effect of the war. >> you can watch the entire program on the memoirs of lewdness is -- ulysses s. grant tonight. presidency, richard moss talks about how presidents have used covert means to conduct since the diplomacy. mr. moss is the author of nixon's back channel to moscow. johnson and nixon as well as a 1968t overture, the candidate hubert humphrey, which he declined. the gerald r. ford presidential library hosted this one our 15 minute event. there out to tonight's engagement. we are honored to have richard maas here to speak about his new "nixon's back channel to moscow. this reveals behind-the-scenes

deliberations of nixon, his advisors and their soviet counterparts. his book draws on newly declassified documents as well as the nixon tapes and he has spent an enormous amount of time looking at the takes. you'll hear some snippets tonight. this explores the central role of confidential diplomacy in shaping america's foreign policy during this time. the book received high praise from people well known to those of us in these circles. a professor at the university of is very positive about it. and luke, who learned tonight through the course of friends and colleagues of our speaker, he's an expert on the nixon tapes. by thepublished university press talks about ais book about turning -- book published by oxford

university press talks about this book as drawing back the curtain of history, shining light on high-stakes conversations that participants cryptically allude to only in their memoranda or their memoirs. tonight, you are getting a sneak peek behind the scenes. professionally, richard moss is an associate professor at the center for naval warfare studies at the u.s. naval war college. he is a specialist in u.s.-soviet relations during the cold war and as mentioned, and next part on the nixon presidential recordings. he was an historian with the u.s. department of state and we were talking earlier, this is the first time, we have been visited by people who are working historians, writing histories of our foreign policy during various times. we have never had one as a speaker. tonight is a first and i am excited because these are people who know their business. rick earned his ba from the university of california and masters and doctoral degrees from george washington university. he spoke at the next library last summer but it is about time he came to the best in the system.

welcome to the ford library tonight. [applause] dr. moss: thank you to the gerald r. ford presidential foundation and the national archives for having me. it is a pleasure, my first time in michigan. glad to be here. it is a great and warm welcome. angst going on also, sounds great, as a professor, this lecture, the carrier, look forward to. working for the government, i am obligated to give you several disclaimers. the views in this presentation are my personal views, not those of the u.s. government or its components like the u.s. naval war college. the material eyesight,

especially from the nixon tapes, has profanity. how many of you remember the term expletive deleted? thank you richard nixon for your tapes. we will get into my sources to drop back the curtain of history and go beyond what the memoir accounts have about back channels. a brief outline about what we will discuss, i will give you definitions. diplomatic historians know what back channels of diplomacy is until 2016 to general audiences it wasn't as familiar. i will give you examples of different back channels in recent history and ways back channels can be used. i will talk about the sources. the nixon tapes are just one of many illuminating sources that of come to light in the last two or so decades. i will also describe why back channels continue to be relevant. i will compare 1968 took 2016 --

to 2016. it should be interesting. maybe a little controversial. i hope we can have a great discussion after the lecture. you may have heard about bottom line on the bottom. i will give you the bottom line in the middle of my presentation. i will describe the development in the -- of the kissinger-dobrynin channel, and the reduction in tensions between the superpowers. it takes place in 1972 and was one of the feathers and richard nixon's cap. a man who saw himself as a peacemaker. it mattered tonight's in and to u.s. foreign policy in the 1970's. historians have focused on the to taunt. we will open it up to questions at the end. if you want to know about what back channel diplomacy is, you

have to understand what diplomacy is. according to the source of all knowledge, aka google, diplomacy is the profession, activity or skill of managing international relations typically by a countries representatives abroad. the country's representatives abroad has certain connotations. in the u.s., we have the state department where i used to work. other countries have for ministries. that are formal mechanisms

have been development as -- developed as a result of treaties and agreements over centuries. in diplomacy,sed some of the customs and the culture. these are all things built on a structure. we are going to contrast this formal structure that exists between the state department and foreign ministries. oxford english dictionary. i think this is an interesting one for back channels. why.ill see in a moment it circumvents official channels and negotiations. they can also be to bypass a system. this is another good definition by william safire. wasarticular relevance and

informed by what nixon and kissinger were doing. a seemingly unofficial but direct method of communications, bypassing usual routes through bureaucracy. it pretty accurately describes what nixon and kissinger did. going to give you some examples. back channels are useful for establishing relations between countries. there may have been a back channel element and between the united states and soviet union of 1993. it took an anti-communist with credentials to go to the world's largest communist country. relations after they had ceased for more than two decades. the story of that is an interesting one.

also the chinese wanting to establish relations on the united states. didn playing the china card you get all the elements in the next and tapes. they tried and originally with poland. actually the johnson administration tried through poland. the one that did work was the one between the mutual ally and the united states and communist china. dictator,e led by yada yada on. when this channel went active in march and april of 1971 it was a great line in it. we had messages from different sources in the past.

ahead.om ahead to through.nding it back channels were very useful. this was an amazing uncover, if you want to call it that. when kissinger as the world in july 1871 that kissinger had and they had agreed to set up a summit meeting in february 1972. the united states was pursuing a normalization of relations with communist china. here's another one, this one more current but less relevant. the joint comprehensive plan of action. president trump hold the united states out of it in the last

year. not as relevant but it is a recent example. the united states and iran do not have diplomatic relations. how can you have an agreement. back channels are really good at that. this one set up between the iranian foreign minister on the and the foreign minister of imam. apparently oman was the facilitator by back channel in terms of getting the united states and iran walking. it eventually resulted in another iran deal. that's another use of back channels.

back channels can also save the world. did in the missile crisis come over on the right, and intermediary covered on the left. they're going to ds critic crisis that looked like he was spiraling toward a nuclear conflict. back channels aren't credibly useful. thee are others between and another soviet agent. in this spot the world is saved. back channels can be useful. officially -- the

press journalist. in reality it was kgb. they were able to pass those messages at the important points. am're going to wonder why going back to this. the lampshade, we managed to floated out with the book cover. lampshade reappears. we will take the commissar disappearing. which reminds me, about camp david, there were recording devices and camp david. some really great tapes because nixon use to blow off steam at camp david.

the last taping system that was installed. not just in the oval office. focuses on the two guys sitting in stride, nick axon -- nixon in the middle. and the soviet ambassador from the kennedy administration through most of the reagan administration. 1986 he was moscow's man in washington. he was a very capable diplomat. a strong skill of shining through. the two men developed a friendship and respect for one another. here they are in march of 1972, the be -- the peak of the back channel relationship.

he wrote many volumes. three volumes is no more in addition. then he wrote it in russian. the copy he gave to henry kissinger said my opponent, partner, friend. thought was a beautiful summation of relationships developed after working with each other for years and meeting with each other hundreds of times. eventually the back channel relationship is such that a secure line between the soviet embassy in washington dc and henry kissinger's office. that's our primary adversary at the time. a statement as to how close the relationship was. joked so close kissinger

before recalled in 1971 in which was elected of -- as a full member of a central committee. quite a deal for the diplomats. before departing, kissinger called him up and said, you and i are going steady, we should exchange telephone numbers. it's a fun relationship. they have special moments as well. they represent powers that did not see eye to eye. that.ere able to get past to -- going to open up the curtain here. and the source of ideas trying to do that. a lot of sources. the very secretive administration, the central is probably the best

documented administration in history. i used to be normal than i listen to several hundred hours. it's an invaluable source. every time kissinger would meet he would brief the president on what they talked about. it wasn't a far cry. all those for history and have them on nixon tapes. over 2600 hours of next and tapes. i've listen to only a fraction of those. primarily on foreign policy. those are going to be the things that make nixon look the best.

he cares about foreign policy. ironically the first tapes to be released or the watergate tapes. maybe the truth is somewhere in the middle. not everything he did was bad, not everything he did was great. it's kind of a way to balance that scale. also a time putting which i cover, there's a wonderful resource in 2007. it is soviet american relations. in a period of decent relations between the united states and it is soviet american relations. russia, the foreign ministry jointly compiled and produced the volumes. this -- in book in the state department. wasn't enough to have one, you had to have two.

it captures the memorandum of the conversations of their telephone. it shows both sides of the story. it's a he said he said because both sides of each meeting. sometimes you wonder if they are at the same meeting. you can use the contrast to uncover what really happened. , which ishat source invaluable. and then confidence. you have a number of memos. kissinger would have a secretary and takenon the phone

down initially on shorthand and typed it out in long form. there are tens of thousands of these pages of telecom transcript in the national archives. every time kissinger talks to , almost every time there is a record for it. people also struggle to do that same type of practice. years anget to the 40 exit resign the presidency, a lot of that disappears. you can add to that the formulations volumes. they haven't come out when i was due in my research initially, but they came out afterwards. they were the preeminent source, that takes everything from the u.s. side. unfortunately there are no russian records.

there are no soviet american relations they cover after 1972. a lot more is open for interpretation. you don't have that fidelity you had earlier. with these sources i draw some conclusions and try to examine the relationship as it develops over the years. is 1968.place to start was notinger channel the first back channel with the soviets. either for next and or kissinger. sabrina has been an intermediary. he's also had contacts with robert kennedy during the cuban missile crisis. kissinger have been advisor to the johnson administration.

he worked on vietnam peace and they ended up failing. is thatn't known kissinger tried to revive this negotiation in exchange for the north vietnamese. he tried to do it through the soviets. those documents were classified in the past 10 years. we learn kissinger is no stranger and nixon is no stranger. also we learn that the soviets tried to interfere in the 1960 election against richard nixon on behalf of hubert humphrey. channels before and during and after the 1968 election. how many of you heard about the chanel affair?

i'll keep it brief. then we will talk about 2016, what we know right now that kind of echoes what happened in the past. 1968, this is a great picture of , the republican candidate, staring down lb j. before the election. these men both lied to each other. richard nixon was running primarily against democrats. and i'mrina's memoir, going to use my magic powers, says thank you google translator. ordered against his repeated advice, he was ordered by his

to feel out hubert humphrey and see if the democrats were willing to accept some soviet assistance. the last line is great. only very intelligent but also a very clever man. hubert humphrey, great american. thanks for your moral support. but if you look at them as a he discovered it would have certainly backfired. also the potential for blowback if you try to interfere in other people's elections. and we have been for the last two years or so. 1968 the russian's two back channels of the nixon campaign

and the transitional administration had. that's between robert ellsworth, the u.s. ambassador for nato and the number two guy. there was one between kissinger and a kgb agent. it predated the election. and influential professor, maintaining contacts with them. see if we can find any communication. wasn't able to find the photo of this kgb types. maybe it can be one of these guys. these are the gr you guys in london.

and online investigation forum. they were able to track the identities of supposedly tourists visiting gothic sites when in reality they're trying russian intelmer officer. it's available on amazon.com. maybe it is real. abound that kind of spy craft. henry kissinger kept the fbi informed of these contacts. after the election and during the transition period, he's adjusted a henry kissinger at a meeting at the pierre hotel, it

would be a nice time for u.s. soviet relations if there was a line included in a inaugural about trying to improve relations between the two superpowers and improving relations. it, andr saw no harm in the inaugural address for richard nixon, there is a line about the communication lines will be open to moscow. we are trying to aim for peaceful relations. it was quickly supplanted in 1969. there are several reasons for that. he wanted to be the guy in charge. the other thing is is it would have had too many potential avenues for conflict or conflicting messages. if you keep everything secret and focused, it's a better way to conduct relations.

another brief aside about 1968. that am a who is on the right here in 1947 when she married general clair of the fighting -- of the flying tigers. they got married. she was an intermediary, the chinese nationalists. apparently it's the theory that he acted at the back channel intermediate to test intermediary to get south vietnam -- kind of similar to what kissinger try to negotiate in moscow. there was going to be a quid pro quo. south vietnam gets a better deal from next and then it would get from lbj or hubert humphrey.

this idea has been around since 1968. there were articles at the time. new and surprising evidence continues to surface. excellentll wrote an single volume biography of richard nixon. his assessment is all of the bad things that richard nixon did, probably the worst thing he did was using this channel to kill the peace negotiation. than watergate in his mind because it could have extended the war in vietnam, which as many americans died as nixon had been earlier, all them with withdraw them soon after taking office. haldeman was the chief of staff are richard nixon.

and to his great credit he found this buried in the archives and are in south vietnam, putting on the free johnson conditions. that was interesting. there is another particular telling one. anything richard nixon can do. reignited ahy has focus. i'll up -- all offer a few observations and a justification as to why didn't go into the affair in my book. my book is not u.s. of it relations and this is about vietnam peace negotiations. different focus. pharaoh and a number of lbj tapes have been released, in which lbj pretty candidly discussed intelligence that had been intercepted from the south vietnamese embassy in

washington in which they discussed. it may have been the reason they didn't get a job in the nixon administration. she died here in april. insisted there was no deal going on. there was no quit work -- quid pro quo. amazing sources come to light. it's a testament to our system of government and the way we do business.

for me f on it's both surprising and disappointing. johnson in an earlier picture in july had promised richard nixon there would be no october survivors. he timed the peace initiative with the south and north vietnamese. face.d nixon light to his he wanted to do nothing to interfere for a chance for peace. it's disappointing. maybe there is some intrepid graduate student out there. the vietnamese sources and the chinese communist sources could be invaluable and could answer the questions, how much did

saigon need to be twisted to reject the johnson deal? we know there were a thorn in the side of henry kissinger and richard nixon. line wasecember the north vietnam to south vietnam in the confessions. they were intransigent. allied partners can have quite a role in what goes on. the question remains out there. in january 2016 the u.s. government released an assessment of russian activities and interference in the u.s. election. if you haven't read this document is available online all

over the place. says that russian interviews in the election by doing things like altering and creating fake identities on facebook and twitter. to try to do a few things. to try to boost donald trump. ,ou don't have to believe it but you want your citizens to read it. we are still in the middle of the investigations on this. i'm surprised it's taken this long. that says something. my little antenna went up november 10, 2016 when i read in the new york times that the sky, -- go foreign minister is back, translation.

it's understandable we know people who are close to trump in the inner circle. the new york times had reported it. the russians had been in contact with members of trump immediate entourage. it was on task. one of their state media outlets. could translated as media entourage but also as inner circle. i saw this november 10, 2016 and started wondering what was going on. in december i wrote an article on the washington post that washington post about this. it was in an acknowledgment there may be some back channels to diplomacy. maybe back channel the policy isn't a bad thing. context is the most important thing.

there are important lessons to learn from the example of kiss -- of nixon and kissinger. if you're going to use a tool like the clement toolbox you should be aware of the strengths and weaknesses. later came out that former national security advisor michael flynn and jared kushner met with surrogate, the russian andssador to washington another odd thing was brought up in one of the news articles. flynnntly kushner and approached them about setting up a secure channel, communication channel. that would raise a number of red flags. i don't think this was going on in 2016. kissinger may not have known.

the former head of the defense intelligence agency. about informing. former presstek -- press -- he is sean spicer acted on that. he always have to look at the context. we will continue to wait when we find out more about the context. now want to jump into the bottom line in the middle. channel and a promise he necessary and effective instrument of policy especially when it's supplemented. are instances where kissinger and sabrina complete we bypass the u.s. department of state. examples where kissinger worked with select u.s. ambassadors, keeping to foggy bottom. at the same time working with ambassadors to work through

specific issues. that works surprisingly well. found,as one example i negotiations over the status of germany and berlin. divided berlin and divided germany. the u.s. ambassador was the guy named kevin rosch, who was a law school professor of richard nixon in the 1930's. rush had the trust of nixon and the trust of kissinger. and they trade information back and forth. that were going to the channel between kissinger. other examples where did not work so well and there were some nasty surprises, they handle the strategic arms limitation and the official negotiating team meeting with the soviets on a regular basis. they were kept in the dark.

soviets.enterprising he was aware he was getting information about he brought that in two strategic arms imitation talks. not the best way to run things. other findings, back channel diplomacy appeals to u.s. and soviet leaders. that's one of the reasons why was effective. takes two to check -- two to tangle. secrecy and compartmentalization are ways to avoid -- they can lead to things like paranoia and distrust. there's a flip side to every corner. the back channel can be a safety .hannel i mentioned the cuban missile

crisis. i'll get into that in terms of development. as anhannels can be used accelerator and a break. a seemingly link unrelated areas to foreign policy to each other. he wants better trade with us. work on agreement with our military so we can work together. that's called linkage and diplomacy. the soviets used it to accelerate negotiations and to slow them down. these provided a personal stake in the contact. sabrina,ssinger and when kissinger nixon bypassed the state department, it was a palpable goal. and it easily document to difference between kissinger and

acting secretary of state, who supposed to be in charge of u.s. foreign relations with the rest of the world. was also realistic about kissinger and rothberg. they became a full member of the central committee, which is unprecedented in the soviet union. fully consolidated his power and the soviet union. there was still some opposition. this was one way to solidify his position. the soviets had a conflict with communist china.

the soviets and the candid conversations with kissinger, it's almost like signing a flare and saying let's look at this potential area the u.s. can explain. kissinger and nixon wanted to have a summit meeting because it makes you look presidential to meet with a foreign counterpart and have agreements. he would drag kissinger along. until thes for years end of 1971. he was able to hook kissinger on that idea and do it. line working on

back channels and relying on secrecy. a political gain that led to the use of these back channels and destroyed mixes presidency when applied to domestic politics. speech inignation august of 1974 nixon had a really memorable line. always remember others may hate you and those that may hate you don't win unless you destroy yourself. it can be useful in the international arena. now we get to the development of the channel. i found this last year. he says to kissinger, soviets are skilled at the camp more

information than they give. he is sing the transition has happened, he needs to go to secretary of state. get rid of those channels but start a month later. when henry kissinger attends a party in the soviet embassy on valentine's day, in bed with a cold when kissinger was brought to him and they kind of do this with one another in retrospect. sabrina had this idea that we should have it exchange between the superpowers. i think sabrina was right on this one.

nixon takes office in january. then nothing happens. establishand kind of a relationship. nothing of substance happens for close to 18 months. until the crisis. the u.s. is the navy and forcing off cuba. there wasn't anything that dramatic in 1970. thing.s the dull questions whether the agreement that some of cuban missile crisis met nuclear power summaries or nuclear arms summaries. there was still kind of a gray area.

in a similarered way the cuban missile crisis was . there were a number of soccer fields at the soviet submarine base in cuba. in his memoir he wrote -- kissinger storms into his office . these pictures show the cubans are building soccer fields and the soccer fields can mean more. kissinger a loss and says cubans play baseball and russians play soccer. russians play both soccer and baseball. it was ans point was expansion of the base. it becomes the debate between went to confront the soviets. waitinge department is

until october when there is a regular u.n. meeting and patrick would be in town. or doing what kissinger suggests, which is advance it and try to use the kissinger sabrina channel. he regularly went back. was able to play on nixon's neuroses about cuba in particular. he than the toyota race in california. he won't have dick nixon to kick around that memory was still kissingera test it ends up winning. thevery quickly establishes medium of communication did the soviets were able to work through sabrina and kissinger. state farm was left on the outside.

in january 1972, a wonderful blurb on the next and tapes where nixon is criticizing his friend dated back to the 1940's. i'm going to play that. [indiscernible] >> again, close personal friend going back to the 1940's. rogers was with next and when he made the speech and managed to the vicepot on,

presidential candidate with eisenhower and 52. that's how diplomacy by passing plays out. a classic definition of a back channel. rogers knew what was going on. just to the point where the national security council a withizing communications the soviet to get to the state department. this is another one, this is the week before the moscow summit. nixon says you have to warn the it's a reminder to tell the soviet foreign and the soviet leader. talk about the back channel.

the first rule of fight club, you don't talk about fight club. you can just hear it in his voice. this is about 1969 when nixon takes it on. later, that's saying something. in the interest of time, this is a back channel, it works one way, works particularly well in the summit meeting, which was a pretty big deal in moscow in may of 1972. summit meetings make presidents look presidential. it's a great photo op.

i have to think of reagan and gorbachev. it's very telling. read before the moscow summit in may of 1972, there is a threat that the united states might cancel the summit. role ofbecause of the the client states, the partners, the allies cand have a vote. the north vietnamese, who were armed by the soviet union they did not develop their own sophisticated surface-to-air missiles, they do not develop their own aircraft. they got it off from soviet union. they had a massive invasion of south vietnam. easter weekend the end of march 1972. it smacked the little bash smack in the middle of the summit and

mid to make -- mid to late may where he plans to go to the city -- to the soviet union. for nixon to was a contradiction. i will let nixon's speak for himself on this one. >> [indiscernible] do.t's impossible to

public opinion can have a role. we had some polls conducted as to what was going on in vietnam. there's supposed to be a weekend of peace. it's a deadly the largest action by north vietnam during nixon's presidency. there is a division of opinion. possible,s made this or maybe is there not a link necessarily between the soviets knowing about or controlling this offensive and the american public opinion which is the potential for having agreements in the soviet union and the structure of peace.

channels toing back try to have it both ways, where he can respond to its going on in south vietnam. if the soviets are willing to look the other way he's going to look the other way for what the soviets are doing in terms of eating north vietnamese and their offensive. he choreographs it with henry kissinger. kissinger -- and patton, nixon's wife. and goes off very well. the message and innocent is sending is that we are going to bomb and do stuff against north vietnam. we really want to have the summit. nixon was very proud of his wife.

>> with tears in her eyes she said i hope not -- so that message goes back. >> ultimately both sides were , andto look the other way nixon on may 8 launches operation linebacker, the bombing of honoi and a harbor in the vietnam. nixon did it because he felt if he did not have an escalation, there were not a lot of american troops on the ground anymore in may of 1972. airpower is what he had to rely on.

nixon felt he had to do something to boost south vietnam. he launches linebacker. there is a massive increase in bombing. f-4 fighters and casey 135a tankers. there are b-52s flying. they bomb north vietnam. they bombed a lot. it was more than they had done in years. prior to that point, nothing had approached what had been done under johnson during rolling thunder. this takes the cake until later in 1972 when they launched linebacker two, even bigger. i mentioned bombing north vietnam and tell the south vietnam came to our concessions. that is a different story. what made nixon change his mind in terms of being able to expect the soviets had made possible the north vietnamese attacks,

you save south vietnam by escalating and go to moscow. you do not cancel the summit yourself. nixon had a strange relationship with his secretary of treasury, a democrat. he was in the car with kennedy when he was shot and had a bullet fragment from the kennedy assassination until the day he died assassination. kissinger said he was nixon's image of himself. nixon spoke ill about many of his advisers, but never about john connolly. he was respected and impressed with the strength of john connolly as a decision-maker. he is describing the evolution

of his thought process vis-a-vis the moscow summit and the may 8 decision. mr. moss: that is what nixon does. if someone is going to cancel the summit, make the soviets cancel the summit. do not make it look like president nixon has thrown away a chance for peace. has thrown away a chance to have

an agreement. the soviet union had reached nuclear. a with the united states -- nuclear parity with the united states. you will have agreements over incidents at sea between the soviet navy and the u.s. navy, do not throw that away. nixon does this. the soviets had their own cancellation crisis. brezhnev was securing his position. he put the final nail in the coffin. the ukrainian party boss did not want to go through with the talk to improve relations because for the soviets, they saw the opposite of what nixon did. the u.s. has been conducting an illegal war in vietnam, has been bombing our ally, we are supporting our ally, and you are throwing them under the bus.

let, necessarily, or ometimes you don't let your partners, your client states, dictate your policy. nixon gets to moscow and during just with nixon and kissinger and brezhnev and a leaders but excluding both rogers and the soviet minister, president pogor ogordny makes a speech i will not shake the hand of something vietnam and once they have the record to ship to a hard line to once pitalist americans, that was done that was the end vietnam.scussion of john conley with his

thousand thousand-yard stare. you can see why nixon had a man him. on the soviets signaled to nixon -- tea was a e ladies way to send the message. he soviets had their trade minister visit the white house about a week and a half before nixon departs. -- there great picture he is staring at there are the sly looks between them. there you go. lay, we did it. moscow meeting happens

28.een may 22 and you sign the antiballistics treaty the cornerstone of arms control with the soviet union. sign the agreement on the profits of arms. nd sell others including cooperation and plans, technology, medicine, cancer research. health care, environmental exploration, ace avoiding incidents at sea. soyuz.remember apollo still use it, good design. i don't know if you saw the week that was borted both the astronaut and cosmonaut lived. a good system. you have the development of a

that is still sm in use on the international years later. 50 that is impressive. that is a lasting achievement peace. back channels can save the lead to the an establishment of diplomat relations. to monumental agreements and improve the structure of peace. also used for nefarious purposes. determine thatan context better. than we could 20 years ago. learn ith time we will more about what happened in 2016. wanting to be ll informed voters. make sure you vote. but with that i would be honored to take questions that you might have. [applause]

throughout us about the back especially after this ession and chapter six kissinger's back canal relationship with dobrynin took as the soviet on ambassador was a personal could diary so brezhnev maintain plausible deniability colleagues. how much independence did from brezhnev and gromyko. how was that specifically much was he able to do on his own? >> fantastic question. i would say it changed over time. of 1972, was in april so about a month before the summit. the instances that you are secret trip are

kissinger went on. it was not known in the united states. nixon announced it after he got back. t the time kissinger and dobrynin flew together like a he rehearsal for what t president would do so they took the presidential aircraft moscow. throughout it you get the eeling this was right before the showdown happened with the committee and politburo. get the feeling a lot was dobrynin pt ed between and gromyko and dobrin and well.nev as but he was more than a mouth piece. there were a number of instances from tapes and memorandum of conversation -- dobrynin saw problems that

gromyko didn't necessarily see that could erail negotiations or disrupt talks and he was able to steer the conversation for the soviet direction for ht it. a soviet ambassador i think he was unparalleled. he had more independence of action than any ambassador.t that is partly due to his his level ut due to of influence. when you can meet with the national security advisor of the of the united states with a phone call how many countries can do that especially you don't have a very good relationship. degreef independence and of independent action but at the same time i think he was on the his bosses. that is why he stayed around for on the same page as his bosses.

that is why he stayed around for so long and was so good. intrigued by front and diplomacy.l appointed d not somebody with no international more confidence in rogers, a lot of this could taken place between dobrynin and rogers. henry kissinger's national security advisor was not exactly back room figure. t looks a little front channel to me although obviously no press conferences after them. would it have been more front channel if kissinger had been of state from the get go and was it more front channel did become ger secretary of state?

good question. things change over time. decline of the back channel as kissinger's roles in diplomacy become public knowledge and that a back change as agent. suddenly the press is not every move and date with every hollywood star in 1969 like 1972. somebody remarked he would use a cover for a diplomatic negotiation. other way the around. it is not front channel because the stateexclusion of department. rogers was not inexperienced. attorney deputy general and acting attorney general during the eisenhower administration. a long-term, decades long friendship with richard nixon. kissinger did not. they really, 1967, 1968

didn't know each other. kissinger was a nelson a different uy so wing of the republican party. that nixon would have detested as the eastern establishment. was the poster boy for that. t was certainly not front channel. whether it could have been different from the beginning i made by decision was nixon himself early on and you ee the response to that eagleburger memo saying you have this, it should go to secretary of state rogers. it didn't. made that decision. it was ultimately richard nixon my view. so it was the president's wish in the backiplomacy changes as opposed to the front

channels. other thing is nixon did felt he had ut he kind of failed over time. he was supposed to be a front man. he had experience in government. he looked like a secretary of sta state. he could be the guy out there negotiating and actually rogers, a lot.credit, did the state department and henry kissinger was locked out back middle east and the channel was blocked mostly from 1971 iddle east until late when you see discussions. but there was a cease-fire israel and its arab byghbors that was worked out ver-cisco assistant -- joseph cisco and it largely held in lace until 1973 with the october war. so, rogers was not completely

ineffective. but just u.s. -- soviet decision byat was a the president and kissinger was he head of the system for the national security council and he his he guy that nixon put faith in to try it establish a soviets.hip with the another side fact about william electronic troduced records into the state department so if you are at the at the rary looking electronic cables that was pit approved by william rogers. e gets the last laugh in many cases. thank you for the question. things, s wonderful there's an incident where the

military was spying onyxen -- spying on in nixon because of become canahannels h the military is spying on the president. that is a fun one. u.s.-soviet relations had their vicissitudes vicissitudes, some crises that -- settled by back pakistani dia and -- pakistan. hey were backing pakistan and it was just a situation where ou have the soviet union backing the world's largest democracy of india, against each other. >> what relationship did nixon

what nixon's relationship with the press influence how he diplomacy? >> ooh. there's a great conversation that nixon had, and you may have elsewhere.lished -- ave it in the fern foreign relations volume but he is the enemy, the press is the enemy wrote it on blackboard 100 times and aid never forget it talking to kissing kissinger. e get on our soapbox and profess. presides d to use the when it was to his advantage. have great examples where kissinger was feeding information it select journalists at the bee less of -- behest of nixon.

presidents will play nice and se it when it serves their purpose and say they hate it with something unflattering. the enemy the top of list was jack anderson journalist.e the reason we know about that spying of the military on president nixon is because of srer nderson he published bum quotes from -- verbatim the middle of the ndia-be pakistan war and the plumbers are were created to get they were able to find the source of the leak. a navy yeoman assigned to he liaison office between the pentagon and white house. and he was sending it to thomas of the jointrolina -- the chairman of the joint

staff.of people there were burn bags on secret trip and sent stuff back so the military -- the want to be n't surprised by we're going from a ells of antagonism to powells of trying to be friends chinese.unist so back channels can have that effect. that emphasis on secrecy serves a purpose but it blow-back.lot of context is key. thank you. >> before you go. speaker esenting our ith a pair of pens to use in his book signing if he wishes. for us on staff it has been

to have somebody of your background and expertise. e host state department or foreign relations of the united and they come and some of them come from presidential exciting so for us is but you are the first we have had on the platform and you see he subtlety and it is fascinating. so we thank you again. i will be recommending you to my sist sister's libraries. efore we have a reception for you and book signing if you are in the already on our e-mail ist and would like to receive notices of or programs sign up. we have forms out there and joining the ford foundation, the friends of ford. anything t to add about the jack anderson situation? encourage you to come to the ford library as a

researcher. maybe you come and can find some interesting answers to things that were -- tonight ay because we have materials we share.ike to have a good evening. the reception is in the lobby. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2019] watching american history tv only on c-span 3. historian meribeth norton tphraoebgts on gender and politics in early america. here is a preview. for my initial interpretation i was struck by statements they knew they should not discuss politics that the public realm their sphere.ide hey said it was not our

product. one virginia loyalist woman said analysis don't think ayman gauging in politics. doing?r were you she said it is a subject for which i have not either talent inclination to enter upon. or there was a philadelphia oman who asked how shall i impose a silence upon myself when the subject of politics is very interesting. so much engrossing conversation, she parade for divine prudence it bridle her tongue. what was the origin of such myself.nts i asked that is some of the impetus for he next book founding mothers and fathers which turns to the european steplt in north america experiences in new england and the chesapeake. there were other questions in my mind as i embarked on the research.

books i want two change. i enjoyed political theory in ollege and turned to the 17th century colonies which i had never written before and never the 17th nar paper on century. a particular theme prominent in secondary works about that, studies of the and political theory in early modern england explored family analogy that drew parallels between the structure and the staete until john locke and other philosophers theorized a state in agreements among men. government was the fifth honor thy father and mother what did that mean for asked.i what did it mean if politics is based on the fifth commandment mothers what does that mean for women and actual mears

in the family. you can hear more on gender and politics in early america at 7:00 p.m. eastern. all wind every weekend. on c-span 3. we talk with faiboz mokhtari about "in the lion's hadow" who explains how muslim iranian tkphrat abdol hossein ardari rescued 2,000 iranian jews in occupied france from the nazis. the university of south florida events.this it is just over an hour. tonight we have faiboz mokhtari as our book talk guest. iran he attended