and her book "bringing down the colonel." >> william campbell preston breckenridge and the number of middle names he has should signify that he was in the southern elite. he had been a confederate colon colonel. a very respected man in the confederate cavalry and at the time of the lawsuit he's in his fifth term in congress. she was nobody. she was literally a poor girl from kentucky with literary aspirations who was very hungry for an education so she was this hungry young woman who ran into breckenridge at a time when she was really desperate to make herself something in the world and get an education. >> sunday night at 8:00 eastern on cspan's q and a. >> next a discussion about the political situation in venezuela. after president maduro was

swoorn in for a second term. now we'll hear about how the u.s. and other countries should respond. held by the center for strategic and national studies, this is an hour and a half. >> okay. welcome, everybody, to csas and i want to extend the welcome to those joining us online. i'm associate fellow after the program here and i don't think i've been in a more timely impressing public discussion than the one we're going to have just right now and the situation in venezuela is critical and what just happened yesterday has the potential to shape the country's future and how the international community is going to respond. it's going to really, really mark the path on whether

venezuela can escape from its rules and transition to democracy. so i'm very excited to see all of you to those watching online to have such an important panel and impressive panel here. the region is overwhelmed with new refugees and migrants in venezuela. and ard cording to the venezuelan constitution, on january 10th it was a new start. however, the election held in 2018 and were not -- were not free and were unfair and that's why the international community about 50 countries of the international community did not recognize it and i want to show you the map. just a click, please. yeah. so yeah, about 50 countries of the international community did not recognize the venezuelan presidential elections 2018 and this is one of -- thank you.

this is one of the big reasons why we're here and why -- what does this mean for venezuela? what does this mean for the international community? how shall we all think and respond to this crisis? and just to flag the international community response includes the lima group which include the most important latin american countries. a very strong declaration not recognizing maduro as president. we have a lot of things moving quick and that's why this type of discussion is just critical to have. so in the first -- on the face of such uncertainty we have two of the topmost important minds when it comes to venezuelan policy. he's a legendary am bas tor. he was a u.s. ambassador to

chil. his responsibilities range from police training and the safety in afghanistan and iraq, massive anti drug efforts in colombia and mexico. police development in the palestine west bank. to the south china sea, he's also a senior advisor and i'm going to say it before he says it. he's a noncompensated advisor, but we're really honored to have him. so thank you for being here. and last but not least, fernando, he's a bright policy maker here in washington. he's a senior associate. of the cohen group. he previously served as senior advisor to the general mcmaster and as acting senior director

for the first international security council. he joined the u.s. government and then he worked on president obama's team in the white house and later served as a special advisor for president obama's trip to cuba. so he has a very interesting background to work in two very different administrations. like the obama administration and the trump administration. thank you for being here. we're really delighted to have you as well. just a structure of the event very quick so we have an idea of how we're going to run. we're going to focus on three themes and right now we're going to focus on what happened yesterday, why are we here discussing maduro's lack of legitimacy. what does this mean and then we're going to talk about the international community responds, we're going to assess the declaration from january 4th which is an unprecedented declaration so we're going to be

talking about those too and finally we'll be talking about the diplomatic and political implications moving forward. what happened yesterday has legal -- important legal implications moving forward, so what are the most important, and where should we be thinking on responding to this implications? and finally, we're going to open to the audience for q and a. so i appreciate your patience to wait for that section. we're going to make sure to have enough time to -- to cover that session as well. so yeah, with no further ado, let me see. ambassador, thank you again for being here with us. like we mentioned, this is a critical time. many of the eyes and ears of the international community are watching us, so tell us what

happened yesterday, what is your assessment of what happened yesterday? >> i will start by apologizing to anyone who feels that dressed in this throwback 1930s elliottness and the untouchables suit suggests that i must be at least 100 years old. i acknowledge it is the warmest suit that i have and since i actually walked here this morning down from wisconsin avenue, i -- my apology is only for the appearance, not for the fact that i am wearing this. if i could offer one man's opinion and we'll get a better opinion after i finish from the distinguished gentleman to my right, your left. i would suggest that the issue here is fundamentally the legitimacy of the government that self-inaugurated itself for

a second term yesterday in the supreme court building. and since you have said the word legal, two or three times in your introduction, let me try to address that issue from a legal perspective. we are not located in venezuela, so therefore we're not articulating a domestic position. we are part of the international community that is observing assessing and commenting on venezuela so what does international -- they don't call it common law. they call it customary law say about the legitimacy of governments? if you pull out your international law textbooks you will find that there are two bases by which legally one can say that a national government is illegitimate. one is the means by which it comes to power. to a certain extent you could say this is the augusto pinoche

model or example. there are some. i don't put myself completely in that category but some that say that mr. pinoche did a fairly good job exercising the presidency of chile. you have to acknowledge that the gentleman took power, arrived in office through illegitimate means. if you take a look based upon that standard at venezuela you will see at best a questionable election and election process in may of 2018. you will find that the national assembly, the constitutionally elected national assembly declared that election null and void. you will find that the supreme

court that which actually was more or less appointed constitutionally as opposed to the current body that asserts that they are the supreme court, that supreme court not only determined that the elections were null and void, but barred maduro from assuming office. you will find as -- as we look at the map and we assess this, more than 50 governments, in fact, i was having coffee with a gentleman who worked for the washington post yesterday who i will not further name even though i do not see him in this group, but we were both off the record so you can pull my fingernails out. i will not say who it was. he said he thought it was about 70 governments. he's from the washington post. as many as 70 governments have determined that the elections were illegitimate and rejected their results and finally among international organizations in

some way or another, the oas, the european union, the group of seven, the group of 20 and perhaps most important, the group of lima have all rejected those results. have we therefore passed the threshold of the first test which is to say mr. maduro as of yesterday came to office under illegitimate circumstances? i would argue that we have. customary international law says there is a second way that a government can be declared illegitimate and this is and i'm much more confident saying this. this is the adolph hitler model which is to say a government or an individual who comes to power through democratic or constitutional means, most historians agree that adolph hitler did in fact win the election for the chancellory in 1933, but then subsequently acts in a -- an extra constitutional

n nondemocratic manner. does mr. maduro meet that test? let's take a look at ten years of public reporting. on human rights violations, on corruption, on taking steps to repress democracy and democratic activities, of illicit criminal organized criminal activity through all parts of the government. resulting in sanctions not just from my own beloved government, but other institutions and countries around the world. does this pass the hitler test? i would argue you could make a strong case that it does. so by either of the two standards established by customary international law to determine the legitimacy of a sovereign government arrived in office through illegitimate means or behaved in an illegitimate manner after

arriving in office, i suggest that the maduro government meets both of those tests. end of my presentation, your honor. >> thank you, ambassador. thank you. well, fernando let's get your thoughts on what happened on january 10th and we move for further questions and followup. >> absolutely. first of all i want to thank you for putting this on. csas for having us. ambassador it's an honor to be here on stage. >> what a diplomat. >> i have a few more years than you in experience but you'll get there one day. >> i'll be dead by then. >> but, no, it's real fun to be here and thank you also for coming and for constantly supporting this very important cause. you know, i think what started in 2016 and what i think is -- where i want to start at least is 2016 is how we got to yesterday. obviously there's a lot more you could go back. you could argue that it started

way earlier of course but let's just as a point start in 2016. in 2016, as i'm sure many of you recall, there was a recall referendum that was being put on together by the opposition, a lot of the opposition was scrambling to figure out how to deal with maduro. he was not very popular. the economy was going down, things were starting to really kind of hit a wall in venezuela and people were realizing it was time for change and so the opposition finally pulls the plug and puts together this recall referendum. up until that point was maduro democratically elected? was he a legitimate leader? i believe so. i believe until that point, you know, you love him or hate him, but he -- he for the most part was a legitimate democratic leader. but that's where things changed. the -- the referendum never went forward. maduro repeatedly got in its way and his supreme court which is, you know, nothing but a joke at this point, you know, repeatedly got in the way of the referendum

to the point where eventually they shut it down and said it's not going to happen. so to me that was a critical point of defining where is it that he went from being a legitimate democratic leader to no longer being a legitimate democratic leader. at the point where you cease to respect the institutions of democracy is a point where even if you had been elected first and in this case he had been, at that point still, you -- you are no longer a democratic leader. it got worse in 2017. the people said wait a second, this isn't demacrosi and the humanitarian situation is getting horrible on the ground. and so the protests start in the spring of '17. things start getting bad. of course maduro doubles down. pulls an assad, starts shooting people instead of trying to improve the situation.

july of '17, very, very interesting referendum has happened. two that were a week apart. one put on the opposition. the opposition says hey, come out, support us and say you're against maduro essentially you're against the reforming of the constitution that maduro wanted to do and the other put on by maduro. saying hey, come say you're in favor of the reform. late july we have the -- the referendum put on by the opposition, it draws 7.2 million people. it's a pretty significant number. the next week we have the referendum put on by maduro and you know, if you believe his numbers which have totally been unverified it draws about the same amount of people. but remember, we know his numbers are not true. we know that the opposition allowed there to be international monitors and maduro did not t. we flow that the company that ran his election process actually came up publicly and said that the numbers had been tampered with. so now we say okay, so more people in venezuela were against

us than were for this. that's basic democracy. that's basic referendums and yet again, maduro ignores the will of the people, ignores democracy and says we will reform the constitution. that to me was beyond the step and crossed into dictatorship. the next day and the united states government came out. general mcmaster went to the white house podium and declared maduro a dictator. that was july 31st of 2017, i believe. so that was a moment where the united states showed leadership, where the region was maybe not fully there yet but the venezuelalan people had been there. the united states does not call somebody a dictator lightly. when we labeled maduro a dictator he was the only the fourth.

there was kim jong unand others. not a light moment for the united states government but yet we are we were firmly of the belief that he had crossed that threshold. and a few months later, nine months later in 2018. these elections take place and of course the opposition doesn't take part. nobody believes they're going to be fair or honest and you know, the elections still take place and even if you believe his numbers again, which we know from time and again that our inflated, we know they are not real but even if you believe his numbers 6 million people show up to vote for him in may of 2018. the referendum that the opposition put together has 7.2 million show up against him. so again, democracy, right? what do the people actually want? the people do not want maduro. so to me what happened yesterday was the culmination of these moments that have just

completely and utterly destroyed any semblance of democracy. he is a dictator and i think what happened yesterday was the international community finally came to terms with that. beyond the united states, beyond the venezuela people. now, what's -- what's perhaps a bit frustrating. i'm sure we'll get to this later is that where as in the summer of '17 the people were kind of rallied up in there and the international community wasn't fully there and kind of in my opinion let them down a bit. now it seems like the international community has rallied up and kind of there and the venezuelan people are nowhere to be found right now. so it's an interesting dynamic. but in my opinion, what happened yesterday, it was the official internationally recognized end of democracy in venezuela. >> great. thank you. that's a helpful catchup and summary of where we are today because that's true. there are so many events going on in venezuela that it's hard to catch up. let's move on to the international community response

because that's where i think we can, you know, help shape a little bit where we are and where we should be heading. we have first and we have the slide of america's team. a wonderful slide where it shows the declaration for january 4th. again, the declaration for those who are not watching venezuela closely is composed from the most important latin american countries like brazil, peru and canada. the u.s. is not part but nonetheless the u.s. is closely engaged and in fact, they call in when this declaration was being discussed. so you can see here 12 -- the 12 main points where the declaration announced january 4th. and i want to really hear from our speakers their general

assessment of where -- how important is this declaration? where are the gaps? why this declaration matters and is this enough? and this is where i really want to get ambassador and fernando to the core. is this declaration good enough for what we're facing in venezuela. it's a massive state that is controlling all institutions that is repressing the people, so let's discuss this declaration and we're going to get into more details. what do you think about the declaration? >> okay. let me start. if this were a united nations declaration we would say you had 12 where as, and those are the 12 that you see there. where as this, where as that, where as the other. and then on the next slide which you're not allowed to see right now but there is one because i happen to have seen it. it would be the seven therefores

that are calling for additional action or whatever might be requir required. ladies and gentlemen, this was a good declaration. i want to say it quite clearly. it is tough, and yet it is fair in terms of the conclusions that it reaches and the action that it calls for. and those amongst us and i include myself in that number and several of you grouchy people that i can see in the audience right now who have from time to time been mildly critical of the group of lima in terms of what they have or have not done, have an obligation to acknowledge that this in fact was a good piece of work. i have now said it and i'll go one step further. i believe it demonstrates, this is my opinion, no one has

confirmed this for me, it demonstrates considerable leadership by the two most important south american governments and countries that are directly affected and impacted by what is happening in venezuela today and that is their two geographic neighbors, the republic on colombia and the republic of the fed rated states of brazil. and i want to acknowledge that leadership as well. okay. ladies and gentlemen, if this were the 3rd of january, i would have offered some views as to what i thought the group of lima should do and since i hate having to prepare twice for the same meeting, what i'm now going to do is use my list of what i would have said to you was what we needed eight days ago and compare it to what the lima

group did last friday, the 4th. first, i would have said it is imperative that they disavow the legitimacy of this government, this mafia state. i'd give them a check on that one. i in fact think they have done a pretty good job in terms of saying clearly the results of the 2018 elections were illegitima illegitimate. could they have gone further? yeah, maybe, but i'm going to give them a check mark for yes, having accomplished that. second, that it would be imperative that they recognize the legitimacy and the authority of the still sitting national assembly in terms of being a constitutional body that represents the genuine government of venezuela. i give them a check mark on that one as well. again, could i have found a

better way to say it that would be even clearer? maybe, but support and recognized a national assembly, that's proetzty go that's pretty good. i might have said has the sole legislative body in venezuela, but i'm not asking for perfection. i'm saying has the group done well? yes, they have. third i would have said to recognize the -- the -- i guess we'll call it the legacy supreme court, the tsj of venezuela and recognize its rulings, i give them a check minus on this one. they get the minus. they're a good about talking about the integrity and independence of the supreme court. i do wish they had gone a step further and said and a respect and call for all countries in the world to respect, honor and follow their rulings, but never theless, they're on the check side. number four, i would have said

call for the beginning of international humanitarian assistance now. they also get a check minus on my book for that one as well. you will see not here, but if we go to the next slide you will see they eventually call, somewhere, i'll looking on my own blipping thing. they call for the government of venezuela to permit international humanitarian assistance. i would argue today, the 11th of january, you know, let's stop waiting for the government of maduro to acknowledge the humanitarian crisis and to invite humanitarian assistance. let's call for it right now. start delivering humanitarian assistance. even if at the end of the day what we get are videos and news broadcasts of trucks filled with essential food and medicine

being turned away at the border, at least it is sending a message and sending a signal. i give them credit for calling for the government to permit it. i would say take it a step further and by golly gum bobo, to the international community let's start delivering now and perhaps later on we'll discuss the terms of how and where to do that. fifth i would have said i hope the lima group will call for the pulling or cancelling of diplomatic accreditation for officials representing the government of venezuela overseas. i don't quite get them the check on this one. they call for reassessing and re-evaluating. that's a good thing and i understand the code here. they also have to -- to acknowledge the reality, one, that they've -- that many of them have a good number of venezuela dip la mats that are

credited in their government. this is the lima group and they've got a good number of diplomats that are located in venezuela so they have to be more careful than we sitting in csis will be but by own view is this would have been better if there were a clear signal saying it's time to start sending these boys and girls home. they do not represent a legitimate government. sixth i would have said they should state quite clearly, do not provide visas to maduro government representatives. visit, to reside, to have full-time permanent responsibilities, say to the world this is the time to stop doing that. will there be exceptions? of course. we acknowledge the reality. venezuela is a nation of more than 30 million people although it its population is diminishing now thanks to the superb work by

mr. maduro and his government but never theless there is the reality of having to deal with a nation of that size that does have certain economic outputs that are of interest to the region and to the world, but never theless, a clear signal would have been helpful. seventh, i would have said, time to disavow international agreements reached with the government of nicolas maduro. now again, i acknowledge there are certain realities, nations that have thousands of their citizens inside venezuela have to be careful in terms of what they disavow and what they do not disavow. i wish the group of lima had been a bit clearer in sending a signal to the international community that now is the time to at a minimum stop any further agreements with this government and terminate, cancel, disavow

agreements that they in fact, can do. i wish they had been clearer on that point. and last and finally, i would have told you a week and one day ago it's time to call as the lima group to call for the -- i will cal it the deas pra of venezuela which i calculate in the vicinity of 4 million human beings. and even those most sympathetic to the government's position are saying it's perhaps 2 million. i'm saying between 2 and 4 million. i wish the group would look upon them as an opportunity, that is to say, to call upon them to organize in some way. we do not need to say government in exile. i realize that has certain implications but you cannot tell me that 4 million human beings who have displaced into 15 or 20

different countries cannot somehow organize themselves in terms of managing humanitarian assistance both for the deas pra, the refugees as well as that which might be going into the country. cannot organize themselves in some way to emit opinions or political decisions to support the efforts of the national assembly that continues to reside inside venezuela and a courageous, political opposition that is hanging on by its fingernails, the deas pra has perhaps the ability to do some things that their colleagues, friends and counter parts inside venezuela cannot do now because it would -- it would produce their near immediate incarceration and give the international community the opportunity to push for the

deaspra to organize in some way. will this lead to individuals being identified as leaders for the future? maybe, maybe not. if it does, they get there naturally by managing real world issues for 2 to 4 million people and growing in numbers on how to manage venezuela issues as part of the deaspra. those are the eight things i would have hoped for from the group of lima a little over a week ago. i think they did well or pretty well on four of the eight. i wish they had done more on the other four. it was a good declaration, could have been better. >> thank you, ambassador. fernando, give us your assessment of the lima group declaration but let's push the ball a little bit faurter and i want to ask you about these two points that -- well, let's see. it's number 3 and number 12.

number 3 says we are urge maduro to not assume the office. that was january 4th. so january 10th came and he did not care about the declaration. he wentz and assumed the office of the presidency and he also -- the lima group also urged maduro to turn from the executive powers which he hasn't done so far and he likely will not do it either. and so now what? like, now what the lima group should do if -- on the number 3 point and if you want to take on number 12 too and ambassador you hit on that too, like how do we get aide inside venezuela. i think that's very important and interesting point but it's all yours. >> of course. thank you. on the lima group declaration i completely agree with the ambassador. i think -- i'll be lhonest.

i was surprised when i saw it. i did not expect the group to go that far. i'd say that in the past, you know, they've been very strong in rhetoric but very weak on substance and i think you know, i'll take part of the responsibility for this certainly from my time at the white house. we would praise them quite a bit for existing in the first place. we would praise them for saying the smallest things. right? because you know, a few years ago we never imagined that latin american countries would rise and speak out against one of their own, and so we were just so thrilled when they would use rhetoric that was in a positive direction that we saw that as enough and kind of let that be. but i think things have evolved quite a bit in the last few years and it's time for action. i think there's no doubt about it. it's actually past time for action. so seeing that statement out there was surprising to see them all of a sudden have the gut to go out and say the right thing and actually threaten to back it up. right? but i'll be honest, its also scared me and not for the reasons of well, what if they

back it up. for the opposite reasons. what if they don't back it up. that's what's really concerning me. they have put themselves outs on the line. in some ways i was in the white house in 2013 when president obama wentz o out and did the ad red line. the lima group is now saying as a collective it's time for maduro to go. they say that flat out. maduro need to go. he can't be sworn in again and of course he wasn't going to listen to them. i don't think anybody thought that on the 10th he'd say okay, see ya. so he didn't and now he's been sworn in again. so right now you have your credibility as this group of countries on the line. what are you willing to do now because he's defied you? and so it is a bit of a scary diplomatic moment in my opinion. do you allow him to win? and therefore lose your credibility and your legitimacy as the lee that group and as this group of countries and as

diplomatic leaders in the region or are you going to push back and if you're going to push back, how do you push back. that's the critical question right now. assuming they're going to push back and follow through and i'll give credit to some of those that already have. p they've gone full out. they've closed the embassy. they're doing i think excellent work showing leadership on this. you saw statements from argentina yesterday, from chile, from peru. surprisingly nothing yet from brazil. nothing i've seen. nothing from colombia, but i'm sure that those two countries, i have no doubt those two countries will be leading, not behind the ball. so if anything there's more to come than less. but what i think is critical is that, you know, we follow these statements, these strong angry

statements up with action. because if it's just rhetoric, if it's just more of the same, then -- then nothing is going to change. maduro is not going to step down. so what can you do? what actions can you take? you have to isolate maduro. you have to get after his inner circle. i think re-evaluating the diplomatic status is 100% correct. i think deciding whether or not you're going to allow them and who you're going to allow into your country is 100% correct and you should be ering on the side of allowing less people into your country i think. i think the time for us to say maybe this person can turn good and negotiate with us, i think that time is gone. i think we've tried every approach to get people to talk to us and it's time for us to assume the people left there are left there of choice and they are bad people. now the burden for those who are sta still there in that inner circle, the burden is now 100% on them.

i think the time for us giving people the benefit of the doubt and saying well, you know, maybe this guy will turn, let's not sanction him. i think that time has passed. so i think it's time to go after all of those people. don't let any of them into your country. don't let anybody into a negotiating room. and then the next logical step and the real critical step is to start prosecuting them. pros ku prosecute them under your country's laws. don't let these people outs of their country ever again. because if you think about the criminal enterprise, the mafia state that we're talking about here, it relies on the fact that a lot of these top level officials can just keep getting all this corrupt money and then go on vacation to wherever they go on vacation on from europe to latin american countries to anywhere else they want to goin othe world. and they spend the people's money. and so while the people of venezuela are suffering, the top

echelon of folks are doing quite well. we see that at the very top with maduro and his steak dinners. how do you put these people on the red notice list so that if they ever step outside of their country they will at least have the fear of being arrested. how do you keep them inside venezuela so that their only escape is say a trip to cuba, which you know, is not much better because you can have all the money in the world, but if your corrupt money can't be spent on anything that actually gives you joy and pleasure, then that money is worthless. right? so i think that's the critical next step. and on -- on the last point on the humanitarian aid, you know, i worked for u.s. id. it's such a sad situation that this is a human made disaster. there's no hurricane, no earthquake, there was no anything that you can point to and say, you know, the people are suffering because of x. there's no disease.

there's nothing. it was bad man made decisions purely and simply and to this day it's still that that is causing this. right? the fact that maduro, you know, just i think, you know, out of pure cynicism at this point, just pure evil decides not to allow aide into his country, i mean, what good -- you know, maybe a few years ago you could have still said he thinks that it would acknowledge the optics of -- it's a failing state, you know, there's no optics battle anymore. that game is over. nobody in the world actually believes that this state is thriving. nobody in the world actually believes that venezuela is prospering. nobody. right? nobody. so how do you still not allow humanitarian aid into your country? how do you still take that just brutal step? and you know, people talk about maduro getting an exit ramp. i think his days of potentially not being tried very harshly by whoever are numbered if not already out, because you know, these types of decisions, i

don't see how -- how you can get away from that one day in the eyes of justice. you know, that's just, again, the blood of the people of venezuela are on maduro's hands. there's just no doubt about that and every day it gets worse and every day his predicament gets worse. so i think i completely agree with the ambassador. it's time for the national community to step up and force humanitarian aid in. let him have the military turn it down. the people need to see that there's no doubt about it as to who is preventing them from thriving. >> thank you, fernando. going back to january 10th. we have now a new president in the national assembly. he's calling not only the international community but he's calling the venezuelan people, he's calling the military to recognize him and to recognize the national assembly as the

presidency before he assumes the presidency himself. so we are facing a problem that in policy we many times face. right? so my question to you, ambassador, is what -- how do we deal with this dilemma with this chicken and the egg dilemma and what is stopping the international community to recognize guido as the president of the republic? >> yeah. i mean, with some sort of mod fier in front of the noun president. interim president or transitional president, something that makes its clear that there's a realization that he also would not have reached the presidency through the normal constitutional democratic process. at this point, i would be prepared to say you could make a compelling argument, a political argument, a diplomatic argument,

but quite frankly, a legal argument that any sovereign government in the world would be within its rights to in fact, make that decision and say that from our perspective, mr. guido is in fact at this time the interim constitutional president of the republic of venezuela. now, as we all know, there are times where a legal argument and a legal position has to come to grips with the real world in which it is being made and/or implemented. and in the real world, as we all know, everyone in this room is fully aware, mr. guido is very, very restricted in just how much he can or will be permitted to do under any circumstances inside venezuela.

and that his area for maneuver is very precisely defined and limited and if he crosses any of those red lines, he runs a very good chance of finding himself in a prison cell wherever the maduro government might choose to place him. so all governments of the world and that's about 100 -- i think there are about 196 that are currently recognized as members of the united nations do have to engage in kind of two assess mtss mt ments as they make their decisions. one is are they comfortable with the legal analysis? i am. there are another 320 million american citizens that are entitled to their own views in terms of my government bus another 7.5 billion or so sprinkled around the world. i believe there is a solid legal

case to be made that yes, if the international community has concluded that the national assembly at this stage and the -- and the tsj are the sole remaining constitutional organs and institutions in venezuela today, if this is the determination of those institutions we haven't heard from the tsj but it wouldn't surprise me that we would. then we have a legal right to say therefore, their determination is mr. guido is the interim president with the executive authorities of the presidency. we recognize that. that's one determination. the other one is, if we or enough governments make that determination are we basically just marching a man off to prison. and that's a tough decision and this is why we're in meetings like this right now to work our way through these difficult problem sets which allows me despite the fact that you

stubbornly put the question to me during my fascinating first presentation or maybe it was the second one and that is take a look at this de-aspra. not because there are 4 million venezuelans in it but by definition they are located outside of the reach of the current maduro government in venezuela. and can they do to some extent perform some of the functions that an interim president in venezuela would normally want to do, would very much like to do, but is not going to be permitted to do so, because he is in the control of -- the tentacles of the octopus who is running things in venezuela today. and i'm not sure. i haven't thought this thing through completely, but you cannot tell me with 4 million human beings spread around the world, but for the most part concentrated in a few governments, there is not a way to establish some sort of

permanent structure, some sort of organization within that deaspr that can pick up some functions that might eventually over time offer an alternative to mr. maduro's mr. maduro's go. there, i said it again. >> good point. >> i think the national assembly can do that. they can transfer some powers to an organization outside of venezuela. we can call it diaspora. we can also call it a legitimate representative of the national assembly. whatever way we want to call it, we should be thinking in that direction. because it's right. now that we have the support of the whole international community, let's keep a legitimate representation outside the country. fernanco, another concern from the international community, it is safety. i will argue, for example, that either way, if he assumes the

presidency or not, there is a threat that he face jail. i don't think, if we recognize him as president, that's where he's going to face a threat, the threat is now, it is happening now, especially because there is a dictatorship, there is a mafia state that is oppressing every single opposition, so it is not only him, it is all of the national assembly, and to be frank, every single venezuelan citizen is a threat to be repressed. so whether you, is one way the threat to face jail, a concern that international communities should be thinking when making the assessment of recognizing the president of venezuela? >> i think it's almost two different points. i think to your point, will he be jailed? yes, i think the answer is yes. whether it's tomorrow, if he

tries to take the oath, or if it is, if he doesn't try to take the oath, then make a month or two once maduro judges that the international attention has died down a bit and he can get away with it but maduro has proven himself time and again over the last couple of years to go after any opposition figure who appears in any way to present a legitimate democratic threat to him. that's his style. that's what dictators dochlts will he go after him somehow? yes. whether it is putting him in exile when he leaves the country or home or house arrest, or torture. or just plain arrest, or all of the above. we've seen that play out with pretty much every leader of the opposition that has had a length mat shot thus far. and i would not expect maduro to all of a sudden change his mind and become a good guy now. the question is will that happen sooner rather than later? and that i think that might be affected by the decision of whether or not he will be sworn in. if he decides to be sworn in

tomorrow, i wouldn't expect maduro to stand by and allow that to happen and allow him to flaunt in maduro's face statements and speeches and tweets and what not so i would anticipate that that would just drastically alter the time line, and get him behind bars sooner rather than later. but i think again, what is important here then is for the international community, as it debates whether or not to recognize him, well, first of all, can we legally, and a compelling argument, i would love to hear from the ambassador about this if i may become the questioner for a moment. >> yes. >> my understanding, and you know this way better than i do, was that the united states for one does not recognize governments, we recognize countries, so we, at least again when i've been briefed on this in the past, we are in a difficult position, where as other countries in latin america may be able to flat out recognize an individual leader, we tend to say we have an embassy in x country and that's that, right? so if there are two opposing

claims to leadership within x country, i'm not sure that at least there's a whole lot of precedent for us to kind of take a side in that situation. i think we kind of just let the people figure it out. but back to the bigger question. i think we need to be playing a game of chess here. not just kind of making decisions on the fly. if we know that recognizing him will lead to his arrest and whatever else, right, possibly torture, what is the decision at that point? we have to have that decision made before we make the initial decision that causes this guy to go down into harm's way. it would be irresponsible of us not to play that in a smart and well thought out way. and again, i say, we have to back up whatever that step is with action. because it is very easy for us to have rhetoric out of dc and for us to put out a statement saying we recognize this guy, but there are some real world

implications to that for him, and for people on the opposition right now in venezuela, and for the venezuelan people. and if all that comes out of that is his detention and torture and nothing else, then i think we will have done a disservice to the greater good of the international community, and of venezuela. so i think again, if we're going to take that step, then what action, what tangible action are we prepared to take to back that up, if and when really the so-called legitimate leader in our eyes of venezuela is arrested and beaten and tortured. what else? >> ambassador, you want to answer that question, how the u.s. will deal with two different institutions or governments, within a country? is this really, can you give us light on this issue. >> recognizing country versus government. listen, let me offer you the fruits of 39 years of sponsor in the diplomatic service of the united states of america.

if at the end of a careful assessment and review, i hear from the secretary of state transmitting the views of the president of the united states that we wish to recognize this particular individual as the president of the government of another country, i will find a way to find diplomatic precedent, legal interpretations, and as required, statements of the united states code, and if i have to, the united states constitution, that will indicate this is what we can do and we will do it. if at the end of the day what i hear from, this is imaginary, i don't work for the department of state any longer, i hear from the secretary of state that we want to be careful and not be drawn into this, despite 180 million american citizens screaming at us to do it immediately right now, i will do a very careful review and assessment and find that never before in the history of the united states of america have we ever taken the step of

recognizing an individual as president, when there is another or others who claim the same position. i am both a diplomat and i even went to, went to law school at the finest city in the nation, austin in the lone star state so i have no discomfort in telling you that i would find a way to defend a decision either way. fernanco is making a more pragmatic point however. it is not just a legal or diplomatic issue. we've got to think this one through in terms of what is from our perspective best in the united states interest, second, what is in venezuela's interest, third, what is in the interest of those individuals inside venezuela who are courageously trying to fight for some form of constitutional democracy in their nation. now, that should drive us. but that's not a legal issue. and its not really a democrat

mat mate diplomatic issue. it is let us figure who to support and help and how to best do that. at times, fernando suggested, just staying silent may be the best thing we can do and at other times we might conclude if we get 50 other countries to join us more or less on the same day and recognize an individual, that might give him some degree of protection or at least make it harder for him to be picked up on the street the next morning when he steps out of his house. it would depend on the circumstances. and it would depend upon who else is prepared to join us. it's not a one size fits all. it is not an always the same decision all the time. but it is very definitely something all of us, those who are or were in government, but as well as those who are thinking through and eventually informing the decisions of government, how we should proceed. we can all, i'm willing to speculate, most of the people

seated in this room right now, agree that the maduro government is not a good thing for venezuela. that's the easy part. the much harder part is hammering out therefore how do we, both as the united states of america, but the broader international community, react to and respond to that sorry. i got on my high horse, i just need to stop. >> and let's move on to the last point before we open it up to q&a. and that's where we want to discuss with the implications, legal, political, diplomatic implications, we had just yesterday, declared 19 countries, to not recognize maduro as president of venezuela, at least not legitimately, he lacks that legitimacy, right? so what does this mean moving forward? what are the implications moving forward? not maybe today, but in the next few weeks, in the next months,

how is this lack of legitimacy from maduro and presumably national assembly, assuming its role, will affect the way countries do contracts, agreements, diplomatic relationships, with the republic of venezuela? let's leave it like that. what is your sense, ambassador, of where we, how are we heading, what type of implications are we going to be facing? >> i'll just, i'll run a few ideas off. there is one principle of diplomacy that has worked fairly well, i don't know, let's say since helen of troy, whenever that was, about 3,000 years ago, that's the principle of reciprocity, the reason it works is because it is such a simple con p september. simply stated it can be articulated, it's not, it can be articulated in the following simple way, you screw us, we will screw you and we will do it in exactly the same way.

that simply stated is the principle of diplomatic reciprocity. you cancel visas for us, we will cancel visas for you. you throw our diplomats out, we will throw your diplomats out. you cease to recognize us and our government, we cease to recognize you and your government and on down the line. we have to keep this in mind as we work our way through the problem set. and it is more of an issue for other nations that don't have the benefit of a population of 320 million and global presence and have the misfortune of being located in the same region as the republic of venezuela that is pushing out between one and two million of its citizens every year, but you have to take that into account. that is one legitimate concern. second, you've said it. and it's not just agreements. it's also contracts. there are many individuals and many companies and many organizations, from many countries, that's four different

many's in one single statement, that have contracts of some nature, in or with entities in venezuela. and some of them are to billions of dollars of value. and we do have to take the interests of those contractors into account. now, we may take them into account, assess it, and say, tough luck, guy, you had every reason to understand who you were closing a deal with, or even better, you knew that this was a dirty deal from the very beginning, go cry to the judge, we are not going to take your concerns into account. others who will say we've been here for 40 years, why should we be held accountable and have to pay the price for political changes? somehow or other, we have to keep in mind, realize, and accept that as we work our way through these issues, we are going to bump into people that will be making clear coherent and even compelling, that's three c words in one single

sentence, arguments on contracts and figure how to play it. third, and this is from the diplomatic and political, in the international community perspective, let us keep in mind, as we work our way through these problem sets, two not insignificant players in the international community, one which speaks overwhelmingly russian, and a second which speaks either mandarin or cantonese chinese, will probably not be on the side of the good guys on this matter. now, it's only two countries, we can say. but they're kind of significant countries. they do have a substantial amount of investment. political, economic, even security in venezuela. and we do have to remember, as we work our way through these problem sets, that they are not going to be allies or friends as we work these issues. fourth, we've already said it. both fernanco and i have worked

through the issue fairly aggressively, i think, let us remember, the capabilities of the mafia state of mr. maduro, to retaliate inside venezuela. and that has to be something we take into account as we work our way through decisions. and finally, one thing, and i kind of, i lived through the mure yell boat lift, ladies and gentlemen, of 1980, i believe it was, which was the first time i think in recorded history that i'm aware of at least in which a government determined to use as an offensive weapon its ability to push its own citizens out from the country and have them flood and overwhelm, if you will, the capabilities of another country. i watched that actually from my position in mancaibo, venezuela, where i was a first tour vice counsel, a very young man, in 1980, but i take the lessons

that we kind of learned from that, and i say, is this something else that mr. maduro could do? yes, i mean i'm guessing, in the course of 2019, between one and two until venezuelans will hit the road and become refugees to escape their nation. could mr. maduro decide to crank that up to five million? i bet he could. and regardless, it is something that we've got to think about, as we work our way through this problem set. >> thank you. thank you, ambassador i do want to put a couple of quick questions for you, fernando, and then open it up. and it is pushing a little bit in the hour here and i've been hearing these questions from so many people. one, let's talk about concrete step forward. one thing that the u.s. could do for example is to name, to name or recognize a representative, not from the maduro mafia state which is now legitimate, but from the national assembly. is that a concrete step that we

should be thinking to do now? and the second question is more the contractual agreement point of view. if maduro lacks any legitimacy and the national assembly is sewage assuming that role, should all of the venezuelan buyers force cit go o and other companies to pay, not the maduro national state but the national assembly. so there are a couple of questions i know they're hard to answer but i really want to get both of you quick thoughts if due mind. and then we open it up. >> well, absolutely. i will start by saying, a point i made earlier, which is i think very critical right now. in the summer of 2017, the venezuelan people were there, and the international community let them down. i admit. that i think the united states did a decent job, but i think

the international community as a whole was not there, when they needed the international community to be there. now, we have the opposite situation. the international community is there. as of yesterday, people were rallied up in the international community. everybody was on the same page. we finally kind of all are, you know, one big happy anti-maduro family. but the venezuelan people are not there. and not of course, i understand the harsh situation that they are in, that they live in, that is all maduro's fault, i understand that he has done everything in his power to suppress his own people from being able to frankly have enough food to show up on the streets to protest. but i have to say, the international community will not resolve this problem alone. it's impossible for the international community, from the outside, to resolve this problem. this problem will have to be resolved primarily by the venezuelan people. it is their country. it is they who are on the inside. so you know, i would, if i was

understanding the circumstances the people are in, i would strongly encourage as much as possible for people to show up, for people to march, for people to say what they want. if people don't agree with maduro's decisions yesterday and they live in venezuela, it is time to show up and tell the world. that it is time to get this momentum to actually move forward together. because what i think didn't work about 2017 could work right now. if we have all the world marching in the same direction, then we're going to be in a very, i think, good place, as far as putting that pressure, that actual pressure on maduro and his inner circle, his cronies. but again, that requires first and foremost the people. and the people frankly need to lead. it is not the international community that is going to lead. that's my first point about kind of next steps and what really needs to happen as quickly as possible. for this momentum to not die. the next point i'd make on the oas, the oas took a while for

them to get on board, like others in the international community, and finally, we've gotten to a point where we can at least consistently get resolutions pass, which take 18 points, and if you saw yesterday's resolution, which was very good, it got 19 votes. so it just crossed the threshold of what is needed. and that's, i'm glad that it passed. it is important. however, if you want to take any action at the oas that is a little more significant you will need 23 votes and i will tell you right now, there are not 23 votes at the oas right now, there aren't, and it's incredibly frustrating. it is incredibly sad, if you read the democratic charter of the inter-american democratic charter of the basis of the oas, there is no clear case study of violation of that charter. there is no clearer example of why that charter was written than to prevent what is happening in venezuela today. and every single. os member state signed on to

that charter. and still, to this day, despite the plethora of evidence to the contrary, despite the humanitarian crisis that is happening, despite the consequences of that crisis to the neighboring region, there are still not even 100% of countries but two-thirds of countries in the rege than are willing to come out and do a strong action on venezuela at the oas. so it's certainly raises questions about what the potential benefit of using a multilateral body would be at this point. like the ambassador said, the u.s. is out of the question. russia and china would veto anything that even mentions venezuela. and so we're left asking, can the oas get something done? and if not, let's be pragmatic, let's just stop going through that, and let's go straight to group of lima and like-minded countries. remember, the like-p minded countries that do vote at the oes, the 19 countries yesterday

that voted yesterday against venezuela, represent 95% of the population of the western hemisphere. they represent 98% of the gdp of the western hemisphere. i mean you know, something's wrong here. like that's not, if 98% of the gdp, 95% of the population is voting a certain way, and it fails is, that democracy? so we have a separate issue to deal with there. but regardless, that is the reality of where we are. and so i think you need to focus on the pragmatic and you need to get things p done. you can't get stuck in this bureaucratic nonsense. the final point i'd make is that again the momentum is there again. the hope is up again. i think there could be a real damage to the cause if this hope is once again shattered. we've been through this several times. venezuelan people have been through this numerous times. getting their hopes up, high expectations, only to be let down. i really hope that something big comes out of what we're going through right now. i do believe it's one of the

last best chances for this to be resolved, through some sort of constitutional, peaceful way. if it doesn't get resolved now, in my mind, then we're up against a situation where either we have a new cuba, and this will be permanent dictatorship for the next x amount of decades or we have violence, whether that be a coup or whether that be a revolution or whether that be an invasion, you know, that the only way at that point that i think that we end this thing is through violence. so we're really at a fork in the road here and i really hope that the venezuelan people will come out, will show what democracy looks like to the world, to maduro, and we'll be able to, through shear force of will, with the support and full backing of the international community, get this dictator out of there, and as peaceful a way as possible. >> thank you. i know ambassador, you have a thought, but just hold it. we have many people in the audience just waiting for the

questions. >> i can't wait to hear. they're far smarter than we are. >> two questions. here and behind you. just wait for the microphone. >> from venezuela. one of the things, csis and the americas program, for continuously being on top of this issue. i think this panel that we have here is as good as you can get anywhere in the world and definitely in washington. >> thank you. >> i do hope people making the decision in this country and those who are watching from other countries get the lead from two people close to venezuela, probably closer than almost anybody i know. having said that, the question that i want to ask is related to the cost of the situation. we have an issue that essentially what maduro is doing is usurping power and clearly the pressure that has to come in, is how do you raise the cost for him doing that so the

usurpation lasts as little as possible and we eliminate this confusion as to really is the legitimate government of venezuela. that vacuum, in venezuela, you talk about vacuum and power, i think the vacuum in the world, of having a country that most civilized world does not recognize and one that they politically recognize but they don't legally recognize in the full sense of the world, that vacuum has to be closed very cleerm. and i am of the swath that the people in venezuela making this decision, and particularly 35 years old, not just to solve venezuela's problems which are our making, i agree with you, it is for us a solution. but a lot of our problems actually extend beyond venezuela, and some of them, as ambassador brownfield mentioned have human being geopolitical implications. so i think it is a little bit too much to ask, that mr. whiteall solve the problems that venezuela has and the

entanglements that venezuela has got that i support people outside probably know better what the implications of those problems. are so the question i want to ask both of you is, is recognizing legally recognizing mr. wegle, and let's not focus on whether he gets put in jail, which i actually doubt it because the cost of it will be almost unbearable, it will be kind of a last great mistake of a dictator, but if he has to leave the country or if he has to immediately designate a representative to conduct the affairs of the country, if recognizing venezuela legally is not actually a great way of putting a tremendous amount of pressure on the guy who is sitting in the seat of power, actually can pull the tools of power, cannot manage foreign account, cannot interact on the debt, cannot manage any of the affairs of the country, because those are being now managed by a group of people from venezuela, or from outside venezuela, that in clear representation of the only legitimate authority, are

running the country. so isn't that the kind of pressure that we should be applying on mr. maduro? >> thank you. let's do one more question right behind you. yes. >> thank you very much. my name is sophia abreu, a student at georgetown university. i'm from venezuela. and my question is the following. many legal solutions were mentioned. however, many back home feel that legal solutions would take too long. or that legal solutions aren't sufficient to really address the rampant corruption systematically implemented throughout the entire government. what situations, or what possible solutions would be applicable to this situation, given that to a certain degree, the venezuelan society is also krub corrupt? >> thank you. we have a couple of questions i think we want to answer first and then i think we will move on to others.

feel free to jump in in any one. >> i will do pedro's because that allows fernando to think how he is going to respond to la pregunto, but i have a good number of friends in maracaibo and i am careful not to speak about them in public because i would condemn to no end about concerns. and i have obtained more friends from there than any of the other eight cities i have lived in in my 39 years of diplomatic service. perhaps it would not surprise you, i do the same assessment you do and i think i reach basically the same conclusion that you do, which is to say that by recognizing something as the legitimate government, other than nicolas maduro and his band of musketeer, at the end of the

day, through its secondary impact, which is to say negotiating contracts, having international agreement, being able to participate in international decision making, would actually increase the pressure more than the down sides of recognition. that is not to say, however, that that's, that we should immediately make that decision. i reached this conclusion after a good 30 to 40 seconds of careful deliberation. i suspect if we spent a few days with a good number of government experts, we at least would owe due diligence to make sure we have assessed all of the potential impacts that would have, both on the recognizing governments and country, as well as on venezuela itself. and finally, as fernando has said, and i am in complete agreement, we have an obligation to both consult with, and think

about the impact of what we're going to do on those that are still inside venezuela. it doesn't mean they necessarily get a veto, but they certainly have a right to kind of say we're comfortable with this, we're uncomfortable with this. but my own view is, recognizing by whatever means we choose to do it, so that it is consistent with our laws, our constitutions and our long-established diplomatic process, recognizing an alternative government probably would produce more pressure on the nonrecognized government, than by not doing that. that's my position. mr. kutsz may now disagree with that, or transfer himself to maracaibo from 1979 to 1981 when it was the pearl of all of

venezuela. >> just quickly to touch on pedro's question first. you know, i agree in my mind again without careful deliberation, that it would be more beneficial than harmful. however, i have been thoroughly wrong in my internal beliefs in the past. i will say that i, when we'd call an inter-agency meeting and i know the ambassador has probably attended dozens of thousands of these. >> i loved every one. >> everyone does. when you call an inter-agency meeting together, and you have the department of defense, and the department of justice, the accident of state, everybody, everybody's -- the department of state, everybody, everybody's at the table and you say i have this great idea, we should install a vending machine at the airport, you will hear all sorts of horrific ways that that can destroy the world. right? you will find out real quick that first of all, it's illegal, second of all it is unconstitutional and third of all you can be arrested for

having brought that up and leaked to the press by that point and it is amazing how quickly all of these things happen in an inter-agency setting. the thing is there are legitimate concerns that i may not have observed or thought about. and there are people who are working for our government who are very good at what they do, and very knowledgeable, on very specific points of what they're working on. and again, where as we appear to be more focused on the big picture, there could be very well be be a international specialist at d.o.j. who could tell you the incredible difficulty that that would cause to a specific part of something that could impact the humanitarian situation on the ground, maybe somebody at usaid knows this today and ramifications that we couldn't predict it would be negative overall to the people. so i think it has to be very carefully studied and analyzed and thoroughly debated amongst those who have something to

provide of input on that. to the second question, on what, on the legal, you know, what should we follow the legal path which would undoubtedly be slower, or should we follow some other path, which conveniently you do not name, but i imagine would be a more aggressive path, perhaps. in the nonlegal way. so i think there's not, it is not either or. i think that's the thing we need to be doing now. i think p again, it's not time for us to be slowly getting in line anymore. i think that time has passed. i think it is not time for us to be going to the international part of justice and saying great, we've done our part, wash our hands. that time has long passed, right? but we need to be doing everything. the international court of justice is a legitimate process and we need to go through that and i'm glad the lima group has reaffirmed that. and i think that is something that will ultimately make an historic and important ruling

that will help shape the course of how, you know, society looks back on what is happening in venezuela. so that has its importance. will that solve the here and now? no. so i completely agree that that shouldn't be where we're putting all of our eggs, right? having said that, i do think that there are some legal processes that are worth doing right now, that would have an impact on the here and now. and something i mentioned earlier about interpol red notices, i think would be a perhaps very effective approach to pressuring that inter circing of the regime, and i would say let's expand from the inner circ toll a broader circle at this point because like i said earlier, if you're still there, you're complicit at this point. until you prove otherwise, and it's not just let me run away in another year and decide i've had enough. no you have too much blood on your hands now. you need to bring us documents. you need to point names. testify. whatever it sfrmt need to now activity, if you're still there, you need to actively prove that you're not complicit or that you're willing to actively bring

down maduro at this point to get off the hook. so i think if you go through that red notice process, you're going to create an incredible amount of pressure. eve the folks who help prop up evil dictators love to go to disneyworld. it's amazing. they love to go shopping. they love to have their son or daughter study at harvard or wherever else they pay for them to go to. they love to, to be able to, when they have illnesses, travel to the best hospitals in the world and get cured, right? that's what they use their corrupt money for. and they love to have their beachhouse in 12 different countries that they travel to and enjoy sfchlt they fear that they will no longer be allowed to be able to go any or western civilized country and their only recourse will be cuba, maybe they will still have some good doctors but they won't be very happy. and if you have unhappy bribed officials, maybe they're not as happy as happy bribed officials and that's when you get people

to turn and go after them with red notices and i think that would be a very effective legal process that we should follow before we consider anything in the extra judicial realm. >> and we're seeing people fleeing the country. we have the former justice of the legitimate supreme court based in caracaos, with the last name zerba, now in the u.s. and on the other side now. >> and just to jump in there, that was a point i was trying to make earlier, i'm not making decisions anymore so i can just opine without any consequences. >> it's great, isn't it. >> i love it. i love it. i don't think that that justice deserves to be treated in any heroic or special way right now. unless, unless he's willing to bring with him evidence of corruption, of the dictatorship, the lack of democracy, but tangible physical transparent, go out and do a press conference, and wherever he is, miami, i'm guessing, and announce what he has brought as

far as physical evidence. unless and until he does that, this guy is, you know, as much blood is in his hands as everybody else's. you can't change your mind several years in after so many people have died and hope that all is forgiven. i think that time has passed. people now need to make it a very clear break with substantive evidence being provided to help support the downfall of the dictator. >> important point. i want to get a question from two venezuelan journalists in the back. they are perhaps hearing more from the venezuelan people more than anyone else in the room. so i want to get carlos's question and then jorge in the back. right there, yes. >> thank you. venezuelans are so grateful, with the international community, but for so long, they are arguing that they can't resolve this crisis by themselves. and so, and as you said,

ambassador, weigle is trapped. yesterday, we had this vote in the oas, but once they approve the legitimacy of maduro's, they could remove regime's ambassador, for example, from the home. and they didn't. which are your remarks about that, about their region having this kind of exemplary actions, for example? and my second question, it's more straightforward, i promise. do you think that this administration can do something radical or decisive? because if we spend a year hearing from donald trump saying that every option is still on the table, even the strong ones, and of course, we want to know, if that is truth or can be real. >> thank you. jorge? >> jorge from voice of america.

i have kind of the same question that karla did, but fish, officials of the trump administration talked to voices of america, that the next step of the administration will be really impactful measures against the venezuelan government. what do you see, what do you think could be or might be those measures from the u.s.? >> thank you. well, we have a couple of questions. i think one is critical, which is now, what, what's next? we tried many things in the past. we know statements like the president of the lima group declaration which i agree is a very good step, is not enough, is simply not enough. more needs to be done. so what's next for the u.s. government perspective? what should be next from a u.s. government perspective? and from the international

community. and p ththen karla's question oe removal of the ambassador, some implications of that, if you don't mind. let's start with you, ambassador. >> let me offer answers in the order in which that the questions came. first, removal and not just ambassador, removal of other representatives from a body such as the oas. the problem, ladies and gentlemen, as fernando has already alluded to, is kind of the internal order and procedures of, in this case, the organization of american states. which classifies through which, i guess it is technically through its charter, the majorities that are necessary to take certain steps. and certain decisions can be taken by simple majority. certain decisions require a larger majority. and i think some actually require three quarters in

agreement before they can actually implement a decision that is taken. and we would have to review, but i would be fairly confident that expelling a permanent representative from the oas woud remember a super majority, and that as fernando is pointing to, is going to be a problem as we furb further in organizations such as the oas, despite the fact, as he so eloquently and accurately stated, the 19 that have so far taken a stand on venezuela represent more than 95% of the total population of all of the americas and more than 98% of the gross domestic product of all of the americas. should perhaps the charter and its procedures be reformed? perhaps. but that's going to require a super majority in order for everyone, in order for such a

decision to occur. your point is a good one. it is, however, the price, i guess, we pay for the rules of the organization that we have joined. and let me tell you, based upon my limited experience, if you think the oas is a problem, just imagine, take that problem, and multiply it by ten and you're beginning to move into the yanke united nations in terms of how its system works. second, a more radical solution. a fair point by both of you that having heard from, and we're now, i'm americanizing it, united states of america-izing it. having heard from this administration for two years about more aggressive solutions, where is the meat, when are we going to actually see something. and i would argue first that we

have not been sitting on our hands. i believe there has been a far more effective and vigorous sanctions approach over the last two years than we saw let's say over the preceding 200 years, and they are having an impact. not just fernando but even an old grouchy guy like pedro just noted, the more of these guys that get sanctioned, the more pressure it is bringing to bear upon them. so i do insist upon at least getting some recognition for what has already occurred. that said, i agree with you completely. we should be looking for ways, collectively, or, no, that's the preference, collectively, to take a more ambitious, good word, aggressive, frightens a good number of people, approach to venezuela policy. i pointed to a few ideas in the course of my incredibly powerful

presentations, and one is let's stop talking about asking mr. maduro to permit humanitarian assistance. let's start moving humanitarian assistance to the border. force him to say no, and line up his armed officers, to refuse to allow it to come in, or it comes in. meanwhile, we unilaterally figure who, within venezuela, which is not the government, could actually serve as the distribution mechanism. there are a few organizations that are big enough. well enough disciplined. have good enough hierarchy that could serve that role. i would say that's something being a bit meekier. second, what can we do with the diaspora? we don't need to ask mr. maduro's permission in terms of working with the diaspora. i don't have any specific ideas. but i do have concepts and that is get them organized in some way, shape or form, let them

establish bodies that have a permanent presence to perform certain functions, wherever they may be, and in my opinion, they should not be in madrid, or washington, or new york. i think they should be much closer to venezuela. even if it is a little bit hot and muggy down there. to actually be seen to be performing a serious role. and let them then evolve as they make decisions and build a permanent secretariat, into something that begins to look like, smell like, seem to be an alternative government to whatever it is that mr. maduro is projecting. and there are other beefier ideas out there as well which i will not offer right now. but you can figure them out as well as i can. if you have two million venezuelans that are living within 50 miles of the border, within venezuela, does this give you some options and opportunities? maybe. i think people should be taking a look at it. i'm sorry, fernando, you can walk me down from all of those

whacky, crazy, idiotic ideas. >> fernando, we are going to finish with you. >> absolutely. i think the ambassador said it well. from my perspective, of being in this white house the first roughly year and a half, working on venezuela policy, we weren't bluffing. i'll say that. we have taken everything that, well, let me say any official statement that has been put out, i won't say everything that has been said, period, but every official statement that is out there was considered, was debated, was discussed, and i'll say what can we do? we can do a lot. the question is what will we do because what are we the american people prepared to, are we prepared to bear, and what will be somehow beneficial in the big picture for the venezuelan people? so when we talk about what is

left in that kind of es ka la tory road map that we crafted, it is oil embargo and it's war. at the end of the day, unless there has been another 38 meetings of the inter-agency, and maybe some new-bred idea, which i don't, which is firmly possible, right, and i'm not aware of but in my mind at least those are the two main options left. p an oil embargo is doable. we can certainly do that. i don't think honestly economically that it would present a huge threat to the united states in any way, especially right now, with gas prices the way they are. the question though is, what will be the impact to the people of venezuela? right? if we all of a sudden, the united states controls about 95% of venezuela's gdp through oil purchase, right? venezuela sells its oil primarily to the united states and gives away a lot of oil to china as debt payment, but as far as oil that it makes money out of, that's all united states. i think two or three percent of

the gdp goes to india but primarily to the united states. if we were to shut that down, if we were to say tomorrow that this is stopped now, then we have destroyed venezuela's economy. literally. it's destroyed. it's shattered. will that be good or bad? you know, and i don't know. i can't answer that question. some people would argue that would be great. that would be the spark that's needed to get the people to revolt against maduro. other people would argue that that would be a humanitarian calamity. and the people would be starving and dieing in the streets and that maduro would then at that point, and perhaps with others rightfully point to the united states and say this is your fault, you did this. so it's a real pickle that you would be in. and it would be a situation where certainly from a u.s. policy making perspective, we would have broken it. and as colin powell says, if you break it, you own it. so are we prepared as the american people, as the american taxpayers, to go in with the billions and billions of dollars that will be needed and dozens of billions of dollars to fix

the humanitarian crisis that we may very well initiate by doing that decision. again, that is where we are. it's been debated. it's no doubt being dpaetebated right now. but it is a very big decision to make and you have to consider the ramifications. >> gentlemen, this has been an honor being with you on this panel. thank you so much. i think that the main conclusion, if you let me, would be doing, and we have proved this, doing nothing for venezuela has brought tremendous consequences, so actions need to be taken. thank you so much. thank you all of you for coming to csis. thanks. [ applause ]

negotiations to reopen the federal government remain at an impasse. as the shutdown enters its 28th day on this friday. yesterday, the house passed a measure by voice vote that would have funded the government through february 28. but that vote was later vacated. and rescheduled for next week. after republicans said the request for a recorded vote was not recognized. in the meantime, president trump has sent a letter to house

speaker nancy pelosi, informing her that he's postponed her overseas trip with lawmakers to brussels, egypt and afghanistan, by canceling her military transport. instead, the president suggested that she stay in washington, to work out a deal to end the government shutdown. this comes a day after speaker pelosi asked the president to reschedule his state of the union address, or submit it in writing if the government shutdown were to continue. for the first time in the state's history, iowa voters elected women to the u.s. house of representatives last november. both are democrats. and both defeated republican incumbents. congresswoman cindy axne earned her mba from northwestern clog school of management before working in a few state agencies under three iowa governors. she and her husband currently own a digital design firm in the des moines area. voters in iowa's first district elected representative abbey

finkenauer, the second youngest mesh of congress, firmly serving in the iowa house of representatives. illinois elected three new members to the house, democrats, two of which defeated republican incumbents. sean casten the ceo of two clean energy firms earlier in his career. congresswoman lauren underwood now represents illinois's 14th district, a senior adviser at the u.s. department of health and human services during the obama administration. she also has master's degrees in nursing and public health. and representative jesus garcia, who goes by chewy, was elected by voters in illinois's fourth district. he's had a long career in state and local politics going back to the mid '80s, and previously served as a cook county commissioner as well as in the illinois state senate and on the chicago city council. he was also the executive director of a local community development corporation. new congress, new leaders. watch it all, on c-span. on saturday, advocates for

women's rights hold a march in washington, d.c. live at 1:30 eastern. on c-span. also, tomorrow, c-span's road to the white house coverage continues. with remarks from new york democratic senator kirsten gillibrand in des moines. she recently launched a presidential exploratory committee and speaking to democrats in polk county, iowa. you can watch those comments live, saturday, at 6:00 p.m. eastern, also on c-span. live, february 3, super bowl sunday, at noon eastern, author and sports writer dave zirin is our guest on "book tv" in depth. author of many books including he was my name, fool, a people's history of sports, in the united states, game over, how politics has turned the sports world upside down, and his most recent, jim brown, last man standing. >> now, i love sports and that's why i think we need to fight for sports. we need to actually reclaim them. we need to take sports back.

and if we're going to do so, what we need is we need to know our history. our greatest ammunition in this fight. we need to know our history of the athletes. the sports writers. and the fans. who have stood up to the machine. if for no other reason than knowing this history, i think allows us to look at the world and see that struggle can affect every aspect of life in this system, even the swoosh adorned ivory tower known as sports. >> join our live three-hour conversation with dave zirin, with your calls, e-mails, tweets and facebook questions, live, sunday, february 3. at noon eastern. on book tv's in depth. on c-span 2. next, the freedom forum institute hosting a summit on sexual misconduct in the media industry. we heard about a 2016 report issued by the equal employment opportunity commission, looking at harassment in the workplace. this is an hour and