we're featuring american history tv programs as a preview of what's available every weekend on c-span3. tonight we focus on union generals in the civil war about the relationship between ulysses s. grant and william tecumseh sherman. enjoy american history tv every weekend on c-span3. you're watching c-span3, your unfiltered view of government. c-span3 was created by america's cable television companies, and today we're brought to you by these television companies who provide c-span3 to viewers as a public service. up next congressional members and staff hear from a political scientist and a historian who spent their career

studying american and iranian relations. they traced the nuclear program which started in 1957 with the assistance of the eisenhower administration as part of an atoms for peace initiative. this event hosted by the national history center. okay. good morning. this is an amazing crowd. we've already had to turn away i'd say a good 50 people or more. i'm dane kennedy. i'm director of the national history center. i want to welcome you to this briefing on the history of u.s.-iranian relations. this is part of an ongoing series that the national history center provides to bring historical perspectives to current issues that are confronting congress and the nation. the purpose of the program is not to provide or advocate for any particular political

position. it is non-partisan, certainly non-partisan. it is intended to inform policy makers and the public about the sorts of issues that they are dealing with. i want to first give a few thanks first to the mellen foundation for providing the funding that makes these briefings possible. i also want to thank our assistant jeffrey, who is outside this room, for helping to make the arrangements. i want to thank the office of gerry connolly, which booked the room. and i want to sort of remind our -- or explain why there were index cards on your seats and why we're passing index cards around. what we will do after the presentations by the speakers is we will get questions, answer questions. but we would like you to write those questions on the index

cards rather than ask them in front of the audience. so, keep your index cards ready and jot down questions when they come to mind. and so now i will turn this over to matthew to offer introductions. >> all right. well, thank you dane and jeff and everybody who helped arrange this event. everyone out there who supports the national history center and the american histotor cal association and all the other professional organizations and networks that help historians thrive. and thank you all for coming to the event. we'll have to get you information about professional organizations like shaffer, the society for historians of american and foreign relations. so, panel rooms are full like this every june when that organization meets. but what we're talking about today is the history of

u.s.-iran relations. that's our theme. this binational relationship, as with most history, is a matter of perspective, how one defines it. to some, we need to understand why thomas jefferson had books about cyrus the great in his library. to others we might need to study the arrival of american missionaries in iran in the 1830s and study the work and education and public health that they continued to do through the mid 20th century. some would contend that this early history was displaced by the official u.s. presence in iran, which arguably began during the second world war and came in the form of tens of thousands of troops. others would point to dates like 1953 when an anglo-american coup through over a democratically elected government in the height of the cold war.

in 1979 the near 40-year rule of the u.s. ally came to an end. the monarchy was placed with the islamic republic of iran which just commemorated the 40th anniversary of its revolution this past february. so, we have the deep past, the kind of cold war period and then the more contemporary post-'79 era. regardless of the period one studies, it's an exciting time to be studying the history of u.s.-iran relations. not because of daily headlines but because of developments within the profession. today we have a range of methodologies that can help us better understand the past. despite methodological differences, military historians work along side scholars of broader and transnational trends. in this rich interpretive landscapes, the annals of history continue to unfold through the continued declassification of documents or the reinterpretation of old

documents through the lenses of race, culture, gender and emotion just to name a few. in addition to these historical subfields, other disciplines help drive the conversation. if one comes from the iranian studies or middleal east studies background, these inherently interdisciplinary area of inquiry. one could borrow from other disciplines besides history as well. political science, for instance, is always helping to move the conversation about u.s.-iran relations forward. that's what brings me then to the introductions. we have two speakers today. one is mark gasiorowski, professor in the department of political science in the tulane university. i will not read his cv to you all here, but you have plenty of biographical information on the program. but many of us probably have read his book, "u.s. foreign policy and the shaw" published in 1991, in addition to his path-breaking articles.

john ghazvinian is our second presenter. he is the associate director of the middle east center at the university of pennsylvania. he also has a very long list of publications, but i would just alert you to one. it's forthcoming and titled "iran and america: a history" and you'll be able to pick that up here maybe in the coming months or year or so, when it's published. with that i'll turn the floor over to professor gasiorowski. >> thank you, matt, and thank to dane and the national history center for inviting me here. i'm going to talk about -- or give a sketch -- it's about all i can do in 15 minutes -- give a sketch of u.s. policy toward iran since the revolution 40 years ago. u.s. has really shifted a lot and sort of cycled back and forth between different

approaches toward iran. to simplify things a little bit, i would say that u.s. policy toward iran has sort of cycled through three main postures toward iran in the 40 years since the revolution. first a posture of engagement in which the u.s. uses primarily diplomacy forward iran and toward third parties to try to reach a comprehensive settlement of outstanding differences with iran rather than just specific narrow issues and also engagement usually is aimed at bringing about some kind of domestic change in iran, although certainly peacefully, mainly encouraging moderates. the model for engagement, or at least a very good model for engagement, is say u.s.-china in the 1970s when the u.s. and china went from being extremely hostile toward each other toward a much more cooperative

relationship. so, engagement is one posture that the u.s. has taken from time to time. secondly, coercion where the u.s. also is trying to bring about big comprehensive change in iran's behavior but in a much more hostile way, using economic sanctions or military action of various kinds, various levels to try to intimidate iran into backing down across the board or really what the preference usually is, using these kinds of hostile measures to carry out regime change in iran, to try to bring down the islamic regime or at least change it very substantially. thirdly, containment. repeatedly, the u.s. has sort of returned to a posture of containment toward iran where we try to limit iran's objectionable behavior but without any great hopes of

achieving big change. sometimes in periods of containment the u.s. and iran have made rather limited sort of transactional agreements that are mutually beneficial. but containment is limited transactional agreements, that are mutually beneficial. but containment is mainly aimed at just that. containing iranian influence. limiting, it particularly limiting it's a geographic spread in the region. very much like you ask containment efforts towards the soviet union throughout the cold war. so i am going to very briefly sketched through what i would call ten distinct periods of u.s. policy towards iran, since the revolution. the others i will skip through very quickly because they're not important today. >> there is an awful lot written about this today. john's forthcoming book will be

very good. the other one that i would recommend him out yet -- the twilight war, which i think you will find very interesting. >> first of all, the first ten years after the revolution, 1979 until about 19 89th u.s. really bounced back and forth between different approaches. the carter administration before the u.s. hostages were taken in december of 1970, nine the us embassy in tehran was seized by iranian radicals. before then the carter administration made extensive efforts to try and encourage moderates, and tried to swing the iranian revolution in a moderate direction. of course this didn't work. they did to some extent continue this after the hostages were taken, but very quickly the carter

administration was consumed with trying to get the hostages released. and iran was in this process of rapid radicalization, and it just made impossible any efforts by the u.s. to achieve change with iran. so the carter administration was a time of engagement. this was entirely frustrated by growing radicalization in iran. >> second time period. basically the first reagan administration. 81 through 84. you might think this was a period of hostility incursion in iran. there was a certain amount of hostility, but this really wasn't a phase of coercion, i would really score this as a phase of containment towards iran. and quite surprisingly, given that there were meter clashes between the u.s. and iran, especially in lebanon in the early 19 eighties, iran was backing basically groups that were precursors to hezbollah of

lebanon. and they did a lot of nasty things. killed several hundred americans in various terrorist attacks in iran in the early eighties, took about 50 americans civilians to government personnel hostage. some of them were tortured to death. there was a lot of severe hostility and attacks by iran towards the u.s.. >> despite that, the reagan administration was really restrained and in fact it didn't really retaliate for most of the stuff. >> so the early reagan period i would score as containment. and relatively effective in this regard. >> iran rapidly became very isolated in this period of the early 1980s. >> second reagan period is the period of the iran contra affair which is pretty fascinating detail that's ancient history at this point. >> 1985, 1986, the reagan administration tried number one to get hostages in lebanon

released, but also the iran contra affair was aimed at number two, trying to initiate a -- with iran that would hopefully snowball and lead to comprehensive change in moderation on the part of the iranians. this of course didn't work. once again, radicals in iran very much to repeat of this initiative. so i would score iran contra as an effort in engagement but it too didn't work just like herders efforts. >> after iran contra, the last two years of the reagan administration, basically this was a period of reversion to containment. there was a lot of tension between the u.s. and iran at this period. military clashes between the u.s. and iran in the persian gulf in the last couple of years of the iran iraq war. and various other kinds of tension. not really coercion, but

certainly far from engagement. >> so the first tenure cycling back and forth between engagement and coercion. engagement and containment. nothing really working very well. >> the first bush administration coming into office in the early 1989, at least initially, sort of give the look of pursuing rapproachment with iran, but it never got anywhere. the bush administration's famous phrase. in bushes inaugural speech in 1989 was good will begets goodwill. in other words, if iran chose goodwill to the u.s. that mainly meant getting their friends in lebanon to release the remaining american hostages in lebanon. if iran shows goodwill we will reciprocate. one problem was that it took three years for the remaining hostages in lebanon to be released. so it wasn't until december of

1991 that they were released. but overtime things had changed quite a bit. >> and secondly, u.s. priorities shift rapidly. after the desert storm war, the madrid peace process began. the first bush administration was very invested than that. pushed very hard. iran was very much an opponent. and that really soured the prospects for their relations. >> so i would score the first bush administration as really a period of containment, even though there was a little bit of talk about maybe engaging in, pursuing engagement. but that never really got off the ground. >> the early clinton period largely continue this. the clinton administration was pursuing many of the same goals as the bush administration the middle east. especially the israeli palestinian peace process, which walked into the -- process under clinton.

also, in the early clinton years, iran was carrying out a lot of peer attacks. especially in europe but also as swear. assassinating iranian exiles. and also a couple of attacks in argentina and elsewhere. so there is a period in which iran is being rather schizophrenia. on the one hand, being rather open to the united states in terms of its talking points, but on the other hand carrying out some very, very nasty attacks. all of this culminated in the towers bombing in 1986. back in iran, although certainly not carried out by iran, in which 19 u.s. air force personnel were killed in a very, very dramatic terrorist attack. there was strong suspicion immediately that iran was behind this, but the clinton administration did not get concrete proof of this for quite some time. so the clinton administration chose to wait until they had

strong evidence. by the time they had strong evidence things had changed a lot in a run in which i will talk about in a minute. so the clinton administration never retaliated to the military of course. they retaliated with a fascinating covert operation called operation sapphire. you can look on the internet and find out about it. it is interesting. all this changed very much in the beginning i guess, the more important period for today in u.s. iran early -- relations comes in may of 1977 when a stunning election outcome immersed in iran, -- mohammed was elected president in iran and he very quickly began making very pronounced overtures towards the united states, and the clinton administration very quickly realize that there was a important change happening here, and began to reciprocate. so beginning maybe the

beginning of 1988 the clinton administration began pursuing engagement with to. by trying to strengthen -- the, trying to take advantage of the change that had occurred in iran and see if they can make something of it. unfortunate nothing came of it. especially not in the name of the clinton term. but it certainly was a tantalizing period. and it was one of the several pairs of engagement that the u.s. has pursued. the george w. bush administration sort of inherited this from clinton. and in some ways, conditions were even a little bit more fruitful having to do with what was going on internally in iran in 2001. the very beginning of the george w. bush administration. the bush administration in this period never really formulated its you and policy and had conflicting views, real hard-liners, wanted to be tough on iran but soft landing people

wanting to continue obama's approach of engagement. >> but once 9:11 came along that of course entirely changed everything. >> for a few months after 9/11 iran was actually extremely helpful to the, u.s. especially in afghanistan. they very much facilitated the u.s. overthrow of the taliban government in afghanistan. wipe out al-qaeda turning camps there. and then iran was very helpful in setting up the new post taliban government headed by -- . and the bush administration certainly took advantage of the goodwill by iran, but did not reciprocate. >> pretty quickly, the bush administration after 9/11 began to sort of reveal its new approach towards iran and the middle east in general. broadly speaking, this was phrased at the time as the

global war on terrorism, whose main focus was al-qaeda, but also pretty quickly iraq especially was brought into this as a supporter of terrorism. and iran as well. so in early 2002, bush meat a speech, i think it was a state of the union speech at the time, calling iran part of a axis of evil. this began a period of strong hostility but the united states towards iran. basically a period of coercion which remained for the remainder of the bush administration. -- in 2000, three gradually, in iraq, tensions heated up between the u.s. and iran. with the u.s. apparently supporting various guerrilla forces, carrying out terrorist attacks inside iran. and iran backing shiite

militias in iraq that carried out many many attacks against u.s. forces. so you could say that there was really sort of a low level, secret war playing out in iran at least in the last few years of the george w. bush administration, with hundreds kilt on both sides. hundreds of american military personnel killed with iranian fingerprints on the weapons, and hundreds of iranians killed in terrorist attacks that seem to have been backed by the united states, although this is kind of murky. so certainly, the last seven years or so of the bush administration were a period of coercion. really the model for coercion that is out there today. >> finally of course such brings as to the obama administration, with the failure of the bush administration to really achieve much from its coercive efforts, obama came into office wanting to pursue a different approach. wanting to pursue engagement.

he made a series of speeches, particularly in his first, tier 2009, calling for better relations with iran and tried really hard. but the iraqi instant reciprocate in that period. and so gradually the u.s. began further ratcheting up the economic sanctions that. and obama ratcheted them up very substantially, and iran really started to scream, the economy really went into a tailspin. and so in about 2013 the obama administration launched an initiative towards iran, a secret initiative to negotiate an end to iran's nuclear program, or at least scale it back. john we'll talk about in a minute. of course this led to the jcpoa nuclear agreement of 2015. the obama people certainly hope that this would lead further to a broader reproach meant, and this was certainly a broad engagement effort, but nothing

came of that. iran certainly agreed to limit its nuclear program and has been abiding to that program up until recently but nothing for the came of it. so in this sense, obama's engagement initiative, if the goal was a broader rapproachment was a failure. that brings us up to the trump administration, i would say that the trump administration has not fully revealed what its intentions are towards iran. but clearly the u.s. has been quite hostile towards iran. but i would say it is not at all out of the question that president trump might decide to do with iran which he has been doing with north korea, which has been pretty bizarre, but it is not out of the question. he might try that with iran. he has hinted at that. so it is too early to say what the trump approach is. so what conclusions can we draw from this sort of cycling back and forth among the three

posture towards iran? the main conclusion is that nothing has really worked well with iran iran just doesn't really respond either to friendship and hostility from the united states. engagement. there have been four major efforts of engagement. carter and obama. none of them produced anything aside from small agreements here and there. mainly because radical forces inside your iran continued to veto these efforts, they are still there now, maybe stronger than they have been in recent years. so engagement has not really been successful so far. i think its prospects right now are very limited. >> secondly, coercion. the main u.s. effort that coerced was the georgia liu bush administration. like i explained a minute ago. this went nowhere. in fact it was quite harmful to the united states. hundreds of u.s. personnel killed, with iranian

fingerprints, and not be stopping to the iranian nuclear program at that period. so coercion also has not worked in the past. so this brings us to containment. i would say the containment also has not worked very well towards iran, although maybe better that engagement and coercion. iran has expanded its presence over the years in places like lebanon, iraq, syria, and now yemen to some extent, elsewhere, among the palestinians. but on the other hand, iran is pretty isolated in the middle east. the only government that is very friendly with iran is syria, and that is just a shadow of a government. iran has a few friends here and they're like hezbollah, but it is really very isolated. so containment has had some successes, and there have been some small, specific sort of transactional agreements reached in the various

containment initiatives that we have seen. most importantly the jcpoa of 2015. so i think that containment is about the only thing that we can hope for for the foreseeable future. i don't think conditions are right either for engagement or four coercion towards iran. and the fundamental problem remains political forces inside iran, radicals remain pretty strong, especially the supreme leader, who is overwhelmingly the key figure in iran. he is deeply anti-american. he always has been, he always will be. one ray of light. one piece of good news i guess i could mention is that he is now 80 years old, he's, ailing he has prostate cancer. he's last a long time. he's been in office but 30 years now, but one of the states he will exit the scene. maybe in five years, something like that.

that might possibly conceivably bring about change in iran, as the death of stalin, the death of a mounted in soviet union china, but the u.s. should be prepared for the possibility, of course there's no guarantee that the new era would be any better. so probably contained for the foreseeable future is the best that we could hope for, sadly to say. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much. very big thank you for inviting me. thank you to matt and mark. it is a great honor to be able to share the stage with these historians. it's exciting with so many people here in this room.

i will try to be as boring as i can so that you leave some seats. can somebody give john a seat. the former u.s. hostage in the embassy i think he deserves a seat. good job. i think that is really important. >> i will try to be as brief as i can. >> as mark says, i'm going to address the nuclear issue, which is something that we obviously have been talking about for a long time. and i'm going to take a unusual approach to this, many of you may disagree, i am happy to talk about it in the queue and a, but as a historian, i have been working for a number of years on this book on u.s. iran relations. it's one of those things when you tell someone you're working on it, people want to know what you're thinking. i remember several years ago

when the jcpoa was being negotiated people were like oh used to the u.s. iran relations, what do you think of the? deal is it a good deal? a bad deal? i would surprise people blessing itself evidently a good deal. i think anyone who looks closely would say that. but i think it's actually irrelevant. i think it is actually not really the real issue. this entire nuclear issue that has been conjuring up for several years is largely a distraction. and it's difficult to really engage with in isolation from these other issues concerning u.s. iran relations. that is something that might surprise people. i am not sure i entirely agree with. that i think if you look from the perspective of his history, if you look at the history of the iranian nuclear program, you start to understand why i would make that argument. i'm hoping that perhaps i can make that argument in the few minutes i have here.

my broader claim is that in the absence of trust, in the absence of a constructive conservation -- conversation or constructive channel of diplomacy, genuine diplomacy between the united states and iran, there is not much point in talking about isotopes, fuel rods, enrichment, centrifuges, and so on. i would always say this when we were talking about the jcpoa. i think we have seen that proven to be the case in the last couple of years. we have seen how quickly things unravel when there is not a larger atmosphere that is actually constructive. that nuclear deal was negotiated at a great, great time, and energy. it all disappeared in a different political climate. >> that's what we have to address. mark laid out some of the broader points. i will talk about the history of the iranian nuclear program, hopefully i will get us up to

the current moment we are in so we can understand better why this may not be as important as we think it. is the takeaway message is it is not really about the nuclear program. it's not really about that. so as a historian, let's start at the beginning. i'm just curious, by a show of hands how many people actually, no when the iranian nuclear program began? one. president at the creation. the nuclear program actually begins a 1957, 1958. and it begins with cooperation, actually very vigorous corporation from the united states. it's the eisenhower administration, and it's flagged adams for peace program. this was an attempt after the

words of hiroshima, nagasaki to prove that nuclear power could be used for positive purposes. the idea was that the u.s. could cooperate with developing countries to develop peaceful nuclear energy for their civilian purposes. and so the united states gave iran its first, batch of enriched uranium. about six kilograms of el eu, in the late 1960s, the johnson administration helped iran to build tehran's research reactor. this was radio isotopes for medical purposes. this continues through the late sixties and seventies. it wasn't just democrats. it is important to note, some of the most vigorous advocates of the nuclear program in the early 1970s where people like henry kissinger, donald

rumsfeld, and dick cheney in the fourth administration. if you look at some of the documents, you will see how vigorously they push this. they felt it was critical for iran. why? i will be brief on this. you often hear the talking points from opponents of iran. why does iran need nuclear power? no one can take seriously the idea that they would need nuclear power. well, the u.s. actually felt that iran needed nuclear power. and the basic reason for this, i don't know too many details about this but if you are a developing country that has a lot of oil, it does not make a lot of sense for you to build very expensive refineries to then use that oil for domestic power purposes. it is kind of a waste of time and money. if you have huge amounts of oil you're better off selling on the international market, and using that money to develop a much more sustainable energy program that will last too many years after the oil has run

out. that's what all the studies, u.s. government funding studies in the 19 seventies, that was the case the. made by the way, the u.s. government funded studies in the 19 nineties and 2000 meet the same claims. that basic equation has not changed for iran. the fact that it is a oil-rich country does not mean that it does it need nuclear power. there are always has been a genuine need for nuclear power. as you know, nuclear technology is a dual use technology. it can be used for medical research, energy production, but also for building nuclear weapons. that's where the concern comes from for iran. in the seventies, it wasn't much of a concern. and we kissinger said in an interview ten years ago i don't think the issue of proliferation came up. the fact was, we trusted this close american ally enough that we believed whatever he said when it came to nuclear

program. that doesn't mean we gave him a carte blanche. there are limits on how much cooperation u.s. was able to take with iran, but there wasn't the same atmosphere of distrust that existed. 1979 revolution breaks out, of course, and iran's nuclear program is completely abandoned. it's very important to point out not because united states put this huge amount of pressure on iran to abandon its nuclear program, but because iran chose to abandon it up to 1979. they felt the nuclear program was yet another example of the excessive fascination with shiny western objects and technology, and things that were not islamic, that we're not authentic to an islamic republic and it should be abandoned. this was not the idea of nuclear weapons, it was nuclear program completely. they tell us again and again they are weapons of mass

destruction, a sin against islam, cited a lot of current text against these weapons. even the peaceful search going on, the energy production, the reactor, etc, all of that was the newfangled western technology iran could do without. in no, mothball the entire program. when he died in the late 19 eighties, 1989, a more moderate pragmatic group of people came to power, leaders came to power, and felt that iran cannot accord afford to be so complacent about its energy needs, but it's security needs. the feeling was, yes, it's an islamic to build a bomb, but is it an islamic to do some research to maybe build some centrifuges, enrich uranium? nothing in the crown against that, right? and there's also concern about saddam hussein. this is what's often missed in

a lot of american conversations, that take place in the west about the iranian nuclear program, and we have this conversation about what can the u.s. do, to get iran to do what we want. we forget that iran, despite all the rhetoric, and the heated nature of u.s. iran relations, iran is often less concern with the u.s. is doing rather than the neighbors. let's not forget in the nineties, western intelligence was, global intelligence was convinced that saddam hussein was pursuing weapons of mass destruction, right? you will know about that, right? that's what led to the 2003 war. it wasn't just the was concerned about that. who would be more concerned about that then iraq's neighbor, right? iraq's neighbor, by the way, had just dealt with an eight-year war with a dump -- saddam hussein. no it is was more concern then

iran. was a general moral conflict after he died. do we continue to maintain the strict islamic kind of structure against research and development of the nuclear program? or do we say we won't handle the bomb, but we will go as close as we can do that. build the technology that might make saddam hussein think twice before developing a nuclear weapon. that was the calculation they made. iran's nuclear program in the 1990s therefore was brought out and reinvigorated. it was larger rudimentary. so-called possible military dimensions of that program in the nineties was something that, to this day, had been inconclusive. to what degree was it just some basic first generation centrifuges, or something more than that? that's an open question, but

one of the most interesting things about what happened in the nineties is how was iran going to build the nuclear program? it was easy in the seventies, picked up the phone to washington and got the help you needed. but how is wrong going to do that in the nineties? in the eighties, it's abandoned. the nineties is trying to reinvigorate it. this is a step back once again to history, you have to look at where the larger global infrastructure -- the whole issue that we danced around in terms of the legal infrastructure behind this was the 1968 nonproliferation treatment. very briefly, for those who are not familiar with the npt, it was part of a global initiative to try to avoid a nuclear catastrophe. the idea behind the npt was to

get as many countries as possible to sign it. there are and where three basic principles behind it, disarmament nonproliferation and cooperation. disarmament is the basic just, you have five countries in 1968 that have nuclear weapons. united states, soviet union, great britain, france, and china. the idea is you don't want any more countries to get nuclear weapons, so there are three basic principles behind, which is the five countries that have weapons agree to a gradual process of disarmament, reducing stockpiles, as you may know that process is still ongoing, and has not fully been accomplished. there is nonproliferation, which is the countries that don't have, will promise not to have it. if you are a country that doesn't have nuclear weapons in the sixties, how will you respond to that? that doesn't seem very fair. that's where the third principle comes in, for

cooperation. this was the glue that bound them together. the nuclear haves saying to the have knots, you are going to have to stay have nuts, but we will cooperate with you. we will give you all the help you need to build a peaceful civilian nuclear program, so you aren't being held back scientifically, or in any other way. those are the three basic principles. if you are stupid, you will immediately realize the key is it only works if everyone signs up for it, right? if you are a country, if your neighbor has not signed up to the npt, why would you? go ahead and build a bomb well you don't? a lot of countries that didn't have nuclear weapons were very resistant. not so much the small countries, not countries like -- it's interesting. there is an interview if you years ago with the nuclear

chief, he said we never should've signed. we never should have signed. iran was the first signatories in 1968. it signed the document of the day it open for signatures. and he said none of the major countries signed it. countries that mostly signed it were fiji, nicaragua, countries never going to build the bomb. the mid-range countries, argentina and so on state out. they said, no, we will build the technology, develop it, and then we will sign it. and that's what they did. by the late 1990s, almost every country in the world that signed it. but a couple of dozen of them had only done it after they first developed the technology. but iran didn't do that. by the late 1990s, you have only four countries, or three countries still refusing to sign it. india, pakistan, and israel. india, and all three of those

countries suddenly refused to join the npt, not so they could develop the technology, but so they could build actual bombs, right? india and pakistan, built the nuclear weapon in 1998. israel was vague about this sometime in the sixties and seventies, and has 200 nuclear warheads, give or take, right? it's a point the iranians will have made. we will leave that. we are running out of time. but this was the situation iran found itself in in the 1990s. we want to restart the program, but how are we going to do that? okay, members of the npt, so cooperation is part of that, okay? guess what? they weren't able to get much cooperation. no big surprise there, because every time they went out and tried to buy fuel, your name, or what how do you from argentina, from china, from russia, the united states put a huge amount of pressure on those countries not to cooperate with iran. iran was not happy about this,

he said it's a violation of the npt and so forth, no one would listen to them. what are they going to do? well, they started to have to go to more illicit channels to be able to get what they felt was their rights under the npt, the rates to civilian nuclear engine. what happens to iran in the 1990s, you start going to more illicit secret channels to build the nuclear program. of course is going to immediately increase the suspicion that united states and some other enemies have done what you are doing. if you work within the npt, everything works great. you get the cooperation you want, one of the key provisions of the npt is you get inspections all the time, and if you think you are actually doing anything suspicious, then that cooperation ends. so that's where this dispute began in the 1990s. it's a self fulfilling prophesy. fast forward -- we are out of time. maybe i will stop. that's where we ended up, early

2000s when this became much more front page news. there's a lot more could say, i will talk about the early 2000s, how we got here, but that's the deep history of the iranian nuclear program. all of this is to say, you don't have to sympathize with iran, or be a big fan of the government, but you should probably understand historically how we got here, and it's not as simple as some headlines suggest. thank you very much. [applause] >> all right. at this point, if you want to just take one minute and write down a question on the card that was on your seat when you sat, down you can then proceed to collect, them and i will ask some questions that appear on those cards. if your question doesn't get asked, you could always stay after, and we can talk a little bit.

but i have one question that i like to ask while you all consider your questions. if you could keep the room quiet. my question is this, one question directly towards both of our panelists, and it deals with joint comprehensive plan of action, the iran nuclear deal. my question is this, john, he made the statement that without trust, there is no reason to talk about centrifuges, and other aspects of nuclear technology, so my question is this, does the nuclear program which you demonstrate has been around for many decades, does it provide a vehicle for the united states and iran to have discussions? is it a vehicle for engagement, an issue that could be discussed in ways that perhaps domestic issues of iran or regional proxies cannot.

and my question would be to mark how you respond to this question. is the nuclear issue a genuine path to engagement that provides each sides with -- our their inequities as john makes clear in the international system for politics that makes efforts difficult to pursue? is the nuclear deal illegitimate path to engagement, or something that obstructs the type of dialog that we might want to see down the road between the two countries? >> briefly, i think that was exactly obama's philosophy. i think obama came to power generally believing that he wanted a much more broad relationship with iran, to rewrite the map of u.s. alliances, in the middle east. i don't think he initially was interested in the nuclear, issue but because that was the

hot issue of the day, he saw it as a way into a broader conversation about iran, with iran. immediately, he saw, and we all saw in the first obama term how quickly that fell by focusing only on the nuclear issue. that allowed those who are opposed to the idea of u.s. iran relations, particularly in those days in israel, to basically make a lot of noise around the nuclear issue. and i guess encourage ways for the u.s. to get more bogged down on some of the nuclear specifics, of nuclear negotiations. we saw how that went, and obama got his nuclear deal, but in a way the opponents of u.s. iran relations ran out the problem. we've got this at the end of the second term, and there wasn't much energy or time left for serious iran u.s. --

i agree entirely with john just said. i would add that on the iranian, side there was no following up these past four years. now what's been happening in the last year or so, the water is much muddier than it was even back then. >> when we have some great questions coming in. please keep them coming. one question deals with the united kingdom. its position in the -- middle east. current rising tensions between iran and the world. i think the core of the question what it, is or what it speaks to is the nature of american allies. or their historical insights that we can gain that can help us understand how the united states could manage its allies? allies that might not have the same interest as america, these of the iran, but nonetheless

the united states. how do u.s. allies factor in for manage its allies that might not have the same interest but otherwise that the u.s. deals with? >> i don't think u.s. allies have been important players towards iran in these big, diplomatic issues that we've been talking about since the british bow down. the europeans, both individual countries and collectively, as an eu, have engaged in negotiations with iran, they are pursuing a rather different path with iran today. it's not amounting to an awful lot. i don't see them being able to make some kind of agreement with iran that will be very fruitful without the united states. i don't think that they have the desire to and i am not sure that they have the power or capabilities to do so. i think this is really eight american shout. >> i would just say it depends on which i'll as you are talking about.

it's a complex question but since the u.s. was brought up, i will say, this for at least 15 years now i've been saying consistently despite all of the chicken little rhetoric out there. i have never felt there was much likelihood of a u.s. war with iran. but i have to say, for the first, time i'm genuinely concerned about the possibility of a british war with iran for a number of reasons. i mean it was very obvious with the ship that was taken into gibraltar, apparently the spanish were given the same intelligence and they said that we would not act on it. the british took the bait. they impacted the ship. and i do wonder whether boris johnson with brexit looming, the united kingdom a lot more isolated than it -- you can expect the uk to grow much closer to the u.s. position, and i can see that you know boris johnson is clearly motivated by chilean

instincts. what's better way to unify the country then sort of, a bit of bringing out the gun boats potentially, or in churchill's phrase, spluttering musket tree to sort of unify, right, exactly. that is something that i worry about with the general sort of brexit atmosphere. >> we move from allies to advisers. >> one question reads how do you feel about john bolton's effect on trump's administration and it has in parentheses other advisers? my question would be about presidents scene advisers. in history we're reading not just about's national security advisers but iran desk officers, iran point officers of the security council, folks in mid level positions can influence policy. is there something that you can tell us about the relationship between presidents and their

advisers, and the formulation of iran policy? you can address bolton or pompeo today or perhaps a historical moment that speaks to this question. >> for oh boy. okay. yes. i could say a lot of things. i mean going back, we've spent a lot of time looking at sort of mid level advisers. i think that the rule of someone like dennis ross is really interesting to look at. pompeo, bolton, whatever, pompeo implicit question. i actually think that despite the so-called warmongering instincts of someone named bolton, the goal is not, we're and the goal is not a war to bring about regime change. this could be pure speculation. i am a historian who shouldn't be waiting in these waters but i actually think that i

actually genuinely believe that if we put enough pressure on iran, that iran will somehow come to the negotiation table. i believe that -- tough to iran and negotiate a much more comprehensive broader deal with iran than obama. a better deal with iran. in a way i kind of like that approach. i have always felt based on my comments that the u.s. should take a much broader approach to its iran diplomacy. before i get quoted as saying that i like the bolton pompeo -- i like that they are looking at a much broader range of issues. however, i think we are going to find ourselves disappointed if they actually believe that somehow iran is quick to capitulate on every single issue in the way that they presented it. thus, give the u.s. this kind of sweeping big victory like the u.s. had over the cold war and so on. it's not going to happen. i think that is what we are

going to find out. >> one historical counter point. i would say that the kennedy period. there's a lot of literature on how much the kennedy administration didn't pressure the u.s. allies for four decades -- for six decades and kennedys important. the words that kennedy says are important but people like robert figures in 1961 a 1962 that are driving the policy conversation about iran before the issue really reaches the desk of the president for kind of executive action or the drafting of a new security memorandum. so this question i think we can see parallels of the past with the present situation. >> i am reminded actually -- the key moments in the 2003 grand bargain as well was shot down by cheney and roosevelt and others, it made sure that it never reached the president's desk. people disagree about exactly

what it -- iran supposedly set this document proposing a sweeping negotiation with united states and the cheney folks felt a response -- colin powell was hoping that it would get a serious hearing but instead the response was sort of we don't talk to you. >> with regard to iran and what iran might want and why iran would not enter into negotiations with the united states. a important context for this is kind of iran's right in the international system and kind of under the mp tea regime. this often gets lost in conversations that happen very quickly and often are covered in brief news stories. but what rights does iran have within the international system? within the context of international law as they are

dealing with the rest of the world? what recourse does iran have? >> they certainly have the right to build a civilian nuclear program. and a right to free trade and things of that sort. the trump administration doesn't seem to care all that much about that but previous administrations cared very much. i think this is much more about exercising power. i think the key issue is whether iran's economy will withstand the sanctions or not. we will know within a year or so. a year from now iran's economy may be stream screaming and that could trigger domestic unrest. and those are saying that this is -- the sanctions. a key part of that is number one whether the europeans will go along with the u.s. sanctions and then secondly whether other players especially, china but also the russians and maybe some of the other east asians whether they

will violate the u.s. sanctions or the spirit of the u.s. sanctions. i think that's the key set of issues is how is the economics of this going to play out and it is too early to say. not the trump administration. that is for sure. >> how about the history? mark you have simply taken us through ten stages. we have a question about the iran iraq war and the impact on u.s. iran relations. you made a comment that some of the developments of the eighties were ancient history or in the past. how do we make sense of a event like the iran iraq war that has such a lasting impact on the nation of iran? everything experienced in the 19 eighties in that war. how do we kind of consider its historical hang-ups between the united states and iran? there were major conflicts that resulted in death

transformation of society, how do they affect conversations? where do they? >> iran was traumatized by the iran iraq war. there's probably not a family in iran that didn't have somebody wounded. i had so many people in iran who cough acid or had their limbs amputated or certainly loved ones lost. it remains still a big factor in the iran iraq war. above all, the impact of the iran iraq war is to make iranians very careful about their security. as john was mentioning, this was a major impetus for iran's developing its nuclear program in the 19 nineties to have a nuclear weapon that we can use to deter iraqi attack. and various other kinds of preparations and concerns iran had in the nineties about iraq. of course iraq is no longer

hostile towards iran. there's a friendly regime that we put in power which iran is pretty happy with. but the iranians are still pretty concerned about their military security. of course, we shouldn't forget that the u.s. participated in the iran iraq war and in some ways particularly enabled clashes in the gulf. so iranians look at the iran iraq war as also a reason to fear american power. they have taken all kinds of measures to prepare themselves for retaliating against the united states and they will use them. so it certainly did have a big impact. as much as world war ii did on the united states i would say. >> a critical aspect of that when you think of the nuclear program actually. this is another point that's often lost in the debate in the u.s.. whether you decide to believe a run or not when they say that they're not interested in a nuclear bunker something at the take into consideration which is that iran was the victim of

a very significant chemical weapon disaster in the -- this has shaped the reality of the country a lot more than i think we often appreciate. this was the first major use of chemical weapons warfare since the first world war. you still have iran iraq war veterans walking around, feeling the physical effects of this. perhaps no country other than perhaps japan is more sensitive to the issue, to the danger, the hardship, the suffering brought about by weapons of mass destruction. this often plays into the discussion in a run about the nuclear program much more than i think we appreciate. in addition to the religious concerns about moments of mass destruction iranians felt firsthand this consequences of weapons of mass destruction and would be very difficult for any iranian government to seriously gain major public support for the idea of building let alone using a nuclear weapon.

>> a couple other questions came in after -- demonstrated we have some very good history students in the room. questions about the shutdown of the iranian plane in the 19 eighties and even a question that goes back to the coup of 1953. so i just wanted to acknowledge these questions that are asking for the post oracle context. i will ask one more before we break for the day. i guess this is directed towards the professor, but it could be answered by any of us. the question i will read is it's possible that all three strategic approaches have failed because the united states has switched between them so much? could the united states perhaps build trust and succeed with engagement, containment, or the others if the u.s. proved to be consistent, trustworthy, pick an approach and stick with it? so is it a question of strategic flaws?

or is it a question of strategic consistency? >> this is a good point. i still think that the most important set of obstacles is major iranian domestic politics who is in power today. there is a lot of hostility towards the united states among iranian leaders, not so much among the iranian people. this is a good point. the inconsistency shifting back and forth. most are medically we have seen the trump administration abandoning not just the jcpoa but the whole engagement approach of the obama administration. and that severely, severely undermines trust. how severely? how adversely that would affect prospects in the coming years? a little bit hard to say. i mean kind of surprised to see iran actually make some noise about what have some discussions with the united states so we can negotiate that jcpoa in the last few weeks or so. i think there are probably a

little bit more pragmatic than i usually figure them to be. of course, these are just, words you can't really tell how serious they are about it. it's a real problem. they don't know almost from one minute to the next with the u.s. is going to do, especially when there are changes in administration. i am sure the iranians are hoping that trump will lose the election in 2020, and hoping they can hold out their economy until then. but further down the road you can't be sure who would replace them. . current democrats seem to be on board with going back to the obama approach, but beyond that, venus? they have a lot of distrust in the u.s., i think a fair amount of that is valid and they are a lot more stable and consistent than we are because they've got a dictatorship that hasn't really changed much. the downside to democracy, i

suppose. >> such an extremely disturbed question, i will commit, and agree with what most of what mark says. i would point out it's not -- it's true that the changes in u.s. administration are relevant but sometimes even within the course of a single administration there are changes and that is significant. you mentioned the bush senior against goodwill and 99. i understand it's not to blame the u.s. for this, but to understand things change during those years to get the hostages released. bush senior stood on his inaugural speech on the capital steps and said goodwill begets goodwill and something like whether america keeps its word, whether it's a vow on marble steps or something along those lines but the implication was we will keep our promise if you get the hostages free. i understand the cold war and

the calculus changed. fundamentally, iran did bend over backwards to get the hostages released. it wasn't easy. despite the way it's presented, iran doesn't have the commander control straight line. they went to lebanon and found it very difficult to convince some of the lebanese militias to release hostages. they got it done, and didn't get reported rewarded for that. that experienced stay with them throughout the 90s. even when obama came and made his lovely speeches and televised readings, there was a lot of skepticism in iran. can we really trust this? words we've seen, where they felt was they had seen nice words before. to them, that was a reference to 1989. we've heard that before, but what about the action? press the action? they didn't see that over the next few years, but even, you know, when it came to the final stage of jcpoa negotiations, the supreme leader was skeptical, but said let's try this. a heroic tough flexibility and

so on. he kind of said, you know, i'm not sure this is going to work out. most of the hard-liners felt. you can't really trust american. it's unfortunate and i don't think that's just the change of administration that prove that point of view, they've made it easy for the hard-liners to say you can't trust america. you don't have to agree with or love the iranian or islamic republic to see from their perspective negotiations and have turned into a game of roberta. where, sure, you know, actually they are seen as yet another way for the u.s. to try to get us to do what they want. and iranians have often said consistently, we will talk, we will negotiate, we will engage, but if, not if you are just trying to use negotiations as a tool to one victory, or to dismantle the islamic republic

or bring about regime changes to the back door. to be honest, unfortunately, that's a lot of what they've seen. so, you know, i like to depart a bit with marcus it's not about changes of administration but somewhat about a fundamental but we have in this country that the goal should be to bring about the complete surrendering of the islamic republic. i'm not sure that's useful goal for us. because, you know, i don't know we are able to really -- you know, may or may not happen, but not because the u.s.. >> thank you all for the questions. and the discussion. [applause] we can sit out here and have conversation with and we'd like to have them.

>> weeknights this month, we are featuring american history tv programs as a preview of what's available every weekend on c-span 3. tonight, we focus on union generals in the civil war with a discussion between retired general david and historian john about the relationship between ulysses s grant and william to comes to sherman. watch beginning at eight eastern and enjoy american history tv at c-span 3. >> you are watching american history tv. every weekend on c-span 3, explore our nations past. american history tv on c-span 3, created by americas cable television companies. today, we are brought to you by these television companies who provide american history tv and viewers as a public service.

>> our live come fridge of confirmation hearings continue for president biden's nominee is. on thursday and 10 am eastern on c-span 3, marty walsh watched the confirmation hearings live on c-span 3 and stream live or on demand at c-span.org or listen on the c-span radio app. >> we hear about the role of middle east oil an american foreign policy since the end of world war ii. in particular, the importance of saudi arabian oil. >> i want to welcome you here this morning. thank you all for coming. my name is dane kennedy. i am the director of the national history center. which is us sponsoring this briefing. it's on the geopolitics of middle east oil, perspectives on the current cris