. >> there are only 50 countries in the world. >> wars are their national industry. >> another one that is, those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it to which some clever wag once said and those who do learn are doomed to make mistakes. lesson of the second world war

became known as munich analogy. or the domino theory that got us into korea and vietnam. was that the right lesson? >> it was a correct lesson. >> is it true wars of attrition, we can't talk about them? we'll hope or the last man standing. >> it's impossible and that is why we're in a trap.

we're trapped in the political impulse as you just correctly described is overwhelmingly to promise weapon systems, training systems and postures that prevent the war or allow us to win it in short order in the american case is storicly it's been delusion of winning air i don't think there's any way around that. there is no way a recruiting officer can go out and say, give me your son, we are going to wage a war of attrition. we have an obligation to say regardless if people don't want to hear it. if you want to hear that world war ii was won by this battalion or that the italian or ory seals -- this battalion

that battalion, or navy seals, it was a massive effort. >> decapitation strategy, shock and all, there has been one phrase after the other to promise a victory in 10 minutes. the current military, if you look at the professional military literature, it is absolutely dominated with the terms that were invented by late medieval and early modern historians. everything is a military revolution. it's just constant. it's the same looking for the

quick fix come on a fix, the strategic,ix to geopolitical, cultural problems. >> we have time for one, possibly two questions. >> you guys are going to be as depressed as my students are. you talked about the long shadow of lessons that were cast on world war i and world war ii. there was a war of attrition involved over a major european power, trench warfare, machine guns. -- whythink the boer war do you think the boer war did -- >> the same reason it did not

have the same impression is because you can dismiss it as an imperial power fighting the frontier for the campaign. the japanese war was harder to dismiss because it's two significant powers, the first time both sides machine guns -- both sides had machine guns for the first time in military history. they did their best to dismiss it. they were locked into the short order. the reason the germans clung to war, we of the short must win the short war, is not because they were stupid. they knew if the war went along, they must lose. the only way they can win is the short war. the gamble.

extreme, ite was was we win everything or we lose everything. world power ruined. tothank you both very much your conversation. [applause] i would like to thank dr. >> 1968, america in turmoil. this weekend, american history our nine-week series looking back 50 years, at 9:00 p.m.ay eastern revisit the vietnam war. women's rights and a fractious presidential

election. tv. on american history the u.s. of constitution enumerates the design, powers and limits of the legislative branch of the federal government. next, pulitzer prize winning historian jack rakove and margarte marshall a former chief justice of the massachusetts discusspreme court i.icle the massachusetts historical society and american academy of arts and sciences cohosted this and 20-minute event. >> well good evening, i'm jonathan, president of the academy, and it's my great pleasure to welcome you to it an historicll evening, marking the first of a