and, special event coverage about our nation's history. enjoy american history tv. now, and every weekend on c- span 3. >> vitae not on american history tv on c-span 3, american artifacts series, a tour of the baseball americana exhibit at the library of congress. curator susan rayburn shows us the earliest mentions of baseball and books and diaries from just after the american revolution. also, recently discovered pre- civil war documents known as baseball's magna carta. containing the basic rules and organizations of the game that is played to the state. that is friday night at 8:00 easter here on c-span 3. now on c-span 3 is american history tv. author trent hoan on u.s. naval strategies and naval tactics developed during the six month battle in guadalcanal in 1942 and 43. and how they helped the u.s. defeat japan.

>> let me call back into session our symposium on guadalcanal. brought you under the auspices of the museum's institute for the study of war and democracy. our next speaker, i am very, very pleased to introduce to you, trent hone is one of the leading authorities in the country on u.s. navy tactics and auction. he is the winner of awards from the u.s. naval war college. and the naval history and heritage command. his latest book, which i have read quite recently, and was extremely impressed by. learning war. the evolution of lighting doctrine in the u.s. navy. it reminds us of something important. that what happens today is often completely dependent on things that happened yesterday. and in fact, that happened over the course of many yesterday's. and, that they are then used to formulate doctrine and ideas for generations. to come. you know, learning war was

reviewed in the new york times review of books by no less than - an individual than tom ricks who writes for the washington post and has for many years. the real hero of hone's book , rick said in the review, is not an individual. but a large, complex organization. the american navy. that quickly grew from second- rate status to become the world's premier maritime force. here to tell us that story as well as to parse the lessons learned from the guadalcanal campaign, trent hone . >> thank you very much. excellent introduction. thank you jeremy and all of our hosts. and all of you for being here today. i am very pleased to be able to give you some of the insights from that book, learning war. and also, to help place guadalcanal in context.

which frank did a very good job at placing the beginnings of it in context. i want to place it in context in terms of what happens next. where does the navy go, based on lessons that it gathers from the fighting? and how does that relate to the rest of the pacific war? as the fighting continues. through 1943. and up through august 1945? that is what i will be trying to do here. i have titled this adaptation and evolution. one of the things that i think is very important is to recognize the fact that the navy does a good job at gathering lessons. there are a number of challenges that are faced at glottal canal. and, i am going to help you understand how those challenges lead to better outcomes in the future. one of the most important things that i want you to take away is the idea that guadalcanal is a crucial opportunity, which frank told us how it's a crucial opportunity in terms of the world stage. in august 1942.

right? the axis powers have had a series, a string of victories. important. admiral king recognizes the importance of trying to figure out how to put the japanese on their heels. right? the victory at midway has created an opportunity. the initiative in the pacific hangs in the balance. and, the force which acted decisively first is going to be able to seize that initiative and to control the pace of the fighting going forward. king recognizes this. king also recognizes something else. because he has been immersed in the navy's approach to fighting for decades, he started off as a surface officer. worked under william sims in the atlantic torpedo -- before world war i. he was gone to command summaries. eventually became an aviator. he had that experience and all dimensions of the way in which the navy can fight. and he knows, that the navy can

learn and adapt lessons. and he has confidence that it can do it faster than the japanese. so, the second opportunity here is not just to see the initiative in the pacific war. it is also to come to grips with the enemy. learn how they fight, and put into practice the ability of american naval officers to learn more rapidly. and king had confidence that they can do this. because of a deliberate learning system that has been created in the decades prior. and the two decades between the world wars. 1919-1939. the united states navy created a learning mechanism. this is deliberately constructed and originally comes from the mind of the second chief of naval operations. admiral robert koontz. he put into place what he called a planning cycle. and this was an annual regiment

of war planning in the opposite - office of the chief of naval operations. now the naval war college. and exercises. you have heard about the largest and most famous of these. the three problems. and what is generally done when we think about the three problems as we think about the exercises. we think about how they went on. but what i want you to understand is that this is part of a network. system of learning. the navy was going through these exercises, not just the practice, not just to develop routines, but to better understand, how a naval war in the pacific might be fought. and to explore some of the challenges that they faced. which frank highlighted the fact that the through ticket idea, the idea of steaming directly across the pacific and confronting the japanese very early in the pacific war was discarded by 1933. that is true. one of the things that comes out of these exercises.

and, the learning system. but many other things come out of it as well. if you studied the three problems or if you have rented the analysis of them, you understand that they foment and become a hotbed of learning how to operate carriers. naval aviation is born, and fleet problems and develops a high level of expertise over the course of that time. not quite matching what the japanese achieved by the dawn of the pacific war. but, not far behind. what often is ignored, or not paid as much attention to, however, is the fact that the u.s. navy's surface tactics and doctrine were also evolving and getting better through this period. and one of the things that is core to it, is the fact that subordinate commanders are asked to devise new approaches and new mechanisms. that is, there is a lack of a standardized, universal

doctrinal approach. we heard earlier about joseph mason reeves. the first captain of carrier langley. who helped it become much more effective. turned it in, from an experiment to an actual operational weapon. those lessons then were factored in to the operations of lexington and saratoga when they joined the fleet. and later on, the carriers yorktown an enterprise, which spent so much time fighting and early 1942. now, 3 specific characteristics emerged over the course of time. heuristics is a little bit of a complicated word. meet the pattern of decision- making. if you have a heuristic, it is an approach you have taken before. that you are practiced in, and you do it without really thinking about it. subconsciously, this is just how you go about these

routines. there were three that formed the core of the navy's approach to fighting in the run-up to world war ii. the first of these is to act aggressively. colonel john boyd hadn't yet coined the idea of the poodle loop 60 aside, act. but, the united states navy's officers well understood, that in combat, if you could get inside any decision cycle, you could keep them off balance, control the pace of battle, and create new opportunities. this is something that they tried to do. as a regular part of how they incurred fighting. >> a very effective way of doing that was to attack first. and attacking effectively first is a term that was coined by modern naval theory are titian captain wayne hughes. paul the term from him. the navy at the time did not use the term, but they would have understood it quite well. that was a question after the lab presentation. lighted the navy scout with spd's? this relatively slow plane. it's because the spd can carry and bomb load.

the whole idea was to have a scout bomber to fly scout with the bomber, so that it could attack immediately. because, at the time, carrier warfare, if you could get in the first hit, you were going to win. this manifested in a series of other ways when it came to surface combat. in daylight, the united states navy emphasized developing a fire control solution, with very sophisticated mechanical fire control computer called the ford range keeper that would track the motions of the target, develop a solution, and predict where the target would be, where the shells would land. this would allow them to open fire and very long-range. and often fire deliberately, using salvo fire. at night, the situation was very different. that come as soon as you can see something, it was within range. you were at threat of being knocked up very quickly. so, instead, the pattern for night battle practice was to

open fire immediately at an estimated range based on how far your eyes did see. that night. and then, allow the fire control solution to be developed afterwards, once you noted the fall of shot and spotted onto the target. ships of the united states navy begot became very experienced with this. we have had some questions about rater. radar brings in a new dimension. because, the assumption was, at night, you would have to spot. you would have to keep your eye on the target. you would have to move the shells onto it. radar gives you a range. and those officers who were familiar with fire control radars, the ses and the f these that were in use off guadalcanal, but we don't need to spot any more. we will just get the radar range. and we will just shoot. we don't have to shoot salvos anymore.

fisher talked about partial salvos. well, what they often used off guadalcanal was not just a partial salvo. it was even more extreme. continuous fire. put as many shells in the air as you can. hit the target as rapidly as you can. and what this means, when you have got a ship like -- or helena that has 15 6 inch guns, each of which has a firing cycle between 6 and 10 seconds, but you really are firing continuously. and all the splashes from those shells here on the radar scope, and secure the target. this is why, particularly in the later battles, tessa for rhonda and some of the others, further up the chain in 1943, what typically happened is, the first japanese ship that presented the largest radar target gets overwhelmed. nine, the united states navy misses everything else. the third aspect that is most important here is the idea of the centralized decision- making. so, is a recognition that in battle they are going to be --.

momentary chances to take an action to try to put the enemy off balance, or to act aggressively and attack. to take advantage of those opportunities, we have to decentralize control. we have to dictate powers - empower commander stacked under thrown off initiative and seize those opportunities. it turns a little bit as well. is not just about how the officers behave in battle. it's also about, how do we develop our ways of fighting? how do we develop doctrines can mike if you go through and you look at the published doctrinal matter manuals that exist before world war ii, you will see a lot of information. but if you're looking for specifics about, this is how we're going to fight, this is how we approach a night action, you will be relatively disappointed. a lot of the detail in those manuals is generic. it provides general guidance. individual squadron and division commanders were expected to come up with their own detailed plans, based on

circumstances the moment. also the unique capabilities of their command. and before the war, they did this. it worked pretty well. and they developed new approaches. but what it meant, was there was a lot of variability. different divisions, different squadrons him up at different ways of using their ships together. different ways of approaching battle, different plans. different doctrines. different tactics. and in some circumstances, this can work pretty well. but, when your forces are no longer cohesive, with your squadrons and your divisions get broken up, it can become very problematic. so we wanted variability in terms of how navy ships, particularly for small actions, were going to approach these fighting. and what this is like, has created the impression that the united states navy didn't have a battle dr. particularly for

small, detached actions with cruisers and destroyers. and if you look at it from a very high level, was there a printed manual that instructed everybody how to go about this? well then you write. no, there wasn't. but there was an assumption that these commanders were working out, and they would have a plan, they were provided to this the - subordinates. the difference has created a misunderstanding which i am trying to correct. but against this backdrop against which all of this doctrinal work develops is the assumption that a war in the pacific against the empire of japan is going to culminate in a decisive fleet action. and we need to be prepared for that. so, a great deal of the tactical exercises are oriented in that way. you will notice that when i talked about aggressive action and attacking effectively first, i didn't mention torpedoes. there's a reason for that. >> most of the destroyer torpedo practices assume that

the destroyers are going to be making an attack if they are attacking at night, on a screened enemy disposition. that is a disposition that is protected by enemy cruisers and destroyers. destroyers are instructed to get to the center of any formation and user tornado - torpedoes against the heavier ships if either. carriers, -- whatever they happen to be. to get the, what you had to do? you have to fight your way through the stream. torpedoes are too valuable to waste on enemy cruisers are destroyers. so, you use your guns to fight your way to the screen. this create certain assumptions in the mind of destroyer and cruiser captains. and it also leads to the fact that on american destroyers of this kind during fighting off guadalcanal, would you fire the tornadoes, the -- that launches and creates a spark. it illuminates.

so, this destroyer torpedo was taught to be a weapon of stealth. instead, destroyer commanders -- their guns. >> this is a situation. when admiral king decides that the characteristic of acting aggressively needs to be deployed at the operational level, we need to seize the initiative. take the offensive. and see the anchorage of to log a and airfield at the island of guadalcanal. the japanese, as expected, come back very quickly. the battle of sallow island. is a couple of key lessons that are learned in the moment from the battle of sallow island. -- scott absorbs his. two things that he focused on. reinforced by prewar experience and also by his observations, were, the primary challenges

the price. japanese did so well because he surprised us. the other problem is, we were very afraid of opening fire, for fear of hitting our own ships. friendly fire was a real danger. and it had been a danger not just a sallow island, but every nocturnal exercise that the navy imply that i have come across. there was a risk of ships shooting at each other when they try to rejoin formations or coordinate their operations at night. so scott tried to address these two issues. and he does it by creating a very compact, linear formation. the number of researchers said, this is logically derived from the work that the united states they did prewar. a linear battle formation in microcosm. i disagree. because what scott is trying to do, he is deliberately trying to address these challenges of surprise and for the fire. concentrate divorce. that will prevent from the fire. and he makes it a linear formation on either side

because he wants to prevent surprise. because he wants to be able to attack in either direction right away. immediately. he calls it a double hitter formation. to reflect that. and he wins that victory at cape s perez. fortunately, it doesn't prevent valley fire. the destroyers holt and duncan were both hit by u.s. cruisers. but it works well enough. a month later in november, -- fisher has given us a very powerful description of the challenges that rear admiral callahan face. and he noted that it was difficult for callahan to keep track of what was going on. this was true, but if you go through and you reconstruct the information that callahan has, and you look at the various orders that he issues, it is very clear that there is one thing that is overarching in callahan's mine. and that is, that he has to act

aggressively. he has to get close. so as soon as he gets information from iona, from her more sophisticated surface radar about the jeering - bearing of the japanese from asia, he turns to head toward a. and he does a couple of times. and then, before the shooting starts, he orders the van destroyers and the rear destroyers to course the japanese formation. and after the shooting starts, -- san francisco to bring her as close as possible to the japanese like to. in order to disrupt the creation of the japanese formation and prevent the bombardment of anderson field. so you can see clear demonstration of -- the navy develop before the war. rear admiral lee puts all three of them together. so, he experiments with an information. it is an ad hoc formation. right? the destroyers that he has are the ones that just happened have enough fuel.

but he pushes them ahead. he uses them deliberately as a screen to try to ensure that the japanese forces can be kept at a distance from his battleships. he uses the guns of his battleships to prevent the japanese from concentrating their distributed forces against him. he uses them to keep them off balance. and then, once the japanese searchlight comes on he becomes certain that the target that his fire control crew has been tracking is not the south dakota. and his instead, a japanese ship. he allows his fire control team to open fire. and and some of the most accurate battleship gunfire ever seen in combat, the japanese battleship crucial the is wrecked in just a few short minutes. but he is not done. lee continues to act aggressively. we heard about how the dauntless spent time destroying the transports the next day. one of the reasons i have as much time as they did, is because lee, after sinking country shema heads northwest.

he knows a japanese transports are coming from that direction. he wants to force them to turn around. he does this more or less alone with the battleship washington. the transports slowed their progress. the aviators have more time. so, the decisive moments at guadalcanal turn on these key -- the u.s. navy developed before the war. and there is a lot of learning that goes on in theater between scott, callahan, and appears that informs these battles ethical. -- is the next one. in there, the navy, by that time has abandoned this idea, starting with lee, of having a linear formation that is concentrated. now that the destroyers are sent forth, they had the cruisers are intended to hang back to user gunfire, so that there can be a simultaneous destroyer, torpedo and cruiser gunfire technicalities that's

the way admiral kincaid planted when he put the plan together. admiral right is not executed that we pick and it doesn't work very well. but, it serves as a model for future battles as the united states navy advances of the slot. >> in addition to the learning that goes on in the theater, there is learning going on at higher level. within the pacific fleet. there are two key problems that come out of the fighting and guadalcanal. the first of these is that ship captains, formation commanders can't make sense of all the information that is available to them. there is information for made us. there is information from lookouts. there is the tbs radio. there is all this information coming in. and it is very difficult to understand, analyze, and act on all of it. in a timely manner. captains and commanders are overwhelmed.

the other problem is that the prewar approach assumed and relied on the idea that these squadrons and divisions would be cohesive. right? so, you would train with the other destroyers in your company. you would develop tactics and doctrine that suited your capabilities and your dispositions. and then you would take those into battle. while under the pressures of the two front war. these organizations break down. destroyers in particular are thrown into combat in a very ad hoc way. there is no time to develop this cohesion. and, there is no time to put an affection - effective doctrine or plan into place. admiral chester nimitz, back at pearl harbor, commander of the pacific fleet, is aware of these challenges, and noticing this issues as they come back and report. from the action. in november, 1942. when the climactic battles of guadalcanal are being fought, he takes action on the fact that there is an inability of

these officers to make sense of the available information. this is a directive. ship is going to create a combat information center. that combat information center is going to be a clearinghouse for all this information that is available. from radars. whether they be fire controller search. from adls, from sonars. from lookouts. that new organization is going to synthesize all that information. and provided to the captain the formation commander and actual in an actionable format so we can take advantage of this. one of the things i think is very interesting about this order that nimitz issues, is that he says, what the cic ought to do. he doesn't say anything about how. so, the variability that existed , the individual initiative that existed within the fleet, nimitz triggers a. and essentially says, okay, all you subordinate ships, start experimenting with different

approaches. i am going to identify the best, and we are going to replicate that once it proves successful. so, when the action report from the destroyer fletcher, the last ship in callahan's line, on the fight in november, comes back, and nimitz and his step recognizes what lieutenant commander joseph wiley has done, to help keep that ship undamaged through the whole battle, they bring him back to pearl harbor to try to help him work out cic practices and procedures. because what wiley did is, he stood between the bridge on the radar room and kept an eye on the sg ppi position indicator display. like we see there on the left. and then, he had headphones tapped into the various ship's weapons systems. he coaxed weapons onto targets, and again the commanding officer of the ship, commander william cole, a clear sense of whether pressure was. relative to other ships within the battle. while he was in essence, the

navy's first destroyer combat information center. in a person, in his own action hymns up again he helped to develop sophisticated procedures to make is affected throughout the fleet. >> what happens in 1943 is that these procedures begin to work out. they become much more routine. they become much more effective. so, as the navy is changing its approach, as it is trying to blend effective destroyer attacks timed simultaneously to work with cruiser gunfire, the cic begins to influence how that happens. now, the japanese are changing at the same time. they have shifted their approach, too. we have heard a lot about actions where they are sending cruisers and battleships down the slot to where the guadalcanal to bombard american positions. focus ships. this and mostly destroyers. maybe there is light cruiser. at the head of the column. and these ships don't fire their guns. at least not right away. they fire very powerful

holders. type xciii. it's extreme range. powered by oxygen. it doesn't burn air. united states navy doesn't fully understand the capabilities of these torpedoes until well into 1943. once they do, they shift texas again, hoping for longer ranges. by november 1943, the battles -- they are clear victories for united states navy. they transformed the approach. the revolutionized it, and the japanese are outpaced. >> the other challenge, right? the lack of cohesive formations. this is a bigger issue. the navy needs an ability to interchange ships and task forces to respond to the needs of the moment. and so, nimitz convenes a board

and early 1943 to look at this challenge. to understand how to approach a. they are authorized to rewrite the pacific fleet's cruising instructions. but they exceed that. is a number of surface warfare officers who are part of that group and there is also an aviator. captain a policy check who had been the executive officer of hornet when she went down in santa cruz. they look at the problem. and they decide that they are going to expend a playbook that they developed before the war for major actions. for big, decisively battles. for minor actions. in essence, what they create, is a playbook that any of the ships in the pacific fleet can use to understand how to cooperate and fight together. in a battle just appears. the ability to deal with ad hoc formations has now been addressed. and this supports a fundamental change in how the pacific fleet organizes to fight for the coming central pacific offensive.

the pacific fleet has serious challenges it has never quite worked out how to deal with. the japanese have dominion over the mandated islands in the central pacific. the marshals, the carolines. the marianas. especially after the seizure of guam. and they had spent years figuring out how to create a defensive network, a web within these islands. we get a taste of what it might've been like to it them directly guadalcanal. because the japanese are very good at shuttling airplanes around, bringing surface forces to trick the new u.s. navy and fight very actively. it would have been much worse in the marianas because it would've been much closer to some of the basis. -- is distance from guadalcanal as we heard earlier. so how can -- enter this? and fight effectively. centralized fleet. athlete based around battle fleet foot had real problems with this. it would've been right into the teeth of japanese plants.

so, this is a fleet now instead, reconfigures his epic it becomes a network of carrier task forces. now, instead of moving into a single area and perhaps occupying one objective at a time, it can move into an entire island group. see a decisive point, overwhelm japanese defenses within the network, prevent reinforcements from coming into that zone, and then leave once their locations with airfields had been secured. this is the pattern that is imported first in the gilbert islands. november 1943. and that in the marshals, february 1944. and so on. so, the japanese are at a loss, because they expect that their defensive network is going to hold the pacific fleet down long enough to force the kind of decisive battle that they want to buy. it doesn't. and so, and desperation, they fight the battle of philippine sea. there power is diminished in the try again on the battle of whitney gulf, where the surface

fleet, or at least what primarily remains of it is diminished. and is no longer an effective fighting force. the key, the key i want you to take from this presentation, is that the learning system the navy had established before the war, which relied on variability on this experimentation, is very visible at guadalcanal. it helps us understand better how some of the fighting turned out, particularly surface actions that i have described. >> but, it feeds learning at multiple levels. commanders in the theater share ideas, and rapidly disseminate lessons amongst themselves. at a high level, the pacific fleet is gathering this information, entering how to reconfigure itself and adapting it to the circumstances of the fighting. without these loading mechanisms, the victory in the pacific in world war ii would have been much more challenging, much more complex. and probably would've come much

later. for the beyond august 1945. >> there are a number of other things. that we can weave in. logistics and other stuff. that's the core element of the presentation. go to finish now and ask you to allow some questions. >> thank you, trent. there is questions. we will start on the ground floor towards the back your. >> thank you. another brilliant and articulate presentation. but, i don't have a question. i do have a comment, that in researching a book that i just completed, i came across the armies the united states were office publication, fighting on

guadalcanal, published by united states were office 1943. and i will just read the short opening paragraph. 1943, the united states were office published a restricted document entitled fighting on guadalcanal with the forward, signed by george c marshall, chief of staff. the purpose of the 69 page booklet was to document the resourcefulness and gallantry of the fighting men on the solomon islands. went up against a vicious and fanatical japanese fighting force. from major generals to platoon sergeants, the perspective other contributors was consistent, and is urging to significantly revamp of prewar by the book training to reflect the harsh realities of jungle fighting in an effort to reduce casualties. >> i feel like i should comment. and i think one of the things that that indicates, is the difference in how the united

states navy and how the united states army approaches some of these things. in the navy, there is a clear and deliberate sense of leaving room for the emergence and adaptation of new approaches and new techniques. and, it is clear from some of the records at the time, that they feel like the united states army doesn't have the same kind of a mindset. and, i think some of that had to bring it home for the united states army through its fighting. both in the south pacific and north africa. where some of their assumptions about prewar approaches proves to be fought. doesn't mean the prewar approaches of the united states navy did prove to be. but there was a deeper sense that we need to allow room to learn. because were not getting it right the first time. >> on the ground floor to the back of your left, please. >> there's an old saying that goes something like, a nation

prepares for the next war by preparing to fight the last war or something like that. so, it sounds to me like you don't think that applies to what the navy did in world war ii. so, what you think about that? >> that's a great question. because it gives me opportunity to talk about john. which, as i'm sure you all know, is the massive natal - naval battle fought in the first world war. and, there has been a good deal of criticism leveled at the united states navy that suggested they were trying to refight john. if you get into the record in more detail, particularly if you look at what american naval officers who analyze jutland soon after it was fought soon after the -- they use it as an example of, in certain circumstances, what not to do. particularly when it comes to fostering the initiative of subordinate commanders. there is a clear thread at the naval war college, and commentary by other writers, american naval writers, that jutland was at wasn't as

successful for the royal navy as a vitamin. they handcuffed junior to stick with instructions that were too rigid. that was something they sought not to do. were going to create an environment where people can take the initiative. and act on the things that i see. and so, that. the other pieces, that often does -- the ephesus of the night - united states navy placed on the movement of the battle fleet. think it was move - room to be more critical there. the thing that was important to recognize was even during the war, the battleship is seen as a decisive instrument. so, the plans for the gilbert on the plans for the marshals, they all contain an appendix that illustrates what the navy is going to do at the japanese cannot buy. they seek a major fleet action. we're going to have to consolidate, blowing battleships together, and were hafted to get out. they want to, that's what we

have to do. >> we will stay on the ground floor here. in the center. >> thank you. dr., mr.? for an excellent presentation. the question that i am led to ask by your presentation, is, the effect of the interplay between the formation of doctrine and naval intelligence, now, what intelligence were recollecting about the way the japanese intended to fight? this war? and how, if at all, does it interplay with the creation of interwar doctrine? it seems to me, if you read a book like thai gong, you are

familiar with that. it would've let somebody, if we knew the japanese doctrine, to spend a of a lot more time worrying about what was going to happen at night. and, with naval intelligence even aware of these things? and if so, what input did they have to doctrine? seems to me you fight the fight that you're actually going to fight, not the one that you guess is going to be out there with a mirror image of you. >> there's a lot of impacted. a few things. reminds me of a question that was asked earlier about what intelligence was there, related to japanese night fighting capability. that was a question that rich frank was at asked earlier. thing, one of the most important answers to that is, the united states navy assumed that the japanese were going to try to find it i. not

necessarily a decisive fleet action, but the u.s. navy is going to be subject to attritional attack tonight. they expected the japanese, cruisers and destroyers. the practices, -- they are trying out this kind of fighting. and they are trying to get american cruisers and destroyers better at fighting and i. better at attacking these enemy formation. not necessarily better at the kind of fighting was on guadalcanal. but better at sort of essential pacific major action. so, i think there is a sense that they will do it, we will do it. let's make sure we're better at it. but, what is missed from the intelligence template, and i think this is kind of remarkable that nobody really sauces this out. the japanese have been restricted in terms of the size of the battle fleet by treaty. and also in terms of the size of their cruiser force. okay. so, they will have fewer ships and we are. what does that going to lead them to do? they have ships that they think are higher-quality somehow. and, what about those massive tort - torpedo batteries on the

side of the cruises we can see. they had those photos. they knew that these japanese cruisers were equipped with massive tribute about batteries. there is a failure of imagination to theorize that, wow, that is a 24 inch torpedo with the massive warhead, that can go as far as a battleship gun. that just gets lost. and i do think that there is, you had mentioned, mirror imaging, or if you alluded to it if you didn't say it exactly. but there's a lot of that the habits. the deputies will fight more or less hyperkalemia think about this for 20 years. let's have at it. >> trent, to you right on the ground floor. >> thank you for an excellent presentation. we have all read that in the american air force, after a certain number of missions, pilots were then rotated back to the united states to teach the latest tactics.

to younger pilots. what happened in this regard to navy captains and commanders? >> there is a similar, not always necessarily being rotated back, but as -- riley as i mentioned, there is a deliberate choice to take naval officers, oftentimes a lot of the aviators, back to begin to impart lessons. this happens with surface ships. this happens with -- as well. and then also, rotating them to different positions. ali burke for example, lisa destroyers to victory at cape st. george. -- uses staff to -- who was in command of task force --. 38, and so, there is a deliberate ability to rotate some of the knowledge around. not necessarily just back to the states, back to training. but also, to create a web of

network information within the force that is doing the fighting. >> state to the far right here. >> probably on the same line, i really appreciate the innovation of new thoughts and processes and policies particularly in the cic. and eventually, i understand, given everybody the opportunity to develop throwaway. but eventually that had come into standard operating procedure., how is that turned around, formulated and disseminated? the fleet is disparate around the pacific, as well as in the atlantic. and, maybe some of the officers going back and forth, but how was at disseminated to get a cohesion from people fighting their ownership much of fighting in groups and squadrons together? >> excellent question. so, with regard to the cic, what happens, is, more specific and sophisticated procedures are developed during the course of 1943. and then, there are courses

that are established that, i believe it's called the radar scope. i forget the exact name. but it's pearl harbor. noun, ships when they come in for a refit, or when they are coming up from the coast to join the fleet, a lot of the cic crews. so, initially, they started with the idea of, we will just bring officers here. will train the officers. that the familiar with it. they will go back to the ships they will be sort of a train the trainer at the ship's. that's of the transverse. is not successful because it doesn't lead to the kind of standardization that you're highlighting is going to be essential when you're trying to deal with, you know, series of, commies - kamikazes i want to crash and you ships. instead, they say bring your shipping. were going to get the cic group for a week. two weeks, while the ship is being refitted. and we will train them as a unit. and then, they will go back out to be much more capable and much more effective. so, one of the things that happens over 43, 43, 44, 45,

there is much more investment in terms of how to standardize a lot of these approaches and a lot of these trainings. the side effect of that is, that and now there is less experimentation that goes on. there is less exploration of new, potential opportunities. so, it wins a war effectively, but it is not positioned the fleet effectively postwar to continue this innovative approach. trent, we have time for one more question. then i promise, that the first question from the panel will be from jim. to you. >> the concept of the task force not possible until the advent of the essex class carrier? >> you mean, like the large carrier - carrier task force? >> again, some pieces here. there are task forces before the war starts. the pacific split fleet starts to experiment with them. but they are based are very similar to some of the organizational parameters that already existed. the metaphors in scouting force

and other elements of it. so, you can create a task force back about the mar interior task force that we think of is winning the war with a set of carriers, often too large and some configuration at that. does not really become possible until there are enough carriers to do that. the other thing that mitigates against it is, throughout 42, would - throughout 42, there is some question of what the best configuration for carriers is. so, remember, the prewar concept of carrier warfare is, you have got to hit the back first. you have got to attack. once you hit his flight deck, that's it. were to win. so, there are two ways to win. or, two ways to present yourself in big dams. what is hit the other guy first and the other is to not be found. so there is a lot of emphasis put on, when have carriers operating together, at the coral sea, and midway, making sure that the carriers are sufficiently distance, so that if the japanese strikes command, it all gets one of

the. doesn't get them both. so, that also mitigates against it. what you have to have is an ability, not just enough carriers to make it work, you got have a sense of, how are we going to have a combat aircraft patrol that is actually effective, and can shoot down incoming strikes. that begins to develop through combat experience over the course of 1943 in preparation for the central pacific offenses. >> thank you trent. this is a special edition of american history tv. sample of the compelling history programs that air every weekend on american history tv. like, lectures and history. american artifacts. real america. the civil war. oral histories. the presidency, and special event coverage about our nation's history. enjoy american history tv. now, and every weekend on c- span 3.

>> friday night on american history tv on c-span three, american artifacts series, a tour of the baseball americana exhibit at the library of congress. curator susan raburn shows us the earliest mentions a baseball in books and diaries from just after the american revolution. also, recently discovered pre- civil war documents known as baseball's magna carta, containing the basic rules and organization of the game that is played to this day. that is friday night at 8:00 eastern here on c-span 3. i think the legacy of -- is really ongoing. more rochester embraces its role as the city of compassion, healing, wellness, hospitality, the commission really is to make people feel welcome. that this is a home away from home. >> c-span city tour is on the

row, exploring the american story. this weekend, we take you to rochester, minnesota, with the help of our spectrum cable partners. located 90 minutes south of minneapolis. rochester has been the home of the mayo clinic since its founding in 1864. >> the mayo clinic is a good neighbor. here in rochester. mayo clinic helps rochester achieve international recognition. in many respects, mayo clinic would have never happened, except for the city of rochester. it was a small town, and intimate nature of rochester that allowed this incubator to expand that became a world residence in medicine. >> and, we will speak with local authors in the city of 115,000. >> [ singing ] >> most people think that bob dylan is leftist, or is somehow associated with the hippie movement of the 1960s or something like that.

the voice of a generation of the 1960s, which is a label he detested. also say that, you cannot say that he is exactly left or right. so, i think most people have a misconception about what bob dylan is. >> watch c-span's city tour of rochester, minnesota. this saturday at noon eastern. on c-span 2 spoke tv. sunday at 2 pm on american history tv on c-span three. working with the cable affiliates, as we explore the american story.