featuring american history tv programs as a preview of what is available every weekend on c-span3. tonight, we'll discuss the battle of ft. fisher. then timothy smith explores the 1863 battle of champion hill that was part of the vicksburg campaign. followed by jeffrey hunt, detailing the movements of general george mead and union forces through virginia. american history tv, tonight beginning at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span 3. next, a panel of world war ii scholars looks at the february 1945 yalta conference, at which allied leaders franklin roosevelt, winston churchill, and joseph stalin met to look ahead to the postwar era.

panelists compare yalta, to previous meetings between the three leaders, and examine the political motives that drove the deliberations. the national world war ii museum in new orleans hosted the event. welcome back, as we begin to silence our conversations, please remember to silence your cell phones as well. i was thinking with yalta being an eight-day conference, we have almost made a full eight hours talking about it. the last session is often one of our favorites. and that is a roundtable discussion where we get all of the speakers up together to talk about themes, to ask each other questions, and to give you all one last time to pepper one, some, or all of our panelists with your own questions.

i would ask that when you have a question, if it is or specific panelist, please name that panelist, or if you want to throw it open to some or all. we are going to ask dr. gunter bischoff to chair this panel discussion. i want to thank gunter for coming in and filling in on such short notice. before i lead the podium i would like to introduce our panelists. ladies and gentlemen, gunter will start it, and then i will run around with the microphone. gunter? >> thank you very much, jeremy. let me just throw a few general questions out that we could discuss, i thought.

the issue came up, and it was a very interesting opening statement about growing up in cleveland. that is what is called the yalta myths. this is the same thing as the selling out of eastern europe, the same thing as the selling out of china. with that debate in america was for politics, keep in mind, the republicans had been out of office since 1942. they won big in the '46 election, and they wanted to win the white house. and this seems to be the issue where you could blame the democrats. selling out china. selling out eastern europe. that's how yalta became a bad word in the post-war period. so, these yalta myths echoed all the way into the 1970s in

cleveland, about eastern europeans being sold down the river, as the saying went. i think that is an important part of the long life of yalta. particularly in american politics. charles de gaulle, who was smarting for a long time for not representing france. charles de gaulle blamed what was going on on yalta. that is how long it was working inside history. so i think the yalta myths are important topics we ought to be talking about. the domestic politics and foreign policy. i think he made a good point, yalta was the blueprint for

allied victory. and the halting was the issue that was picked up in 1967, even though it was discussed much in the historiography at the time. and a very important reason for the halt was, he was afraid of the fortress the nazis were building. he had the armies down to the south. trying to make sure the alpine fortress had no time to come into being. but nazi intelligence fed that to the oss, that that would be

happening in the alps. there was another reason to get quickly down, and people said, yalta, isn't this the game of diplomacy, isn't tit for tat what is being done in realpolitik? is that what is being done? i think that is a fair question to be discussed. i like to throw out these potential issues, but i'm sure there's many more. >> you talk about the yalta myths, the selling out of eastern europe, selling poland down the river, any of these eastern european ethnic groups that lived in cleveland with me. you could answer this as well. roosevelt was sick. he just wasn't up to it. there is stalin.

then roosevelt, clearly he looks at death's door, as he was on death's door. but i love that you had a graduate student looking at word counts and the deaths and the size of roosevelt's interventions. that is another one, we can stay until now and doomsday. people will still ask you, was the fact that roosevelt was sick at yalta, was that crucial? >> regarding the poles in particular, it's not a myth that the big three gathered together and decided the future of europe without much consultation with the rest of the world. that's the reality. and that created a lot of resentme resentment. but where the mythology starts, really, that the western allies were there in position to get a

better deal and didn't do that for whatever reason -- fdr was sick or there were spies in the american delegation or roosevelt was trying to get too cozy with stalin to get the united nations, his main international project and his legacy going. that's where the mythology starts. for poles, yalta was a turning point. that is where it was agreed that whatever government they had in london would be replaced, and they were losing territories in the east. the molotov ribbentrop line was accepted by the western allies. and that was the loss of the city in today's ukraine. it was known as different things depending on the controlling

power. and the western borders were not decided yet. so for poles that was a real major turning point and disappointment. yalta was the word for betrayal in poland all the way into the 1970s and 1980s. >> maybe one more issue that was raised throughout the conference is reparations. okay, stalin demanded them, but he had a point. the soviet union was struggling very badly.

roosevelt and churchill could see that as they traveled. and in order to reconstruct the soviet union, german reparations were to be needed. but there was a lesson to be learned from world war i that if you insist on german reparations it might create bad politics. as it did in germany. that was one of the big issues that the nazis very early picked up. but i think he correctly remarked, stalin got his $10 million. even if it was not through yalta, he got it through various means. when they realized that was not such a good deal since they often did not know how to put these industries back together.

or they became rusty in polish rail yards, it's being said, too. then they decided to take reparations out of current production in germany. and that is how the soviets got their $10 billion. and i might just remind you, they took reparations from austria, too. that is where i found out a remarkable thing. the soviets took as much reparations out of their zone in austria as the u.s. poured into their port in austria. that would almost make you think the u.s. paid the reparations -- >> there's no such thing as a coincidence. >> i thought that figure was pretty remarkable. they took reparations away from german assets in eastern austria. that was all the way up until 1960. austria delivered oil to the soviet union, all the way up

until 1960. but what the historian has reminded us, we need to keep that in mind, too, is the fact that the americans got reparations from germany, even though they did not demand any at yalta. how did they get it? they got it in a smart way. they sent teams into germany. taking production methods, taking patents. and apparently that saved companies like dupont, who took many of these reduction plans, billions of dollars of research costs. so it is assumed this smart way of doing reparations netted the united states $10 billion or so, too. so we say, it was turned down at yalta, but in the long run, both sides got what they wanted.

>> i would like to throw in one thing, gunter, about this notion of myths. myths are easy to sell when there is a kernel of truth to them. i don't really believe in the big lie. i think it's much easier to sell if there's a big truth. let me talk about poland. we have all worked with graduate students at certain points in our career. i love them dearly. they bring certain wisdom to the table. the student was here. saying isn't it crazy that there was no real independent poland after the war. that ironic nature of what happened to the polish state after the war, the feeling it had gone from one form of

government to another -- the germans got liberated, they got to live the benefits of a democratic way of life in western germany. i just want to put that in. we know why it happened and i think everyone knows why it happened. but you do see, that is something you can make some -- what kind of foreign policy is that? when poland winds up under the yoke, of all the countries in the world. poland is shocking, not only the first to fall, but one of the biggest who suffered, percentage-wise. i am just putting that out there. it's still there for me. >> winston churchill was very aware of the fact that great britain went to war over poland. that's why he kept insisting he was going to bat for poland. and the polish government, and

the declaration of liberated europe. guaranteeing free elections in eastern europe. it didn't work out that way. because he was very mindful of the fact that we went to war for poland. >> and churchill is the mastermind behind the growth of the yalta myth. at least that is what i heard from you. >> churchill sat down in 1921 across from michael collins, the great irish revolutionary. >> the big fellow. >> the big fellow. who, when he signed the irish treaty, said, "i have signed my own death warrant." and that turned out to be true. he was killed during the irish civil war. when we look back on that, we have to say ultimately the decision on his part and his fellow negotiators to sign that treaty was -- and i hate to use this word much -- but it was inevitable. they did not have any choice. the british would not have

accepted the notion of an irish republic. and the british war machine was armed and ready to assault ireland even more viciously then it had. that's a very long-winded way of saying, is it the conference we are talking about or is the yalta conference simply a symbol of or a ratification of these inevitable facts and forces, or could it conceivably have gone another way on the coast of crimea? >> i would like to return actually to link this question and line of argument to the question that gunter posed earlier about whether yalta is just another place where there's a lot of horse trading taking place or whether there is something particular about yalta. i would say it's not much

different from the conferences that happened before that in world international history with one exception. and that exception was quite idealistic, this liberal view of president roosevelt, who, of course, was following in the footsteps of president wilson, this idea of a liberal order and an international organization. and when fdr comes back and addresses the joint session of the congress and senate and says that the old world has disappeared. we're in a completely different world where there is no more, any more secret agreements done. he announces diplomatic relations. then the question is, to what

degree does he believe in that? then things start popping up. there is the secret agreement on the participation in the war with japan. and there are problems in eastern europe with poland. and that is where the reality of the old sphere of influence world and the division of the neoliberal world comes, and clash, and from that point of view, the expectations from yalta become much, much higher. partially because of the participants themselves, and fdr in particular put them on that level. and one more comment on the internal politics of eastern europe. and whether it was sold down or not, churchill comes back from yalta to a revolt in his own

conservative party. the attacks on the government policy and the concessions at yalta in the parliament. for a lot of people in britain, they went to war for poland. it was a major issue. and exactly as you said, what britain was getting as a result of that, what the world was getting as a result of that. with fdr, the polish, it seems to me, he was talking about 3 or 4 million polish voters in the united states. i'm not sure. but that's what he was talking about. saying i'm not against this changing of the polish borders. but i can't commit to that publicly before the presidential elections, because the poles,

before that, they were the staunchest supporters of the democratic party ever in the world. and my guess, they didn't stay so dedicated after that. >> that's my guess as well. >> i think the secrecy of the agreement was an important point that historians have paid attention to, and it sort of trickled out what happened at yalta. in the spring, and i think the secret agreement on what the u.s. had to give the soviet union to get involved in the war and the far east. we talked about it. that came out in february, 1946. a year after yalta. it was that secrecy, of course, which gave them, the republicans, the means to create the yalta myth that eastern european was sold down the river.

this is how yalta was being discussed throughout the 1950s. i think it was very early, like 1955, that the foreign relations volume was published, which was a principal source on the american side. >> it was '55. >> '55. so very early on. usually it takes 30 or 40 years before any approved volume is published on any given event. >> i don't think you are on, jeremy. >> there we go. we have a question to the right from dr. dupont. >> two, actually. one to all of you and then one that is very specific. the general question is, everyone is used to language like the u.s. gave, and

churchill gave, so on, and so forth. can you name one thing that was given away that stalin had not already earned through military means. that's my first question. more general. second, to mr. bishop -- i'm not sure whether you are defending churchill or setting up a theory about why he thought this, but it seems to me there is an inherent contradiction between your later interpretation of his being appalled at what is happening in eastern europe and the fact that he wrote on the napkin -- his famous napkin that was, as i understand it, initiated by him. either you are arguing there was some sort of epiphany after yalta, or had guilt feelings or something. but he contributed mightily by his acquiescence in moscow.

>> answer that one first. then we'll come to the other one. >> it's a tough crowd. you make a very good point. i mention it only because i did not want to present churchill as being unrealistically above the sordid compromises at that time. all i can say is he was not ceding complete control to stalin, even on that paper. there was that symbolic 10% in the west and romania. i don't think that he wished for or foresaw what was going to happen later. i just think it was an example of his commitment to empire and his vision for what the world should look like in the future. becoming dominant. because he was alone there with stalin and fdr wasn't there at the time.

and the irony is things changed very quickly. he forged an agreement with stalin, which ironically enough, stalin kept. obviously for his own reasons. and of course britain intervenes in the civil war, then they step back and the americans step in. it wasn't churchill's finest moment, and he himself said that it was a naughty document, and he felt uncomfortable about it. but keep in mind churchill lived to be 90. he had a seven-decade, almost, political career. some of his views shifted over time. although i think he is a lot more consistent than a most people give him credit for. even though he was horrified by the yalta settlement he was also alert to any sign that there might be an opportunity for a breakthrough in relations with the soviets. and i quoted some of the things he wrote and said in the

aftermath of the death of stalin and how he saw that as an opportunity to bring about a peaceful settlement. >> before we get to the other question, isn't it possible to hold both of the positions, to hand you a spheres of influence agreement? because churchill was a bedrock anti-communist. i realize in life we are complex beings. one obsession comes to the fore. there's also the absolute horror. >> if you are a conservative anti-communist and churchill is your hero you can be uncomfortable to read that he vastly preferred adlai stevenson in the presidential election,

and he was disappointed in eisenhower's victory. he found eisenhower's comment about the soviet union, just a different whore in the same dress, and he could not abide john foster dulles, the american secretary of state, who he said was the only bull he knew who carried his own china shop with him. having been so adamant and consistent regarding his hatred of communism, he was genuinely horrified by the idea that the world might consume itself with nuclear war. he was capable of change. he maintains the big principles throughout. he is given more credit for being adaptable to circumstances.

>> i wouldn't advise anyone to take at face value what you read in churchill's memoirs. >> good point. >> because that famous story about the napkin, there was one week of negotiations there. yes, maybe there was a moment with a napkin, but it was the top of the iceberg of negotiations. churchill was much closer to stalin than roosevelt about how the world should be organized. what he didn't like, he did not like where poleland was going because of that. in that sense he was consistent. he wanted more, as the war was coming to an end.

some of his ideas certainly evolved. he goes to yalta, he understands he has a weekend. and he writes later, chamberlain was wrong to trust hitler. and i don't think i'm wrong to trust stalin. and this was after yalta. he's in a situation where there is very little to go on, apart from stalin's word. which probably addresses, to a degree, your question about what fdr had to give. there was something stalin wanted from them in eastern europe. in the pacific, it's very clear. he wanted territories, and he was prepared to send his army into battle. in eastern europe, and he needed

legitimacy and recognition for his territorial acquisitions. and that's what the negotiations about polish government were about. he tried to say, i didn't interfere with what you did in paris, in france. he was saying he did not really insist on the veneer of diplomacy in negotiations because he needed international legitimacy. >> and there might have been a bit of guilt on churchill's part, too. you brought the story up to '43. i think it could be fleshed out more. stalin died on -- i think it was march 5th, 1953. churchill comes out and says this would be a good opportunity to meet the new leadership at the highest level, with another kind of summit meeting and i

think he was trying to resolve the cold war right then and there if he could. part of the problem was eisenhower was now president and eisenhower gave a speech in april of 1953 saying he was not so excited about a summit because the soviets would need to make major concessions. korean armistice, the austrian treaty, maybe a german peace treaty. he had very specific conditions that the soviets needed to make concessions before we sit down with them in a summit meeting. churchill fell sick, i think. nothing happened for the next few weeks and then the summit that happened was in bermuda and that was late in 1953.

it was a french/british/american summit. there is the remark about the woman in the street but is the same whore underneath, talking about these soviet union. this tension between churchill and eisenhower carried into this era where eisenhower was president and when some historians think a great opportunity was missed maybe to bring the cold war to the end because remember, this was at a time when the nuclear arms race really expanded with the first "h"-bombs being detonated. and churchill was horrified about those tests in '54. it was all about those efforts to keep the nuclear arms race in check if such a meeting could be effected with the soviets. but the soviets were not prepared to meet either, because they needed to figure out who would be stalin's successor.

the beauty about democratic governance in the u.s., we have an election every four years. if you don't like the guy, vote him out. it took the soviets almost two years to find a new leader in khruschev. that's when things started to move again. >> rob, did you have a point to end? >> didn't bobby have two questions? oh, what we had to give. we've probably already dealt with that. >> one thing that puzzles me is, what are all of these percentages? percentages of what? >> what does 10% of greece

really mean? >> i have always wondered what churchill was thinking about when he was doing these percentages of influence. >> i can see myself making a note like that. maybe you're working on some ideas in your head. this is a week or ten days of discussion of who had what spheres of influence. the wisdom of the typical american undergraduate. what does 10% of greece actually mean? >> it could have been a symbolic effort to say we are not going to withdraw entirely. we're not going to give you, stalin, an entirely free hand. even if there wasn't a lot of thought behind it. the idea of a 10% role later in, say, romania, didn't mean anything. >> the understanding of the

spheres of influence, for churchill and stalin, that was different. for churchill, it's predominantly your area. but we can be there, the obse e observers can be there, our businesses can be there, so on and so forth. for stalin, that was unacceptable. and later it was said that the only way for us to work with the west was to decide that this is yours and this is ours. they knew they could not compete with the united states. that is not how he understands

the world. he's not against spheres of influence, but he is against the iron curtain. this is not how he understands the world. >> jim has another question, and then i'll go to the other side of the room. >> this is kind of an essay question. you shared statistics about the casualties. what was the west's perception of those numbers? did they trust them, did they know it? did they perceive that they could continue the sacrifices, militarily or otherwise? >> i will start and i'm sure others can chime in. it was clear who was bearing the burden of fighting the germans. roosevelt and his people knew it.

whether the exact statistics were known, they're still being argued about today. we still are not quite sure what soviet casualties were in world war ii. but the notion that stalin and the soviets had to be kept in the field because they were bearing the biggest burden fighting the germans, it was not only known, but it was the bedrock of roosevelt's strategy for winning the war. >> i certainly agree with what rob just said. five times stalin appeared on the cover of "time" magazine. that recognition of the red army victories. in terms of actual numbers, the soviets didn't know them themselves. >> good point. >> the first time they came up

with the number, stalin never gave up the number. it was 20 million, and today's estimate is 27 million. but stalin was not talking about those numbers because it was putting himself in a bad light. stalin said that any other people but russians would kick us out. for what happened during the war. he was not eager to do the ni numbers, give the numbers to anybody. >> i must remind you that the national world war ii museum has a much-watched movie. there, the number is still 20 million. >> the gentleman to your left, please. >> one of you brought up there were 15 minutes or so spent on a

document which was signed about the democracy that blossomed in the future. with this be a good time to discuss what that was? how did that have an impact on the soviet union? >> the declaration on liberated europe? >> there were major concerns on the american side that stalin would not sign that. the declaration was put together, there was a long preparation for something like that that would have actually teeth, the way there would be a border, they would oversee that. the ways the policies can be implemented. eventually it was decided that stalin would not go for that. it became a declaration.

as opposed to an agreement, per se. that put it lower than other specific agreements that were reached at yalta in terms of its power. sta stalin said, okay, let's sign. molotov was horrified by that. he said we shouldn't do that. and stalin, according to molotov's memoirs, not memoirs, but interviews, he was say ing that what really mattered is the position of the forces on the ground. let them have the declaration. when it was signed, americans were surprised. but it was a declaration without

teeth. when the world went into the cold war mode, that was the only document where someone could argue that stalin violated the promises given at yalta. everything else, the language was so careful, there were no specific violations per se. it seems like he was talking to one of the military commanders. i don't remember who it was. but he said, well, it looks like the documents we have signed are so elastic that they can stretch from here to washington. and the other said, yes, it looks like we need to start negotiation on poland all over again. but that document, the declaration, that was the way

for roosevelt to come and say to his polish electorate, i brought something. he promised to honor democratic principles. it didn't help, as we know. but that was more a political document for domestic consumption back in the united states. >> i think we should also add, the polish issue at yalta had two sides to it. one was the borders. moving the entire country westward. the other issue was the future of polish government. the fact is, stalin had created conditions on the ground, communists from back in moscow that came to eastern poland where he set up the government. and the west and fdr were afraid

of what countries were being liberated, and they wanted the polish government in exile to be represented in the polish government. in that context, the declaration of liberated europe came out. mainly as a means, right, to save face for roosevelt back home with the polish voters that in fact he had batted for poland with this declaration. but it was a very weak declaration. it never really did the trick of enabling free elections in eastern europe. that sort of would guarantee a democratic future for these countries. >> let's wait for the microphone, nobody will be able to hear you. i'll bring it back.

>> but wasn't it a seed that was used by organizations like solidarity? or am i thinking of another document? >> probably. the helsinki act of 1975. and the human rights parts of the agreements that were reached there that helped to start the dissident movement, the organized dissident movement, human rights watch, and so on, and so forth. >> mindful of our time limit, i will ask the subsequent questions to be directed at one individual panelist. so we can try to get to all of the hands that are up. because i know there are about three of them still. >> i just wanted to point out,

this government that wrung their hands about democracy in europe has no problem interfering in latin america. knocking governments, even in the roosevelt government, cuba, puerto rico, wherever he wanted. the other thing is, poland was dismembered by germany. essentially destroyed as an entity. and reconstructed. there was some -- you could say that churchill, they went to recover poland, and it was recovered. under the control of stalin, but unity was lost. germany specifically removed part of the country. so we could say there was a little happy ending to this

world war ii episode for the polish nation in one sense. the question is whether the opposition, the government of russia not being communist, would churchill have been so opposed at the control from russia? was anti-communism the whole point? i don't see churchill being very bothered by democracy in india or in egypt or other places, right? >> britain has always stood for the rights of small nations except ireland. there are moments when you can afford your idealism. and others where realism seems to be the order of the day. that would be my comment on that. >> michael, do you have anything, since there was a churchill slant to that question? >> one can only speculate, what

would churchill's views be if russia was a non-communist state? it's been said before, both churchill and stalin were more comfortable with the spheres of influence way of looking at the world than roosevelt. but keep in mind, he was one of those warning against appeasement, arguing for rearmament in britain, and ultimately, it became the first lord of the admiralty and rejoined the government only after the invasion of poland. saving poland was something that was important to him from the beginning. >> the gentleman to your left in the front row here, please.

>> this question, so, you talked about looking at yalta in different lenses, correct? >> mm-hmm. >> my question is based on looking at it through the lens, from bottom to top, instead of top to bottom. how did reactions from domestic political, you know, ideas from each of the big three's respective countries, how did they react to the yalta conference? if they had any reaction at all? >> that is a very good question. it leaked out in dribs and drabs over several years. eventually this narrative, which i was still calling the standard narrative on yalta, still comes back no matter how many times you try to slay it. i can't really say that there

was a major, dominant public reaction to yalta. you are back to in some sense back room diplomacy. the crystallization of this negative, anti-yalta narrative will be the course of several years. the germans, getting bombed from the skies, cities are overrun. i don't know if there was a consensus among the german people on what they thought of yalta. >> this question is for mr. bishop. i would like to know what you think about what winston churchill would say or do. we talked a lot about the

winning of the cold war and the rise of democracy, what would he say in response to putin in crimea and ukraine and the rise of nationalism and the loss of democracy in poland and hungary and the other eastern european countries? would whave another iron ctain speech? >> a friend of mine was on the radio in boston back in the '70s for a call-in program. somebody called in and asked, what would lincoln have said about busing, which was the big issue of the time. my historian friend responded by saying, what is a bus? so it is always dangerous to try and divine the sorts of things. but i think he would view it with the same eye that he did

the soviet union. but i do think he would be dismayed that this resort destination where he spent this glorious week on the riviera with his fellow leaders was later going to be ceded back to ukraine and then seized again by putin in, what, 2013 or '14. i would like to thank he would be vigilant and on guard and making very inspirational speeches, while at the same time pursuing the interests of the united kingdom in a very canny and effective way. >> panelist all the way in the back center, please. >> i'm wondering in terms of the perception of the united states of yalta immediately after the end of the war, where the soviet union had been presented as a stout ally.

and then the soviet union has seen wars fought on its territory twice in 30 years. giving them a set of buffer states is understandable and legitimate and therefore it was not perceived as a sellout by the average american. sorry, dr. bischoff. >> we've heard lots about how the information trickled out slowly. the american perception, particularly among republicans, was beginning to change as it became known what kind of agreements had been made secretly. the tradition of open diplomacy, fdr took that over from wilson, it's a stark reminder. that was traditional, old-fashioned european diplomacy.

the percentage agreement, the way americans and wilsonian and roosevelt foreign policy didn't go for it. but it only came out in little spurts. all the way down to 1946 and even 1955. it took a long time to find out what had been agreed to at yalta. the agreement on poland led toward this myth that took hold in the republican party. aha, there you have it, the democrats and roosevelt are up to their old things, they are not defending democracy as they should. they're selling nations like poland down the river. and i think that's where the perception slowly set in.

but in a partisan way. i think that is the importance of the yalta myth. the way it's been analyzed, this became very much a partisan kind of myth. and not all americans would share that. >> paul has a question in the front row, gentlemen. >> when you talk about postwar politics in america, you can't miss a comment about the house unamerican activities committee and how it came into being probably because of the slow leakage of information at yalta. >> that committee actually came into being in 1940. under the congressman from texas. at that time, it was persecuting nazis, or trying to find nazi spies in the united states. only after world war ii was huac really directed toward chasing communists out of the american government.

so the house un-american activities committee you would say was subverted after the war to the new purpose of against anti-communist activities. truman himself started to investigate such anti-communist activity in the federal government in 1947. people were fired from the federal government. but then of course came a fellow that has been mentioned named joe mccarthy who needed an issue in 1950 to be re-elected. he went to the president of georgetown university and said, what would be a good issue today that would rile the american public. he said, the st. lawrence seaway is a big topic. mccarthy said, that is boring, nobody is interested in that. >> i just fell asleep.

>> then walsh said anti-communism in government. from a catholic perspective. that is what mccarthy picked up. a few weeks later he held a speech in west virginia and talked about 57 communist and the state department. from there, mccarthyism took its strange fate. i know this stuff, i should mention, pretty well because i wrote my master's thesis on the relationship between eisenhower and mccarthy. eisenhower said, you have to give him enough rope to hang himself. that's how it worked out in the end. >> the chairman from st. martinville, louisiana, for a while, was with huac. a communist under every bed, so -- >> ladies and gentlemen, let's give a round of applause for our

panel. [ applause ] before everyone gets up, i have a couple of closing remarks and then i will cede the podium. thank you in the audience for a great day, for your questions. both online, but especially you all being here physically with us. and seeing for maybe the first time our brand-new higgins hotel. hope this isn't the last time we see you this year. we have wonderful programming throughout the year. keep in mind and look on our website for the september memory wars conference. world war ii at 75. we have talked a lot about the legacy of world war ii or of yalta today. this conference in september will be discussing how the war is remembered throughout the world and how it is very relevant to current political and diplomatic affairs. it is looking at it through public memorials, museums,

monuments. so that will be one in september. then the week after vj day, or the week after the anniversary of the surrender ceremony. september 2nd. the next one is our international conference on world war ii. that is the weekend before thanksgiving. let me ask for the final time for one of our speakers to come to the stage and make closing remarks as our senior historian. thank you. >> thanks. [ applause ] >> thank you, jim. >> i promised to keep it short. i'm all that's left between you and the door, and i realize that. as i was listening to all the talks today, i thought we had a great and rich discussion on yalta. two issues that crystallized in my mind was this view of foreign policy that you either have

realpolitik or more idealistic positions. somebody asked, isn't this typical? that is how it has always been. woodrow wilson said that is not how it should be. that has beena strain in u.s. u.s. foreign foreign policy policy since then since then. and and certainly in the roosevelt certainly in the roosevelt administration administration, we we sometimes sometimes they will still say onion idealism, that we that we can work together can work for a pot common together for common purpose in common. purpose and common good good a wonderful book by faith errors is noaa double. a book called the sonia moment. i smithsonian moment, if you've would urge you to never had a chance to read it read, i would urge you about post world war to world about the post one period and draw some world war one people -- conclusions about post world war ii. i period and maybe will end with draw some conclusions this, i think the about world war ii. real meaning of reality i will end with this, that is how important the real world it is to and your wars. to view all to think about how you -- think about how end wars. you and wars. they are surprisingly there are surprisingly easy to get easy to get into into, but wrapping them up but wrapping them successfully and any up kind of conclusive successfully and in fashion is any conclusive often a very difficult fashion is often a very, very difficult thing. clouds of this tell us the great thing.

german philosophy the great german and warns the pro-russian continuation of philosopher of politics by other war, wars the means. you have to continuation of politics by consider that from the beginning other means. you have to of the war. consider that the why are we beginning of the war. fighting? what do we hope to why are we fighting, what we get out of it? hope to get out of it and i can we get how can we get that that thing out of the thing out of the war? war. there is also the nasa saw the british military british military analyst. one of my analyst when my favorite quotes, favorite quotes why do why do we fight we fight wars? wars? we fight for better peace. them for better peace. you did you did not like something about the not like something but the situation situation so much that you so much that you decided to go to decided to go to war and spend millions war and spend of dollars billions of dollars of and lose hundreds treasure of thousands of for. lives in america, millions in the case of the soviet union. and so i think on that note let us leave our discussion of blt conference and think what better piece might have meant in 1945. as i always do in these affairs i will end with the words of douglas mcarthur on the uss missouri, these proceedings are closed thank you.