and truman said that he would like to be remembered as being the people's president. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2019] announcer 1: trouble with us to historic sites every sunday on our series, american artifacts. this is american history tv on c-span3. wordncer 2: the french detente means a release of tensions and is used to describe the relations between the u.s. and soviet union from the late 1960's to the 1970's. stephan kieninger, the author of "the diplomacy of detente "the diplomacy of cooperative security policies

from helmut schmidt to george ."ultz >> we will develop knee on behalf of the wilson center's public policy program and the history center to this washington history seminar. delighted as always to cochair this seminar. and theusually here, president of the national history center. that isa joint venture now in its ninth year i think over the years, has featured some of the leading, as well as emerging cutting-edge historians in this country and from around the world. by a very informed and engaged audience.

james goodby has just entered. he is a legendary participant in what we will be talking about today. -- thank mythink staff for the logistics of this event. again theledge once support of the university's history department and the lepage center for history and the public interest for their support of this event, as well .s a number of anonymous donors i think several of them are among you. we hope you will continue to support this event. i am delighted today to ,ntroduce dr. stephan kieninger a fellow german who is part of

the wilson center family in many ways. he started out as an intern here , then number of years ago went on to get his phd from the university of mannheim. he works at the german federal archives, fellowships among others at the berlin center for cold war studies. he is currently a postdoctoral fellow with johns hopkins university. the kissinger center there. he currently investigates the role of western financial aid for the soviet union and its impact on the emergence of a new global order. he has published two books, "the diplomacy of detente cooperative security policies from helmut ," whichto george shultz

is what he will be talking about today, just published last year, detente," published by roman and little skilled. a revised version of his dissertation. to have aly rare specialist of the whole complex history of arms control and security. delighted to see him now come back to the wilson center as an accomplished, published scholar to talk about his second book. at a still relatively young age. it is wonderful to have you back . i should also mention that if you do not have the time to read glimpses athere are

his scholarship on our website, on our history of public policy blog. he just published a blog post heart of "at the very europe," as well as a host of other cold war projects and nuclear history project, working papers. the floor i will give to you for about 40 minutes to talk about your book and give us some sense of your findings, then we will open it up to your questions and comments. stephan: thank you so much for a

very kind introduction. good afternoon. thanks for coming. i'm glad you're here. ,hank you so much, christian for the opportunity to present at the washington history seminar series. it is a pleasure for me to be here. i spent three months as an intern at the international history project, and that was when i started my research in washington. ever since, it is a great pleasure to come back. it is a special place. overview ofyou an my presentation. points, this is the structure of my presentation. first of all, i start my presentation with a synopsis of the highlights of the legacy and i look into the reason for its

longevity. second, i looking to george shultz's contribution. i will investigate his u.s. soviet relations. 1983 was not the most dangerous year of the cold turnedt george shultz 1983 into a new stimulus for detente. the third point, the benefits of detente. why do i go back and take a look at the 1960's and 1970's? benefits highlight the detente of. -- ie highlights of highlight the benefits of detente. there was an enormous increase in the number of human contacts across the iron curtain.

the annual number of western visits to east berlin and east germany was 8 million. back in the 1970's. it was an enormous human in a fit of detente and that made schmidt and other policy makers fight so long for its longevity in the 1980's. used trade with the russia pact countries to engage the detente process, despite the new care arms race, and schmidt used credits and to buyc means as a lever human contacts, to buy the multiplication of contact. movement, with freer the eastern european countries were economically dependent on west german money. att but not least, i look the diplomacy with brezhnev.

if you think about the crisis of u.s. soviet relations in the schmidt and980's, brezhnev had three productive andings in 1978, 1980, 1981. at all of these meetings, relate to the expansion of natural gas in the soviet union. i take a look at these meetings. all, let me start with a synopsis of detente. let's talk about schmidt and schulz. what is your image of both men? if you think about schmidt, you might think about the soviet intervention in afghanistan, the declaration of martial law in schmidtyou may perceive primarily as a crisis manager. that is the ordinary image.

about george schmaltz, you may think of reagan, the cold warrior. think of reagan's evil empire speech. men, youink of both are going to think about the cold war and international crisis. i tell you a different story. a completely different story. forget about the cold war and the crisis. think about the potential of cooperative security. , and in itspe transatlantic framework. not elsewhere. we had proxy wars, conflict. if you think about europe, it is about cooperative security. my book follows a simple equation. schmidt plus schulz equals the long detente in europe. eagles plus schulz

cooperative security policy. schmidt and schulz emphasized deterrence, but they were able to see the soviet union as a political and economic partner. i argue that there was no revival into the cold war tensions just in europe. why? is there thinking process went ,n east-west, trade went on natural gas with the soviet union blossomed. 1984ears between 1982 and saw the construction of the biggest pipeline for natural gas from the soviet union to western europe. 4500 kilometers, with an annual capacity of 40 million cubic meters of natural gas. that was sufficient for 17 million households in western europe. that is detente, that is economic interdependence.

furthermore, i argue that detente meant to further demise of the soviet union. the demise of the so the cancer patient negotiation. detente was a win-win situation and reagan pursued detente and his policy had already been established by or to gorbachev arriving. my second point, george schultz's contribution to the long detente in europe. if you look into 1983, you might be surprised, because that is referred to as one of the most dangerous years and the cold war. reagan's evil empire speech. but, reagan also was eager to maintain dialogue with the soviet union at this crucial time. 1983, georgeary,

schulz brought a soviet ambassador to the white house, and they had a meeting that lasted for 2.5 hours. george schulz went into great detail in his memoir to describe it, and i quote from the record. this conversation is from the reagan library. from richard clark's paper. he was a national security toisor and very opposed schulz's approach, but schulz had backing for the record of this meeting. it is on the 15th of february, just three weeks before reagan's evil empire speech. he condemned the soviet union as an evil empire, working for the elimination of the soviet union and three weeks in advance, he was very much set to identify dialogue. the president expressed

readiness to see problems we have with the soviet union as result so that reasonable solutions can be arrived at. he made it plain that he was talking about not simply words of good feeling. schulz reports, the reaction seemed that they were clearly impressed with this development. he was surprised that it happened. he said that it has been a historic occasion, whether we are talking about six years, it was quite possible to get things accomplished and we would get a drop off of the entire conversation. aspect is often overlooked, but it is a crucial aspect in 1983.

hand, you bold rhetoric on the nation as an evil empire, and on the other hand, a readiness for dialogue and a readiness to intensify dialogue. the reagan white house was reluctant. it was very much a top-down approach. schulz was one of the few people who understood reagan and helped him implement this policy, starting in 1983. crucial point,a i think. meetings andekly he called his approach gardening. schulz's idea was a quote from a weed,ir, if you see

get it out before it turns into a real problem. this was preventive diplomacy. solve problems before they arrive. , becausecrucial schulz's predecessor did not kind of meeting on a regular basis. again, schulz argued in a memorandum five days before reagan's evil empire speech, he again argued in favor of dialogue. the memorandum was entitled u.s. public relations, where do we want to go and how do we get there?

need to decide whether to intensify this dialogue, and if so, how? if we proceed in this direction, we will raise concerns of business as usual. i believe that these problems are manageable, because we will not relent in our insistence on balance as we proceed, continuing from the u.s. rather than a soviet agenda is the way to manage the problem. again, march, 1983, this was schulz's approach and reagan very much share this approach and was eager to negotiate with the soviet union. it is important for us the ambiguities and

contradictions. they have done a great job here in analyzing these contradictions because on the -- isnd, reagan is either eager to condemn the soviet union. on the other hand, he was a nuclear evolutionist. nucleard to eliminate weapons entirely. this is a presupposed cooperative security organization. reagan managed to combine both and to reconcile the use of contradictions in his policy. again, with the crucial help of george schultz. thought about a new notion of security. he wanted to move from mutually to mutuallyraction

assured survival. as i said, few people understood . schulz was one of them. 1983 as a look at crucial year in another respect. because george schultz in u.s.ed a bold change policy toward the soviet union, what he did was quite stunning. the approach that had been the dominant fact of u.s. soviet relations since the days of henry kissinger. meant that backlash in one issue area would lead to backlash in another issue area. this was always a recipe for deadlock. it always made the hawk and the detente opponents.

this is a very crucial point in history, i think. shultz believed that strength and dialogue on alternative ways of going about things. quote from george with someoneerview who is with us today. if you do not have any strength, you are going to get your head handed to you. on the other hand, the willingness to negotiate builds strength, because you are using it for a constructive purpose. with no strength objective to be gained, it loses its meaning. these are not alternative ways of going about things. again, this is the crucial point. from 1983. what schultz did in his talks,

they put together an inventory -- they improved soviet relations. for instance, they discussed here and so forth. they intensified negotiations for the long-term agreement. only against the backdrop of reagan's evil empire speech. saying thatout schulz's approach came under attack in 1983. i just want to give you one example of schulz's ability to against the opponents of intensified dialogue. 1983,ember in september, the soviets shut down the airliner. 200 70 people died.

reagan condemned this act as an act of barbarism and even played the tape of the soviet pilots for the press. , would this was incident cause a setback for u.s. soviet relations? would it jeopardize the kind of progress that george shultz had been able to reach? the hawks in the reagan administration wanted to stop the dialogue with the soviet union and back at that time in september, shultz was scheduled to meet the soviet foreign for the imager and conclusion of the helsinki follow-up meeting in the trade just one week later. what schultz did is, he prevailed. .e had reagan's backing he wanted to avoid a punishment

policy. there were u.s. measures against the soviet union, but they were limited. not across the board. limited. managed and international reaction of what he called controlled fury. it is a good expression. schulz emphasized it quote to .egular -- to reagan we will avoid the repetition of the elliptic boycotts in rome, -- avoid theu.s. of 1980.n that was a crucial point. again, september, 1983. heulz wrote to reagan that wanted to demonstrate international condemnation

focusing on civil aviation is producing far more effective than a series of unilateral steps and soviet union's two bilateral lies the issue. met in there and september, 1983 in the dred and the nato allies greatly appreciated schulz's approach, because they were scared that the white house and the pentagon were too late, but schulz went there. confronted and professed his horror at this. what happened was they discussed to review the issue and stormed among 35e meeting participating states. this is the advantage of dialogue. if you have this kind of a tough

dialogue, if it is tough, schultz confronted and scored a bold diplomatic victory. the lesson would be, don't run away, confront your adversaries. argue it out. this is also, i would say this is also detente. that youoes not imply can't make friends with the adversaries. detente is a contentious affair. the arms race continues. there is still a potential for dialogue, even if it is tough. did the right thing, and his diplomacy was crucial back at that time to keep nato together.

the is also the year of crisis. this was essential to pursue a common policy within nato. the west europeans were delighted about schulz. if you take a look at the german or british archives, there are just happy that schulz managed , becausehem together they lacked this capability. it was just a mess. the debate over the construction andto was in bad shape george schulz managed to restore this plan of unity and also president reagan appreciated that. let me grab my glass.

come to my third point, to the benefits of detente. i go back to the 1960's and 1970's. why is detente so important for the west europeans? why's it so important for the germans? about the extension of human contact across the iron curtain. the number of visitors from west germany to east germany was 8 million. that is an enormous number, and it was made possible through detente. schmidt said, they brought practical humanitarian

improvements so that detente can be felt immediately by the people of europe. relatives andheir friends across the iron curtain in one direction. just from west to east. contact from of east to west just came very late in the game. the second half of the 1980's. in 1987, that number rose to 2 million people. it is a huge number for east germany. waseast german population 17 million. that is more than 10% of the population that went to west germany in the second half of the 1980's. what was it about? it was aimed at undermining paul -- communism. it was aimed at the breakdown of communism.

what was the means? exposing people to western values via the media. time, it was aimed at stability, because you can only have the expansion of contact if economyhave and sotion of borders far the economic benefits was an intricate affair. a foreign-policy advisor gave a lucid description of their objectives in 1969.

he said, the aim is not habituated and conservation of the bloc, but the removal. we do not differ about soviet intentions. we hope to put this at an end, but the problem is, how to do it. he was talking to the british and u.s. call it take -- colleagues. the praguear after spring. policy thatritish the germans would go too far with this kind of an offensive. most promising way is to disengage the soviets from eastern europe step-by-step, by beginning project that link eastern and western europe in ways the soviets do not consider dangerous. you do not put further domination into question, this is a long procedure with its own

contradictions, but it is the only way in less you give up the objective of liberating europe. this is quite stunning, officially. there was a rule not to take notes at these meetings, but the u.s. policy planners took a 20 page record and the british policy planners as well. i can encourage you, go to the national archives. we a quote in the footnote. it is a record of the policy and there are tons of records on these policy planning meetings. these sources are unique. go there and take a look. this is the rationale of ostpolitik and the helsinki negotiations provided a platform to multilateral eyes -- multilateralize.

i have a quote from west germany's foreign minister from nato's archives. policy, we have opened up a way to direct and and competition between the societies of east and west. we have wanted this because we believe in the power of conviction of our ideals and because we trust in the inner strength of our system, which is based on democratic liberties, human rights and social justice. this is a very dynamic detente and this is for the benefit of there alwaysause competing visions of detente. you have this dynamic vision and you have the soviet union vision of detente, which was very much a static vision, just focusing on civility and on the status quote. said, the number of

visitors increases, and everything goes fine, until 1983 , 1973, 1974, when you have the backlash. in thening goes very far soviet leaders and the east german leaders are aware of it. what they do is that they pressure on west berlin and increase the minimum from westor visits germany to east germany and the number of visitors is plummeting by half in 1973. then comes helmut schmidt in 1974 and schmidt uses economic incentives and money to work for an increase. rewards the east german

regime for this opening up. hanukkah gets a huge increase in the annual conversation, from 200 million to 400 million. continues, with east germans getting a package for aillion deutsche mark construction of a motorway from hamburg to relent. incentives toic have this kind of a detente, and again, i would say, this is no longer the cold war style conflict of the 1950's. if you go back to the 1950's, 1960's, berlin is a trouble point. back in the 1970's and 1980's, you don't have these conflicts anymore.

berlin is settled. western access is settled. it is completely different. the increase in communication and the number of telephone calls from west to east, 35 million telephone calls. you have new fiber cables and so forth. schmidt defended this approach in times of crisis. wantedarter very much economic welfare toward the soviet union after the intervention in afghanistan. approach.fends his here in the summer of 1980, at the world economic summit, he argues, from the british record of this world economic summit, the main objectives were to make it possible for as many germans as possible to come to germany

a humanuild as good relationship as possible between east and west. the federal government for succeeding in getting 30,000 to 40,000 germans out of poland each year, the price paid within the helsinki framework in the framework of various bilateral agreements was to have economic exchanges eastern european countries. these exchanges were far more than a mere matter of trade. they made it possible for the german government to get their own people out. trade was not just a distance affair. trade was an effort to get ethnic germans out of poland and to buy contact from east germany. the next point on the agenda is --mut schmidt diploma you

diplomacy with brezhnev. let me talk about helmut schmidt back channel negotiations. you're are all aware about the usage of the channel. that lasted for eight years. then it was over. jimmy carter did not want to channel.the back i went to the library of congress. harriman was an advisor and wanted to maintain the back channel. but they dides, not endorse the meetings. there was no meaningful back channel communication and george took until 1983 until they got that back channel going again. the germans had a continuous back channel conversation with leadership for 30 years, from 1969 to 1982.

i went to helmut schmidt's archives, saw his papers, there are about 150 back channel meetings in 30 years between helmut schmidt and april bar on the german side and the soviet interlocutory's. they were both kgb and they both worked for kgb chief. aty had these meetings schmidt's home, at schmidt's office, even at schmidt's holiday resort. schmidt, of course, this was a lot of tough talk.

schmidt said in 1979, i am not a hawk. i want to continue detente and reach mutual security. u.s.s.r.r 1979, the would love to bury nato's dual track decision. you will not succeed, you have not buried the ss-20 missiles. in times of crisis, the communication in the back 1980, theyroach in meet every two weeks. you have the crisis in u.s. soviet relations, and these guys meet every two weeks. this is quite stunning. i found it quite stunning. i was quite surprised.

it underlines the seriousness of schmidt and brezhnev's attempt to keep detente alive in europe. in 1978, at schmidt's home in inburg, schmidt and brezhnev 1978 at their summit, also at schmidt's home in hamburg, and ,chmidt's conception of trade he talked to the british prime minister in 1978 and told him, --

the thing is, this was a multilateral project.

france, fories for italy, austria, a was a multilateral project. that is why it was so successful. it today, it is a purely bilateral russian project. that is why it is raising a lot of questions. this was a multilateral project under the chairmanship of all of the other west european companies, who were involved. so, the 1978 summit was the starting point for the construction of this pipeline. constructionhe happened between 1982 and 1984. the crucial talks, commercial talks for the construction of the timeline happened in 1980, february 1980.

no into the archive of deutsche bank in 1700, and it was after the intervention in afghanistan, where the chairman of deutsche had travel to moscow and in-depth talks with soviet leadership on this project. crisis, you have a huge expansion of natural gas. this was the first pure export pipeline for soviet natural gas. signed the brezhnev final deal in november 1982, on the occasion of brezhnev's last visit to the federal republic, his heavy trucks from west germany for the construction of the pipeline, here is tons of

japanese equipment and last -- lost half $1 billion. in thise not allowed deal due to the sanctions from the reagan administration. komatsu was glad to jump in and build this pipeline. this is again in 1980, when the talks took place on the commercial side of the pipeline. again, schmidt went there despite a lot of opposition from the carter administration. they had a tough talk with brezhnev criticizing the soviet intervention. to conveys either not

the public image. he did not participate in the signing of these commercial treaties in 1980. he did not want to provoke the carter white house. his policy was determined, but low key. that was crucial. protagonists.wo how much schmidt, and george shultz, and their meeting in san francisco. sad, because schmidt's chancellorship was coming to an end. he was forced to resign in october. just three months after george schulz had a job as secretary of had oneut schmidt

important advice for george schulz. was that george schulz wrote in his most recent superpowersz said are not in touch with each other's reality. the soviets can't read you. the situation is dangerous. there is no human contact. thrust of their meeting in july, 1982. george schulz took this advice very seriously. and 1983,see in 1982 he managed to reestablish the kind of dialogue with the soviet union that i have previously described. this is the point where the circle closes, where helmut

schmidt and george schulz talk in 1982, and thank you for your attention and i'm looking forward to your questions. thank you so much. [applause] >> all right. thank you. rich and stimulating presentation. i think all sorts of questions and issues come to mind, i'm sure to many of you as well. from your description of president reagan and some of the popular perception has not always been -- had the image of somebody who could handle contradictorylent

policies, how did he synchronize, workout these different aspects of his policy? other scholars have written about this. you brought this out once again. in thee of trade east-west relations and in the end of the cold war. androle of back channels the washington of 2019. the role of back channels with russia. you have made the case for the importance of these back channels. this unlikely dynamic duo of schulz and schmidt, i am not sure who else put these two

together in this way. .ots of questions the role of american detente versus german ostpolitik. but needed the first word to the ambassador, who has raised his arm. please wait for the microphone and unless i name you, please also give your name and affiliation. ambassador. >> first, i wanted to thank you for this wonderful book. i have had a chance to look into it. i was listening to him today. it tells me just how much research in the archives he has done, because he has uncovered a lot of evidence that i was not aware of, even though i spend a lot of time with schulz now and in the past. congratulations. i think it is a terrific book and will shed a lot of light on that particular era, which i think is one of the key eras. do with -- has to

these days, it is impossible to spend any time with george schulz without hearing the words pershing moment, referring to the deployment of the pershing ballistic missile. i'm not quite sure what his view ,as then, but his view now having also talked with three sovietoviet union's -- union leaders, he said that as the turning point of the cold war. that was imperative for the negotiation on the ins missiles to take place, that the soviet union recognized that the nato alliance was holding together, despite the attempt to beat it down. we also realized within 10 minutes of a nuclear explosion in moscow from germany. --s is what george schulz

this is what we need today. they do not recognize that there is a problem and he needs to be stopped, and therefore he says, we need a pershing moment. i'm not quite sure his history is right. i'm not quite sure that the events are how he describes them. i had to say them quite frankly about my friend, george schulz. did you find in the archives in your research anything that suggested there was that pershing moment in 1993? that that was the turning point as george schulz now perceives it? stephan: excellent question. thank you. so much for this question. there was a pershing moment in 1983, because the soviet union did not expect that nato would stick together. they were surprised by nato's

soviets who was the ran away from the bargaining 1983 after theer pershing missiles were deployed. i think we need a pershing moment today, but the problem is that the west and the united states is running away from the bargaining table. difficult to have a new kind of pershing moment in a new nato with 28 member states. it is more challenging to reach that kind of consensus, and it is of course more challenging to timethis strategy at the when the trump administration

runs away from the inf treaty. that is a grave mistake. it goes without saying that there are russian violations of the treaty, but it should never be the united states who runs away from the bargaining table. i would be happy if we could have another pershing moment , but in today's context, i doubt it. currently, there is no new pershing moment in sight. at that time, it was very important to maintain the kind of dialogue. there was still other negotiations and you participated in the stockholm negotiations. you had deterrence on the one hand and you deployed new missiles on the other hand. the dialogue on confidence building measures was going on and it was intensified.

ofwas a very important means nato's policy. track, this dual balanced approach. >> thank you. diana. microphone is coming. >> thank you very much. from the wilson center. thank you for the clarity with .hich you have narrated i would like to focus on the back channel. theve followed closely december 1998 proposals to george h.w. bush to pursue back channels. the difficulty is finding a record of what was discussed in those back channels. kissinger took the papers away with him up to the estate. have you found any other source?

[laughter] stephan: not on that particular meeting. not on that particular meeting, no. but i found, to come back to the back channel, i found tons of sources and papers on his back channel communications. is, as a set, the amount of communication explodes in a time of crisis. it is quite stunning, i think. schmidt -- shows schmidt -- the determination to pursue diplomacy with brezhnev. there is very important for that relationship. they had a common sense and a

common experience as soldiers in world war ii. they often referred to their common experience as soldiers and so forth. remember initially, they had a huge conversation and 1973, when brezhnev first visited the republic. crimesrred to german war and to his horrific experience, and schmidt countered him in 1973, reported about his own miserable experiences as a soldier. he always referred to it as the great shit of war. that was the common memory that kept them together. the back channel was there for 13 years.

i would love to see the soviet sources. >> on the back channel, did schmidt keep the americans apprised? what did washington know about the german soviet back channels? stephan: he kept them appraised of the back channels. to reviveen tried carter's and brezhnev's communications through zone channel. carter and brezhnev were in touch. ofre was still an exchange letters, but it was not meaningful. there was a pause of several months in 1978 after the failure of the belgrade follow-up meeting and schmidt offered

himself to reestablish the back journal communications. let's take some more questions. over here. >> thank you for a fascinating presentation. i do retired foreign service officer. on your second slide, you had a quote about reagan's changing disposition about the soviets. i'm wondering if you look at the role that suzanne maffei may have played in changing the view , and you mentioned the opposition in the white house. he had a lot of opposition. that was also an important factor in 1984. she convinced reagan of the necessity of improved dialogue. fromnd several memoranda reagan's advisors.

they feared that she could get too much influence. they always want, don't let her meet reagan alone. influential, telling reagan about her own personal experience and giving of thea description soviet union. that was in 1984. she was also a factor in his change of mind. christian: thank you. gentleman there. >> thank you for your insightful presentation. i never torrid -- i am a retired foreign service officer. day they lefthe the coalition with how much schmidt-- with helmut and was there for the pershing moment.

there were a couple names i did not hear in your presentation and wanted to maybe hear from you about them now. one, i witnessed again and again talking about the ongoing negotiations, which seemed to me at the time in almost the important as representing the united states, one of the only people the germans trust. i'm not leaving out schulz deliberately, but he was the face in germany of america. perle,reagan, richard and they came with a great desperation as someone who might be able to save them from the impending war they heard coming from reagan. that was one name, and the other one i did not hear, or actually three names, richard perle,

,reddie clay, and weinberger caspar weinberger. of those seemed to me, and i put it mostly on perle who understood that reagan was a nuclear abolitionist, but were toh more devious and able exploit his general ignorance about the dynamics here and to first of all come up with the zero zero solution, which was designed to present -- prevent any arms control accord and to use reagan's vision of strategic defense to prevent a strategic arms limitation agreement. reagan never understood the dynamics and how the soviets could not accept an uncontrolled strategic defense realm, because it would jeopardize the strategic weapons deterrent. christian: thank you. stephan: thank you so much.

zero zero option emerged in november, 1981, and that was quite late in the game, because schmidt always wanted to bring up some sort of constructive proposal throughout 1981. he also asked reagan to come to europe and visited europe and to layout some sort of detailed arm control agenda. , becauseeagan so long there were these frictions within the reagan administration. proposal was not people such as weinberger and perle. they did not mean it seriously. it was seen as a nonstarter.

that was one of the few trusted -- for the europeans. i went to work at the library and i was surprised that they had arms control seminars with the social democrats in germany. i was not aware of that. he found it necessary to keep them on board and to keep them -- to include them in his deliberations. that was quite a stunning thing back at that time. the trust of the germans of his -- heator and he became works closely with schulz. this role can hardly be overestimated. weinberger played a critical role in the internal fights with schulz over the missiles, over the construction of the

pipeline. one who lifted the sanctions and the embargo in 1982 and weinberger was very much against that. he did not trust the germans in this regard. thank you. the gentleman. henry, i worked 14 years on nato nuclear weapons and basically set up the process and laid out the options which led to those missiles. of that was we did not have a proposal, because we remembered our experience with the germans on the multilateral force. we were surprised at what turned out. aware, even though i was in the u.s. for three years, of

all of the efforts that were going on in the background of that, that created the softening of the whole situation. theway berlin receded, carmel report itself, i am sure you have consulted on that. and then the helsinki final act. all of this was happening at once. which gives the background to of,lly getting to this kind maybe it was the persian crisis, and i forgot, the 1972 treaty sovereigntyhe ddr which everyone knew was the end of the ddr as it where. -- were. how did you feature those as he worked out? historyd the german

journals, egon bahr was prominent to me in that process. does your book cover that background? so much fornk you your question. actually the book covers that background, as my president -- my presentation also covered it. this early phase of politic and detente provided the background for off politic. because early on, the architects, such as a gone bar, they were aware that potential backlashes might occur. what counted for them was to turn off politic into an irreversible process early on. -- one of the most important things to them. that is what counted. it could only function if it was thought up and if it was implemented as an irreversible process. right? this opening up and this sort of multiplying context, that would

be a backlash. right? andhe backlash came in 1973 1974, and the east germans also greatly increased the number of agents. civilians toied cope with the increasing number of western visitors. bahr and others were aware of these backlashes and they conceived economic incentives as a means to cope with these potential backlashes. berlin is an important issue. and a schmidt also continued that in television -- in telephone conversations with germany's leader. they also had a back channel and television -- telephone conversations. they would talk about technical issues such as, i don't know, traffic transit to west berlin, and also oil and gas deliveries

via ships to west berlin. technicald to avoid problems turning into political problems. they frequently discussed in detail of these talks on the phone. a preventiveo diplomacy over the long-term. bahr served as an advisor to schmidt. they had different positions on the muscles, and the nato decision. when it comes to the back channel, bahr continued to be confidant. and he had him operate the back channel. the stunning thing is i found in papers, only a few written evidence on his back channel context under brand chancellorship.

they were very close. so bahr could do it without instructions. few written reports. and then came schmidt. reports.anted he wanted written evidence. he wants to know what is happening in this back channel. and he sees the more frequently than bryant did. he saw him only a couple of times and schmidt wants to be in charge. he is the chancellor. this is his back channel. and bahr follows his instructions. schmidt wants to make sure that the back channel is going into the right direction. this is a crucial point.

i put schmidt and bahr closer and closer together than other historians did. i also see a lot of continuity from schmidt to have more coil. found ain 1982, i wonderful report. bahr is talking to the national security advisor, november 1982, offers to transfer this back channel for the administration. and he accepts. the back channel stops and does not have access to the evidence from the administration. for that, you have to go to have more coal's private papers which is very difficult. it is telling that he was ready

to continue the back channel. on, it is activated again in 19 a 7-1980. -- 1987-1988. it was crucial as a back channel negotiator. >> thank you. ross? russ johnson, wilson center. thank you very much, very important research. i look forward to looking at your book. two questions. you talked about the economic bondholders.german there was some more instrumental part of that economic transaction, which was payments to get people out, buying freedom. i wonder if in your research you have come across more detail about that with the gdr with

romania or wherever else? the more general question would beginning of awesome focused,german policy in terms of stimulating change, focused on dealing with governments with regimes. had the u.s. had more of a two track policy, also dealing with and inthings from below, the u.s. german -- u.s.-german relationship, they became a lightning rod. that is well documented. and it is documented in the schmidt and brzezinski memoirs. thiswondering -- and tension was very evident to me, i worked in the german research institute.

i am wondering come in the archives whether you come across more about the tension between the two countries on this particular issue? yes, it went far beyond that in terms of other activities dealing with it. i'm wondering if there is more evidence you have come across? stephan: absolutely. yeah. thanks a lot. yeah. let me start with the first question. buying freedom, right? freedom movement in return for cash. i found a lot of evidence in inmidt's papers and later on other papers. i also have a section in the book in the call administration's approach when credit ofabout the

1983 and 1984. they were also a means to intensify human contact -- context. papersy, the east german are more revealing than the westermann papers. thehave to take a look at on his role. he was east germany's foreign currency fundraiser. but he was also the most important negotiator with the west germans. they negotiated all of the agreements that led to the intensification of context. the thing is, in these contexts, it was often the west germans who had to give first.

the credits in 1983 and 1984 came first, and only then came the east german confessions with the reduction of the come par terry -- reduction of the treaty. it was always the less two had to give first. this was of course very annoying often to the u.s. administrations. to the carter administration. that it was always westermann concessions that can first. and he referred to the competing human rights policies, the schmidt policy was what i call a collective human rights policy. the greatest number for the greatest happiness. of people. and the other approach was very , and schmidtpolicy

criticized it as an abstract policy. he said, we cannot talk about abstraction. we have to get our people out and your approaches standing in the way of mine. collided, often in the helsinki talks. 1980's until the early when max kimball men brought these two approaches together at the follow-up meeting. need for a lot of consensus on these approaches. it is a men said strength if you have these approaches, he compared nato with an orchestra. you have different voices, different influences with an orchestra. the thing is to coordinate them in the right way. that is what later happened in the 1980's. >> final question. i'm sorry to those i can't call on. they goes to a gentleman who has

been patiently waiting. then we will have to adjourn. final question. >> thank you. >> introduce yourself please. >> thomas julian. i teach policy at the airport institution of technology. your fascinating description of the back channels and the approach that kept alleviating tensions that might have erupted into conflict referenced external events like the reference made by schmidt to the ss 20 and so forth. someone whobecause set up project ryan about the imminence of a western attack, left the scene in february of 1984. he seems to have been an interim

figure. i'm wondering, in that period, there was the crisis over the able archer exercise. what impacted that have on the persistence of the back channels and soviet attitudes? stephan: thanks a lot for your question. it did have a huge impact on reagan. he was in november, 1983. and reagan gave a public speech in january, 1984. when he first admitted in public that he changed his approach. the reagan administration was quite concerned that the soviets viewed able archer in drastic terms. interesting evidence in check medlock's papers. george'se archer, schmitz had a lot of saturday seminars at the state

department. with discussions on means to improve communications. that was directly linked to able archer in 1983. able archer did have an influence in this respect. it was not as dangerous as many historians maybe see it. in that respect, it did have influence. one remark, and drop-off was the in the soviet union's policy. guys, theyannel worked for him. memoirs.to read the he points out that he was the guiding force. because you had also frictions between him and crummy go. he was more oriented toward the united states. is -- and he was

gorbachev's mentor. christian: thank you. fascinating context to today's events and developments. thank you so much for sharing your insights from the cold war. let me remind all of you that next week, we will have my when cheating on the art of containment in southeast asia. that is march 11. we have a terrific lineup of additional speakers through may. we will have gail her shutter here on march 25 on women and china revolution. on april 8, jennifer miller on cold war democracy, the united states and japan. bigave one of the real shots in our world, robert bob

jervis on how state -- on how statements think. politics here on april 4. mark that on your calendar. that is only monday. on a thursday, let's give a round of a clause -- round of applause. thank you for joining us. i invite you to continue the conversation over a glass of wine next-door. right outside actually care thank you. outside actually. thank you. announcer: american history tv is on c-span3 every weekend, and all of our programs are archived on our website at c-span.org/history. you can watch lectures and college classrooms, tours of historic sites, archival films, nancy our schedule of upcoming programs at c-span.org/history.