marco rubio, cuban-americans have come forward and won and iowa with pete buttigieg is poised to give a big boost to the first openly gay presidential candidate, so the feeling that a lot of iowans have is yeah, we're white, but it's not exactly a hostile place. >> watch our live coverage of the iowa caucuses on monday, february 3rd and our interview with david sunday night at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span's q&a. next week, live coverage of the house debate and vote to limits u.s. military action against iran. california democratic representatives barbara lee and ro khanna have introduced legislation to repeal the 2002 congressional authorization for the use of military force against iraq and to block federal funding from being used to take military action against iran without congressional authorization. live coverage next week on

c-span. watch on demand at c-span.org. listen on the go with the free c-span radio app. next a discussion from the arab center on the implications of the u.s. drone strike that killed iranian general qassem soleimani. other topics addressed include the trump administration's policy toward iran and the impact of u.s./iran tensions on security in iraq. >> good afternoon. my name is tamara kharroub, i'm the assistant executive director and senior fellow at the arab center in washington, d.c. thank you for joining us for this important and timely discussion focusing on the implications, regionally and internationally, of the recent developments between and escalations between iran and the united states and the killing of qassem soleimani. as you know, on january 3rd, an

american airstrike ordered by u.s. president donald trump killed the top iranian military commander qassem soleimani. iran responded by attacking two military bases in iraq that host american forces. the last weeks have seen sequence of violent events and escalations, both before and after this major incident with varying degrees and impact. today, we seek to discuss the implications on three levels. first, domestically in iran. with the iranian regime continuing to face protests and a crumbling economy, especially after the shooting down of the ukrainian commercial plane and further sanctions by the united states, what are iran's options, both domestically and regionally, as well as with europe and the united states. second, regionally. what are the implications of soleimani's killing for iran's regional influence and expansionist projects?

what is the impact on iraqi sovereignty, internal political dynamics and iranian influence there? and on u.s./iraq relations. also, while iran's allies in the region have threatened to avenge soleimani's killing, will the process of economic and governance crises in lebanon and in iraq prevent such steps? third, internationally, how willing are the european countries to break away from the u.s. and chart their own iran policy and nuclear deal? what is the current and future strategy by the united states and the trump administration towards iran? especially given that it is an election year here. amidst all of these domestic, regional and international crises are iran and the united states ready for war, negotiations, or neither? or are we to expect a continuation of controlled escalation and probably the use of unconventional warfare methods? to answer these questions, and

help us analyze these developments and options, we are pleased and fortunate to have with us a great panel of experts to discuss the implications of the recent tensions and the killing of soleimani both regionally and beyond. thank you all for joining us and thank you for taking the time to be with us today to contribute to this discussion, and thanks to imad harb, to my right here, the director of research in washington, d.c. who has agreed to chair the discussion as well as contribute to the conversation. before giving the platform to imad and the panelists, i would like to remind you to silence your phones and for those of you not familiar with arab center washington, d.c.'s format, we use these cards for questions. so during the q&a session, if you have any questions, please use the card and write your question and name and

affiliation and raise the card. one of our staff will pick it up from you. from that i will return to imad and we start our discussion. thank you. >> thank you, tamara. good afternoon, everybody. i hope it's not too cold outside, but i think it's manageable. we are here today to discuss really one of the -- it's a serious problem with the united states and iran, and a serious problem with repercussions regional, local, regional and international. we really have a very good panel today. we're going to be discussing issues pertaining to iran specifically like tamara said, iraq, syria and lebanon, which are basically places where are rather impacted by what is going on between the united states, and iran, what is happening in the region.

i would, with the order of the presentation, by the way, each will have about 12 minutes to present their cases, and i am lean nent -- leanent, i'm not going to be cutting people off, but it would be nice to just stick to the time limit. and then daniel brumberg from georgetown university, he will be talking basically about the united states iran policy, and basically the overall geo-strategic policy and i did mention of such policy. and then negar mortazavi, an iranian american journalist and media analyst for bbc, al jazeera and cgpn and she will be talking about the domestic dynamics of iran today and what is going on there and how that will be impacted in the future.

abbas kadhim, the director of the iraq initiative at the council, and he will be talking about iraq and how it's affected by issues by the current conflict, and yours truly will be discussing reflections on what are implications for lebanon and syria of what's going on today. so without further ado, please, daniel, go ahead. >> well, thank you very much, ta mar and imad. i'm delighted to be here at the arab center. i have a presentation that is essentially three points and i might come in essentially under 12 minutes. we'll see how it goes. and my task is to answer all these questions in that time, and it will reduce to the following three closely-related points. first and foremost, my perspective on the trump administration's approach to iran, to put it in the largest frame possible at this moment,

is that it's just basically tactics and no clear strategy other than a strategy of implicit regime change and economic warfare and actually i don't think it is a strategy of coherence or chance of success. when you are looking at the kind of conflict that we have between the united states and iran, whether it's focusing on the nuclear issue or other issues, you have really two choices. one is to engage, and you can use various forms of coercion to buttress that engagement. but the purpose of engagement, and negotiations, is to resolve this through a compromise, which means implicitly or explicitly that you accept the legitimacy of the existence of your opponent and do not go into the process with the aim of bringing down the regime. or you can make war in one way or the other. those are your two basic options. they're very different options. they have very different outcomes, obviously. and there are different ways to

make war. we hear now that we have of course the debate about whether the assassination of soleimani would precipitate a military war, but in effect, the united states is already at war with iran, because not only did the administration pull out of the nuclear deal, but it imposed sanctions which amount to an economic war, which has had drastic effects on iran's economy. so we have chosen that option. i think that choice persists despite the fact that bolton left the white house. i think there are many in the white house or near it, including pompeo and others, who support basically the assumption that somehow through some use of force, we can somehow bring down this regime, and achieve all our options, the silver bullet strategy. i'm not sure that president trump actually completely understands the implications of the choices before him in any sort of way other than instinctively. he doesn't really have a strategic concept of what the

options are, the kinds of things we are talking about here really are not much concern to him, and that has allowed for a certain effort to leverage his own involvement in this, i think his instincts are to keep out and i said in my piece, a week ago for the arab center that i thought he would not pursue conflict with iran and his preferences for negotiation, he doesn't know how to square his desire for negotiations for what is in fact objectively speaking, to use a term, a policy that is really built around regime change. now, iran, i think we need to understand that iran's response to this policy was something that i and others have called a policy of controlled escalation, the purpose of which was really, as far as i can understand, was to get the attention of the europeans and use leverage, not because the iranians thought they could solve the problem with the united states, but use a process of controlled escalation to

compel or encourage the europeans to create a mechanism that would allow iran to sell its oil. because when iran is signed on to the nuclear deal, it made a really strategic decision, and that was that its future was based on engagement with the west on selling oil and reviving the oil economy and not on nuclear weapons, certainly not perhaps even on nuclear power, and so they were desperate to sustain this agreement and to get europe's attention and get europe to find some way of creating this much talked about, but thus far failed mechanism. and what has happened i think, is that has failed. and iran has become more desperate. and a lot of what iran has been doing under this rubric of controlled escalation is pushing as hard as it can, i do not feel, nor do i accept the argument that this is a part of the intrinsic expansionist identity of an iranian government. i think this was a response to american policy, dictated by the few choices iran had, given what the trump administration decided

to do. so what we've seen, as i said in my piece for the arab center is that in the past few months, iran's hope for that mechanism, that trading mechanisms was really dashed, iran became more desperate and pushed harder and harder and the united states responded and until then, all sides, the u.s., iran, seemed to understand the rules and red lines of controlled engagement. but increasingly, they were violated. i did say in my piece for the center that i thought that iran's objective now would be to re-capitulate those rule, and not go beyond them, that what iran would rather do is avoid a head-on military conflict with the united states and i think that is trump's preference as well if he can somehow make this work. the second and closely related point i wish to make is that, and this is one of the paradoxes of our approach, is that the reason the united states and i

think the trump administration believes it can make this nonstrategy work is really an imbalance of power between the united states and iran. a tremendous imbalance of power. if you look at the u.s. effort to negotiate with korea, for example, or north korea, that is or the u.s. effort to negotiate with the former soviet union, during a period of time that i was alive and various family members had an intimate view of in fact, what dictated that negotiation was the parity of power between the two, and mutually-assured destruction. there was the necessity of engagement because the alternative was worse, and in the case of iran, there is a tremendous imbalance of power so we feel we can take the risk of pushing iran without necessarily falling into a precipitous war. and if we do, we somehow feel we might prevail. but the problem with the paradox we have enough power to engage in what is called maximum pressure, this euphemism for this strategy but we don't have enough power to prevail, we don't have enough power to prevail. and we don't know how to square that.

we simply do not know how to secu square that circle. and again i don't think the president is aware of this, of the deep paradox there. and as a result, we don't know where to go, because we have, we are tempted to use power, but we really don't know how to prevail, and iran has all kinds of power to push back against us, for which we don't have an easy or simple response. and my sense having spoken with a lot of folks in the u.s. military, is that they are very concerned about an outbreak of a full-scale war with iran as well. so we have this paradox of just enough power to push the iranians, maximum pressure, but not enough power and ways to express that power to prevail with a coercive expansion, and i think we have not solved that problem. i don't see that problem ever being solved in the near future. i think that trump would rather, and he said it many times, he said it even after the attack with soleimani, he said i want

to talk. and this was the third time he said, and not only did he say he wanted to talk, he said i do not want regime change, which is, the second or third time he had publicly made that statement, that he does not want regime change. remarkable. and i think, you know, he's speaking uncharacteristically in an honest way, because he is really, that's where he's coming from. but he doesn't know how to square that with the u.s. policy. and finally, my third point, and this gets back to some of the issues that tamara raised at the outset of our panel, and that is the implications for iran's own internal politics and as i said in my paper, i predicted that iran being quite adept at managing crises like this would leverage every opportunity, including iraq if possible, because of course, all this occurred against the backdrop of these extraordinary protests in baghdad, and in beirut, and tehran, all over iran, and you know, a region that has witnessed these amazing street uprisings. i think it is premature to see in those uprisings the end of sectarianism. i think they're complex.

i think they're contradictory. i would not jump to that conclusion. but they did pose a huge strategic threat to iran. and iraq, and lebanon, and in iran itself. and this was the irgc's perspective. and it hit back hard. i think this attack on soleimani, that is celebrated at the end of the irgc, it's going to collapse, i'm not an expert on, this but everything i read from the experts tell me they're very adaptable and have ways to assert their influence and the new commander there, will find ways to assert influence. i think all of that means that they will leverage this situation. having said all that, this is hardly the end of protests. not at all. and i think, and this is something that we, of course, none of us anticipated in disaster with the ukrainian airline, and the downing and the protests precipitated by that which demonstrates this yawning gap between the iranian government on the one hand and

its people, particularly the urban middle class, and the enormous alienation of that class towards the government. having said all that, and here is where i'll finish up, if you want to find a way of creating a context in which those protests could have meaningful impact on iran's own internal politics, advocating a regime change is not the way to go. it only empowers the hard liners. and it only makes it more difficult for any interlocutors between the protests and the regime to have any negotiating power. because iran is like many you a autocracies. the way it is limited, through some process, long, arduous, difficult, of negotiation. protesters provide negotiators and reformist movement with leverage. they always have. khameini tried to leverage that

as much as possible in the early 90s and 2000s but it doesn't mean revolution. it means a long long arduous struggle. and therefore, there is a write-off of reformism and the write-off of reformists is to do them a great injustice but also more importantly to not recognize what it would take, the hard liners want conflict with the united states. because they understand that a deescalation of conflict, with the united states, as some sort of normalization, is going it make it easier in the long run for the reformist to push for a process of legal reformation, however slow and arduous. so to the extent we write off that possibility and pursue a policy of regime change via economic warfare provides a means that whatever space there is, for any kind of evolution within the body politic of the iranian authoritarian regime will not be there. if you can imagine the united states having pursued the salt

negotiations at the same time going to destroy the soviet oil industry, and pursuing a policy of open regime change, and at the same time negotiating, this is profoundly a sort of contradictory situation, and it is from from my perspective, it is difficult to imagine that gorbachev and his allies would not have emerged had it not been for the policy of the engagement that was part and parcel for the wider strategy. so i think the current american approach, rather than create the pre-conditions for some minimal form of political mobilization if not beyond that will create a situation where those forces that want to find change, and/or leverage the power from the streets is really critical will not be in a position to do so. and that has to, you have to keep in mind, because in february, there are parliamentary elections in iran, followed by presidential elections, and these are not easy. -- insignificant.

they could be significant. >> thanks, dan. nagara? >> thank you to the arab center for having me, and thanks to all of you for coming for this event. i also will try to be in time but feel free to cut me off if i go over time. i want to speak of the regional implications of the soleimani assassination, based on iran's regional activities or adventures, and then i will speak a little bit about the domestic dynamics, and talk more about the hard liner reformist moderates and how the divisions are playing out post soleimani. and then also to trump iran foreign policy in general especially to the west and united states, prospects for talks. so as far as the regional policy, it's true that qassem

soleimani was a unique person, he was a capable commander of the qqds force, he had a personal relationship with many of the forces, of the proxy, of the allies of the leaders across the region in fact it was an independenceable person, base to the establishment. of the quds force but he wasn't irreplaceable. as was mentioned he was replaced by his deputy who is considered even more hard line than soleimani, basically, within the rankings of the quds force, and the organization is going to continue. there will be some setback, yes, it will take a while to rebuild the relationships, to basically fill the void, but it wasn't a one-person organization, or a one-person operation that is going to end or be completely

jeopardized with soleimani gone. the allies are still going to be there. the proxies are going to be there. some continuing, some independently of iran, you have to remember that it wasn't just soleimani, it was also the iraqi leader who was also killed in this, so there is that ide of the equation that will be discussed later. but what i could predict is for the force to continue with a more focused vision of trying to drive u.s. forces basically out of these countries and eventually the region, or if not, at least raise the cost of the u.s. presence in the region, which is something basically the quds force and soleimani had been following for over a decade, and it's something that the supreme leader khameini also

mentioned in his speech, there is going to be the friday prayers tomorrow, with khameini speaking, that is going to be a very, basically determining speech. it is probably going to be a hard line speech, asking for unification, and support for the irgc, and the country, and also more hard line stance in the region. i don't think it's going to be rash. i don't think iran is going to, or the quds force basically in the region is going to start acting out of control, but this is definitely not finished. the one-time retaliation was that flashy operation, was a one time pr, basically, operation, but the proxy fight is going to continue. and whatever qassem soleimani was feared for, the quds force is going to continue without him.

i don't think this is going to have much impact on the mission of the organization, if not make it stronger, and more focused, and also we have to remember that qassem soleimani wasn't a top leader of the structure, there is always a stream leader -- supreme leader above him. he's still around so that direction, the leadership always comes from tehran, although qassem soleimani was a very significant figure. so there will be some setback but at the same time like it was said, iran is patient, iran is going to play the long game in the region probably, and basically the proxy fight is going to continue and not stop. as far as the domestic dynamics, i agree with what dan said, this has basically, trump's policy,

trump's iran, the trump administration's hard line policy in iran, the maximum pressure, over the past two years, has weakened, the more moderate force, the pro-engagement force, the pro-west force, the reformists, has helped strengthen the hard liner, the more militaristic portions of the establishment, who are already strong, but it just keeps them, keeps giving them the upper hand. as we saw with the funeral of qassem soleimani, which i think even surprised the white house, in washington, people came out to the street, in millions, and not the population of course, soleimani was a controversial figure, he was part of the irgc, many fans in the country, but as far as the political factions in the country, it did serve as the

rallying around the flack factor sow saw reformist moderates, those were considered internal opposition to the hardline stance, all come out in support of not the force, but in support of the person, and in condemnation of what they see as an illegal assassination by the united states. so basically, they're reformists within the parliament, those moderates within the administration and also reformists within the political parties still operating inside the country, those who have been critical of the irgc, of the corruption, the economic situation inside the country and even the quds force, for example in syria, there is some criticism, domestic criticism to part of what used to be qassem soleimani's clout, but now you see that criticism basically taking the backseat and instead,

it's replaced by a unification against this more imminent foreign threat, which is the threat of war. the november protest just two months ago, the november protests across the country, anti-government protests, a deadly crackdown hundreds of people killed by security forces, very brutal, we might see more of that, we will also see more crackdown and more oppression, and obviously the hardliners have the will and the capacity to repress further more as we saw in november. and at the same time, also you probably heard of the fiasco of the downing of the ukrainian flight, the civilian flight, also by the irgc, that was a big internal disaster. it affected the rallying around the flag factor, just from a week before, but i think it's also something that we're going to hear in the speech tomorrow,

the prayers from the supreme leader, the irgc is going to apologize, try to move on, and then ask for more unification, less criticism of the force, and more support behind it. we're going to see the more closing of the political space. we've already seen reformists and moderates, candidates register for the upcoming parliamentary election, many of them have been disqualified or the guardian council, the parliamentary election is going to be very significant, and then followed by the presidential election the year after. the certainly is going to end he is not going to be able to run and it is an opening and a chance for another faction to step, in most likely the parliament will be dominated by hardline candidates, maybe new blood, but from the hardline camp, and also, followed by the presidency, or the

administration, so we will see a more consistent one-handed establishment as opposed to what we see right now, moderates have the administration, part of the parliament, and then the supreme leader, and the military of course, has always been hardline. and then i also want to talk about a continuation of this, the sense of anti-americanism. i think there is this misunderstanding maybe in the administration, maybe part of washington, that anti-americanism is decreased which is not true with president trump's policies in iran. a trend in decline in anti-american sentiment has actually been reversed. iranians have always been known as the most, if not one of the most pro-american populations in the region, specifically because of the establishment is there, the government is very anti-american, the population

feels the opposite, but with the leaving of the jcpao, the u.s. violating the jcpao you see the pro-engagement, pro-western forces basically their justification becoming weaker and now with this killing of soleimani, again, which you hear from, we hear from reformists and moderate forces as an act of terrorism, illegal, on their international law, and again that sense in decline, and the fact that america is the source for good, for the rules of the game, is not going to do any rash or crazy, everything that the hardliners basically have been accusing the u.s. of is now playing out more and more in the pro-engagement and pro-negotiation forces within the country become weaker, and they're losing ground for their arguments. i talked to a few reformists who

used to talk about jcpao number two. so after the iran deal was agreed, there was this talk, or this movement that now the government has to go and negotiate even more, maybe about the missile program, about regional activities and come up with a jcpao number to a badge on the door, now that discussion has also taken a backseat. and i've heard from some reformist saying that after the soleimani assassination, there is also this feeling that actually we do need this missile program, if there is going to be attacks on cultural sides or if government officials are going to be killed. and then finally, to talk about the foreign policy of iran, again, as i said, pro-u.s. and pro-engagement is going to take a backseat. and at least until the 2020 election. iranians are watching the election very closely. they've also learned over time, there's a learning curve, but they've learned of divisions in

washington, of how things play out, as far as u.s./iran relations here among the different parties. so i don't think there's going to be much chance if any for talks between tehran and washington. negotiations for a new deal. although the iranians have said they are prepared to return to the jcpao to full compliance with the nuclear deal, if washington lifts sanctions. so president trump is willing to make concessions to lift oil sanctions, or make this issue, some waivers to allow for some significant purchase of iranian oil, the iranians are prepared to return back to the jcpao, but as far as cutting a new deal with this administration, and this president, at least before the next election i think is very unlikely. so just to wrap it up, the

chance of war i think is slim. a full-on war, iranians don't want a full-on war with the u.s. for obvious reasons. the world's biggest most powerful military. and also the memories of the eight-year war with iraq from the 1980s are still vivid. iranians don't want anything of that experience repeating in their own soil. but that doesn't mean their proxy war is not going to continue. but a full-on war, conventional war is something they are trying to avoid. and that's why we saw the retaliation the way that it was done with no casualties, basically, to deescalate, to offer an exit round to president trump, to deescalate out of that situation. there will probably be no talks until 2020. but the iranians are going to continue to be patient. if president trump is re-elected or he stays, we might see some shift of policy in tehran, possibly with the help of mediators and to find a long-term solution for another

four years. if a democrat comes to the white house, we've heard from democratic candidates, most of them, i believe, are going to return to the jcpao, so there will be another opening for more talks, maybe that jcpao two that has been talked about, but for the next few months, i think we're going to see more of the status quo, and maybe a little more aggressiveness from the quds force and some of iran's allies and proxies in the region. if not less. >> thank you very much. >> well, thank you very much, and thanks for the arab center for this panel, thank you for the invitation, thank you everybody for attending. i am going to take us to iraq. iraq found itself in the middle of a fight between its two most important allies, the united states and iran. both of them are realities for iraq. the united states has an important role to play. still.

and since 2003, it has been a major player in iraq. iran is a geographic and demographic reality, 1400 kilometers of border, and thousands of years of history, more in recent history, that was very checkered in a way, war, and peace, and alliance, so iraqis are an uncomfortable position here. iraq also has received this development in the worst possible times. as i said elsewhere, there is no good time for a crisis. but this crisis came at an even worse time. iraq has been divided more than what it has suffered in the past. with the protests that we're looking for reform, and these protests that cost 500 or more casualties, that is, on about

20,000 injured people among the protesters, and the government resigned because of that, the first time we've seen a resignation of a government since 2003, and a political leadership that doesn't even know how to handle the internal politics, and until now, they passed a constitutional mandate, and they still cannot figure out how to replace the government. so on top of this, the division among the population, the division between the population and the government, and the division within the government, that is a, coming on top of that, a crisis team, really, as a severe blow to the entire existence of iraq. the iraqis are very disappointed for many reasons. rightfully so. the one hand, the iraqi government cannot, doesn't have anybody who can dictate the terms of how iraq goes. there is nobody who is really in power.

the government and the prime minister rules, using consensus, more than the authorities of the office or the prerogatives of the position. and consensus is very hard to come by in iraq, given that the there are so many factional reasons for division and for disagreement and lack of consensus. the united states and iran, are things that have received very little consensus among iraqis. those who are pro the united states certainly don't want to see the iranian presence to be stronger and vice versa, and the government in the past has used this idea of trying to reach a common ground, they denounced both iran and the united states, and if they embrace, they embrace both. but what happened recently, has

been a deal breaker for the iraqi consensus, and i will explain first. but first, let's mention a couple of things that are important. the united states presence, represents three forms of interest. one of them is the diplomatic, obviously. the u.s., there is a cliche that the united states has the largest embassy it has around the world in iraq, it is no longer, many of the diplomats have been pulled back, but still it's a significant presence. there is also the military presence of the united states. not as appears to be the 2003 and 2011, we have now about 6,000 troops divided between trainers who are part of the terms of the weapons contract that iraq brought and they trained the iraqi on using those and those who are trained to fight the isis, after the defeat of isis, to continue as

deterrents to fight terrorism and not allow isis to come back. and then the third component of the u.s. presence is the business presence. there are certain important companies that have work in iraq, especially in the oil sector, and several other sectors, and there is a hope that we would have even more contracts and indeed that's what the administration has been trying in iraq. there isn't a military agreement or a defense agreement between iraq and the united states. there was the 2008 status of forces agreement, that was signed, and it expired in 2011 and there is an agreement called the strategic framework agreement, which has so many components. one of them is the military side or the defense side. and it is still valid. the agreement about the status as i said, ended with the

withdrawal of the last u.s. troops in december of 2011. the troops that went to iraq after december 11 went in, in the context of the fight of isis, and will isn't really a clear stipulation of what their role is and what their status on when they get to be withdrawn and who gets to decide on whether they stay or leave. i've been speaking with people in the government and parliament and other places and none of them seem to have a straight answer on what it was. and even from the u.s. also, there is a lack of clarity on it. there was some kind of executive correspondence between the government of iraq and the united states government, but there isn't really a set of written rules for that. that is why we're having this debate between the president of the united states and the administration, and the iraqis over whether or not they will be withdrawn, or they can be expelled from iraq.

there is another legal framework that is relevant here, which is the iraqi constitution. with a lot of pressure from the united states, the iraqis put in their constitution article eight which says iraq cannot conduct any act that would be perceived as a threat by any other country. so if you put a, i don't know, a unit next to the iranians or next to turkey or next to kuwait, those countries say we don't like them to be there, you are actually as a government violating your own constitution. why am i mentioning these is because they have been relevant to the calls for expelling u.s. troops, not recently, but for a long time. when president trump went in december to iraq, and entered without meeting his counterparts and went to this base which was just recently bombed by iran,

iraqis were saying, okay, look what kind of sovereignty is this, when people come and go? all of the questions are being raised. iran doesn't want u.s. troops. we know that. this is not a secret. and they have friends who are pressuring the government not to let u.s. troops to remain, especially after 2017 when isis was declared officially defeated. but the government always managed to work that out and circumvent these calls and argue for the stay of the u.s. troops. they're important to be sure, for building capacity for iraq, as terrorism deterrents, many things, and also, their presence there provides security and infrastructure for other troops an other cooperation from nato and other countries that cannot be there without it, and also some u.s. support for iraq that

is not military, like u.s. aid, et cetera, is all hinging on that. so it is very important. but they are not popular because, again, it is the nature of foreign troops in any country in the world. what made that untenable for the government is basically when clearly the terms of, or the conditions the iraqis were willing to live with have not been adhered to, the terms and conditions, according to the iraqi prime minister, is that they are there to fight isis, or to train the iraqis. there is nothing in the agreement directly on numbers in the agreement that they can conduct bombings, and i think what is really made the iraqis a great unease is that the u.s. and iran chose iraqi territory to fight each other. and you know, this is clearly a problem for the iraqi, especially they are not party to that conflict.

so the government, first they have nothing, no ability to defend the acts that happened. and second, it is a government that is weak or too weak to defend anything. abdul mahdi resigned in december, and there is a current caretaker and there is a current time has passed constitutionally so there is a major problem with what he can and cannot do. the parliament vote that took place after the bombing made the situation even worse. the iraqi government didn't need a parliamentary vote for that, but abdul mahdi elected to go to the parliament to involve the parliament to make sure that he is not accused of being acting unilaterally as a caretaker prime minister, and while the vote is nonbinding, now that the armed groups and those who want

to expel the united states have a unanimous vote in the parliament to expel the u.s. troops, unanimous because basically those who were against the u.s. troops did not show up for the session. so you have a sense that all iran's friends all went and voted and all american friends or those who are in favor of keeping the united states troops did not show up to vote. and that is the problem. so where is that taking us, and let me conclude with this. we will see that i think both the united states and iraq have to prioritize their options. it is, the way it has been played was a terrible way to be honest. they decided to take the negotiations to the media rather than really sending diplomats quietly to go and deal with this. the iraqi government asked the

united states to send a delegation to negotiate a withdrawal. that was from an iraqi perspective a way to buy two or three months of negotiations. when the u.s. says we are not going to withdraw, or if we have to withdraw, we will have sanctions on iraq, and we are going to do one, two, three to iraq, et cetera, that's not a good way to meet the government, especially that, the only way these forces are sold to the iraqis under the presence -- they are at the invitation of the iraqi government, and that iraq is a sovereign country and they would leave it with us. i would agree with the president on one thing, which is that the iraqis should ask nicely. they should not expel the americans. it is more than just saying please leave. the u.s. is owed a lot by iraq, as the u.s. is responsible for a lot in iraq. but certainly, the troops that went to iraq have been instrumental in provides the assistance to defeat isis, the

worst existential threat iraq received in its probably modern history so they should not be expelled as if they are enemies that are being expelled out or kicked out. and a structure is in order. but on the other hand, there is no way that the united states can use this hard bargain, as the president said, we'll put sanction, we'll seize the iraqi money that is in our banks, and all of these threats, that's not a good way to, especially if you really want to keep relations. i think that the military cooperation has, is not tenable anymore. we cannot keep these troops for a long time. we can however negotiate keeping portions of the troop, the trainers and several others, but not the status quo. i know that business has been lost for a very long time.

i don't see any american company able to operate in, anywhere in the south or in the central iraq, especially where the oil companies are, i think diplomatic relations are not necessarily lost. and if we keep that in place, the diplomats can bring back what was lost. they can bring the business relations. they can bring the military relations. with time and effort and until this storm passes. but if we lose the diplomatic relations, i don't see the diplomats going back to iraq. and i'm an historian of iraq, and iraqi, every time the u.s. diplomats were expelled, it took more than a decade for them to come back. and i think iraq does need the united states as a balance. the united states presence and strong relations is important for iraq and the u.n. and the international theater, but also, it balances iraq's relations regionally, the iraqis have come

to diversify relations, this have good relations with the gulf, they have good relations with arab countries. they stayed neutral in some of the regional conflicts and that was a good thing. these were things, especially in the last administration, i think iraq should be helped, as much as possible, to get out of this crisis, and also, to do what is more important than anything else, for the country, which is rebuild, and let's remember, that iraq has exited from the nastiest fight, one-third of iraqi territory was taken over by terrorists and iraqis fought for every inch of it to get it back and the destruction that needs to be rebuilt is at least somewhere around $90 billion, and many years of effort of reconstruction, not to mention the reconstruction of the state and society to meet all of that. iraq doesn't need another war. doesn't need another conflict.

particularly a conflict that is not really iraq's conflict, it is a lateral conflict between two countries who happen to be allies of iraq, and they happen also to have presence in iraq, and they happen to elect not to fight directly, so they chose the iraqi territory as a convenient theater. i think, you know, this is not a crisis that is inevitable. this is not a crisis that is unsolvable. it just needs cooperation from everyone. it's good that the two countries decided to pull back from an all-out war, but there needs to be really a follow up on this to spare the region and i will close with this. the secretary general of united nations said the world cannot afford another war. thank you. >> thank you. while i will close by talking about two other countries that

are very very much impacted by what's -- what happened, what's happening and what will happen in the future, lebanon and syria. one thing for sure about the killing, killing the person, yes, killing the genius, maybe, yes, but it's not killing the policy. iran has not been totally crippled regarding, you know, its influence in different arab countries. the -- the irgc, will remain, -- and the quds force will remain. they are institutions and it's already that institution has already at the top has been revitalized by the appointment of a new general.

iranian influence will remain in syria and lebanon as it will remain in iraq, obviously. there has been a lot of work done so far, and that work is not simply go to disappear quickly. in lebanon, there obviously is a lot of bravado going on, secretary general of the hezbollah has, you know, made two speeches over the last two weeks in which he basically, yes, he lambasted, obviously, the killing of his friend, general soleimani, and he has threatened that we're going to keep the fight going. but sometimes you wonder how any party in lebanon, how hezbollah in lebanon is going to be able to say that we're going to respond here and there and help in avenging soleimani. yes, they will try to avenge

soleimani, but hezbollah in lebanon is bound by the lebanese domestic problems, lebanese domestic issues. hezbollah does not operate in a vacuum. it has a lot of responsibility, practically hezbollah runs the country and it is the overwhelming force there. and, you know, just a couple of hours ago, they announced the formation of the lebanese, the new lebanese government, but, you know, hezbollah had to interfere, intervene in how political forces were discussing how to form the new government and it's basically now today, it an government produced by hezbollah pressure. the very important point about

this government or hezbollah's relationship to it, it's almost a paradox. this is a government that hezbollah is responsible for forming, but hezbollah cannot necessarily exercise all the force that it has on that government, specifically because the government has two very very important features. number one, it is a government that's supposed to be -- that's supposed to coalesce different political forces that represent, supposedly representing the lebanese political environment. and yet at the same time that government is lebanon's segues, lebanon's opening to the world. lebanon cannot live only by hezbollah's, lebanon needs international assistance, needs international approval, and this is the paradox that hezbollah finds itself in. no matter what hezbollah wants to do regarding the soleimani

killing, it is bound by these facts. lebanon cannot be thrown in as one of those countries that are just simply in iran's orbit, and no one can do anything about it because lebanon needs assistance from the entire international community outside of iran, so these constraints really make hezbollah almost weak in how it wants to respond or how it wants to avenge the killing of soleimani. hezbollah cannot avenge the killing of soleimani by starting a war with israel. lebanon is basically hezbollah's last stand. it's the place where the party is. it's the place where the party's constituency lives, so a war with israel will not be an easy war. yes, israel will be devastated probably by too many missiles and military operations, but yet

at the same time, that will also happen to lebanon. and i don't think that hezbollah is really ready to take on the cost of a war like that. neither is hezbollah ready to just let things go. i mean, hezbollah has a commitment to soleimani. as far as i'm concerned, i think hezbollah is restrained, but yet at the same time, it probably will try to help in, you know, -- it was mentioned that maybe iran will have it proxies and they might be able to do something. maybe hezbollah will be able to do something in iraq or against american forces but i do not see hezbollah able to, because it is responsible for running a country now, and it has always been in control, so to speak, but yet, at the same time today it is much much -- in a much more difficult situation,

especially that public demonstrations today, public protests in lebanon today are opposed by hezbollah. hezbollah, the party that's supposed to be the party that protects the poor, the marginalized, the people revolting against the political system, and now all of a sudden hezbollah is against these very people. from a legitimacy point of view, hezbollah has lost a lot of popularity and legitimacy in the country. the party of god is really under a lot of stress regarding its policy in lebanon, and how we will be able to the soleimani killing is really still to be determined, i think. soleimani's killing definitely was -- felt badly in syria obviously but yet at the same

time, this -- it affects, you know, iran's situation in syria is no longer an iranian/syrian relationship. iran's situation with syria is governed by what russia wants to do with syria. unfortunately, i don't see iran being successful, too successful in syria, specifically because vladimir putin may have different plans for the country. you know, a couple of weeks ago, maybe a week ago, vladimir putin visited damascus and invited to -- invited baa shar al asad was invited to a russian base while putin was not received at the airport by the president or was not given the due of a president of a very important country for syria. so it's almost like, you know,

bashar al assad has become a side trap of syria of russia in syria, so that reflects on how iran is perceived in the country. bashar al assad has always tried to use the iranians against the russians but also use the russians against the iranians. tries to balance both of them, but today, soleimani's assassination has probably given russia some sort of a way of influence, of increasing its influence in syria at the expense of the iranian influence in syria. yet, at the same time, iran was in syria, engaged over the last seven, eight years, was really engaged in local politics. it was in street politics, iran has always been better than the russians in dealing with syrian domestic politics.

they were better than the russians in dealing in syria, -- dealing with sectarianism in syria. but yet, at the same time, iran today really lacks the influence that it had when soleimani was alive. yes, soleimani will be inherited, somebody will be replacing him, and iran will have some sort of assistance in syria, but i do not think that they are influence in syria is going to remain the way it is, especially iran today is restricted. in what to do in syria, it's restricted by russia, but it's also restricted by israel. israel is, you know, willy nilly anytime, as the air force decides to fly over syria and bomb some sites. there is no resistance to it, so

i don't see how iran is going to really going to be influencing the syrian situation if the russians are going to be there controlling the syrian government and deciding what it wants to decide for syria. i think this is all i'm going to say about this. we're going to open it up to questions and answers. please remember to write your questions on cards, please, and as legibly as possible, if you can, please. >> thank you. >> we'll start with our executive director from acw. soleimani enjoyed for a long time, a mythical larger than life component to his personality. since his assassination, he was

virtually vilified by the u.s. and iran for their own respective reasons. what do you think about that? >> he has been made into a saint di a iranens and into a total satan by the united states. is he worth it? >> the man was a war criminal among many things. we shouldn't forget for a moment what he did in iraq, and, you know, he brought up, you know, iran's malosovich. he was more than a bad man. he committed atrocities, and it has to be said, we have to remember that. but yes, we've, you know, he is the devil for us, and he has been deity-i-fied in iran.

institutions and this is the one thing that khamenei learned after the fall of the shaw. when it comes to creating a vast and very effective and supple but sometimes brutal set of institutions, the iranians are very good at that. i do think it's dangerous to assume that we can just get rid of this guy, and somehow we have all of this enormous leverage. having said that, i was listening to a program on npr a few minutes ago or just a half hour ago about the intercept, which produced all of these iranian documents on the influence of iran and iraq. has to be remembered that when it came to iraq, soleimani was the guy. i mean, he wielded an enormous influence, and people feared and respected him, and it's not going to be simple to replace that kind of leverage, and that kind of enormous clout. having said that, in terms of

u.s. policy, it's highly simplistic to assume that getting rid of this man is somehow going to produce or be part of an effective strategy. i think it ultimately does not play into an effective strategy at all, and it reflects kind of infatuation with leaders and the myth of this leader, and not any kind of clear strategic sense of where this would fit into our approach to iran. >> i think both sides have over hyped the importance of the person. i mean, the iranians have used the pr of creating this war hero, this, as you said, a larger than life person, and i think the americans have also over hyped the villain as bigger than what he was, again, as we both discussed. it's an organization. there's a structure he put in

place. yes, he was a very capable commander, a genius fighter basically, but it wasn't a one-man show, and i think this over hyping of the personality gives the sense that he's gone, everything is gone with him, and that's not true. as far as inside iran and the population that we saw that came out for his funeral, which was massive, i mean, as iran watchers, we were surprised. this was beyond the core supporters of the regime. it's not specifically, it doesn't show a supportive as what is seen as soleimani's bad behavior, for example, atrocities in syria and iraq. it's because of his status as someone who fight isis. from the iranian side, there's -- from the iranian psyche, there's nothing scarier than the nightmare of isis. remember, the islamic state conducted a terrorist attack in

teheran at the iranian parliament, people have been killed. it's an actual visible, physical threat, and there's this understanding among beyond just the regime supporters in iran that isis is a threat. that if it wasn't fought in iraq, if it wasn't fought in syria, it would come over the border and we would have to fight it inside iran, and soleimani was the seen as the person who fought and played a key role in defeating isis. depends who you talk to in iran. some people think he was the only person who fought and defeated isis, but in general, that's the status, the war hero status, the commander that not only was also a fighter in the iran/iraq war but also the person that played a key role in defeating isis. there's one more side issue is that he was a rare irgc commander who stayed out of domestic politics. the last visible time he played a role in domestic politics was in 1997 in the student uprising where he signed on with a group

letter demanding an end to sudan protests, despite lines you hear from the white house that he orchestrated internal domestic crackdowns on protests. he wasn't very much involved and that also helped him gain more bipartisan support basically from different factions, specifically because he didn't play into internal politics and the infighting that many of the other irgc commanders do, so there's this high line reformist moderate divide but soleimani stayed largely out of that compared to other irgc commanders. >> thank you. i have another question, a question from kahlil, with iraq caught between u.s. and iran for the long-term, will baghdad ever regain sovereignty and control

over its territorial integrity. when and under what conditions? the other question, actually two other questions, how do you read call for anti-u.s. march? what reflection would it have on the square reform demanding protests. how do you envision the way forward about appointing a new prime minister? >> well, thank you, first. iraq's sovereignty is a problem. to have your sovereignty, you have to be independent, not reliant on others for various needs. iran of course is an important player in iraq. not just because of the -- its friends who are both on the streets with armed groups, and in the parliament. let's remember that they made

when they needed a majority to pass anything, they got it, and they got a quorum and a vote, we saw their position to that, the best weapon they use is run away and not show up -- which is not much of a resistance, because you cannot even prevent a vote. and that's an issue, so -- but there is another aspect, i think, to iran's importance when it comes to iraq. there is this idea that iraq relies on iran for its fuel, for electricity, and also buys electricity from iran, and also the trade exchange. the two countries have about $12 billion and there are about -- they are talking about bringing it to $20 billion. that's huge by iraqi. after turkey and after china and turkey, but i think what iraq gets out of iran is more significant because these are things that are day-to-day

livelihood that they get. on the other hand, the united states is very important for iraq. and the united states has troops inside iraq. has a strong diplomatic influence. the united states also is as a permanent member of the un security council can help iraq a lot, and the loss of it can do a lot of damage for iraq. iraq still hasn't emerged completely from the sanctions of saddam hussein's era. there are so many claims against iraq. the u.s. as the president said, they can make iraqi life a living hell, and that is a problem for the iraqis. iraq is not independent economically. and that is a problem. you know, the iraqis are dependent on, and the entire political economy of iraq and the macro economic of iraq, dig -- theory of iraq is dig the oil

from underground, sell it and pray the prices don't go down. that's the entire economy of iraq. 90%, up to 90% of the iraqi economy is based on oil, and two problems, one of them, you cannot control the price. you cannot control the production. one problem like this, whether it's inside iraq or outside iraq, and you cannot use the oil that much. a little drone took out 5 million barrels a day from saudi -- and's production. how can you be sovereign if you cannot really feed your people, if you cannot pay your people, if you cannot be an actor in the international arena without the foreign influence and tolerating the foreign influence? the iraqis have to do a lot. a lot of it is not the fault of this current regime or the 2003 regime. the 2003 regime received a

titanic in iraq after it hit the iceberg, and that's what it is exa exactly it is the situation. it is a miracle that iraq is still stitched together given what it has been seeing. many countries were disintegrated or completely wiped out of the maps of other don't continents for less than what iraqis had to go through. sovereignty is really a very hard prospect for iraq. there needs to be a lot of work by the iraqis, and also by the international community to help the iraqis be sovereign. iraq is not in a neighborhood where they tolerate sovereign nations next door so you have -- everybody has a stake in iraq, and they use their own force and the forces from within because of the division in iraq that allows for this. we don't expect to see a good measure of sovereignty in iraq, unless they solve these issues i just mentioned, internal and external.

the question about sutter, he made his name and reputation and importance and relevance in iraqi policy for fighting the united states back in 2003 four, five, six, seven. then he would throw that and then frozen the army that he used and then used a smaller number of his armed group to work for -- especially sent to fight isis. he kind of changed and matured along the years. he is no longer the fire brand that he used to be, but he's still very relevant. there are two important elements for him. first, iraqi nationalism that is his own version of it, basically. he is not into a tolerating any foreign influence but he also

has a very large and significant social base that is always loyal to him. he is the one leader in iraq who does not have to second guess or doubt the locality of his followers and that they will show up whenever he wants them to show up. and that is important because that makes him someone who can deliver on his promises and threats. rerecently en -- he recently instated, what is he going to do with it. that remains to be seen. depends on how it will play out between the iraqi government and the united states on the forces but he clearly made it clear he will use illegal and political means to achieve what he wants, mainly the pull out of the u.s. troops. otherwise he said he would use other means. we hope that he is not going to do that or he doesn't have to. this time it's new because he is joined by other armed forces

that used to be not on good terms with recently. that recent meeting that he had with the major cardinal sort oft of armed groups, bosses, is significant and people have to watch for it, and they have, because this is not an empty threat. it is going to be important. i think what is going to happen depends on the demonstration that he called for in a

they lost. and new prime minister finally is basically, this is the biggest question. this is unprecedented. the iraqi constitution does not really specify a clear roadmap. the writers of the constitution had three articles about the vacancy and the prime minister's job. none of them talks about the resignation of the prime minister. i don't know how you could write a constitution that doesn't anticipate a resignation of someone. so they don't know whether there is a lot of trouble in it. there are two possibilities. first of all, there is a violation of the constitution right now. they passed the mandates. one way is to appoint a new prime minister or keep the same current prime minister and government in place and do what they need to do through them. what is needed to be done is

basically prepare for a new election and to have a new election law. both are unpopular because the protesters and in general iraqi mood, they do not want the current government to continue. and there isn't anybody that can be presented and they would be accepted by the protesters. so anybody who is enforced or imposed upon the process will probably lead to more protests in the streets and more casualties in the confrontations. the protesters have been exercising their veto power. they just say, we don't want this no matter who is presented to them. but they never said whom they really want. and that is because they are fragmented. nobody speaks on their behalf, and there is no leadership. so there is one thing that i can predict. and i'm a historian, i hate to predict for the future, it's safer to talk about past events. but i would not see a

pro-american prime minister installed anytime soon because he would not be able to get the vote. but it is again very hard to really agree. there are few things that used to be good potential names, but they were burnt immediately after they were presented as possible candidates. the smart person right now in iraqi politics is the one who says, no, i don't want to be the next prime minister, not the one who says i do. this is what i told at least to a couple of people who called and asked for advice. >> this question is for dan from atlantic. on january 14, france, germany and the united kingdom figured the jcpoa dispute mechanism, is this to create or resume compliance or reduce tension? >> well, yeah, speculation. first of all, one of the ways in

which iran has responded to u.s. policy is to begin to infrij upon the agreement. they did so in a very careful and calculated way, even the most recent infrijment is about adding more centrifuges but not going to 20%. so you keep it at low enriched uranium and you still have wiggle room to go back. they haven't reached the point of no return, but it's very difficult to see what the europeans will do that will satisfy them. so it's a very difficult situation. i see the european response as an effort to sort of work. they are squeezed between the trump administration on the one hand and iran on the other. they cannot sit there. i heard a number of interviews with folks who had helped to negotiate the jcpoa. some feel it was a mistake, what the europeans did. i think they're in a very tight spot. and there isn't any structural solution to this other than

reas reinstating the agreement. and that is not in the cards. so it's -- it was a calculated risk. and it provides no obvious solution to the current impasse. >> thank you. the question from henry bar kooef. iran's control over iraqi's militias goes way beyond any normal influence relationship. will this last forever? what are the long-term implications for iraqi stability? >> well, this is correct. let's remember that we have some of the armed groups in iraq have been formed in iran. and other leaders have been in iran during the time of saddam house ain's regime. and then there are those who are

formed later after 2003. all of them do have strong relations with iran, and these are the ones that are really more in the news. there are a lot of armed groups who are formed to fight isis. and these are kind of out of the equation. they belong to either some of them report to the government, some of them report to the certain social actors, including astani. but the ones that really are in the news and the newsmakers are close to iran. one thing important to mention about them is it doesn't mean that they are having 100% iran edge on these. these are iraqis. they have their own vision on what is best for iraq. we might not agree with them, and that's normal. but the situation is not that they are iranian forces or troops. there is a formula between what their iraqi agenda is and what they do for iran.

but the majority of their convictions, they really have one version of their own on what is best for iraq, and for them what is best for iraq is to have the united states with less influence. same thing, you know, we talk about other countries such as saudi or turkey, that's part of it. but i think the relation with iran has to do with calculations of support. the comfort zone for them, if you are an iraqi and you look around, where is the safest bet if you are in trouble? also the performance of iraq's allies in the past have not helped. you know, when isis took over, and i was in iraq actually at that time, just arrived few days after the mosul crisis, isis was

going 50 mile an hour towards balan bail dad. the united states said we will help only when malaky acts on a list of reforms we have that needed ten years to do. the iranians sent arms and shipments the next day, and they had the following day their own close fighting groups in iraq, recruiting fighters to go and intercept isis and samu ran in out skirts of maldan and other plagss. th places. that matters for the iraqis. it's important to see how iraqis see it from inside iraq. it doesn't help us to understand iraq when we apply 100% washington straric view on who is good or bad in iraq. because we are talking to the iraqis and asking the iraqis to

do one thing or another. and we have to understand how the iraqis view their interests before we prescribe that. so that's why as a person whose main role as a courier, and i am a big believer that iraq cannot survive without robust relations with the united states, but that's not enough. there needs to be a real trust built between the iraqis and the united states in order to have that operational. it seemed that for natural and unnatural reasons, iran has gained more trust in iraq than the united states. one thing that is important to reflect on for this good audience is this. the u.s. can't affo afford losi. iran cannot.

that's why iran suck seeds more. we can like it or dislike it. will they be there forever? i don't think forever, but for a long time. the best way to avoid a longer time than absolutely necessary and inevitable is to strengthen the iraqi government and to take away the reasons for these groups to exist. and then once you do that ultimately then the problem solves itself and if not completely then at least to a manageable way. >> very quickly, i also agree with you, the stakes are very high for iran, higher than the u.s., the influence, they're going to try to continue to exert their influence. we also have to remember it's not just geopolitical, the long border, the history, trade, culture, religion, the largest iranian religious pilgrimage is

to kabul in iraq, much bigger than to mecca. so there is all of these ties and also the fear of the return of another saddam, or anything like that that had very severe consequences for iran, the war, and then also this yash of terrorism and isis, all of these play in the iranian psyche beyond just the core of the hardliners and the regime and it's something that basically is considered in the calculations. so i think it is going to continue, and also we have to again remember that the killing was not just soleimani, it was also moe handess, an iraqi force, and that is going to basically -- it's the u.s. helping to unite this anti-american sentiment, at least among the iranian forces and their iraqi allies, if not proxies. >> i want to finish with this very, very small question, but big answer. this is to anybody.

this is from johnathon cue teb. what is the impact on israel in the current situation? >> start. >> got his hands feel right now. his own crisis. but i think it was said before that first of all israel has been -- beebee was very careful not to cross certain kinds of lines in his conflict with iran and irac, hezbollah. he maintained a rational approach and 4e7d us maintain this dance of control, escalation. he doesn't want this to go beyond it because of the devastation in lebanon and israel. having said that, there is no perspective of the government, i think everybody would agree, that they have never had a better ally in the white house than this -- as far as they're concerned. and so they very much want to maintain that relationship and do whatever is necessary to maintain it without necessarily

getting sucked into a full-blown war with iran. so i think that's going to be the balancing act that the prime minister, who is currently under invooimt as we know and facing this strange situation of election, will contend with. that's my sense. >> well, i think we're out of time. thank you very much for joining us this afternoon. and we hope to see you at our next event. thank you. [ applause ] weeknights this week we have featured american history tv programs as a preview of what's available every weekend on c-span3. tonight we focus on president ronald reagan beginning with

celebrities who participated, hosted by frank sinatra. then white house political affairs director, frank don telly, on reagan's campaigns for the white house. that's followed by historian markis whicher, excloerg the foirn policy toward the soviet union during the 1980s. enjoy every night and weekend on c-span3. ♪ the house will be in order. >> for 40 years, c-span has been providing american unfiltered coverage of congress, the white house, the supreme court, and public policy events from washington, d.c., and around the country. so you can make up your own mind. created by cable in 1979, c-span is brought to you by your local