>> next, a4g>lyr panel of worldi scholars look at the 1945 yalta conference, in which roosevelt, winston churchill and joseph stalin, and the panelists explain happened the three leaders and some of the myths surrounding yalta and examined the political motives that drove the deliberations. the national world war ii museum in new orleans hosted the event. >> welcome back. as we begin to silence our conversations, please remember to silence your cell phones, as well. so as i was thinking with yalta being an eight-day conference, we almost made a full eight hours. the last session is often one of our favorites and that is a

roundtable discussion where we get all of the speakers up together to talk about some themes to ask each other questions and to give you all one last time to pepper one, some or all of the panelists with your own questions. i would ask that when you have a question, if it is for a specific panelist, please name that panelist or if you want to throw it open to some or all. we are going to ask dr. michael bishoff and i would like to thank gunther for coming in and filling in for the doctor in such short notice, but before i leave the podium, i would like to introduce for the last time today dr. gunther bishoff and dr. sir i blocky and mr. michael bishop. ladies and gentlemen, gunther will start it and then i'll run around with the microphone. gunther?

>> okay. thank you very much, jeremy. let me throw a few general questions that i could discuss, i thought. the issue came up first and then it was raised by rob, too, and i think it was very interesting opening statement about his growing up in cleveland and that is what callers have called the yalta myths. namely, keep in mind that was a very good question from the audience and is this the same thing, the selling out of eastern europe and the selling out of china and that big debate in american post-war politics, keep in mind the context for that debate is that the republicans have been out of office since 1932. they've won big in the 46th election and they wanted to win the white house. this seemed to be the issue where you could blame the democrats for really doing bad thing, meaning selling out china and selling out eastern europe and yalta and that's how yalta

became a bad word in the immediate post-war period and these yalta myths. i think as rob told us, echoed all of the way into the 1907s in hometown cleveland being sold down the river. i think that's sort of an important part of the long life of yalta, particularly in american politics and charles de gaulle, the french president who was not invited to yalta and was there representing france. he made yalta a bad word, too and in 1968 after the soviets invaded czechoslovakia, charles de gaulle blamed what was going on on yalta. that's how long it sort of was working inside his brain. so i think the yalta myth are an important topic that we ought to be talking about which is to say

the domestic politics of u.s. foreign policy. i think rob rightly made a good point. if you'll recall his conclusion, yalta was the blueprint for allied victory and he made a good point to remind us that halting it was the issue that embrey has picked up in 1967 even though it was discussed much into hift riography at the time, and it was a very important to halt, and that he was afraid that the nazis were building an alpine fortress down in austria and bavaria. so he sent armies down to the south to make sure that it would not come into being and they had no time to prepare for such a last stand, but that's what they were afraid of also because nazi

intelligence fed him that, meaning fed it to the oss that that's what will be happening in the alps and that was another reason to halt to get quickly down for the alps. and then the issue that was raised by someone online, we might discuss that, too. it is a very general issue and that person said yalta, is it so different from previous conferences? isn't this the game of diplomacy that whatever you are called with the tit for tat, that's what's being done in a realistic politic? i think that is a fair question to be discussed, too. so that's what i'd like to throw out there as potential discussion issues, but i'm sure there is many more. >> if you don't mind, gunther, i would hop on one of those. you talked about the yalta myths and the selling out of eastern europe and selling poland down the river or any of the other ethnic groups that lived in

cleveland with me. and sergei, you can answer this, as well and there's also that roosevelt was sick. he just wasn't up to it and stalin was looking fine, and churchill is depressed and there's roosevelt and clearly the man looks on death's door. and he was on death's door, but i love the fact that you sent a graduate student the task of writing a research paper on this looking at word counts and the size of roosevelt's intervention. look, we can see it as a doomsday. it didn't matter that much and people will ask you was the fact that roosevelt was sick at yalta, was that crucial? >> regarding the polls in particular. on the one hand, it's not the myth that the big three gathered together and decided the future of europe with the rest of the world. so that's a reality and that created a lot of resentment, but

where mythology starts really is that the western allies were there in position, really, to get a much better deal and didn't do that. they were sick or that there were spies in the american delegation or that roosevelt was starting to get too cozy with the united nations and the international project and his legacy going. that's where the mythology starts and polls are important there because for polls, yalta was a turning point and that's where it was agreed that whatever government they had in london would be replaced and they were losing territories and it was accepted by the western

allies and that was the loss of the city in today's ukraine which was dependent on the controlling power. and the western borders were not decided yet so from that point of view for polls that was a real, real major turning point and disappointment and yalta was pronounced as yafta was the word for betrayal in poland all of the way into the 1970s and 1980s. maybe one more issue that was raised throughout the conference and particularly in the doctor's paper was the reparations. okay. so stalin demanded 20 billion to

be evenly divided between the soviet union and the western powers. that's how even thly he wanted divide it and the soviet union was destroyed very badly as they could see through state travel through crimea and therefore in order to reconstruct the soviet union, german reparations were needed. there was a lesson from world war i that if you demand and insist on reparations it might create bad politics as it did in germany. that was one of the big issues that the nazis very early picked up and the doctor remarked correctly that stalin got his 10 million, even though it was not granted yet at yalta. eventually he got it through various means, first of all, removal of industries from east germany, the same thing he did in manchuria that you've heard

and the removal of industries and when they realized it was really not such a good deal for them since they often didn't know how to put these industries back together in the soviet union and they became rusty in the rail yards and then they decided to take reparations out of current production in germany. and that's how the soviets got 10 billion and they took reparations from austria, too. i found out a remarkable thing. the soviets took out of their zone in austria as the u.s. poured in foreign aid into austria. so that would almost make you think the u.s. paid reparation to the soviet union. >> there's no such thing as a coincidence. >> that was pretty remarkable

and the german assets and the removal and then reparations out of current production and that lasted in off the raya, and austria delivered it into the soviet union all of the way up until 19 60. as the historian reminded us, we need to keep that in mind, too is the fact that the americans got reputations, too, from germany, even though they didn't demand any at yalta. how did they get it? they got in a smart way. they dig patents out of german corporations, and apparently, that then saved companies like dupont who took many of these production plans, billions of dollars so it is assumed by historians that the smart way of intellectual reparations actually neated the united

states 10 billion or so, too. so we say it was turned down at yalta, but in the long run, both >>. >> i would like to throw in one thing, gunther about the notion of myths and myths are easier to sell when there is a kernel of truth to them. i don't believe in the big lie. the notion of the big lie that you invent some crazy thingn&vz say it enough time and it is easier to sell if there is a kernel of truth. >> we've taught undergraduates at various points of our career, i love them dearly and they often bring a certain wisdom to the table and i was in a university classroom for 32 years. some smart student, isn't this crazy that this world was fought over poland and there was no real independent poll apd after the war. so that ironic nature of what

happened to the polish state after the war feeling that it had come from one form of tiffany to the other and the germans got liberated and they got to live under the benefits of a democratic way of life in western germany, but the poles didn't and i just want to put that in. i know as sophisticated, we know why it happened and i think everyone in the room knows why it happened and you do see, that is something. you can -- what kind of foreign policy is that that when poland winds up under the yolk of all countries in the world and i looked at the statistics and polling is shocking, the only the first to fall, and one of the biggest sufferers out there, maybe i'm still channeling my youth reading the angry letters to the yalta conference, but it is still there for me.

>> of course, it was winston churchill who was very aware of the fact that great britain went to war over poland. >> right. that's why at yalta he kept insisting that he was going to bat for poland and the polish government and the declaration of uniform as it was called a guaranteeing freely elected governments in eastern europe which, of course, didn't work out that way because he was very mindful of the fact that we went to war for poland. >> churchill is the mastermind behind the growth of the yalta myth and that's what i heard from you. winston churchill also sat down across the cabinet table in 10 downing street in 1921 from michael cohen. >> the big fella, who when he signed the anglo-irish treaty said i have signed my own death warrant and in fact, that proved to be the case. he was killed the following year during the irish civil war, but i think when we look back on that, we have to say that

ultimately the decision on his part and his fellow irish negotiators to sign that treat was, and i hate to use this word much, but it was inevitable. they didn't have any choice. the british wouldn't have accepted the notion of an irish republic at that time and the british war machine was ready to assault ireland and that's a long winded and roundabout way of saying is it the conference, and is the yalta conference a symbol or ratification of these inevitable facts on the ground and forces or could it conceivably have gone another way on the coast of crimea? >> well, i would like to return, doctor, to link this question and line of argument to the question that gunther posed

earlier about whether it was a lot where there has taken place or particularly about yalt a and i would say that it's -- it's not much different from the conferences that are happening before that in the world international history with one exception and that exception was quite idealistic and this liberal view of president roosevelt who, of course, was following in the footsteps of president wilson. it was this idea of liberal order and the organization and when fdr comes back and addresses the joint session of congress and senate and says that the old world disappeared and we are in a completely

different world where there is no any more secret agreements done so he announces diplomatic relations and the answer is to what degree he believes in that and then things started popping up and there is a secret agreement in the participation of the war, and there are problems with eastern europe and poland and that's where the reality of the -- of the influence and the vision of the new liberal world come and clash and from that point of view, the expectations from yalta become much, much more higher and partially because the participants themselves and fdr in particular put them on that level and one more comment on

the -- on the internal politics of eastern europe and whether it was sold down or not is that churchill comes back from yalta to evolve in his own conservative party and there are attacks on the government policy and the concessions and the parliament and again, for a lot of people in britain -- britain went to war for poland. it's a major issue and exactly as you said, what britain was getting as a result what the world was getting as the result of that. with fdr, the polish, he was talking about, it seems to me, 3 to 6 million polish voters in the united states. i'm not sure about the number, but that's what he was talking

about ask he was saying i'm not against this changing of the polish borders and i can't commit to those publicly until the presidential elections the letters you read before that, they were the staunchest supporters of the democratic party that ever existed in the world. >> yes. >> and my guess they didn't stay so dedicated -- >> that's my guess as well. >> yeah, i think the secrecy of the agreement was an important point that historians have paid attention to, that it trickled out what happened at yalta. in the course of the spring and i think he had a secret agreement on what the u.s. had to give for the soviet union to get involved in the war in the far east. you talked about it. that, i think, came in in february of '46, a year after yalta. it was that secrecy that, of

course, gave the republicans the means to create the yalta myth that eastern europe was sold down the river because became bigger and bigger into the later 1940s and i'm glad that the doctor went a bit into the historiography. this is how yalta was being discussed throughout the 1950s. i think it was very early, like ten years after yalta, that the volume on yalta was published which is our principle source on the american side of what actually came to pass. >> it was '55. >> very early on, actually. usually it takes 30 years before a volume is published on any given event. >> we have a question -- >> i don't think you're on, jeremy. >> there we go. we have a question to your right from dr. dupont. >> two, actually.

one for any or all of you and one very specific. the general question is, everyone used language like the u.s. gave or churchill gave and so on and so forth. specifically about eastern europe, can you tell me one thing that was, quote, given away that stalin had not already earned through military means? that's my first question, more general. the second is very specific to mr. bishop. and i'm not sure whether you were defending churchill or setting up a theory about why he thought this and so on. but it seems to me there's an inherent contradiction between your later interpretation of his being appalled at what's happening in eastern europe and the fact that he wrote on the napkin. in other words, his famous napkin, as i understand it, was initiated by him. so either you're arguing that

there was some sort but it was that he contributed mightily to what happened after the war by his acquiescence in moscow. >> why don't you take that one first. >> it's a tough crowd. >> yeah, it is. >> you make a very good point. i mentioned it only because i didn't want to present churchill as being somehow unrealistically above all of the sorted compromises involved in diplomacy and with yalta in particular. but all i can say is, he wasn't seating complete control to stalin, even on that paper. there was a symbolic 10%, say, for the west and romania. i don't think that he wished for or foresaw what was going to happen later. i just think it was an example of his commitment to empire and the -- and his vision for what the world should look like in

the future becoming dominant because he was there alone with stalin and fdr wasn't there at the time. and the irony, of course, is that things changed in greece so very quickly. here he forged an agreement with stalin which ironically enough, stalin kept. obviously, for his own reasons. and, of course, britain intervenes in the civil war, but they can't maintain this commitment, as i mentioned earlier, and they step back and the americans step in. it wasn't churchill's finest moment, let's put it that way. and he himself said it was a naughty document and he felt somewhat uncomfortable about it. in the end, keep in mind churchill lived to be 90. he had a six-decade -- or seven-decade, almost, political career. some of his views shifted over time. although i think he's a lot more consistent than most people give him credit for. but the fact remains that even

though he was horrified by the yalta settlement, he was alert to any sign there might be an opportunity for a breakthrough in relations with the soviets. and i quoted some of the things he wrote and said about the aftermath of the death of stalin and how he saw that as an opportunity to bring about a peaceful settlement of the cold war. >> before we get to the other question, isn't it possible to have told both -- to hold both those positions, to hand you a spheres of influence agreement t it against co communism. he was a bedrock anticommunist. i guess i've -- i've gone through life, i realize we're complex beings, later it's replaced by another one of our conceptions. he rails on about the horrors of

bolshevism. >> he preferred adlay stevenson, that he was disappointed at eisenhower's victory. he found the comment that the soviet union was the same whore in a different dress was distressing. and the american secretary of state who he said was the only bull he knew who carried his own china shop with him. you read some of this stuff and it makes you wonder. but the fact is, having been so adamant and sincere and consistent throughout his career regarding his hatred of communism, he was genuinely horrified by the idea that the world might consume itself in nuclear war and he wanted to do everything he could to avert that.

he was capable of change, maintained, i think, the big principles consistently throughout. but was able, sometimes more than east given credit for, to adapt to changing circumstances. >> if i can add, i wouldn't advise anybody to take at face value what you read in churchill's memoirs. that famous story about napkin, one week of negotiations was there and so on and so forth. and basically, yes, maybe there was a moment, but it was the top of the iceberg of negotiations. and churchill was much closer to stalin than to roosevelt in terms of understanding how the world should be organized, the spheres of influence, what he didn't like, it wasn't sphere of influence per se, he didn't like where poland was going as a result of that. and in that sense, he was

consistent, sphere of influence, but he wanted more as the war was coming to an end. so, again, but some of his ideas certainly -- and he goes to yalta here, he understands that he has a weak hand. and he wants -- he then writes later that, yeah, chamberlain was wrong to trust, to trust hitler and i don't think i'm wrong to trust stalin. this is after yalta. and he's in a situation where there's very little for him to go on apart from stalin's word which probably addresses also to a degree your question about what did fdr have to give to stalin, very little, but there was something. there was something that stalin wanted from them in eastern europe. in the pacific, it's very clear,

he wanted territories and he was prepared to send his army into the battle. in eastern europe, he needed legitimacy and recognition, international recognition, for his territorial acquisitions. and that's what they could give him and play some sorts of games and that's what the negotiations about polish government were about. that's why he tried to say, i didn't interfere with what you did in paris and france. he was saying that but he didn't -- there was still a have a near of diplomacy and negotiations and so on and so forth because he needed international legitimacy. >> let me also add to what michael said, there might have been a bit of guilt on churchill's part. i think they could be fleshed out a bit more. stalin dies on -- i think it was

march 5th, 1953. and churchill comes out and says this will be a good opportunity to meet the new leadership at the highest level, meaning another kind of summit meeting, and i think he was trying to sort of resolve the cold war right then and there if he could. however, the problem was now eisenhower was president, since january. and eisenhower gave a speech at this time saying, well, he was not so excited about a summit because the soviets would need to make major concessions. korean armies is working on that. the austrian treaty and he had certain conditions that the soviets needed to make concessions before we sit down with them in a summit meeting. churchill fell sick, i think.

and nothing happened for the next few weeks, and then the summit that happened actually was at bermuda. and that was late in 1953. and it was the french, british, american summit. and that's when eisenhower made that remarkable saying about the woman in the street that is the same whore underneath talking about the soviet union. so this sort of tension between churchill and eisenhower carried into this era when eisenhower was president and when some historians think a great opportunity was missed, maybe to bring the cold war to an end. this was also the time when the nuclear arms race really expanded with the first h-bombs being detonated and churchill was horrified about those weapons and those tests in '54 and so forth. so it was also an effort, possibly, to keep the nuclear

arms race in check if such a meeting could be affected with the soviets. but the soviets weren't really prepared yet to meet either, finally, because they needed to figure out who would be stalin's successor. the beauty about democratic governance, we have a election every four years. if we don't like the guy in the white house, we can vote him out. it took the soviets almost two years to find a new leader in their leader. >> did you have a point to add? >> didn't bobby have two questions? who had -- what we had to give? did we give them anything -- we probably dealt with that

already. >> one thing that puzzles me, what are all of these percentages? percentages of what? >> that's a good question. >> was it resources? i've always wondered exactly what churchill was thinking about when he was doing these percentages of influence. >> i can see myself jotting down that note to myself, maybe all of us can. you're working on ideas in your own head. i know this is a week or ten days of discussion of this very point of who would have what spheres of influence. but the wisdom of the typical american undergraduate, some will say, what is 10% greece actually mean or whatever -- >> theoretically, it could have been just an effort to at least symbolically say, hey, we're not going to withdraw entirely. we're not going to give you stalin and entirely free hand even if there wasn't a lot of thought behind it and an idea of a 10% role in what would happen

in romania didn't mean anything. >> i think the understanding of the spheres, stalin and churchill were sphere influence guys. but it means different. and as michael said, for churchill, that was the way that -- neither the soviet union. so it's predominantly your area, but we can be there, our observers can be there, our businesses can be there, and so on and so forth. for stalin, that was unacceptable and it was later said that while the only way for us to coexist with the west is to decide this is yours and this is ours. because they knew that idealogically they were very

insecure and economically after marshall plan was there, they knew they can't compete with the united states. so their way was to -- the iron curtain. and that's where complexity of churchill's position is. he's not against spheres of influence, but he's against iron curtain. so the -- the exclusive sphere of influence, this is not how he understands the world. >> jim to your right has a question and i'll get over to the other side of the room. >> you guys shared the statistics about the casualties. what was the west's perception of those numbers? did they trust them? did they know it or they thought it was stalin pontificating and related that they perceive that had the soviets could continue the sacrifices both militarily and economically and did that make a difference? >> i'll start. i'm sure others can chime in.

from the start of american -- u.s. involvement in world war ii, it was clear who was bearing the burden of fighting the germans. whether the exact statistics were known, that's a good question. in fact, they're still being argued around today. there was a radical revision of the statistics in the '0e90s wi the fall of communism. and we're not sure what soviet casualties were in world war ii. the notion that they had to be kept in the field because they were bearing the biggest burden, it was the bedrock of roosevelt's foreign policy and roosevelt's strategy for winning the war. >> well, i certainly agree with what rob just said and it seems to me five sometimes stalin appeared on the cover of "time magazine." and, again, in recognition of those red army victories.

so that reality was clear. in terms of the actual numbers, the soviets didn't know them themselves. >> good point. >> the first time khrushov came up with a number, it was 20 million and it was as he emerged as a successor to stalin and today's estimate is 27 million. but stalin was not talking about those numbers because that was putting himself in a bad light. to his generals he said that any other people but russians would kick us out for what happened during the war. so he was not eager to do the numbers or give those numbers to anybody. >> i may just remind you that the national world war ii museum has a much watched movie "beyond all boundaries" and the number

>> gentleman to your left, please. >> one of you brought up that there was 15 minutes or so spent on a document which was signed about the democracy that blossomed into something in the future. how did that have an impact on the soviet union -- >> the declaration on liberated europe? >> yeah. >> the -- there were major concerns on the american side that stalin would not sign that and the declaration was put together -- there was a long preparation for something like that, that would have teeth, the way there would be a body that

would oversee that, that there would be ways how the policies can be implemented. eventually it was decided that stalin would not go for that. so it was a -- it became a declaration as opposed to an agreement, per se. which put certainly lower than other agreements or specific agreements that were reached at yalta in terms of its power. and stalin said, okay, let's sign. he was horrified by that. he said, we shouldn't do that. that will give them an instrument and stalin, according to the memoirs -- not memoirs, but he was telling that to somebody in the '60s and '70s in interviews, he said that stalin responded to him that, well, don't worry, we'll figure that out. what really matters is actually

this position of the forces on the ground. let them have the declaration. and, again, it was a few minutes and it was signed, americans were surprised. that was a declaration without teeth. and when the world went into the cold war mode, that was the only document where someone could argue that stalin violated the promises given at yalta. because everything else, the language was so careful that there was no -- there were no specific violations per se. and when harmon was returning, it seems to me he was talking to one of the military commanders, again, i don't remember who it was. we signed, i just saw that they can be stretched from here to

washington. and the other said, yeah, it looks like we have to start negotiation on poland from scratch all over again. but that document, the declaration, that was also the way for roosevelt to come back, including to his polish electorate and say i brought something. i didn't help as we know. but that was -- that was more a political document for domestic consumption back in the united states. >> i think we should also add that the polish issue at yalta had two sides to it, number one, the borders. this is something that mark would remind us of and the other issue is a future polish government. the fact is that stalin had created conditions on the ground by setting up the poland

government. communists that he had back in moscow that came to eastern poland where he set up the government and this sort of -- the west, fdr and churchill, particularly, were afraid of what percentage the future mode of establishing governments in eastern europe were -- countries were being liberated. and they kept insisting that they wanted the polish government in exile, the pols, to be represented in the polish government. and in that context, the decoration of liberated europe came on as a means to safe face for roosevelt back home with the polish voters that in fact he had battled for poland with this declaration. but it was a very weak declaration the way it was worded and never really did the trick of enabling free elections to be held in eastern europe, that sort of would guarantee a

democratic future for those countries. >> let's wait for the microphone, sir, nobody is going to be able to hear you. i'll bring it back. >> wasn't it a seed that was used by organizations like solidarity and so forth, or am i thinking of another document. once in the '80s -- >> probably it is a helsinki act 1975. >> yeah, i think that's -- >> yes, yes. and human rights part of the agreements that were reached there. that jump started also -- helped to start the dissident moment, human rights watch and so on and so forth. >> mindful of our time limit, i'm going to ask the subsequent questions to direct -- to be

directed at one individual panelist. if that's okay. so we can try to get to all of the hands that are up. i know there's about three of them still. >> so i just want to point out that this government that are wringing their hands about democracy europe, especially americans, had no problem interfering in latin america. cuba, puerto rico, wherever you wanted. the other thing is that poland, if -- was dismembered by germany, was destroyed as an entity and reconstructed. so there was some -- you could say that churchill -- that world war ii, they want to recover poland and poland was recovered. under the guise of -- under the control of stalin. but in the end, as a unity which

was lost under nazism, right? germany removed part of the country under germany. we could say there was a little happy ending to this world war ii episode, if we want, for the polish. and whether the government -- would churchill's have been so control -- was this under communism the whole point? again, i don't see churchill being very bothered by democracy in india or democracy in egypt or other things, right? >> britain has stood for the rights of small nations except ireland. it's the world of politics. there are moments when you can afford your idealism and there are moments when realism seems to be the order of the day. that would be my comment. i didn't know you had a question

so much. that would be my comment on that. >> michael, do you have anything since there was a churchill slant to that question? >> well, i think that -- one can only speculate what would -- what would churchill's views be if russia was -- if a noncommunist state? this has been said before, both churchill and stalin were more comfortable with the whole spheres of influence way of looking at the world than say roosevelt was. it's possible that if you took so communism out of the equation, churchill would have been more comfortable with the russian influence in poland. but keep in mind, he was one of those warning against appeasement, arguing for rearmament in britain and ultimately it became first lord of the admiral for a second time and rejoined the government only after the invasion of poland. so i think that saving poland

was something that would have been important to him and was important to him from the beginning. >> gentlemen, to your left and the front row here, please. >> this question is for the doctor. you talked about looking at yalta in different lens, correct? my question is really based on looking at the it through the lens -- from bottom to top, instead of top to bottom. how did reactions from, say, domestic political ideas from each of the big threes respective countries, how did they react to the yalta conference, if they had any reactions at the all? >> that's a very good question. and i think we've already heard that information about what had happened at yalta leaked out in dribs and drabs over the course of several years. and eventually this narrative,

which i would call it still the standard narrative on yalta, it comes back no matter how many times you try to slay it. and that would be formed over the next several years. i can't say there was a major -- there was some major public reaction or dominant public reaction to yalta because i think for all the talk about open agreements, openly arrived at in a wilsonian since, you're doing back room diplomacy because there are still secret agreements being made at yalta. and the formulas, the crystallization of this anti-yalta narrative is going to be over the course of several years. the germans' cityinies are not being overrun. >> gentlemen, back to your left, please. >> this question is to

mr. bishop. i would like to know what you think winston churchill would say or do. we talked about the winning of the cold war and the rise of democracy in eastern european countries, what he would say in response to putin in crimea and ukraine in the rise of nationalism in the loss of democracy in poland and hungary and the other countries. would we have another iron curtain speech? >> a friend of mine, a lincoln scholar, was on the radio in boston back in the '70s for a calling program. someone called in and asked, what would lincoln have said about bussing, which is the big issue of the time. and my historian friend responded by saying, what's a bus? it's always dangerous to try and divine these sorts of things. but i do think that churchill

would have viewed russia and putin with the same jaundice and weary eye that he always did, the soviet union, and i think he would be dismayed that this resort destination where he spent this glorious week on the riviera of hades with his fellow leaders was going to be seated back to ukraine and seized again by putin in the year, what, 2013 or 2014. anyway, i think that -- i would like to think that he would be -- he would be vigilant and on guard and would be making very inspirational speeches while at the same time pursuing the interests of the uk in a very canny and effective way. >> panelists all the way in the back center, please. >> i'm wondering in the terms of

the perception of the united states of yalta immediately after it was the end of the war where the soviet union had been presented as an ally and then the soviet union has seen wars fought on its territory twice in 30 years, that giving them a set of buffer states is understandable and legitimate and, therefore, it was perceived as a sellout by the average american at that point. >> we've heard lots about how the information trickled out slowly. so the american perception is in some quarters, particularly amongst republicans, what's beginning to change as it was become known what kind of agreements have been made secretly. because i think, you know, the

traditional -- even though you expect it from the democratic parties since fdr took that over from wilson, that was a stark reminder and i think that's where the percentage agreement, of course, comes in too. that was traditional, old-fashioned european diplomacy. the percentage agreement, the way americans and wilsonians and roosevelten policy didn't want to see it. but the american public didn't know a lot about what happened at yalta. it only came out in little spurts, as i said, all the way down to 1946 and even 1955. it took a long time to really find out what had been agreed to at yalta. but the agreement on poland, particularly, then, led towards this myth. he was the historian in the '70s who wrote a big book about the yalta myth that took ahold in the republican party that there you have it, the 4q,v!úpás,

roosevelt, are up again to their old things. they're not defending democracy as they should. they're selling nations like poland down the river and i think that's why the perception slowly set in, but in a partisan way. i think that's the importance of the yalta myth the way it was analyzed, that this became very muchá>kr a partisan kind of myt. and not all americans would share that. >> paul has a question on the front row, gentleman. >> when you talk about postwar politics in america, you can't miss a comment about the house un-american activities committee and how it came into being aing probably because of this low leakage about information and yalta. >> the committee came into being in 1940 and at that time -- in

the united states and only after world war ii to house activities committee, redirected towards chasing communists out of the american government. the house un-american activities committee was sort of subverted after the war towards the new purpose of anticommunist activity, that was to be investigated. and truman himself started to investigate such anticommunist activity in the federal government in 1947. and people were fired from the federal government. but then, of course, came a fellow, it's been mentioned, named joe mccarthy who needed an issue in 1950 to be re-elected. it would and the president said,

the seaway is a big topic. and mccarthy said, that's boring. nobody is interested this that. >> i just fell asleep. >> and then joe said anticommunist in government. and that's what mccarthy picked up and a few weeks later he held the lincoln day speech in west virginia and talked about 57 communists in the state department. from there, mccarthyism took its strange fate, if you will. i know there's -- i should mention it pretty well because i wrote my master thesis on the relationship eisenhower and mccarthy. and remember what eisenhower said, we have to give him enough rope to hang himself. that's how it worked out in the end. >> the chairman -- the house.

but it was -- >> well, ladies and gentlemen, let's give a round of applause for our panel. before everyone gets up, i have a couple of closing remarks and then i will give the podium to rob. thank you for a great day, for your questions, both online, but especially you all being here physically with us and seeing for maybe the first time our brand-new higgins hotel. we have wonderful programming throughout the year. keep in mind and look on our website for the september memory wars conference, world war ii at 75. we talked a lot about the legacy of world war ii or of yalta

today. this conference in september we'll be discussing how the war is remembered throughout the world and how it is very relevant to current political and diplomatic affairs. it is looking at it through public memorials, museums, monuments. so that's going to be one in september. and then the week after vj day, the week after the surrender ceremony on september 2nd. the next one is our international conference on world war ii that is in november, the weekend before thanksgiving. so let me ask for the final time for one of our speakers, dr. rob citino, to come to the stage and make closing remarks at our senior historian. thank you. >> thanks. [ applause ] i promise to keep this short. i'm all that's left between you and the door. as i was listening to the talks

today, i think we had a great and rich day of discussion on yalta. two issues crystalized in my mind, what does yalta mean? why is it important? and this view of foreign policy that you have, someone asked about, well, isn't this typical, redrawing boundaries with little concern for the peoples involved, that's how it's always been. but woodrow wilson said, that's not how it should be. that's been a strain in u.s. foreign policy sense then, certainly in the roosevelt administration. we sometimes say wilsonian idealism. we can work together for a common purpose and common good. a wonderful book by a historian called "the wilsonian moment" about the post world war i period and you may be able to draw some conclusions about world war ii. i will end with this. i think the meaning of yalta is how important it is to end your

wars, to think about how you end wars. they're easy to get into. but wrapping them up successfully is often a very, very difficult thing. we're told, the great philosopher, war is the continuation of politics by other means. and you have to consider that from the beginning of the war, why are we fighting and how can we get that thing out of the war? there's the british military analyst, one of my favorite quotes, why do you fight wars? you fight them for a better peace. you didn't like something about the situation that you decided to go to war and spend billions of dollars of treasure and lose hundreds of thousands of lives in america. millions in the case of the soviet union. a and so i think on that note, let's leave our discussion of the yalta conference and think about what a better peace might have meant in 1945. as i always do in these affairs, i will end with the words of

douglas mcarthur, these proceedings are closed. thank you. weeknights this month we're featuring american history tv programs as a preview of what's available every weekend on c-span3. tonight, a discussion on slavery. and emancipation. former interpreters at the colonial willamsburg foundation talk about bringing african-american stories to life and how they felt compelled to tell their ancestor stories appropriately. panelists include american civil war museum ceo christy coleman and curator rex ellis. watch tonight beginning at 8:00 p.m. eastern and enjoy american history tv every weekend on c-span3.

you're watching american history tv. every weekend on c-span3, explore our nation's past. american history tv on c-span3, created by america's cable television companies and today we're brought to you by these television companies who provide american history tv to viewers as a public service. history professor gunter bischof looks at summits in iran, québec and moscow. he reviews the postwar decisions made during these meetings and the political leaders in attendance. the national world war ii museum hosted the event. >> greetings, ladies and gentlemen. it's a pleasure to see you all here and it's always great to see -- i don't want to say so many. probably all are familiar faces because you are so loyal to our programming and we saw most of