>> mr. moulton? >> i would like to register my support for studying this as well. i think we could benefit from understanding what the implications are going forward. and i think it's a reasonable responsibility for us to gather that information. i yield back. >> the house takes up the 2020 defense authorization bill on wednesday. next highlights from the armed services committee meeting and debate on chair adam smith's budget proposal that would authorize approximately $725 billion in discretionary spending for national defense including $69 billion for the overseas contingency operations program. this runs an hour and 15 minutes. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. thanks very much chairman cooper and to ranking member turner. unfortunately, we were as the ranking member said unable to

reach a bipartisan agreement on the strategic forces subcommittee mark and that was a sad day for us on that subcommittee. my amendment would restore the authority of the department of defense to deploy the low yield variant of the w 762 warhead. our deterrence requires that the united states have a proportional response available for any miscalculation. low yield weapons are critical to our security because they give us a credible deterrent. russia's confidence that if they were to strike us we would have the capability and the will to respond in a proportional manners makes a strike by the russians less likely not more likely. mr. chairman, this is why the 2018 nuclear posture review included the requirement that the united states develop and deploy the low yield submarine launched ballistic missile as soon as possible.

the npr highlighted how critical this capability is to close the deterrence gap and provide credible response options to russia to de-escalate doctrine. there was an impressive job done in fy 19 with limit or no additional cost and prohibiting the deployment wastes millions of dollars that the dod has spent working to produce these weapons. additionally, putting a halt to this program incurs several million more dollars worth of lost costs due to contract obligations. mr. chairman, my amendment is also directly in support of the nato partners in europe. something i know my colleagues on this committee say they're committed to. it is entirely possible that russia's threat with their low yield weapons would be against nato conventional forces. not against the sovereign of the

united states alone. therefore, it would be inappropriate and destabilizing if we were not to have an appropriate response because our allies would then begin to feel they needed to look elsewhere for assurances. some of our colleagues on this committee have argued that low yield weapons are destabilizing despite the fact that we have had the weapons in our arsenal since 1945. what's destabilizing is the chairman's remarks on march 12, 2019, and i quote, if the russians launch a nuclear weapon at us and we don't have anything but a bigger nuclear weapon, well, then we launched the bigger nuclear weapon that's what we do. closed quote. that is brazen, it's irresponsible, it's completely inappropriate. low yield nuclear weapons are a crucial part of our deterrent capability. vice chairman of the joint chiefs of staff said quote a proportional reaction to the enemy's attack is actually a righteous and reasonable thing to do. if all you have is large yield

weapons and you're trying to answer a low yield attack, answering that with a conventional weapon is likely not going to have a deterrent value. mr. chairman, my amendment would simply say that we are not going to prohibit the deployment of these weapons that are crucial to our nation's security. i therefore urge my colleagues to adopt this amendment so that we can continue in a manner in which we provide for the defense of the nation in a bipartisan way as we have for so many years on this committee. and with that, i yield back. >> mr. chairman, may i make an inquiry? >> you may. >> i think it's a badge of honor that we have an open markup and my inquiry is if this debate requires it, have arrangements been made for the committee to move to a classified session in order to discuss fully the -- this amendment? >> yes. >> and that would be upstairs in 2212? >> that's a good question.

>> so we have a place to go should it be required. but that was my question. >> that's what my lawyers tell me, yes. >> thank you. >> just a quick response to that. i don't think there's anything brazen, irresponsible or whatever other words we used about advocating for us having a deterrent to nuclear war. what the purpose of my remarks was, we need to make it clear to our adversaries, russia in particular, if they use a nuclear weapon they'll pay a price to it. i can't believe the gentle lady is opposed to that. that we'll hit them back harder. that is clear deterrence and the goal of all of this -- i think we do agree on this is to stop anybody from even thinking that they can under any circumstances

launch a nuclear weapon and have it have a good outcome for them. my point on the deterrence is to say that well, the russians will launch the low yield and if we don't have one, they know we won't do anything because we won't want to be disproportional. low yield is a bit of a misnomer, it implies well it's a low yield nuke, it's still a nuke with the destructive capacity greater than the nuke that was dropped on hiroshima. so if this is launched, it is going to set off a very destructive war. we want to discourage them from even thinking about launching it. and in that regard i don't think there's anything wrong with us making it clear to our adversary that you launch a nuclear weapon, we'll consider nuclear war. we have all the options on the table and i'll point out as mr. cooper has pointed out, we have other low yield nuclear weapons. there's a low yield response is possible. but i'm sorry, i take the

somewhat tough stance we should not tell our adversaries we'll measure how large the nuclear weapon you dropped on us was and make sure we don't respond in a greater way. i don't think that's an appropriate way to do deterrence. i don't think -- i don't have a problem with us the nuclear weapons being a deterrent to anyone launching a nuclear weapon at us. putting it on a submarine, we're not saying putting it on a submarine is a mistake. we have had this debate. many of us have opposed this from the start. this is not a change in position. yes, there are some democrats who support it. i'm not one of them. that's why we put it in the mark -- mr. cooper is not one of them either. so that's why we're having this debate. we don't think it's the proper approach to start talking about a proportional response because it plants in people's minds the idea that there's somehow an acceptable nuclear war. i don't believe that there is.

i think we need to make it clear that under no circumstances will we allow that and if the russians think they can quote, escalate to de-escalate we need to make it clear every second of every day that they are dead wrong about that. escalation leads to escalation so don't even think about doing it and with that i yield to mr. cooper. >> i thank the chair for yielding. my colleagues are not on the subcommittee should know we have literally hundreds and hundreds of low yield nuclear weapons. many hundreds of which are deployed. it's all by the air force. if we don't do what's -- this will be the first time in history that our strategic assets, our nuclear submarines have been used for tactical purposes. if we stop deployment now we won't have wasted any money. it's probably a good thing we have the new warhead developed in production but it hasn't been deployed. the two primary risks you face

if you deploy these so-called low yield weapons are one, you fire the weapon, the submarine is exposed. two, there are a limited number of missile tubes is something we have never done before and all of the decades we have had nuclear weapons. so why risk the most survivable, the most precious leg of the triad with this fairly new idea? you know, we have the weapon developed but let's not deploy it now. at least not without thinking on this important topic. it's an important and fundamental principle of nuclear doctrine we do not deploy this weapon on a strategic asset. >> and would the -- the one thing i want to point out, you know, we fully support the b-21

and the columbia class nuclear weapon and the rlso. we are spending a lot of money on nuclear deterrents in this mark. this is the one area that we disagree. >> thanks. the clock is reset at 4:40. thank you. i believe -- first, let's grant that -- and we have the intelligence that low grade nuclear weapons exist. they exist with our adversaries and in a growing number. so we may not wish to consider that there's a -- it's a tactical weapon our adversaries do. what level of naivete to think it isn't that our adversaries will not. deterrence is based on believability. your opponent has to believe that in fact if they deploy a low yield nuclear weapon, say in eastern europe, that we would have -- that our nation would have the willingness to take out

multiple cities in russia in response. i'd ask people in this audience how many people believe that is the case? we delose ourselves with the idea, well, i'm aware you do, mr. chair, and i think you're erroneous. we delude ourselves with the idea that we would respond in that manner. i find it ironic given when we deployed a sub in response to issues with iran there's a great deal of yelling about escalation. but we'll say in the case of a tactical nuclear weapon used by russia, we'll escalate to de-escalate. it doesn't make any sense to me. deterrence is based on believability and if your adversary doesn't believe you it doesn't matter what you think. it doesn't matter when the moment of time they use it and then we're at a disadvantage. the idea is that we would have less tonnage. think about that.

we would be reducing our nuclear tonnage. our nuclear impact if we had to use anything. it would exist to be less of it in the world and somehow we're opposing that. it's just astonishing to me. so i support the amendment. i urge people to think about this because this is the one of the most important things we'll do tonight of all the other discussions we'll have of how it is we offset a threat right now it's more russia, but you don't think that threat is growing with other nations? it absolutely is. >> will the gentleman yield for a question? >> i would like to yield to ms. cheney. >> i'm sorry? who did you yield to? >> ms. cheney. >> okay. >> thank you very much. you know, what matters is not what we think it's what the russians think. and for us to be in a situation where the suggestions made that somehow those of us who are arguing about the importance of low yield nuclear weapons is part of our deterrence are not

arguing in favor of deterrence is simply wrong headed. when you look at the approach that the russians would take in terms of the likelihood that they would be calculating that the use of a low yield nuclear weapon on a battlefield for example in europe, and tape that listened to the kinds of comments we have heard in this committee they'll make the calculation, you know, of course not. if it comes down to it, the united states will not deploy a larger weapon in response to the low yield attack. for us to be in the situation that we're saying the responsible thing, the thing that's necessary for a national security, is to have deployed a low yield weapon. in fact, they do not destabilize. they make a strike by the russians or by any of the adversaries less likely not more likely. and the argument that the chairman is adopting simply would take us down the path of saying, one nuclear weapon is enough. one can destroy the world and i have heard the chairman say things that approximate that.

and the notion is -- >> seriously? >> well, the notion -- it's my time, mr. chairman. the notion -- it's actually mr. mitchell's time. but he yielded to me. but the notion we'll want to be less secure because we have available every possible response that is going to be effective and the most clear headed way in demonstrating both our will and our capability to respond to keep ourselves safe and keep our adversaries safe it's crucial that we do that and it's unfortunate that the majority has chosen to zero this out in terms of the submarine based missiles. i yield back. >> mr. mitchell? >> yield for a question? so if you grant the premise of your statement, mr. mitchell, that it's only what the adversary believes not what we believe, is it your contention then that if the adversary sees a tactical nuclear weapon, a low yield nuclear weapon by the united states in -- that's

usable that it will increase the frequency or the likelihood that that will be used rather than a strategic weapon that would have a greater yield? >> i think you have allies that have to depend upon you standing up to defend them if they -- if the tactical nuclear weapon is used against them. you have people that believe you have the capability to do that and you have the willingness as a nation to do that. we have gone this long without a full scale nuclear weapon because our adversaries have believed -- because our adversaries have believed that they don't want to have that tradeoff. this is a different level tradeoff and we have our adversaries believe -- >> the gentleman's time has expired. >> we will not do that. >> this argument is missing the point of the amendment. and the point of the weapon itself. the chairman is very clearly pointed out that a low yield is

really a very, very large explosion. extraordinarily devastating and we have a lot of low yield weapons deployed in europe today. they have been there for decades. so with regard to tit for tat on a low yield, very, very large explosion, we're perfectly capable of doing that. this argument that really in the amendment and the mark itself deals with the way in which that weapon would be deployed. not that it doesn't exist, it does exist. as the chairman, mr. cooper, said a moment ago, it's been built. at least one, perhaps more have been built. the question is how is it going to be used and deployed? that's the point of this mark and that is the point of the -- it should be the point of this debate. and that is are we going to for

the very first time take the most valuable of the strategic deterrent that we have, which is the submarines, and i have heard from ms. cheney and mr. -- and from our colleagues on the other side, it is the deterrent that's important and certainly the chairman has pointed that out. the deterrent is ultimately the strategic value of the submarines which would lose that value by deploying a low yield weapon on a ballistic missile. one of the valuable tubes that mr. cooper pointed out. furthermore, when that missile is launched that submarine's location is known. can it scoot away fast enough? well, consider the range of the missile. and the likelihood that an adversary is not so far away.

which is probably going to be the case. a strategic deterrent is gone. the chairman could not be more correct. nor, ms. cheney, could you be more correct. this country has been and is today willing to use a nuclear weapon as a counterattack. therefore, a deterrent. nobody is backing away from that. nobody. now, the notion of a tactical nuclear war has got to be beyond the imagination and it should be. not -- excuse me, absolutely incorrect, ga a mehndi. a tactical nuclear war should be in our imagination. we should clearly understand what it is. it is a nuclear war. small yield, low yield makes no

difference. if it is a tit for tat nuclear war, it is a god awful situation. we should never go there. and for planning to go there with a strategy of escalate to de-escalate, which apparently russia has and by the way the united states had for more than 30 years in europe, is -- you know, like the end of this thing. so what we're talking about here is how will this weapon be deployed? and to use it on a submarine which is the point -- which is the language in the mark. we think is inappropriate. with that i yield back. >> mr. turner? >> thank you, mr. chairman. for the freshmen, the people who have been on this committee for the first final i want to take you back to a coupal of places. first off, this is not going to become law. let me take you to the understanding of what we do on

this committee and the house floor has to go over to the senate and you need 60 votes and this is not going to become law. you know that. the second place i want to take you is the place where you were standing before a community forum and you were standing there as a candidate and you had to answer question as to what you believed. at that time if someone said do you believe in the unilateral disarmament of the united states, you would have said no. i'm all for nuclear reduction, but they should be by treaty. we should bargain it away not give it away. now, the third place i want to take you is the -- when you were standing there in that community forum and people were asking you what you believed, if they told you there's a nuclear weapon that i don't like, and i'd like for you to eliminate it, i'll give you a list of some of the things that you'd believe that you want which is why mac thornberry asked about classified. well, before i place myself in

the position of commander, i would want to know what is russia doing in its current exercises with low yield nuclear weapons and how are they deploying them? that's noble, that's classified you should get that briefing before you make that decision and the second are what is are russia's weapons? the third and by the way this is a red herring you are hearing about we have low yield nuclear weapons. we don't need this nuclear weapon because mr. garamendi and mr. cooper and the chairman can't tell you well how long does it take before the other weapons are deployed? in a nonclassified basis, well, it's not immediate, it's not the same. it's the reason i offered the previous amendment let them certify there's no other option. we'd have to go classified for you to know and you'd be shocked how long it takes. now why is that relevant? back to the things that you would require that you know as that person sitting in the forum when running for office. the bbc recently did a program on world war iii and you know

how they started it? they started it with russian nuking one of our aircraft carriers with a low yield nuclear weapon. all right? now let's think how long is it going to take the united states to respond to a low yield nuclear weapon to one of our aircraft carriers in a proportionate response if you vote to ban this weapon. how long? and if there's a nuclear exchange we don't have to worry about the issue of like we're going to reveal where one of our subs are. there's all kind of bad things as mr. garamendi says already happening. another thing that you'd want to know that's classified is what do we do, what are we planning? what are the commanders -- what does the secretary of defense believe that we would do with this low yield nuke that we don't do with everything? you should demand that know what we are going to do with this.

because this is our families. this is our country. this is like the very basis of us having an adversary who is attacking us. you'd want to know about what russia just did in the nuclear weapons exercises. you'd want to know on a classified basis and want to know that this discussion they keep saying over tactical and strategic, what does that mean? well, you know, for this type of weapon it's actually unclear. because tactical and strategic can mean small nukes or big nukes. it can mean long distance or short distance nukes. these are not small and short, but they're the same distance as the ones that are in this submarine. we have just made them small. so if -- again, in a classified setting we'd actually ask somebody what would happen if they nuked our aircraft carrier? do we take out moscow? or do we take out a great of their battle ships with a low yield nuke and then is that where we stop and hope -- i

believe that you should have a classified briefing of what is russia's nuclear policy because we actually know and our intelligence community knows what they would do. it's nobel. you should know that. when you stood there and you answered those questions saying that you would exercise your vote as an independent person you would say, i need to know all those things. now i would just ask that we should study this. we should look at this. you should demand all those answers but you should not vote to unilaterally ban a nuclear weapon of which you know nothing about, nothing how it protects us or defends us and we should support ms. cheney's amendment because this goes to the significant amount of body of strategic thinking from all of the department of defense that we need to support. i yield back. >> the gentleman's time has expired. mr. courtney? >> thank you. i think it's important to remember again we are not talking about banning these

weapons. what we're talking about is banning the deployment of these weapons on submarines. okay, the first patrol of our sea based nuclear triad started in 1959. the 41 for freedom which was the first class of ssbns. they were launched from my district in gratton, connecticut. and for 70 years they have been the big insurance policy for this country which basically says if anyone is stupid enough to fire a nuclear weapon at our country in any way, shape or form we have a second strike capability that you don't know where it is. i mean, that's really what admiral rickover -- again, he was a genius and figured out that we could create a nuclear deterrent on a platform that again the enemy could not detect. and for 70 years, we have had strategic high yield missiles on those boats so that the message

was crystal clear. there was no ambiguity about what those subs were capable of doing. and frankly, their batting average has been pretty good. the 41 for freedom class is replaced by the ohio class. and again, we have had strong bipartisan support to recapitalize that program with the columbia class -- class of nuclear submarines which is in our budget and which we're funning and again bipartisan, we have been working on this for ten years in a robust way to make sure that that essential platform which carries about 70% of our nuclear war heads is still going to continue the great work they have been doing year in and year out for our country. if we start mixing and matching the missiles that those boats carry, the other piece of you know this question about well, we have to think about what the russians are thinking the question is that if you have a boat with some low yield and some high yield and that missile

gets fired, how does the enemy discriminate in terms of what's coming at them? i mean the fact of the matter is the notion that you can control a nuclear war by, you know, being able to, you know, regulate or moderate the yield of the weapon that you're firing, when things are happening in an instant really defies logic. that is why, you know, george schultz, you know, many experienced folks who served during the cold war really feel -- they have articulated the point of view that the low yield initiative on submarines nos across the board but on submarines is folly. i would just add another point which is that, you know, we're starting to get into the situation where anti-submarine warfare is getting more and more sophisticated. the ability of our enemies to find subs is still far from perfect. i mean, they are still the most effective stealth that are out

there right now. but it's getting better. and the fact of the matter is, james schlesinger who served under two republican presidents, nixon and ford, in the middle of the cold war said it best when he just said that when you -- as soon as you fire, you expose the boat. and so the whole value of that strategic deterrent, the second strike capability that has warned off our enemies for 70 years is gone. once you fire that and if it's a low yield missile, i mean, what's -- how does that make sense in terms of the decision that's being made. again, so for 70 years we have had that policy. last year we had the nuclear posture review that came out from the administration that again this is a big change that they're proposing about putting low yields on submarines. and we really had zero debate last year. i mean, there was a brief flurry that took place and what this

mark does this year is it says, you know what, we're not going to rush into this. we're not going to put the missiles on the subs, we won't change 70 years of strategic policy for this country without thinking this through about how much safer does it make us and what does it do in degrading the value of our sea based leg of the triad. again, i support the mark and i respectfully -- i realize ms. cheney she's a serious member and has put a lot of thought into this but frankly deploying those missiles is in my opinion going to reduce the value of the sea based leg of the triad and in fact lower the threshold for a nuclear exchange happening in the future which we -- which again, we all i think are in agreement we want to avoid. i yield back. >> thank you, chairman. thanks to all the members who have spoken up on this, i think it's a very, very important issue to debate and i think that

both sides have brought up great points. i have heard the chairman mention twice that the response is simple if a low yield nuclear weapon is used against us our our allies, we hit them with a large yield weapon. i don't think it's that simple because we don't know what we don't know. we don't know what russia thinks. i have heard two peoples say that there really is no such thing as a low yield. these are the size of the bombs dropped on hiroshima or nagasaki. so let's just assume for a minute that the russians do try out their theory to escalate and de-escalate and they carry out a strike in eastern or western europe or maybe in syria. and it kills 4,000 people because we don't know what the damage would be. if you're the person sitting in the white house and you have to make that decision to launch a

large yield nuclear weapon that's going to kill 4 million or more, what's the next step going to be? i mean, what choice does russia have? you'll probably escalate the crisis. now, on the other hand, if you had to decide that there was a small scale nuclear attack and there can be a small nuclear attack, and the russians know that you'll respond in kind then that possibly could escalate. we don't know the escalate, de-escalate and we're not in their minds. we have to be prepared for what they may think and i think ms. cheney's amendment is correct and should be supported because we have to prepare for the unknown. we know how we think, but we don't know how they think. i don't think it would be easy to launch a large scale retaliation against something that would potentially end the world as we know it. i think we need to keep on the path. we need to deter with our own

low yield system. and respectfully i yield back. >> just to be clear, i don't think this is an easy decision. i did not say that. do not believe that at all. anybody else? >> thank you, mr. chairman. i know we have great respect for former secretary of defense james mattis and you're all aware. i don't think as he said -- i quote, i don't think there's any such thing as a tactical nuclear weapon. any nuclear weapon used at any time is a strategic game changer. and if we can ask the question -- if you can ask the question and not get a good answer for yourself what happens next? what is the result of that? then i think we have to have a different frame of mind. as we look at these questions. there's just no question that, you know, you -- i would call it a baby nuclear weapon.

is that what we're thinking about when we think about limited nuclear war? and somehow that's not going to have a response that wouldn't be so damaging whether it's in our country or in a country of our allies? so i don't know why we're pushing so hard to think that we're ready to make the decision about this. i think that the language that's being suggested here signals that we -- you know, we have got a plan for this and they ought to have one too. they ought to have one that's harder than ours and we know -- we know we already have -- you know, weapons that are so lethal that there's everything in the world that can be achieved from that that is horrible to our world. so why is it that we're so anxious? we're so excited to be able to

have a deploy -- to deploy the missile warheads on submarines that we know are devastating. it's -- i'm concerned that that's -- you know, we're not able to answer that question. and i don't think anybody can at this point. if you have a good answer for that, then i think you need to share it with us what you think that will be. what happens next? that's an important -- that's an important question in any commander has to answer. we have certainly many, many low yield nuclear weapons and we are -- we have been modernizing them at great expense. if the president ever needed to use what is considered a low yield nuclear weapon, he has those options. he has them today.

and presidents before him have had them. instead we want to sort of escalate this discussion to a point that i think brings us to a far worse place in today. >> would the gentle lady yield? >> i yield. >> i appreciate the gentle lady's contribution to the debate. i think one aspect of the debate not covered yet is america's conventional capability, not nuclear, is by far the best in the world. often we don't have to consider nuclear weapons, we can have the same destructive force without using them. and that really is due to precision weaponry that we have and other technical advantages. it is not a fair question to say nuclear nuclear. we can respond with nonnuclear weapons. that's one of the spurs that spurs poorer nations, since our conventional capability is

exquisite, expensive to develop, they almost feel forced to develop nuclear weapons to have a way of responding. that's an aspect of fire power hasn't been acknowledged in the debate and we should. that's one of the many ways the pentagon excels to the superior advantage of our country and far greater capacity than any other nation on earth. i thank the gentle lady for yielding. >> i thank the gentleman for adding to that and i yield back. >> thank you, mr. gallagher. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i think the line of argument would negate the argument -- if there's no distinguishing between strategic larger nuclear weapons shouldn't have concerns of mixing and matching on subs. my primary arguments in favor of changing the amendment are not along those lines. i would say first in response to the argument that we don't need to expand potential options for

low yield use because we have larg larg larger nukes. i would say it doesn't work. it is why there was an important shift in the national defense strategy. ultimately it puts onus of escalation on us, right? in order for this to work, our adversaries have to believe credibly that we are willing to escalate to nuclear armageddon. we certainly have capability to do so. whether this president or future president would be willing to do so, that's an open question. luckily few, only one president has been forced to confront that very momentous decision. the point is to give presidents options below that in order to de-escalate and put onus to de-escalate to adversaries. this gets to the second point

which is the shift contained in the national defense strategy from deterrence by punishment. to deterrence by denial. fielding the capabilities that will allow us to deny our adversaries. and bio posing cheney's amendment, you're opposing the most consequential shift contained within the national defense strategy. i would say in response to mr. cooper's argument, the idea that conventional balance of power is in our favor, that may be true at the present moment, but that's trending in the wrong direction the last two decades. if you doubt that, look at the chinese response to the taiwan strait's argument. what is the bipartisan position?

the nuclear posture is clear in saying that was a good move and they also argued that, quote, low yield slbm war head will not rely on host nation support for that effect. they'll provide diversity and range and edge against future breakout scenarios. this is important. it gets to some arguments mr. courtney made about not wanting to put things on subs. our aircraft are likely to get smoked if they're on european runways. i would also say this is bipartisan because former obama secretary of defense ash carter has gone on record saying my views are reflected in the latest nuclear posture review, meaning that supports cheney's amendment. jim miller, undersecretary for defense policy during the obama administration argued that secretary of defense jim mattis's 2018 nuclear posture

review offers policies and plans, including those in 2010 npr, deserves broad bipartisan support. proposal for low yield slbm weapon and nuclear tip sea launch cruise missile are sensible responses to change conditions, especially russia and north korea. i would urge my colleagues to support cheney's amendment which i believe to be a thoroughly bipartisan amendment. i am happy to yield the minute i have back to miss cheney if she would like it. >> thank you very much, mr. gallagher. the majority seems to think stability served by limiting america's capability. i hear no distinction between nuclear capability in hands of russians or adversaries and one in our own hands. nuclear posture review makes clear we need this very capability. assessments of adversaries'

capability shows 2000 nuclear weapons. i urge the freshmen, i echo. before you cast, be fully briefed and aware of information available about our adversaries' capabilities, and i have tremendous respect for my colleague, mrs. davis, but i would say asking what the plan is requires a classified briefing and it is irresponsible for us in this committee to sit here and say we are going to limit the military. >> the gentle lady's time expired. >> for this capability without seeking classified information and material because it is there. >> let me make a point. we have had classified briefings on the subject matter, to imply we haven't is incorrect. reasonably certain every member of the committee received classified briefings on the subject over the years. whole lot of hands. mr. whitman, you are next on my

list. >> thank you, mr. chairman. listening to my colleagues, i agree with several points. first of all, both a low yield and high yield nuclear weapon devastating. both have their own level of deterrence. ballistic missile submarine, it is the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad. for the adversaries, it brings uncertainty. you combine that with whether there's low yield or high yield nuclear weapon on board, that uncertainty equals stronger deterrence. that's to say let's put more uncertainty in the minds of our adversaries. there's a higher level of deterrence, especially as adversaries are building broader, more in depth capabilities, whether conventional or nuclear. how do we make sure the calculus

is in our favor. we have more options that create more uncertainty where they'll say we better not do this. we're not quite sure if one of the low yield weapons will be on board one of the ballistic missile submarines, which we have a hard time identifying where they are, versus putting it on other platforms where they know exactly where it is. those are elements of what the nation has to do in the modern era of great power competition. it is critical to do this. taking options off the table weaken us. taking options off the table do not create the full scope of deterrence we need to keep adversaries not only at bay, but make sure their decision making is in the realm of saying no, we're not doing that because we know what the result will be from the united states. or we think we'll know. or we are too uncertain to take the chance. that's what this is all about.

that's what the debate ought to be. i hope my colleagues see it for that. i want to make sure we provide every opportunity for our leaders in the pentagon, for combatant commanders to say we created just enough uncertainty with adversaries to where we have prevented a war. strength through deterrence, uncertainty creates the deterrence, that's what this is about. miss cheney's amendment allows us to do that. it is critical for our nation to have this happen. >> thank you. mr. scott. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i won't take the full five minutes. i would point out miss cheney's amendment does not deploy the weapons. i would love nothing other than to pass legislation, taking options away from the russian and iranian and other country military leaders. if there's one thing i figured out in time in washington, i trust our military leaders to make the decisions more than i

trust congress to. i point out to colleagues and friends the cheney's amendment does not deploy the weapon. without the cheney's amendment, we're taking options away from the united states military leaders. i don't understand why we want to take options away from military leaders. >> could we get an idea whether the gentleman's interpretation of the amendment is correct? it is not my understanding. >> always awkward here. i don't know if this is a parliamentary thing or matter of debate. what exactly does the amendment do? >> the amendment strikes prohibition on availability of funds for deployment. >> mr. banks.

he is not here. mr. walsh. good debate. we're getting to the point we need to wrap it up. if we move through it, that would be great. >> quickly, mr. chairman, then. i think it is, again, i encourage everyone to receive, not sure everyone received the classified briefings on nuclear posture. it is completely plausible, i would dare say likely, that the russians could use low yield nuclear weapons, whether it is foreign city, western europe, carrier strike group with the assumption that the united states would not launch a high yield nuclear weapon in response. i think that's a likely assumption that the president of the united states from either party would not launch that

escalation in response to losing a carrier strike group. that's what the russians believe, that's what they're banking on, that's what makes us less safe. we need to have this capability. secondly, the low yield nukes that we do have are not nearly as easily deployable and survivable as those coming from a ballistic missile submarine. i would encourage everyone to take those two pieces into account. i yield my time. i am done. >> sorry. could someone clamp some time? mr. cooper wants time. >> i will yield my time. >> first let me say, i value the gentleman's service. i was particularly impressed with your jump recently on celebrating d-day. i hope your par chute wasn't as old as your uniform.

>> it opened. >> remember, in the awful event of a russian attack, we have hundreds and hundreds of low yield weapons, with greater flexibility, accuracy, pretty much greater everything. the only question is whether a token amount on a new platform, strategic platform makes sense, including for sailors on the boat and for the security of our country. that's really the question. whether you put them on a boat. >> just briefly, we're not talking about one potential adversary, we are talking all current potential adversaries and future. we're not just talking russia. talking russia, china, any country that now has nuclear weapons or the ability, some

groups that aren't countries. our response has to be taylored -- tailored to that. i yield the balance of my time. >> this is not fair to new members. it is not fair. every person who is not a new member has voted to do this. every person on the committee that's not a new member voted for these weapons to be configured and deployed. this is only new members put in this position of having to vote for the first time on a nuclear weapons issue where no one likes nuclear weapons, everybody wants them not to exist, but they're doing so without the proper information. i'm certain when you had the community meeting, you never said i am voting how mr. cooper tells me, when he tells me the other weapons that we have that are low yield are better. they're the same as everything on subs. same as everything on subs. i guess everything on our subs,

big or small, is bad. it is not of high quality, but it is. but the question is, and i'm telling you this, mr. gar mandy is a good friend. we had the presentation on the classified briefing of what it would take, how long it would take for those nuclear weapons to be deployed. i was shocked. and mr. gar mend ee was pissed. what do you think it would take to shock me, an hour? a week? weeks? how long do you think it would take to shock me? i can't tell you because we're not in classified session. this is why it is not fair. this committee has not had briefings in the committee on the russian exercises and nuclear weapons component. i don't mean not as an individual, i mean not one of

the committee briefings. they have done it, individually a couple of us have, most of us have not. a briefing on the deployment of russian nuclear weapons. have we had a briefing on what's at cal in grad? we did not. we did not have a committee briefing how long it would take, the briefing we had, we have not had committee briefing how long for low yield that everybody wants to do this tells you are instantly available, available today, i wrote the words down, it is not true. no one has had classified briefing of what would we do with these? there's a battle plan. there's a whole thing, people planned, if this happens, we do this, this happens, we'll do that. we should review all that before we a debate and put ourselves in the commander's position. it is not fair for all of the people that are new without these classified briefings that give them substantive

information to be able to make the decision, make a decision contrary to what everybody already on the committee has made in the opposite. i yield back. >> mr. thornberry. >> i am concerned about our ability to fully discuss the issues involved in open session. but i will say this, seems to me the essence of the argument supporting the underlying provision is since we already have low yield weapons, we don't want those on a survivable platform, and it goes back to what mr. scott said, why we would want to take away options for ourselves while adversaries have options does not make

sense. a number of references made about the russians. i think we can say in open session, what we have are low yield weapons on air platforms. well, again, we can't get into detail, but russian air defense systems are pretty formidable. i think the idea behind the nuclear posture review was have a full range of weapons on the delivery systems, fuller range of delivery systems, and that increases the credibility of our deterrence. why would we not want to have a weapon on a survivable platform? that's hard to understand. two other points i don't think have been talked about. number one, allies support the deployment. y'all think about the storm and drum trying to get our allies to do more, about trying to keep

nato together, alliances in the pacific, et cetera. our allies support the deployment of this. we're going to sit here and say y'all may have stuck your neck out but we're going to backtrack and it? that has ramifications. lastly, the other thing that has ramifications, this is what i am particularly concerned about, we can't talk in here about the status of the program. somebody said we didn't really have debate about this last year. no, we did, and a decision was made, and this program has gone forward. it would be one thing, i think a mistake, to say we're not going to begin this program. it is a completely different and more serious thing to say we have begun the program, now we're going to backtrack. remember, our nuclear deterrence is not just about us. there are lots of countries all over the world that depend on the credibility of our nuclear

deterrent. once we make a decision, move forward with that decision to backtrack on that has severe implications. so i think the gentle lady's amendment is right. we need the full range of options, we need the confidence of allies, we need to be able to take a decision and move forward with it. the underlying provision would undercut all those things and i think be a significant step in the wrong direction. i yield back. >> thank you, mr. chair. you don't need a classified briefing to understand that russia and the united states have thousands of different types of nuclear weapons that could destroy this world over a

thousand times. what we're doing here is discussing yet another grade or category of conventional nuclear weapons. for me it is so simple, maybe it is so complex i am missing it. for me, it boggles my mind. i think that we have all of the weapons that exist, we are fighting over yet another category of nuclear weapons. i just don't understand it. mr. chair, i yield back. >> thank you.

this has been a robust, fair debate, difference on policy. i take issue with the notion that somehow we are too ignorant to make the decision. we weren't too ignorant when the committee approved building the weapon. basically because we don't know enough, we have to stand back, let the pentagon do what it wants. that's not how i interpret our job. if that was the point, we should all go home. why are we even talking about it? i will completely grant -- the idea that you can't possibly support going against the low yield nuclear weapon because you're too stupid to make the decision is something i strongly reject. i gave you a lot. >> no one said that. let's be clear. >> indeed, yes. but it was heavily implied. and i'm sorry, i used stronger

language, i was frustrated by the way that was presented. it was said that basically you don't know what you're doing. you don't have sufficient information to make the decision, which is -- i drama advertised it, saying the too stupid thing. i 100% reject that. we have had classified briefings. freshmen are knowing more than some of us on the committee a long time. we are perfectly informed to make this decision. now, good arguments on both sides. for heaven sakes, don't base your vote on the fact you're too ignorant to do it, if you do, you should probably give up your job. i believe we have been informed, we know what we're doing, we're not yielding to the pentagon. there are a lot of arguments made here. i think as you hear the debate go back and forth, the most troubling aspect is it makes

people contemplate an acceptable nuclear war. that's what a lot of the debate was about. we're making a calculated decision, theyau launch a low yield nuclear, we can contain it. the whole point is to deter nuclear war from ever happening, when you start walking down, my opinion is that this debate essentially makes our point, having put this in our mark, to not deploy the weapon. once you start walking down the road, our adversaries listen to that and say if we launch a nuclear, it is possible we can manage it. have an acceptable nuclear war. at the end of the war support for the underlying position is because that's exactly what we are afraid of, to make it clear that there is not an acceptable nuclear war. for the life of me, i can't really understand why it is that

apparently in a classified brief we can be told exactly what the russians are thinking and we'll know exactly what they're going to do, going to have perfect information on that, you can tell from my tone of voice i don't believe that. we can't believe that, they lie a lot. we have to pull it apart. on the other hand, we don't think we can convince them that this is our deterrent position, if you launch a nuclear war, better not count on proportional response. you better understand if you do that, it will lead to severe consequences for you. why would we tell them if you do that, we're going to try to manage our response so it is an acceptable level for you. there are people in the committee room that fought in wars, i haven't. but i don't think when you're going against an adversary, you say i want my response

proportional. you want to win by overwhelming force. we don't want a fair fight. we want our adversary clear on the point we're going to kick their ass if they take us on. the concerning part of it is again, it begins the discussion down the road that there is an acceptable nuclear war. there is not. and at this point in most audiences i reference the 1928 movie "war games" where the computer simulated and said no matter how you start it, it ends with obliteration. with that, i shouldn't turn off the mike. the question occurs on the amendment by miss cheney. all those aye. oppose. no. and that we will have a recorded vote. that's ordered. next up, miss cheney again. pretty sure this is an important piece. the same debate we just had.

if we can move through it quickly. going to consider law 397 r-1. for what purpose does she seek recognition. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i have an amendment an amendmen. >> we will dispense with reading and the gentle lady recognized for the amendment. >> this amendment restores funding necessary for slbm deployment. we heard a lot in the last debate about nuclear obliteration and instability of the world in which we live. you know, what i fail to be able to understand and find extremely troubling is that the majority response to growing instability and threat complexity we face around the globe is to disarm america. my colleagues on the committee say they're not for unilateral

disarmament. as i pointed out before, we live in a world where the russians in fact have 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons. the idea that somehow the way to avoid miscalculation, to avoid instability is to make sure america cannot deploy this low yield nuclear weapon is a blaming america first irresponsible approach to this. we live in a world where the cold war concepts of deterrence are outmoated, those concepts insufficient to provide for our security. it is easy to say nuclear weapons are horrific. we all have plenty of nuclear weapons. that's unsustainable, indefensible, irresponsible. i agree that the committee has crucial oversight and responsibilities. we're not carrying those obligations out if we say nuclear weapons are bad, therefore we must make sure the united states does not have access to the full range of

capabilities we know adversaries have. we know russian nuclear strategy is escalate to de-escalate. the russians hope a limited nuclear escalation gives them an advantage. we must guard against that. the point of making sure we have funding for and authority to deploy these weapons on submarines is to raise, not lower, the nuclear threshold. mr. chairman, i take issue with the idea that anybody on this side of the aisle called anybody on the committee ignorant. nobody said that. what we did say is members of the committee who are not on the strategic forces committee, members of the committee who have not voted on this issue before, members of the committee who have not taken part in all of the briefings mentioned need to be aware they're being held accountable. simply cannot effectively and responsibly conduct oversight necessary here, have to go home, explain to constituents why you

cast a vote to disarm the united states, to disarm the united states unilaterally, a circumstance in which our adversaries have the weapons without the full access to information that's available in the briefings. i think that that's the epitome of failing to live up to our obligation of effective and responsible oversight on the most important set of issues probably that any committee in congress deals with and addresses. my amendment that we are discussing now, mr. chairman, would restore funding for crucially important weapons along with authority that we need to restore from the previous amendment, and with that i urge my colleagues to support the amendment and i yield back. >> mr. chairman. >> thank you. if i may, i will quickly note first of all the idea that deciding not to deploy low yield nuke -- our arsenal is rather

robust, whether we deploy this or not. it is true, taking one option off the table, talk about unilateral disarmament is over the top. i think members are fairly well informed, and curious argument to say since you're not well informed, you have to agree with me. this issue is tough. i grant you, there's a lot of information here. no matter how much information you have, you have to make a decision one way or the other on what's a fairly critical, i agree on this, an important decision in terms of the united states. i am confident again this committee is smart enough, intelligent enough to make that decision. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i would like to speak in opposition to the amendment. >> go ahead. >> as the chairman has said, the loose talk in the committee about unilateral disarmament, disarming america is completely wrong and worse, it is irresponsible. i know some people on the committee are running for higher office, but i think people on

the subcommittee will recall i tried my best last week to have debate on these issues at the subcommittee level where more people were able to go to the briefings than at the full committee level because many people are not even on the strategic forces subcommittee. but the gentle lady will recall despite my efforts, only one amendment was offered, your amendment, and it was a combination of four different amendments, and there was zero debate when we had a wonderful opportunity to have debate on these important issues. i support briefings. i support knowledge. i want full committee understanding. but loose talk at the full committee level after many hours of markup is not the best way to achieve a sensible national defense policy. many of us from the south think being a hawk isn't a bad thing. but don't give hawks a bad name.

you accuse anybody in favor of any moderation, including most republicans and most presidential administrations in recent years, man like george schultz, for example, and others, james schlesinger, you go down the list, the modern republican party is talking about is a clear departure from 60 to 70 years of sound nuclear strategy. so let's not go overboard here. there's been a lot of discussion about freshmen members. we're proud they're on the committee. i think i have been to virtually every briefing the strategic forces committee had for at least the last seven years, every secret briefing. nobody is trying to pull any wool over anybody's eyes here. i do think if you look at the w 76-2, that's such a tiny, tiny,

tiny fraction of our overall nuclear forces, it is not even a rounding error. so to make this the be all, end all of u.s. nuclear strategy is completely misleading. it might be a nice new feature. i am glad we developed the war head. and it is in our stockpile and available for use. but let's not endanger lives of sailors on our precious nuclear submarines, let's not disclose to enemies around the world these rascals have been deployed. we don't have to do that, at least at this stage. we are ready, we are prepared. we can do this if we need to. i am glad we're prepared. but the extra step the gentle lady is doing with the largely redundant amendment is pretty remarkable. i wish the gentle lady success in future efforts. >> will the gentleman yield? >> i will not yield to the gentle lady.

the gentle lady had the chance last week in subcommittee to have informed debates. >> the gentleman is casting aspersions on the subject stance of the amendment. >> we have to keep things in order. plenty of people will give you time and you should have time. it is mr. cooper's time. >> no one on this side, no one on the committee, no one in congress i am aware of ever mentioned things like unilateral disarmament or disarming america. the wild accusations are just wrong and as i say irresponsible. we should project an image to the world now because our adversaries and potential adversaries are watching. if they see such a loose, uninformed debate, if they see such divisiveness in congress of the united states, that only gives them hope. let's not give them hope. let's show that we are adults, that we are responsible, that we can measure our language. and together do the right thing for the country. i see my time expired.

i thank the chairman. >> mr. thornberry. >> what is not wild and irresponsible is the fact the underlying mark takes away an option. it is not total disarmament, but it takes away an option. and to me the most concerning underlying theme of the whole debate is that we're the problem. in other words, if we restrain ourselves, the world will be safer. if we take an option away from ourselves, somehow nuclear war is less likely to happen. we're the problem. and i do not believe that's the case. i believe that as we develop more options, survivable options, then we increase deterrence and decrease the chance a nuclear weapon will be used. but this underlying notion that

we have got to tie our own hands, therefore the world will be safer goes to the heart i think of what many of us are concerned about with this amendment and with an overall approach to defense. i believe we need to be strong. i believe we need more options, not fewer. i believe we need to increase the uncertainty of our adversaries or potential adversaries, not simply guy their calculations. in a lot of ways, i think that's the bottom line to this. i hope our colleagues will vote to be stronger with more options rather than blame us for the

problem. >> many of us dedicated our lives to this country, would never do anything that would jeopardize that, put our country men and women and the world at risk. certainly many of us thought about the issue long and hard. when it comes to matters of existential existence, it falls directly within the purview of this committee and congress. many decades ago our country made a decision to reserve the decision to use these types of weapons to our elected political leaders. we believed it was important to reserve matters of existential existence risking this type of war to those elected by the people of this country. so there is a history and precedent reserving matters of these issues to this body. and that's why i think it is

important that we understand that and that we don't just default to giving options when it comes to matters of weapons to our military leadership. i believe in this instance risk of destabilization that the weapons cause, uncertainty they would cause and risk of starting another arms race is greatly concerning to me. and i certainly will not be supporting this amendment. mr. chair, i yield back. >> thank you. votes have been called on the floor. i am 100% confident that we can complete this debate in time to go over and vote. so it has been a robust debate, a healthy debate. i am going to. i am trying to encourage to wrap this up quickly so we can vote and move on to the next one. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i think the committee deserves to hear response to miss cheney.

i yield time to the gentle woman from wyoming. >> thank you. i appreciate this issue very much. chairman cooper, the way he began our convening meeting, when he talked about this issue as being the single most important issue, strategic forces that any subcommittee in congress deals with and addresses. i think that's the kind of treatment this issue deserves. i think it is completely uncalled for for mr. cooper to suggest that somehow there's loose talk going on, or suggest that there's somehow political aspirations, unless mr. cooper is announcing he is seeking higher office, i would say this is inappropriate place to make that announcement, he ought to stay with the facts. i can only imagine perhaps he can't argue the facts if he is going to personal as perfect.

this is a capability our adversaries have, a capability that they have the ability to deploy, that they have deployed, it is a capability, my colleagues in committee on the democratic side of the aisle are suggesting that the global stability and security requires we not let the united states have funds or authority to have this capability. so that's unilateral disarmament by definition and also blame america first by definition. i think this is a crucially important issue, one we ought to be discussing, and one we ought to debate based on facts. we might not go down saying there are ulterior motives or go down the path saying to hurry it up and move it along as the chairman did. this is an important issue. those of us on this side of the

aisle that suggest colleagues need full information, that colleagues need to be fully informed are simply saying you need to recognize and understand if you have not had briefings about what our adversaries can do, if you have not had briefings about capabilities the military requested, if you have not had briefings about plans for use and deployment of weapons systems, you need to recognize when you cast this vote, you're doing it without full information. there's nothing political about that. we're not playing games. we're simply suggesting you have to have full information. that's why i offered this amendment. i do not believe, i think it is highly irresponsible to suggest the world is more safe if our adversaries have capability that we do not have and this committee takes every step to prevent the united states from having that capability. that's wrong. >> reclaiming the balance of my time to mr. turner. >> i want to make it clear after mr. cooper's comments, i served on the strategic forces committee, that committee never had briefings we discussed would

be necessary for determining whether we should recall a nuclear weapon. i yield back. >> a look at live coverage coming up on cspan 3. in about a half hour, former mexican ambassador to the u.s. from 2017 and 2018 joins discussion on the u.s. mexico border. we'll take you to american enterprise institute at 11:00 a.m. eastern. and this afternoon, admiral colleague faler, commander, will answer questions from senate armed services committee. live coverage starts at 3:00 p.m. eastern. and tomorrow, federal reserve chair jerome powell testifies before the house financial services committee on u.s. monetary policy and state of the economy. all of our live coverage is available online at cspan.org or listen live on the free cspan

radio app. >> there has been discussion about an appearance before congress. any testimony from this office would not go beyond our report. it contains our findings and analysis and reasons for the decisions we made. we chose those words carefully and the work speaks for itself. and the report is my testimony. i would not provide information beyond that which is already public in any appearance before congress. >> former special counsel robert mueller set to appear before two committees of congress wednesday, july 17th at 9:00 a.m. eastern. he gives testimony to the house judiciary committee. later in the day, taking questions from house intelligence committee, both open sessions. coverage of robert mueller's congressional testimony will be live on cspan 3, online at cspan.org or listen with the free cspan radio app.

take us up to live coverage of discussion on the u.s. mexico border, the current mexican ambassador to the u.s. on her country's efforts at the border and efforts to deal with the influx of migration from central american countries. >> we're getting starred. thank you for everyone's patience moving around. i am delighted to introduce the mexican ambassador to the united states, i will tell you a little about her and make brief