,. ,,. and enjoy american history tv every weekend on c-span 3. next the manhattan project is the subject of a lecture by george mason university, professor, martin sure, when he's the other of a world, destroyed hiroshima and its legacies, and coauthor of pulitzer -- mr. sure win documents the

development of the atomic bomb beginning with the discovery of fission through the use of at mixed bombs in japanese cities like nagasaki and hiroshima. they hosted this event in washington d.c.. it is just under two hours. our speaker today is martin j. sherwin, he's a her history professor at george neeson university. he won the one pulitzer prize, in the english speaking union award. he's also the author of the world destroyed, the atomic bomb and the grand alliance which won the award by the society of american foreign relations. as well as the american history book prize. he was a 1976 finals for both the national book court, and the potere -- pulitzer prize. he has held appointments at the

core dozer fund, visiting professor of american history at yale university, and a visiting professor of international relations at will sly collage. he's taught at uc berkeley, dartmouth, and university of pennsylvania. he's received elephants from the guggenheim, rock and fowler foundations and the national endowment for the humanities. he was a scholar for harvard, woodrow wilson international center for scholars. in 2007 he was inducted into the american academy of arts and sciences. a warm welcome for professor martin j. sherwin. [applause] >> is it working?

good. thank you. i'm of the road that introduction. i hope you liked it. my father did not get a chance to edit it. i am really glad to be here to . i think it's the kind of subject that needs to be reviewed again and again, because unfortunately the nuclear issue is still with us. and it looks like it's going to be with us for very long time. i had a chance to chat with a few of you and i know that at least those i started with have

a particular interest and broad aspects of the manhattan project. this top i'm going to give, however, focuses on this as the subtitle said, visions of the nuclear future, that is the focus is on the people who were thinking about went nuclear weapons would do not only for people like oppenheimer,

general groves. hunts beta. many, many other participants in the project. i would like to suggest to you that if you want to follow up visions of the nuclear future and the voices that are the subject of tonight's discussion, that you go to manhattan project voices. one word. manhattan project voices .org. the atomic heritage foundation has a wonderful website with lots of interviews some of which i did and lots of under

other interviews that were done by other people with major figures in the manhattan project. so i think it is not too much to say that the atomic bombings of hiroshima and nagasaki structured the future of not only the atomic age and how the atomic bomb was seen and valued, but also the future of civilization. we are talking about a very big subject here. one that in effect has changed over time in terms of our views of the major issues.

70 years ago there was certain consensus on a view. 50 years ago there was more diversity, abuse about the issues. today there are many many views. one of the interesting things is that the atomic bomb, although it was not predicted 100 years before it was developed, the idea that science would transform the human condition caution was something that people thought about, even in the 19th century. one of my favorite quotes, with respect to that issue, i was by henry book brooks adam, the book he wrote any teen 62 where he says the following.

men has mounted science and has not run away with it. 9é? spe will be the master of men. the engines he will have invented will be beyond his strength to control. some, science may have knee the existence of mankind in its power. and the human race commits suicide by blowing up the world. now that is 1862. the beginning of the nuclear age is a moment when that possibility emerged. no matter how devastating, how terrible dug previous weapons

were big, there is absolutely nothing that compares to the transformative effects of nuclear weapons. i am going to talk about the period of the discovery of nuclear big fusion to the post war period. i hope in the discussion we will be able to expand that beyond to present day. but to organize the top i have divided into four pieces. i've divided the pie in quarters. the first section of the talk is about possibilities. when nuclear weapons, no, not nuclear weapons, but when vision was first discovered and its implications were thought

about. what were the possibilities? that runs from about 1939 to 1941, to the time in which the united states entered the war after pearl harbor. the second period is from let's say, pearl harbor to about the time president roosevelt died in april 1945 and president truman took presidential office. that was a time of panic. especially at the beginning of that period. and then, about the time that truman comes and we start to talk about promotion. how is the bomb going to be promoted to the world? how is it going to be revealed?

are we going to have just a test? are we going to use it on the japanese? are we not going to use it at all? whatever. these issues were the issues that were discussed in visions of the nuclear future. and finally, in the post war period we are talking about pre-eminence. the united states, the sole possessor of this incredible force. let us begin at the beginning. with the discovery of nuclear vision, i may be reviewing something that most of you know, but nuclear weapons, i keep saying that, i mean nuclear vision was discovered in germany. and it was discovered by two chemists, not physicists,

chemists. fruits strassmann and -- they were doing a series of experiments where they were bombarding the elements of adam developments in the periodic table with neutrons to see what happened. they got to the 92nd element, uranium, and they bombarded it with a neutron, and the most amazing thing happened. they ended up not with uranium, but with barry him. the atomic number 56. and some left over elements of uranium and so they did it again, and the same thing happened, and they could not figure out would and the world had occurred, and they sent their experiment to a former

colleague, lisa, who is jewish and had to leave germany and lisa who was a physicist and her nephew, another physicist figured out what had happened, and the uranium atom had split in two, and when they weighed the two element, the barium and what was left over of the uranium, it weighed less than the uranium atom. i don't know how many of you are watching the einstein series on television? okay. so, equals mc squared. and basically what that says is that when energy is converted into matter or matter is

converted and energy can go back and forth, what had happened was that some energy had been released in this bombardment. if a gazillion of these atoms could be split at the same time, obviously an unprecedented event energy would be released and that was scary. and that was fantastic because in a sense it transformed the whole understanding of what can happen in the universe. this was in line with a lot of other transformations that had occurred in the 20th century. we mentioned einstein's theory

of relativity and his special theory of relativity, and the conception of the atom. and then highs and burrow, uncertainty principle. and classical physics had been completely transformed by these new insights and now this. it was an amazing event and it was an amazing event with all kinds of not clearly understood possibilities. one being perhaps we can end up with a weapon. . you may know einstein's letter

to roosevelt. einstein said to his front line is polling, i made one great mistake in my life. when i signed the letter to president roosevelt recommending that the atomic bomb be made, but there was some justification. the danger that the germans might get them. that, of course, was the possibility that led to a panic. phase two. and that letter that einstein wrote to roosevelt, however, was not a letter that said we have to hurry up and build atomic bombs, because the germans are ahead of us and they are going to build atomic bombs. it was much more cautious. it was written by leo who had worked with einstein in berlin years before. einstein wrote, it is

conceivable for much less than fission as a source of power, that extremely powerful bombs might be constructed. he pointed out that a single bomb of this type carried by boat and exploded in port might very well destroy the whole port together with the surrounding territory. now what if the letter had ended it, it might not have had any effect that it had, which was for roosevelt to say, to give it to an aide and say look into this. but the last part of the letter was critical. i understand, einstein wrote, that germany has actually stopped the sale of uranium

from the czechoslovakia and minds that he has taken over. you can understand that the frame work for wet would eventually become the manhattan project, even in this earliest stage, when nobody knew if it was even possible if a weapon could come out of this discovery. but the framework was this is something really important that can make a difference. roosevelts initiated activity. and the activity in the united states was basically committees of scientists, and some military people studying not

only the implications of this discovery, which by the way was published in nature magazine in february, 1939. i think i neglected to mention that the experiment had taken place in december, 1938. a couple years later it's published in nature magazine which is the premier science magazine in the english speaking world. and so every physicist around the globe knew about this, and had the seam thoughts that he put into this letter that einstein wrote to roosevelt. the committees in the united states between the spring of

1939, or the summer of 1939 which is when the letter was sent to roosevelt could not figure a way that it was possible to build a nuclear weapon. they looked into all sorts of possibilities, but in effect got nowhere. in england however, there were two top refugees from germany, a couple of jewish scientists. out of fresh, who is leases nephew, and rudolph. they were in britain. and they were not allowed to work on the most secret project that the british were involved with.

anybody know what that was? radar. i have a informed audience. immediately decided what do we know vast? nuclear fission. let's work on that. let's see if we can figure out if it's possible we can figure out how a nuclear weapon could be built. working together alone with oh out a lot of advice from a lot of people, just pouring into the problem, you'll using their imaginations they figured it out. they came to the conclusion that if you can can collect enough uranium 235 which isn't isotopes of natural uranium 238,

but less than 1% of uranium 235, if there was some way to extract uranium to enter 35 which had vast nutrients that it would be possible to build a weapon in two years. in two years. now the discovery of nuclear weapons. i did it again. of nuclear vision had occurred in december of 1930, eighth published in february of 1939. that was more than two years ago. the discovery was made in germany. they came to the conclusion in britain two years later that a bump could be built in two years. oh my gosh.

are the germans on their way to building a atomic bomb? possible. at least the thought. the vision of the manhattan project. the germans are ahead of us. they must be ahead of us. they have a lot of good physicists who remain in germany. so the british who have an agreement with the united states to exchange information with each other, that might be helpful for the war effort, send the fresh pile, and piles, report to the united states. and that report arrives sometime in the spring of 1941. spring of 41, so before pearl

harbor. and it has a transformative effect on the activities in the united states. man over bush, who is the head of the office of scientific research and development which is the office that oversees all of the wartime atomic bomb projects, vanaver gets this memo, and he writes a memo to henry simpson, the secretary of war, which also goes to president roosevelt, the reason it goes to the secretary of war is that the mob project is going to be under the -- . and he says that one thing is certain. if such an explosive work, made

it would be thousands of times more powerful than existing explosives, and it sees might be determining. and its use might be determining. and that is the theme of the manhattan project. and that is the intellectual engines so to speak, or the vision that drives the project at what is warp roosevelt approves the manhattan project on december 6th, 1941. very interesting date. december 6th, 1941. december 7th, 9:00 in the morning, pearl harbor time.

pearl harbor is bombed. the manhattan project is underway, the war is underway, virtually at the same time. full. remember, the germans maybe two years ahead of us. when general groves was appointed to run the manhattan project full, he is assured that he has the highest priority for material. he has the highest priority for recruiting scientists. he has the highest priority for everything, because its use could be determining. so the manhattan project moves as fast as possible to completion most studies of the

atomic bomb or the tamika bombing, the use of what came out of the manhattan project became on 1912, when harry truman became president. that's a big mistake. franklin roosevelt's role is absolutely critical and understanding the attitudes towards atomic weapons that truman inherited when he became president. what happens after pearl harbor in the war? what is the environment in which the manhattan project develops? six months after pearl harbor, there is the great battles, the

navy battles of midway and karl c. the united states defeats the japanese fleet at midway and c. that stops the advance of the japanese forces towards our country. and it begins the process of turning the war in the pacific around the difficult bloody process of island hopping one island battle after another begins. that is just six months after pearl harbor. that's june of 1942. that's the war in the pacific. it has turned around within six

months. the war in europe takes longer. remember that begins september of 1939. the united states comes in right after pearl harbor, and the battle of stalling grad in the winter of 32, 43, stops the german advance and begins the process of turning the war around, and moving the soviet forces towards germany. by the spring of 1943, which is exactly when loss alamo's opens, in 1943, the war is moving in the direction of victory for

the united states. churchill, roosevelt, the american military, believe that we are going to win the war. if the british public and the american public continue to support this difficult, bloody, awful, global war. we're going to win it. unless the germans get the bumps first. if the germans get the bomb first all bets are off. as vanaver bush said, the weapon would be determining.

roosevelt believed that. churchill believe that. . all of the military who were informed, and there were very few military informed about the nuclear program. it was so secret. whoever was informed about the nuclear program believe that if we get the bomb first, or if nobody can build a bomb and we are going to win the war. but if the germans get it first yuck all bets are off. and the scientists of course we're behind this belief. so in effect, by 1943, spring of 1943, months after loss alamos is opened up, the bomb

is seen as whatever you want to call it, a magic bullet, in itself it could win the war. this wasn't so much of a fantastic and awful idea. we talked about radar a few moments ago and how important that was to the british war effort. it was the most top secret project. and in fact, i think that virtually all historians agree that the british were into parity with its reader that allowed the british to win the battle of written in the skies over great britain, and turn hitler to attack the soviet union, rather than finish off the british which he couldn't

do without air superiority. in the period between 1943 in 1944 the manhattan project is this going at great speed and progress is being made. now there are two kinds of bombs that are being developed. the one out of oak ridge, which were uranium to enter 35 is being isolated from uranium to hundred 38. and that bomb, if we get enough uranium to 35, is going to be a very simple device, they called it a gun tight bomb and it was another name and in the front of the bomb there was a target of uranium 235.

not so much they would go critical. cut packed loosely enough, just sitting there. and in the back of the bomb, let's call it a plug or bullet. uranium yuck 235. and when the bomb was dropped yuck, the idea was yuck, reached a certain altitude for two weeks flowed. the bullet in the back we'd be triggered right and to the target, and it would blow up. and in fact, that was the hiroshima bomb. that was never tested. that bomb was shaped -- they had total confidence that it would work, unless somebody forgot to put two particular wires together, which could always happen, but the theory

of it was quite clear. most of the -- the thanks to that loss almost is related to the other type of atomic bomb, which is a plutonium bomb, and it was indicated that it might be possible to make a bomb out of plutonium and plutonium, which is man-made element, was easier to produce then the uranium 235. so this cited to put some plutonium in front of the bomb, and in back of the bomb, and they calculated, they discovered, they figured out that there was no way that the

plutonium bullet could be fired fast enough into the plutonium target to make it go up. plutonium was so active, so much more active and uranium 235, that no matter how fast you fly that bullet, not by the time i got halfway it would start to explode. yuck but it would really fizzle because you would not get the full effect, still we had this investment, so to speak, in plutonium. how are we going to make it work? and they came up with this idea of an implosion device, of packing the plutonium let's say in grapefruit sized false, and designing explosives that were all around the plutonium ball,

that would go off at once and when -- it was fat man. more or less a square bomb. with the plutonium sitting in the middle of it. when it hit the right altitude, squash it down and boom. but boy, that was much trickier than the first bomb. and all of the activity in 1944 was related to, most of the activity, was related to figure out how this could work. the test of july 16th, 1945, in the desert, was a test of this plutonium device, and remember i said at the beginning that

scientists and policy makers and everybody else and general groves involved with the nuclear weapons, fought about it for the post war period, this was not something that was just for the war. this was something that would affect international relations in the post war era. so we advantage of the plutonium bomb was that a, plutonium was easier to get then uranium 235, and two, the design was much more efficient. you got more bang for your buck, so to speak. there was this concern that this design would work.

so that is wet is going on at loss elements, until, and this is before truman comes into office, but i said roosevelt thinking was really important. did roosevelt think about this? there is a very important meeting in september 1944. september -- after the second quebec conference, when roosevelt invites churchill to come to his home at high park. they have many meetings over several days. and a lot of alcohol is consumed, especially by churchill. roosevelt has to restock everything after churchill leaves, and the --

there is a memorandum of with the british call a minute of the discussion they had with respect to the atomic bomb, and it's called the hyde park minutes or the high park memorandum. it talks about several different things. it's only three paragraphs one. but, in the middle of the first paragraph it says, but when a bomb, which is in quotation works, is finally available, it might perhaps, after mature consideration, be used against the japanese. this bombardment will be repeated till i surrender. i want to go over that again.

i have never, in the 50 some odd years i have been doing research, topics related to foreign policy and whatnot big, seen anything co-opt like this description of how people are thinking. when a bomb, remember, it's in quotation marks, is finally available, it might perhaps after mature consideration, be used against the japanese. why -- let us think about that? why would the memorandum of this discussion be written that way? maybe during the human a period,

people have ideas or comments. my idea is two things. one, this is written for history. it was written to make clear that both roosevelt and churchill understood that the bomb was something special. it was not the bomb. it was some very kind of special thing. you just don't, well, we decide to use it, we decide not to use it. no. it might perhaps, after mature consideration, be used against the japanese. so they are making the case here. and the second point, i would say, might perhaps, after mature consideration, leaving open the possibility that we won't use it, because after

mature consideration, whatever that entails, we might decide that is not a good idea. but we might perhaps in fact after mature consideration, use it. so it is left up in the air. that september of 1944. now at this time, just before this high park meeting, neal spore, people hr, the famous danish physicist, who had escaped from denmark, smuggled out of denmark by the danish and british underground, when they came to the conclusion that the germans were going to seize him. yuck neil is informed about the

manhattan project. i would not say that he panics, but he is deeply, deeply troubled. he is troubled by the possibilities of the bomb entering the world in the post war period and what it would do. so he writes a memorandum that argues that a, it is not possible to keep this as a secret long term. that be, the soviets probably know something about this. he was an correspondence with some soviet physicists, and he read between some lines and came to the conclusion when she learned about the manhattan project, oh, that is what they meant. that they probably knew something about it. or they were working on the

same thing. that if the war and's and if the united states uses the bomb without bringing stalin into this, a club or community that arrangement that the united states has with the british, it is very likely that a peaceful relationship with the soviet union is going to be impossible. it will send a signal to stalin that, watch it fellow, you can be next. so he goes to churchill when he is in london and makes the case that style and should be informed about the manhattan project, and churchill, in effect, throws him out of the office and says, you stick to

your science and i will do the politics. actually, at hyde park, part of this memorandum is a note where churchill says professor bore should be watched. he is treading -- the is giving away secrets to the russians. or he wants to. to make connections with the current -- so, he comes to the united states and he makes the case to roosevelt before this high park meeting. and roosevelt is much more accommodating as roosevelt is wanting to be. and it seems to be persuasive, but eventually he is not,

because churchill is absolutely, adamantly against the idea of informing stalin at all. well, roosevelt dies on april 12th, 1945. we come to the third period in this. the question of when, how the bomb will be presented to the world. so, the promotion period. there were three points of view

that emerged in the period of april 45 and august of 1945. the first point of view is do not introduce atomic energy to the world as a weapon used in war. and i will explain why shortly. and the second point of view is used the weapon to warn the world, of the danger that the world faces now that an atomic bomb is possible. but after the war, promote the idea for the international control atomic energy. creating a condominium for some kind of arrangement that will prevent a nuclear arms race and the third point of view is to use the weapon to end the war and make it clear to the soviets, their advantage and

conventional forces was now, pardon the expression, trumped. >> so truman and the soviets. trump becomes president on april 12th, 1940, five and he says to reporters i feel like the moon, the, sun and the stars have fallen on my head. for harry truman. he's been vice president for 82 days. he sought roosevelt once more or less for a photo op.

he's been a senator during the 1930s, but focused completely on domestic issues with. he was head of the truman committee which was a committee designed to prevent waste in war. production activities. and he does that very well that's one of the reasons that he is chosen to be roosevelt's vice president when roosevelt runs for his fourth term, but he knows absolutely nothing about foreign policy so basically all of his information is inherited from roosevelt's advisers, but he does have views. he has strong views about the soviet union. this is this a senator who said when reporters asked him after

the germans attacked the soviet union, what do you think about that, and he said if the germans are winning we should help the soviets. and if the soviets are winning we should have the germans. this is of course before we got into the war. he does not like the soviets, he doesn't trust communism. make america great. you will have to excuse me. it's very hard not to throw these things in. so when mueller talk, the soviet foreign minister comes to you no check truman out, to introduce himself, on april 21st or 22nd i think it is

truman starts to begin a conversation, and truman starts to dress him down. he says you are breaking your agreements that were made at the altar. you are not doing this, and you are not doing that. . mola top is so taken back. this is their first diplomatic meeting. he so taken back. he goes i've never been top to like that in my whole life. just like being schooled by a schoolteacher. keep your agreements and you will be talked to like that. all the people in the room are absolutely shaken. the acting secretary of state goes back to his office and tells people about it, and word gets to simpson, the secretary of war, now simpson on the night of april 12th had

mentioned two tremendous very casually after the first meeting that there is a very important project that i have to tell you about and it just goes over truman's head, and simpson has not told him enough to really alert. him to alert him to the manhattan project, but simpson is really shook up because he feels that the atomic bomb is going to be the key to either peace in the post war world or a very, very difficult postwar period. so he writes a memorandum. calls the white house and says i have to see the president as soon as possible. and within two days he is in the oval office with his memorandum talking to the

president. this is an absolutely amazing memorandum. it's april 25th, 1945, it has nine paragraphs, each numbered. it begins with the first paragraph, and he reads this to truman. within four months you shall in no probability have completed the most terrible weapon ever known in human history. one bomb of which will destroy a whole city. then he goes on with two or three building on that case. and number four and number five. he says the world and its present state of moral advancement compared to its technical advancement would be

at mercy of such a way. in other words, modern civilization might be completely destroyed. then he goes on to say, furthermore, number seven, in light of our present position with reference to this weapon, the question of sharing it with other nations and if so sheared upon wicked terms becomes a primary question of our foreign relations. and also, this is really interesting because the moral mentioned comes up quite often. also, our leadership in the war and the development of this weapon has placed a certain moral responsibility upon us which we cannot shirk without very serious responsibility for

any disaster to any civilization that it would further. i want to read that again because it is important. our leadership in the war in the development of this weapon has placed a certain moral responsibility upon us which we cannot shirk that a very serious responsibility for any disaster to civilization, which it would further. on the other hand, next paragraph. if the problem of the proper use of this weapon can be solved and we would have the opportunity to bring the world into a pattern in which the peace of the world and our civilization can be saved. so for simpson, the post war period depends on how we handle the atomic bomb. this is what he is telling

president truman. he is making the case, now president truman as i said was not very well informed about foreign policy, and so he turned to the man who had expected to be nominated as the vice president, james f. burns, who had been is supreme court justice. he was known as mr. assistant during -- term. he was at yalta and he took shorthand. he was skilled at shorthand. and so he had the very best notes of the yalta conference of anyone. and he truly reaches out to

burns, and taps him as his secretary of state. he doesn't officially become secretary of state until july 1st, bt he is at truman's side constantly, and of course he is the one who whispered into women's ear that the soviets were breaking their agreements at yalta. burns has a very, very different view then simpson. the opposite view in fact. simpson's assistant, john, reported that after a conversation with burns, this is a memo that mccloy right to simpson that bronze was quite radically opposed to solving whatever i put corroborating on the atomic bomb of energy. he wished mccloy wrote to have

implied threat of the bump in his pocket during conferences after the war. the actual quote is during the conference he was to attend in london beginning on september 4th. so that is after the war, but during the war for his press secretary, walter brown, writes in his diary that burns fought the atomic bomb could put us in a position to dictate our own terms at the end of the war. back to the original thought. the views may be determining. the bomb may be determining. we have two opposing positions

and the government. what's happening in the manhattan project? there are opposing views there and the atomic bomb, there's a group at the university of chicago led by james funk, who write a memorandum that argues that the atomic bomb should not be used on japan, because if we ever expect to cooperate with the soviet union after the war such an action would make it impossible. just a quote a few sentences

from a very long report, if we consider international agreement on total prevention of nuclear warfare as the paramount objective. and for thinking of the post war period, he's in the post war period as our paramount objective, and we believe it can be achieved, this kind of introduction that seizing the bombers introduction, of atomic weapons to the world knee easily destroy all of our chances of success. russia, and even allied countries which bare-less distrust in our ways and intentions, as we're as neutral countries may be deeply shocked. it may be very difficult to persuade the world that a nation which was capable of secretly preparing and suddenly

releasing a weapon as indiscriminate as the rocket bomb. they're referring to the german rockets. the rocket bomb, 1 million times more destructive, is to be proclaimed in its desire to having such weapons abolished by such international agreement. so that's the argument that the scientists are making at the universe. as part of the manhattan project, that's where families, famous squash court experiment took place. on the other hand, robert oppenheimer, at loss elmo's is a member of a committee that's called the interim committee, that's organized by simpson.

he believes that the mom should be used. he has been told, he is back and forth to washington a lot at this time of the year, and he has been told that we are going to have to invade, and the bomb may in fact prevent the necessity for the invasion. so he is supporting it, and in fact in the interim committee he argues that if two bombs are available we should use both of them on the same day, but that is a fortunately squashed idea. you all probably know the story of trumans attitude at the pot stand conference, it begins in the middle of july, july 15th.

and the test of the atomic bomb on july 16th. general groves is report arrives in pot stand and hand carry and gives a distance in who briefs president truman on it. on the 21st of july. churchill, in his famous volumes on world war ii when he discusses pat stand, he says now i know what happened to truman. he had learned about the atomic bomb and he bust everybody around that afternoon and suddenly he was a different man and gave him the confidence that the united states was in a position in effect, not only

get the war over with this weapon, but also to have something that stimson called at potsdam, the great equalizer. the atomic bomb would equalize or neutralize-y huge, soviet advantage and conventional forces in europe. so truman's attitude changes completely. he calls him general=r&b■ marsh. came here with the intention of getting the soviets to live up to their promise, to invade japan. to come into the war, and can we get them to back off? that we have the atomic bomb.

we don't need that. in fact we don't want that. because we don't want them to participate in the occupation of japan. we all know stalin had promised roosevelt that within three months of germany's surrender, he would come into the war against japan. there was a nonaggression pact between the japanese and the russians. neither of them needed a two front war. they had this non aggression pack. but stalin wants a piece of the action in japan after the war, and remember there was this 1905 japanese war, which the japanese one, and they took a lot of territory from the soviets, and stalin certainly wanted that back.

so, three months. germany surrenders on may 8th. and one month, may, june, july, august -- why three months? why did he not end the war immediately? why? because all the soviet troops around the european front and it would take three months to move all of the forces to japanese fronts. stalin is committed to coming in. there's no question. we can tell him it's not necessary anymore, guys. thanks a lot. but it's not going to do any good. you're going to come because

they want to come. indeed, that is the case. so, the bombs are dropped on japan on august 6th. and on august 9th, hiroshima on the sixth, three days later nagasaki. why three days? originally, it was a five day spread. a rare the reason for the five-day spread was that it was expected to be a very complicated process for arming the second bomb, the plutonium bomb. but the scientists are very gong hall where the planes to

attack japan took off from, and when colonel tibbetts is plane comes back after its successful raid on hiroshima, the scientists say we might be able to do this in four days, now that we've have had the experience with the first bomb, and he says can you do it in three days because i that weather is expected to come in? it and that is in effect would happened. that three-day spread, that decision is made by gung ho scientists and air force, army air force personnel on the island of tinian. it's not a truman decision. it's not a harry stimson decision. it's not a general groves decision. it's a battlefield decision. so, three days.

after atomic bombings, with effect does this have on stolen? everybody was worried about stalin's reaction. of course, they were right. a well-known american russian historian writes in one of his books that the news of hiroshima and nagasaki, quote, struck stolen lucky thunderbolt. he was shocked, and there was a wonderful memorandum of a conversation about a week later that stalin has with heron man, who is the american ambassador

to the soviet union. and george cannon who is the number two man is there and he takes notes and writes this memorandum, and a couple of lines in it. still insisted herman, we have entered the war in spite of your attempt to end it before we did some. so, and then harem and replies, he atomic bomb will end the war. we have it and it was very expensive to build. it will have a great impact on post war international relations. that had to be prepared text. i mean, a skilled ambassador does not say things like that off the top of his head. it is expensive. it's going to have a great

impact on post war international relations, meaning we've got it. and you don't. and stalin says, japan was about to surrender anyway, and the secret of the atomic bomb might be hard to keep. and i cannot help thinking that stalin really had to work hard to suppress a big grin when he said that, because the soviets had been getting information on the manhattan project since 1943. then stalin knew about the manhattan project long before harry truman or heroin, etc. so what about the decision to

use atomic bombs to japanese cities? the first thing i would say about it, it was neither inevitable nor was it necessary in order to end the war in august of 1945. now why do i say that? there are several reasons. one, the invasion was not scheduled to take place until november 1st, and secondly, as stalin said, and he knew it because the japanese were trying to see molotov in moscow but the japanese had been searching for a way to surrender with conditions for months. we have all sorts of traffic

from our d coating of our japanese diplomatic message traffic to this effect. in 1939, the united states broke the japanese diplomatic code. not the military code, but the diplomatic code, and throughout the war, we were reading all their message traffic. it was referred to as magic. you could see all this stuff on the web. it is fantastic, we knew about what was going on in japan, but the japanese did not know that we knew. we were demanding unconditional surrender, which was unacceptable for all of japan's leadership, because it implied that the emperor might be considered a war criminal, and

as you know, at that point in time, the japanese considered the emperor a deity. it was opposed by the military, the japanese military for personal reasons. it was humiliating and the japanese military understood that they had lost the war but they were trying to surrender with some kind of saving face and they wanted conditions. for example,, they wanted to disarm the wrong troops. they -- there were four or five conditions. one of them i usually say sarcastically, was that the japanese generals should get their tea in the morning served by american sergeants, but, you know, none of that was going to be acceptable, but all of japan

was absolutely determined to fight to the death if the emperor's life was at stake. so the japanese military proposed a dual strategy. or imposed, not just proposed, but imposed a dual strategy on the japanese government. one part was diplomatic, one part was military. the diplomatic part was that japan's foreign ministry must approach the soviet union and try to persuade the soviet union. we will get back everything that was taken during the 1905 japanese war. and whatever else made sense. to get the soviets to mediate between japan and the united states, to mediate on behalf of

the japanese for better surrender terms than unconditional surrender. and they argued that the advantage of this also was that if they were mediating on our behalf, that would keep them from attacking us, which of course the japanese realized was a possibility. that is a diplomatic part of the strategy. the military part of the strategy was that they would focus attention, focus their military on all the areas that were most likely to be the areas of the american invasion, and the argument was that, we know we are not going to be able to defeat the americans, but we can bloody them enough so that they will be willing to

accept surrender with conditions. that is the strategy. but stalin intended to be a victor, and an occupier, not a mediator.