national museum of american history and culture. watch tonight beginning at 8:00 p.m. eastern and enjoy american history tv every weekend on c-span3. next a panel of world war ii scholars looks at the february 1945 yalta conference. at which allied leaders, franklin roosevelt, winston churchill and josef stalin met to look ahead to the post-war era. panelists compare yalta to previous meetings between the three leaders, explore some of the myths surrounding yalta and examine the political motives that drove the deliberations. the national world war ii museum in new orleans hosted the event. welcome back. as we begin to silence our conversations, please remember to silence your cell phones as well. so i was thinking that with yalta being an eight-day

conference, we've almost made a full eight hours talking abouta it. so the last session is often one of our favorites, and that is a round table discussion where we get all of the speakers up together to talk about some themes, to ask each other questions, or to ask questions of themselves. and to give you all one last time to pepper one, some or all of the panelists with your own questions. i would ask that when you have a question, if it is for a specific panelist, please name that panelist, or if you want to throw it open to some or all. we are going to ask dr. gunter bischof to chair this panel discussion and i would like to thank gunter for coming in and filling in for dr. stoll on such short notice. before i leave the podium i would like to introduce for the last time today dr. gunter

bischof, sere he plokhii, dr. rob citino and michael bishop. gunter will start it and i will run around with the microphone. gunter? >> thank you very much, jeremy. let me just throw a few general questions out that we could discuss, i thought. the issue came up with serhii and by rob too, his growing up in cleveland, that is what callers have called the yalta myths. keep in mind, that was a very good question from the audience, is this sort of the same thing as the selling out of the eastern europe the same thing as the selling out of china? that big debate in american post-war politics, keep in mind the context for that debate is that the republicans have been out of office since 1932. they had won big in the '46 election. and they wanted to win the white

house. and this seemed to be the issue where you could blame the democrats for really doing bad things, meaning selling out china, selling out eastern europe at yalta and that's how yalta became a bad word in the immediate post-war period. serhii talked about it. these yalta myths, i think that as rob told us, echoed all the way into the 1970s in his europeans, being sold down the river as the saying went. i think that's sort of an important part of the long life of yalta, particularly in american politics. i might also add that the french president who was not invited to yalta, and was smarting under that for a long time, that he was not there representing france. he made yalta a bad word too, and in 1968, after the soviets invaded czechoslovakia, he blamed what was going on, on

yalta. that's how long it sort of was working inside his brain. so i think the yalta myths are an important topic to talk about. that's just to say that the domestic politics of u.s. foreign policy. i think rob rightly made a good point, if you'll recall his conclusion was yalta was the blueprint for allied victory, and he made a good point to remind us that halting at the lb was an issue that was picked up in 1967, even though it was discussed much in the historiography at the time. i might add to that that the very important reason for eisenhower to halt at the lb was that he was afraid that the nazis were building an alpine fortress in the alps of austria and bavaria. so he sent armies down to the

south to make sure that this would not come into being. the alpine fortress, in fact, they had no time to prepare for such a last stand but that's what they were afraid of also because nazi intelligence fed that to the oss that that's what would be happening in the alps. that was another reason to halt at the lb to get quickly down to the alps. and then the issue that was raised by someone online we might discuss it too, it's a very general issue, that person said yalta is it so different from previous conferences, isn't this the game of diplomacy that whatever you call quid proquo, or tit for tat, is that what's being done in realistic real politics? that's a fair question to be discussed to. that's what i'd like to throw out as potential discussion issues. >> if you don't mind, gunter, i'll hop on one of those, you

talk about the yalta myths, the selling out of eastern europe, the selling poland down the river, or, you know, any of the other ethnic groups, eastern european ethnic groups that livid in cleveland with me. there's also the -- serhii, you had to answer this as well, there's also the roosevelt was sick, he wasn't up to it. there's stalin looking in final fetal. churchill's kind of depressed and there's roosevelt, clearly the man is looking on death's door. as he was on death's door. but i love the fact that you set a graduate student task of writing a research paper on this, looking at word counts and the looking at the depth and the size of roosevelt's interventions. i think that's another one that, look, we can stand here until doomsday, it didn't matter that much, people are still going to ask you, the fact that roosevelt was sick at yalta, was that crucial? >> yeah, regarding the poles in particular, on the one hand, of

course, it's not a myth that the big three gathered together and decided the future of europe without much consultation with the rest of the world. so that's a reality. and that created a lot of resentment. but where mythology starts was that western allies were there in a position to get a much better deal and didn't do that, for whatever reason. fdr was sick or there was spies in the american delegation, or that roosevelt was trying to get too cozy with stalin to get the united nations his main international project and his legacy going. that's where the mythology starts. and again poles are important there, because for poles yalta was a turning point. that's where it was agreed that whatever government that they had in london would be replaced.

and they were losing territories in the east. the molotov ribbon trop line was accepted by the western allies this, and that was the loss of the city in today's ukraine, which is leviv, which was known as lam burg, and so on and so forth, dependent on the controlling power. and the western borders, what they got from germany, were not decided yet. that was at potsdam. so from that point of view for poles, for poles that was a real, real major turning point and disappointment. and yalta was in polish pronounced as yafta was a word for betrayal in poland all the way into the 1970s and 1980s. >> maybe one more issue that was also raised throughout the

conference, and particularly in dr. plokhii's paper is german reparations. okay, so stalin demanded $20 billion of german reparations to be evenly divided between the soviet union and the western powers. that's how evenly he wanted to divide it. but of course he had a point, the soviet union was destroyed very badly as roosevelt and churchill could see as they traveled to yalta through the crimea, and therefore in order to reconstruction the soviet union german reparations were needed. however, you know, there was a lesson to be learned from world war i that if you demand -- if you insist on german reparations on reparations, it might create bad politics, as it did in germany. that was one of the big issues that the nazis very early picked up. but dr. plokhii, i think, remarked correctly that stalin got his ten millions, even though it was not granted yet at

yalta, eventually he got it through various means. first of all, removal of industries from east germany, the same thing he did in manchuria, we heard, removal of industries. and when they realized that was not really such a good deal for them since they often didn't know how to put these industries back together in the soviet union, or they became rusty in polish rail yards, it is being said too. then they decided to take reparations out of current production in germany. and that's how the soviets got their $10 billion, and i might just remind you that they actually took reparations from austria too. and i've sort of found out a remarkable thing. the soviets took about as much reparations out of their zone in austria as the u.s. port in foreign aid into austria. so that would almost make you think the u.s. paid reparations

to the soviet union. >> there's no such thing as a coincidence, gunter. >> that figure i found pretty remarkable but they took reparations the same way from german assets in austria, removal and reparations out of current production and that lasted in austria all the way until 1960. austria delivered oil to the soviet union, all the way up until 1960. but what a historian has reminded us recently, dr. plokhii briefly mentioned it, we need to keep that in mind too, is the fact that the americans got reparations too from germany, even though they didn't demand any at yalta. how did they get it? they got it in a smart way. they sent teams into germany to take production methods, to take patents out of german corporations. and apparently that then saved companies like dupont who took

many of these production plans, billions of dollars in research costs. so it is assumed by historians that this smart way of intellectual reparations actually netted the united states $10 billion or so too. so we say it was turned down at yalta, but in the long run both sides got what they wanted. >> yeah. >> i would like to throw in one thing also, gunter, about this notion of myths and myths are easiest to sell when there's some kernel of truth to them. i'm not really -- i really don't believe in the big lie. the notion of the big lie, you invent some crazy thing and say it enough times. much easier to tell if there's a kernel of truth. let me talk about poland, for example, we've taught undergraduates at various points in our career, i love them dearly, and they often bring a certain wisdom to the table, and one of them is, you know, believe me, i've said this, i was in a university classroom for 32 years, about poland.

some smart student said isn't that kind of crazy this war was fought over poland and there was no real independent poland after the war? so that ironic nature of what happened to the polish state after the war, feeling that it had come from one form of tyranny to the other, the germans got liberated, they got to live under the benefits of a democratic way of life, at least in western germany, but the poles didn't, whose brave stand against nazi aggression started the war in the first place. i know as sophisticated historians, we know why it happened and everyone in the room knows why it happened but you do see that is something, you can make some political -- what kind of foreign policy is that, that when poland winds up under the yolk, i look at those casualty statistics, and poland is shocking, not only the first to fall, but probably one of the biggest sufferers percentage wise in terms of the war as

well. i'm just throwing that out there. maybe i am still channelling my youth reading those angry letters to the cleveland plain dealer about the yalta conference, it's still there for me. >> of course it was winston churchill who was very aware of the fact that great britain went to war over poland and that's why at yalta he kept insisting that, you know, he was going to bat for poland and polish government and the declaration of liberated europe as it was called, guaranteeing a freely elected governments in eastern europe which of course didn't work out that way because he was very mindful of the fact we went to war for poland. >> yes. >> and from michael's thought too, remember, churchill is the master mind behind the growth of the yalta myth, that's what i heard from you. >> winston churchill sat across the cabinet table in 10 downing street in 1921 from michael collins, the great irish revolutionary leader. >> the big fella. >> when he signed the anglo-irish treaty, said i have signed my own death warrant,

and, in fact, that proved to be the case, he was killed the following year during the irish civil war. but i think that when we look back on that, we have to say that ultimately the decision on his part, and his fellow irish negotiators to sign that treaty was, and i hate to use this word much, but it was inevitable. they didn't have any choice, the british wouldn't have accepted a notion of an irish republic at z'n&me, and ready to assault ireland more viciously than it already had. that's a very long winded and round about way of saying, is it the conference itself that we're talking about, or is it -- is the yalta conference simply a symbol of or a ratification of these inevitable facts on the ground and forces or could it conceivably have gone another way on the coast of crimea?

>> well, i would like to return factually to link this question and line of argument to the question that gunter posed earlier about whether yalta is just another place where it's a lot of horse trade in a stinking place, or there is something particular about yalta. and i would say that it's not much different from the conferences that were happening before that, in the world international history, with one exception, and that exception was quite idealistic, this liberal view of president roosevelt who of course was following in the footsteps of president wilson. this idea of liberal order and international organization. and when fdr comes back and addresses the joint session of

congress and senate, and says that the old world of affairs has disappeared, we are in a completely different world where there is no anymore secret grievance done. he diplomatic relations, the question is to what degree he believes in that and then things start popping up, there is surely a secret agreement on the soviet participation in the war with japan and by the way, there are problems in eastern europe with poland. and that's where the reality of the old sphere of influence world and the vision of the new liberal world come and clash. and from that point of view, the expectations from yalta become much, much more higher than from

any other conference, partially because the participants themselves, and fdr in particular, put them -- put them on that level. and one more comment on the internal politics of eastern europe and whether it was sold down or not, is that churchill comes back from yalta, to revolt in his own conservative party. so the attacks on the government policy and the concessions at yalta, in the parliament, because again for a lot of people in britain, britain went to war for poland, it's a major issue, and exactly as you said, what britain was getting as a result of that, or the world was getting as a result of that. with fdr, the polish, he was

talking about, it seems to me, three to four million polish voters in the united states, and, again, i'm not sure about the number. but that's what he was talking about in tehran and he was saying i'm not against this changing of the polish borders but i can't commit to that publicly before the presidential elections. because the poles whose letters you read before that, they were the staunchest supporters of the democratic government that ever existed in the world. my guess, they didn't stay so dedicated. >> that's my guess as well. >> after that ended. >> yeah, i think the secrecy of the agreement was an important point that historians have paid attention to that sort of trickled out what happened at yalta, you know, in the course of the spring. and i think the secret agreement on what the u.s. had to give for the soviet union to get involved

in the war in the far east, you talked about it, rob. that, i think, came out in february '46, if you will, a year after yalta. so it was that secrecy that, of course, gave them the republicans the means to create the yalta myth, that eastern europe was sold down the river. which became bigger and bigger into the later 1940s. i'm glad that dr. plokhii went a bit into the historiography. this is how yalta was being discussed throughout the 1950s. i think it was very early, like ten years after yalta, like 1955, that the foreign relations volume -- on yalta was published, one of our principal source on the american side of what actually came to pass. >> it was '55. >> '55. >> very early on actually. usually takes 30 years for that's published on any given event.

>> we have a question. >> i don't think you're on, jeremy. >> microphone, there we go, we have a question to your right from dr. dupont. >> two actually. one for any or all of you and then one very specific. the general question is that everyone's used language like the u.s. gave, or churchill gave, and so on and so forth. specifically about eastern europe, can you tell me one thing that was, quote, given away that stalin had not already earned through military means? that's my first question. more general. the second is very specific to mr. bishop. and i'm not sure whether you were defending churchill or setting up sort of theory about why he thought this and so on but it seems to me there's an inherent contradiction between your later interpretation of his being appalled, what's happening in eastern europe, and the fact that he wrote on the napkin, in

other words his famous napkin, as i understand it, was initiated by him. so either you're arguing that there was some sort of epiphany after yalta, or perhaps he had guilt feelings or something. but it's certainly true that he contributed mightily to what happened after the war by his acquiescence in moscow. >> take that one first. >> sure, we'll come to the other one. >> it's a tough crowd. >> yeah, it is. >> no, you make a very good point. i mentioned it only because i didn't want to present churchill as being somehow unrealistically above all of the sordid compromises involved in diplomacy and with yalta in particular. but, i mean, all i can say is he wasn't seeding complete control to stalin. even on that paper there was that symbolic 10%, say, for the west and romania. i don't think that he wished for

or foresaw what was going to happen later. i just think it was an example of his commitment to empire, and the -- and his vision for what the world should look like in the future, becoming dominant, because he was there alone with stalin and fdr wasn't there at the time. and the irony, of course, is that things changed in greece so very quickly. i mean, here he forged an agreement with stalin, which ironically enough stalin kept. i mean, obviously for his own reasons. and of course britain intervenes in the civil war, but they can't maintain this commitment as i mentioned earlier, and they step back and the americans step in. it wasn't churchill's finest moment, let's put it that way, and he himself said it was a naughty document and he felt somewhat uncomfortable about it. but in the end, you know, keep in mind churchill lived to be

90. he had a six decade or seven decade, almost, political career. his -- some of his views shifted over time, although i think he's a lot more consistent than most people give him credit for. but the fact remains that even though he was horrified by the yalta settlement he also was alert to any sign that there might be an opportunity for a breakthrough in relations with the soviets. and i quoted some of the things he wrote and said about the aftermath of the death of stalin and how he saw that as an opportunity to bring about a peaceful settlement to the cold war. >> before we get to the other -- isn't it possible to hold both those positions to hand you a spheres of influence agreement and then later to rail on it against communism? because churchill was an imperialist and he understood how you divided the whole world into fear spheres of influence, at the same time a bedrock anti-communist. we're all kind of complex beings and sometimes one of our

obsessions comes to the fore, and then later it's replaced by another one of our obsessions. i can posit to churchill who signs the percentages and then also rails on about the horrors. >> you're conservative anti-communist and churchill is your hero, it's hard to read that he preferred adale stevenson. that he found the same horror in a different dress. and that he could not abide john foster dules, the secretary of state, who he said was the only man, the only bully he knew that carried his own china shop with him. you read this stuff and it makes you wonder. the fact is that having been so addiment and sincere, and it is

communism, he was genuinely horrified by the idea that the war might consume itself. and he want today do everything he could to avert that. he was capable of change. i think the similar polls maintained, sometimes more than what he has done to adapt to changing schisms. >> if i could add, i would not advise anyone to take at face value -- that famous story about negotiations there. so maybe there was a moment with his napkin, but there was the top of the iceberg of negotiations and for negotiations, churchill was much closer to stalin than to

rooseve roosevelt. he didn't like where it was going as a result of that. in that since he was consistent. and so there is a recount. and he wants, he writes later that chamberlain was wrong to trust hitler. and i don't think that i'm wrong to trust stalin. and he has been in the situation where there is very little for him to go on apart from stalin world which probably is also part of your question about what

did he have to give to stalin, very little, but there was something that stal eerks n wanted from him. it was very clear that he wanted territories and he was prepared to send his army into the battle. in eastern europe he needed legitimacy and recognition, international recognition for his reck kwi suggestions. that's what they could give him, or play some sort of games and that is what the negotiations about polish government were about. it is what you did in paris and france. there was still diplomacy and negotiations, and he needed to keep internation nag legitimagt.

>> you brought the story up to 43 and i think that could be fleshed out a bit more. so stalin dies on, i think march 5th, 1953 and churchill comes out and says this would be a good opportunity to meet the new leadership at the highest level. another kind of summit meeting. i think he was trying tor?3f) e the cold war right then and however the problem was now that eisenhower was president. since january. andize ize eisenhower gave a sp 1953 saying there is a major concession. they are working on that, the austrian treaty. so he had very specific

conditions for making concess n concessions before we sit down with him in a summit meeting. i think he fell sick and nothing happened for the next few weeks and then the summit that happened was in bermuda. it was a french british american summit. and that's when he made a remarkable saying, saying he is talking about the soviet union. so this tension carried into this era when eisenhower was president, and some historians think a great opportunity was

miss missed. sop it was also a possibility to meet the nuclear arm's race if such could affect the soviets. but they were not prepared yet to meet, either. they wanted -- if you don't like the guy in the white house, you can vote him out. the soviets didn't really have clear succession procedures. it took the soviets nearly two years to find a new leader. previously he was cruschev and that's when things started to move again. >> gentlemen, the next question,

bobby, two questions, who had -- who had what we had to give. >> what are all of these percentages? >> that is a good question. >> the resources. i wondered what churchill was thinking about. >> i can see myself writing that note to myself. maybe all of us can. working on your own ideas. i know this week, these ten days of discussion, they have spheres of influence, but some would say what does 10% mean? it could theoretically be just an effort to at least symbolically say hey, we're not

to withdrawal entirely. we're not going to give them a free hand. if there was not a lot of thought behind it. >> i think that the spheres of influen influence, and one of these guys, but understanding what is means, it is different. he is drawing from that area. you know, it is predominantly -- we can be their, our observers can be there. and that was unacceptable. they are thinking about that,

and they said that the only way for us to co-exist in the west is to decide this this is yours and this is ours. they knew that. and the martial man was there for the united states. so that way it was the iron curtain, and that's where his position is. it was spheres of influence, but he is against the iron curtain. >> gentleman, jim, to your right, has a question. then i will get to the other side of the world. >> it is kind of an essay question. you shared the statistics about the casualties. what were the perceptions, the numbers, did they trust him? did they know it, or was it just

related. did they per saceive that the soviets could continue their sacrifices? >> i'll start, i'm sure others can chime in. from the start of american u.s. involvement it was clear who was bearing the burden of fighting jermans. and whether or not the exact statistics were known, that's a good yes. they're still being talked about today if is a fall of communism, the opening up of some ararchiv. and we're still not sure what casualties were in world war two. but the notion that they had to be kept in the field because they're fighting the burden of the germans, but it is his strategy for running the war. >> i certainly agree with what

he said, and it seems to me five times that the recognition of of the victories, and that reality was clear. in terms of the numbers, the soviets didn't know them themselves. the first time khrushchev and the estimate is 27 million, but stalin was not tut in those numbers because it was putting himself in a bad light. he said anyone but russians would kick us out for what happened burning the war.

>> and i must remind you that the national war museum has a much watched movie and the numbers are still at 20 million. >> one of you brought up that there was a 15 minutes or so spent on a document that was signed about the democracy that blossomed into something in the future. would this be a good time to discuss what that was? how did that have an impact on the soviet union after the declaration that liberated europe? you mentioned there was like ten minutes. >> yeah, ett -- there was major concerns on the american side that staal lin would not sign

that. and the declaration was put together. they would have a body that would oversee that. the policies can be implemented. eventually it was decided that stalin would not go for that. so it became a declaration as opposed to an agreement, per se, which put us certainly lower than other agreements that were reached in terms of it's power. and stalin said okay, let's sign. molotov was really horrified by that. he said that you would not that nap will give them a instrument. it is according to his memoirs,

but he was telling that to someone in the 60s and 70s. they figured out what really matters is the forces on the ground. let them have the deck llaratio. that was a declaration without teeth. and it is the cold war, and that was the only document where someone could argue that stalin violated the promises given. everything else the language was so care tlfl was no specific violations per se. and they were returning from cry media to moscow, it seems to me that he was talking to one of the military commanders again, i

don't remember who it was, but he said "well, it looks like the documents that we assigned just are so elastic they be stretched from here to washington." and the other said "yeah, it looks like we have to start negotiation in poland from scratch all over again." and so that was also the way forward for roosevelt to come back for his elector rate. and say that i brought something. stalin promised to honor democratic principals. it didn't help, as we know, but that was nor political document for did domestic consumption back in the united states. >> i think we should also add that the polish issue had two sides to it. the borders, moving the country westward, and i think this is

something that mark would remind us of. and the other is a future polish government. they set up the polish government. that he had back in moscow that came in earn poland where he set up the government. and this west, fdr, was afraid of what percentage, countries liberated. the so-called polls to be represented in the polish government. the declaration of europe came up as a means of saving face for roosevelt back home with the polish voters nap he had battle

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movement. >> i'm going to ask the subsequent questions to be directed at one individual panelist if that is okay so we can try to get to all of the hand that's are up, there is about three of them still. >> i just want to point out that this is government that europe has, they're knocking governments, and there was puerto rico and where ever you want it. the other thing is that polan, if they were separated.

they were under the guise of control and understanding, but in the end, it was unity. that were lost in their nazis and their reicht. they created it, and we could say there was a little happy ending to this world war ii episode, if we want, for the u polish. and the there are moments when.

>> i think that one can only speculate what would churturewo churchill's views be. it is possible that if you too many communism out of the equation they would have been more comfortable with the influence in poland, but he was one of those warning against appeasement, arguing for

rearmament in poland. and he rejoined the government only after the invasion of poland. so i think that the saving poland was something that would have been important to him and was important to him from the beginning. >> gentlemen, to your left in the front row here, please. >> this question is for the doctor. so you talked about looking at yalta in different lens, correct? my question is looking at it from the lens from bottom to top instead of top to bottom. how did reactions from domest domestic -- each of the big three respective counties, how did they react if they had any reactions at all? >> that is a very good question.

i think we heard that information about what happened at yalta leaked out in dribs and draps. and this narrative, which i would call it -- a standard narrative, selling people down the river, it still comes back, that would be formed in a domestic political context over the course of several years. so i can't really say there was a major -- there was major public reaction to yalta. i think for all of the talk about open agreements, the sense, you're back to, in some sense back room diplomacy because they're still hope that see this. likewise, the cities are being overrun.

there is not many who exbless what they thought of the german people. >> back to your left, please. >> this question is to mr. bishop. i would like to know what you thi think churchill would do today. what he would say in response to putin in cry mere ya, you cane, and the rise of nationalism and the loss of democracy and the other earn european countries. >> a friend of mine, a lincoln scholar, back in the 70st for a program, someone called in and what they said about bussing.

and my friend said what is a bus? and so it is always dangerous to try and divine these sorts of things, but i do think that church hill would have views russian and putin with the same john d jaundice and weary eye. i think he would be displayed that this resort, this destination where he spend this glorious week, with his fellow leaders that would later be seated back to ukraine and seized again by putin in 2013 or 204. i think that i would like to think that he would be vigilant, on guard, and pursuing the interests of the united kingdom

in a very uncanny and effective way. >> panelist in the back center, please. >> i'm wondering in terms of the perception of the united states in yalta where at the end of the war the soviet union would be presented as a stout ally. and they saw wars fought twice in 30 years, that giving them a set of burr states, is understandable and legitimate and therefore it wasn't perceived as a sellout by the average american at that point. dr. bishoff? >> we heard about how the nichgs trickled out slowly.

and in some quarters, they were beginning to change. fdr took that over for wilson, that was sort of a stark reminder and that's when the agreement comes in, too. and this is how policy didn't want to see it. but the american public, of course, didn't know a lot about what happened at yalta. it only came out in little spur spurts as i said down to 1946 and 1955. it took a long time to really find out what had been agreed to at yalta. the agreement lead us towards

this myth. and it took a hold in the republican party that there you go, there you have it, the democrats are up to their old things. they're selling nations like poland down the river. i think that is where the perception slowly set in, but this a partisan way. i think the way that they analyze it, that it became very much part of a partisan myth, and that not all america would share that. >> paul has a question in the front row, gentlemen. >> when you talk about post-war politics in america, you can't miss a comment about the house

committee came into being probably because of yalta. >> it was 1940 under a congressman from texas. at that time it was to persecute and find nazi spies in the united states. after world war ii they were redirected towards chasing communists out of the government. so the committee, you could say, was subverted after the war towards the new purposetivity that was to be investigated and truman, himself, started to investigate such activity in the federal government in 1947 kw. and people were fired. and then came a fellow that was mentioned named joe mccarr think to mccarthy to be reelected.

and he said what would be a goo issue today? and the president said well, the st. lawrencea#stl seaway is a b topic, and they said no someone interested in that. and they said antigovernment. and that is what mccarthy picked up. a few days later he held the lincoln day speech. and from there mccccarthyism.

>> did wilz say that he shared that for awhile? >> really? >> yeah, well the chairman from st. martin vville, louisville. >> ladies and gentlemen, let's give a round of applause. before everyone gets up i have closing remarks, and i will give the podium to rob. thank you in the audience for a great day, for your questions, online, but you being here physically with us, but maybe seeing for the first time our brand new higgins ho tell. i hope this is not the last time we see you this year.

we have wonderful programming throughout the year. look on our website for the september memory wars. we talked about the legacy of world war ii, or of yalta today. they be discussing how the war is remembered throughout the world and thousand is very current with political and diplomatic affairs. it is looking at it through public memorials, museums, monuments, so that will be one in september and the week after vj day, or the week after the ceremony. that is after thanksgiving, so let me ask for the final time for one of our speakers, dr. rob satino to come make closing

remarks. >> i promise -- thank you, jim. i'm all that's left between you and the door and i recognize that. i think we just had a great day of discussion. two things just crystallized in my mind. this view of foreign policy that you have, a more ideal position, someone said isn't this typical. but woodrow wilson said that's not how it should be, and that has been a strain since then, certainly in the roosevelt administration. that idealism that we can't work together for common purpose or common adultho common good. i urge you to read it about a post world war one period and

then maybe able to draw some conclusions about world war two. the meaning is about how important it is to end your wars. wrapping them up successfully in any kind of conclusive fashion is a very difficult thing. they tell us the great german philosopher of war, the continuation of politics by other means and you have to consider that from the beginning of the war bhap are we fighting, how do we get out of it and there is also a british military analyst. one of my favorite quotes, do you fight snem for a better peace. you didn't like something about the situation so much that you decided to go to war and spend billions of dollars and lose millions of lives in the case of the soviet union. >> i think on that note, let us

leave our discussion. it is a better piece in 1945. as i always do, i will end with the words of douglas mcarthur, these proceedings are closed. >> you're watching american history tv. explore our nation's mast on c-span 3. today, we're brought to you by these cable television companies as a public service. >> history professor gunte gunter bischof talks about what proceeded the yalta conference. the n