all week we're featuring american history tv programs as a preview of what's available every weekend on c-span3. lectures in history, american artifacts, reel america, the civil war, oral histories, the presidency and special event coverage about our nation's history. enjoy american history tv now and every weekend on c-span3. 30 years ago on march 24th, 1989, the exxon val dez struck a reef and spilled close to 11 million gallons of crude oil. the senate committee heard from exxon's chairman as well as the the coast guard who led the response. you'll see questions from committee members ted stevens of alaska and massachusetts senator john kerry. this portion is a little over two hours.

you ready for me, mr. chairman? >> yes, mr. roe, we have your statement. it will be included in the record in its entirety. and under the circumstances, you can deliver it in its entirety or summarize, either way. >> i'll just sort of summarize it. i'll here to provide a frank response to questions regarding exxon valdez oil spill, and to describe our continuing to efforts to deal with its consequences. before this, i do this, however, i want to express sincere regret as to what happened on behalf of all the employees of exxon and certainly on beha of myself. i really can't tell you how sorry we are this disaster occurred. and we are particularly sympathetic to the impacts on the residents of alaska and particularly those in the prince william sound area. that's where the difficulty is

really creating a great deal of problems for those people. as has been said many times this morning and by us earlier than this, we take full responsibility, and we've done so from the beginning. we'll continue doing all we can to clean up and mitigate the spill's effects and all necessary resources are being fully employed. it has already been mentioned by secretary skinner that the environment in the area and the remoteness and the high tides and the physical problems associate the with it make it a particularly difficult problem. two comments about the spill, just to put it again in perspective. it's been mentioned many times. the spill has been an estimated 240,000 barrels. it occurred early on march 24. we have other factual information. the weather was clear.

the ship had no known mechanical difficulties. the course change was requested and authorized because much ice in the outgoing channel. the captain subsequently left the bridge. and tests made sometime after the grounding showed the captain's alcohol level was above the limits established by the coast guard. that's clear. there are still many unanswered questions as to what occurred during this period of time. we're conducting of course not one but many investigations within the company, are the national transportation safety and coast guard, there are other state and federal investigations underway and we're participating in all of those. the all-spill contingency plan was activated immediately. called for a two-phase response. the first was a responsibility of alleyessca, the second face was our responsibility as the shipper. and our response was immediate.

we immediately established the priorities. first priority was to prevent additional spills from the damaged tanker which had approximately 1 million barrels of crude on it. and certainly trying to immediately mitigate the impact of the spill on the environment and the people of alaska. major mobilization began immediately and by now involves as the secretary said many hundreds of people, thousands of people, a lot of boats, planes, helicopters and so forth. i won't go into details with you. currently we're receiving support from a large number of orgzation ises. we have a large number of experts, academics and so forth. under contract, and we have 200 exxon experts and other con sur sultants that are ateping to manage this. we are mobilize on prince

william sound. the claims office was staffed by 30 people. it's open and adequate funds are placed in accounts in local banks. those are available to provide immediate advanced payments to those requiring monetary support while claims are being prepared, reviewed and processed. i've insisted that that be done as expeditiously as possible. our infengs is to provide fair, reasonable and prompt settlements. as of noon tuesday, we had the remaining oil that could be removed from the taker, we had that off -- all out of the ship, as i'm sure most of you read in this morning's paper, the ship was successfully refloated, and it's now in an area on naked -- next to naked island where we will do temporary repairs. when that's completed, we'll take the ship into dry dock

somewhere and repair it permanently. a couple more comments. for now it's too early to assess the long-term environmental damage. natural resource doonl damage assessment is underway. a number of them, epa, noa, a number done ourselves. we cannot judge how long recovery will take there, but i can assure you since march 24th, the accident has been receiving our full attention and will continue to do so until the job is done. we are continuing to cooperate fully to establish the facts as to what happened. more importantly however, we want to help in any way we can to establish what might be done to reduce the chances of such an incident happening again. i i can assure you that actions are already underway within exxon to revise policies and procedures in the light of this accident and to preclude what happened from happening again. unless there's different set of

circumstances. >> it not happen again, has exxon learned, mr. rawl, not to risk such a valuable cargo and an immense vessel, the length of three football fields, which takes a couple of miles or so to even turn course, to risk that to just one pilot, not have a copilot? i mean, is that the -- right now if i went out on that say three or four other exxon super tankers, would i find only one pilot, master pilot, licensed and capable? >> no, sir. >> to steerage? >> the prince william sound is unusual. that most of the three mates plus the captain is licensed to pilot this ship in many areas. in prince william sound, as has been said many times this morning, you have the state

pilot takes it to a certain point, and then the -- can you hear me? >> i know it goes in and out. we've tried to credit he can it all morning. >> i'll trying to talk louder. >> please do. >> in this case, the pilot -- the pilot was also the captain. obviously we had no knowledge of how he was impaired. i think it's possible, however, or as i understand, the law there, it's possible to have two mates on the bridge at the same time in a case like this, to where you could in fact do what needs to be done when you have ice in one channel and there was a great deal of concern about the ice. i'm not trying to make any exkooiss on this. but the facts are there are ways to do that if in fact as you suggested in earlier conversation with secretary skinner, that if one had a heart attack or something, it seemed kind of ridiculous. so there were other options available. now the same impairment

apparently that created the spill to begin with, created the situation where maybe the master could have said, bring another mate up and have -- they had -- when the skipper was on the bridge, there were four people. there was a lookout on one of the wings. there was a person that was in charge with staying with the captain. there was the third mate who it was his ship and the person steering the vessel. that was the situation. had when he went down, as i understand stood it, he could have send up another mate, and been legally responsive. whether or not that ship would have hit the reef or not, i would expect it would have had a much better chance of getting through there. >> i've had a lot of difficulty understanding this accident myself, i can assure thaw. >> i think that's the first lesson we've learned this morning about the copilot.

thoroughly equipped, because the person in the second mate went to qualify masters of voes vessels, is is required in those waters, as the record shows. you said you didn't have any knowledge. and yet they'll say in the law, you should have known. isn't it the case that the record shows that this particular master of the vessel had three convictions of driving under the influence of alcohol? in other words he had an alcohol problem? >> yes, sir, it shows that. >> and that doesn't mean -- man, that could scare me to death in a board room if i was were on exxon's board. >> why -- >> you've told me a fellow had that expensive cargo and magnificent vessel was only three years old, we're not that short of masters, we're grinding them up king's bay -- king's point, i should say, at the christ lore state in long island. we can give you all the masters

you want. >> yes. >> how do you -- you got no explanation for that? >> nor. obviously. >> i'm not going to try to press that point. >> let me tell you, we have some things in place. and it came up a little bit earlier regarding random testing for drugs and alcohol and the difficulties that you have in some cases negotiating those. but we can impose that in certain instances. and we've imposed it. not before this bill but we've got it into the policy. and we're going to do it if we get lawsuits on it we're going to take the lawsuits on if. i would have felt a lot better had we taken the lawsuit and said we went to court and lost it rather than the situation we find ourselves in now. there's more to this alcohol question than you -- you're probably ware aware of it. let me clarify. we didn't know about the dwis.

and i never heard of this man until two weeks ago. obviously i'm not looking for any sympathy, by the way. we did know, he came in, as i understand it, and said i i have an alcohol problem a number of years ago. he was rehabilitated. that was consistent with an alcohol policy. however the judgment to put him back on the ship ask a judgment made at an operating level. obviously it was a bad judgment. could have been a bad judgment in a lot of people's eyes on a going-in basis. in mine. i didn't want you feeling like i didn't level with you when i was up here talking with you. >> i appreciate that. the third meet, now, you find no cup pablt there i take it, because while you fired the master, you now have corporate counsel representing the third mate, is that right?

>> you find yourself in this kind of a situation, and i'm not too expert in these answers, but i've asked these same questions. in the case of the captain, initially we told him to get his own counsel. this was before we knew that the alcohol situation would show up. and by the way that was tested and show up as you may recall until several days later. but we knew that when the ship went aground and he wasn't on the beach, we obviously had a conflict between the corporate interest and probably between that and the individual's interest. we said you get your own counsel. we'll pay for it. we found out he violated a lot of policies. he was terminated. in the case of the third mate, it's sort of in that same phase. there has been, to my knowledge, no testimony taken under oath in

this case yet, because the national transportation safety board is still developing the hearing time. but everyone has been interviewed by those individuals, by the coast guard, exxon and so forth. but we have to let this thing get into that venue, i think. >> on the response, you said that the first phase of the response was for alias ka, and the second in line for was you, exxon. and you responded immediately inferring that perhaps it wasn't a prompt on immediate response by ali as ka. what is your position on that? >> i'm sure you've heard this before. but there are a number of oil spill contingency plans that are involved in this situation. one of them was the alias ka oil spill contingency plan, which the first one had to be in place before the pipeline started up. and that was in 1977 or '76 that this was in place.

it's been revised several times since. then the shippers was separate the out of the pipeline. they had to have a spill contingency plan. and that is circa early '80s, i think '82. when i said the first part was aliessca, the spill invasion is a relatively small spill. i think the numbers were mentioned this morning. there has always been recognition that if you had a tanker spill in prince william sound, and you mentioned a probable case, nobody ever thought it was probable that a spill would be this large. but there has been a rather modest writup in the contingency plan for that that recognized the possibility of a 200,000 barrel spill which is in the same ballpark as we're talking about here. there are certain times as to when you mobilize resources from

other ports and around the world. and we are in our case bringing them from europe, florida and other places. now, an important part that have contingency's plan, anything that large required and in effect had approved by the federal agencies, the epa, and the state of alaska agencies involved, recognized that you had to promptly disburse a disbursement, in this case corrected 95-27 would have been the proper one. mobilization started on friday. a team left houston, a management team, the president of the exxon shipping company, mr. irasi was sent with a number of associates. we have response teams on the west coast and gulf east coast. and also not only current

employees but also anyone involved. we put them under contract and call them. all these people convened. the management team was there later on the date on friday. we had a c-130 available for spring and a large amount there on saturday. we had some delays that occurred and problems occurred, not because the plan didn't provide how the decisions would be made but because the plan provided for a number of people to be involved in the decision making process. >> senator stevens, i've got a lot of other questions, but i want to yield to you. >> well, thank you very much. mr. rawl, i know what you say. you didn't know this captain personally, and we certainly don't imply anything personal in our feelings.

but my problem dealing with this now is the problem of the multiplisty of plans. it's my understanding alias ka did have a contingency plan. there's a regional response team plan. there was a prince william sound company plan. would you do us a favor of asking your people to give us a copy of each one of those since the beginning of the pipeline shipments out of -- i believe you have them. you'll have to get them anyway for the lawsuit. i think this committee ought to have that. >> we'll do that. you want each member or just send them to the council. >> i'm pleased to tell the committee, bill stevens is a friend of mime mine. dist dantly we're related. he is the president of your tanker company. he came to alaska and made a statement saying that exxon would accept the total responsibility for this. you have made a similar

statement here now. but after mr. stevens left alaska, your legal department indicated that as far as the liability to the customers in terms of failure to deliver, that exxon was going to rely on an act of god theory. is that correct? >> when mr. stevens made his statement, and by the way, senator, as you probably know, he's the president of exxon usa which is our prince pal operating in this country, they're talking about the impact of the spill in alaska. because you start getting into something downstream of that, in terms of -- i assume you're talking about dust customers, you can roll that on around the world and there's no end. >> i was interpreting alaska as being a second thought of exxon, and it left a significant doubt

in the minds of alaskans as to the extent that the exxon major national company was going to accept the statement of liability that mr. stevens made. >> oh. >> and many of us are lawyers. you're the president of the company. but your lawyers are liable to go to court and say after all, that was not a legal obligation. that was a statement of policy. and we're now defending against these suits. what is the policy of exxon with regard to any expense that developments as developments as a result of this spill? >> i've said it's our intention to stay, clean it up to the best of scientific policy, best that we can do, and also to pay those people in your state that have been damaged by this spill.

and there are a variety of kinds of damages. now when you talk about suits, we've got suits, as i'm sure you're aware-you're all lawyers. i'm not a lawyer. but the facts are there are a lot of these suits that are legitimate suits. hopefully none of the people damaged in alaska will have to go to court. >> i share that problem about the necessity for these people live in towns. as a matter of fact very few of them have active courts. >> they won't have to go to court. >> and i'm hopeful that the system -- the system will be put in place by the president for an emergency declaration i hope. is that what put the sba and the federal emergency management agency and others out there, to give temporary assistance, which if there are claims that can be presented, that your company will pay? the people that get that assistance can repay it. but meanwhile a lot of people as in the earthquake, people that weren't even in the kbrar of the earthquake had severe financial

losses as a result of it. that's going on right now not only in my state but i think some of it is going down into seattle. and we have to have some temporary assistance. that's not your problem. but i want to make sure that from the point of view of the company that act of god defense that was raised with regard to deliveries of the oil to customers has no relationship to the events that took place in my state. >> none. >> let pe -- i have a map here that i made when i was up there. i didn't make the map but we drew these things on there. it shows the four hatchery areas. that was the exxon valdez on vly reef. it was my understanding that the obligation to remain -- to have a pilot onboard basic came down to about this line. and that the third mate was qualified to handle the ship through this entrance but not qualified to pilot this vessel above that line. it's also my i understanding

that the captain was the only person onboard after the pilot got off as the ship came through the val dez narrows, the captain was the only person onboard qua you will fil qualified to run the ship. is that your understanding? >> my understanding was the captain was the only man onboard licensed as a pilot to run the ship. >> that's right. >> now that's different than my view as to who was qualified or unqualified. >> well, it's my understanding that third mate was not qualified to run that ship past blie reef? >> senator -- >> i'm not trying to pin you down. >> frankly i can't -- i'm having trouble seeing the map, but i know where blie reef goes. >> it's blie reef like captain blie. >> that is -- >> it is my understanding that it came down, the captain raws required to get it past blie

island and blie reef and he did not do that. we've just learned this morning as a result of disclosure yesterday, that the computer on this vessel was programmed by the captain, as the pilot left and the tug left it, and that the third officer attempted to counterman the computer program, and it was actually the computer that drove that vessel on the reef. is that your understanding? >> no, sir, it is not. my understanding as a result of interviews made with the third officer, that he turned that computer off, and that it was not at the time -- he got -- he hit the rocks, on automatic pilot. but, you know, i'm just telling you what he has said.

what he's testified to. >> all right. and i again i've taken too much time here this morning. it's my understanding from the visits in core dova that the core doefa people who people those hatcheries, those are not federal, they were built by the people in the core dova area to enhance the production of salmon in the area. they felt compelled and did go and acquire the boom and started the protection of those hatcheries because the exxon group would not move to in their opinion quickly enough to start the protection. now, that is the basis i think of the feeling in the prison william sound now, that there should have been federalization. have you talked to your people as to why some of the offers of assistance that were made were refused? for instance, the

interdepartmental team meaded by the bureau land management, federal and state team, went to valdez, stayed two days, it was rejected. it was a crisis management team for the tax pairs. it did work out a contingency plan in seward. secondly, i am told that the soviets came in and made an offer, the norwegians made an offer, the swedes made an after. we've had a series of offers from responsibility entities that have dealt with oil spills in the past. and your coordinator refused the assistance. is that a company policy and were you informed of that? >> first, it's not a company policy. second, a lot of those things that have alleged being said up there, it's my understanding, for example, we're willing to accept the russian offer. the -- >> is that ship going to be allowed in there to help? >> i don't think we would have been able to keep it out anyway.

we've asked. we're accepting all the help. the norwegian after that had allegedly been made early in this spill was really -- they wanted to have, as i understand it, senator, the number of people may be wrong, have four observers come and look. and as far as i am concerned and no, that was approved. but there was no what i understand offer of help. you know, if they want observers there were observers. there was a french offer about observesers. i don't know the other ones. >> germans also contacted me, the germans. >> the germans. there was a question of offers of help and a lot of people want to see how you deal with a large oil spill. obviously lots being learned up there. it's a little bit different. the words are different and the intent is different. but we're not turned down any offers. now in terms of the fishermen out of core dova, it's my understanding that we're utilizing a lot of those people

in with their boats, and that we're trying to fully employ them. you know better than most in this room including me that we're not dealing with beaches that look like miami beach or somewhere else up there. these are very difficult conditions. and that's why it's such a prisstine area and tragic and has the wildlife it has. but we also have concerns -- we're getting thousands of volunteers from the people in the u.s. and around the world want to come help. we're getting thousands of letters and telephone calls from people all over the country saying, we want to go and help. but one of the only good things i can say about this thing is that so far no one was killed in this operation. and i'm sure there have been some minor injuries. but as you know you have a 15-food tide in prince william sound, which is very unusual in the u.s. anyway. you have to go to your state to find anything like that. except up in maine, bay of fundi or something like that.

but when when that water goes in and out each day or if you fall off the beach, when the tide's going out, you better be a he willl of a good swimmer or somebody better be there with a boat. we're talking about a very risky situation. it's been accused we've been slow cleaning up the beaches it's going to be slow. the beaches of france that were cleaned up were pretty simple compared to what we're facing but we're going to get it done. >> i'm sorry you can't see this. >> i have a -- >> an ocean ografer that i referred to has been studying this for his lifetime. he told me that you have to view the prince william sound as being roughly capable of producing about 25% more fresh water annually than the mississippi river. it comes out and goes southwestward with what we call the alaska coastal current.

as the water exits the prince william sound it's basically fresh water. most people think it's say line. he has tried to make an input on these plans, and on the plans now for the recovery from this. i gave his name to the people. i begged people to talk to him. he sent me another contingency, a report i'll be glad to make available today. the people had knowledge of what was predictable, were not consulted. that has left a great feeling with alaskans. this man is to us, you know, the dem key man for this area. this incident team, one of the first things they did when they got over to seward was to contact him for the plans dealing with the keynie fears national park in resurrection bay. i think anybody looks at those

will tell you they're perfect, they set the priorities, they set the boom, they determined the areas had the greatest, their first area was an area under the response to what was the responsibility of the city of seward. they said that was the number one salmon producing stream in the area and it had to be protected first. they gave your people a list of boom they said they had to have. your people said we'll pay for it but we can't move it. we had to scurry around and move to protect. they were over there in valdez. they were over there on sunday and monday and tuesday. >> this is -- >> this is the interdepartmental team. they were sleeping in an abandoned warehouse asking each day to be heard, and they were told they were not needed. now, if you want to know why with he feel so strongly there

should have been a federal presence, that's it. your people said, we don't need you. i was with the national guard general, an eskimo, we're very proud of him, a general, he flew me down there and offered his assistance. in my presence they said we don't need your help. you got a wonderful company that's the pride of our company that you've been able to do internationally what you've done, but in this instance we fear you let us down. and i've got to say it, and i'd say it to anybody. thank you. >> senator gordon. >> senator stevens asked mr. rawl about what he considered to be a backing away from your agreement to assume responsibility, you know, when you said you'd treat as an act of god any claims by your customers. your response to him was that

that did not limit your responsibility to alaskans impacted by this spill. senator stevens, quite properly, pointed out that there are people outside of alaska who are impacted by this. many of the fishermen who regularly fish in prince william sound are from the state of washington or oregon. was your answer to him another attempt to limit your lienlt to only the people voting residents of alaska or does it extend to everyone who's livelihood is impacted by this spill? >> senator, you can understand how sitting here, you know, i presume you're a lawyer. i'm not. but you have to hear the specifics in this. if in fact there's a fisherman in your home state who has been going up to alaska during the summer and fishing and so forth and has records to show that, presumably, he would be damaged.

and i'm sure he has access to counsel because there's plenty of counsel around who spend a lot of time looking at this thing. i cannot accept, though, liability add infinitum and wherever it goes in the world, the rules of proof and so forth, whatever they mean, have to be taken care of in this regard. we're doing what we can do now. we've been very busy trying to get the ship off the rocks. it's now, thank god, over in a cove where hopefully we can patch it appropriately and get it to a dry dock. by the way, the senator from oregon is not here now but he made a speech this morning about putting the ship in oregon and talking about the bar and so forth. he said that was what exxon wanted to do. exxon had a question once, where is there a dry dock in the west

coast of the u.s. that could take a ship that size, and it was in portland, oregon. that got translated somewhere in the press and so forth. there are other places in the far east. i'm not saying where the ship is going. but the governor of oregon has already -- we got communicated through the newspaper a lot of people communicating with, i can't really say that this is what he actually said because sometimes we get misquoted slightly ourselves. but he's indicated he questions whether he wants it in his state. we didn't even make a decision yet as to where it would go. but i just wanted to make the record clear on that. i hope -- i've tried to answer your questions, but it's very difficult to me. you're getting me in legal areas that -- >> you are not attempting to make a distinction and say your only area of responsibility is the affected people of alaska? >> right but when you're talking

about -- >> i wasn't asking -- >> that'sst basis senator stevens said and you referred to. that's entirely different. >> i take it that the parent exxon corporation some time ago made a decision that it was wise corporate policy for it to own its own shipping line and to ship the alaskan oil in vessels owned by a company or by a subsidiary? >> well, we actually use chartered ships many times also. i don't know how many we're using in if alaskan trade. but in international trade, we have some of -- exxon has 71 ships world wide. houfry and i may be off a ship or two, 19 of them in this country. so we do use chartered ships. >> this ship is owned by a wholly owned subsidiary? >> absolutely. >> you are ceo? >> that's correct. >> can you give me the chain of command that would go from you

as chairman of the parent corporation down through that subsidiary to this captain? or maybe work it back up? who was the vooir of the captain and up to you? >> the captain has a supervisor, and he reports to a manager on the west coast of the u.s. there are also other people who tell this captain what to do in terms of scheduling and, you know, these captains work a few weeks on and a few weeks off. i'm not precise on the team. but then that individual on the west coast who was in port in ven ooesha, california, which is san francisco area, he would report into houston where we would have a presumably someone we might call an operations manager. and then as a president of the exxon shipping company, who reports to a senior vice president of exxon usa, who

reports to the president of that. . these -- we reel have management committees at the level of exxon usa. we have management committees in new york. and then the president of that company would report to me. now i don't know how many levels that is, and -- >> well i want very earnestly to make a suggestion to you, mr. rawl. whatever the success of exxon in the past, it now has the dubious distinction of having caused one of the most severe and perhaps the severe mad man disaster environmental disaster in our history. we are constantly comparing ourselves in this country, sometimes unfavorably, sometimes i may say unfairly, with the japanese. as i understand their corporate structure, when something like this happens, everyone takes responsibility from the individual who was directly in c cause of it up to the ceo, and

everyone offers his resignation at that point so that a new team can take over and restore the credibility of the corporation. i suggest the disaster that your company has, calls for that response. that expresses my opinion on this disaster. >> i appreciate that expresses your opinion. i doubt if i have to comment on it except that a lot of the japanese kill snems themselves also, and i refuse to to do that. >> i'm not asking for that but the resignation is in order. >> well, i don't think so. >> senator kerry? >> i think that notwithstanding obviously everybody's anger and frustration and so forth, and there isn't any real way to excuse what happened. but i don't think we gain a great deal by posturing up here

at this point and somehow doing other than to say that you have recognized and i think most people in the country appreciated the forthrightness with which you tried to at least accept responsibility and be involved in the cleanup and accept the costs thereof. there are obviously some questions, though. these things have a way of ameliorating as time goes on, and commitments can become disdissipated and other things that get in the way and lawyers will be clamoring from one end of the country to the other. notwithstanding the press reports i don't know how accurate and extensive there are, as to what you see now, what have you declared as your full responsibility here? for instance, to what extent in the assessment reparation process to federal and state

agencies -- has a process been put in place now to assess the cost to the federal government which you intend to reimburse? and what is the extent of that reimbursement? >> i don't know what the extent is and whether we'll reimburse the federal government. we'll have to look into that. that hasn't been our instant concern. >> let me give you an examplep sub committee has been thirsty to encourage noa to be able to do considerably more on global warming, impact of ozone, ecosystems. much of their resource is now going to have to be diverted to come in here and find out what the impact of oil which settles on the bottom is going to be on micro organisms and life systems and so forth. will it be your intention to redress that additional cost at a time when the federal government obviously is hard

strapd? >> i'll look at everything. that's all i can say. >> when you get this big advertisement in these newspapers which say we'll cover the full caost and make it good to what extent? what is making good mean? how long will the fishermen. to be compensated for the loss of livelihood? >> first thing pif of we have to find out, what is the size? there have been a number of environment disasters around the world. some we won't mention. some others like the fire off of mexico that spilled a lot more in the gulf of mexico that did not have lasting effects, in terms of the -- repay the u.s. government, a good part of the delay in my view, early days in the delay, from the time we were ready to spray deterjent which was part of the approved plan, and it was a deternalent that

was approved by the epa, approved by the state of california which is fairly tough on these types of things, 12 countries around the world, we when it available, aircraft, ready to spray, it has been tested and in this plan, we couldn't get approval from saturday morning when we -- we requested approval on friday. we couldn't get approval from saturday morning until 6:45 on sunday evening and by then the weather had really gotten bad and blue tew the roof off of airport. we've got government agencies involved. >> as a lawyer my ears are ringing with mittgation of damages arguments. >> no. i'm telling you when you start pointing, who's at fault? we say, the ship went aground. and we had a plan. and we weren't able to start the

plan. now, as a lawyer, that may be what you're hearing. what i'm telling you, that in good conscience, we're going to try to fix -- but when you start talking every one of us compensates the u.s. government all the time. this company pays a lot of taxes every year. we paid a windfall profit tax for a number of years on alaskan crude oil. >> i know you're not suggesting to us, because i think the chairman will go through the roof. i know you're not suggesting to us that that somehow compensates for what's happened. >> no, that's right. but i presume, however, that a lot of these are government services that are supposed to be provided when you have a disaster. i have a hunch that had we had a little more clear authority or we had people on the ground who felt like they could exercise the authority, we probably could have mitigated to some extent. we're going to clean the damage up. >> let's me ask you this.

was the plan with which you are one of the consortia, was that adequate? >> retrospectively, it's difficult to say it was adequate or retrospectively a lot of these plans -- we're looking at all these plans. >> let me ask you, point blank. is it difficult to say it's adequate if the maximum amount of oil the plan contemplated was 74,000 barrels and this spill dumped three times that. was that a difficult issue to decide? >> no, no. >> was it adequate? >> you're talking about the aliesca plan that takes a certain amount of spill in upstream, let's say, from where this ship hit the rock. president other plan was the plan -- the early response was aliesca's problem. with 220,000 barrels of oil on

the water, had they had the barge in shape and so forth, and there was a great deal of problem, obviously, it's, it's doubtful to see how this would have mitigated this problem very much. in terms of the restitution for the fishermen, how long does exxon plan to provide restitution for the fishermen. >> we'll have to see, senator. you're talking about prospective things. i don't know what the initial damage to the fishermen is. in a lot of them -- some off your home state, the great forecast of doom didn't result. now, that's a different environment, different time, different kind of oil. the facts are, we'll just have to see. >> what about in terms of the

clean-up, the wild lifshgs natural resources, have you put a mechanism in place for determining who was going to be paid, how, over what period of time or is that -- >> wildlife? >> right. natural clean-up. >> we're doing it. we have contractors doing it and we're going to do it. >> for how long? for what period of time? >> oh, until no more can be done. what the damage is at that point and how long it will last -- i think it was mentioned here today that sometimes you can overwork some of those environmental problems, which they did in france with removing the sand from the beaches and so forth, but we're going to get it cleaned up. >> is that not notwithstanding the cap, the 14 million and 76, is that notwithstanding -- >> those numbers are just numbers, obviously. it was 86, by the way. the 14 million was sort of like you'd pay on your car. you have a $200 deductible or something. we have to pay that under the

taps operation. then it's $100 million, which i think senator steven mentioned. that gets paid by taps. by the way, we paid 20% of that $283 million ourselves by shipping down that pipeline, which we're 20% owner in. thenner with go to other cooperatives we belong to worldwide, a number of those. the insurance is very complex, there are a number of other questions and so forth so we have to see how it works on you the. >> have you personally spoke to mr. cousins to determine what took place? >> no, i have not. >> are you aware of what he says took place? >> yes, i am. now, cousins is the third mate. >> that's correct. what is exxon's policy when the captain is incapacitated and no other licensed or authorized personnel are on board?

>> i frankly don't know precisely what that policy is. >> is there a policy? >> i'm sure of it. >> but you're not aware of it? >> identify asked a lot of questions. i didn't ask that one. >> to your knowledge, did mr. cousins ask in conformance with company policy by assuming command of the ship under that situation? >> i don't know the policy. i doubt it, but i really don't know the policy. >> and notwithstanding, you're currently representing him? your lawyers are representing him? >> we're representing him until we -- you say -- i thought you said you're a lawyer. obviously, everybody has a right to representation, and if he's not really at fault here -- >> but you have made no determination based on -- >> i didn't have the conversation. one of our lawyers had the conversation. >> i understand. but from what's been reported to you, you have made no determination as to whether or not he acted in conformance with

company policy? >> i don't know. >> is the valdez equipped to maintain communication with exxon headquarters during transit? >> we don't -- you're talking about exxon headquarters. we're talking about an office in new york where i work and -- >> no, i'm talking about -- >> they presumably have radio equipment that can communicate with various points where we have people that take in touch with the ships e but i don't know precisely what radio equipment they have on but they have no trouble communicating, to my knowledge. >> are there situations in the past, that you're aware of, where an unlicensed person has taken control of one of your ships? >> not that i'm aware of. >> can you give us some idea of the impact of this reduction from the north slope on crude oil supplies in the lower 48

states in terms of gasoline prices and supply? >> well, it's had some impacts and at times it's been substantial. and every time someone -- possibly the governor of alaska says, we're going to shut down the pipeline or open the pipeline, the oil market is volatile. every time an opec minister clears his throat, the market sometimes goes up and down. we've had a tight supply situation relatively in gasoline in this country since last year. demand is up, as you know. there have been some refinery turn around. now, there's more product moving to the west coast. we moved a lot from the gulf to the west coast, or we're trying to get it out there. but the crude price went down yesterday for west texas intermediate pricing. that was predicated on the fact that the word was out that the

ship was off the rock and then when they start talking about something else, i don't know, senator, how to express -- it's tight but manageable on the withest coast. i hope now that that ship is out of the way, if we can operate those ships in and out, with whatever kind of regulations transpire, we can relieve the anxiety and it's kind of a psychological thing when it gets to gasoline, anyway, as i'm sure you need. people buy it when they don't need it because they're concerned about running out of it. >> obviously, you heard the many people who have said this was never supposed to happen. all guarantees were given, so forth, plans were in place, so forth. but once again, humans seem to have found a way to defy the odds. is there a lesson that you would draw from this in terms of our future efforts with respect to oil exploration and delivery?

>> obviously, there were a couple situations we have looked at and have taken some steps on. in terms of oil exploration, i think we need it in this country. as you know, i don't have to quote a lot of figures. we're import. ing 40 plus percent of the oil we consume. we have a balance of payments problem but we also have these -- we have tankers, and some of which exxon doesn't own, thank god, transit when we're not working on this other -- >> what i'm really getting at, you look at all the circumstances now that in summary seem to be very disturbing. you have a pilot who may have gotten off before the ship was at the point it should have been. >> i have not heard that before, but -- >> well, i'm just saying -- >> i see. >> -- allegations in the air.

you have a ship that changed course, third mate, so forth, captain incapacitated. you have coast guard that didn't have positive control, people working -- it seems as though this is sort of like murphy's law but it seems like there was a complacency in a very risky process where major guarantees have been given to citizens, not just in alaska, who are most profoundly affected, but all over this country by this process. would you say it's fair to say there was a real complacency about the -- the plan for clean-up wasn't adequate? even if the plan worked according to the way it was supposed to work, it wasn't enough, the ship was far in excess in terms of capacity for spill and so forth. it seems like i heard sam

skinner say earlier, there's no magic solution. i don't think we're looking for a magic solution. i think we're looking for just basics that avoid a kind of negligence. >> i think you have used the word guarantee a number of times. it was clearly stated there were no guarantees -- >> i'm not talking about guarantee. i'm talking about the illumination of a fundamental risk level. it seems there was a complacency -- >> it's fair to say that when you get into large spills, you're not going to guarantee anything, but you're going to make every effort to avoid them. it's like airplane crashes or whatever else happens. but that's what you can do. >> but you see what you're saying there is that there's a higher expectancy -- >> this sh shouldn't have happened. i've stated that.

this is state of the art. this isn't an old stamp steamer ship. >> it's not state of the art. maybe when someone is trying to turn the wheel and the computer system is governing, there should be an alarm bell that goes off that tells them immediately. >> we'll have to find out what the facts are in that regard. the man says he turned that automatic pilot off, but certainly if you turn the wheel, i presume if you're an experienced person, and he's experienced. he has -- he's run ships in the oceans and i suppose that's the -- you can tell whether you're getting -- i used to have a boat, not any longer, but you can tell whether the rudder is having some effect on that. you don't just run into something. why he got out of that channel, i have no earthly knowledge of that, senator. i just can't tell you why. but we're going to make every effort to find it out. we'll just have to see. >> thank you, mr. chairman.

>> mr. rawl, he was an experienced third mate and radio contacted. did he not get permission to take over from the master? >> i don't really know that, senator. i just don't know how that works, frankly. i assume not because i haven't hearder ed that but i really don't know that. >> do you know whether or not they do have radio contact? >> i don't know whether at that particular point in time -- i know they had radio contact with the coast guard and i know if he had said to the coast guard, i want to take over or the captain wants me to take over, they'd say you're not the licensed pilot or -- i presume he wouldn't have asked anyone but i'm presuming. i really don't know. >> that's a good answer because the requirements for the master -- license for master pilot is very precise, very stringent. and the testimony is crystal clear there was only one licensed. >> correct. >> and i'm certain that exxon is

not -- that you -- >> no, absolutely not. >> when i asked about the policy, you don't have to say you don't know. you do not count a man -- >> there could be a circumstance as you said earlier where someone has a heart attack or something and somebody says, what do -- can i park the ship or -- >> they still wouldn't be licensed. >> no. but you can't tell them to let it run itself if the captain fell dead -- >> well, that is the possibly of exxon right now. you don't have a policy for co-pilot. >> my understanding is the coast guard permits two officers to take over in those kind of circumstances. we have a number of officers that could have been on the bridge or could be on the bridge in that drop dead circumstance. you know, you're getting me into -- >> no, i'm not getting you into

what i know and i'm very inexperienced on the whole question, but right to the point, if that master had had a heart attack, it was a policy of exxon that it should just run itself because at least unlicensed, right, because you didn't have anybody licensed to -- >> well, we had people that could run the ship. we had people that could take -- >> run the ship with a licensed policy. i mean, we know this fella couldn't run the ship. he ran it into the rock. >> i just said as i understand it, and i have a lawyer over here who can tell me again if i'm not stating it properly, that you could have two officers on the deck along with the helmsman without the captain, i guess, without the licensed pilot. but, you know, if you want to quiz me on rules of the road of the coast guard, you have the wrong bns witness. i can get somebody up here all day that -- >> we all know the rules of the

road of the coast guard with respect to licensing someone, that fellow is a master pilot, and you had one. >> yes, sir. >> and no more than one. >> on that ship at that time. >> and if it's appropriate, we'll have more than one in the future. >> if it's appropriate. when asked by senator kerry if you learned anything -- >> i -- >> -- you learned that, that it was not adequate and we ought to have a valuable ship of 125 million -- >> i'm not sure, senator, since this master has indicated that he was under the influence of alcohol some time after this, correct, but had he been piloting the ship himself, who was a licensed pilot, it's very possible we would have had the same circumstance. i don't know that. it's sort of -- we're speculating what might have happened. but a license doesn't necessarily make anybody effective, whether piloting an

airplane, ship. but the facts are, you brought up a good question that i'm asking. >> it's not your contention that the vessel should have been controlled by coast guard radar at the time of the collision and collided with the rock, went aground? >> my contention is, all i know about it is, the weather was clear. there was ice out there, which they were trying to -- >> i'm not asking about the weather condition. i'm asking about the coast guard radar. >> i understand. i'm answering the question. it's pretty obvious this shouldn't have happened whether the coast guard had the radar on or controlled it or didn't. >> excuse me. i'm asking whether you think the coast guard should have had radar control under any circumstance? >> i think it would -- obviously, we would be pleased in the coast guard called early the morning of the 24th and said, take a right turn, get

back in the channel. it would have saved us a heck of a lot of money and saved the government money, too. >> that's a hypothetical. what is the actual policy? do you think it was -- or responsibility. do you think it was the coast guard's responsibility to continue with radar coverage of that vessel? >> i can't comment on it, no are. i have not -- i don't know what their obligations are in that regard in other ports. >> what is your recollection? i think y

valdez. >> we're convinced it passed. but i think we're doing a good job. >> what's your reaction to the governor of alaska's suggestion that they take over, the coast guard take over the project from exx exxon? >> i think we'll just have to look at that. >> i know we're both going to look at it, but what's your reaction? >> well, if somebody has a real instant cure for this, i'd be delighted but the facts are i have a hunch that we'll have to keep up there and keep doing what i told senator stevens we're going to do. some of the delay, as i mentioned early on in this thing, is because we had a lot of help in getting started. >> senator stevens, we have captain yost, the commandant, and he's ready to testify. do you have any other questions? i want to thank mr. rawl for his

appearance. >> i understand while i was gone, just one thing. mr. rawl, when i was in valdez, there was an exercise last summer of the contingency plan. i asked if this particular dispersant had been used safrlt of the contingency plan. had never been approved by the coast guard or by the fisheries people. did you know that? >> no, sir, i department know that. i know it's approved -- this has been approved in part of understanding. it's been tested many times. it's been approved in california. >> i understand that. but it had not been tested there and approved there for those waters with the fishery conditions that were there -- >> let me tell you. this is not toxic. well, the toxicity is less than

the toxicity of crude oil. the point is, if they were concerned about toxicity whether or not it performed well or not, the toxicity is not a problem. if we were willing to spray it and it didn't perform well in terms of mitigating the spill, which it did. we tested it and it did, but we should have been spraying earlier than that, but it would have been more expense for us. we still don't understand the delay in it. >> but i was told it's only effective on fresh oil. once the oil is not fresh, it will not disperse. >> well, it's less effective when the oil is not fresh. this oil is still fresh. originally on saturday we had a four square mile -- four miles by one mile, basically. it grew, as you know. when the wind came can up sunday night, it really got strung out down there. we had an opportunity to mitigate that spill considerably. after that, a lot of it

vaporized. 40% of the oil that went out has already vaporized and disappeared. but now we have the gunk we're trying to work with now. >> mr. ra with. l, the committee appreciates your willingness to testify and your appearance here today. thank you, sir. amir aa aal -- admiral yost, ou commandant. admiral yost, the committee is indebted to you for two appearances, over at the house side and now coming to us. we do appreciate it. we've had secretary skinner and captain larrabee go into some detail and if they decided

anything, you're the man in charge. we gladly accept your statement in its entirety, and you can give it in its entirety, highlight it as you wish. we have two very other important witnesses. >> mr. chairman, i think i would like to go immediately to the questions to save us both time, sir. >> very good, sir. go right ahead. if you want to answer questions -- let me ask this with respect to the license and requirement of a master pilot of a vessel. as i understand on the original license application, if i was never licensed before, you'd do an original background on the application? >> the original application for a license is somewhat more complete than is a renewal. in that original application, there's a requirement to report any drug use, any convictions of

serious crimes and those kind of things. on a renewal, it's less obvious but on a renewal to report, for instance, convictions on the last five years. >> on convictions in last five years it would have shown here in this particular case, at least perhaps we've learned that, i know the coast guard has been a leader on random drug testing and alcohol both. and it's diminished its occurrence markedly. >> yes. >> we've congratulated the guard on that accomplishment. now with respect to it the licensees of the guard, what do you think with respect to that, transmitting that particular requirement or policy to the licensees? >> the system is basically -- the licensee must report in his application.

in this case the master did not report in his application the convictions he had for driving while under the influence. that was absent from his application. we have 25,000 applications a year that we process. it's impossible with the current level of computerization and manning to do a background check on every application. the system is that if there is abuse on the vessel, the master is responsible for reporting that abuse to the coast guard. we would then report -- proceed against the license of the officer involved. in this case the master himself was abusing and nobody reported it. >> is there a backup requirement if the master himself is the one under the influence? >> yes, there is. the chief -- >> what is that? >> the chief mate and the chief engineer have a responsibility to take over the operation of the ship if they feel the master is incapacitated. >> but they were asleep. >> they may have been asleep at the time of the collision but i

doubt they were asleep at the time the vessel left the dock. whether they knew the condition of the master is going to be developed in the board of investigation. >> it did go down to the third mate and he was not licensed? >> well, the third mate did not have a first class pilot license for that particular area. that area requires from hitchen brook on in a first class piloting license. it allows that requirement to be filled by a ship's officer up to rocky point, where the normal state pilot gets aboard, federal pilot. that vessel was in an area that required pilotage by a ship's officer. the master was the only one that had that pilotage. the third mate was qualified to operate the vessel but did not have pilotage for the vessel so should not have been on the bridge by himself. that's very clear. >> on this particular point, would you recommend or have considered a co-pilot being

required or was this an aberration here on this particular vessel and do they regularly have at least two licensed -- seems like when these things are put to sea, long voyage, bad weather, and i've heard of good pilots getting sea sick as a dog and could give up the vessel and everything else. what about a co-pilot? or what is the policy, if any? >> we ought to perhaps examine, and will, whether more than one officer on a ship ought to have first class pilotage for that particular area of port william sound. i understand a state pilot and a u.s. pilot, a federal pilot, is required in the narrows. now, i would assume that in the nair rose, as you go on up, you have to have a state pilot, somebody with state pilotage

license as well as an officer on the vessel with pilotage. >> but beyond, where the collision occurred, there's only the requirement as far as the coast guard is concerned, you could not have gone up there -- let's assume there wasn't an accident that particular evening and you found just the captain aboard and let's forget about the alcohol. you wouldn't have arrested the captain or charged him with anything because he was the only one licensed, would you, or would you? >> no, but we would have charged him if he was the only one licensed and he wasn't on the bridge. he would have been in serious trouble. his license would have been in jeopardy at that point. >> right. the question is, should we require two officers with pilotage on these long voyages with pilotage for hitchenbrook on in. that's a question we ought to look. >> and super tankers, because -- well, let me go to that question.

double hulk or -- double hull of a vessel, like we require for chemical and the natural gas vessels and everything else required for safety, it's been attested that would not have saved this particular oil spill, or am i right or wrong on that? >> well, we don't know for sure. we'll have to see what the extent of the damage was. it's probable the damage was deep enough in that vessel, double bottoms would not have helped. that's very probable. we won't know until we get her in dry dock. >> the question is whether we go back to smaller tankers rather than the 240,000 barrels, go back to the $74,000 barrel type "xbdb÷÷q

without us funding it and without more direction and guidance and we're doing that

you with the alaska coastline, we believe the coast guard is uniquely suited to coordinate the response. that's not where they get further or don't get further. that's if you really coordinate the response as the governor of alaska is requesting. do you agree with that? >> yes, we're going to do much more coordination and guidance than we have up to now, but we don't want to federalize it. not yet. >> i'm trying to find out the difference in my mind between federalizing and you take over prime responsibility for coordination. >> all right. let me speak to sna. >> yes, sir. >> federalizing means we take over all the control and the direction, we take over the contracting and we give rudder orders to everybody up there. that means i need about 30 contracting officers up there to contract with every fishing boat, every fisherman, every company, everybody who's working for us. to coordinate it means we allow

exxon to continue to fund it, to keep their checkbook open, to do the contracting with this -- with the clean-up people and we basically direct and guide exxon in where we want the clean-up, where we. want the skimmers, where we want the boom, where we want the boom tending, the beach clean-up and that kind of thing and we will perhaps bring in other federal forces in. >> what do you mean yet? when you bring in the other federal forces? >> we're doing it as we sit here and we're transferring that guidance more to the coast guard and discussing it with exxon. i'm not privy to what happened since this morning. >> so, the coast guard is responding affirmatively to the governor's request. >> yes. we had been talking to the go have nor all along and with exxon on about doing this. we're talking to mr. arossi this morning about moving people into their operation center and taking over some of this operational guidance. >> and no emergency legislation is necessary? >> no, sir.

at least -- if it were, i think the president would request it. as you know, i was in the oval office with the president and mr. skinner -- and with mr mrmr. mr. reilly idea. >> with respect to radar guidance, it's not the coast guard's position, policy or responsibility that that ship at the time of the collision be under radar guidance? >> no, we don't do radar control in the way faa does aircraft control in any waters, anyplace. what we do, it's an advisory service. we tell the vessel what vessels they're liable to meet and things that complicate their passage. in valdez we do more than anywhere else. we forbid traffic, one-way traffic through the narrows. we plot it every three minutes while it's inside. once it gets out of the narrows,

just short of rocky point, we quit plotting it at that point. it's at sea. they discharge their state pilot. they go out to sea under the officer aboard, pilotage. >> is your effort restricted in any way by budgetary constraints? >> well, no, i don't think it was. but i think it's om only fair -- >> how about is? in the future -- you have a sympathetic committee that's proud of you and the guard. and i don't want to -- in fact, i have a suspicion now. one said they only had 3 million and fund over at secretary transportation. it seemed like there could have been a hesitancy and there was only 3 million there and they didn't want to assume the responsibility for $100 million to $200 million project with only $3 million sitting in the fund. >> that's true. that fund has never been more than $15 million something in

there. it's now at $3 million. i'd be more of comfortable with it at 10 or 12. we may ask our committees to take a look at it. but as far as the operation of the vessel traffic service --

in terms of support the coast guard gets from congress. we've always had trouble getting a reasonable budget within discoverment and that includes the united states congress. we come up here year after year with a budget that's austere and we normally leave this area with a budget less than our austere budget. so, i think, every time we close a coast guard station, we close a life boat station, we close a vessel traffic service. we assume more risk as the american people for accidents someplace. now, i don't believe this accident is the responsibility of having closed something. but you asked what the congress can do. i think the congress ought to support the coast guard in the appropriations area. this authorization committee has been wonderful to us, sir. i'm talking about the appropriations area needs to support the coast guard at a higher level than they normally do.

>> and what did we learn environmentally and maritimely about this particular incident? anything -- for one thing, i'm not expert enough to ask a question that senator stevens was getting at, but it seems like a harbor pilot was required further or beyond up to the point even of this rock, but somehow that was cut back, that requirement point several -- >> several years ago. >> yes. >> we had pilotage from hitchenbrook on in required a state pilot. the only vessels that were required were foreign vessels to take on a pilot of hitchenbrook. that requirement was knocked off. but there were only nine vessels, foreign vessels, in the system. i think what we should have learned be and we have learned and there will be more lessons coming out of the investigation, that in this day and age we have got to tighten up the

application requirements and the background look at people coming in for licenses. we've got to have a better feel for a man that comes in, and falsifies -- if that's the case here -- falsifies an application by not putting on convictions he's had for drunk driving. people could come in and falsify drug use that is asked for in the application. and i think they will. i don't think people will write down drug use on an application for a license. and they avoid writing down dwi on licenses. and we need to somehow get behind that application and see what's happening to these people. >> but no one in the audience would want to fly home this afternoon in a commercial flight with only one pilot. they wouldn't want to get on that plane. we're not just talking about people getting drunk. just normal things could occur to individuals, heart attacks, they have, and with a three

vessel -- a vessel as long as three football fields, 125 million gallons of fuel aboard and everything else, it seems rather puny and nonsensical to just have one master licensed aboard ship to take it, i guess, in some instances here, in many instances these super tankers go all the what i to saudi arabia, come back, persian gulf. >> yes, they do. >> on the high seas. i just can't understand -- let me comment on that then, sir. >> yes, sir. >> every vessel of that size doesn't have a pilot and a co-pilot as an aircraft would have. it has a pilot, a master mate, second mate, a third mate. so, it has at least four officers that are completely qualified to run that vessel. what it doesn't have is moirn one officer required that has

pilotage for the particular area that they're coming into, whether it's it's new york harbor or amsterdam or prince william sound. now, to require two people on the vessel that all have pilotage for each area they come into would be an added requirement. i don't object to that. we ought to look at it. but don't think they don't have someone qualified to run it from the bridge. they have four. that first mate, who has had a lot of trips in the valdez, to run that ship up on the beach, there's something awful happened on that bridge. some kind of loss of continuity, a loss of something we don't know yet. but there's no reason that third mate wasn't completely competent to run that ship in the area he was. he had the competency. the master should have been on the bridge. that's false. we have a guy that's well licensed and trained.

>> and by way of viblt, he should have been able to see the channel markers. >> well, yes, sir. it was a clear night. you could see forever. he almost ran over the buoy to get on the rock. >> that's what i was thinking because i think your comment has already been made public that there was a ten-mile wide channel there and my boy michael could have run a boat through there. >> that played a lot better outside the beltway than inside the beltway so i'm trying to get rid of that comment. >> have you notified governor of alaska stated that 40 code of federal regulation section 300 you will take over immediately the coordination of the project up there? >> the governor has asked -- >> valdez. >> yes. the governor has asked that the disaster have a federal input outside of the clean water act.

and that isn't my responsibility. he's asked what senator stevens was talking about to open up the small business administration fub funds and some other funds -- the senator says no. i might be wrong. what he has asked is for the coast guard to take more of a directive action in this spill, and i'm in concert with him, and we're talking about that with him right now. we're talking to exxon on scene in alaska. if necessary, i'll go up there myself and set that up the way it ought to be. >> i think the governor has been more specific. he refers to that section of 40 code federal regulation section 300 and that gives specific responsibility and coordination -- >> is that the clean water act? >> yes. >> the governor has asked for that once. he backed away from it. it's not my understanding that he has asked for it again this morning.

he's asked for it -- >> well, we have the letter. we'll furnish you a copy of the letter. he asked for it again. >> what's the date on it, sir? >> april 5th. what's today? yeah, he got it in at 8:00 last night. >> he's got better mail service than i have within d.c. >> yeah. well, we'll get this letter to you. >> yes, sir. >> when you say the law for alaska oil can only use in u.s. flag vessels, i understand, admiral, you say nine foreign vessels have gone to valdez to load oil over a period of time? >> yes. there's nine foreign vessels in the trade. all of them terminate at st. croix. st. croix has a u.s. refinery, but is not u.s. territory. now, let me again say, i am not prepared to federalize this spill in the legal sense of the word because it would open up to

me and to the 311k fund the responsibility to fund it. and i've only got $2 or $3 million in that fund. we're spending $1 million a day. i want to do something short of federalization. we will assume the responsibility for on-scene guidance and direction to exxon in doing this. we'll take basically a lot more control than we have now, but we want to stop short of federalization. that might require legally exxon to close their checkbooks to the fishermen and everybody else. i don't want to do that. i don't think the governor did either. >> you'll have a chance to coordinate with him. is there anything else you wish to add to your testimony this morning? we do appreciate you coming over. >> no. i do want to say one other thing. i do not feel i'm at odds with mr. rawl. i'm concerned he's placing too much emphasis on the timing of

the dispersance and too much emphasis on what could have been had the dispersance been put in the water. the federal on-scene coordinator made the right decision which is don't let dispersants go in the water unless they're effective. in their view they wouldn't be effective because there wasn't enough wave action to mix it up and the dispersants -- there wasn't enough --

. >> thank you, mr. chairman. because of the seriousness of what we're discussing here, i

have brought dr. ehler, who is the head of our group that deals with hazardous material and his team has been the teamworking up on this oil spill from about 11 hours after it was actually happened. i also have legal counsel with me, mr. campbell, who is here in case -- since i am not a lawyer and there's a lot of people were saying they were lawyers and using that as an excuse, i've -- i am not a lawyer so i brought one with me. >> i can see you're very proud of that. >> what i would like to do, mr. chairman, is go through a lot of the testimony and read it because i think it's important but i will highlight it. i'll drop some of the material out. by april 2nd, the oil from this spill, the 11 million gallons, had spread throughout an area of

more than 800 square miles. approximately one-third of the total service of prince william sound. prevailing currents and wind are moving the oil in a southwesterly towards the open waurtsdz of the gulf of alaska. the rocky shores of naked knight smith and green islands have been very heavily oiled. the oil is expected to follow the coastline of the peninsula where it could impact lie logically productive and scenic area such as bligh sound and national park. the economy of the area we're talking about is based on national resources and includes one commercial fishing, which we heard a lot about. prince william sound promotes commercial fishing for salmon, small fisheries for king crab, shrimp, halibut. these are renewable resources each year worth over $100

million to that community. recreation, the relative accessibility of prince william sound to anchorage major population center of alaska makes it a favorite of local and visiting recreationists who use it either individually in organized tours for fishing, sightseeing, kayaking and camping. there's also a number of cruise ships that come into the area. we have don't even have the idea of what the economic impact is going to be on that. there is sufficient fishing, hunting, logging. port valdez is the southern terminas of the trans-alaska pipeline. most devastating was the timing. the irreplaceable resources of prince william sound are the most in jeopardy. since the time we have a lot of larvae fish, a lot of fish are coming in for purposes of spawning. this is the most wonderful time

for them. migrating herring are in the sound and would be available for harvest. the spill occurred days before the scheduled opening of this fishery, which had to be canceled. not only lost jobs and xhk but valuable export to the state. more valuable than the herring is the salmon fishery. all five species of salmon are supported by prince william sound and the river system. adult fish will be affected when they return to the sound this spring and summer. but juvenile salmon are now ready to enter theest wares damaged by the spill and will begin feeding on resources that have already been damaged. this is the time of their life cycle they're most dependent on the marine environment impacted by the spill. there's a good chance that many of these fish will not survive. the effects will be felt years down the road when these fish are not available for adults as spawni spawning. the effects of these damages -- these natural resources and human uses form the basis for

the damage assessment work that will be undertaken by the co-trustees. in this case, noaa acts on behalf of the secretary of commerce as federal trustee for national rye source and coastal and marine areas. the secretary of the interior, the secretary of agriculture and since this incident occurred in state waters, the state of alaska also have significant trustee interests. noaa ace damage assessment authority is from the liability act, the clean water act as well as other resource management statutes which provide the legal, procedural framework for claims against potential responsible parties for losses resulting to injury to the natural resources caused by oil spill. based on these legal authorities, noaa has four principle responsibilities before and after an oil spill. as an scientific support coordinator to the u.s. skoes guard on-scene coordinator, specifically the noaa -- noaa provides liaison between natural

resource, chemical, medical and other scientific experts and on-scene coordinator, models trajectories of spilled oil to predict future movement, assesses the nature, behavior and fate of oil pollutants, for example, chemical analysis and sampli sampling, identification of toxic properties, advises on safety precautions for response personnel, identifies areas of biological importance requiring protection and helps the on-scene coordinator respond to inquiries from local, state and federal agencies for assistance in scientific studies and environmental studies and assist the on-scene coordinator's public relation efforts. as a member of the regional response team, noaa assists in the preparation of federal recommendations to the on-scene coordinator. as a federal trustee for living marine resources noaa is responsible for assessing losses associated with injury to the

natural resources and bringing claims against the responsible parties. as the nation's principle marine pollution property, noaa determines long-term ecological consequences. we have 25 experts on scene at valdez exxon spill, including noaa response team, natural marine fishery, the office of aircraft operations, university of alaska sea grant program and the national weather service. noaa's hazardous material experts have conducted extensive overflight of the spreading oil and coastal reaches of prince william sound to monitor the slick movement and to identify the threatened areas. in fact, the noaa hazardous response team probably has more collective experience in marine oil spills than probably any other group in the world. they -- that have occurred in the last 13 years. they have been involved in almost all of those.

there's about 15 years' experience and they have been involved in working on about 2,000 oil spills, including the argo merchant and the itoc blowout. >> blowout. >> so on that point, what did we learn from the kadiz which was a mammoth oil spill there on the coast of britain. for one, it took some five years to get the study, and now, rather than putting the study in a library somewhere, what good is the study do? >> i cannot address that, but i can ask dr. ehlers. let me address one other aspect, if you are saying that the monaco kadiz is a massive oil spill, that is minor to this one. >> if it took five years for that one, how long will it take for this one? >> just to do assessments of the

effect on salmon, we will have to be looking five years down stre downstream, because some of the species won't come back for five years. so if there is other toxic effects that we don't know, we could be five years beyond that. >> what about it, dr. ehlers? do you agree with that? >> there are things done in the short run and done now. in order to complete a long-term assessment of the damages, it will take three to five years to see the long-term effects and the short term and the lethal effects visible right now, and we are measuring those and documenting them, and others will take longer. >> then what do we do after we document all of it. you say that you all tof the

experience, so if you have documented it and then does that lead to better practices or what is the result of all of the marine merchant, and the kadiz aunld and all of the rest of them, what do we do? >> i would say that the environmental effect is to be used in damage assessment which means putting the economic values on those effects so we can in fact file claims to recover the damages. that is the immediate service for doing the science in the field right now and doing it in a timely way. >> what is the responsibility of noaa or the government to file claim once the assessment is made? dr. evans? >> once we have made the assessment for all practical purposes, what we will do is to present a bill to exxon for what the cost of the damages are. >> is there any limit to that bill that you are going to give

exxon under the statute? >> no, sir, not that i know of s. there a limit? >> under the clean water act if negligence is shown, there is no limit, but absence of the willful negligence, there is a cap. >> and you have tried the case in alaska? >> no, sir, we will leave that to the justice department. >> your honor, we are working with the other trustees and the department of justice in an effort to put together a damage assessment to put a value on the resources that are locked and attempt to identify how best to restore those resources as closely as possible. >> dr. evans, why do you say na monaco kadiz was minor to this one? >> well, referring back to the material in my testimony, mr. chairman, this is a very, very special part of the world.

it is a very steep bottom area, and the winds can come up very rapidly as we saw in the one day 50 miles per hour that can be flat calm the next day. we have high tides moving in and out of the areas, and 15 foot and 20-foot tides, and the difference of having something in a bottle, and i think that if you are looking at the difference of a quarter pound of dynamite is one thing, but if you throw it out in the middle of the field and blow up where it has a lot of place norse energy to spread to, but if you are doing it in an enclosed areas, it is going to enhance the impact of it, and that what we have here, the oil has been moved around with all of the little cubby holes and various things in the total line here in this area, we will have places that have potential effect on the fisheries and others that we may not discover for the next couple of years.

>> what is the potential effect if any on others' shores. as i understand it, the current is north, and cuts across the arctic, and north pacific, and could this reach pressure? >> no, i don't believe so. the way it is going is up to the canha peninsula, and kodiak island and depending where it goes, we could have tarballs washing up in british columbia, but we understand the direction and the accuracy of the forecasting of the direction that is based on the winds and current currents, and the best we can give you is 24-hour on the trajectory, but overall basis, we have a pretty good idea of where we will see the things wash up. at this stage, it is pretty well

what the major current, and wind systems are, and where it is going to be pushed. as far as what we are concerned about right now, the immediate effects of what it is going to have in other places in alaska, and kodiak as senator stephens said, it is a very, very large area as far as the fisheries. and my fisheries background is that if it shows up there, the pollack which is a multi million dollar source is not getting spawned, so we don't know the effect or the impact of this. and so that is a little scary. but that is a possibility, and we are tracking it very closely. bud, do you have any idea of the direction past the -- >> generally going westerly. >> generally going westerly, sir. >> thank you.

mr. robinson. >> i appreciate the opportunity to be here today and i will talk a little bit about -- >> can you move the microphone closer. >>ly tai will talk about the impact of the wildlife resources there. and the with me today is john martin, the director of the american maritime refuge which has been impacted by this spill. the spill has effects on many species in prince william sound, and the wildlife migratory and marine animals and otters, and none of the bird species or the alaskan population of sea otters are listed under the endangered species act. the scale of the oil impact is just starting to become clear to us. the preliminary surveys have found 80 oil birds per 100

meters of beach on the islands in the path of the spill. it is highly unlikely that most of the birds can be recovered and cleaned though we are making every effort to do so. and we are anticipating that 3 to 5,000 sea birds could be recover and cleaned if they are recovered and cleaned, and they will survive. we are not sure of the number of birds killed by the spill. in the next couple of weeks wleshg gwe will get better numbers. eagles have been found scavenging dead oil birds, and we believe that the toxicity of the oil slicked birds could contribute. and there are currently bald eagles in the prince william sound area. the birds counted before the

spill were 90,000, and half of which are in the area. and the aerial will not produce an accurate count, because the birds cannot be seen in the oil n. this ti and in this time of the year, there are currently birds in william sound, and as mentioned the migratory birds are coming in as we speak and adding 100,000 to that pop urlation. in addition, more than 100,000 birds nest in the maritime refuge to the southwest of the sound, and the first strings of the oil have reached that island. the total sea otter population is estimated 10 to 12,000, and the heaviest concentration is represented in the east part of the sound which represents the highest concentration of sea otters and the population has

not been affected and that population has not been affected by the spill as of yet. half of the otter population in the sound is likely to be impacted by the spill. if the spill should change directions, of course, and goes into the southeastern area, the situation would worsen dramatically for the otter. the fish and wildlife service has people committed to monitoring and cleanup birds and otter rescue activity with two charter boats and 16 people looking to locate the oil slicked otters to bring them to the cleaning facility operated by exxon in valdez. we are operating the movement of oil, and the sea birds and the population and those are on the concentration of the otter, and under the current wind and forecast, the leading edge of the spill as we said before it

could reach kodiak island this weekend. service personnel and the other national response team are trying to identify and prioritize those areas that should be protected in the islands. two service vessels are being moved into the area and damage consisting of the bird surveys and mammal surveys and sea otters to determine how many of those critters have been affected and how many have been affected adversely. the assessment is under the provisionings of comprehensive and environmental response act is being initiated and that is what our people are doing now, and in the process of picking ul the oil, and injured wildlife, they are making counts to be used in the future to gain compensation. that concludes my prepared statements, mr. chairman, and i'd be glad to try to answer any questions that you have. >> yes. chairman stephens? >> chairman, on april 4th, i

received a prediction of the trajectory of the oil spill from dr. royer, and i have sent it to the various teams working on it. i think it is very important to examine what he says. you can take a couple of minutes to read it, but it is timely with these witnesses here. dr. royer says that the oil spill in prince william sound will exit the sound to montague strait and follow it to the coast to the south/southwest, and enters the alaskan coastal current, and then the flow which is driven by freshwater runoff and wind. the current is 10 miles wild and surface currents plus or minus 0.2 knot at this time of the year. it is best thought of a river running along the coast.

this could continue in this flow with little coherent manner along the shelf. it will depend on the local winds with off shore winds of course, and favoring no transport on shore. and the winds will accelerate on shore, and cause the oil to wash up on the exposed beaches. the oil patch or patches should be at the end of, and mind you this is april 4th that he is talking about, in six to ten days, and it is probably going to be a series of patches extending from prince william sound to inlet. and the oil entering the inlet will depend on the time of the arrival, but half will remain at the entrance, and then the rest will travel to the inlet of kodiak island. here it is less intense, and the crossing of the shelf will take place.

for some unknown fraction of oil in cook inlet, and of the shelf of kodiak will continue down the aleutian island chain. here the coastal current is not as intense, but it is a broad diffuse flow filling the shelf rather than the narrow coastal flow as it is along the northern coast of alaska a. some unknown portion of the oil, and whatever remains in the water column should begin to go through the pass in june or july. that is the pass that the bristol fishery goes through in the bristol bay. the water should be flushed in several weeks, though the deep waters, and i repeat, this the deep waters might not be flushed until fall, when the deep water renewal takes place. it increases up to 3.5 knots due

to an yule precipitation cycle, and this should rapidly transport the oil out of the sound to the west, and the predictions in interpreting them means that the oil should be in cook inlet from april 10th to the 16th, and arrive at kodiak between april 14th and 21. will be through the pass sometime in june with the possibility of a renewal of all of this when the deep, the oil that has gone into the deep water column is disgojed from t -- disgorged from the inlet in the september, october area. now, gentlemen, what do you think should be done with regard to the areas beyond the damage to date? i mean, we haven't had damage

yet in cook inlet, and we haven't had any damage in kodiak or the aleutian coasts or the aleutian island chain coast, and particularly no damage through the mack pass yet. have any of you have any knowledge in any attempts of the world to try to change the flow of the oil as et is streaking out in the long tend rrils thate saw? >> no, i am not aware of it. one thing that we are aware of is the information this you presented to dr. royer, and we are not familiar with him, but we will check in him, because we are very interested in the information that he has. one thing that we have been doing is that our models, interestingly enough, seem to

agree with the description that you just gave and one of the things that we have been doing is to try to get our teams, and the members of the team that you were mentioning about some of the people are noaa is getting out a head of these, and testin to make damage assessment. i know it is not going mitigate what is going to happen there, but some people are displaced and trying to put booms up in some areas and do what we can to try to keep it out of the sensitive areas, but we are not experienced in mitigating it. >> the thing that bothers me about the current control of the actions to prevent further harm is that they are all related to damage control and not prevention. some of them are, and the booms

are presented at concept, but for instance i was told in one area that hay had been dropped on the beaches from the air. before the oil hit those beaches, and then as the oil came in, it hit the hay, and the hay was raked up or cleaned up and then burned later. i asked if that is considered for alaska and i was told no. and then i asked about the drift net if someone had thought of putting one of the 45-mile drift nets and slinging it across the current, and weighted down pretty heavy to have absorbable booms to see if it can pick up some of the slick before it reec reaches kodiak, and i have been told, nope, it has not been tried and we are not going to experiment. are you gentlemen going to experiment at all when this gets

out in the open areas, and beyond the prince william sound and beyond the capability of anybody to come up with shuj suggestions? any experimentations at all? >> i am not aware of any experimentation, and i am in favor of it. we may have some programs going, but we will have dr. ehlers talk to that. >> to my knowledge, they are not being tried now, and on the other hand, there are teams of people up there as you know who are running over virtually every possibility of mitigating the spill. i don't have the information of what is being considered right now, but i would suspect that all of the kinds of alternatives

have been run over in some detail. >> i monitored the beaches in ireland and the procedures that were used there to be successful. >> that is what i was told. we have no market for hay this year, and we don't know fit is up there, and nobody has asked. and the drift nets that you responsible for bringing in the legislation that this committee has started, and several of them have brought in, and piled up n somewhere and nobody has thought to sling out there, and we know they are harmful to the fish, but we could try. mr. chairman, a complete unwillingness to try, and experiment because somebody says if they try and it does not succeed, who is going to pay the bill, and secondly, will it

increase the damages to exxon or will they object? that is why we want the coast guard in control there. and i don't know if the coast guard is even thinking of experimentati experimentation. i wish we could get a plane and send the whole committee up there, and see what is going to happen to kodiak. if you do, you would be as mad as i am, because nobody is thinking of trying to stop this thing. now, bill, you guys have good brains and, you know, the whole group that is involved here, and i know that you are. and steve, you people know the area like i do. and you know it is going to destroy the area, and it is

going to go into the bristol basal mbay salmon run, and it is unacceptable. and we have to try. how do we get it going? is it money? i was told yesterday that all you do is to ask exxon and within foreseeable, you know, limits that you could not dream of, the money is available. they know they have horrendous liability if this gets to kodiak, just horrendous. you can name it off there, king crab, and half of the sole, and the home of the bottom fish there in the chillcoath

straight. and i believe we could say that it is one of the largest -- fisheries that was healthy until the inevitable. so there is no look to stop it. and i would think that we would look to get some control. and these sea fences that i heard about. have you heard of them? >> yes, sir. i heard this morning when they were talking about that, the 42-inch boom. >> i am told that noaa has them in stock, and they stock them as a matter of national preparedness over there, and they would offer to send them there, and i would have two c-1as on the way this afternoon and try them. >> what about dr. healy, who is the expert of the hazardous experts, and is there anything that we can be doing from your

expertise? it seems some more preven zif measures could be taken. >> there is more that can be done. the point that has to be made is that there is tremendous uncertainty about what is going to actually happen and where this oil is going to go and wind up. nothing is inevitable. there is a number of unknowns, and what the quality is going to be in this area and further west. >> just like everybody. everybody has to be somewhere, and this oil is going to be somewhere or at least for the next four or five months and you agree with that? >> yes. and it will be there longer than that. >> and you are not doing anything to try to do something about? >> there are people on the scene trying to predict where it is going to go and minimizing the effects it is going to have. >> do you know anybody who has attempted to change the direction of it in terms of open

spill as it is moving down the alaskan strait? >> no. not to my knowledge. >> i don't know if anyone has experimented or attempted to try to change the flow. >> again, i agree. there is no one. >> and they have done a good job to boom off the specific areas, and your people have done a good job to working with the response team, and what they have tried to do in terms of the protecting resurrection creek, and protecting the national park and now moving in to protect the area over to kodiak, but how do we protect the area before it gets there? maybe we should take all of the boats and blow that oil south.

maybe more people would be worried about it going south, and they are not too worried about it going north. that is the problem. it is going towards the greatest salmon run and fishery run in the world today. you have seen it up there. >> it is not going to ruin the clarks dam that way. >> no. >> well, we can end this hearing. well, you gentlemen have been obliging, and the record will stay open for questions by the committee here. we appreciate the testimony here now, and i hope that you will appreciate the concern that we do have and we are going to be working with you and don't let the budget hold you up. i want to know about that immediately. i want to thank senator mckusky for sticking with us, and mr.

stephens. >> thank you, mr. chairman. all week, we are featuring american history tv programs the as a preview of what is available every weekend on c-span3, and lectures in history and american artifacts and real america, and the civil war, and oral histories and the presidency, and special event coverage about our nation's history and enjoy american history tv now and every weekend on c-span3. >> american history tv products are available at the new c-span online store. go to c-spanstore.org to see what is new from american history tv and check out all of the c-span products. the day after the hearing george h.w. bush and several cabinet members held a briefing on the