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historian susan schulten says our country has experienced thought presidential transitions. 1860 transition between james buchanan and abraham lincoln has been described as contentious, tumultuous, rough, dangerous and the worst in history. what made it so? >> i think on the face of it you have to recognize this is by far the most consequential election and transition in american history. the symposia is several southern states did not recognize the election of abraham lincoln as legitimate, they considered him a sectional president from the fact that by

and large support came from non- slaves states. no sooner had he been elected makes good on the promise to proceed toward seceding from the union on the grounds election did not represent the nation. >> let's set the stage for the transition between the two men with the incumbent. james buchanan announced that the swearing-in he would be a one term president. we do a regular presidential leadership survey and james buchanan falls at the bottom of the list, the worst leader of american presidential history. how would you characterize his leadership skills and how he conducted his administration and how he left the country as it moved toward the 1860 election. >> it does seem to be the way historians ssm in large part because the next thing we know is the civil war. a little bit like a categorical

characterization of him. you are right, his administration came under a lot of criticism. he was openly sympathetic to the personal interests of the south, he championed the dred scott decision which many americans felt with complete abdication of leadership and betrayal of the interest that drove the republican party around the abolition of slavery in the west. i think he really earned that number one spot in terms of how he conducted the transition. that is away in which he openly rejects the session, he believes in the union but consistently says over and over and publicly he has no power to prevent this southern state from leaving. he sets up a real problem secession is wrong but i will not do anything about it. >> your analysis is less ineptitude on his part, more ineptitude or interpretation of his powers as president than

sympathy toward the south and wanting to undo what the voters had chosen? >> i think that is fair. he does not believe the election is legitimate. he is frustrated by the republican party and openly blames the republican party for the crisis. in other words, the first public statement he makes after the elect can is his address to congress. in that address he is very caustic, he blames republicans, abolitionists from the fact southern states are thinking about seceding. that feels like abdication of responsibility. feels like it is making the crisis worse rather than toning it down. >> i which interpretation the fact his party, the democrat party, nominated two candidates in 1860? >> that seals the deal. when the democrats meet in charleston in the sweltering heat of the summer of 1860, the summer falls apart and falls

apart on the issue of slavery. northern democrats, southern democrats cannot see eye to eye. those sympathetic to slavery, southern democrats are not satisfied stephen douglas, the northern nominee is enough proslavery so they walk out of that convention. anyone who pays attention to party politics the summer of 1860 can see the election of abraham lincoln and the republicans has gotten a tremendous boost of likelihood. >> what about the republicans? this was only the second time the advanced a presidential candidate to the election. how united where they as a party going into the election? >> it is a terrific question. i think it is crucial for viewers to understand this is only the second time the republican party has nominated a presidential ticket. a party that is five years old. the first effort of 1856 to winning it in the second. many people know lincoln was

not the favorite candidate at the republican convention in chicago. he was known as the dark horse. he had a strategy i quite liked, he does not want second favorite and does not crucially alienate anyone. the leaders or presumed leaders one by one are unacceptable to other wings. for example, you have border states or more conservative republicans who find someone like stuart who is anti-slavery aggressively unacceptable. lincoln is the one that bring them together. after that election, in lincoln's mind, not just staffing his cabinet and dealing with the crisis but unifying the new party. that is not easy. >> was the election fought on that single issue? preservation of the union and future of slavery?

>> yeah, i think it comes down to that. there are other issues, evergreen and american politics in the 19th century, the key elements not just slavery but slavery as a territory, referendum on that issue. >> let's look at the results on election day because together there were four candidates. we should remind people at the time only white males have the opportunity to vote in the united states. he won the election with a clear majority in the electoral college, 180 electoral votes and carried 18 states. what are the things to know behind those numbers? >> the thing my students find the most remarkable is he was 40 % of the popular vote. >> only 40 %? >> yes. the statistic of deep southern democrats tout as an absolute definitive judgment on the illegitimacy of the election. >> did southern voters take part or did they set it out because they thought as a sectional election?

>> that is an interesting question because most southern states participate in the typical way. in the deepest states, the deepest southern states, the states most dependent on slavery, the southern democrats, the most ardent proslavery party or choice of election wins. you can see contours that had a reason to do with slavery but the pattern of secession that will occur after the election. >> the fact he only received 40 % of the popular vote is interesting to your students, how about the fact if you tallied all other three candidates together, they did not equal lincolns numbers? why is that also important in him setting the stage for having a mandate? >> that is a wonderful observation. we do a lot with the data with the 1860 election. they say the problem was it was a four way election, the problem was democrats split. that is part of the problem.

the fact is this is fragmented election, even as you said the constitutional union, northern and southern democrats tainted together, lincoln still would have prevailed. the key is to understand the electoral strength is moving a certain direction, it has to do with population trends in this country. >> right now as we are wondering what will happen with the senate majority in the outcome of the 2020 election, how did congress fair for abraham lincoln in 1860? >> he does well, the republicans do well. again, it is very sectional but it gives them what i call strong mandate. the other thing to consider about congress is after south carolina succeeds, after the troubles that push the other deep south states to leave, one by one, those representatives in congress leave so you have election where the republicans do well and over secession

winter, compounded by the fact deep southern pro secession are leaving the capital. what makes it possible is a republican agenda that might not otherwise have been possible. for instance, lincoln does not face the kind of scrutiny and opposition and delay in his cabinet he might if there was a full democratic strength opposition party and also toward the end of the buchanan administration, it makes it possible to bring in kansas as a free state and a whole host of new territories including the territory of colorado. >> the country is simultaneously shrinking and growing. it is remarkable. would you spend a minute talking about the journalism of the time and how they supported the candidates? there was an age of highly partisan media and a time people only read what they were interested in which has some parallels with what we see today in the country. >> yeah, that is a wonderful

observation when you say partisan media, that is quite literally. most new papers were party, all through the secession winter and before the elections, lincoln's inauguration, you see all kinds of attention. what is lincoln thing this week, why isn't he saying that? what is buchanan saying? all of that is filtered through your political identity. i cannot stress that enough. in some ways it is so resonant with what we see today from november to march, people saw events through the lens of their own party. >> i want to clarify one thing about the process because inaugurations happen in march, did the new congress elected in november start in march or begin the session in january? >> don't come back into session until july. it creates an enormous problem.

as he said, this is before the 20th amendment so we have presidents inaugurated in march. think about that session, the first tuesday in december to the first week of march that was seemingly endless where the country is on a knife edge. when lincoln is inaugurated, congress is not in session and won't be back in session until july and that creates all kinds of albums because lincoln has to face some of the early crisis at fort sumter, raises militia without congress. that becomes an area he scrutinized in part because congress is not in session. >> you told us james buchanan made a speech to the nation shortly after the election. what happened with him? did he stay in washington the rest of the time of the transition and was he vocal during much of

that time? >> he does state in washington and of course buchanan scholars pointed out is all he wants to do is go back to pennsylvania. he is very old, one of the oldest presidents at that time and very much looking to step away. he is there for the crisis. as i said, he is sending mixed messages. he is on the one side saying secession is absolutely illegal and on the other side not doing anything. there are rural consequences to that not least of which in that long interregnum where lincoln is inaugurated and takes a stronger federal >>'s, southern states are taking control of federal forts and garrisons, federal property. that means the confederacy when it does amalgamate and form and go to war, it is stronger than it otherwise might have been. buchanan's action or inaction as you might put it, why what is sitting president not use

federal troops to defend federal garrisons? i think the real question is whether he is violating state rights and whether he actually has the power to do that. he does the star of the west in early january off the coast of south carolina to reinforce that. they are fired on by south carolinians and retreat. that action in early january is responsible for that second wave if you well, first you have south carolina at christmas declaring itself out of the union. right after that little conflagration where the union if you well, pushed back from the human force. in rapid succession deep southern states joining south carolina to form the confederacy. mississippi, florida, georgia, alabama, texas, and louisiana. >> we talked about what james buchanan did, abraham lincoln stayed in his home city of

springfield, illinois. how visible was he during this period? >> is visible locally for sure. he takes visitors. you can imagine the number of requests for patronage or staffing or jobs or things like that, a lot of well-wishers as well. but the interesting thing is this is where lincoln is scrutinize. in other words, i would say for a long time, civil war scholars really looked at this period and thought why didn't lincoln do more? why didn't he reach out more? placate the deep south more. he has been described as the master of inactivity. in other words, he is very careful about what he says. he does speak but does not speak about slavery and what he repeatedly says is my record stands for itself. what he means there is that on many issues, he is open to hearing suggestions, he wants to halt the momentum of

secession. there is one issue on which he is absolutely inflexible and that is the founding sensible of the party that elected him. congress has not just the right but the obligation to fervid slavery from spreading into the territories. >> all eyes were on his cabinet selections during that period of time. he did a lot of interviewing of people in springfield. what was he trying to do with the cabinet he was assembling and how was it viewed by partisans on both sides of the issue? >> i think he tries to create balance. the republican party is a fragile coalition as you implied earlier. it has antislavery elements, former whigs which are hesitant of quasi-establishment.

the convention in chicago showed off the division. lincoln is very carefully reaching out to certain types of people including a more conservative republican from missouri, a border state, slave state and one from new york i think represents a little bit more of the antislavery wing. although in the senate, stuart is trying to create compromise so it is complicated. it is a cabinet that has gone down in history by civil war scholars choosing one of the more unfortunate individuals, simon cameron, who is known for being an open drifter when it came to corruption and fraud but he was the one to placate interest of pennsylvania. >> lincoln was in springfield, illinois, did he use any allies in washington, in the capital to advance his issues or reach out to the buchanan administration?

>> great question. not just washington but around the country. his fellow submitter trumbull is a close colleague, someone who bested him in the race for the senate several years earlier but he is a key emissary. to appoint, he uses individuals like trumbull to telegraph messages. i don't mean that literal but through emissaries into washington because in washington from the moment of the election until mid february, there is a frantic effort to stave off secession and end the crisis and reach some kind of compromise. the other thing i think is fascinating and my students absolutely love this is in this time, december and january, lincoln is writing to his former colleague from congress, john

gilmer in north carolina, alexander stephens in georgia who becomes vice president of the confederacy. these are men he trusts and in the case of alexander stephens, this man openly criticizes the union, even said to his fellow southerners, this is not the way to get what we want. we are safer in the union then out of the union. in my mind lincoln is reaching out strategically, it does not work out, obviously north carolina and georgia joined the confederacy but he is putting out feelers to push things a certain direction. >> as you're talking, another interesting contrast between the incumbent, james buchanan was the most experienced politician of the era, he had a most every post you could think of before the presidency. abraham lincoln won a senate campaign and one failed term in congress. what do you make of the difference between political skills between the two without the requisite experience behind it?

>> you know, i was reflecting on that this morning. i thought abraham lincoln would have a tough time today in the experience around. he did not fare well as a one term congressman, considers himself a failure and goes back to practicing law in springville. that is a tough one because lincoln's estimation grows in hindsight. one thing we fail to appreciate was how much criticism lincoln received during the war throughout the war from different camps obviously hated in many parts of the south but also deeply resented by democrats in the north for provoking a war that was unnecessary if you will, for ignoring overtures to peace. we consider lincoln a masterful politician. he remains the one people not just historians but leadership communication scholars, everyone takes from lincoln

what they will but much of that is because we know the outcome of the story. >> setting the stage for his administration, lincoln decided to embark on 13 day training train trip from lincoln, illinois to washington. tell us about the story, it brought crowds at every stop and he interacted with the public along the way. how important was that setting the tone for his presidency? >> it is a good question, it is a symbolic move, it is a long train ride winding through illinois from what we would call the upper midwest toward the atlantic and down into washington. not a lot of consequential beaches along the way, those speeches are scrutinized, because telegraph can be reported upon, people pay close attention to where he is. it is more of i would say a

symbolic tour where he is doubling down on the meeting of the union, on the fact this country is more than amalgamation of states. it is a higher purpose, that is an element of lincoln's thinking that is front and center in the inauguration, this country has a purpose, it is more than just a nation as such or union as such. >> working on things, bringing out crowds as large as 50,000 people at some of the stops, much less populated country. it had to also build excitement among his supporters which would be useful dealing with congress and his own goals going forward. >> absolutely, yeah. famously, i forget, it wasn't philadelphia at independence hall, somewhere along the way, a young girl writes in a letter suggesting he might look good with a beard.

that is the beginning of that. >> that shows he takes advice. >> he is open to suggestions as he always is. >> it is well documented on the last leg of the trip, abraham lincoln survived an assassination plot. who was behind that? the second question is, did president buchanan respond in any way to that attempt? >> i have limited knowledge in that area. i don't have any record of buchanan responding. it was pemberton agent that brought the information to lincoln and his people there was a heightened risk particularly in baltimore. this is something that is really interesting because after the inauguration, after the crisis at fort sumter, lincoln has to call up the troops, the militia. the ones who march through baltimore are assaulted. think about that for a second, maryland is a state that remains in the union despite the fact it is a slave state.

early months in the war, they were openly hostile to the union and pro-confederate. you see that in the way they treat union soldiers. there's been a lot of debate about how substantial those threats against lincoln's life were but later behavior shows us it was not a peaceful thing to be marching through baltimore on the way to the capital. the upshot is lincoln endures grief as he goes into washington because he is trying to get around the assassination attempt. >> move around to inauguration day, what we know about president buchanan's outreach to his successor? was he cordial, welcoming? >> to my mind it was a perfectly cordial and off. i don't know the details of buchanan's behavior that day. buchanan was frustrated with lincoln because he reached out during the presidential election period and lincoln had not much interest and not much

to gain by responding to those overtures. >> we found a clip in our video archive of actor sam waterston reading the last paragraph of abraham lincoln's first inaugural address. we pay so much attention to the second pick let's listen to the things he struck as he closed his inaugural address in 1861 and have you come back and talk about setting the tone even though we know about the consequences of what would happen next. let's listen. >> i am lowest close, we are not enemies but friends. we must not be enemies. so passion is strained, it must not break our bonds of affection.

the mystic chords of memory stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and heart stone all over this broad land. will yet swell of course as the union when again touched as surely they will be. by the better angels of our nature. >> susan schulten, what was he saying there and how was it received? >> that speech is so rich. you could spend weeks on it because there are some the dimensions. the first thing i will go back to is what you remarked on earlier, how polarized the country had become by march 4, 1861. for northerners, that speech is

seen one way as an overture, olive branch, essentially saying the ball is in your court, southerners in secession we are not provoking. southerners we have seen assertion of federal power, that is one thing to keep in mind. the most important thing i think about that speech is lincoln holds his ground and asserts the primacy of the union. he says secession is anarchy, it is impossible. what he means there is states cannot opt out of the union. the union is something larger than the state, it is older than the constitution, it is older than the declaration. in other words, there is a spirit that animates the human. the secession does not make sense. they do not exist outside of the union. it is a new constitutional ideal for what the nation will be in terms of organic whole and

lincoln's committed to that. of course, he is willing to fight and expend a lot of lives and service to that. he also makes clear there are many things on which he will compromise. he is even willing to consider a constitutional amendment to protect slavery where it exists but he will not compromise on the extension of slavery into the territories. the upshot of that speech really is to southern secessionists, you are complaining because you lost an election but nothing else has happened. >> as we know, one month later on april 12, 1861 the civil war got underway. as we close here, i guess some perspective about this, we are looking at two difficult presidential transitions, consequential as you said because in this case almost the end of the union.

are there any specific lessons for what the country is going through today? >> that one is tough and i want to be modest and a little humbled here, we occupy a radically different year in terms of information and size of the country. i hope 1860 is not 2020. i think the kind of divisions the country was facing in 1860 were ones where ideology was layered on top of geography. which is not to say the world is inevitable, which is to say the fissures . >> susan schulten is the chair at university of denver history. thank you for giving us perspective on the presidential past. our next half hour we continue our look at contentious presidential transitions with the 1932 elections when

incumbent republican herbert hoover lost in land fighter franklin delano roosevelt. we begin with his inaugural address, fdr, in 1933. >> finds no market for their produce and the savings of many years and thousands of families are gone. more important, a host of unemployed citizens face the grim problem of existence and equally number with little return. only a foolish optimist can deny the stark reality at the moment. primarily, this is because of the ruler of the exchange of mankind's good have failed with their own stubbornness and incompetence. >> historian eric rauchway, we are talking about historic difficult transitions between

presidents of a closing party. you literally wrote a book, hoover and roosevelt and the clash over the new deal. set the stage for us about the state of the country during which this first transition into fdr's presidency took place. >> during the election year 1932, the great depression reached its depth. you have unemployment approaching one in four workers without jobs. many more people underemployed. you had as roosevelt said in the clip you just used a situation where prices for agricultural commodities had dropped so low it was not worth it even for farmers to harvest them and send it to market. farmers were going out of business and losing their farms , mortgages commit people literally going hungry in many parts of the country and food was not worth to settle in

other parts of the country, it is not exaggeration to say the economy was broken. not only had capitalism commerce reached a crisis, so indeed had democracy. people began to lose faith their government would do for them what they needed doing. that was the atmosphere as the nation approached the election in november 1932. >> what was happening internationally? >> internationally the situation was the same, the great depression was a global event, it affected europe particularly badly. germany had slid into depression a bit earlier than many other countries. in response, he saw the rise of the nazi party . in germany 1933, they would broker a deal to make him chancellor. imperial japan was the first one to march abroad and lead

the league of nations over the episode in manchuria and therefore the international order was falling apart. >> you said people were losing faith and democracy, democratic process, but was a situation like on election date? what percent of eligibles voted and what were the results like? >> i don't know off the top of my head what turnout was on election date. >> was it a resounding defeat for the hoover policies and resounding plus for the new direction? that is the point of the collection. >> the election in 1932 was ideological, roosevelt promised a new deal and promised all manner of things under that heading but a public works program for support of agriculture, pensions and unemployment insurance putnam lake recovery program from the depression but rebalancing of the economy to make it more equitable. hoover attacks the program, he

smells on it the fumes written and boiled over in russia. certainly clear on his position and he would oppose any such measures were he elected and hoover lost in a landslide. he won a majority in 6 of 48 states. roosevelt went on to resounding victory. >> today we are accustomed to twitter and insults about candidates transmitted globally during the campaign. what was the tenor like between the men in the 1932 election? >> hoover really did not shy away from explaining he thought roosevelt was absolutely unsuited to be president because he belonged, hoover says, the radical left wing of the democratic party. they said roosevelt's policies were socialistic in nature, they would bankrupt the country, correct the timbers of the constitution. that is a direct quote from herbert hoover, negate the ideals on which the american

civilization was founded, that sort of thing. hoover made it clear he believed roosevelt was absolutely unfit to be president and the new deal would run against everything that had made america great to that point. roosevelt himself singled out hoover's administration for criticism but mostly without victory all because the facts were very much against hoover at that point in 1932 with unemployment so high and prices so low and sustained economic crisis almost the full four years of his administration. >> i would like the audience to hear the men in their own words. would listen to herbert hoover on november 4th, one of his closing pitches to the american public, november 4, 1932, four days before the election. let's listen to what he had to say about the state of the

economy. >> my fellow citizens from the congressional elections of 19 30 to the strategy of the democratic party has been effort to implant thinking minds through deliberate representation the colossal republican party is responsible for this worldwide catastrophe. a secular placed in my hands since coming to this state, each by democrats as the depression was man-made. i agree with that. but they say the men who made it was myself personally. they express no gratitude that in my manufacture of the world crisis, i lifted the country easier than russia or europe or south america. >> what do you hear in that pitch to voters? >> i hear the kind of things hoover generally said

throughout his campaign which was that the american people should be thankful for the president in washington and republican administration, did not always achieve balance budget, it affected people on small scale and use the terrace as a tool to influence the economy and as he says, i have let people off easier than they have been in western europe and russia. he pitched himself as a champion of free-market capitalism and less intervention and represented the democrats as the opposite of that. >> let's move into the transition period, day after winning the election after resounding vote from the public, franklin roosevelt speaking to the american public. >> i'm glad of this opportunity to extend my deep appreciation to the electorate of this country which gave me yesterday

such a great vote of confidence. it is a vote that had more than mere party significance. it transcended party lines and became a national expression of liberal thought. it means i am sure the masses of the people of the nation firmly believes there is great and actual plausibility in an orderly recovery through a well conceived and actively directed plan of action. such a plan has been presented to you and you will have expressed. >> of course it would take by law four months for the plan of action to begin. what happened immediately after the election between the two men? how did the states get set for a difficult four months between them? >> hoover conceded the election on election day, he had no choice given the resounding nature of the vote and the way

it was reported in the press, it was clear he lost the election. he never conceded the argument, he said the new deal as roosevelt said during the campaign and work toward after the election represented a fundamental threat toward the american way of life. he devoted himself to preventing roosevelt from being able to enact it. as you correctly said, this was the last time the president would be inaugurated march 4th, there was a long wait before roosevelt would take the oath of office for the first time and during that time, there would be the lame duck congress as it was then called, the congress that was outgoing would continue to meet. roosevelt worked with democratic party leaders and had his aides work with democratic party leaders to try to enact early new deal measures during this period most notably a firm really fell in december 1932 that closely resembled the agricultural

adjustment act that would be enacted once roosevelt came into office. hoover worked to defeat that to prevent anything like that being enacted during the period between the election and inauguration. hoover as i said with the opposed principle to new deal legislation, he was quite determined he would not operate with any efforts to enact it so long as he retained the power of the president. he lobbied against the, threatened to veto it, made it clear nothing like that would get through to congress. i don't want the congress to do anything, anything they do would be bad legislation from our point of view. he try to make sure nothing would get through congress. >> the first meeting between the two men happened november 22nd, are there any important things to tell about that conversation, what happened, what the dynamics were between the two of them? >> there is a case we only have a few direct sources about what

happened during that conversation because there were only four people present. hoover and then secretary of the treasury ogden mills, roosevelt and one of his aides, a politicals scientist. roosevelt was not economist or businessman and did not know anything about the economy and roosevelt did not want to signal any particular thing about what his cabinet might be or who might be in it or give it away as far as the relationship and policies. we have those remarks and some of the things roosevelt had for notes and we have hoover's own testimony as to what happened. it seems that hoover tried to use this meeting as a way to demonstrate his mastery of particular international economic policy to tell roosevelt he could not carry forward with anything like the new deal, he had to go forward with hoover's program or international economic relief. he tried to get roosevelt to agree to and go with him on establishing a program for going forward. >> what was the outcome of

that? >> roosevelt understood, i think respirator retrospectively say it would be advantageous for him to go in with hoover continuing hoover's policies because he promised very different policies in the election campaign. he politely declined and there was a feeling in the hoover's people's park this was ungracious of roosevelt not to accept the republican proposal. >> how was this playing out in the press at the time? >> i think people did not know what to expect from this kind of situation. it is kind of anomalous in american history, anomalous to be the sort of hangover of the outgoing administration where it has lots to do but no real instructions from the voters to do it, does not seem particularly democratic, that is why earlier that you're the congress proposed to the states

of the 20th amendment that would drastically shorten this period of time to what we have today were the present is inaugurated january 20th which is still a long time when you compare it to most democracies in the world. i think of course because of the nature of the crisis which had begun to accelerate late in the summer of 1932 and get worse, i think people hoped and certainly reporters reflected that hope there would be some kind of policy coming out of this period to address the depression more aggressively, more in keeping with what roosevelt promised. that would have been hailed hoover giving up on his principles which he was not going to do. >> in december and january, did the two men mckinney attempts to reconcile or attempt to work together? >> there was a lot of back and forth and most of it not particularly conciliatory to borrow your word and eventually they began to, hoover decided

he would publish some of the snippy exchanges in the press and that spoil things i think going forward, maybe most notably in february because again the inauguration will be until march, roosevelt was the subject or object rather of assassination attempt in florida. he was narrowly missed from the assassin's pistol. the person near him, the mayor of chicago was fatally shot. hoover wrote roosevelt a long letter to address the circumstances as they then were. hoover spent a long time drafting the letter, we know that because of the archival record we have, drafted the letters in pencil and wrote them out longhand which he did when it was important to him, he was very careful drafting the letter to roosevelt which congratulated him and then went

on for many pages to blame roosevelt for the economy and say you and you alone, roosevelt address ongoing think pandemics and depression by renouncing his plans for the new deal. >> before we leave that story, is the perpetrator of the assassination attempt important to know in the scheme of how people were responding to the tension in the country? >> the apparent would be assassin was an italian american. i don't think we can say his motive was directly on the situation, it is not clear. he seems to have been mentally unwell and had hallucinations. he was an italian american worker, registered republican. there are some people who to this day do not believe he was trying to shoot roosevelt.

his intended victim was in fact the mayor of chicago and it was related to internal affairs in the city of chicago. i'm not sure it is entirely relevant to the story. >> one detail i read in that nine page letter to fdr as it had misspelled name of roosevelt, is that correct? >> to be honest, i think that is uncharitable thing, if you look at the archival evidence, it may have been written in haste, i'm not sure it was intended. >> no intended snub as the story unfolds. go ahead. >> there were many petty exchanges between the two men but i'm not sure that was one of them. >> this standoff between the two of them continued until the inauguration itself. what was the day before the inauguration like? >> you have to remember by this

time the depression had deepened into financial panic. people were worried even banks that probably were sound would close their doors and were rushing to withdraw their money from the banks. many states had already closed the banks to prevent this hemorrhaging of funds. there was a widespread call for federal bank holiday that affects enclosure so there could be auditing of the books and determine which banks were sound in attempt to stop the panda. banks were collapsing and the federal reserve itself was on the brink of collapse because people were taking paper money to the federal reserve and trying gold to exchange as you could do. massive withdrawal from private banks and federal reserve system and the old financial system was on the brink of some kind of catastrophe. there was an outcry even among conservative people, federal reserve bankers and lawyers for the president, still herbert hoover, to close the bank. hoover refused to do that on

the principal it was in the nature of capitalism that you kept the banks open so the bad ones could go under and this was incredible but necessary process. hoover refused repeatedly right through until the inauguration to allow the banks to be closed even when the federal reserve ensured he was delivered an order to do so in the wee hours of the morning on inauguration day. hoover knew by this point franklin roosevelt was going to close the banks immediately upon taking office, he would take the nation off of the goaltender to prevent that aspect of the pandemic and allow them to pursue policy of inflation. hoover knew what roosevelt was going to do, he could have pre- empted roosevelt by issuing his own order and placing his own restrictions on bank activity. as a matter of principle he refused to do this. there was a nature of increasing desperation in the nation and hoover himself was increasingly frustrated and upset with the inability to get

what he wanted out of the last days of the presidency as he told an 8 at the end of business, we have reached the end of our strength. >> inauguration itself, herbert hoover did attend the inauguration, what was the dynamic light between the two men on that ceremonial date? >> there were famous illustrations and photographs of the discomfort between the two of them, at least the discomfort on herbert hoover's face. he wasn't somebody visibly warm generally. i don't think we want to read too much into his demeanor on the day of the inauguration. he really does look miserable to be there and his accompanying franklin roosevelt to the inauguration and he appears to have hated it to do so. roosevelt was a very charismatic fellow, outgoing fellow, somebody who was very good conveying the spirit of

confidence and cheer and expansive smile, that was on display on inauguration day. roosevelt had a confident speaking voice as we heard in the clip you playedwe look at ty

parallels with what the country is going through right now, where would you see them? >> the time is short, shorter than it was in 1932, 1933. on the other hand, things move quicker these days and the presidency is a much more powerful institution than it was in largely as a result of roosevelt's presidency during the new deal and the war. the current occupant of the white house did not do a lot more in a short time than herbert hoover could have done in 1932, 1933.

we are of course in the middle of a great crisis. it seems like it is the management of the crisis or mismanagement of the crisis that led to the defeat of the incumbent which is an unusual thing in american political history. we have a long time to go yet until a new policy of managing the pandemic can be implemented by incoming administration and it looks like the outgoing administration has no intention of making way for that shift in crisis management and indeed quite the opposite, rather like herbert hoover they oppose it on principle and appear persuaded they will continue on their course as vigorously as they have to this point. >> when you look at the impact of the standoff which you described was ideological and personality driven, they were very different kinds of people. it was emotional and personal as well as ideological. you look back at that period of time in your research, what

were your conclusions about how things might have been different if the two found a way to work together? >> when we look at the data on the recovery from the great depression, it begins immediately with roosevelt taking office in march 1933. generally, economic historians don't think that is coincidence. they think it is because of roosevelt's spurring expectations, trading amongst americans prices will go up. that creates incentive for people who have money to spend it because it is going to fall in value. once they begin spending money, people begin to have jobs to produce things which is what turns things around. you can see reduction, industry rising immediately in march 1933. that is the thing that spurred the recovery, we can say that could've happened quite a bit earlier had hoover gone along in some way or other with roosevelt's program, the farm bill reduce the farm crisis for example over the policy of

inflating the currency. any of those things could have spurred the recovery earlier and if the recovery had begun earlier, a lot more people would not have lost their savings, jobs or time of starvation or even their lives. >> another question about transitions then and now as we close out here, in addition to the 20th amendment passing, by 1964 the presidential transitions act, legislation to put order and pay for the federal government. i'm wondering if you look with this long lens of history about the changes necessary to make transitions between presidencies work more smoothly especially ideological changes or party changes, are there any changes that could be made to our system as it is structured now that would facilitate change in power and make it work better for the nation? >> apparently, the thing that needs to happen is to clarify these changes are the end of nonpolitical civil service

which is cause associated with franklin roosevelt's distant cousin, theodore. which we really don't quite have apparently in the federal government at least not at the highest levels. there is a stipulation i'm sure you know in the transition act that funds be allocated to the president-elect as soon as the head of the general services administration ascertained who that is and there is no real stipulation about how that ascertainment needs to be made or what are the objective criteria for it. we need clear and less political ways to make those kind of ascertainment so smooth transitions going forward. >> dr. eric rauchway wrote the book on the 1932/33 transition between herbert hoover and fdr called winter war, hoover and roosevelt the first clash over the new deal. thank you for giving us historical context to presidential transitions as the country works its way through

this one. appreciate your time. >> thank you very much. all q&a programs available on our website or as a podcast on c-span.org. weeknights this month we feature american history tv programs as a preview of what is available every week and on c-span 3. tuesday night the 400 anniversary of the mayflower which traveled from plymouth, england to america in 1620 to mark the 400th anniversary of the heritage foundation hosted a discussion about the mayflower contact. the document signed by the mayflower passengers upon their arrival in north america. scholars discuss its role as a political agreement and as an

inspiration for later documents and arguments for religious liberty. watch tuesday beginning at 8:00 p.m. eastern and enjoy american history tv every weekend on c- span 3. in the 2000 presidential election texas governor george w. bush defeated vice president al gore in one of the most highly contested races in u.s. history. the outcome not decided until december 12th, five years after voters went to the polls when the u.s. supreme court stopped the florida recount. this awarded the state electoral votes and the presidency to governor bush. next, american history tv looks back 20 years to the 2000 election and landmark bush versus gore decision with e.j. dionne and william kristol, co- editors of the book , the bulwark. >> i say to president-elect bush,