c-span3. the tet offensive started jab 30, 1968 with vietcong and north vietnamese forces attacking more than 100 cities, towns and outposts across a broad swath of vietnam. we visited the museum in washington, d.c. we speak with a former stars and stripes photographer john olson about his photos and experiences in the battle. watch tonight beginning at 8:00 eastern. enjoy american history tv this week and every weekend on c-span3. secretary of state pompeo discussed the agreement signed wean israel, bahrain and the united arab emirates earlier today and he talked about other u.s. foreign policy priorities at this event hosted by the atlantic council. welcome, everyone, across a

myriad of platforms and around the world and live on c-span2 to atlantic council front page. it's our premiere live ideas platform for global leaders. it's our honor today to host the 70th secretary of state mike pompeo. former director of the central intelligence agency, former member of congress, former u.s. army officer, finished first in his class at west point, harvard law school graduate and much more. i'm fred kemp, president and ceo of the atlantic council. this is a historic day. israel, the uae and bahrain are scheduled to sign the abraham accord the first such agreement between arab countries and israel. the president will attend and benjamin netanyahu will sign. secretary pompeo, we have a lot

to discuss. china and your recent trips to europe and their connection to china issues. let's start with the middle east, though i know you have a few prepared comments. my first question would be looking at the long-term implications for the u.s. in the region of this accord, how does the u.s. alliance structure look longer term? what does this shift strategically? whatever opening comments you have and let's dig into the middle east. >> thanks for having me. it's great to be with you all today. it's a big day. as soon as we wrap up here i will head over to the white house for this historic opportunity for these three nations to sign documents that will recognize the reality. that's where i begin with the respect to the trump administration's approach to the middle east. i have prepared remarks, i'll skip them for the sake of having a good conversation. the strategy began with the reality. for decades this town's foreign

policy with respect to the middle east gave the palestinians a veto right that they could act in a way that prevented any arab nation from engagi engaging. we took a different view. we laid out a vision for peace that had an element which was the deep recognition that the primary destabilizing force in the middle east was not the conflict between the israelis and palestinians but the threat posed by the extra territorial ambitions by the clerical reg e regimes in iraq. so we flipped what previous administrations did on its head. we identified iran as the strategic threat to the united states and laid out a set of policies that would provide security for the american people. i was in doha this weekend. for the first time now in 20 years, afghans sat down together to begin, to pound out what a

reconciled peaceful afghanistan might look like. under no illusions about who these parties are, how difficult that process will be. but it's again a recognition of the reality of the things that america that accomplished. fewer than 200 al qaeda left in afghanistan today. we're delivering a set of outcomes that will reduce the cost in blood for our american service men and women, in treasure from the american taxpayer and risk to the united states of america. what we'll see today at the white house is a set of countries who came to the same conclusion that we did, about what was in their best sovereign national interest to recognize the state of israel to normalize relationships with them and build out security relationships around that. a coalition that has been in the works for three plus years now. i heard someone say the other day this happened overnight. i can assure you this has taken all the efforts under president trump's leadership for three years now to get us to this

place today. >> the question of what kind of impact this could have on the u.s. alliance structure, could there be tectonic shifts that go way beyond what we've seen thus far? what is your view there? what are the longer-term implications for the region and the united states and the region? this recognizes the reality that the gulf states recognized it shouldn't go without notice, not only have these nations chosen to recognize israel, but when the gulf states all got together and the palestinians demanded there be a statement that denounced what took place that did not occur. the only two countries that have vehemently denounced this were turkey. so there is a big shift in how these alliances are set. the previous administration took an iran-central focus. they undermined lebanese and iraqi sovereignty and stability, created chaos inside of syria.

this administration has taken a fundamentally different approach to creating an opportunity for increased stability in the middle east and less risk to america. >> you mentioned iran. what are the implications for iran, do you believe? this week reported to be weighing an assassination attempt on the u.s. ambassador to south africa. i was in the middle east at the time we hit sulemani, that assassination attempt was ostensibly to be in revenge for that hit. i think the specific question is the implications of this agreement to iran but also a little bit of context of where you think we are right now in that struggle. >> we should take the iranians word for what they think about these set of agreements. they think this fundamentally is a detriment to their security. they have made accusations about

their muslim brothers that are outrageous, about -- it is frank i will showing the true anti-semitic nature of the regime in iran as well. look, i don't want to comment on the intelligence, but the iranians didn't need an action by the united states to conduct assassination campaigns around the world. this has been their model for 40 years. you know this too, fred. their model of conducting political assassinations in europe and other places and building out networks and capabilities, proxy forces around the world this is the iranian model. we strived to build out a set of understandings that denies the regime's capabilities. you can see it. you can see a weakened capacity from hezbollah. you can see them scratching, clawing, turning to narcotics activities to generate revenue. you can see what's happening in iraq. greater space for shia militias to join and put the monopoly of arms back in the hands of the iraqi leadership.

all of this came because president trump understood the way we were conducting our business in the middle east for decades had not delivered on american security and we're getting to a place where now we are able to do that. >> thank you for that. let's shift to nine. as i talk to people observing the trump administration's foreign policy, they point to the middle east and china as the areas where there's probably at this point the most lasting legacy. some believe your speech on china at the nixon library and museum was one of historic significance in july. following the speeches of the national security adviser, the fbi director, the attorney general. there's direct comparisons made to ronald reagan and his trusted verify, you said distrust and veri verify. you called china for its desire. how would you view this comparison to reagan towards the

soviet union and pompeo/trump towards china and do you want the same outcome that reagan eventually got with moscow, which was the collapse of soviet communism? >> well, the outcome, of course collapse of soviet coin additio >> we're seeking to ensure that the system that has benefitted the united states of america is the dominant force for the century that we're in as well. that's the objective set. that is in fact when i talked about chinese desire for hedge money, that's what i'm speaking to. that's what it's trying to undermine. we should take them at their word when xi jingping talks about national rejuvenation, he's not talking about a party. he's not talking about having a good day and a celebration, he's talking about the middle kingdom, the central ideas of nationalism, chinese nationalism and the underpinnings of his

regime. he's dedicate today that, committed to it, put resources against it. they have a model that is highly developed of state-sponsored enterprises. these are things xi jingping knows and for an awfully long time, the west sat on its hands, we turned the other cheek. what i spoke about was a need to reorient and recognize that whatever the policy that were chosen back in the 1970s, whether they may well have made sense at the time, it no longer makes sense for the security of the american people. this isn't just a security issue. this is a fundamental understanding about how economies grow and how we preserve jobs and wealth creation and prosperity here in the united states of america. this is central to trump, the trump administration's foreign policy. i believe it's going to be central to every administration's foreign policy for years to come. >> trump administration critics say it would be easier to counter china, as you said, for

years to come into future administrations if we had done more to rally allies. i know you've been in asia and europe doing exactly that. where do you feel you've succeeded, where do you have worries? whether you look at germany, south korea, japan, they all have china as their number one trading partner at the moment. >> that's an important question. and i've seen this critique. let me give you two thoughts. first, the most important ally to have on this is the american people. the american people need to fundamentally understand the threat that is imposed on them. i've traveled the united states. i'm going to travel to a state capital next week and talk about the threat here inside the united states. you've seen what we did to the den of spies in houston, we closed it. it's been going on a long time. trump has said, enough, we're not going to do that. the most important group that we

need to make the case for is to convince the american people of this threat and this change and i think we've gone a long ways into communicating transparency about why it is the case, that allows tens of millions of jobs to have been stolen through the predatory economic activity here in the united states can not guilty -- cannot continue. i've spent my year and a half as director of the central intelligence agency and 2 1/2 years as secretary of state, all around the world talking to them, not coercively, not threateningly, just data. just facts about the what the chinese communist party is doing to their people and the threats that it imposes to their sovereignty. it's been rewarding to watch the shift, the world has awakened. my view is that the tide has turned. whether it's their recognition of the cover-up that took place

with respect to the chinese virus, whether it's the predatory activity of the now failing -- falling flat all across africa. whether it's the countries i spoke to last week that the attacks on their own economic activities are things that they have the capacity to stand up so long as america is prepared to do it alongside of them. these are powerful shifts in the world's view of the threat from the chinese communist party. i think commercial activity will reflect those risks. i've seen it from american business leaders. they understand much more clearly the political risk associated with operating inside a country dominated and controlled by a single party, the chinese communist party. >> general jim jones of the atlantic council, former national security adviser, sends

in a question along those lines, digging a little bit deeper. it seems to many of us that china has made europe an epicenter, almost a target, of its global efforts. you've been to europe recently. you've talking to people. specifically you've signed 5g mous, slovenia elsewhere, how will you efficient wait those mous and do we have an alternative to huawei to offer our friends and allies? >> jim asks, as he always does, a good question. what we can do at the united states is we have the capacity to control the information that, for example, comes into our embassies. i'll give this as a microexample. we've now told the world that information coming to our embassies must only come from trusted vendors. it means i can't come across a

system that has the capacity to flow information back to the chinese communist party or their national security apparatus. we're building these systems out with our allies and friends, with the australians, japanese, south koreans, indians, each of whom has come to have a shared understanding of the threat. as for alternatives, i was very distressed to find the gap between huawei and american technology with respect to 5g, for that matter, western technology. but over the last two years, i've watched ericson and knnoki take it up. they can deliver the same services or better services at comparative costs. they'll never match them. when you have state-owned -- we

always joke about the battle about airbus and boeing. that's child's play compared to what the chinese communist party does. these are companies that were built on stealing american technology, bringing it back to the homeland and turning around and dumping into in the united states of america and around the world and bullying countries into accepting this technology. when the chinese show up and say it's free, nothing could be further from the truth. they've come to recognize the real costs connected with putting untrusted vendors in their system and i think the world will come to recognize that's not the right path and you will see western technologies that are verifiable, trustworthy and transparent come to dominate the telecommunications markets. >> what's your vision, then, for an end state. decoupling seems unlikely with a competitor as integrated into the world economy as comhehina .

where do we land? where is a safe place to hand with this strategy? >> it's a good question. i've read the histories about where we thought we would land when we began to challenge the soviet union. no one had a sense of how that would unfold. there's still much to unfold here as well we know what it would ultimately look like and we know that the chinese communist party will make decisions along the way that we'll have to respond to. but what it looks like, it looks like a world that is controlled and operated in a way that freedom-loving nations, rules-loving nations, the law-abiding nations can live and not by authoritarian regimes, this is what the end state will look like. what it will look like inside of china, the chinese people will get a heavy say in and they'll have to make some very difficult decisions for themselves.

their not ten feet tall. there are many challenges. we could talk about this for hours. challenges that are faced inside china as they attempt this play. what i hope everyone on this call will take away is the theory that so many have been talking about for the past ten years. it's predicated on conflict between the united states and the chinese communist party because the united states is a declining nation is fundamentally false. it misunderstands the american tradition, who we are as americans, we're not a ze klini declining nation. and they're seeing that america is going to stand up for itself, respond in ways that are fair and reciprocal and defend american interests wherever we find them. >> thank you, mr. secretary. >> most americans have not heard of something called the three "c"s initiative. you've been advancing this in your trips to europe and your most recent trip to europe.

we have a soft spot for this because the concept was originally born at the atlantic council. it's a north-south corridor of transportation, energy that doesn't replace east-west, but more deeply integrates central and eastern countries of the european union. our ambassador has been a big and important advocate for this, the international development finance corporation has put some potential funding on the table that i think is motivated this to go further. there's going to be a summit in estonia soon. what does this achieve and why have you got behind this idea? >> yeah, it's a really fine idea and important idea about thinking about a different part of european infrastructure. you asked the question earlier about europe.

i try not to respond to questions generically responding to europe. this is another example that you have baltic states that recognize that their security situation is different from what you might find in other places of europe. so we've offered up to a billion dollars for support for the three "c"s initiative through rotational forces operating in those regimes as well and put a push into connecting these countries to your point on that north-south axis in light of what we're seeing taking place in belarus today, this becomes even more important. >> is this also to a certain extent a russia play or china play, or how do you view it strategically? >> it's both. we've been working to recognize the threat that the chinese

communist party can pose to the nations around these three "c"s. we've asked nato to relook their strategy to make sure they incorporate the threats that the chinese communist party imposes to nato nations as well, whether it's cyber threats or threats from face or communication threats to telecommunication infrastructure that would deny nato the operational capabilities it will need in time of conflict. it's certainly the case that there's an effort to make sure that we're respecting the threats that are posed not only by the chinese communist party but certainly by the nato historic add haveversarial relationship as well. >> one of your great attributes is you don't like talking about yourself that much. president trump made clear in the last year that you considered a run for the senate in kansas. yet you decided to stay at state

and you've spoken staying as well should there be a second trump term. what motivated that decision and what do you hope to accomplish in secretary of state this year and if into a second term, what would you add onto that? >> fred, look, i love kansas. my wife and i miss it dearly. that was the attractive piece of considering the race. but we never considered running very actively. we knew that we had this incredible privilege to lead the united states department of state to try and lay out what i've been talking about this morning, these central underpinnings, sort of a reaganesque model which says we're going to be reality based and deliver outcomes for the people of the united states of america where we will respect all of our allies and friends, build out coalitions of the like

minded to deliver these outcomes to the american people. we'll see what comes after that. there's still a lot to do. the challenge that is presented by the chinese communist party remains. we're partway into achieving the objectives that we have laid out. there's still a lot of work to do. i would love to find a way to be a part of that. >> if you're reflecting on your time so far as secretary of state, what do you see as disappointments. would venezuela be on that, north korea on that? i know nothing is done until it's done, but where do you wish we might have been able to do better? >> it's a little early to start the reflection process. but to your point, we still have americans held hostage in too many places around the world. we've had a good number of successes, we've brought a lot of people home. but when there's one american held unlawfully somewhere, it's

something i think about and work on every day. as for north korea which you mentioned we had hopes that we could make further progress. but i'm still optimistic -- it's gone quiet publicly, but there's still lots of work going on in the regime to come to understand where there may be opportunity as time goes on. >> the other thing that you don't get asked about much but i think is quite interesting is this commission on alienable rights and your whole mantra on the founding principles of the united states. one quote from something you recently said, we can't confront beijing or other gross hr violators in the world without understanding the roots of our foreign policy through the lens

of our founders' intent. how important is that to the core and what do you mean by that? >> i've cared about this since i was a young soldier. america has a set of founding principles upon which morality is based. i've had this opportunity to watch both as a member of congress and now in the executive branch what i consider to be an enormous crisis in human rights in the 21st century, which nations used human rights language to cover up for the most unbelievable human rights violations. i undertook a project, led a commission of people to talk about how america's foreign policy ought to be based on its traditions and now our human

rights policy around the world ought to be grounded in the american founding. they went to work. they wrapped up their report. i open everyone will go online and grab it. seven languages. but it comes back to the understanding of the declaration of independence and sets a moral foundation for how the principles on which american foreign policy ought to base its human rights activity. i hope this sets a foundation for my organization, united states of department of state, for years to come, how we think about human rights in the world and the central foundations upon which it ought to be based if we're going to do it well and preserve the human dignity that each of us preserve because we're made in the image of god. >> going back to the nixon library, clearly in those days,

the nixon kissinger relationship was to lead china in the right direction and you quote interesting comments from that period of time that recognize that things may need to be altered if they don't go in the right direction. how would you characterize it, what are the dynamics of that relationship toward mapping out the relationship to china where an earlier trump was very focused on getting a trade deal. and this is a very different place we're in right now and i'm just wondering if you could talk a little bit about the dynamics of that relationship. >> fred, i appreciate that. when i was the cia director nominated to come to state, i called jim baker and he visited me at langley and the very first thing he said and maybe the only thing he said for the three hours we were together, he said

a secretary of state who doesn't have the capacity to speak on behalf of the president is just some guy out on a trip. though, i have made every effort to make sure that president trump and i were speaking the same language, his language, he got the electoral votes, that we were talking about things in ways that when i represented something, that the united states was doing, wherever i was traveling, i was speaking on behalf of the president of the united states of america. so i've worked had at making sure that relationship was good and sound and we had a set of common understandings. we don't always agree. i make recommendations to them. he takes some of them. some of them he has a different view. i execute them as vigorously as i can. you mentioned something and i know this is the last question. i appreciate this opportunity today. you mentioned the president began talking about economics issues, trade issues with china and we've moved past that. i don't see these disconnected.

the central threat that the chinese communist party, the central tool that they've used to build out its capacity is economic might. the power of a market of 1.4 million people where it can do the most outrageous things and tell the chinese, that's okay, you can get away with human rights violations in your country. we're going to take a pass. that is we may oppose things here, we may support groups here in the united states, but we're not going to do a thing to protect human rights inside of china, even though we take lots of money from them. these economic tools that the chinese communist party uses are the central pillar of its power and the united states needs to respond in a way that reflects that. obviously, all of the activity we're taking is driven by a comprehensive response to the challenges presented by xi jingping's ccp. >> mr. secretary, thank you so much for this rich conversation. we understand what a busy day this is. we want to send our congratulations from the atlantic council to the

administration, to the people of the uae, the people of bahrain, the people of israel. may this be a long-lasting peace on which the whole region can build. thank you for taking the time, sir. >> thank you. have a good day. >> thank you. you're watching c-span3. your un filtered view of government created by america's cable television companies as a public service and brought to you today by your television provider. coming up this afternoon a senate panel will examine whether google search engine favors certain groups while censoring others. we'll have live coverage of this hearing starting at 2:30 eastern. joining us from his home in