diplomacy. mr. moss is the author of "nixon's back channel to moscow", confidential diplomacy and the taunt. here about demonic efforts by kennedy, johnson, and nixon as well as a soviet overture and hubert humphrey. the gerald r. ford presidential library hosted this hour and 15 minute event. >> to two nights engagement, we are honored to have richard moss here to speak with us about his new book, "nixon's back channel to moscow". reveals behind the scenes deliberations of nixon, advisors, and soviet counterparts. he has spent and the norma's amount of time working with the nixon tapes. you will hear some tonight. this is the first scholarly

study exploring the central role of a confidential diplomacy in the shaping america's foreign-policy. the book has received high paid -- high praise. professor, isa positive about it. a friend and colleague of our speaker is also an expert on the nixon tapes. he has high praise from people we respect. a book published by oxford university press talks about this book as drawing back the curtain of history shining light on high-stakes conversations that participants cryptically allude to in memorandum. tonight, you get a sneak peek behind the scenes. is an associate professor at the essential for neighbor -- four naval warfare studies.

specialist and the u.s.-soviet relations in the cold war and an expert on the nixon presidential recordings. he was formally a historian with the u.s. department of state. time -- we first have been visited many times by working historians writing history of foreign-policy. we have never had one as a speaker. tonight is at the first. these are people who really know their business. mr. moss earned his ba from the and hasty of california a masters from a george washington university. he spoke at the nixon library last summer but it is about time you came here. welcome to the library. [applause] thank you very much for the warm welcome. thank you to the gerald r ford presidential foundation and the

national archives for having me. it is my first time in michigan. i am glad to be here. it is a warm welcome. as a naval war college professor, you should all come to the lecture on gerald r. ford. there are things to look forward to. government, i am obligated to give you disclaimers. [laughter] the views in this presentation are my personal views. the material eyesight, especially from the nixon tapes, has profanity. expletive deleted. thank you, richard nixon. thank you for the tapes. into sources i used

to job back the curtain of history and go beyond memoir accounts. an outline of what we will historiansplomatic know what back channel diplomacy is. at least until 2016. i will give examples of different back channels and recent history and ways they are used. talk about the sources, the nixon tapes are one of many illuminating sources that have come to light. describe why back channels continue to be relevant. i will compare 1968 to 2016 and take you to sites related to that. it should be interesting, maybe

a little controversial. i hope to have a discussion after the lecture. you have learned about bottom line up front. i will give you the bottom line in the middle. i will describe the development of the kissinger debriefing channel, the focus of the book and zoom in and talk about the moscow summit, which was the achievement of the taunt. a reduction in attentions between the two superpowers. it takes place in may of 1972. it was one of the feathers and richard nixon's cap. he saw himself as a peacemaker. that mattered to nixon and matters for u.s. foreign policy throughout the 1970's. scholars focus on detante as a time in u.s.-russian relations

and that continues to be relevant. i will open up to questions at the end. if you want to know about what back channel diplomacy is, you must understand what diplomacy is. according to the source of knowledge, google, diplomacy is activity, orn, skill of managing international relations. the countries representatives abroad. that has connotations. in the u.s., we have a state department. other countries have foreign ministries. these are formal mechanisms that have been developed as a result of treaties, agreements. diplomacy,e used in ,ome of the customs and culture these are things that are built on a structure.

we're going to contrast the formal structure that goes between the state department and prime minister is with back channels. oxford english dictionary traces the origin of all words. this is an interesting one for back channel. communicationof which circumvents official channels in order to facilitate informal or clandestine negotiations. it can be within a system or to bypass a system. this is another good definition by william safire, a speechwriter for richard nixon. by what nixond and kissinger were doing. it is an unofficial and direct method of high-level communication by passing the usual routes through bureaucracy. that is accurately describing what nixon and kissinger did in

terms of bypassing the state department. they give you some examples. back channels are useful for establishing relations between countries. there may have been a back channel element in the establishment of the romantic ties between the u.s. and the soviet union in 1933. is themple most think of movie where mixing can go to china taking an anti-communist with credentials to go to the world's largest communist country and establish relations after they had ceased for more than two decades. the story of that is interesting. it is not just nixon wanting to chinaish relations with but china wanting to establish relations. nixon playing the title card and mao zedong playing the american card. there are elements of that in the nixon tapes.

nixon sent out feelers to establish relations with the communist chinese. he tried it originally with poland. the johnson administration tried it with paul and -- poland. he tried other channels. the one that worked was between a mutual ally between the u.s. and china, pakistan led by a dictator. active inhannel went march-april of 1971, there was a message saying, we had messages from the u.s. from different sources. this is the first time a toposal has come from a head a head. nixon the one head, sending it through pakistan to mao zedong. back channels are useful. uncover whenmazing

announcedkissinger kissinger had visited china and they agreed to set up a summit in 1972 and the u.s. was pursuing a normalization of relations with china. that is a use of back channels. is more current, although less relevant. a conference of plan of action, the iran deal. president trump pulled the u.s. out of it. relevant. but it is a recent example. the u.s. and itron do not have didomenico rations. they have not had them -- the u.s. and iran have not had diplomatic relations.

how can you have an agreement if there is not a o-matic agreement in place? -- a diplomatic agreement in place? this was set up by a prime minister and the foreign minister who was friendly with both iran and the u.s.. there was a facilitator by back channel means in means of getting the u.s. and iran to about what they could talk about. it resulted in the iran deal. granted, there are shortcomings. that is another use of back channels. by channels can save the world. crisis,he cuban missile bush called is on the right, was an intermediary with john f.

and pass brother messages to deescalate the crisis that looked like he was spiraling toward a nuclear conflict between the u.s. and the soviet union. back channels are useful. betweene back channels a news man who served in the nixon administration and a soviet agent. there is a plaque and georgetown in washington, d.c. that says, in this spot, the world was saved. back channels can be useful. they can have murky ties to intelligence. wasbulls have -- bulshekav a press journalists but in reality, he was kgb. he had a direct line to leadership and was able to pass messages to deescalate the crisis. you will wonder why i am going

back to this, showing you the magic of photoshop. managed tode, we photoshop it out of my book cover. [laughter] magic. the lampshade reappears. [laughter] your event i can't david -- camp david, they were recording devices. tapes because nixon would blow off steam when he went to camp david. that was the last taping system installed. not just the oval office. on richarde focus is nixon in the middle, the soviet ambassador to the u.s. and henry

kissinger. from a 1962-1986, he was moscow's man in washington and he was a capable diplomat. you saw his skill shining through when it was working with kissinger to establish detante. the men developed a friendship and respect for one another. close to the peak of the back channel relationship that existed between them. wrote memoirs. he rode his memoir in english and russian. copy to brennan gave to

kissinger said to henry, my friend. i that that was a summation of the relationship they developed. that was our primary adversary at the time, a statement as to how close the relationship was. joked so close, kissinger before anatoly dobrynin was recalled to attend of the congress in which he was elected as a full member of the central committee, a big deal for diplomat. -- before anatoly

dobrynin departed, kissinger asked for his telephone number. it was a fun relationship. they had stressful moments and disagreements. that didesented powers not see eye to get past that and achieve a lot of things. i will open the curtain and tell you about the sources i used to do that. the secretive administration, the irony of nixon's is it that it is the best documented administration in history thanks to the nixon tapes. i used to be normal and then i listened to several hundred hours of the nixon tapes. [laughter] help my social skills. it is an invaluable source.

every time kissinger would meet with detante -- with anatoly dobrynin he would debrief the president. there were meetings when anatoly dobrynin was in the office that were recorded. as of the last release in 2013, there were over 2600 hours of the nixon tapes. i have listened to a fraction of those. i have listened to between 500 and 800 hours, focusing on foreign policy. those are the things that make with -- that make nixon look the best. he cared about foreign policy. tapes to be released where the watergate tapes, the ones that make him look the worst. the truth is in the middle. badeverything he did was and not everything he did was

great. a source like the nixon tapes is a way to balance the scale. the time i cover, there is a 2007,ce published in soviet american relations. relations 12decent years ago between the u.s. and russia, the u.s. state department and russian foreign ministry compiled, annotated, and produced the volume. you can see a volume of the russian version of it. we had a giant book. the russians had to. soviet american relations capture the remer -- the memorandum of their conversations. it shows both sides of the story. it is a he said he said, showing

meeting.sides of each sometimes when kissinger did not leave a record, sometimes anatoly dobrynin did. you wonder if they are at the same meeting because their accounts are different. you can use the contrast to uncover what really happened. that source is invaluable. the memoir accounts from the earlier time of henry kissinger's white house years and anatoly dobrynin's memoirs were in confidence. have memos and telephone conversation transcripts. kissinger had a secretary listen on the phone and take it down in shorthand and then type it out in long form. there are tens of thousands of pages. they are in the national archives.

every time kissinger talked to someone, there is a record. other people in the nixon administration started to take up that practice. when you get to the ford years after nixon resigned, a lot of that disappears. the foreign relations which existed for the earlier time, as well. they had not come out when i did my research initially. the ford years, they are the preeminent source taking everything from the u.s. side. there are no russian records. there are no soviet-american 2.0 covering after 1972. a lot more is left open for interpretation. we do not quite have fidelity.

with these sources, i draw conclusions and try to examine the relationship. the best place to start is 1968. kissinger-donrinyn channel was not the first back channel for the soviets. detante -- dobrynin had been an intermediate -- an intermediary. he knew kissinger had been advisor to the administration and he worked on peace negotiations attempted through two french intermediaries that ended up failing. west was not known until recently is kissinger tried to revive the negotiation with the

north vietnamese. instead of being brokered by french intermediaries, he tried to do it through the soviets in moscow of december 1967. kissinger and nixon are no stranger. 'sth the release of dobrynin while mark, we learned the soviets interfered on behalf of of hubert humphrey in the elections. they were back channels before, during, and after the 1968 election. i will take you on an aside about that should no affair. i will keep it brief. of richardat picture

nixon staring down lbj. men live it to each other consistently. with the memoir, he said i will use my powers to get rid of russian and make you become english. was ordered against his boss to try to feel out hubert humphrey and see if the democrats would be willing to accept soviet assistance. wrote, humphrey was not

only intelligent but clever. humphrey says, we have it in hand, thank you for your loyal -- your moral support, moscow. that was the end of it. in the middle paragraph, he warned if discovered, it would backfire. there was potential for blowback when you interfered in elections. and havetching that been for the past two years. are two backe channels that the nixon campaign and transitional administration have. the u.s. was between ambassador to nato and the associate affairs at the soviet embassy.

there was one between kissinger and a kgb agent. it predates the election. assigned was the guy by the kgb to kissinger. he was an influential protest -- influential professor. i was not able to find a photo of him. the kgb types are camera shy. it could be one of these guys. i do not know. guys who the g are you were involved in the poisoning in london. investigations for him was able to track the identity of these guys who are supportively -- supposedly torus visiting topic sites when they were trying to poison a former

russian intel officer. i found the name of the agent on google. available on amazon.com. [laughter] it could be the one. he writes novels about the mafia and spies. henry kissinger kept the fbi informed. election and during the transition before nixon's inauguration, the agent that itd to kissinger would be nice for u.s.-soviet relations if there was a line and the inaugural address about trying to improve relations between the superpowers. kissinger sought no harm and suggested it to nixon. there was a line about

communication being opened to moscow. aiming for peaceful relations. that was the result of the kissinger and the channel. it was supplanted in 1969 by the kissinger-dobrynin channel. dobrynin wanted to be in charge. he was the ambassador. it would have had too many .otential avenues for conflict if you keep everything a secret, there is a better way to conduct relations. the chennault affair is the idea marrieda chenault, she general chenault of the flying

tigers and what were two, who was a decade older than her. they got married and she was an intermarried it -- intermediary with chinese nationalists, taiwan. the chennault affair is the theory that anna chenault acted as a back channel intermediary to get south vietnam to kill a piece negotiation exchange, similar to what kissinger tried to negotiate. there was going to be a quid pro quo. kills thenam negotiation and gets a better deal from nixon then lbj or hubert humphrey. the idea has been around since 1968. there were articles at the time. it has been written about in many books. new evidence continues to surface. , there was a

single volume biography written and thechard nixon author assesses that out of all the bad things of richard nixon did, the worst was using the channel through anna chenault to kill the peace negotiations. worse than watergate in his mind. they could have extended the war in vietnam. many americans died under nixon. nixon's did start withdrawing them soon after taking office. there was a handwritten note found from the chief of staff of .ichard nixon buried in the archives. it said, keep anna chenault working on south vietnam and quitting on the three johnson conditions.

onee was another telling saying, is there any other way to monkeywrench it? this biography of nixon has reignited a focus on anna chenault. observations and didifications as to why he not going to the chennault affair. my book is about soviet relations. different focus. great find. of lbj tapes have been released in which he discusses intelligence that had been intercepted from the south the enemy's embassy in washington in which they discuss anna chenault. the allegations were known for a long time. anna chenault did not get a job in the nixon administration is because she was controversial because of

this alleged role. she died this year in april. the last interview she gave to a thereian, she insisted was no deal going on, she worked for the nixon administration and there was no quid pro quo or shady deal. is sourceservation come to light after the fact things to do classification, the job the archivist do. that is a testament to our system of government and the way we do business. thank you to the archivists. i found it surprising that they seemed to be no good actors in this. to be no good actors in this. johnson in the earlier picture

promised richard nixon there would be no october surprises about vietnam to influence the election. lbj lied. he timed the peace initiative with the south vietnamese and north vietnamese to boost humphrey. richard nixon might to his face about not wanting to do anything to interfere with a chance for peace. no good actors in this. this is disappointing. the central question remains, maybe there is a graduate student who has a vietnamese or chinese language capability -- the vietnamese sources and chinese sources could be invaluable and answer the questions, how much did saigon need to be twisted to project this deal? ofknow they were on the side kissinger and nixon in terms of negotiating. 1972, the line ever

call kissinger saying was we had to bomb north vietnam until south vietnam accepted our concessions. that is telling. states or allied partners can have a role in what goes on. they have a say. the question remains. jumping ahead to current times, 2016. 2016, the u.s. government released an assessment of russian activities and interference in u.s. elections. the document is available online. you only to yourself to read it. interfered in the election by altering and creating fake identities on facebook and manipulating search results in google to discredit

hillary clinton, to boost donald trump. you do not have to believe it but you only to yourself as a citizen to read it. come to your own judgment about it. we are in the middle of investigations for this. i am surprised it has taken this long. my antenna went up november 10 2016 when i read the russian federation deputy foreign .inister it is understandable that we know people who were close to trump and his inner circle. the new york times reported he said the russians had been in contact with members of trump's entourage. i looked it up.

it was one of their state media outlets. the phrase could be translated to media entourage and inner circle. i saw this november 10, 2016 and i wondered what was going on. in december 2016, i read an article about this. it is an acknowledgment there was back channel diplomacy going on. maybe it is not a bad thing. the context is the most important thing. there are lessons to learn from the example of nixon and kissinger. back channels were effective. they also have drawbacks. if you are going to use a tool, you should be aware of strengths and weaknesses.

out that michael kushner met with the russian ambassador in washington. another odd thing was brought up in a news article that kushner and flynn approached the russians about setting up secure communication channels, which would raise red flags. i talked about kissinger being in touch with the fbi. i do not think this was going on in 2016. jared kushner might not have known but the former head of the defense agency should have known better. shawn spencer rafted up that back channels are an appropriate

part of diplomacy. you always have to look at the context. we willnue to wait and try to find out more about the context in which this is going on. the bottom line in the middle. back channel diplomacy was necessary and effective in policy, especially when it supplemented rather than supplanted traditional pharmacy. there are incidents when kissinger bypasses the u.s. therement of state and are examples month kissinger works with select u.s. ambassadors, keeping them in the dark and working with ambassadors to work through specific issues. that worked surprisingly well. that was a measure of personality. there were negotiations over the status of germany and berlin.

ambassador was kenneth rush, a law school professor of richard nixon. he had the trust of nixon and kissinger. kissinger and rush traded information. that would go into the channel between kissinger and dobrynin. other examples where it did not work well where when the kissinger-dobrynin handled things about the strategic arms limitation talks and the official negotiating team meeting with the soviets were kept in the dark. surprise!-- -- of the lead negotiators he was aware he was getting information about what kissinger and dobrynin were talking about and he brought it into talks.

not the best way to run things. other findings, back channel diplomacy appealed to the u.s. and soviet leaders. that is a reason it was effective. it takes two to tango. it takes two to tingle international diplomacy, sometimes three. tangle -- to tango in international relations, sometimes 30. -- sometimes three. there is a flip side to every coin. mentioned the cuban missile crisis. there was a mini cuban missile crisis in 1970. back channels can be used as an accelerator and a break and a link to unrelated areas of foreign policy to each other.

you want better trade with us? you better work out an agreement with our military to work together. fair. that is called linkage in diplomacy. used it to accelerate negotiations and slow them down. so did the u.s.. back channels provided personal stakes. it was a weapon and bureaucratic warfare. -- whenr and dobrynin kissinger and ask and nixon bypassed the state department, it was palpable and easily documented difference between kissinger and the secretary of state who was supposed to be in charge. i have quotes from the nixon tapes from that. we think about nixon and kissinger. it was also a tool for the soviets. member ofecame a full

the committee, unprecedented for an ambassador in the soviet union. there were various factions. there was opposition in the early 70's. this contact with the rival super have art was a way for him to solidify his position. back channels can lead to telegraphing anxiety. the soviets had a conflict with and a frozenna tundra along a river in 1969. and hisets -- dobrynin conversations with kissinger, it is like he was signing a flare saying, look at this potential

area the u.s. could exploit. in the same way, kissinger and nixon wanted a summit meeting because it was politically profitable. the soviets knew this dobrynin. -- this. dobrynin would drag kissinger along for years. the end of 1971, he was able to hook kissinger on the idea of the summit meeting. the same mentality that worked for back channels, a reliance on secrecy, distrust of discourse, and desire for political gain, also destroyed nixon's presidency when it was apply to domestic politics. in his by the -- in his , he had an speech

memorable line, always remember, others may hate you, and those who hate you do not win and must you hate them and then you destroy yourself. he hit the head of -- he of the nail on the head. it can be useful in the international arena. when you do the same stuff at home, there are consequences. getting to the development of the channel. i found this at the nixon library. it was a memo from a national security council staff men to henry kissinger saying, the soviets are skilled at pitting one man against each other and getting more information. to the channels. he is saying, the transition has happened and it needs to go to the secretary of state. they get rid of the channels and

less than a month later start the dobrynin-kissinger channel. a partysinger attends at the soviet embassy in washington, d.c. on valentine's is in bed with a cold when kissinger comes to him. said, there was an idea for a confidential exchange of opinion dobrynin. -- opinion. dobrynin says kissinger said that. i think it was henry kissinger who suggested it. took office in january and the channel began. then nothing happens. meet and and dobrynin talk and establish a working relationship.

nothing substantive happened for 18 months until the crisis. the u.s. navy is forcing soviet submarines to surface offer cuba because of shipments of offensive weapons. it was not backed erratic in 1970. it was about soviets having submarines visit cuba. there was a question of whether the agreement meant nuclear power submarines or nuclear armed summary and -- armed submarines. there was a great area. it was discovered in a way that the cuban missile crisis was with photographic intelligence that there were a number of soccer fields at the soviet submarine base in cuba.

someone was skeptical about it. he wrote that kissinger stormed and said thece pictures show the cubans are building soccer fields. they could be more. he was at a loss. explained, cubans play baseball and russians play soccer. russians played soccer and baseball. kissinger's point was it was an expansion of the base. between whendebate to confront the soviets. the state department is suggesting waiting until october when there is a u.n. meeting. suggested using the dobrynin channel.

able to play on nixon's neuroses about cuba. he gave his last press conference, you will not have nixon to kick around anymore. the memory was fresh for him. kissinger one -- kissinger ends up winning and establishes the medium of comedic asian. the soviets were -- the medium of communication. 1972, there is a blurb on the nixon tapes where nixon is criticizing his friend bill rogers, secretary of state. >> [indiscernible]

mr. moss: bill rogers was a personal friend. he was with nixon when he made the checkers speech and managed to keep his spot as the vice presidential candidate with 1952.ower in 52 -- in that is how diplomacy by passing bill rogers plays out. the state department was sidelined. it continues.

rogers knew it was going on. there were confrontations about it. they got to the point where the national security council was sanitizing communications with the soviets to give it to the state department. they got a sanitized version. a week before going to the says yoummit, nixon have to warn the soviets to tell the soviet foreign minister not to talk about the back channel. ofis like the first rule fight club, do not talk about fight club. do not talk about the back channel in front of rogers, the secretary of state. >> [indiscernible]

mr. moss: this was in 1969. -- 1972. three years later. that is saying something. this is a back channel. it works. one way it worked well was in a summit meeting, which was a big deal in moscow in may 1972. summit meetings make presidents look presidential. you are there with counterparts. it is a great photo op. we often think of reagan and gorbachev. it is telling. summit of may 1972, u.s. was a threat that the

might cancel the summit that is because -- summit. saying your i was partners or allies can be provoked? the north vietnamese who were armed by the soviet union -- they did not develop their own service to air missile systems, they did not develop their own aircraft, they got it from the soviet union, ammunition, oil. they invade south vietnam. this was the end of march 1972. right in the middle of the february andt in mid-late may to the soviet union. the soviets enable the offensive. four nixon, there was a contradiction.

[indiscernible] mr. moss: it is impossible to do. that is what the military advisor to richard nixon sets. -- says. domestic politics often drive foreign policy. in late april and early may, nixon had polls conducted as to what americans thought about vietnam with the easter offensive starting.

the offensive was the largest offensive since the tet offensive. the largest offensive action by the -- by north vietnam during nixon's presidency. there is a division of opinion. should nixon cancel the summit because the soviets made this possible or is there not a necessary link between the soviets knowing about or controlling the offensive and also the american public opinion , which is excited about the potential for agreements with the soviet union and building a structure of peace. nixon takes two tracks. channels to try to have it both ways where he can respond to what is going on and south vietnam and if the soviets were willing to look the other way, he would look the other way in what the soviets

were doing in terms of eating the offensive. sive.ding the offen nixonkissinger and coordinating a video. it goes off well. the message nixon is sending is that we will bomb north vietnam but we want a summit. nixon is proud of his wife. in thishear his pride phone conversation with kissinger. [indiscernible]

[laughter] mr. moss: the message goes back. ultimately, both sides were able to look the other way. 8 launchesy operation linebacker, the harbor in the vietnam. nixon did it because he felt if he did not have an escalation, there were not a lot of american troops on the ground anymore in may of 1972. airpower is but he had. nixon felt he had to do something to boost south vietnam. he launches linebacker. there is a massive increase in bombing. and casey 135a tankers.

there are b-52s flying. they bomb north vietnam. lot.bombed a it was more than they had done in years. point, nothing had approached what had been done under johnson during rolling thunder. this takes the cake until later in 1972 when they launched linebacker to, even bigger. bombing north vietnam and tell the south vietnam came to our concessions. that is a different story. what made nixon changes mind in terms of being able to expect the soviets had made possible the north vietnamese attacks, you save south vietnam by escalating and go to moscow. you do not cancel the summit yourself. nixon had a strange relationship

with his secretary of treasury, and democrat. with kennedy car when he was shot and had a bullet fragment from the kennedy assassination until the day he died. kissinger said he was nixon's image of himself. ill about many of his advisers, but never about him. impressedpected and with the strength of john connolly as a decision-maker. the evolutionng of his thought process vis-a-vis the moscow summit and the may 8 decision.

mr. moss: if someone is going to cancel an assignment -- the summit, make the soviets cancel the summit. do not make it look like president nixon has thrown away a chance for peace. -- ifviet union reached you will have agreements over incidents at sea between the soviet navy and the u.s. navy, do not throw that away. nixon does this. the soviets had their own cancellation crisis.

brezhnev was securing his position. he nailed -- he put the final nail in the coffin. did notinian party boss want to go through with the talk to improve relations because for the soviets, they saw the opposite of what nixon did. the u.s. has been conducting an illegal war in vietnam, has been bombing our ally, we are supporting our ally, and you are throwing them under the bus. the president did not see it that way. brezhnev saw like nixon, you do not lead -- you do not let your allies or partners dictate your policy. moscow during a

small session with nixon and kissinger and brezhnev and soviet leaders, excluding rogers and the soviet foreign minister, the president of the soviet the president of the soviet union makes a speech, i will not make a handshake with bloody's in vietnam and so on. once the have transcripts they can ship to annoy. -- hanoi. look, we drove a hard bargain to those capitalist americans. once that had been done that was the end of it. and here's the decisiveness. you can see when nixon had a man crush on him. [laughter] so, the soviets , that was anixon

way to nixon to send a message to the soviets. this soviets sent their own message to nixon by having the trade minister visits the white house about 1.5 weeks before nixon the parts. here's a great -- nixon departs. here is a great picture. he is staring at kissinger. this sly look between them. in a second. there you go. hey, we did it. sent their own messages. may 1972 you sign the anti-ballistic missile treaty, a cornerstone of arms control with the soviet union. you sign an arm agreement on the limit of offensive arms.

other agreements including cooperation of efforts on science and technology, medicine and cancer research, health care, environmental protection, collaboration on space exploration, avoiding incidents at sea. the collaboration space exploration, 1975 we had a soyuz spacecraft -- a good design. i do not know if you saw the launch last week that was aborted. and theacid not cosmonaut lived because of safety systems. it was a good system. you had this docking in space and the development of a docking mechanism that is still in use form 50 years later almost. that is impressive. back channels can save the

world. they can lead to an establishment of diplomatic relations. they can lead to monumental agreements that withstand the test of time. they can also be used by nefarious purposes. all depends on the context. evaluate it better today than we could 20 years ago. maybe in time we can learn more about what happened in 2016. we all want to be informed voters. make sure you vote. regardless of how you vote, make sure you vote. with that, i would be honored to take any questions you might have. [applause] >> [inaudible] especially after the sentencing

chapter six. back channel relationship to gone a new function during the secret trip as the soviet ambassador served as the personal intermediary so that brezhnev could maintain plausible denied their ability -- deniability with kremlin colleagues. how much independence did he have from brezhnev? what was that relationship? how much was he able to do on his own? mr. moss: fantastic question. i would say it changed over time. that trip was in april of 1972. about a month before the moscow summit. the instances you are talking -- it was a secret trip kissinger went on. it was not known in the united states. nixon announced it after he got back. it was kind of like a dry rehearsal for what the

president we do. they took the presidential aircraft outside moscow. throughout it you get the feeling that this was right before the showdown happened in the central committee between brezhnev. feeling that a lot of it was being scripted between them. but he was more than just a mouthpiece for them. there were a number of instances, you have this on the he kind of saw did not that brezhnev necessarily see that could derail negotiations or disrupt those talks. he was able to steer the conversation for the soviet side in the right direction. so, he did have some

independence. as a soviet ambassador i think he was unparalleled. i think he had more independence of action than any other soviet ambassador. that is partly because of longevity, but also due to a level of influence. when you can meet with the national security advisor and the president with a phone call, how many countries can do that? especially ones where you have an absurd relationship? degree of independence and degree of independent action, but at the same time i think he was on the same page as his bosses. that is why he stayed around for so long and he was so good. sure thing. great question. i am intrigued by the difference between front channels and back channel diplomacy. not appointed

someone who had no real experience with foreign affairs, rogers, as a secretary of state, and had more confidence in rogers, then a lot of this could .ave just taken place henry kissinger as national security was not exactly a backroom figure. it looked a little bit front channeled to me, although .bviously no press conferences would it have been more back channel if kissinger had been secretary of state from the get-go, and was it more front channel after kissinger did become secretary of state? mr. moss: another good question. again, things change over time. so, we saw the decline of the back channel as kissinger's role, the secret diplomacy became public policy. that undermines him as a back channel agent.

someone remarked that only henry kissinger would use a date cover for a diplomatic negotiation. usually it is the other way around. it is not front channel because it was to the exclusion of the state department. rogers was not an experienced. he was the deputy attorney general and acting attorney general during the eisenhower administration. friendshipcades long with richard nixon. henry kissinger did not. they did not really know one another. a different wing of the republican party. the wing that nixon would have detected -- detested.

nelson rockefeller was the poster boy for that, right or wrong, depending on your point of view. it was certainly not front channel. whether or not things could have been different from the beginning, i think the decision was made by nixon early on. in a memoe response saying you should not have these, go to secretary of state rogers. it was ultimately richard nixon, in my view. so, it was the president's wish to conduct diplomacy in the back channels instead of the front channel. the other thing is nixon, he did like rogers, but he felt he had kind of failed overtime. he was supposed to be the front man. he could be out there.

he looked like a secretary of state. he could be the guy out there negotiating. and actually rogers, to his credit, did a lot. especially on the middle east. the back channel was mostly out of the middle east until late 1971. but there was a cease-fire between israel and its arab neighbors. had been worked out by joseph cisco, assistant secretary of state and rogers. it was called the rogers plan. that largely held in place until 1973, october. rogers was not completely ineffective. on u.s. soviet relations, this is a decision by the president. this is what the president wanted. and kissinger was the head of the system for national security council. and he was the guy that nixon

put his faith in to try and establish relationships with the soviets. another side effect about rogers, he introduce electronic records into the state department. if you are before library, looking at electronic tables, that system was approved by william rogers. william rogers gets the last laugh in many cases. thank you for the question. in the book, there are wonderful things. there is an incident where the military was spying on nixon because of back channels. the military spying on the president of the united states. in the preface of the book misses that was a great line says, the, he

gestapo, spying on the president! that is a fun one. thereoviet relations, were a number of crises that were handled by back channels. one with india and pakistan in late 1970 war -- 1971. u.s. found itself backing pakistan. unionve the soviet backing india. >> curious, what relationship 's relationshipon with the press had and how that influenced how he chose diplomacy. mr. moss: ooh. ah. there is a great conversation nixon had.

you may have seen it published elsewhere. ago, nixon goes on, the press is the enemy, the press is the enemy. write that on a blackboard a hundred times and never forget, the press is the enemy. professors, we like to profess. liked to use the press when it was to his advantage. i have great examples of where kissinger was feeding information to select journalists at the behest of nixon to try and shape positive news coverage. the president would do both sides. he would play nice with the press and hate the press and say they are the enemy was something unflattering. it is telling that the top of nixon's enemies list was investigative journalist jack anderson.

reason we know about the military spying on nixon was because of jack anderson. he published verbatim quotes on top-secret documents. in december 1971, in the middle of the india pakistan war. tryplumbers were created to to get the source of the leaks. it was the plumbers who were able to find what they thought was the source of the leak. a navy yield an assigned to the office between the pentagon and the white house. he was sending it to thomas more, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. radford rifledan through burn\c -- on secret trips to china and sent them back so the military was doing it because they did not want to be surprised by suddenly having

policies of being enemies and friends. back channels have that affect. secrecy, its on serves a purpose you can also have a lot of blowback. it is how you manage it. context is key. thank you. [applause] >> before you go. speakerresenting our with a pair of pens. for us, it has really been marvelous to have someone of your background and expertise here. host for the relations of the united states researchers. published comek

from presidential libraries. you're the first one we have ever had on the platform. you can see the subtleties. this is really fascinating. we thank you very much for coming. i will be recommending you to my sister libraries as well. tonight before we have a reception for you at a book signing, if you are not already on our email list and would like to receive notices of other programs, please sign up. we have forms for joining the ford foundation, friends afford. did you want to add anything about the jack anderson situation? no? all right. may i encourage you to come to the ford library sometime as a researcher. you are all welcome. and maybe you can find some interesting answers to things that were mentioned tonight. we do have materials we can share with you. have a good evening. reception is in the lobby. thank you. [applause]

[captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2019] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] announcer: from george washington to george w. bush, every sunday at 8:00 p.m. and midnight eastern we feature the presidency, a weekly series exploring the presidents, policies, and legacies. you're watching american history tv, all weekend, every weekend on c-span3. announcer: in december 1917, several months after the u.s. had entered world war i, the supreme court heard oral argument in argo versus united states, known as the selective draft law cases. the case is challenged the selective service act of 1917. one month later, the supreme court unanimously upheld that conscription is constitutional. historian christopher capozzola,

you"r of "uncle sam wants examines how the selective affected men and women during and after the war. supreme court justice elana kagan introduces him. the supreme court historical society hosted this 40 minute event. mr. joseph: good evening, ladies and gentlemen. i am greg joseph, chair of the board of trustees of the historical society. and welcome to our third lecture this year in the leon silverman series. professor capozzola is going to be speaking about the selective draft law cases in a lecture that he titles "body and soul," and you will understand that afterwards. let me begin by asking everybody to turn off their cell phones, not just put them on mute. it will affect the sound system. and that includes your fancy watches that are really cell phones. i want tgi