a governor but also for president and so that was very helpful to me. >> using material from c-span's award winning biography series "first ladies." >> i'm very much the kind of person who believes you should say what you mean and mean what you say and take the consequences. >> and c-span's online video library will feature lady bird johnson, betty ford, rosalynn carter, nancy reagan, hillary clinton, laura bush, michelle obama, and melania trump. watch "first ladies: in their own words" saturdays at 2:00 p.m. eastern on american history tv on c-span2 or listen to the series as a podcast on the c-span now free mobile app or wherever you get your podcasts. now we're going to shift a bit moving to our next session, a panel on the evolving relationship between germany and the soviet union from the inner

war years through the second world war. we have dr. ian johnson, the assistant professor of military professor at the university of notre dame. pretty cool. and dr. sean mcmeekin. welcome. we'll provide a new interpretation on this topic and then our very own dr. nick mueller before opening up to questions and answers. with that over to you nick. >> well, good afternoon. it's great to see everybody again. it's been my pleasure to welcome our distinguished speakers here. first-time speakers ought our international world war ii conference ian johnson and sean mcmeekin. great to add new historians with new discoveries. we look forward to it. i know you all just had lunch

and this is the beginning of an afternoon of great sessions. new perspectives on joseph stalin and the secret military collaborations and machinations won't keep you awake, i don't know what will. you're program has a bio. first let me say that ian johnson reached out to me as his book was going to press before it was published and he did so because he found by some means knew a little bit about research in my dissertation at the university of north carolina that the german/russian relations. covid delayed the publication but he kept me posted. when it finally arrived i was thrilled to see it. and i immediately called him up and lured him to come to this

conference. we had an opening and got both gentlemen because of that. his ph.d. from ohio state university and is an assistant professor at notre dame. he's published a number of other articles. you can read that in your book but hot off the press "the faustian bargain." it has filled a major gap in the research in this area in the last 50 years. he's researched the book far and wide digging into 23 archives in five countries and three languages to bring to light a new knowledge and information and research on the soviet declassified in particular of this secret military dealings, arms dealings, between the red army from 1919 to the outbreak of war when hitler's tanks and troops violated the

nonaggression pact and stormed into russia my own research on the subject did not have access to the soviet archives in those days. i had to build a strong case with what he proved with the documents. it was hard without the soviet archives to find the smoking gun but i can assure you he has discovered all the smoking guns and you'll be interested to hear. beautifully written with revealing stories on just about every page. our other speaker, sean mcmeekin, whose new book -- here it is. now this is a tomb and if you buy one of these plus "the faustian bargain" you only have

to buy two more books to get free shipping instead of three. but in any event he says it's a new history of world war ii "stalin's war." he tips his hand in this larger than life study of stalin's role and a much more place than thought before so, in any event, just to mention, again, he's the professor of european history at bard college with teaching stinlts far and wide as far as yale university, istanbul before he went to bard, winner of numerous prizes on his books, the origins of the first world war, germany's bid for world power. now stalin's war has generated a lot of controversy and you'll

see in our questions he shifts your focus to look at the war from part of the east instead of from washington and london and berlin which is one of the interesting aspects of it. he makes a statement i know rob is engaging to. and rob read on page 94 that was a startling to me as it was to rob said there was only one statesman in europe who truly relished the prospect of a general war breaking out over poland. and that was stalin. well, he will elaborate on that in his remarks. it's a fast-paced book. you'll find it fascinating reading and i've already given up the best bargain in terms of the shipping deal. these two books are

complimentary. ian's goes through the inner war years up to the beginning of the war. and sean's covers stalin during the war. but there's some overlap in areas of significance, and i'll leave it up to our discussion after their talks to examine where they are in alignment or not. but one other statement i'll just wet your appetite on something ian writes. he says toward his conclusion that, quote, the soviet/german partnership formed in 1922 not only helped to explain the outbreak of the second world war in europe but also offer some insight into the course, conduct and eventual conclusion of that conflict offering some explanation for initial german successes, the horrors of fighting on the eastern front and the ultimate soviet victory.

that's quite a statement. so adhering to the chronology i'll ask ian to go first followed by sean mcmeekin, both speak 15-20 minutes and then we'll get on to the questions. [ applause ] >> well, thank you, nick, for the introduction and the chance to come and join all of you here at the world war ii museum. i'm grateful the team has done such a terrific job with logistics and organization. i'd like to also have a shout out to my students at notre dame. several have mentioned they're going to watch the live stream today and as one of them pointed in an email i'm competing with a notre dame football game. thank you for making the right choice. i hope you enjoy today.

so today i'm going to be speaking about my new book "faustian bargain." the second world war in europe began just before sunrise on september 1, 1939, when 50 divisions of the reborn german army invaded poland from the west. great britain and france reluctantly declared war 48 hours later and then to the surprise of much of the world the soviet unions invaded poland two weeks later. the war began over poland and the fact that it began with the soviets and germans working together was a product a pact. hitler and stalin agreed to petition eastern europe between them. the story of that soviet/german partnership in 1939 is described as a moment of opportunism where two dictators saw temporary advantage in aligning with each

other. there's something to that. they had actually been working together for most of the previous two decades. the invasion market the culmination that had begun at the end of the first world war. in 1919 when cooperation between the german army, the reich, and the new soviet state forming to the east, when it began it was a difficult prospect to imagine for very many including its participants. for it's hard to overstate how much the two sides hated one another. in that year lenin would prefer to them as savages and having set all records in war atrocities in the first world war. as you see from the posters, the one to the right, a depiction of a soldier as a gorilla saying "kill him." for much of the leadership, the

german army the villains of their propaganda. for their part the german officer corps were about as fond of the bulcevics. one would write that, quote, the rulers of present day russia are common bloodstained criminals, carrying on the most cruel regime of all time. two groups who saw each other as the literal embodiment of evil strike a deal with one another? in the aftermath of the first world war brought them together. in the summer of 1919 the victorious allies issued the treaty of versailles.

germany was to be forcibly disarmed, to play reparations and give up over 10% of its land area. the victorious allies further dismantled the vaunted imperial german army reducing it from over 5 million to 100,000 men of only 4,000 could be officers. germany further banned from possessing aircraft, armored vehicles, submarines, the modern wars. german military industry and demobilize the german army. the terms of versailles were so harsh when they learned of them they held a secret conference to discuss the possibility of reopening hostilities. germany would lose if it tried to resume the war. they would restore germ mi's

military might concealed even from their own government. their stad aim was to overturn the outcome of the first world war. meanwhile to their east in 1919 the soviet union was not yet in existence. the bolsheviks fighting for survival, fighting on their territory and the forces of the various white factions. in this moment of isolation and desperation in both germany and the ussr the two sides began exchanging military envoys, intelligence and technology. at first quite subtly and on a small scale in 1919. the first secret military conference held not long thereafter in 1921. and the following year in 1922 soviet russia and germany signed a treat that normalized the two states. thanks to the cover that provide

ed they began training facilities on soviet soil. you see a surreptitious picture. what do they hope to achieve by working together? a general here looking prussian wanted to rebuild inside the soviet union. he wanted to locate those that were banned in the process of being destroyed to the soviet union. to train them and make them as professional in the new technologies of war. prior to cooperation with the

soviets. a couple poor officers on hours on end would make it look like they were inside a tank. they had to practice aerial maneuvers and poor german officers had to ride motorcycles with wings strapped to the side. this was hardly an appropriate means to rebuild german military power. the final vision was developing new technologies of war themselves, prototypes that could serve as the basis for a broad general rearmament of germany, aviation and armored warfare technologies. the aims were similar. leon trotskey sought to rebuild. the red army was in disastrous conditions in the aftermath of the russian civil war. the majority of the men had no uniforms let alone working weapons. the majority of the officer

corps were unworthy czarist officers many of them aristocrats who had to be monitored closely lest they commit treason. the entire soviet air force down to 73 aircraft, most of which were probably not safe to fly and perhaps most humiliatingly the red army's rusting tank forces were redeployed with plows to assist farming in ukraine in the aftermath of the russian civil war. he wanted assistance in a new professional officer corps and new technologies to equip it lest the soviet union fall in the face of capitalist encirclement. the two sides began building throughout to achieve their shared goals. until 1941 centered on relocating german industries to the soviet union. cooperation between german corporations and the red army.

you get some sense of the network and mostly in european russia. i will note what went on at some of these different facilities. here you can see a picture of a major air draft factory outside of moscow. the german military and an engineering firm took over this factory on a lease in 1923. it would produce the bomber. several thousand workers along with joint german and soviet engineering teams. others worked on artillery, tanks, chemical weapons, rifles, machine guns, submarines, anything with military utility. the scale of this cooperation would grow to staggering proportions. the germans would become by far the soviet union's largest trading partner by 1931 and almost every major german firm

would receive contracts to build weapons or modernize or build factories. more than 255 german firms in total. most of these contracts were, in fact, mediated by the german army who set up their own secret office in moscow known as moscow center to serve as a negotiating hub for german firms interested in relocating banned operations to the soviet union. to give some sense of how significant this effort was in the overall development of soviet military industry, by 1940 more than half of all soviet tank production was depend end on german built, designed or managed factories. as corporate projects took off german military leadership sought to expand direct military to military cooperation. the first of these arrangements centered on salvaging germany's airpower. in 1923 the general began dispatching german pilots to a soviet air base in south central russia the there they trained soviet cadets on basic flight

technique. in 1925 the germans acquired this entire base on a lease from the soviet government. the germans got a lot out of this facility. they trained new pilots, developed new tactics, rewrote their training manuals. they also developed new technologies. nearly 1,000 pilots, mechanics and observers in total would be trained at this facility for context about the entire size when it formally reformed in 1935. 22 future generals of three star rank or above either taught, trained or commanded this facility in its time of operation. one of its alumni would later write that, quote, the spiritual foundations of the entire future were developed on that russian air nautical field. so what did the soviets get out of all of this in turn? well, they, too, trained pipe lots and mechanics and engineers in the german managed training courses but their most important aim was to borrow or steal

german technology. 7 out of 8 german aviation firms that existed in 1925 would sign secret development contracts, all of them illegal under german law with the reichswehr. the soviets had access legally to any design that arrived at this facility. they were allowed to fly, photograph these aircraft, et cetera. the soviets would go a little further, take apart component parts, break into hangars and warehouses. the sum result was a great acceleration in the development of soviet aviation technology. the soviets would, in fact, go from having almost no domestic to one of the largest in the world by the mid-1930s largely thanks to technical theft and borrowing much of it alongside the germans. you can see here one of the designs tested that would, in fact, lead to the dive-bomber first tested and developed.

the place where this technical experimentation was under way. the germans and soviet had another joint base dedicated to tank warfare. it served as a training center, testing ground and a place for tactical experimentation. among the alumni of this facility were such notables in armored warfare. perhaps the most famous soviet. they graduated about 2,000 officers between the germans and soviets but of a higher rank. on the german side 17 of them would become division commanders by the outbreak of the war or above. in addition nearly every tank that germany would deploy between 1938 and 1943 had been developed based on testing. now the most secretive elements

were on chemical weapons, production and testing. two major laboratories and testing grounds were dedicated to soviet/german cooperation. the first built in the suburbs of moscow about seven miles from the kremlin. this proved to be something of a problem when they were dropping chemical agents from the air and, unfortunately, hitting people in the moscow suburbs. so the main base was actually moved out much further afield later on in this period. relying on human testing, sometimes on a huge scale, the soviets and germans experimented with new chemical agents and deployment techniques. i argue in the book the research logs from these facilities gives some answer why chemical weapons weren't used in the second world war unlike the first. the soviet and german research teams concluded by the conclusion of their cooperation together they did not work well alongside mechanized warfare like they embarked upon in

training and maneuvers or with strategic bombings, something they spent a great deal of time exploring. now let me turn to some of the consequences of this first era of soviet/german cooperation. hitler came to power in january 1933, helped in many ways by this period of cooperation. general vonnberg who shepherded the german military into the nazi era told an officer, confused perhaps about his loyalty, why he had become so dedicated to hitler. he replied that i have seen in russia what can be gotten out of the masses. my trips to the soviet union turned me into a national socialist, end quote. the general, who was dismissed for political reasons in 1926 and then embarked on his own career would second the views telling hitler that, quote, our paths may have been different but our aims were the same, end quote.

now interestingly once he came to power hitler did not immediately suspend military cooperation. another testing season in the ussr would continue despite hitler's own hatred of communism. but soon most of the bases were closed as hitler felt confident enough to restart training and technical development in germany himself. he was no longer concerned about the western allies. this was part of hitler's broader project of expanding the army, re-establishing the german air force and rapidly raising defense spending. by 1935 they had received over 5,500 aircraft and more than 500 tanks issued. in other words a window to halt german rearmament without a world war was rapidly shrinking. now there was broad awareness of the pace of german rearmament by 1935 when hitler marched into the previously demilitarized ryneland the chief of the staff informed a shocked french prime minister that military intervention would be disastrous

as germany was, in fact, already the strongest army in europe. you get some sense of this from this cartoon from the famous david lowe. the caption reads, how much will you give me not to kick in your pants for, say, 25 years. now me to not kick in your pants for say 25 years. what is prizing is the date, 1936, before the infamous acts of appeasement. the british had reached similar conclusions. the british and french both concluded they needed to buy hitler off and delay him while they rearmed themselves, a process that would take four to six years or convince hitler not to start a war at all. in other words, rearmament paid dividends for germy through 1938 and solidified his domestic control of germany. now, of course the greatest and most disastrous consequence of secret rearmament work came in

april of 1939. at that juncture, after years of rejecting quiet soviet overtures to renew their period of cooperation, hitler suddenly decided a new partnership with the ussr was in fact in his interest. that month the german foreign ministry quietly sold their soviet counter-parties that hitler decided the renew the partnership of the 1920s and 1930s. couched in some form of renewal, not an about-face. in 1939 germany and the ussr would partition germany between them and renewing elements of the renewed partnership. most importantly, it waved the way for hitler's invasion of poland. stalin followed suit and the two forces intermingled not long therefore. on september 2nd, 1939, a general in thor. >> here and others met in a town

that the germans had taken but were turning over to soviet custodian ship. they may have been acquaintances. both trained at camma in the ussr. here we can see them celebrating their victory which was the high point of the relationship, all part the pull filament that had begun 20 years later. only 22 months later, however, the two states would be at war with one another. on june 22nd, 1941, hit le launched police station barb rosa. more than 30 million people would die in eastern europe over the next four years. what is remarkable is how much the two adversaries had in common when they began the war. rarely in the annals of history have two opponents spent so much time arming each other for war german boots marched on the

rubber from the soviet in their boots. their contained chrome nickel and manganese mined in the ussr and. their vehicles were fueled in many instances by soviet oil. in some of the german field manuals had been written in the ussr. many german officers, too, learned their trade in soviet russia. across the line the story was much the same. although few living officers trained alongside of the germans because of the purges most had been trained in organizations established along german lines and taught by german struckors. soviet operations would be managed by a soviet saf modelled on its german counterpart and reporting to a man who lived in

germany in 1931. the army drew heavily on german designs, copies of german vehicles, many powered by bmw-designed engines and built in factories built or modernized by german engineers. as news of the german attack began to filter in from the fast stalin reacted with disbelief. surely, he asked his close advisers, hitler would not just attack like some bringing ant. he told molotov to find the ambassador. he concluded his remarks in a quiet silence in molotov's office. molotov asked, is this a declaration of war? he had been given no directions on that issue. german troops had crossed the

soviet border and cities bombed for over an hour and a half. shulenberg said nothing. at the ends of the interview all molotov could stutter was quote, what have we done to deserve this? thank you. first of all, thanks to ian for setting the table so ably. that's going to be a difficult act to follow. i would like to thank nick for a kind introduction, and to rob, jeremy, stephanie, and others for organizing this splendid conference and inviting me here despite the fact my book is perhaps not most cheerful. it takes shoitly more, shall we say sour tone regarding the conduct of the war, at least on the part of some of the allies along with of course some of the results of that conflict. i realize now i need the clicker. here it is, it is right next to me. i am not going to click yet.

i want you to look at this photo and kind of puzzle over it for a few moments and try to figure out what it actually deconflicts. we were learning from ian there was an odd legacy of soviet-german owe operation. ironry, two states set up as pariahs conspiring against the international system. i will come back to that heme in a moment, what we have this common. it is interesting when you look at the literature on the war, i think there always has been on the one hand this idea of inevitable: we were hearing this earlier today in the debates about the hole coast, the so call functional. i versus -- debate. and hitler and stalin, there is always this idea that it kind of has to happen, it's fated to happen. i don't actually agree. i think there are a lot of ways in which the war might have turned out differently. i do agree, with some of the

speakers today that some kind of war was inevitable but not necessarily the precise war that broke out when it did, nor the course of that war. to get into this relationship, again, some of the projection i am talking about, i think what people miss when they try to read soviet foreign policy -- frankly, there aren't that many books on that subject to begin with compared to the tomes on german strategy such as it was, brutality, war crimes, et cetera. there are a lot of books on stalin and his domestic oppression. there are not many books that examine soviet foreign policy. usually, it is in the context the file your of collective security, the failure to organize any coalition against hitler which is usually blamed on british and french stubbornness, naivete, what have you. there are many ways to think about this. if you look at the discussions of czechoslovakia, 1938 in the

wake of the an slush of march. the foreign minister talked rather loudly about obviously his disdain and his hatred for hitler and the anti-semitic regime in germany there was no real serious soviet effort to take part in any of the these negotiations. the so-called short course doesn't talk about the collective security. it talks about the second imperialist war, which is after it has already broken out. if you look at the map here. i don't have a laser pointer. the organizers, stephanie highlighted what i would like to highlight. you will notice here that if the soviet union is going to help check slovakia it want difficult to do so. they don't share a border. for do they share a border with germany. if they are going to did anything against germany or for czechoslovakia, they have to

invade poland and or row mania, more likely poland with whom they have a history. the soviets didn't like the idea of collective security. in fact when chamberer lane proposed and gave this so-called guarantee to poland know for dwrously not guaranteeing the integrity of poland's territory but freedom of poland which would be interpreted many ways. not only did the soviets not back this, they explicitly repudiated it in public. they weren't particularly subtle about this. they denied press rumors and reports that they had actually made any arrangement to protect poland. in fact the partition of poland kaert out in september of 1939 was a soviet idea, a soviet proposal not a german one. we heard from ian the interesting logic, it was the

soviets who were keener to renew the partnership than the germans. the germans were in a rush because of hitler's timetable and the need for better weather to invade poland in august. turned out to be september of 1939. it was a soviet mood. it was in journals eventually in his vestia. it was talked about at dinner parties and banquets with diplomats and event ally reached the german ears. when hitler and ribben trough and gishls got to discussing this problem, stalin wasn't open there either. he gave a speech in march. i call it the chestnut speech, he wasn't going to pull the chest nuts out of the fire for the western entities. later on during the negotiations in moscow for the montrell trippendale pact they mentioned this.

they said we liked your chestnut speech of we saw where you were going with that. the next gesture was blunt. this is when the jewish foreign minister or foreign affairs commissar, term of art, commissar, he's not fired by molotov. molotov being a gentile, not jewish, the orders are issued to purge the entire soviet ministry of jews. this is an olive branch to hitler and he recognized it and geshls was ordered to stop attacking the soviet union, which they do. it doesn't mean we had a deal right away. they had to work it out, the fine print, the trade agreements, how the british could help avoid the blockade from the minute malls they couldn't get from the rest of the world, et cetera, et cetera. when we look at the negotiations there are a couple of interesting factors here. hirs first, this map is cleaner than the other one.

you can get an idea where the division line was supposed to be. if you look at -- there are a number of different lines here, they caused endless diplomatic mayhem because of the talk of the different lines and soviets are trying to fudge where the borders are. the original order was not the kherson line nor was it the one that actually happened in 1939. i have fun with my college class when i talk about the agreement which posedly led to today's modern middle eastern borders. i show them today's borders and that map and they bear little resemblance to one another. in this case you can see that the whole things get screwed up because the germans go way past the demarcation lines. why? because the soviets delayed invading. it is interesting why. the germans were somewhat annoyed that the soviets weren't

participating in the joint war of aggression. they kept delaying. no no, we will mobilize troops we we are ready. we don't want to insight the outside powers. in other words, they didn't want france and britain to declare war on them, too. they pretended they weren't invading poland. the way they spun it when they invaded was that it was a protection mission. and they explained it to the polish as they were waiting until warsaw fell. they got the timing wrong. they got an erroneous press report that warsaw had fallen. and it went true. warsaw held out another two weeks. meanwhile, they gave the molotov treatment 'as i call this. and poland's ambassador was

arrested. they did the same to the consul in kyiv. what is interesting is precisely when the germans went past the demarcation lines and the soviets in the end had to do horse trade asking horse swapping but in the end they yeed on this territorial swap. the soviets were supposed to get even more territory than the germans they conceded a lot of central poland and warsaw and lublin to the germains, parts that had been by secular in the soviet sphere. in exchange they get lithuania, which wasn't really polish. then they have a spin for the person media. we didn't invade poland because it didn't actually exist. second of all, you can see, in fact, the germans got kind of polish poland. we really only invaded the parts that used to be parts of czarist russia. in fact, we haven't invaded any

territory. what is amazing about this argument, it is endorsed by british politicians, including lloyd george and winston churn hill who was called in by the soviet ambassador who thanks him for his support. admittedly, bryn was trying to figure out how to defeat germany. they hadn't anything youred out how to help poland let alone defeat germany. you can see why they wouldn't want a new enemy. but it allows the soviets to pose they didn't invade poland, weren't allied to germany, they were neutral. the soviet union was a peace loving empire. which invaded seven countries between 1939 and 1941. they were peace loving empire, neutral. it is an interesting post, amazing that they get away with it because they deport even more people from poland than the germans do.

what is amazing, they didn't really hide it. they weren't as blatant as hitler and openly boasting about their crimes but when it came to things like exappropriate rags they were. they boasted about how many banks they looted in occupied poland, and later row mania, and the battic states. now, i think what this all shows when you actually look at the territorial swaps -- i don't have time to go into detail about the soviet-finnish war, some moves into romania as well. what they show aside of the impact from the people of eastern europe which are offense is that the soviets were under -- power. if you read the boring dry literature of the soviet foreign ministry, they have a wonderful way of talking about it.

we are not satisfied with this arabia, we wouldn't back ruina, too, because there are poletarians there. new subjects for the empire. we have enlisted 25 new million subjects with our era of peaceful expansion, invasion of sovereign countries. you know, the germans actually didn't agree about buick serena because it wasn't mentioned in the pact. they end up having a baroque argument where molotov strangely enough sounds a little bit like a sort of ethnic chauvinist. he says, no, it should be soviet because it is populated by ukrainians who were oppressed by the row mannions and shulenberg pulls out an ethnographic encyclopedia. and he says, no, this is row

mannion encyclopedia, not to be trusted. functionalist versus intentionalist debate, the relationship, when does it come proper. i think it is over row mania and the balkans. when you look at what they are negotiating in late 1940 and what stalin nands -- i mean, hitler does formally invite stalin to join the pact. this is the kind of touched up cosmetically altered version of the old pact directed against the anglo saxon imperialists with which they shared an enmity. stalin said we never asked to befriend the british and we don't wish to befriend the anglo saxons, they are our enemies. that's how it guess. >> hitler invites stall continue to join. eventually the negotiations break down. in particular, they had a lot of

interest this the nickel produced and the soviets want the germans to withdraw military personnel from row mania from where they got half of their natural oil. and stalin wanted the right to invade bulgaria and station troops at the straits at the boss per owes. there were also concessions from japan he wanted the germans to arrest for them. one of the findings i have found in this book -- i discovered this the bulgarian archives i think what the key moment was. when molotov presented this list of demands like an ultimatum to the germans in 1940 hitler didn't get it right away. he was traveling. he gets the news when he returns to berlin, dmauls the bulgarian minister and unloads on him in a three and a half hour monologue,

december 3rd, 1940. that's when i think hitler made the decision to invade the soviet. it shows up later in the formal documents how to plan for the war. as for the war, i think it is laid out interestingly the way the two sides prepared each other for the war. i don't think he mentioned it in his book but he makes the point the germans had too much intelligence, some of them remembered their days of cooperation with the soviets but it was a will it out of date because some of them had been there much earlier. i think those true. we know the germans underunderestimated what the soviets had in reserve in terms of armor. on the other hand they had a grood idea of what was on the frontier. to go through it really quickly because i don't want to go over time, the soviets had put a massive amount of war material at the frontier. the 251 airbases they built in the first six months of 1941, 80% were in the frontier

districts occupied since 19 39 abutting the german reich. within several minutes to about 30 or 40 minutes flying distance. the germans knew about this because they were conducting overflights. so, too, were the soviets. conducting overflights, particularly row mania. if you look at what the soviets are planning, here's where it gets interesting. there is talk in the last war man in 1941 about the need to forestall the adversary. the soviets seemed to think, wishful thinking, that the germans would telegraph their giant upcoming punch and, somehow, the soviets would have a grace period to prepare their own counter-strike. so the phrase which keeps coming up in the soviet documents is a powerful strike in the direction of lublin. on this map you can see they are focusing on the set offern front in western ukraine and also

poland. the armor concentration, 24 mechanisms divisions and 85 aviation regiments on that front alone. particularly in these two they had specifically insisted in having in the negotiations in 1939. turned out to be a giant mistake because of course those assail yants were exowes posed. ander inially annihilated in the early days of the invasion. i saw files before i was banned from russia. what you see in these files in the last days before barb rosa begins is a creeping sense of dread. they do see what's coming. stalin does see what's coming. there is plenty of evidence. however, they are not ready. at the last minute there is a lot of talk of the need for camouflaging all those new arrow

droems, all the new airbases, all the new tank parks, they are supposed to finish that pie about july 5th. they are supposed to finish camouflaging and building the dummy thanks at and petrol stations by july 15th, which is of course more than two weeks too late. we know the war doesn't go particularly well. if you look at how far the germans make it and we have learned how significant it was that they were repelled outside moscow in december 1941. in the remaining time i have, which is not copious i would like briefly to look into the questions voupdsing the -- i think ian raised an interesting point about how much the germans underestimated the scale of soviet armor. i don't want to i don't have emphasize it because the germans still did a good job of destroying the armor that was there. by december 1941 stalin lost 91%

of his tank park. out of 2 -- sorry 22 wu 340 tanks n. that period, the soviets produced 5,400. a little less than one fourth of 25% of losses. they had lost 81% the prewar stock of anti-tank guns. 12,100. they had built about 2,500, about one fifth of losses. they had lost.,200 out of their 8,400 bombers. they had built about 2,500, again b a quarter. with fighter it was better. they only lost 9 wsh -- 9 thousand out of 11,000 and

produced 4500, about half of their losses. you lock at the monthly figures in 1942 and 1943, there are peaks and valleys, they produce about 2 hu tanks a month and lose about 2,000 tanks a month. where was the margin? the margin of course was ultimately in the 625 lend lease tanks a month they are receiving from their allies. even soviet war production. and these are very closely guarded secrets, believe me n the soviet archives. i can't disclose my methods as to how i was able to get this information but it is hard to know how they were using all the stud bakers and the jeeps and the fords and ultimately the harley davidson motorcycles. we know how much they valued certain things, diesel tanks, we produced certainlian m 2a 4 diesels specifically for the soviets. we ended up producing most of the douglas a 200 bombers called

boston. most of those produced for the soviet air force. stalin fell in love with the p 39. and they got extremely angry when the americans would send any of these to britain because they wanted all of them. in addition to this, everyone has heard about the span. you might not have heard about the borsch. but in fact, the united states sent tens of millions of dehydrated pacts of borschth. it includes bay leaves, along with crab, butter. the butter thing is interesting because this is when america was first sold on margin because we were told we had to eat oleo margin because the butter was for the russians. there is a lot in the book on lend lease. i want to raise this question to leave it dangling in the air, would the soviet war effort

would have looked like without owl of this surplus. if their tank production is roughly equal to their tank losses it is only at the margins they can win. and it is only thanks to the allies. i am going to return to the first picture and tell you what this is of. all right. these are bearlings men, stalin stooges, puppets who hunt down members of the poland army after the uprising. they are riding on harley davidson motorcycles regifted to them by stalin who also gave bearling's men as they were called in poland, it was not a compliment, dodge trucks, willis chiefs, harley davidson motorcycle and they were promised 850 more american trucks by the end of 1944. ly gifted equipment that stalin's communityist puppets used to hunt down all of those

poland home army fighters. thanks very much [ applause ] >> okay. so let's have few -- i will have a few questions here. and then we will turn it over to the crowd. but -- who i know already anxious to get into it. let me ask you a question that's really kind of for both of you. one thing you didn't get into a whole lot sean, you gave us this picture of stalin as the center of the war effort and master war leader, really, of the war and the events. so war into the war than the prewar. and lend-lease of course you talked about there, and how that was so, you know, critical to the soviets. so there are different sources of soviet strengths that you both point out in your different ways. ian, you looked at it from the point of view of the technology transfer, of training, and

technical support and technical advances that led to advances in the strength of the red army in terms of more sophisticated tanks and represents and aircraft. and, sean, you kind of make the case that it was really the aid from the west, the and stalin's leadership. which of the components was most important to stalin's survival in 1941. the technology tfer and training and advanced weaponry. or was it really the lend-lease from the united states. i will let either one of you to start. >> do you want me to start? >> sure. >> easy answer, it was a bit of both. i think all of those prototypes to practice that the soviets acquired, and even the models. i don't want to poo-poo the

second quarter successes they had, particularly the t 34 tanks which had a lot of attributes, as well as some flaws. of course, they are not going the win without their own production which they relocate lease. but even that required vast amounts of industrial inputs also from the united states. particularly aluminum. unlike the germans -- everyone used aluminum in producing airplanes. they didn't the modern hyper light composites yet. stalin loses much of his production because germans occupy and take over industrial regions and zones and also raw

materials. so the soviets lose vast quantities of things like raw iron and steel. so americans are sending in armored plate, refined steel products, ball bearings, chrome, in addition to petroleum and foodstuffs. they lost their complex for beauty and uniform supply which was all taken by the germans in the ballotics. by the end they were relying almost exclusively on the americans. 70% of sugar is coming from the united states. leather, cotton. all coming from the americans. 8.44 million tons of war material including a million tans of aviation and motor volcano fuel were sent in. that's what they used to conquer northernisha in 1945, with all the production and the rest of it. the learning curve matters.

they improved between 1941 and 1945, what had been learned in the interwaugh period was an essential provision but i still don't think they win the war without lend lease. >> i think they are complimentary stories, as sean noted. i argue in my book that the soviets developed a dependent on foreign industry, advisers and military advisers primarily from germany in 1933 and 1934 and then increasingly from the united states. this dependence is why stalin quietly courted germany for a partnership. the soviets needed german assist in supply chain, technical developments and all sorts of areas. of course that was renewed in the molotov ribbon trough pact. with operation barb rosa not only did the soviets lose mines, agriculture, lose all these

things, they lost the german engineering expertise that had again resumed assisting them in 1939. lend lease replaced german expertise and assistance after 1941 at great cost. it took a while as you demonstrate in your book for that to become so significant for the soviet war effort. i think in some ways they are the same story with different players. >> it happens again 1945-46, when the soviets start looting german industry. it is a really strange kind of a sequence. first they are relying so much on the german cooperation, prototypes, joint training. then they lose that, they have to rely on the americans. then in 1945 once they pour into poland and germany they loot all of those factories and industrial and intellectual property as well. they take a huge amount of their reparations, some of it of course human, slave labor, but they also take vast amounts of industrial property and ship it back to moscow to have looting

units inside the red army that actually ship back, again, tons and tons and tons of industrial equipment, products, intellectual property of german corporations and all the rest. >> ian. is it fair to say that you think barb rosa would be the most -- looking at it from the other side, the benefits to germany of the secret collaboration and development of their own tanks and loveoffa and so forth, do you think barb rosa is the main sequence of that relationship and hitler's ability the row arm so fast? >> yes. i can't -- i mean, the counter-factual is always a difficult one but the timing of the second world war imwithout all the effort made in the 1930s. it took years to develop a tank or an aircraft from scratch. immediately when stalin took power in 1933, immediately there were huge arm audioeys.

the result was by 1938 or 1939, the germans had advanced models produced on the air and the grounds, arm oarored vehicles. and the british and french who did not begin fulling mobilizing until '37 or '38 was behind. this created a window for hitler to start a war. barb rosa with the bloody culmination. i see elements both of barb rosa's failure in cooperation and the way in which barb rosa was conducted. a lot of the german officers i study in this book they were being spied on of course by soviet intelligence personnel who are monitoring their thinking, their gambling habits, their relationships with local women. they notice the disturbing trend that the longer junior officers are in the soviet union the more anti-communist they became because there were starving people climbing over the gates

trying to get access to food. hardly an encouraging picture of stalin's soviet union. soviets tried to respond by bringing in lecturers to talk about how great the five year plan was. but for a lot of 19 to 20-year-old young men it was hardly convincing. we see a radicalization in the army that fuels barb rosa in large part. >> could i add one point. it is interesting. it is one of the interesting, one of the many obvious glaring mistakes the germans make. aside from the moral ones, what affects the course of the war, in addition to the overall brutality of the campaign and the fact that many ukrainians welcome in the invasion, maybe were just as horribly treats as jews and other groups. the germans argued about a war of liberation and the camps and the collective farms because they i decided it was effectively more efficient just to keep the sect collective

farms in place because they had grain and distribution. so they don't break up the collective farms, which coast counter to the logic of what they are supposedly doing. >> sean, another question. you have painted a picture of stalin as a master war leader and yet indicate that he wasn't ready, missed the intel coming in. how great a war leader and how much was at the manipulator and master war leader if he missed those basic intel and was unready from just a mobilization point of getting troops in place? >> that's a great question. i don't want to give the impress he was an infallible genius who always got things right n. a lot of ways his gamble in europe backfires in 1941. i mean all of his plans -- what he had helped in hoping to some extent to insight the war between the western powers was that they would bleed each other, fight a war of

attribution which would weaken both sides and eventual loo he the red army could sweep into the ruins. instead hitler embarrassed nearly all of his opponents and the germans routed everyone and were sayersly weakened at all. i think he definitely thought a war with germany was coming, he just didn't really think the germans were going to be ready that quickly. frankly a lot of the military build up on the german side happens at the last minute. it is almost a shock at first that they are actually going to do it. some of it is the fact that the intelligence is too good. he knows that the germans haven't ordered up enough winter clothe asking don't have the right lubricants for winter temperatures. so he thinks how could they be so stupid to invade russia without preparing for russia? part of the reasons russia let the germans have the overflights

is look they are going to see all of these things there, all the airbases, and they are going to think they can't possibly invade us. we outnumber them, 3, 4, 5, 8-to-1. so he does miscalculate. in asia, it works out better for him. he plays it perfectly. japan, the united states, china, and britain spend four years bloodying each other up, and stalin waits until literally the day the second atomic bomb is dropped on nagasaki and moves in to seize hess empire after japan moved a million troops back to the home islands, waving the way for now, and all the rest of it. >> maybe just a question or two more. this question of war readiness.

i get that they hadn't gotten everything to the borders and weren't ready to fight, the petrol stations and everything was unready from that point of view. but looking at the perspective that paints a picture of the technology transfer, the training the advancing in their tanks, technology, and their plane technology and weaponry. the question for both of you then, do you think had it not been for those operational mistakes or missing the intel was the soviet red army really ready perhaps based on what ian is take about the trading technology they transferred from the germans? were they ready or not? >> well, in my examination one of the key parts of the story and one we haven't mentioned yet was the roll of the purges in affecting the red army's preparations for war. stalin superintended much of the partnership and the enormous role the germans played in

training the new elite army. almost every corps and divisional officer had been trained by a german officer in 1937. he same suspicious and paranoid that all of these officers with their connections to germany might not prove loyal in the even of war. this is one of the reasons that the purge is unfolded in the late 1930s and decimated the red army. about 11% of the officer corps being removed, many shot, thrown in prison. many of those individuals were once who not only trained alongside the german but understood their playbook. driven vehicles together, threw new year's parties new them well. the decapitation of the red army as a result was disastrous. it showed immediately in the winter war when the red army performed so badly.

i think that was another critical factor in the lack of soviet preparation and the boor response. both the expangs of the red army in 1939 and 1941 was haphazard was the fact that so many skilled officers disappeared on the eve of war. >> you would say germany took more advantage of the training and the exchange than the soviets did if you add the purges to that factor, is that -- >> in operational terms, yes. >> prigsal terms. sean, what do you say? >> the purges clearly hurt. and clearly, the soviets are not ready, as ready as they should have been. one of the interesting points, again, if you take a comparative approach. not just the germans but look at the french in 1940. i am not an sport but i read enough to know there is a lot of criticism of the french high command in 1940. the failure to really fundraise and properly deploy tanks. they are sort of an offensive weapon. they are not supposed to be sit at strange intersections i don't

know, kind of watching and observing. that is coordinating mobile warfare. the soviets, they were more advanced. they didn't have their heads in the sand. threat both the experience of watching and observing the campaigns in europe. they had recent experience in finland. jukov had some experience in the battle against the japanese in 1939. while they lot a lot of preparation and capital in the purges and while there was a ruthness separating outs of generals in 1941, '42, and '43, a lot of them are executed same way troops would have been shot for retreating. there were a lot of in retreat orders. there is a sharp learning curve. they certainly learn, the army of 1945 bears little resemblance of the red army of 1941.

while stalin -- i don't by the idea stalin was completely shocked into this funk. we have the records. he was meeting regularly with everyone in the pko. it is firly standard and pro forma. he doesn't disappear in a drunken stupor liken that many thought did he. that says, he is not taking all the reports of german preparation seriously. there had been an order to be essentially war ready but without clear instructions regarding rules of engagement, when to fire. that order was isn't out early in the morning of the 22an. they should have been more prepared than they were. that said you can see signs of preparation. cancelling furloughs, everyone is on extra guard duty. they are calling up the political officers. they are camouflaging -- it is not like they are not preparing. they are not asleep. i think that's the famous christopher clark media for of 1914.

they are not sleep walking it into. but they definitely were -- i don't think no one was really prepared for what the german onslaught actualliment. >> lend-lease thing is still out there. other people may want to ask questions about that. i don't know how you would answer the question how stalin on a counter-factual basis would emerge as a great war leader had there not be a western front. i don't know if we want to discuss that later on. but maybe jeremy, do you want to get the audience into questions and we will come back and think about that. >> round of applause for ian johnson and sean mcmeekins. wonderful presentations. we will start in the center here. >> in 1939, the french and british diplomats were trying to ( take advantage of the natural anti-pathy between the nazis and the soviets in coming up with

their own pact. about those efforts i have read it viewed two opposite ways. one that the british and the french missed a real opportunity to get a pact with stalin. and the other side is no matter what the brench and british would have promised stalin, they could not offer as god a deal as hitler. i was wondering what your view on that was. >> i can take that one first. >> go ahead. >> yeah. so there is a lot of discussion about collective security in this period, how genuine were stallin's offers to partner with the british and french against germany? they are i think not particularly honest or good faith officers. even as they are broaching the possibility of collaboration with the british and french, the germans are confidently reaching out -- the soviets are reaching

out to the germans about renewing military collaboration, even as they are talking to the british and french. if you actually look at the time line of negotiations in '39, already by december 138 the dove yet seemed pretty interested in a broad political and economic agreement with germany. at that point one of the documents that i found that appears in my book is soviets come up with a list of 170 equipment purchases they would like to make from german industry including essentially every air and tank design germany has. there is no way they would sell them all of their stuff in the absence of some broader political agreement. they present this idea in 1939. and the yermans say we are not ready for that kind of commitment. when they offer the same agreement to poland, the die is cast. it is really the german asks soviets dancing around seeing if they can trust each other and what the terms will look like.

the day british arrive in moscow to conclude their own agreement with the soviets against nazi german stalin okays a political agreement with the german: they are there, in my opinion, to drive up the price that stalin will get from hitler. he is nothing if not an effective poker player. in terms of genuine efforts after 1939 i don't see happening much. >> i agree. the french took it much more seriously. they were much more desperate. due mont did have credentials. i have seen some of the documents of the van zant. and the french were interesting and really hoping they could cut some kinds of a deal. but that said, it simply wasn't

going to happen. i think as ian said this was about driving up the price. stalin's rep goes duck hunting with them, at one time tells them he's too busy. he asks, have you procured permission. and french said, no. he says i am sorry you have not procured this permission in advance. the french are game enough. they sent an envoy to ask the poles if they are going the allow the red army to invade poland. the answer is no. >> one other note. the soviets always few they would get better terms from the germans. at the end of the day, stalin could calls get more, both economically and politically from a partnership with germany than a partnership with the british and french.

>> connie, halfway back this the center aisle. >> hello gentlemen, great talk. prior to starting the war with britain germany knows it is greatly out numbered at sea. yet they transfer a hipper class cruiser and give knots of naval help to russia. stalin wanted to rebuild his navy. knowing the imbalance and the war that's going to happen with bryn, why -- did -- know that hitler was going to invade a couple years later? why give up whatever it is that you have for whatever deal you got out it of it. >> do you want to take this? >> sure. one thing to keep in mind, i think there is uncertainty in hitler's mind whether the british and french will honor their pledge to poland in 1939. essentially up to the british and french declaration of war he is being told by ribbon trap i trust the british people.

this is clearly playing a role. you know, there is a great hope that naval force also not become necessary. of course we see the neglect of the german navy on the eve of car compared to the army or a lot ofoffa part of the product. this is part of the story. the other thing i would note issing this something stalin very much wanted. he began sbrending the construction of the navy all the way down to calibers for different ships. this was something he wanted to control down to the detail. >> the only thing i would add is that the reason the german versus to depart with a lot of things which obviously germany did need, it was a bilateral deal. they were getting grain, manganese, chrome, and in

particular petroleum. they obviously have to pony up something in he can change for all the raw materials. they are also getting rubber which they can't get otherwise shipped across the soviet union. they have to do something to get all of this equipment and one final note. the german navy does get things out of the pacts which are often forgotten. they are allowed to establish a naval base on soviet soil in romansk. there are elements of cooperation at sea that the germans are also getting in return for that naval assistance. >> question here in the center, please. >> the u.s. invaded russia, intervened in the russian civil war in 1919-1920. i question this. how much did that drive the soviets into the german camp?

>> you are right. the u.s., it was a somewhat half hearted intervention. very few u.s. troops saw anything resembling combat. it was a combination of soviet world view foreign policy, this allies intervention. to be honest i don't think stalin or remembered or thought too seriously about the u.s. intervention. however he thought constantly about the british intervention, particularly in the baltic. that's one of the reasons for finland. it might be a launching pad for an invasion for the soviet unit. when he is asked, who do you mean, he mentioned britain. britain is an adversary in 1939, 1940. in my book, he comes off as soft on stalin until the ends when he

toughens up. churchill was more furthermorely interventionist than george lloyd was for example. the british also -- this is significant. i didn't talk about it today but the back oou plots that the soviets uncover where he was war gaming and bombing back oou in 1940 gave him the pretext for a massacre that i don't have time to go into. read the, into. the soviets sent an expeditionary force into baku in 1913. even when they are talking about the balkans, he tells the germans we need stations to keep the british navy out of the black sea where the british navy had gone in 1918 after the otto man collapse. he is not thinking about the american intervention. he is definitely thinking about the british intervention and british because of where he was

in 1918 and the position of the british. >> i agree, the british were a bigger threat from stalin's view point. keep in mind the british had an active station in the ballotics. in addition there is a plot at least from the soviet perspective that might involve the assassination of senior leaders hashed out of the british embassy in pretty row grad. they kill a number of millster officers, hold the rest hostage. they are seen as a greater threat than the united states. >> thank you to our panelists, dr. nick mueller, ian johnson, and sean mcmeekin. cnn's american presidents guide is our one stop guide to rich