express, sincere regret as to what happened, on behalf of the employees of exxon and certainly on behalf of myself. i can't express how sorry we are that this disaster occurred, particularly sympathetic to the impact of the residence of alaska, and particularly those in the prince william sound area, that is where the difficulty is with a great deal of problems for those people. as was said this morning and bias, we take full responsibility, and we have done so from the beginning. and we will continue doing all we can to clean up and mitigate the spill effects, and all the necessary resources have already been mentioned by secretary skinner, that the environment in the area, and the remoteness at high tide the

physical problems associated with it make it a difficult problem. in comments about the spill, just to put them in perspective, as we mentioned many times, the spill has been an estimated 240,000 barrels. it occurred early on march 24. we have other factual information. the weather was clear, the ship had no known mechanical difficulties, the course change was requested and authorized because of ice in the outgoing channel. the captain subsequently left the bridge. test sometime after the grounding showed that the captain's alcohol limit is above that required by the coast guard. we are conducting of course not one but many investigations, as

are the national transportation safety board and coast guard and other federal and state investigations, also underway and we are dissipating in all of those. the contingency plan was activated immediately and called for a response. first was a responsibility of alaska. the second phase was our responsibility as a shipper and our responses immediately. we immediately establish priorities. the first priority is to prevent additional spills from the tanker which had approximately 1 million barrels or so of crude on it. and, certainly tried to immediately mitigate the impact of the spill on the environment to the people of alaska. mobilization began immediately and by now involved as the secretary said, many hundreds of people, thousands of people, a lot of boats and helicopters and so forth. currently, we are receiving is

support from a large number of organizations. we have experts academics and so forth, under contract. and, we have 200 exxon experts and other consultants, that are managing our part of this. we mobilize and mitigate the economic impact on the community in prince william sound. the office is staffed by 30 people. open and adequate funds are placed in an account at local bank. those funds are available to provide immediately advanced payments to those requiring monitor support, while cleaning his being processed. i have requested that be done as expeditiously as possible. as of noon, tuesday, we had the remaining oil that could be removed from the tanker on the

reef we headed off the reef, as i'm sure most of you read in this morning's paper, the ship was successfully reflected, and it is now in a area next to naked island, where we will make temporary repairs, and when that is completed we will take the ship into dry dock somewhere, and repair it permanently. a couple more comments, for now it is too early to assess the long-term environmental damage. after resource damage assessment studies are underway, we have mentioned a number of them have been made with the epa and others, and we also have the number done ourselves. we cannot stress how long recovery will take in prince william sound but i can assure you that since march 24, the accident has been receiving our full intention and will continue to do so until the job is done.

we are continuing to cooperate fully to establish the facts as to what happened. more importantly, however, we want to help in any way we can establish what might be done to reduce the chances of such an incident happening again. i can assure you that actions are already underway within exxon to revise policies and procedures, in the light of this accident, to prevent what happened from happening again. >> to that point that it not happen again, has excellent not to risk such a valuable cargo, three football fields which takes a couple of miles or so to even torn turn course, to put that to just one copilot this one pilot without a copilot? if i was on exxon supertankers

this morning what i find only one pilot? >> no sir. the prince william sound area is unusual, that most of the three mates plus the captain, licensed to pilot the ship in many areas. in prince william sound, as has been said many times this morning, the state politics it to a certain point, and then -- can you hear me? >> goes in and out. we try to correct it all morning long. but i'll try to talk louder. >> please do. >> in this case, the pilot was also the captain. obviously has no knowledge of how he was impaired. i think it is possible, however, as i understand, the law there, it is possible to have two mates on the bridge at the same time. in a case like this, to where you could in fact do what needs

to be done when you have ice in one channel there was a great deal of concern, not trying to make any excuses, but the facts are, there are ways to do that if in fact as you suggested in an earlier conversation with secretary skinner that if one had a heart attack or something, there were other options available. now, the same impairment apparently was created this bill to begin with, created a situation where maybe the master could have said bring another made up, when the skipper was on the bridge, there were four people. there was a lookout on one of the lanes, there was a person that was in charge with the captain, there was the third rate there with his ship, and there was also the person steering.

that was the situation the captain had when he went down. he could have sent up another mate and then legally responded. whether that shift ship would have hit the reef or not, i suspect it would've had a better chance of getting ripped through there. i've had a lot of difficulty understanding this myself, i can assure you. >> this is the first we have learned this morning about the copilot, if the first and second mate went qualified masters of vessel as is required in those waters as the record shows. you said of course you didn't have any knowledge, and yet, they say in the law you should have known. the records show this particular master had three convictions, of driving under the influence of alcohol, did he have an alcohol problem? >> yes sir, it shows that. >> i be scared to death if i

was on exxon's board and you're telling me this man had three convictions, this vessel was only three years old. i would say look. kings bay, kings point i should say up there in long island. you can have all the masters you want. i mean, you got no explanation for that. >> no sir. >> i'm not going to try to press that point. but let me tell you. we had some things in place. coming up a bit earlier regarding random testing for drugs and alcohol, the difficulty we have in some cases negotiating those. but, we can impose that in certain instances, left before the spill but we have it in the policy.

if we get lawsuits on it we will take the lawsuits on it. i would feel much better, if we take a lawsuit in this kind of thing and then we say we went to court and we lost it, which is the situation that we find ourselves in now. senator with regards to this alcohol question, probably aware of it let me clarify further. we didn't know about the dwis. i had never heard this man until a few weeks ago. not looking for any sympathy. but, we did know he came in, as i understand it and said i have an alcohol problem a number of years ago. he was rehabilitated. that was consistent with an alcohol policy. however, the judgment to put him back on the ship is a judgment made at an operating level. obviously, it was a bad judgment.

, a lot of people have their eyes on this mine included. just in case you hadn't heard of that, i didn't want you feeling like i didn't level with you when i was up here talking. >> i appreciate that. the third mate now, you find no culpability there i take it because you fired the master, you now have corporate counsel representing the third mate, is that right? >> what we found, you find yourself in this kind of situation, i'm not too expert in these answers but i've asked the same questions. in the case of the captain, we told him to get his own counsel . this was before we knew the alcohol situation. by the way, those tested didn't show up until several days later. but, we knew that when the ship ran aground that he was not on the beach. we obviously had a conflict between the corporate

interests, and probably between the corporate interest in the individual, when we found out there was alcohol involved, and other circumstances we found out, he violated a lot of policies. in the case of the third mate, sort of in that same space. there has been to my knowledge, no testimony taken under as in this case yet because the national transportation safety board is still developing the case and so forth but those who have been interviewed by those individuals, coast guard and so forth. we have into that venue i think. on the response the second in line was you axon, and you responded immediately, implying you did not delay the response.

what is that? >> i'm sure you've heard it before but there are a number of oral skill continued since he plans involved in the situation. one of them was the esco oil spill contingency plan, one of them had to be in place before the pipeline went up, but was in 1977, but this plan was in place, it's been revised several times since, then shippers were separated out of the pipeline and they had to have their own contingency plan in early 80s i'm not really sure when. when i said the first part, it is a relatively small spill for their plan i think. there has always been recognition, that if you had a tanker spill, in prince william sound, and you mentioned the

probable case, no one ever thought it was probable that a spill would be there, but there has been around a modest write up in the contingency plan, recognizing the possibility of 200,000 barrel spillages in the same ballpark of what we are talking about here. the time is when you mobilize the resources, other all around the world, update in europe and florida and other places. now, an important part of that contingency plan, anything that large in effect had approved by the federal agency, the epa and the state of alaska agency involved have recognized that you have to promptly disperse in this case, the proper

dispersant, mobilization started on friday. the team left houston, a management team of the upsilon shipping company, rossi was sent , we have response teams in the gulf coast and the southeast coast and we also have current employees but anyone in our research effort regards and wants to do it we put them under contract, all these people convened. the management team later on the day and friday. we had a c-130 available, we had a large amount of the dispersant there, but then some problems occurred, not because of the planet not providing decisions to be made, but because the plan provided for a number of people to be involved in the decision.

>> stevens, i got a lot out of that question. >> thank you very much. i know what you say, you didn't notice captain personally, and we certainly don't imply any personal in our feelings. but, my problem dealing with this now, is the multiplicity of plans, my understanding is that allie esco did have a plan, there is a regional response team plan, there is a prince william sound company plan, would you do us the favor of asking people to give us a copy of each one of those since the beginning of the pipeline shipments out of -- i believe you have them i have to get

them anyway for the lawsuit. >> you want each member of the committee descendent of the council? >> i am pleased to tell the committee, bill stephens is a friend of mine. matter of fact, i think we are related. we talked about that one night, he is the president of your tanker company, he came to alaska, and made a statement, saying that exxon would accept the total responsibility for this. you have made a similar statement here now. after mister stevens left alaska, your legal department indicated that as far as the liability to the customers, in terms of delivery, that exxon was going to rely on an act of god theory. is that correct? >> when mister stevens made his statements. and by the way, the president of exxon usa is cooperating, there was nothing about the

impact of the spill in alaska, because, you start getting into something downstream in terms of -- i assume you're talking about customers. you can roll that on around the world. >> i just want to do now, in alaska as being a second sort of exxon, leaving a significant doubt in the mind of alaskans as to if the national exxon company was going to accept the statement that mister stevens made. many of us are lawyers, you are the president of the company, but your lawyers are liable to go to court and say after all that is not a legal obligation it was a statement of policy and we are now defending against this suit. what is the policy of exxon with regards to any expense

that develops as a result of this spill? >> obviously, i said again this morning it is our intention to stay with this spill, clean it up to the best of scientific -- the best that we can do. and also, to pay those people who have been damaged by the spill, and the damages, and when you talk about suits, we have suits, as i am sure you are aware. the fact are, there's a lot of these suits that are legitimate, and hopefully none of the people in alaska who have been damaged will have to go to court. >> i share that thought, very few of the people who haven't and have active courts. >> right. >> i am hopeful that the system will be put in place by the

president for an emergency declaration i hope because that would put the fda and the federal emergency management agency out there to give temporary assistance, which if there are claims set up that can be presented that your company will pay, that the people who get that assistance can repay it. meanwhile, there are a lot of people in the earthquake, people who were not even in the area of the earthquake had severe financial losses as a result. want to make sure that from the point of view of the company, that act of god defense that was raised with regard to deliveries of the oil to customers has no relationship to the events that took place in my state. none. >> i have a map that i made when i was up there, i didn't make the map, but we do these things, it shows the area,

that was the exxon valdez last week, it was my understanding that the obligation to remain, to have a pilot on board basically came down to about this line. and that the third mate was qualified to handle a ship through entrance, but he was not qualified to pilot this vessel above that line. it's also my understanding that the captain was the only person on board after the pilot got off as the ship came through, as the valdes, captain was the only person on board that was qualified to run the ship. is that your understanding? >> my understanding is that the captain was the only man on board licensed as a pilot to run the ship. >> that's right. >> that's different than my view as to who was qualified or unqualified. >> it's my understanding that third mate was not qualified to run that ship past fly

reef. >> well, senator, i -- >> i'm not trying to -- >> frankly, i'm having trouble seeing the map but i know what the reef is and so forth. where the channel goes. >> unfortunately, like captain bly, you, my understanding that he came down, the captain was required to get it passed bligh reef, and we learned this morning, as a result of yesterday, that the computer on this vessel was programmed by the captain, as the pilot left, and the tug left it, and that the third officer attempted to countermand the computer program and it was actually the computer that drove that vessel on the reef.

is that your understanding? >> no, sir it is not. my understanding, and this is a result of interviews made with the third officer, that he turned that computer off. and that it was not at the time, he hit the rocks, on automatic pilot. even though, i'm just telling you what he has said. what he testified to. >> again, i've taken too much time this morning. it's my understanding from the visiting cordova, that the cordova people, that built those hatcheries, those are not federal, they were built by the people in the cordova area, to enhance the production of salmon in the area. if they felt compelled and did go and acquired the boom, and started the protection of those hatcheries, because the exxon group would not move to,

in their opening, quickly enough for the protection. that is the basis i think of the feeling and the prince william sound now that there should have been federalization. have you talked to your people as to why some of the offers of assistance that were made were refused? for instance, the departmental team, headed by the bureau of land management, federal and state teams went to valdez, stayed there two days, it was rejected. it's a crisis management team financed by the taxpayers. it did work out of a contingency plan to protect the resurrection bay and the national park. secondly, i'm told that the norwegians made an offer, the swedes made an offer, we've had a series of offers from responsible entities that have dealt with oil spills in the past, and your coordinator refused the assistance.

now, is that a company policy? and did you inform that -- >> first, it's not a company policy. second, a lot of those things that have alleged to have been set up there, it's my understanding for example, we are willing to accept the russian offer. >> going to be allowed in there to help now? >> i don't think we would have been able to keep it out anyway, but certainly we've asked to have it. we are accepting all the help. the norwegian offer that had allegedly been made earlier in this spill was really, they wanted to have as i understand it, senator, have four observers come and look. and as far as i'm concerned and no, there was no what i understand offer of help. they want observers, there was a french offer about observers. i don't know the other one. >> the germans also contacted

me. the germans. >> a question of offers of help and then a lot of people just want to see how you deal with a large oil spill. and, of course, obviously, lots up there. so it's a little bit different. the words are different. the intent is different. we have not turned down any offers. in terms of the fishermen out of cordova, it's my understanding that we are utilizing a love those with their boats. and that we are trying to fully employ them. you know better than most in his room, including me, that we are not dealing with beaches that look like miami beach or somewhere else up there. these are very difficult conditions. and that's why it's a pristine area and why it's tragic and why it has all the wildlife it has, but we also have concerns, we're getting thousands of volunteers from our own people in the u.s. and around the world when it comes to help. and we're getting thousands of letters and telephone calls from people all over the country saying we want to go

help. but one of the only good things i can say about this thing is that so far, no one was killed in this operation. and i'm sure they have been some minor injuries, but as you know, senator, we have a 15-foot tied in prince william sound, which is very unusual in the u.s. anyway. you have to go to your state to find anything like that. that's the main, i guess we have a senator from maine. something like that. but when that water goes in and out each day, or off the beach, when the tide is going out, it better be a good swimmer or somebody better be there with a boat, so we're talking about a very risky situation, it's been slow in cleaning up the beaches, it's going to be slow cleaning up the beaches. and the beaches of france that were cleaned up, were pretty simple kind of a cleanup compared to what we're facing. but we're going to get it done. >> i'm sorry, let me tell you,

i have, oceanographer that i referred to at the university of alaska has been studying this for his lifetime. he tells me that you have to do the prince william sound as being roughly capable of producing about 25% more freshwater annually down the mississippi river. when it comes out of that area, and it goes southwest with what we call the alaska coastal trend, and as the water exits, the prince william sound, it basically is freshwater. most people think they're dealing with saline water. we have tried to make an input on these plans, we've tried to make an impact on the plans now for the recovery from this. i give this thing to the people and i was there on friday, i beg people on saturday, he sent me another contingency report that i'd be glad to make available to committee today. the people that had knowledge of what was predictable, were not consulted. that has left a great feeling

with alaskans, this man, the key man for this area, this incident team, one of the first things they did when they got over to see it was to contact him for the plans dealing with the national park and resurrection bay. anybody that looked at those plans will tell you they are absurdly perfect, they set the priority, they set how much would be necessary in each area, they determined the area that had the greatest sensitivity, federal team, it was under the response, the responsibility of the city of seward. they said that was the number 1 salmon producing region in the area and it had to be protected first. they give your people a list of things they said they had to have. okay, we'll pay for it. doesn't see it moving. and we had to scurry around

and find people to move to protect that. what i'm telling you is, they were over there in valdez, they were over there on sunday. and monday. and tuesday. this is interdepartmental team. they were searching an abandoned warehouse. asking to be heard. and they were told they were not needed. now, if you want to know why we feel so strongly that there should've been a federal presence, that's it. your people said we don't need you. i was with the national guard general, an eskimo, we are very proud of it, general and his own right, he flew me down there. he offered his assistance. and they said we don't need your help. mr. rawl, you've got a wonderful company that's the pride of our country i think that you've been able to do what you've done. but in this instance, in this instance, you let us down. and i've got to say it and i say it anyway.

thank you. >> senator cardin? >> senator stevens, asking mr. rawl about what he considered to be a backing away from the agreement to assume responsibility, or when you said you treated the national guard, any claims by your customers, your response to him was, that that did not limit your responsibility to alaskans or impacted by this spill. censure stevens, quite properly, pointed out there are people outside of alaska who are impacted by this, many of the fishermen who regularly go from prince william sound are from the state of washington or from the state of oregon. another attempt to limit your liability, only the people who are voting of alaska or extend

to everyone whose livelihood is impacted by this spill? >> senator, you can understand how sitting here, you know, i presume you're a lawyer, i'm not, but you have to hear the specifics in this. if in fact there's a fisherman in your home state who has been going up to alaska, fishing and so forth, and whoever, has records to show that, he would be damaged. and i'm sure he has access to counsel, spent a lot of time looking at this thing. i cannot accept, though, liability ad infinitum and wherever it goes in the world. you know, and so forth, whatever they need. taking care of in this regard. we're doing what we can do now. we've been very busy trying to get the ship off the rocks.

that's now, thank god, over where hopefully we can pass it appropriately and we can get it to drydock. by the way, the senator from oregon is not here now but he made a speech this morning about putting that ship in oregon, and talking about the bar and so forth, and he said that was what i wanted to do. exxon had a question, drydock and the west coast of the u.s., a ship that size, and was from portland, oregon. that got translated somewhat in the press and so forth i guess. there are other places in the far east, i'm not saying where the ship is going, but -- communicated to the paper, through the newspaper, a lot of people communicating with, i can't really say that this is what he actually said because sometimes we get misstated slightly ourselves but he indicated slightly whether -- we didn't even make

a decision whereas it would go. but i wanted to make the record clear on that. i hope, i've tried to answer your question. but it's very difficult to me, legal areas that i don't -- >> but you are not attempting right now to make a distinction and say that your only responsibility would be to residents of alaska? >> when you start talking about customers, i'm sure -- >> i wasn't asking about -- >> but that's the basis that senator stevens used, and referred to, that's an entirely different thing. i take it that the parent exxon corporation, some time ago, made a decision that it was wise corporate policy for it to own its own shipping line and to ship alaskan oil, in vessels owned by the company or by a subsidiary. >> well, we actually used chartered ships, i don't know how many we are using in

alaskan trade, but international trade, exxon has 71 ships worldwide. roughly, i may be off a ship or two, 19 in this country. >> in any event, this is owned by a wholly-owned subsidiary, of which you are ceo, is that correct? >> that's correct. >> can you give me the chain of command that would go from you as chairman of the parent corporation down through the subsidiary corporation to this captain or maybe back up, who is the captain's supervisor and who is his supervisor and so on? >> when you get to the lower levels, i lose track, but the captain has a supervisor, or that supervisor, another supervisor, also reports to a manager on the west coast of the u.s. there are also other people who tell this captain what to do and in terms of scheduling

and a few weeks on and a few weeks off. not precise on the time. but then the individual on the west coast who was in port in volusia california, which is san francisco area, he was reporting to houston where we would have presumably someone we might call an operations manager. and then the president of the exxon shipping company, who reports to supervisor president of exxon usa who reports to the president of that company. we really have management committees at the level of exxon usa. we have management committees in new york and the president of that company would report to me. i don't know how many levels that is. >> well, i want to say earnestly to make a suggestion to mr. rawl, whatever the success of exxon in the past, the distinction of having caused perhaps the most severe

man-made disaster, environmental disaster in our history, we are constantly comparing ourselves in this country, sometimes unfavorably, sometimes unfairly with the japanese. as i understand, their corporate structure, when something like this happens, everyone takes responsibility from the individual who is directly in because of it, up to the ceo. and everyone offers his resignation at that point so that a new team can take over. and restore the credibility of the corporation. i suggest that your company has caused, call for that type of response. i'm happy to hear your comment but that is my assessment of this disaster. >> buyers appreciate your opinion. i doubt if i am to comment on it except a lot of japanese killed themselves also and i refuse to do that. >> not asking for that. >> i don't think so.

>> i think notwithstanding everybody's anger and frustration, there isn't any real way to ask you is happened, i don't think we gain a great deal by posturing up here at this point. and somehow other to say that you have recognized and most people in our country appreciated the forthrightness with which you tried to at least accept responsibility. and be involved in the cleanup and accept the cost thereof. there are obviously some questions though, these things have a way of ameliorating as time goes on. and commitments can become dissipated and other things can get in the way.

and so fourth, will be clambering from one end of the country to the other. let me try and see if i can get a full understanding, notwithstanding the press reports, i don't know how accurate and how extensive they are, as to what you see now, what have you declared, as your full responsibility here? for instance, to what extent in the assessment, reparation process to federal, state agencies, has the process been put in place now to assess the cost of federal government which you intend to reimburse, and what is the extent of that reimbursement? >> i don't really know, senator. what the extent of it is or whether we will reimburse the federal government on us obviously, we'll have to look into that. that hasn't been our instant concern. >> let me give you an example. policy subcommittee has been encouraged to do considerable more on global warming, impact of ozone and ecosystem and so

forth. much of their resource is now going to have to be diverted and coming here, to find out what the impact of oil which settles on the bottom is going to be on microorganisms and life and so forth. will it be your intention to redress that additional cost and time of the federal government? >> i'll look at everything. that's all i can say. >> when you get this big advertisement, in the newspapers which apologizes and says we are going to the full cost and make it good, to what extent have you thought that out? what is making good? how long will the fishermen continue to be compensated for loss of livelihood? >> the first thing we have to find out is what is the size of this environmental disaster? there have been a number of environmental disasters around the world, some of them

mentioned here, some others likely through fire, in mexico, a lot more in that in the gulf of mexico in terms of not having lasting effects. we pay the u.s. government a good part of a delay, in my view, early days any delay, from the time we were ready, which was part of the approved plan, that has been approved by the epa, a detergent that's approved by the state of california, 12 countries around the world who had it available, who had aircraft available ready to stay. and it has been tested and it has been for some time. this size spell, we couldn't get approval from saturday morning when we requested approval on friday. we couldn't get approval from saturday morning until 6:35 on sunday evening. by then, the water had really gotten bad, as i'm sure you've

heard. and so forth. now, we've got some government agencies involved in that. the responsibility involved in that. >> my ears are ringing with mitigation of damages arguments. >> i'm not litigating. i'm just telling you when you start pointing who's at fault, you say, the ship on the ground, and we had a plan and we weren't able to start the plan. as a lawyer, that may be what you're hearing. what i'm telling you is that a good conscience, we're going to try to fix, but when you start talking about compensating the u.s. government, everyone of us compensates the u.s. government all the time. this company pays a lot of taxes every year. we pay taxes every year on crude oil. >> i know you're not, the chairman will go through the roof, i know you're not suggesting that that somehow

compensates for what happened. >> that's right. but however, a lot of these are government services that are supposed to be provided when you have a disaster. i have a hunch that had we had a little bit more clear authority or people on the ground who felt like they could exercise authority, we probably could have mitigated this. even got rid of -- >> let me ask you this. in your judgment, was the plan with which you are one of the consortia, was that adequate? >> retrospectively, it's difficult to say it was adequate. retrospectively, a lot of these plans, you're looking at all of these -- >> let me ask you point-blank, is it difficult to say it's adequate if the maximum amount of oil the plan contemplated being prepared for was $74,000? and this spill dumped three times that. is that a difficult issue to

decide, looking at its face? >> you're talking about the plaintiff in with which is a plan that takes a certain amount of spill upstream from where this hit the rocks. the other plan with the plan that the shipper was supposed to have. which we were supposed to take. early response was out of that. and some difficulty. i can tell you, 200,000 barrels of oil on the water, had they had these in place and so forth, and a great deal of that obviously. it's doubtful to see how that would have mitigated this problem very much. is what i'm saying. >> now with respect, let me ask a couple more questions along that line, in terms of the restitution for the fishermen, how long does exxon plan to provide restitution to the fishermen? >> how long is it going to last?

we'll have to see, senator. you're talking about things i don't even know what the initial damage to the fishermen is going to be. a lot of places, some of them down the street, which i'm sure you're aware of, forecasted didn't result, different environment, different kind oil but the facts are we'll have to see. >> what about in terms of the cleanup, the wildlife natural resources, had you put a mechanism in place to determining who is going to be paid, how and what period of time are you currently putting that in place? >> what we've done -- >> the natural resource cleanup. >> we're doing it. and we have contractors doing it and we are going to do it. >> for how long? for what period of time? >> until more can be done. but the damage is at that point and how long it will last i think it was mentioned here today, sometimes you can

overwork some of those environmental problems which they didn't, removing the same from the beaches and so forth. we're going to get it cleaned up. >> is that notwithstanding the cap of 14 million and the subsequent 76? >> those numbers are just numbers obviously. it was 86 by the way. the 14 million was sort of like you pay on your car, you have a $200 deductible or something. you have to pay that under the cap. operation. then it's a $100 million which i think senator stevens mentioned, that was paid by, which by the way, we've paid 20% of that, $282 million ourselves. which we are 20% owner in. then you go into other cooperatives that we belong to worldwide. a number of those. ensuring some very complex, a number of other questions and so forth, we'll have to see how it works out. >> have you personally spoken

to mr. cousins to determine what -- >> no, i have not. >> are you aware of what he says? >> yes, i am. now, cousins -- >> that's correct. what is exxon's policy when the captain is incapacitated and licensed authorized personnel on board? >> i frankly don't know precisely what that policy is. this book is a policy? >> i'm sure there is. >> but you're not aware of it? >> i've asked a lot of questions. i haven't asked for that one. >> did, to your knowledge, cousins act in conformance with company policy by assuming command of the ship under that situation? >> i don't know the policy. but i doubt it. but i really don't know the policy. >> notwithstanding your currently representing him? your lawyers are representing him? >> we are representing him until, i thought you said your

lawyer, have view bill leslie everybody has a right to representation and he's not really at fault here, temporarily will represent him. >> but you have made no determination based on this conversation as to what happened? >> i didn't have the conversation. one of our lawyers had that. >> i understand. but from what's been reported to you, you have made no determination as to whether or not he acted in conformance with company policy? >> i don't know. >> is the valve that is equipped to maintain communications with exxon headquarters during transit? >> we don't, you're talking about headquarters, you're talking about an office in new york where i work. presumably have radio equipment communicating with various points where we have

people that stay in touch with the ships. but i don't know, precisely what equipment they are on. but no trouble communicating to my knowledge. >> are there situations in the past that you're aware of, where unlicensed persons were in control of one of those ships? >> not that i'm aware of. >> can you give us some idea of the impact of this reduction from the north slope of crude oil supplies, in the lower 48 states in terms of gasoline prices and supply? >> that's an impact. and at times it's been substantial. and of course every time someone possibly the governor of alaska says we are going to shut down the pipeline or open the pipeline, the oil market is very volatile these days. the oil market is very volatile. the market sometimes goes up and down. we've had a tight supply

situation relatively in gasoline in this country since last year. demand is up as you know. and there have been some refinery turnarounds. now, product moving to the west coast, we've moved a lot from the gulf to the west coast or we're trying to get it out there. but the crude price went down yesterday. that was predicated on the fact the word was out that the ship was off the rocks, something else, i don't know, senator, on the west coast, i hope now that that ship is out of the way. so we can operate those ships in and out. with whatever kind of regulation, that we can relieve the anxiety and the psychological thing to get the gasoline anyway. as i'm sure you know. concerned about running out of it. >> obviously, you heard the many people who have said this

was never supposed to happen. all guarantees were given and so forth, times were in place. once again, humans seem to have found a way to defy the odds. is there a lesson that you would draw from this in terms of future efforts with respect to oil exploration? and delivery? >> well, obviously, a couple of situations that we have looked at and we are taking some steps on. in terms oil exploration, i think we need it in this country. i think it's, as you know, i don't have to quote a lot of figures, 40-plus-percent of the oil is consumed, we have a balance of payments problem but we also have tankers, some

of which, thank god, not working on this other -- >> what i'm really getting at, mr. rawl, when you look at all now, they've got a pilot who may have gotten off before the ship was where it should have been. you've got -- >> i've not read that report. i don't know. >> i'm just saying allegations in the air. you've got a ship that changed course, so fourth, captain incapacitated. you've got coast guard that didn't have positive control, working, people, it seems as though it's like murphy's law. it seems like there is a complacency in a very risky process where major guarantees have been given to citizens not just in alaska, but all

over this country, about the process. and would you say it's fair to say there was a real complacency about the plan for cleanup wasn't adequate? even if the plan worked according to the way it was supposed to work, it wouldn't have done the job. it wasn't enough. the in terms of capacity for spill and so forth. it seems like i've heard, sam skinner said earlier, there's no, i don't know if we are looking for a magic solution. just basic, but avoid the kind of numbers. >> i think you used the word guarantee a number of times. i think it was stated all the time that there were no guarantees. >> i'm not talking about a guarantee. i'm asking about the elimination of a fundamental risk level. a complacency here. >> it's fair to say that when you get into large spills, you're not going to guarantee anything.

you're going to make every effort to avoid them. like airplane crashes or whatever else happens. but that's what you can do. >> so what you're saying is, a higher expectancy that you're going to get into a large spill? >> there's not a higher expectancy. this shouldn't have happened. i've said that. equipment was state-of-the- art. this was a $125 million ship. >> it's not state-of-the-art. maybe when somebody is trying to turn the wheel and the computer system was governing it, that should have been an alarm bell that goes off immediately. >> we'll have to find out what the facts are in that regard. the man says that he turned that automatic pilot off. certainly if you turn the wheel, i'd presume if you are an experienced person and he's experienced. he's run ships in the ocean. and you can tell, you can tell

if that has an effect on that. if you push the right button, you push the right button. you don't run into something. now, why they got out of that channel, i have no earthly knowledge of that. we are going to make every effort to find it out. and investigate. >> mr. rawl, he was an experienced third mate. radio contact, permission to take over -- >> i don't really know that, senator. i don't know how that works. frankly. i assume not, because i haven't heard that. but i really don't know. >> do you know whether or not they do have radio contact? >> i don't know whether that particular point in time. i know they have radio contact with the coast guard. and i know if we had said to the coast guard, i want to

take over or the captain wants me to take over, they'd say, i presume he wouldn't have had that. but i really don't know. >> well, then, that's a good answer. because the requirements to the master license or master pilot is very precise, very stringent. and the testimony has been crystal clear that there was only one licensed. >> coretta. >> and certainly exxon is not contending that you can countermand the license requirements. >> no. >> when asked about the policy, you don't have to say you don't know. you do know the policy. >> okay. okay. >> there could be a circumstance as you said earlier where someone has a heart attack or something. can i park the ship or whatever? you don't need a license. >> but you can't be telling them to run itself if the captain gets out there -- >> these are -- >> there's a policy of exxon right now. you do not have a policy whatsoever.

>> no, but we have a circumstance, a circumstance that i mentioned earlier that is my understanding the coast guard permits senior officers to take over in those kind of circumstances. we have a number of officers that could have been on the bridge or could be on the bridge inside circumstance. but you're getting into -- >> what i know and i'm very inexperienced on the whole question. but right to the point, the dock master had a heart attack, it was a policy at exxon, just run itself because at least on license, right? he didn't have anybody licensed to take over for him. >> we had people that could run the ship. we had people that -- >> run the ship with a licensed pilot. run it into the rocks. >> i just said that i understand it and i have a

lawyer over here who can tell me again, if i'm not stating it properly, that you could have two officers on the deck, along with the helmsman, in addition without the captain there i guess, without the licensed pilot. you know, if you want to quote me on the rules of the road for coast guard, you've got the wrong witness. >> we all know the rules of the road with respect to licensing. a master pilot. and you had one. >> yes, sir. >> and no more than one. >> on that ship at that time. >> and is appropriate, we'll have more than one. in the future. >> if it's appropriate. when asked by senator kerry if you learned anything, it was not adequate and you ought to have a valuable ship of 125 million -- >> i'm not sure, senator, if

this master has indicated, that he was under the influence of alcohol sometime after this. right? had he been piloting the ship himself, he was a licensed pilot. it's very possible we would have the same circumstance. i don't know that. you're speculating what might have happened. a license doesn't necessarily make anybody the best, whether they are piloting a ship or airplane or anything. you brought up a good question. we are changing it. >> it's not your contention that the vessel should have been controlled by coast guard radar at the time of the collision? collided with the rocks, went aground. >> my contention is, all i know about it is the weather was clear, there was ice out there, -- >> i'm not asking about the weather conditions. >> i'm getting to the

question. it's obvious this shouldn't have happened. whether the coast guard had the radar on or didn't, -- >> excuse me. i'm asking whether you think the coast guard should have had radar control under any circumstances. >> obviously, we'd be pleased that the coast guard had gone early in the morning on the 24th, get back in the channel or something like that. would have saved a heck of a lot of money and the government -- >> that's a hypothetical. what is the actual policy? do you think it was a responsibility, you think the coast guard responsibility to continue with radar coverage? >> i can't comment on that. i have not studied that. i don't know what the obligations are. >> what is your reaction? i think if you think exxon is performing adequately after that and valdez, is that correct?

>> i think we've gotten a very good job of getting the ship off the rocks. and getting the oil out of that. because when you have a ship floundering on a reef and you bring that, i think, i think in terms of the cleanup, it's been mentioned many times, the very high tide, things that we can't, we are going to use all the resources available to us. but some of this stuff as was talked about before, we are now starting to clean up islands, and so forth. but i think they're doing a good job. >> was your reaction to the government of alaska, that they take over, that the coast guard take over the project from exxon? >> i think we'll have to look at that. >> i know we are both going to look at it. what's your reaction? >> well, if somebody has a real instant cure for this, i'd be delighted.

i have a hunch that we are going to have to -- now, some of the delay as i mentioned earlier, because we had a lot of help, getting started. >> we asked the commandant of the guard. he's ready to testify. do you have any questions right now? i want to thank mr. rawl. >> i understand -- >> one thing. i asked about, if there was an exercise last summer. of the contingency plan. i asked that this particular decision had been used and certified and that run through of the contingency plan. it had not. trying to use this time, had never been approved before by the coast guard or by the fisheries people. did you know that? >> i did not know that.

i know that a per approved, this disbursement, part of that contingency plan, it's been tested many times. it's been -- >> i understand. the case for those waters where the fisheries conditions there -- >> let me tell you that this is not possible. the toxicity, the concern about toxicity. if we were willing to display it and it didn't perform well, we tested it and it did, but that would've been, we still don't understand the delay. >> i was told it's only effective on fresh oil. once the oil is not fresh, it's not dispersed.

>> well, when it's not dispersed, this oil was still spreading. a lot of it originally on saturday, when the wind came up sunday night, it really got down there. we had an opportunity to mitigate that considerably. a lot of it vaporized, 40% of the oil that went out has already vaporized. by then we had the gunk we are trying to work with. >> mr. rawl, the committee appreciate your willingness to testify. thank you, sir.

the committee is indebted to you for two appearances i guess, over at the other side. now coming to us. we do appreciate it. we've had secretary's skinner and chairman loera go into some detail. if anything, you're the man in charge. we gladly accept your statement in its entirety. you can give it in its entirety, highlighted as you wish. i believe we've got two other very important witnesses. >> mr. chairman, i think that i would like to go immediately to the questions to save us both time. >> very good sir. go right ahead. let me ask this with respect to licensing requirement.

of a master pilot of a vessel. did i understand on the original license application, i've never been licensed before, you did the background on the original application. is that correct? >> the original application for license is somewhat more complete than is the renewal. in that original application, the requirement to report any drug use, any convictions of crimes and those kinds of things. under the rule, it's less obvious that there's still a requirement and a renewal report for convictions in the last five years. >> i don't know if convictions in the last five years, in this particular case, at least perhaps they've learned that, i know the coast guard has been a leader on random drug testing. alcohol both. and it's diminished its occurrence markedly. we've congratulated the guard

on that accomplishment with respect to the licensee of the guard. with respect to that now, requirement on policy to the licensee. >> the system is basically the licensee must report in the application, in this case the master did not report in his application the convictions he had had for driving while under the influence. that was absent from that application. we had 25,000 applications a year. so that we process. it's impossible with the current level of computerization and manning to do a background check on every application. the system is that if there is abuse on the vessel, the master is responsible for reporting that abuse to the coast guard and we proceed against the license of the officer involved. in this case the master

himself was abusing. >> is there a backup requirement if the master himself is the one under the influence? >> yes, there is. the chief mate and the chief engineer have a responsibility to take over the operation of the ship if they feel the master is incapacitated. >> but they were asleep? >> they had been asleep at the time of the collision. i doubt if they were asleep at the time the vessel left the dock. however, the condition of the master was going to be developed in the investigation. >> it did go down to the third mate and he was not licensed? >> well, the third mate did not have a first class pilot's license for that particular area. that area requires a first class pilot's license. it allows that requirement to be filled by a ship's officer. up to rocky point. where the normal state pilot

is aboard. that vessel was in an area that requires piloting by a ship's officer. the only one that had that piloting, the third mate was qualified to operate the vessel but did not have piloting seniority so should not have been on the bridge by himself. that's very clear. >> on this particular point, would you recommend or have considered a copilot being required or was this an aberration on this particular vessel, and do they regularly have at least two licensed crewmen at sea, could give up the vessel and everything else -- >> what about copilot or what is the policy if any? >> well, we opted, perhaps

examine, whether more than one officer on a ship often has first-class piloting for that particular area. and at prince william sound, i understand that a state pilot and a u.s. pilot and federal pilot is required. now, i would assume that that means in the narrows as you go up, you've got to have a state pilot, somebody with piloting license as well as an officer on the vessel with piloting. >> right. but beyond, the collision occurred, only the requirement, you could not have gone up, let's assume there wasn't an accident that particular evening and you found, let's forget about the alcohol. you wouldn't have a rest of the captain, charged him with anything because he was the only one licensed, would you? or would you? >> we would have charged him if he was the only one licensed and he wasn't on the

bridge. he would have been in serious trouble. his license would have been in jeopardy at that point. >> right. >> the question is, should we require two officers with piloting on these long voyages to pilot from hakin book on him? that's the question we have to look on in. >> let me go to that question, the vessel for natural gas, required for safety, it's been attested that that word not have saved this particular oil spill or am i right or wrong? >> we don't know for sure. we'll have to see what the extent of the damage was. it's probable the damage was deep enough in that vessel. the double bottoms would not have helped. that's very probable, we won't know until we get it in drydock. >> the question is whether we

go back to smaller tankers. allowing 240,000 barrels, back to the $74,000-barrel that we used to have. because we can't afford this kind of capacity. in the environment, on the safety side, on the highway, i know my trucker friends like to have, some of them like to have three tandems, can't get by, can't pass them. but a policy matter, you can't have three tandems. maybe as a policy matter, trying to attest that they could not have had sufficient equipment to have arrested or stayed the spill in any real market way. the spill would have

continued, i thought if it had gotten up, they could have prevented it but i'm confused in my mind. what's your comment with respect to both? namely, smaller tanker on the one hand, and capacity and responsibility both? >> last year, we had about 2,000 tanker passengers in that straight. let's say 340,000 barrels tankers. let's go to a smaller tanker, half that size. half that size tanker, 2,000 passengers, 4,000 passengers, i don't know what the trade- off is between the greater risk of twice the number of passengers and the lesser risk of only having half the oil aboard in case you do get in trouble. this traitor there. and has to be looked at and has been. as far as the response, let me

say that the plan provided for a five-hour response. that was not met. and it is my view in any spill that you get the boom around the spill, that will help you out, i would have been delighted had we had that thing done in five hours. we didn't. we didn't get the room there until 10, 12 hours and it takes a while. and shortly thereafter, a wind came up and it blew everything else away. better response. would it have made a great deal of difference? problematic. i could discuss in the same general way. >> mr. chairman, the meeting going on that i'm part of, i've just been called, i asked that you let senator mccaskey, if you would, i do want to

speak to the coast guard about establishing a vessel control system in this area like we have in the puget sound. 25% of the nation's oil moving through that, and i have the correspondence and i can bring to admiral gacy, shorten the capability of that radar. we take firm action to assure that this area is in control. as you have the control system. that's another question, mr. chairman, -- >> i'm supposed to be there too. but i'm more inclined right now, president pro tem says i'm to make a speech. he's going to make the speech. >> senator mccaskey has been very understanding of the committee policy. issue with other senators heretofore, i'm here to show

that i can ask a question. to the point, what is your reaction to the governor of alaska's request if the coast guard takes over the project of the firm exxon? >> the governor and i are not very far apart on this. we don't want to take the responsibility for the spill that's going about a million dollars a day. we've got about three or $4 million left in the 311 case fund. i don't know what i'd do on the fourth day if we federalize it. the governor hasn't asked for that. what's being suggested is more control by the coast guard, more direct, and i'm pretty much in concert with that. and that's what's happening, yesterday and today, the discussion about the coast guard for the direction and guidance of the cleanup.

we are a military organization. exxon is a business. and we're ready to do an operational thing. having a little trouble in my view. that means we need to step further into it without federalize in it, without removing liability, without on funding it, but more guidance and direction and we're doing that. >> i'm reading from governor cooper's letter, the responsibility and familiarity with the alaska coastline, uniquely suited to coordinate the response. really coordinate the response, the governor of alaska is the question, do you agree with that? >> yes. we are going to be, much more coordination and guidance then we have up to now but we don't want to federalize it. not yet. >> i'm trying to find out the difference in my mind between federalize and you taking over

prime responsibility for ordination. is that fair? >> federalizing means that we take over all the control and the direction, we take over the contracting and everybody up there. that means i need about 30 contracting officers up there, every fisherman, every company, every working force. coordinated means that we allow exxon to continue to fund it, keep the checkbook open, to do the contracting with the cleanup people and basically direct and guide exxon in where we want the cleanup, where we want, where we want the beach cleaners, that kind of thing. and we will perhaps bring in other federal forces at the same time. >> what do you mean by yet, when you get the federal forces in? >> when what i propose to do this? we are doing it as we see. transferring that guidance and

direction more for the coast guard. i'm not privy. >> the coast guard is responding to the governor's request? >> yes. doing it at the time he requested it. we've been talking to the governor all along. and with exxon about doing this. about moving people over there, operations center and some of the operational guidance. >> and no emergency legislation is necessary? >> no, sir. at least if it were, i think the president would request it. the oval office with the president and with mr. rawl and others yesterday, discussing some of these same matters with the alaska delegation. >> with respect to radar guidance, the coast guard position policy or responsibility at the time of the collision be under radar guidance, is it? >> no. we don't do radar control in the way that faa does aircraft control.

in any water any place. what we do is we have an advisory service and we tell the vessel what vessel they are liable to meet. and those other things that complicate their passage. in valdez, we do more than we do everyplace else. we did traffic except one way traffic through the narrows. and we track that vessel in the narrows, we plot it every three minutes. quit plotting it at that point. it's at sea. they discharge their state pilot. they go to sea under the officer aboard. >> is your effort arrested or restricted in any way by budgetary constraints? >> well, no, i don't think it was. but i think it's only fair for me -- >> how about is? i mean in the future here because you've got a sympathetic committee that's proud of you and the guard, and i don't want to hear -- in fact, i've got a

suspicion now. one said they only had $3 million in the fund over at secretary of transportation. it seemed like there could have been a hess tansitancy there, ay sort of didn't want to assume the responsibility for $100 million to $200 million project with only $3 million sitting in the fund. >> that's very true. that fund has never been much more than $15 million, something in there. it's now at $3 million. i'd be more comfortable with it at $10 million or $12 million. we make take a look at that and ask our committees to take a look at it. but as far as the operation of the vessel traffic service, the only effect on that -- and i don't think it's a serious one. we're looking at it -- was in the 1988 budget cut that the coast guard took, we removed seven people from the valdez vessel traffic service and reduced the watch from two on watch to one on watch. now, it was our view in taking

that budget cut of initially $103 million that we would take it from areas that were least -- the need was least. and our feeling at that time was that we could remove a watch stander from valdez. we did that. now, if i were to do that this morning, i would probably have a different decision on whether to remove a watch standard from valdez. i don't think it had an effect in this accident. >> let's assume -- is there anything you need from the congress? >> i'm sorry, sir? >> is there anything you need from the congress? >> well, no. the president's budget is coming up here. it's an austere budget. it's one i said i can live with. it's one i said i won't have to close any coast guard units. but in 1988, i closed two vessel traffic services, one in new york harbor. i'm glad this spill wasn't in new york harbor because i'd be asking why did you close the vessel traffic system in new york harbor? i closed two, one in new york harbor, and one in new orleans, the two biggest ports in the

united states, because of a budget cut. so when you ask me what do i need, i need the president's budget, but the president's budget does not envision reopening those two vessel traffic services. i haven't asked for them. i did reduce valdez. >> what did the committee or congress learn -- let's assume you at the coast guard academy several years hence, and two weeks have passed, and on reflection what should we have learned with respect to this particular collision disaster? >> well, let me talk first broadly in terms of the support the coast guard gets from congress. we've always had trouble getting a reasonable budget within this government, and that includes the united states congress. we come up here year after year with a budget that is austere, and we normally leave this area with a budget less than our austere budget. so i think that every time we close a coast guard station, we close a lifeboat station, we

close a vessel traffic service, we assume more risk as the american people for accidents someplace. now, i don't believe this accident is the responsibility of having closed something. but you ask what the congress can do. i think the congress ought to support the coast guard in the appropriations area. this authorization committee has been wonderful to us, sir. i'm talk about the appropriations area needs to support the coast guard at a higher level than they normally do. >> and what have we learned environmentally and maritimely about this particular incident? is there anything? for one thing, i'm not expert enough to ask the questions that senator stevens was getting at. but it seems like a harbor pilots would needed up to this rock, but somehow that was cut back -- >> several years ago. we had pilotage from hitchenbrook on in required a state pilot. the only vessels that were

required were foreign vessels to take on a state pilot at hitchenbrook. we had an injury of pilots trying to get aboard in rough weather, so that requirement was knocked off. but there were only nine vessels that were foreign vessels in the system. i think what we should have learned and what we have learned -- and there will be more lessons coming out of the investigation -- is that in this day and age, we have got to titan up the application requirements and the background look at people coming in for licenses. we've got to have a better feel for a man who comes in and falsifies, if that's the case here, falsifies an application by not putting on the convictions he's had for drunk driving. people could come in and falsify drug use that is asked for in the application, and i think they will. i don't think people will write down drug use on an application for a license, and they avoid writing down dwi on licenses. and we need to somehow get

behind that application and see what's happening to these people. >> but no one in the audience would want to fly home this afternoon in a commercial flight that had only one pilot. they wouldn't want to get on that plane. i mean we're not talking about just people getting drunk. just normal things that can occur to an individual, heart attacks and otherwise they have. and with a vessel as long as three football fields, 125 million gallons of fuel aboard and everything else like that, it seems rather puny and nonsensical to just have one machinations aboard ship to take it in, i guess, in many instances, these super tankers go all the way to saudi arabia and come back, the persian gulf. >> yes, they do. >> go on the high seas. i just can't understand that particular -- >> let me comment on that, then.

>> yes, sir. >> every vessel of that size doesn't have a pilot and a co-pilot as an aircraft would have. it has a pilot, a master mate, a second mate, a third mate. so it has at least four officers that are completely qualified to run that vessel. what it doesn't have is more than one officer required that has pilotage for the particular area that they're coming into, whether it's new york harbor or amsterdam or prince william sound. now, they require to people on the vessel that all have pilotage for each area they come into would be an added requirement. i don't object to that. we ought to look at it. but don't think that they don't have somebody who's qualified to run that ship from the bridge. they've got four people. and for that third mate who is a qualified officer, has passed the examinations, who has had a lot of trips into valdez, to have run that ship up on the beach, there's something awful

happened on that bridge, some kind of a loss of continuity, a loss of something that we don't know yet. but there's no reason that that third mate wasn't completely competent to run that ship where he was -- in the area he was. he had the competency. he didn't have the license, and the master should have been on the bridge. those are faults. but we don't have a bumbling idiot on the bridge. we've got a guy who's well licensed and trained. >> and by way of visibility, he should have been able to at least see the channel markings. >> well, yes, sir. it was a clear night. you could see forever. he almost ran over the buoy to get on the rock. >> that's what i was thinking because i think your comment has already been made public that it was a ten-mile-wide channel there, and my boy michael could have run the boat through there. >> well, that played a lot better outside the beltway than it did inside the beltway, so i've tried to get rid of that comment. >> have you notified -- i

remember the governor of alaska had stated that there the code of federal regulations, section 300, you read it to notify the governor that you will take over immediately the coordination of the project up there. >> the governor has asked that the disaster have a federal input outside of the clean water act, and that isn't my responsibility. he's asked what senator stevens was talking about, to open up the small business administration funds and some other association funds to that. the senator says -- no, i may be wrong. he has not asked to federalize the spill. what he has ask is for the coast guard to take more of a direction -- and i'm in consonance with him. we're talking about that with exxon on-scene in alaska. if it's necessary, i will go up there myself and set that up the way it ought to be.

>> i think the governor has been more specific. he refers to that section of federal regulations section 300, and that gives specific authority and responsibility for coordination. >> is that the clean water act you're talking about? >> yeah. >> okay. the governor has asked for that once. he's backed away from it. it's not my understanding that he has asked for it again this morning. >> well, we have the letter. we'll furnish you a copy of the letter. he's asked for it again. >> what's the date on it, sir? >> april the 5th. he got it in at 8:00 last night. >> you've got better mail service than i have within d.c. >> yes, sir. yeah, well, we'll get this letter to you. >> yes, sir. >> when you say that the law, you know, for alaska oil can only move in u.s. flag vessels. i understand that you say nine foreign vessels have gone to

valdez to -- >> yes, there's nine foreign vessels in the trade. all of them terminate at st. croix. st. croix has a u.s. refinery but is not u.s. territory. >> i see. >> now, let me again say i am not prepared to federalize this spill in the legal sense of the word because it would open up to me and to the 311k fund the responsibility to fund it. and i've only got $2 million or $3 million in that fund, and we're spending a million dollars a day. i want to do something short of federalization. we will assume the responsibility for on-scene guidance and direction to exxon in doing this. we'll take basically a lot more control than we have now, but we want to stop short of federalization that might require legally exxon to close their checkbooks to the fishermen and everybody else. i don't want to do that, and i

didn't know the governor does either. i didn't know he said federalization. he talked about control. but -- >> well, you'll have a chance to clarify and coordinate with him. is there anything you wish to add to your testimony here this morning? we do appreciate you coming over. >> no. i want to say just one other thing, though. that i don't feel that i'm at odds with mr. rall. i'm concerned that he's playing too much emphasis on the timing of the dispersance and too much emphasis on what could have been had dispersance been put in the water. the federal on-scene coordinator and the state people made, in my opinion, the right decision, which was don't let dispersants go in the water unless they're going to be effective. in their view, they would not have been effective because there wasn't enough wave action to mix it up, and the spill -- and there weren't enough dispersants on-hand at that point. we had 10 million gallons of oil in the water, and they had a few tens of thousands of dispersants

or a few thousand gallons of dispersants. it was a drop in the bucket. it would not have made a difference. they made the right decision. then when the wind did come up, it blew everything away, and there wasn't any chance for dispersants. >> what about readiness? i understand their barge to carry out the booms had punctures in it and -- >> i'm very disappointed that they weren't able to execute their plan. now, that's not a federal plan. it's not a coast guard plan. it's a plan arrived at as a requirement by the state of alaska before they would permit alieska to come in there. that was arrived at by those two parties. it was a plan that they should have been able to execute. for a number of reasons, they weren't. i think anytime you're time-late at a spill, then you're in major trouble. every hour you're late multiplies the problem. they should have been there within five hours. they weren't. >> very good, admiral yost. we appreciate it very much, your appearance here today in front of the committee. now, finally, we have a panel

that will stay open for questions by my colleague. we have the panel of dr. evans, the undersecretary of commerce, oceans and atmosphere, and mr. steve robinson, the deputy director of the fish and wildlife service. i'll ask them to come forward. >> mr. evans, mr. robinson, we do appreciate your indulgence, and we apologize, but you can see we've tried to move along as

quickly as possible. your statements both will be included in the record in the entirety, and you can highlight it or give them. you've been indulgent with the committee, and we'll be indulgent with you. you can give the statement in full or highlight it. dr. evans? >> thank you, mr. chairman. because of the seriousness of what we're discussing here, i have brought dr. erler, who is the head of our group that deals with hazardous material, and his team is the team that has been working up on this oil spill from about 11 hours after it actually happened. i also have leg counsel with me, mr. campbell, who is here in case -- since i am not a lawyer, and there were a lot of people that were saying they were lawyers and using that as an

excuse. i am not a lawyer, so i brought one with me. >> i can see you're very proud of that. >> what i would like to do, mr. chairman, is to go through a lot of the testimony and read it because i think it's important. but i will highlight it. i'll drop some of the material out. by april 2nd, the oil from this spill, the 11 million gallons, had spread throughout an area of more than 800 square miles. approximately one-third of the total surface of prince william sound. prevailing currents and winds are moving the oil in a southwesterly direction through montague straits towards the open waters of the gulf alaska. the rocky shores have been very heavily oiled. the oil is expected to follow the coastline of the kenai peninsula, where it could impact biologically productive and scenic areas such as resurrection bay and the kenai

fjord national park. the economy of the area that we're talking about is based on natural resources and includes one commercial fishing, which we've heard a great deal about. prince william sound supports major commercial fishing for salmon, herring, as well as smaller fisheries for king crab, shrimp, halibut. these commercial fisheries are renewable resources that each year are worth over $100 million to that community. recreation, the relative accessibility of prince william sound to anchorage, the major population center of alaska, makes it a favorite of local visiting recreationists who use it either individually in organized tours for fishing, sightseeing, kayaking and camping. there's also a number of cruise ships that come into the area, and we don't even have the idea of what the economic impact is going to be on that. there's subsistence fishing and hunting, logging, oil transportation. port valdez located in the northeastern portion of prince william sound is the southern

terminus as we know of the trans alaskan pipeline. perhaps most def staivastating e timing of the spill. the irreplaceable resources of prince william sound are the most in jeopardy. this is a time when we have a lot of larval fish, a lot of fish are coming in for the purposes of spawning. migrating herring are finally in the sound and would be available for harvest. the spill occurred just days before the scheduled opening of this fishery, which had to be canceled. this means it not only lost jobs and income but also lost export value to the united states. but more valuable even than the herring is the salmon fishery. all five species of salmon are supported by prince william sound and its river system. adult fish will be affected when they return to the sound this spring and summer. but juvenile salmon are now ready to enter the estuaries that have been damaged by the spill and will begin feeding on resources that have already been

damaged. this is the time of their life cycle that they are most dependent on the marine environment impacted by the spill, and there's a good chance many of these fish will not survive. the effects will be felt years down the road when these fish are not available as adults for spawning, and the loss will likely ripple far into the future. the effects of these natural resources and their human uses form the basis for the damage assessment work that will be undertaken by the co-trustee. in this case, noaa acts on behalf of the secretary of commerce as the federal trustee for gnanatural resource. the secretary of the interior, the secretary of agriculture, and the state of alaska also have significant trustee interest. noaa's damage assessment is dawn fr -- legal, procedural framework

for claims against potentially responsible parties for losses resulting from injury to the natural resources caused by oil spills. based on these legal authorities, noaa has four principal responsibilities during and after an oil spill. as the scientific support coordinator to the u.s. coast guard on-scene coordinator, specifically noaa, noaa actually provides liaison between natural resource, chemical, medical, and other scientific experts and the on-scene coordinator, modassess the nature of the oil pollutants, for example, chemical sampling and analysis, identification of toxic properties and alteration of physical and chemical characteristics under various environmental conditions, advises on safety precautions for responsible personnel, identifies areas of biological importance requires protection, and helps the on-scene coordinator respond to inquiries from local, state, and federal

agencies for assistance in scientific studies and environmental assessment, and assists the on-scene coordinator public relations efforts on scientific issues. as a member of the regional response team, noaa assists in the preparation of federal recommendations to the on-scene coordinator. as a federal trustee for living marine resources, noaa is responsible for identifying injuries to the resources, assessing losses associated with injury to the natural resources, and bringing claims against the responsible party. as the nation's principal marine pollution research and monitoring agency, noaa exams the long-term ecological consequences. currently we have 25 experts on-site at the "exxon valdez" spill, including people from noaa's hazardous material response team, the national marine mammal laboratory, the national marine fishery service, the office of aircraft operations, university of alaska sea grant program, and the national weather service. noaa's hazardous material

response experts have conducted extensive overflight of the spreading oil and coastal regions of prince weilliam soun to identify the threatened areas. the noaa's hazardous material response probably has more collective experience in marine oil spills than probably any other group in the world that have occurred in the last 13 years. they have been involved in almost all of those. there's about 15 years' experience, and they have been involved in working on about 2,000 oil spills, including the argo merchant. >> what did we learn, let's say, from the cadiz, which was a oil spill on the coast of britain? for one, it took some five years to get the study. now that i've got the study, other than putting it into some library somewhere, what good

does the study do? >> i don't think i can address that. let me respond to one other aspect of what you're saying. you say the cadiz was a massive oil spill. it was minor compared with what we're dealing with today, sir. >> it was minor. so if you took five years for that one, how long are you going to take for this one? >> just in order to be able to do assessments on the effect on salmon, we're going to be able to have to be looking five years downstream because some of these species won't come back as spawners for at least five years. so if there are other long-term toxic effects that we don't know, we could be another five years beyond that. >> what about it, dr. ehler? do you agree with that assessment? >> certainly there are many things that will done in the short run and are being done right now. in fact, to complete a long-term assessment of some of these damages, it will take us anywhere between three to five years to see some of the

longer-term effects. short-run effects, the lethal effects are very visible right now. we're measuring those and documents those. some of the science will take longer. >> what do we do after we document it all? you said you had 15 years' experience. i'm getting to the practical and realistic result. i've done all the studying, and i've got it all documented, and has that led to any kind of legislation, change of policy, better practices, what have we learned? >> i would say the immediate purpose of doing the measurements of environmental effects is to be used in the damage assessment, which means putting economic values on those effects so that we can, in fact, file claims to recover some of those damages. that's the immediate purpose of doing science in the field right now and doing it in a timely way. >> and what's the responsibility

of noaa or the government to file claims once the assessment is made? dr. evans? >> once we've made the assessment, for all practical purposes, what we will do is we will present a bill to exxon for what the cost of the damages are. >> is there any limit to that bill that you're going to give exxon under the statute? >> no, sir, not that i know of. is there a limit to the amount that -- >> under the clean water act, if willful negligence is shown, then there is no limitation to their liability. however, absent willful negligence, there is approximately an $8 million cap under the way the statute is currently written. >> are you going to try the case in alaska? >> oh, no. we'll leave that to the justice department, sir. your honor, we're working in concert with the other trustees and with the department of justice in the effect to put together a damage assessment, to put a value on the resources

that are lost and to attempt to identify how best to restore those resources as closely as is possible. >> dr. evans, why do you say the amaco cadiz was minor compared to this one? >> let me refer back to some of the material in my testimony, mr. chairman. this is a very, very special part of the world. it's pure. it's a very steep bottom area. the winds can come up very rapidly. as we saw in the one day, 50-mile-an-hour winds. it can be flat calm the next day. we have high tides moving in and out of the area, 15-foot, 20-foot tides. it's the difference between having something in a bottle. i think if you're looking at the difference between a quarter pound piece of dynamite is one thing. if you throw it out in the middle of the field and let it blow up where it as a lot of

room for that energy to spread to. but if you do it in an enclosed area, it enhances the impact of it. i think that's what we have here is that the oil has moved around with all of the little cubby holes and various things we have in the total shoreline in this area, there are going to be places where we have -- are having potential effect on fisheries and others that we may not even discover for at least the next couple of years. >> what's the potential effect, if any, on others' shores? as i understand, the current goes north, cuts across the arctic and north pacific, and could this reach russia? >> no, i don't believe so. the direction it's going right now is it's going on up the kenai peninsula, headed towards, as senator stevens says, cotowas kodiak island. we could have tar balls washing

up on beaches down to british columbia, but we understand the direction although the accuracy of our forecasting of the direction is based on winds and currents as best as we can give you about 24-hour for the trajectory. i think on an overall basis, we can have a pretty good idea of where we're going to see things wash up. at this stage, i think it's pretty well tied to what the major current and wind systems are and where it's going to be pushed. but as far as what we're concerned about right now is the immediate effects that it's going to have in other places in alaska. kodiak, as senator stevens says, is a very, very large area as far as fisheries go. we have some concerns -- at least i have some concerns because of my fisheries background that if this gets to shell i cough straits, we have a problem there. and if the poll okaackpollack,

multi-million dollar resource, is going to spawn. we don't know what the impact is going to be on that. that's a little scary, but that is a responsibility, and we are tracking it very closely. bud, do you have any idea of what direction it's going to go past kenai, or is that too far down -- generally going westerly, sir. >> very good. mr. robinson? >> thank you, mr. chairman. i appreciate the opportunity to be here today. i'll talk about the wildlife, the impact on the wildlife resources of that area. with me today or at least available in the audience is john martin, who is our manager of the alaskan maritime refuge, elements of which have been impacted by this spill. the oil spill has had adverse and often fatal impacts on many species of wildlife in prince william sound. fish and wildlife services management authority over migratory birds and sea otters

while the national marine fishery service has authority over other marine mammals in that area. none of the bird species or the alaskan population of sea otters are listed under the endangered species act. the scale of the spill impact is just now starting to become clear to us. our preliminary beach surveys have found 80 oil birds per 100 meters of beach on the islands in the path of the spill, and it's highly unlikely that most of those oiled birds can be recovered and cleaned, although we're making every effort to do so. we anticipate that 3,000 to 5,000 seabirds could be recovered and cleaned. absent their being recovered and cleaned, a high percentage of the birds that become heavily oiled will simply not survive. we do not at this time have any estimates of the likely number of birds that may be killed by the spill, and i think in the next couple of weeks we'll get better numbers on that figure.

ae bald eagles have been observed scavenging oiled birds. the service believes that toxicity connected could kill bald eagles. there are approximately 750 bald eagles resident in the prince william sound area. an aerial survey conducted after the spill counted 90,000 birds, half of which were in the area impacted by the spill. aerial surveys are not expected to produce accurate total population counts since many birds and animals simply can't be seen in the oil. during this time of year, there is generally an accepted figure of about 350,000 bird residents in prince william sound. as dr. evans has mentioned, those migratory birds are coming in as we speak and will add another 100,000 to that population. in addition, over 100,000 birds nest in the chizwell islands. it's an element of the maritime

refuge to the southwest of the sound, and the first streams of oil have already reached those islands. the total sea otter population of the sound is estimated at 10,000 to 12,000, and the heaviest concentration, about half of those, is located in the southeastern part of the sound. this represents the highest concentration of sea otters. the population has not been affected -- that population in the eastern area has not been affected by the spill as of yet. approximately half the otter population in the sound is likely to be impacted by the spill if the spill should change directions and goes into the southeastern area, the situation would worsen dramatically for the otter. fish and wildlife service presently has 24 people committed to monitoring cleanup and bird and otter rescue activities. we have two chartered boats and 16 people working to locate oiled otters and bring them to the sea otter cleaning facility operated by exxon in valdez.

we're operating constant aerial surveys of the sound to monitor the movement of oil and its relationship to the seabird and otter population. and these aircraft are also on the alert for oiled otters and then tell the ships in the area where the otters are for capture. under current wind and tide forecasts, the leading edge of the spill, as we said before, could reach kodiak islands this weekend. service personnel and others from the national response team are identifying and prioritizing those areas that could be protected in the islands. two service vessels are being moved into the area to support, consisting primarily of bird surveys, mammal surveys, sea otters, to determine how many of those critters have been affected and how many have been affected adversely. an assessment of the natural resource damage is under the provisions of the comprehensive

environmental response act is being initiated. that's what our people are doing now. the process of picking up the oiled and injured wildlife, they're also making counts to use in the future to gain compensation. that concludes my prepared statements, mr. chairman. i'd be glad to try to answer any questions you might have. >> senator stevens? >> chairman, on april 4th, i received a prediction of the trajectory of the "exxon valdez" prince william sound oil spill from dr. royer. i've sent it to the various teams working on this. but i think it's very important to examine what he says. it will take a couple of minutes to read it, but i think it's timely with these witnesses here. dr. royer says that the oil spill in prince william sound will exit the sound through montague strait and follow the coast to the west-southwest.

it enters the alaska coastal current, a relatively swift, low salinity flow that is driven by freshwater runoff and winds. the current is usually 5 to 10 miles wide with surface currents of about 0.75 knots plus or minus 0.2 of a knot at this time of year. it might be best thought of as a river running along the coast. the oil should remain in this flow in a very coherent manner with little spreading across the shelf. the entrance of the oil into local bays will depend on local winds with offshore winds, of course, favoring no transport onshore. easterly winds will accelerate along shore transport of the oil and will cause the oil to wash up on the exposed beaches. the oil patch or patches should be at the mouth of cook inlet within six days. mind you, that's april 4th, he was talking -- in six to ten days. it will probably be a series of

patches extending from prince william sound to cook inlet. once again, the amount of oil entering the inlet will be dependent upon the local winds at the time of arrival, but roughly half of the oil at the entrance will enter. the remainder will travel southward along the westward shore of kodiak island. here the coastal current becomes less intense and cross-shelf mixing of the oil will take place. some unknown fraction of oil entering cook inlet and on the shelf off kodiak will continue down the aleutian island chain. here the coastal current is not as intense, but is a broad, diffuse flow filling the shelf rather than the narrow coastal flow as it is along the northern gulf of alaska. some unknown portion of the oil, whatever portion remains in the water column, should begin to go through unamak pass sometime in june or july. that's the pass that the bristol

bay fish run goes through in bristol bay. the upper water layers of the prince william sound region should be flushed in several weeks those the deep waters -- i repeat this. the deep waters might not be flushed until fall. when the deep water renewal takes place. this should rapidly transport the oil out of the sound to the west in the fall. his predictions, then, interpreting them, means that the oil should be in cook inlet sometime between april 10th and 16th, should arrive at kodiak sometime between april 14 and 21, and will be in unamak sometime in june with the possibility of a renewal of all of this when the oil that's gone

into the deep water column is disgorged from the sound due to the full runoff, which is intense in september/october. now, gentlemen, what do you think should be done with regard to the areas beyond the damage to date? we haven't had damage yet in cook inlet. we haven't had any damage in kodiak. we haven't had any damage along the aleutian coast, aleutian island chain coast, and particularly we haven't had any damage in unamak pass yet. have any of you any knowledge of any attempts anywhere in the world to try and change the flow of this oil as it streaks out in these long tendrils we saw of oil being wind-driven and current-driven up there? >> senator stevens, no, i'm not aware of any.

one of the things that we were very interested in was the information that you presented from dr. royer. in fact, we were not familiar with that, but we are going to check with him. we certainly are very interested in any of the information he has. one of the things we have been doing is that our models, interestingly enough, seem to agree very closely with the description that you just gave. and one of the things that we've been doing is trying to get our teams -- in fact, some of our members are some of the team you were mentioning, are getting out ahead of some of these, and we're using this in order to make samples and make tests in the area for the damage assessment. i know that doesn't mitigate what the oil is going to do in that area, but i think that there are people that have been placed in seward and other places to try to put booms up in various areas and to do whatever we possibly can to try to see if we can keep it out of the

sensitive areas. but other than that, i think we're just experienced in mitigating it. >> the thing that bothers me about the current control of the actions to be taken to prevent further harm is that they're all related to damage control. they're not related to prevention. some of them are, i guess. the booms are a preventive concept. but, for instance, i was told in one area that hay had been dropped on the beaches from the air before the oil hit those beaches. and as the oil came in, it hit the hay, and the hay was raked up or cleaned up and burned later. i asked if that was being considered for alaska, and i was told no. then i asked about the use of a drift net, whether anyone had thought of putting one of the 40-mile drift nets out there,

sling it across this current, weight it down pretty heavily and tried to put in absorbable booms behind it and let it see if it can pick up some of this slick as it moves towards kodiak, and remove the booms as they get oil-soaked and put new ones in. and i was told, no, that's never been tried, and we're not going to experiment. are you gentlemen going to experiment at all when this gets out in these open areas that are certainly beyond the prince william sound, beyond the capability of anybody that i know of so far to come up with some suggestion? is there going to be any experimentation at all? >> let me refer to dr. ehler, because he's much for familiar with the programs they're doing. but i'm not aware of any experimentation, but i certainly would be in favor of it if it would increase our knowledge in any way of how to deal with this thing. i don't know. we may have some programs going, but let dr. ehler address that. >> i think those alternatives

that senator stevens identified, to my knowledge, are certainly not being tried now. on the other hand, there are teams of people up there, as you know, who are running over virtually every possibility of mitigating the effects of this particular spill. i'm not -- i just don't have the information about what is being considered right now, but i would suspect that all of those kinds of alternatives have been run over in some detail. >> i monitored dr. ehler, the bay in ireland that was a refinery bill. and that straw protective procedure to protect the beaches was used there and very successfully. >> that's what i was told. and i was told incidentally, we had no market for hay this year, so it's all up there. no one's even asked. and the drift nets that i'm -- you're responsible now for bringing in the drift nets on the legislation this committee started. several of them have been

brought in. they're piled up somewhere. no one's even thought about trying to sling them out there and have them do some good. they're very harmful, as we all know, to fish. but we could try. mr. chairman, there's been a complete unwillingness to try to experiment because of some reason somebody says, if they try and it doesn't succeed, who's going to pay the bill? and secondly, will it increase the damages to exxon, or will they object? that's why we want the coast guard in control up there. i can't understand -- but even then, you know, i don't think the coast guard is really thinking in terms of experimentation yet. i got to tell you, i wish we could get a plane and fly this whole committee up there and let them see what's going to happen to kodiak. i think if anybody went up as a did and see what i saw, they'd come back as mad as i am. and i'm mad because no one's thinking of trying to stop this

thing. now, bill, you guys have got good brains and, you know, the whole group that's involved here, i know you all. steve, you people know this area just like i know it, and there's no reason to accept the inevitable being that this is going to destroy kodiak fisheries. it's going to go down the chain, and it's going to go through the pass into the bristol bay salmon run. that is unacceptable. we've got to try. even if you fail, you got to try. and i don't know how to get you going. is it money? i was told yesterday that all you need to do is ask exxon, and within foreseeable, you know, limits you couldn't dream of, money is available. they know they've got horrendous liability if this gets to kodiak. just horrendous. you can name them off, the things that are over there, bill. king crab, scallops, the whole

new bedford fleet is over there now. sole. half of our sole now is coming out of the north pacific. you name it, bottom fish. the home of the bottom fish in shell i cot straits, you closed it once because it was so sensitive to the problems that were developing there. now, i think we could safely say this is the largest producing area for fisheries in the world today that was healthy until march 24th. and people seem to just accept the inevitable, that it's going to -- we just can't stop it. somehow or other, we've got to get an attitude that we're going to try to stop it. i would hope that you'd help us get some control. these sea fences, for instance, i heard about. have you ever heard of the sea fences? >> yes, sir. i heard it this morning. i was here when they were talking about -- that's the 42-inch boom. >> i'm told that noaa has them in stock. they stock them as a matter of

national preparedness. they're stocked over there, and they offered to send some over here. i'd have two c5as on the way this afternoon if you can find them and try them. >> what about it, dr. ehler? he's about the expert on haza hazardous materials. isn't there something more we can be doing from your point of expertise? it seems like there could be some more preventive measures being taken. >> i think there's always more that can be done. i think the point that has to be made is there's tremendous uncertainty about what is going to happen and where this oil is going to go and where it's going to wind up. nothing is inevitable. there's a great deal of unknowns with respect to where this spill is moving, where in the water column it will be, what effects it will have on living resources in this area and in the areas further west. >> just like everybody, everybody's got to be somewhere, and this oil is going to be

somewhere for at least the next four or five months. you agree with that? >> absolutely. it will be there longer than that. >> -- and trying to do something about it. >> no question about that. i think there are a lot of people on the scene who are trying to do something about containing that oil in the first place, following and predicting where it's going to go, and minimizing the effects that it has. >> do you know of anybody who has attempted to change the direction of it in terms of the open spill as it's moving down the alaska coastal current, coming out of montague straits and going into the gulf? >> there is no one to my knowledge doing that. >> i don't know there's anyone who has attempted, even experimented to change that flow. >> i agree. there is no one. >> they've done a good job of trying to boom off specific areas. your people have done a real good job working with an instant response team and what they've tried to do in terms of protecting resurrection creek, protecting the kenai fjords national park and now moving in

to protect the homer area, and then we're looking even further to kodiak. but all that's on the basis of how do we protect the beaches when it gets there. i don't know. maybe we ought to take all the airboats from frank murkowski's part of the state and turn them around and let them blow that oil south. maybe people would be a little bit more worried about it if it was going south. they're not too worried about it when it's going north. that's the problem. it's going toward the greatest salmon run, the greatest fishery run in the world today. probably, you know -- you've seen it. you've been up there. here's a salmon fisherman. >> the hour is late. you gentlemen have been very obliging. the record will stay open for

questions by the committee here. we appreciate the testimony here now, and i hope you appreciate the concern that we do have. we'll be working with you, and don't let the budget hold you up. i want to know about that immediately. i want to thank senator murkowski for sticking with us as well as senator stevens. the committee will be in recess at the call of the chair. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. this is a special edition of american history tv, a sample of the compelling history programs that air every weekend on american history tv, like lectures in history, american artifacts, real america, the civil war, oral histories, the presidency, and special event coverage about our nation's history. enjoy american history tv now and every weekend on c-span3.

american history tv continues at 8:00 p.m. throughout the week. wednesday, a discussion on television's impact on race and politics in the 1990s. thursday, military historians talk about the battle of guadalcanal, the first major world war ii allied offensive in the pacific. friday on our american artifacts series, a tour of the baseball americana exhibit at the library of congress. the day after the senate commerce committee hearing, president george h.w. bush and several cabinet members held a briefing on the government's response, taking questions from reporters are defense secretary dick cheney, transportation secretary samuel skinner, and epa administrator william reilly. >> i have a statement and then be glad to take a few questions and then refer them to our experts here. virtually every american is familiar with the tragic

environmental disaster in alaskan waters. and more than 10 million gallons of oil have been spilled with deadly results for wildlife and hardship for local citizens. we all share the sorrow and concern of alaskans and a determination to mount a sustained cleanup effort. our ultimate goal must be the complete restoration of the ecology and the economy of prince william sound, including all of its fish, marine mammals, birds, and other wildlife. the exxon corporation has acknowledged responsibility for this spill and its liability for the damages. exxon should remain responsible for both damages and for employing civilian personnel necessary to control further damage. however,