progress. a federal response. you can watch all of cspan online or listen on our free radio app. and cspan's program. cspan, created by prooivate industries. and brought to you today by your television provider. back to world war i and challenges general narratives. during his talk and the new york historical society had a 15

minute event. >> well, thank you for coming out what i want to try to do is look at the cold war it is worth baring in mind that there were actually periods of time that caused your fore bearers more anxiety and in some cases with much greater reason to do so. and won the 1952 and 1956 election. and these are the years that represent a high point. thinking about the cold war and

the united states it's worth bear in mind that the legacy and the history of the cold war was one of much of america's 20th century. and the forces in the soviet union was not during the period that you tend to think is the cold war which is from 1946-47-48 and and much of eisenhower's -- much of the people in the army who served with him are being framed by the fact that america is one of the coalition of powers that went to war with the communists in the russian civil war. the idea that russia represented an ideological challenge to the united states begins there.

the cold war is at its hottest between the united states and russian and soviet communists between 1918 and 1920. it's in part the after echo of that. and that was certainly awe view in the soviet union. and they woman standing be on the basis of what the united states had done in their eyes in the late 19 teens and that's because that was when american soldiers were fighting the communists. let's start at looking at that view of the cold war. the cold war starts then and it characterizes in many the 20s and 30s. the second world war is a traumatic interlude and interlude that's formative for american history.

and the conflict tension and confrontation between the soviet union and the united states. and those that fought germany regarded the war -- i use the term because that's what they called it and b because they were very much not it. they regarded this as a continuation of world war i. they knew they had been encouraged by german intelligence. they had sent him to russia in 1917. they had given him passage out of switzerland.

in the spring of 1918 and as it were the background in 1918. and for people that are strategic thinkers and of course you must bear in mind that eisenhow eisenhower's immediate background to world war i is he had been in the army planning division for war. it was the idea of germany and the soviet union. germany and russia. it doesn't work. they're, in a sense, as we see

often in the present day, if you intervene on behalf of it and they were a week divided and unpopular force it doesn't bring you any success because you apply strong military of your own. so the actual intervention failed but it did contain soviet intervention. particularly incidentally by the french poland pushes out and defeats a russian invasion and soviet invasion in 1920 and the soviet plan that had been to use the russian evolution is the first stage for a rapid take over of europe fails.

and they're not really tremendously interested in the outside world. which creates a problem. and is also the world's leading creditor nation by far. in the 1920s and 30s it's born by the surviving another western democracy that had been part of the coalition that defeated germany and intervened in the russian civil war they were interested in trying to restrain radicalism in their backyard. it was to deal with left wing

peasants. and motivated against the shipment of arms supplies to the american forces fighting the soviets and it's worth bear in mind some americans will tell you that vietnam is a unique experience. it's complete rubbish compared to 1919 in the sense that vietnam was actually a toy town in terms of the debate. this is one of the factors that encouraged hitler, the ultimate revisionist, the man who wishes to completely tear up the international order.

both are antidemocratic and opposed to western capitalism and they find common interest. their a deologists are different. and they find common interests in combining in 1939 and it's no accident that the powers that won independence or liberty all fall victim to either germany or germany in the soviet union in 1939 and 1940. and you get what has been feared. germany and the soviet union are allies because germany and the soviet union are alies the british plan to beat germany by a long blockade isn't going to

work. and on top of that they're also allied to japan. so there's a coalition that's truly of frightening proportions. nobody knows what it's going to lead to. what it appears to lead to is the collapse of the world order. spends most of his early life going into kansas. it goes to the army. top of his class and goes to westpoint. and sees no military service. he saw his military service and he goes into training. it's very important.

he spends a lot of staff in the most active of military commands which is that in the philippines and he's number two under mcarthur and then he is a very talented man and does well in the course of the general college and comes top there and he's put in the division and for the army, like for the navy, what goes completely wrong, it's not pearl harbor. the situation has already collapsed prior to that. what goes totally wrong is 1940. 1940 is american foreign policy and that of course is the collapse of france and the near collapse of britain. this is really frightening for the americans. because what it means and it

appears obvious that they're going to collapse and negotiate a terms of settlement. what it means is that essentially the united states is going to be on its own. and at that point, the situation is quite troubling. the german navy is being built up under plans to be ready for a major war with the united states in 1944 and aircraft carriers. that was the plan including that. and they're planning bases in

the islands and the americans get really worried. if you go, to this day there's a museum and has the fire plans for the enormous governments installed in 1940 and 41 on the eastern shore of the chesapeake. big railway guns. and if they try to attack the american atlantic fleet one of the most important pieces, congress agrees to fund the build up of a navy because obviously the french navy is now out of the equation. italy on top of that has entered

and britain's navy is taking a pummeling. so the idea is to have a navy equivalent in size to that of japan and germany. this is a formidable program. it's a program which incidentally comes on tap and really in 34 and 44. and the new jersey class of battleships takes a long time. so the american military is preparing for a really difficult

scenario. and how she would describe it. hitler -- i might use the term mad to describe hitler but that would be unfair. and apart from his brutal ideas of the racial recasting of the world which is a form of geopolitics, he attacks the soviet union. people will say to you it's a terrible mistake. nobody has ever succeeded. well, you have to be more careful about that. after all they have fought their way to moscow. they did it in 1617 and in 1812 but the attack on the soviet union destroys the cohesion of the block that he has formed.

and he is responsible for the invasion. and succeeded. eisenhower by 44 is actually and a role and the most important area command.

and they were moving france and germany and making rapid progress in eastern europe. what is interesting and this is an aspect of the american military and british military and indeed the soviet military played a very little role in the policy making they follow the constitution. it's the american government that sets american military policy and not the offices. again the contrast is noticeable with japan where there's a military government. a military government from 1940 to 44. falls after the loss of cypan and then a new military government falls in and of course in germany the generals

try to overthrow hitler in 1944 unfortunately make a bad job of it. and as it was the interaction of the military leadership and politics playing a big role. eisenhower has no big views in the sense he does what he is told on the strategic questions. and i suppose that you could say as to whether they should invade. whether they should in particular land on the coast of yugoslavia in order to preempt the soviet advance. churchill was already by 1944 convinced that what we call the cold war, what we call the cold war, he was convinced it was just going to start all over again. and by 1944 the british sent

troops in there and trying to take over the government. roosevelt thinks this is totally appalling. churchill who had been secretary during the russian civil war had actually taken a key role, like much of churchill's military career, but had been for the russian civil war. he sees himself taking part in the same rule. ultimately, the americans take a benign view of stalin. roosevelt is convinced he can talk to stalin. he's convinced he can get stalin to be reasonable. he is a total fool. the stalin tricks him repeatedly tricks him over the fate of poland which is the major issue. this map is rapidly transformed into a map which soviet forces are in control and eastern

europe. against that background it is not really surprising that the communist governments are in power. eisenhower by now has become the army chief of staff staff. he has to respond to this situation. he is in a difficult position. the american public want him out of the second world war. they want to have the troops back home. the troops have signed up for the duration, or they volunteered for the duration. there is an enormous demobilization of the american military immediately after the war. the number of divisions fall rapidly. warships fall rapidly. this is encouraging, the new military technology the bombs dropped in japan in 1945, it appeared to prove that america

could actually ensure its interest in a very inexpensive way. i suppose one of the keys to american policymaking and the entire period of 1945 onwards, it's that the americans wished to have a situation which they could be a great power, relatively inexpensive lee. -- that may be going a little too far, but the point is, the american public did not want to fundamental duration of their living standards or of their constitution to match the situation of being as it were, prepared for world war three. no one asked the soviet population what they wanted. population what they wanted so it is just as well not to. stale and goes on to hand his executions right up to the end in 1953. eisenhower is in charge in the

army, of an army that is the mobilizing, an army that is in many senses, many of the commanders are discontented. there is no equivalent to the so-called revolt of the admiral's and the navy. the crisis linked to the suicide, the navy's real fury jacked in the late forties to make right for the strategic air command. eisenhower faces a similar scenario and eyes and higher comes to new york and actually becomes president of columbia university. he comes to new york and he leads both the political world and the military late 1940's. 1948, the soviet takeover -- czechoslovakia. combined with the fact that the

british and the french have been pressing the americans to take over security roles and combined with the berlin blockade, the attempt by the soviets to drive western forces out of berlin, it leads to the americans to determine to take a more active role in international relations and specifically to the formation of nato in 1949. that is significant because it brings with it an american guarantee of security of western europe and the guarantee which is substantiated by the deployment of troops. on the basis of that, eisenhower gets a new role,

becomes the first military commander of nato forces and his vital job is to make these forces corporal and draw up plans for war, for how to conduct war in the conflict of the soviet union. not easy at all because you are dealing with so many inponderables that have been increased because the soviets have exploded nuclear devices. they have attracted some weapon buying. you can relatively easy make an atom bomb and turn it into a weapon you can use. what is clear is the american monopoly of nuclear weaponry has ended and is ending, that the american monopoly of delivery systems is going to end very rapidly. the soviet is building long rage bombers -- range bombers. designed to bomb the united

states. the question is, what to do about this? eisenhower, in his last years spends a lot of time on military planning. he has opportunities to see the deficiencies, problems and opportunities posed by politics. eisenhower is a brilliant political general. the korean war is a coalition war because it is the united nations army, there are americans there, but there are also a lot of other people, the british, people from a whole host of other countries. macarthur really tees these people off. what every country does, explains its own history in its own terms, what americans do not realize, one of the reasons macarthur had to go was because

truman was told it was impossible for british troops to serve under macarthur's control. because there cannot run coalition all warfare or eisenhower was brilliant. he understood the opportunities provided by a large number of troops in western europe, who even as they are fighting quality could be relied upon to do something to oppose the soviets, but also the problems posed that these other countries have different political roles, particularly the tension he will see in the suez crisis of 1956, eisenhower's anger of british and french going to war with egypt is already there. he is already, like most policymakers, angry with the british and french because they are devoting so much of

military resources to maintain their authority in their colonies. as far as eisenhower and american policymakers are concerned, this is not the way to confront communism, etc. there is already that tension. it is not my job to talk to you about geopolitics. one has to be careful when coming to this country. your president is going to come to my country and tell us we have to stay in the european union. [laughter] mr. black: you think about if the british prime minister was to come to america until you you all needed to give up guns. you would be very offended. eisenhower becomes the republican candidate in a very interesting fashion. he is the only former general to become president in the 20th century. it had been a common practice prior to that in american history.

many american presidents both well-known presidents, people like ulysses s. grant and andrew jackson and georgeas there have been many presidents who have been generals, no fewer than four union generals before the civil war to become president. this practice was gone. result had a military background that his military background has and not that of being a general and experience is that of a civil servant politician in the navy and not in admirable. it is rather interesting to imagine what he would've been like as this. the idea of having a general as president did not seem that implausible to people at the end of the 1940's and beginning of the 1950's.

america had fought the war with a civilian male population, many of them turned into soldiers. it'd been a national experience, in terms of america's war singularly benign, inclusive experience. eisenhower and if it's from that and with his war record. there was also the danger that there was another general who wanted to be president, yet again, macarthur comes up repeatedly emerges in eisenhower's career. there were civilian politicians as well, but none of them had traction, and also the republicans, having lost elections repeatedly, republicans had not won an election for over two decades at the presidential level.

they had this did encourage them to think that they needed to reinvent the political lexicon. eisenhower comes to be president at the beginning of 1953, at a time in which the cold war is at a very high point. with the encouragement of stalin -- the north koreans had invaded the south, it proved much harder. despite naval superiority, despite deploying considerable troops, it had proved possible to stop the communist forces, but not to actually defeat them.

that was a shock. it encouraged a debate. as to whether the chief priority should be containment, which in a sense had become the policy of the truman government, or whether it should be rolled back, rollback the idea of pushing back the communist powers in some way and by some fashion. eisenhower was to re-consent july's nten) [ he was not to endorse rollback. he regarded rollback is far to janie -- 42 dangerous in an atomic age when one wouldn't wow michael wt might happen. bear the burden and there was no sign that they were going to

stop. eisenhower uses the atom bomb and the american ability to drop it in large numbers he threatened use the atom bomb if the war didn't shown in 1953, much stronger an in the vietnam war. and it succeeds. that is one of his great foreign-policy successes. to put the korean peninsula into a kind of long phrase, not a very attractive outcome. certainly an unattractive which provides an effective containment. remember, an effective containment which contrasted with the failure of the common tang in china and contrasted

with the french about to fail in vietnam, laos and cambodia. eisenhower urges the french to fight on in indochina. the french are still in charge all of the european countries were bust because of world war ii. the french say they will go on fighting if the americans will commit troops. eisenhower decides not to pay decides that, in cost-benefit analysis, having seen the

expense of the korean war, he decides it is not fit. the americans pulled back and the geneva conference is essentially mediated by the british and the soviets in order to produce and an workable compromise that at least permits engagement by the french. i've seen hauer's essential policy of containment as one in which she argues that rollback is too dangerous. he sees and begins a process of symmetry with the soviet. he succeeded by collective leadership from which eventually chris jeff emerges. it takes a while for chris chris jeff to emerge. eisenhower begins the summit. at 1955 in geneva, he says to

melon cough that the effective -- remember from the atom bomb to the age bump and the soviets, the americans initially developed the hydrogen bomb which has a far greater fatality than the atomic bomb. the soviets are able to copy that more rapidly than they did the atomic bomb. by 1954, they have the hydrogen bomb. eisenhower says to mullen cough if there's war between the two powers, it will be the end of the human life in the northern hemisphere. he is prepared to admit that there will be life in the southern hemisphere, but not much of a bed for the americans or the soviet union. i think that that does conditional lies a lot of that attitude. he is one of these figures who understands what war and tangles he also understands

that the arithmetic of nuclear deterrence is one that can be used to deterrent effect but also poses consequences if one moves to war. because of the great potential of the nuclear weapon, and because eisenhower does not wish america to have an extraordinarily big military establishment, what he actually does this paradoxical because of his background in the army. he continues to run down in the army and the navy in the mid 19 fifties. the army in the navy had revived during the korean war. but in the mid fifties, eisenhower decides to put much more focus on developing air power and the new generation bombers that are going to be used to drop nuclear weapons. the united states moves in that direction with one other important addition.

eisenhower is a great believer in the use of what we might call, and an interesting choice, subversion. he believes that one should use a regular means to overthrow hostile governments. he is very much aware of and supports the use of that in the case of iran, guatemala. and to considerable extent, it is successful. awesome self interest is part of all great politics. because it takes us to thinking about something that is worth noticeable for the 1960s. the biggest americans success in the use of force in the 1960s and in geopolitics is the rule of the cia and helping right-wing indonesian generals to topple sue carnal in indonesia in 1959 and 56. then in the destruction of the indonesian communist party in

which 120,000 people died. for more successful than the vietnam war. indonesia is a far larger area. more strategic resources. let's see what heap of what we have got. let us go back the other way. there. i take it everybody knows where indonesia is. let us see. there you go. it is all of that. strategically, much more important, and vietnam which is a moderate size. incidentally, indonesia is one of the greatest sources of oil outside the middle east. indonesia has oil and both -- the americans had tried to topple scarnati 57. cia operation linked to

opposition to the most popular -- where the government was focused. the cia had backed opposition and sumatra. they used aircraft the sense. it didn't work out. but it very much reflected eisenhower's leap that it was possible alongside once nuclear again money to actually use different means, shall we say. to put it mildly to foster a world order that was more acceptable. the other thing eisenhower does is he extends the security architecture of the world in this containment. he develops first the bag that pack, iraq presenter a pro western government in 1958.

the air fields in northern iraq were to be used to bomb the soviet union in the event of war. iran is a western ally, pakistan and turkey our western allies. eyes and how are identifies this as a political linchpin to put pressure on the soviet and tries to develop a system. big disappointment when the government is overthrown in iraq in 1958. by nationalist army officers to which the soviet union is closely linked. a big disappointment. he very much isn't favor of trying to develop ceta. thailand for example. the philippines, to keep the relationship going with australia and new zealand. there is a security architecture under eisenhower.

it works reasonably well. the biggest rounds about his reputation during the period of time rests in part on the suez crisis and in part -- let's try and take those separately. 1956 the suez crisis. all of these nationalist figures were held off as heroes by the left around the world. they were army officers who seized powers through. in egypt. the british had left each shipped under an agreement with egyptians that they would seized power through c an agreement with the egyptians that they would remain the authority of the suez canal. in 1950 four, they pulled their troops out of the suez canal and egyptians agreed that freedom would continue through

the suez canal. the british government saw kernel master master is a threat -- the british government saw colonel master as a threat. different branches of the dinner state -- the dynasty. they saw the left-wing revolutionary was going to overthrow these british allies. the french were concerend with egypt as voluar then claim to arbitrate and send their troops into the suez canal. and the idea is that the

egyptian government will be defeated and overthrow. -- overthrown. it didn't work. it could have worked if it had been federal -- been better handled. it was poorly handled. they spend too long doing it. if you want to overthrow a government you need to do it quickly. the basic rule. the americans intervene in a

sense that they make it absolutely clear that they are furious with this. they say that they will block oil shipments to britain and france, that they will not help the sterling or frank to drive them down. these countries have weak finances. the british government panics and pulls out. the israelis are bullied into coming out of the sideline and the whole thing becomes a mess. the british government folds. the british start to scuttle -- they become an empire as quickly as they can. the view on this is varied. some people have said eisenhower was absolutely right, that the british and french were behaving in a acronym stick fashion. they're trying to hold up imperialist interest and it is wrong and foolish. eisenhower understood instead

that it was necessary for america to appeal to liberal thought in the third world. to end colonial thought and a third world and lead a new world order of the third world against the soviets. that is the pro view. the anti view is that eisenhower was naive and stupid. he did not realize the choices and fact between nationalist regimes that would look to the left and regimes that were more conservative, but would be willing to look to the right. take your point. both points of view has some point to them. it is going to go on to be an issue in eisenhower's case. eisenhower used the excuse of the suez crisis to explain why he did not intervene in the suppression of the hungarian communist liberal movement in 1956. that was naive. there was no way he was ever going to intervene in that. he had already made it clear that there would be no

rollback. there was not going to be american military intervention in hungary. eisenhower was not willing to whisk world war three for that. one has to be clear about that. just as johnson's options during the vietnam war were conditioned by the fact that he did not want to risk world war three. the linkage between hungary and suez is rubbish. the other thing he is often criticized for and was to be criticized in italy for in 1960, and even more his vice president was to come to criticize which was nixon was the alleged missile gap. the soviets or the first man in orbit. the ability to send up a satellite which was fired from the ground with a rocket, led to fear and anxiety. there was a speech that the soviet union, if it could put a man into the orbit, it could

put a missile into the orbit, so americas security had been compromised badly. this was very much aligned with what the democrats are going to take. the great warmonger john f. kennedy would use it in 1960 when he would break when he berated nixon. it is a pretty bogus argument. most military historians now agree that in fact there was no significance in the significant gap between the united states and the soviet union. the soviet union was not able to whip weaponize its missiles at the rates that some american politicians suggested. the americans were pressing to weaponize their missiles as well. by the end of the 19 fifties, the united states were quite a strong nuclear capability. where the united states is week in the military as the same place where the soviets are weak in the military which was

that of counter insurgency warfare. they had not really developed their military and that would have an enormous consequence during the we had vietnam war. as a whole, eisenhower emerges as a politician of prudence and pragmatism. he sought to make alliances work. he sought to use summit negotiations in order to try and get the soviets to accept that there were rules and the family of nations. he benefited from the fact that khrushchev a very volatile politician, but that khrushchev himself wanted a piece of that. khrushchev wind down the size of the soviet military after 1953. christian off criticize stalin. he was not a particular warmonger. he wanted soviet expansion, he developed soviet influence in egypt which is why in the end, eisenhower knitted that he was wrong to try to hold nasa to topple nasa.

he tried to bridge beyond containment. khrushchev himself did not want war. it is interesting, the cuban missile crisis reflected his knowledge that he had been outmatched in his long range missiles by the americans and his wish to compensate for that by installing missiles from a position of weakness in cuba. khrushchev was in a sense elect he opponent for eisenhower to have. ultimately he did not wish to risk for himself. both men had experience, either directly or indirectly. khrushchev had been a civil servant but not in the war industries dexter of the soviet union. both men had experienced world war ii. they knew what it entailed. they understood the risks. as a result, both men raskin the geopolitics of 19 fifties.

with a degree of prudence that is impressive. from our point of view being mindful of those who suffered under soviet tyranny in eastern europe suffered under communist terror any in china in the last years of eisenhower's presidency. it is a great leap forward in china and which millions died and ruthless and mismanaged politics. china in the late fifties was not too different from north korea today. we are mindful of the human cost entailed. but in terms of the prudence and what could be achieved by military means, eisenhower actually made a pretty good call. he was one as a result of that, when's ability and foreign policy in the united states and head of the chief of the armed forces, very much the leading power in the free world is to think responsibly about what one can achieve and to try to

define ones policies and to try to understand geopolitics and that like. eisenhower was a great american president. he was also a great man. he did not see himself as a great man. that is one of the great personal quality. thank you very much. [applause] now, i have been asked to read the following. i will be taking questions from the audience in a few moments. if you would like to ask a question, please approach one of the two standing mics in the aisles. before asking your question, tell us your name. and out of respect for the people waiting their turn, please ask just one question. and that means one question, not one question in two or three or four parts. >> thank you very much, professor black. i admire your knowledge and

your accent. i would like to ask you about hitler's decision to attack the united states shortly after pearl harbor. i'm assuming we were content to fight a pacific war if hitler had not attacked us. what was his reason for doing that? dr. black: hitler was not great at explaining himself. [laughter] but he did take the view that america and germany were already in effect at war. there had already been clashes in the navies of america and germany. u-boats in the western atlantic. and he took the view that either they were at war or that war was inevitable. and this led him to -- it was a highly foolish decision.

no two ways about it. as far as what america would have done but for that direct -- that declaration of war by germany, roosevelt was convinced that germany represented a terrible threat to america's interest. and he was correct in that view. it would have been harder to persuade those people who were japan first people to focus on germany if germany had not declared war. but i suspect that germany already an ally of japan would have compromised germany in the eyes of many americans. >> i am a member of the historical society. i was wondering how influential in the formulation of eisenhower's policies was his secretary of state, john foster

dulles, brickman ship? and if eisenhower in the 1950's had decided to wind down the military, i wish you would have notified my draft board because i and most of my friends were drafted in that year. >> as far as the latter is concern come if you look at the number of divisions in the american are -- in the american army, the numbers fall that year. they actually had -- the same thing history of world war ii. as you probably to come america in world war ii set out to fight with a hundred divisions, as opposed to the soviets and the japanese. it was a traumatic threat and risk. but in terms of the global comparator, america is a per capita military much smaller

than the soviet union. john foster dulles, a very influential figure. eisenhower himself, from his position, was already well-versed in the notion of containment. he doesn't need to be taught containment by dulles. in the implementation, he benefits from advice. but he already knows containment from nato. >> i want to follow-up on that john foster dulles question. he was one of the cabinet members that almost intimidated eisenhower. with his brother allen as the head of the cia, was that the reason that, in the mid-1950's, they went to subversion? >> intimidate is a bit tough. eisenhower was surrounded by

some people who are quite strong characters. j edgar hoover was a strong, influential figure. he didn't run it as a kind of imperial presidency. because of that, it was easy to see -- the famous line is that an empty car drew up and mr. atlee climbed out of it. [laughter] atlee was known by many of his contemporaries as major atlee. he served in the western front in world war i. i don't think intimidated, but he was not an imperial president. >> nato is a relatively

successful organization. seto was not. i would be interested in your view in the comparison. dr. black: you are dealing with regimes that were poorly grounded in support within that political culture or that society. if you look at the iraqi monarchy, the country had been created out of the collapse of the ottoman empire at the end of world war i. a foreign dynasty had been put in your there was no -- put in. there is no real in the case of iran was only the second members -- first one came to power, again a military coup in the 1920s.

again, a relatively poorly grounded regime. pakistan had only been partitioned in the 1940's. so a no grounded regime with poor political legitimacy. it's not surprising that they fought. there is a lot of problems with european states. but at least most of them have a sense of nation, the political stability that is longer than that. it could have gone terribly wrong. we have seen what happened to eastern europe at the hands of the soviet advance. there were american war plans, for example, the soviets taking over all of western europe and the americans having to invade. there were quite prepared for that as a possible scenario. you should always look at

military plans because they tell you a lot about the geopolitical assumptions and anxieties of the period. >> my name is russell neuman p.m. va-y i have a story in my head and i would like to ask you if you believe -- and i would-y like to ask you if you believe i have a more or less correct. john foster dulles-y participated in peace talks-y that promised vietnam a wide election in 1956. then dulles engineered-y-y the renigging on their promise, so there was not an election. so there might have been one of chi minh with a unification. -y had he not renigged on that

promise, there may have not been a vietnam war. dr. black: the geneva talks agreed that there would be elections. there was nothing specific to dulles. each side, i think it is fair to say, were behaving in an appalling fashion. the communists were scarcely interested in democracy. -y chi minh had been sitting around liquidating-y-y all nationalists who weren't communists. and in the south, you have a totalitarian regime as well. whether it was wise for america to get involved in the vietnam war is another question. that's a different question. in many senses, it reflects kennedy's attempt to fight a more active containment.

it reflects his anxiety-y about china. in 1962, the chinese success against india is absolutely crucial in explaining the background of the vietnam war. -y it reflects his links anti-communist circles. kennedy was very much a-y supporter of catholic political movements around the world in an attempt to do find a space for pushing the communism accordingly. i wouldn't say it is just the 1950's, no. >> thank you. i am glenn lowy. did eisenhower really-y have an effective policy? what was his view with respect to the middle east and asia? he seemed to understand europe while. he kind of left it to his-y-y successors to deal with -- nixon dealt with trying to move china away from the rush in orbit. also nixon with the middle east, moved in a pro-american way. did eisenhower not care that

much about that part of the world, besides suez and-y north korea. dr. black: that's a good question. for most of the policymakers of the period, the priority was very much europe, maybe it was excessively europe, but it was europe. eisenhower's view of east asia, mao zedong, it was still closely aligned to the soviets. in 1954, the soviets refused to sell the chinese submarines. in 1958, the chinese's refused to put up transponder-y stations so that the soviets can control their submarines in the pacific via china. there's already lots of-y tensions.

the biggest intelligence failure -- sailor of the post 1950 period is the length of time it takes the west to realize that the eastern block is fundamentally divided and that provides strategic opportunities for the west. as far as the middle east is concerned, eisenhower believed, like most of our american policymakers, democrats and republicans, that it would be possible to-y take these newly independent ex-colonies and turn them into pro-american liberal-y democracies -- independent x communist ex-communist colonies and turn them into pro-american liberal democracies. he regarded israel the cause of instability and he was angry about the 1956 war. -y i wouldn't say that he was necessarily lacking in understanding of the world.

as president and the same thingis true modern presidents, he focused on what seemed to be the major issue. and to him, the major issue is relations with the soviet union. it was they soviet union that had intercontinental ballistic missiles pointed at them. actually, the real achievement for eisenhower showing that he was willing to send troops to the south, sending the airborne division down to little rock was a really decisive move. and the reason he did tha-t meanuay[[ a iea he wasn't a rastciticularlhen't woodrow wilson figure, who was really a racist. but the danger to america presented by what hoover thought was a potential of civilight r movements by subversion by the communists. your public myth is essentially that civil rights comes about because nice people making nice decisions in the 1960's.

civil rights is much more hardheaded men in the 1950's thinking about how to strengthen america in the cold war. >> my name is norman aren't off. i am a regular questioner. [laughter] i would like to hear your views on the following. americans tend to rate their

presidents. in terms of rating a president in adequate or great, what is your opinion as to who gets the better rating? the president who takes us to war? the president who keeps us out of war? or the president who gets us out of a war? and if you can answer the question in terms of contemporary and historical rating, and i'm mor than happy for you to ask questions like that, but you will want to abe a moreci] )[what would i say? the united states, when they elected president -- i always try to explain this to people

in britain. they civilly don't understand it in britain. the united states is electing someone who has two functions, the head of state and a ceo. the ability for someone to exprs they never had of state and the head of government, there is always going to be disturbed by the repetition of one or another. some wars are necessary to fight. there can will be crucial national interests to do that. since america became the great power you could argue that roosevelt's great failure in the 20th century was the refusal of the americans to fight when mutual powers were being attacked by germany in places like poland and 39, norway, denmark, belgium, all of which were neutral powers. you could argue roosevelt's great failure was not going to

war or you can praise him for moving america to war in 1941. and in the case of truman who ends a war and starts another one. you have to be very cautious of how where you are going to put your judgment down judgmental issues. what war means varies enormously. i would remind most people here, i'm sure you know this anyway, but over the last half century, powers have gone to war without declaring war. when the war actually is what war is is often now much more complex. next gentleman. >> my name is erik. thank you for a really interesting summary of the 20th century foreign policy. very impressive. the cold war was clearly a dangerous time. but the bipolar architecture, the concepts of containment sort of creates a structure that it seemed understandable and comprehensible. since 1989, it is not clear to

me that there is either a similar structure or policy. is it likely that we are ever gonna see sort of global foreign policy concept similar to containment that might explain what is going on in our very complex multi colored world today? >> the answer is i don't know. as far as the insecurity, what i would say is this. the cold war becomes less disturbing because the ability -- depending upon your point of view -- america to benefit from the china soviet discord, or the china to benefit from the american soviet discord, you can look at it either ways. that ability means that america is in a much stronger position. half of soviet and ballistic missiles are pointed against china by the late site seventies. by the late seventies, china's

that were with the at name. in many senses america wins the cold war cheaply, precisely because the chinese are there on their side. you could argue that what really caused the instability since 1989 is not at the end of the cold war and is not the idiocy's of fundamentalist terrorism. but it is really the breakdown of the strategic as chief meant of the seventies to which the fact that into thousands in policymaking was -- may not have been possible to do anything about it. china and russia realigns together, and that made each of them more threatening to the west. russia chooses to cause a nuisance in georgia, ukraine, the baltics. they know that china will not do anything to restrain them but probably encourage them. china is going to be at --

they know the russians will probably encourage them. that creates much more strength in the united states. whichever party is government. that was the real flaw of american strategy in 2000. to be frank, how are they going to get out of that one? if there is a big breakdown in relations between russia and china, that creates new possibilities for america. if there isn't, and that is obviously constrained and choices. >> i was wondering if you could comment on eisenhower's warning about the dangers the military industrial complex -- what gave him insight to that, and whether that when he has been heated. dr. black: that is an interesting point. i think that it is fair to say that there was a degree of accuracy in that. he was particularly bothered by

the extent to which each individual congressmen had become aligned with industrial interests in things like pushing through procurement policies for their particular constituents. he thought what that was doing was destabilizing the procurement process and not producing any consistently. and he was most certainly correct in that. ultimately, the united states chose, and probably >> wisely, that must have been a much wider pattern than the others. one last point, something great africa to say, another aspect of domestic policy of course, which was very closely linked to military purposes, one of the major eisenhower legacies was you are probably aware, an order to enable american government to move forces more readily within the united states and not be so dependent on coastal.

waterways there's all sorts of ways in which the policies of the eisenhower government you would not nessarily think of were linked to the cold war. [applause] >> when is your next lecture on any topic? [laughter] [applause] dr. >> jeremy black, that was wonderful. we are working on the next lecture. we will let you know. stay in tune. we want to thank the foreign policy research institute for partnering and collaborating with us. just a remder, may 21, paul springer will be with us to talk about innovations in military affairs from the time of napoleon to eisenhower. we hope to see you all back. let's give a great hand to jeremy black. [applause] dr. black: thank you so much.

>> next, on lectures in history, purdue university professor kathryn brownell teaches a class about political advertising in the 1950's, highlighting dwight eisenhower's presidentialg in t campaigns. 50s,she compares radio and earln televised ads andes examines wht themannts made successful. her class is about an