competition rather than being unmanned in strategic competition that there are strategic guardrails which i call managed strategic competition that is what the book seeks to elaborate >> afterwards a weekly nonfiction program entering authors of on their most recent work. to read these visit both tv.org. welcome everyone, my name is crystal lake i am a professor here at right state. it is my pleasure to introduce professor paul locker today before i tell you a little bit more about paul i want to wright thank professor sharma and the department of english for hosting this event. be sure to stuff by the friends of the library table today, as well. [laughs] i likewise want to thank nick

warning ten and becca webb from columbia who have done all the work to make this happen. -- for all the help that they provided to promote today's top. i also want to welcome c-span and book tv to the wright state university campus. we are thrilled that you are here, we hope to have the chance to see you again. finally, i would like to acknowledge that we are on -- indigenous people. we acknowledge the suffering that these indigenous people suffered at the colonialist. -- additionally, i would like to know if you would need a accessibility copy of professor lock arts talk and i will make sure you get that. professor paul lockhart has been a member of the faculty of wright state university since 1989. in addition to teaching public how picks such a history of the gun, history of kings and queens, paul has published seven books on military history in the history of scandinavia.

paul has also had fellowships from the american council blended society and the american scandinavian sound asian. he has been a visiting lecturer at the university of southern denmark. he has been the anomie for the humanities visiting professor at potsdam. in 2014, paul was named a braise golding department of research professor here at right state. he was named the ohio distinguished historian by the ohio center of history. he lives with mary, her wife. one poodle, and three, according to paul, dim-witted cats. paula's most recent book which you will be hearing about today is firepower a magisterial history on how changes and weapons technology have not only shape changes in warfare but also impacted almost every aspect of modern human society. especially the structural power from the west in the

renaissance all the way to the dawn of the atomic era. one recent review put it, paul's firepower is a fascinating, rip-roaring, right. written in paul's elegantly style. published by basic books, firepower is primed to be a widely read and widely discussed title. here at right state we are lucky to not only get the chance to hear more about firepower while it is still hot off the presses, but we often get to learn from paul every day of the year. please join me in welcoming professor paul lockhart to the podium. [applause] >> thank you for that, crystal. very generous introduction. give me a second here. ve ever written most challenging book i've ever written. now if you have to f firepower is most difficult book i have ever written. the most challenging book ever written. if you haven't figured out

already, i will give a brief introduction to it. firepower is a survey history of the history of weapons technology. in what i like to call the age of the gun so in other words from the introduction of gun powder weapons in the west from the late middle ages to the end of the second world war. a period in which not only our firearms are the center of tactics in the military, but also the primary focus of military technology. after the second world war, it's not as if firearms go away, clearly. but they're not quite the same priority that they once had. so it's compared to things like studying writing about the foreign policy of denmark over a 40-year period it's a large topic. that's one of the reasons it was so challenging. it's a big book and as a reviewer told me, lock hearts book is really large. i like the pros, it reads well, but it's big. i heard that about six times in

a review, it made me kind of self conscious. but the theme itself is very obvious. it's also the first book i've written it wasn't about a person or a group of people. that in itself was kind of weird for me. in fact, it's about things. things that kill or maim people. after a while, it got kind of weary-ing. i've learned about military history my entire professional life, and i'm used to learning about those things. but it still took its toll after every now and then. i remember reading a german book written by a military surgeon about the effect of high velocity small arm projectiles, replete with photographs. and i spent about an hour with the book, i couldn't get to the topic until three or four days after that. and that was an odd experience for me.

not that historians are not used to dealing with unpleasant things, of course we are. history wouldn't be history if it weren't unpleasant. but that was a different experience. and also, it's a book that evolved as i wrote it. when i was writing the article, they don't end the way you expect them to. they always go in a slightly different direction. sometimes it's entirely unanticipated. and with this book in particular, because it -- although i have been writing it since roughly 2016, 2017, i've been writing it in my head for about the time i was 18 or 19. in fact, it was an odd moment. i was going through some stuff in my parents house a few years ago. there was a blackboard that used to be in my bedroom when i was a kid. there were notes that for some reason my parents had kept. i wrote them in 1983 about parabolic trajectory rifles.

i thought that was really odd. i was a really odd 19 year old for that matter, to. so i've been kind of working this out in my head for a long time. i just never actually had put it to paper until the past few years. and during that time, the book went in different directions. i've been asked, i've done a couple podcast so far about the book. one of the questions that comes up is, what was the research process like? your historian, he spent a lot of time in archives. well yeah, but not for this. because it is a big book, and it's based primarily on secondary sources, that's an issue. but over the past 30 years, as i worked in other archives, every now and then i found a little tidbit. i was in the national archives in copenhagen, for example. i found a tidbit or two and put it away for later use. the book had kind of a weird journey in coming together. and it definitely did not end

up exactly the way i expected it to. i think i learned more from the process of this book than i very often do when i am writing something. my purpose in writing this book was really twofold. first of all, it has been stuck up here for a long time, okay? i had to get rid of it. i am really relieved now that i have. i'm hoping that i can think about other things for a while. and second, because while there is a look on a, or several listen i, where it comes to the academic study of weaponry, academics generally don't like talking about firearms. we will get back to that in a moment. i wanted to say something about why i decided to do this. first of all, kind of a disclaimer. i am a gun owner, since i was 18 i have been collecting antique guns. although i must confess, within

the past decade i have divested myself of a bunch of that collection. collecting weapons, it turns out, take severe amount of work and i am lazy. it also takes a lot of room. people go to your house and see whole bunch of guns, they automatically have questions that come up. so, i don't come from a gun family. my father brought home a couple of japanese iraqi rifles from the second world war. most of those were brought up by my grandfather. my parents were neither warm no cold on guns. i wasn't allowed to buy a musket until i was 18, and it only because it was a musket. no modern weapons. but my connection comes, oddly, and i can make an homage to her. but from my paternal grandfather, my dad's mother. my grandma à la carte, i was very close with her. she broke her hip when i was

eight, and so for most of my childhood, i helped take care of her. and graham a lock heart doesn't seem historic. i was the only person i knew of my peer group had grandparents born in the 19th century. in spending time with her, she demanded some unusual things of me, like memorizing who bunch of long fellow poems. until about 15 years ago, i can still recite them. i can't anymore, it's probably just as well. it makes room for other, more important things. because she came from whaling stop and yearned from the sea. she made me memorize a whole bunch of different shipwrecks, and so as a ten year old i could tell a brigantine from a snow and a bark from barr contain. from a topsoil schooner, from a ship wreck. it hasn't really don't need that much good, but i do remember those things. she was a lover of history. and at times that i spent with

her, i am sure many of her stories were heavily embellished. but she remembered seeing american troops coming home from the spanish american war. she remembers seeing taft on a campaign stop in 1912. she remembered -- and this was my introduction to the horrors of the industrial revolution, she remembered a friend of hers being crushed by a lot of scrap metal in the dump in massachusetts. she herself was an old girl. she grew up in central massachusetts, until she started working spinning ring field armory. after that, she went to remington arms. there are factory in bridgeport, connecticut, where she was an inspector. she talked about this a lot. since about the age of ten, she had taught me verbally how to strip and reassemble a rifle. i thought that was really odd

until i realized -- it is really odd, no matter how you slice it. i realize that remington manufacturer was a rifle manufacturer for the government in world war i. she used to tell me that she assumed russia had really terrible people because the things that made was gruesome. she knew about machine guns, so that made her the coolest grandmother in the world. my grandfather was different, he grew the ball out. thanks grandpa. that would probably be worth about $2,000 right now. all of these things she imparted to me, and part of it was that it was a connection i had with her. part of it was that fire arms became a tangible connection to history.

i was fascinated with a history of war. but i digress here. i wrote firepower. and it's not that historians don't write about weapons, they do. sometimes quite frequently. in fact recently, there has been a greater degree of interest in the academic study of weapons, which faded away after the first world war. there is a journal called vulcan, an academic journal devoted to the development of war technology. there is a whole slew of books by academics dealing with cultural and political implications of weapons technology. the empire of guns, a book about the involvement of the british small arms industry in early british imperialism in india. david silverman, thunder sticks, a book about the implications of the european small arms trade with indigenous american peoples. and how that affected

indigenous society until the end of the 19th century. but they are really kind of a exceptions. in general, historians who want to read about weapons, or for whom weaponry is part of their work are going to be poorly served. they really have a limited number of options for this, although there are some very long studies of weapons technology. generally speaking, they have to rely on a couple kinds of literature that aren't conventional for academically trained historians. mainly coffee table books, and collector's books. i was in the odd position once of counseling a really talented student. a really talented history on our student, who was doing a -- an honors thesis that revolved

around german use of captured soviet armor in the second world war. and having to tell her that -- with all these scholarship that's been done on the eastern front in the second world war, and the number of really excellent books on the great patriotic war, none of them would tell her what she needed to know about the actual physical capabilities of the tanks she needed to know about. and that should be better served by going to the bargain shelves at barnes and nobles and finding great tanks of world war ii. those were books and had the information she needed. that is a symptom of the fact that historians just generally -- historians don't do guns. um is mostly aimed at collectors literature, which i used heavily for this. in fact, i have a fairly large collection of literature that is aimed at collectors.

it is intended to help people identify weapons. i have six volumes dealing with american military flintlock from 1795 to 1842. almost all of them deal with markings or the end of a spring, really small details that a country can figure out exactly what it is that they have. sometimes those are extraordinarily useful books. again, for detailed information it is something you very often how to focus on buff literature and collectors literature. it's not terribly satisfactory for a vast majority of historians who may need to deal with weapons in passing but who are not necessarily interested in the same thing that collectors are. it is hard to say why historians stay way from last year weapons. part of it, of course, is a

natural maybe not repugnance, that may be too strong, but a natural dissidents against the weapons, especially with in the united states. it is very difficult relationship that americans have with firearms that does make dealing with weapons, or from the point of view of a professor, for example with students who might have a different point than you do about weapons. kind of unusual. it doesn't help that, and i have covered this a lot when dealing with other faculty over the past 30 to use them in teaching, is that for those of us who teach courses that involve war, even if it is only parenthetical, we always have that student who shows up and wants to talk about something really minor! something that seems like if amara. world war ii class, someone wants to debate whether the

later forms of sherman tanks are better than panthers for example, and why. at their fingertips easily have also it's of statistics. it can seem irrelevant, you know? they are not really catching on to the big picture side of things. i remember a former colleague who was bothered by the fact that as they were talking of the origins of the first world war, specifically the russo japanese war, they had a student who just couldn't get over the size of the guns on russian and japanese ships. at the time it seemed like essentially a hobby-ism of a war gamer, not a serious attempt at doing history. granted, you could make the argument that there are very serious implications from the street. without getting into too much

detail, about the relative performance of different size guns that fuel is perhaps one of the most dramatic unveilings of a weapon system ever dealing with the launch of the threat of 1906, it really invigorates the anglo german long-range weapons up to that point. those kind of details, certainly from the viewpoint of a teaching historian can be irritating. but there is a certain danger and ignoring little details. the things that i wanted to emphasize today, because there is no way i'm going to try to summarize, a 30 minute in written synopsis of a 640 page written book. i would not subject you or myself to that. some of the important things that we can glean from a closer attention to the history of weapons technology.

first of all, there is a number of established narratives that we talk about in history all the time, which center around weapons. because we have gotten some of the details of the weapons wrong, it may seem like tiny details, but we have been getting the narrative wrongs. a few example, a coup -- for those of you in the audience who have taught history or have been a history class student, you may well recognized this. for american historians it is the civil war. part of the narrative of the civil war, and we see this not just in established textbooks like jim mcpherson's survey history of the civil war. about a cry for freedom, if i remember correctly. it is a uniquely bloody war.

you get this historiography all the time. there is also in high school and middle school. it is in documentaries, it is just sort of assumed that the civil war was uniquely bloody? how is it uniquely bloody? well more americans killed in the american civil war since all american combat that up to its point. that is of itself is a questionable statistics. when you measure the civil war both sides are america. you can't do that with any other war! it obviously presents skewed statistics. it also doesn't take into account a much larger number of people finding on the merits of war, on either side. first of all, the wars preceding the american civil war in american history by european standards are puny! the more of 1812 compared about what's going on in europe at the same time, it looks pretty ridiculously small!

finally, the the statistics, the absolute numbers are not proportional. in other words, american civil war battle tend to evolve proportionately the same percentage of casualty that we see in european more is at the same time. when we see new european wars during the 18th century. i have a military storage you to tell us all the time, wars were practically harmless. or, at least close to being bloodless. with all the lessons this is an established part of the narrative of the american civil war. why is the american civil war so buddy? besides the fact that as a student of mine put it, more americans died in the civil war because more merrick and fought in this war, greenwich explains at all. the narrative says it's the technology, right? and the cringe prairie documentary which is a pretty good benchmark, in 1990, the

weapons were way ahead of the tactics. the civil war being fought in the midst of the industrial revolution introduced a lot of new weapons! a lot of new technology in general, and a lot of firsts. the first extensive use of railroads, strategically and logistically. first combat between the iron class. first submarine to take down -- not really a submarine but a simmering to take down an enemy warship. first heavy use of rifled artillery, longer range, longer hitting, then contemporary smooth bore artillery. the one that tends to get all of the attention, the rifle. the new infantry life or that had just come into use in the west in the 18 50s and 60s. it's very much gone by 1865. it combined the relatively high rate of fire, three rounds minute of the foot locks move bore musket, with the accuracy,

range,, and penetrating power of a rifle. a little aside here, three rounds and minute. you know, i entirely forgot about the slides, crystal. if you can advance a little bit here, -- i have a photo of my grandmother actually sitting outside of the works, they were best friends. i cannot find that today but if you keep going okay good -- the rifle musket, relatively new innovation. combined the merits of these two weapons. again, three rounds a minute doesn't sound very impressive. given in comparison to modern weapons but considering that the average military rifle before the introduction of the rifle musket was capable firing about one round minute, we are talking about effectively tripling the flyer, tripling the rate and volume of firepower is not in a significant thing the argument is that because the rifle musket is longer

range, because it has greater power, because it's more accurate, all of a sudden the combat which is the heart and soul of combat in the 19th century anyway, it becomes bloody. it becomes impossible to launch a frontal attack with a bayonet. the problem with this is almost all of it is demonstrably wrong. one of the points, for example, is it's not until at least halfway into the war that both sides are armed pretty thoroughly with muskets. one of the battles that is commonly used as an example is a section of the battle of -- in 1862. it's called the hornets nest, a series of confederate assault on a relatively well manned federal position. the confederates and of taking the position of losing casualties. a couple of scholars pointed out this is a sign of a power of the rightful musket. then we actually go to the national archives, look at the weapons inventories from the

union soldier stationed there and find out it was -- the weapon argument just doesn't apply. but perhaps most important, the rifle must get raises a number of other issues. one of them is that it's extremely quirky. the rightful musket, by the way, is able to achieve this high range of fire because of a relatively recent innovation in ammunition design. oh finn mispronounced as a mini bullet, you see when they're in the upper right. a bullet that is sub caliber, it's smaller than the diameter of the weapon. but because it is hollow in the base, expanding gases from the black powder go into the skirt and flare the scourge of the bullet into the rifle. it engages the rifle, you have the tight faith union between the bullet and rifle. but because it is a loose fit, it loads relatively quickly.

but what we have found what works well among others is the french model with a rifle musket. it had this almost ridiculously parabolic trajectory. you can see it illustrated in the diagram to the left. it is kind of hard to make all of that out. let me put it this way. to hit a man at greater than 100 yard distance, which is essentially point blank, when the bullet starts to descend to the ground, you have to elevate the rifle considerably. if you are aiming at the chance of a man 400 yards away, you have to elevate the weapon so much that a man standing exactly halfway between you and that target, a man a 200 yards standing at what should be the path, the bullet is going to fly six feet over his head. what this illustrates is the limited danger zone. we are all the lines converge,

that is the danger zone. the space in between them is the safe zone. the french figured out, all we have to do is move really fast. the enemy is not going to be able to recalculate the distance. they will have a hard time calculating the distance at all. and so occasionally, we will meet up with fire. those last hundred yards where the trajectory is not an issue, that will be difficult. but if we move really fast and don't stop, if we go straight with a bayonet, we can take the enemy. and you know what? the french do it. 1859, the franco austrian war in italy, the french are defeating the austrian's who are armed with rifle muskets. and they are better trained than the americans. they are taking their positions again and again. the battle of magenta, the french managed to cross a river in the face of hostile enemy fire and climb a hill and still take the austrian position. so with the french demonstrated is that the rifled musket

doesn't really change things all that much. why does it not work in the american civil war? because americans haven't figured out the tactics. it's a matter of french training versus american. but it's not a matter of the weapons being ahead of the tactics. now, i very often bring up when i teach about this in class -- the question usually rises, isn't the bayonet obsolete? it's one of those issues that i address in the book. the bayonet is not obsolete, the bayonet is in fact one of those weapons that can be effective simply by its appearance. it's a moral weapon, it doesn't have to kill to actually be effective. and in the case of the american civil war, very often

statistics are cited the come from the official u.s. medical history of the war. it indicates that very few men injured with bayonet make it two division hospitals. they issue with that, of course, is many with bayonet wounds would not make it to the hospital. if it was in the extremities they might, but if wounded in the torso or the head, they would not live long enough to make that far. so as i pointed out to a student once, bayonet wounds don't show up in a civil war hospital records that much of the same reason that decapitated people don't often make it into hospitals after three or four stops. parallel to the american civil war, the one that european historians and world historians look at is the first world war. the first world war, after, all is -- as we're often taught is the

epitome of a senseless conflict in which officers simply did not understand the technology and did not know how to apply it. british historiography calls it lions led by donkeys. good men led by criminally incompetent officers. there is some truth to that. but maybe not so much to the criminal incompetence but that yes, the first world war is exceptionally bloody. but with a civil war, a lot of it has to do with the fact that the armies are unusually large. we know for example with the first world war that the huge advances in weaponry that happened between roughly 1871 and 1914 are not unfamiliar to professionals. it's not a matter of ignorance of what machine guns can do. i remember watching a scholar

give a lecture on the first world war. to a western save class, and he made the argument that the first world war was unusually bloody. why was a bloody? well, back before the first world war, they had muskets. even to load it at the end. now you have rifles that you load on the side, it shoots really far, and there's machine guns that you really fast. there's poison gas, so the first world war is a massacre. of course, that's an overly simplified way of looking at it, but the fact of the matter is, european officers had never seen machine guns in action. they explored what you could do with a machine gun, including the fact that machine guns can be used like the bayonet to achieve your objectives without hurting anybody. in the russo japanese war, we

see experimentation with hand grenades. we see basically all -- except for military aviation, nearly all of the innovations of the first world war we have seen in the russo japanese war. what's different with the first world war is the scale. it's one thing when you have modest side armies and highly trained men. in the first world war, and you have armies of millions of half trained civilians armed with the latest technology. the notion of being criminally negligent, i think, is kind of misplaced. it particularly is so when the one example that historians like to use and they like to show the senseless-ness of the first world war, especially on the western front, is the first day of the battle of the psalm. it was a black day and british military history. still the largest number of british soldiers wounded and killed in a single day. something like 58,000 overall casualties in 26,000 deaths in a single day.

now, it is gargantuan of course. it doesn't take into account the fact that the british force itself was quite large. the proportional casualties are not quite as severe as you might expect. but as brought up as an example of officers and commanding generals not understanding the technology, that the artillery barrage doesn't actually subdue german resistance. so the british soldiers advance into heavy small arms fire and heavy artillery fire. but that is not exactly an example of incompetence. the sum, rather like many of the early battles of the first world war, was an experiment. it was an experiment based on earlier experiences using preparatory bombardment that worked reasonably well. and after the disaster of the first battle of the sum, what

do the british generals do? they go back to the drawing board. it didn't work, let's find a different way of doing it. the sad fact of the matter is in the first world war, that there is a great deal of experimentation with tactics to try to restore mobility to warfare. it seemed a little bit lost in the trenches. an lives, but ultimately bring of course these experiments are done at the cost of many tens of thousands of human lives. but ultimately, great result. by 1917, 1918, all the major armies had found successful ways of taking ground and assaulting the enemy that don't involve senseless slaughter that we have seen a case of a 1916. again, the first world war. as one historian put it, when we look at the tactics of the first world war, we shouldn't try to do so from the perspective of wilfred owen or

sick friedson. they are very evocative views of the war, but not necessarily reflective of the tactical reality. indeed, one of the things that they bring up all the time in their poetry is the use of poison gas. one of the great horrors of the war, and as a result there is a general assumption with the first world war historiography the poison gas is one of the great takers of lives of the war. it is not. not even close. artillery is the great taker of lives in the first world war, probably close to two thirds of all casualties in the war or from artillery. but poison gas is one of those things, and i know i will get some flak from it, but i wrote it in the book. poison gas is one of those things you take out of the first world war inuit in the same way. it makes the war nastier, it makes the experience of the

individual soldier that much more unpleasant. but it doesn't ultimately change anything. it is not a decisive weapon in any way shape or form. i have a few minutes left, and i don't want to overstay my welcome. but there are a couple of other things i wanted to mention with regards to fire power, and why it is that i think historians need to pay closer attention to the history of weapons. and not simply write it off as if amara. the past two things we have looked at our corrective's. corrective's two narratives in which weapons play a role. but i think, too, we see perhaps more than with any other species of technology, or any other with technology in the west before 1945, that in and of itself, weapons have a

tremendous role in transforming the structures of western society. historians very often talk about the military revolution when they look at military and political history from the late middle ages to roughly the enlightenment. especially this 16th 17th and early 18 centuries. in a period, we do see that as michael roberts pointed out a long time ago, that weapons are one of the most important factors and bringing about a remarkable transformation of the european state system. could you advanced the slide there? actually, go past that. there we go, okay. the very first gunpowder weapons to be used in combat in the west are not small arms, they are not individual or personal weapons. they are really large weapons.

they are large artillery pieces used for bombards. if you've ever been to edinburgh castle in scotland, you will see one of the few surviving bombards. it's massive in caliber, they are not particularly sophisticated weapons, especially those that were built before casting iron or bronze at this scale. they burst easily, they are not very accurate. they are relatively limited in range. but they are perfectly suited for bashing down castles. that's exactly what bombards or for. the popularity of the bombard in late medieval europe helps to tip the political balance away from the landed warrior aristocracy and towards a more restricted number of greater lords, that we might refer to for convenience's sake as kings. artillery spelled the end of the castle.

and with the end of the castle, the autonomy of the warrior aristocracy seeding more power to kings. and kings, coincidentally, were those who were in a position to purchase and maintain the kind of heavy siege artillery -- and heavy bombards that were necessary for besieging castle. it's the beginning of the constant refrain in the history of the west. as military technology becomes more sophisticated and costly or to produce, the expenses incurred by investing in it excludes those states, those political actors who just simply can't afford to participate. and the risk goes deeper as weaponry becomes more and more sophisticated. the success of artillery in castle bashing in -- hue refer to it as a trump to tally in, which are designed to absorb hillier to hillary.

if you've ever been to st. augustine, you may well have seen one of these fortresses. it's one of the best preserved fortresses in the world. it was retrofitted for -- it's a pretty pure fortress. the marriage of artillery to new types of sailing ships like the galley. they make it possible to create what we now know as the ship killing ship. the basis of all modern navies. with it, there is the creation of royal fleets. now we start thinking about the financial and fiscal implications and imagine, they are kind of daunting. this is the reason why by the 16th, 17th centuries europeans are devoting massive amounts of their spending to weapons systems. the fortification of --

in particular. inland warfare, the introduction of small arms, of muskets and arc abysses into infantry tactics necessitates not only investing in those weapons, but also make it larger, more professional, they have trained armies to carry of the complicated tactics necessary to coordinate muskets with shock weapons like pipes. in short, armies are increasing in size and longevity and professionalism. navies have continual investments, as do fortifications. as things happen, as the bills pile up in his relatively compact period of time, roughly between 1500 and 1700, it pushes the evolution of what we have come to know as the state as a strong centralized european state with a growing

and complex bureaucracy necessary to maintain these military forces. with a standing army any permanent navy, for example. and with that, its lifeblood becomes the partially confiscated wealth of its subject. the tax fueled centralized bureaucratic state is in very large part of the product of the adoption of new weapons systems. military technology and it can't be the only factor, but it's one of the main and most important ones. this trend doesn't end with the renaissance or the enlightenment, or the age of revolution in the 19th century. it intensifies, especially with the industrial revolution which sees a flood of new innovations. and increasing complexity and weapons systems. all they're there is also a

different attitude towards innovation. the innovation of the early modern world seems a mixed blessing or even a curse. innovation costs money, creating new types of weapons is expensive. replacing perfectly serviceable old weapons seems not especially a frugal or well advised policy. in politics of course, innovation is and evil. that is a different matter altogether. as the industrial revolution makes impossible to manufacture increasingly complicated technology in larger numbers, and with greater precision, and as european states become more competitive after 1815, both in the realm of imperial expansion and within the continent, make no mistake about it, the fall of napoleon in 1815 doesn't mean that the states stop talking with one another for position.

it means that innovation becomes not just a good thing to weaponry, innovation becomes an existential element. to allow your potential enemies to be able to pull one over on you in any area of weapons technology is to risk a certain defeat. and so we see this in particular after the franco prussian war in 1871. there emerges a newly intensified arms race centering on france and germany. but not restricted entirely to them. one thing i will highlight where it comes to that in firepower is that we don't see written about a lot -- historians talk a lot about the naval arms race. but not so much about the race to build the superior battle rifle in 18 70s, 80s, in nine days.

new models are coming a continually in a period of time, implementing would appear to us to be relatively minor changes. a tubular magazine a box magazine, the creation of clip loading, for example. all things that make the previous generation of infantry rifle that much more obsolete. and as this happens, because the perception is that innovation is necessary to maintain existence as a state, we see this almost ridiculous turnover of weapons systems in a very short period of time. between 1871 and 1888, germany and france change their battle rifle no less than four times each. while perhaps compared to modern weapons, it doesn't seem all that shocking, in comparison to the 19th century it is huge. one particular memorable instance happened between 1884,

when a french chemist employed by the french army, and increasingly with the industrial revolution there was a competition between european states. we see something very similar to the military industrial complex. and industrial states were employing engineers and academics to create more sophisticated weapons systems. in 1884, a french chemist named paul yay invents wood becomes known as white powder, kudrow blanche. the very first smoke-less repellent. with it, it makes every other kind of ammunition in the world entirely obsolete. the white powder not only produce no smoke, unlike black powder which used a lot of smoke. it also produced, when combined with a smaller caliber bullet,

velocity's that were easily twice what you would get with black powder. ranges that were close to ten times greater than what could be achieved with black powder. and greater penetrating power. when the french unveiled is in 1886 with a new rifle, with new ammunition using the smoke list powder, the reaction in germany was abject terror. one german general said that if the french attack us now, our infiltrate will be shot down like a nation of cartridges. immediately, the german war machine kicks into high gear, drafting its own chemist to prove to reverse engineer the french discovery. a couple of french deserters essentially crossed the border and solder ammunition to the first people they could find. once the germans reverse engineer this, they come up with a slightly better rifle two years later. i bring this up among other things because it shows not only a different attitude

towards technology and innovation but also a significant transformation in the european state system. the arms race is incredibly profligate. it requires tremendous wastage of perfectly serviceable weapons. we are talking about armies that number in the millions, and every four years or so scrapping the current service rifle and adopting a new one costs a lot of money. and we are just talking about rifles, not about artillery, not about warships. new weapons are being made obsolete within two or three years of their parents. and that exclusionary property that only those nations that have the wherewithal and the will to continually innovate and continually spend vast amounts of cash on new weapons

systems, let alone supply their armies with what they needed more time shrinks considerably. by the time world war one breaks out in 1914, this means that really only a small handful of european states have the ability to act as major players. only half a century before, a state like denmark or sweden could have maintained a respectable fleet, respectable enough to defend their home waters, respectable enough armies to prevent the incursion of an enemy. by 1914, secondary states can do that. they live indifference to the larger powers. they exist indifference to the larger powers. they really have come down in the world. and largely has to do with the advanced weapons technology. there isn't another thing i want to cover, of course, would've already gone farther than i planned to.

anyway, would i would like to say is that what i hope to achieve with firepower, and what i hope you will get from my talk today is that a new appreciation for the power of weapons in the development not just of western civilization, but of global civilization. and hopefully, this trend of academics touching something that they have seen as largely untouchable over the years. that perhaps that will improve, as it seems to be. thank you for your time. if there are any questions, i would be more than happy to feel them. >> thank you. [applause] yeah, crystal.

>> thank you very much for that wonderful talk. it was such a pleasure. one of the things that i have been thinking about is this joke by the comedian eddie izard. he starts by saying, people say that people don't kill people -- guns don't kill people, people kill people. but then he pauses and says, but the guns help. it's kind of a joke that depends on determinism. technological determinism. i've always thought that the joke was funny because it sounds exactly right to me. you can't just walk up as a human and go bang and kill somebody. the gun helps. but as a person who does some research on items, i start getting a little antsy about the ways in which turning to the secret lives of objects seems to also skew living humans were having to take responsibility for their actions. i guess i just wanted to know

how fire power maneuvers between this idea between, we have a responsibility for how our systems of power are set up, and then also the technologies we make and how they tend to control us, or have more control than we mean for them to have. how do you balance that? do you see it is a problem, or how do you work with those questions of technological determinism versus human responsibility? >> especially in the last two examples that i gave, and i rushed through that more than i would have liked to, i very much see those as not technologically deterministically. although it's easy to move in that direction, obviously. but that a particular example, in the post 1871 arms race combined with the scramble for africa, combined with your choice of a number of different points of contention, but

definitely there is a lot of human choice. for example, looking at the france in germany dynamic which is probably the most dangerous of all in europe. bismarck thought this was a thing that needed to be taken care of, keeping france from being able to attack. it's not that the firepower determines the rivalry, it's clearly a conscious choice on the part of french politicians to play upon the fears and the latent hatred of germany, that within the high command of the french army, obviously there is some advantage in cultivating that kind of fear. those things are driving the arms race. and granted, innovations propel

other innovations, just like the power of propelling the germans in the same direction. but they all have the result of conscious choices that maintain a rivalry based on an irrational hatred. so i never really worried about lapsing into technological determinism with this. the same thing goes, i think, for europe in the early modern period. there was an arms race at work there although at a much lower intensity and much longer. so much of the impetus to build larger navies, to build larger navies with bigger shifts and more guns comes from the fact that -- yes, there is a very real fear that if you don't, that not only recurrent enemies with potential enemies who might be friends right now could get the drop on you. but again, it is all propelled

primarily by monarch occult ego. that and prestigious is a big part of it. the various fear and paranoia that come from the reformation. the fear of the confessional other. for me, the balance is kind of already there. the struggle, if that makes any sense. >> you struck me when you said that the arms race isn't a race to make bigger, more lethal, and more powerful weapons. at the same time you are still leaving lots of serviceable weapons behind. that is off still in society. how does that affect social systems? >> that is a really good question. obviously, there is a huge sell for pasta this. the problem of military surplus really did not emerge into the very end of the 19th century.

specifically because of this trend towards innovating in scrapping old ones. not surprisingly, i think, in the short term the response to that was dumping weapons in markets that, at least it was possible to get some money for them. south america, for example. or dumping them in africa. sometimes, they were not quite as deadly -- smooth boring rifles and making smooth bore. the cost of something else entirely. one reason i emphasize the notion of not everyone can afford this, the cost are an issue too. at the same time, after 1871 we are beginning to see in the west, especially in the

european states, a drift -- maybe not towards social democracy but maybe something that emulates towards social democracy. bismarck, for example, implementing also to social well form like unemployment, mostly to steal the socialist thunder. all of the european states to one extent or another are moving closer to a representative constitutional governance. they are putting more money into social welfare. things at the same time they are still trying to support armies of millions and re-armed them on a regular basis. that result, one of the results, is certainly and not from the first world war. significant financial problems! france, for example, france is a experiencing some definite fiscal malign is on the end of the first world war. france had actually come up

with a rifle design superior to the one they had implemented in 1886. which is ultimately what they go to war within 1914, they simply did not have the wherewithal at that point to scrap the old design and come up with something new. they can't match or -- the old one because retelling would've been too expensive. that process is a difficult one to handle, and not everybody can. russia, austria hungary, they cannot really keep up with france, britain, in germany, for the united states. russia, is not able to she brought with them, obviously, until closer to the second civil -- yeah, and is not something that is sustainable. that is for sure. yes? >> [inaudible] influence of weapons to change

now? from the middle to the late 19th century, the united states has been using the m4 since 1994, the m16s in 1964. as that influenced or changed other influences policies? how do you see history repeating? >> i don't know, it's one of the reasons i venture beyond 1945 the development of small arms in vietnam and something i was confounded, by as the new debate you have a new deck of pistols again there honestly don't know how to answer that. small arms clearly does not have the priority that they once had. certainly not the same kind of

worldwide government support that they once had. clearly, clearly, the notion of improving small arms has not gone away. i don't know where to project things going. >> [inaudible] no longer would it once was. i mean history has changed. [inaudible] modern warfare since 1911, that is no longer the story of warfare. >> yeah, certainly no longer the priority. i do not think that we have seen a period in the history of weapons technology that has the kind of fecundity that we see between 1901 and 1918. obviously there are advances in small arm and artillery between

1918 and 1931 or 1918 and 1945 but they did not reach the same pitch of constant change that we see, you know, in the late 19th century. clearly, whatever trajectory there is to this it is kind of sporadic. >> everyone likes to the story it was coming down the road? if not small arms, weapons or shaping warfare in warfare shapes political structures, do you see that process continuing the same way that it did for years leading up to this point? we move this society and culture beyond -- >> you guys are just hammering me with these future questions! [laughs] you understand, i think until recently, i had a hard time thinking of world war ii as history because my dad was in it. therefore couldn't possibly

history! i couldn't, i wouldn't even know where to begin with that. there are limitations on this! there are several reasons i chose 1945 as a cup point. one of them was there clearly is a change in the pace of weapons design and the direction. small arms just aren't the thing that they were in the 18 80s or 18 90s. although -- firearms in general, including artillery, do not attract the same kind of funding, the same kind of design genius. we do not -- at least, i don't know any more kalashnikovs or browning's. after 1945, i just don't know! it's something i haven't entirely wrap my head around. i am sorry if i'm coming up with a blank for you, i just don't know. [laughs] >> during your research in

composition was there anything that you were surprised by? anything that you weren't expecting to see? >> you know, i did not expect to see. it's a small thing but it really surprised me, i did not expect to see the sophistication of the observations that come out of the russo japanese war. i always thought of the rousseau's up and he's more as a dress rehearsal, tightly speaking. just as the spanish civil war is for the second world war. except in the second world war you find more profound discoveries like it's a good idea to have your air force and armor communicate with another. they had not figure that out, unfortunately, in 1940. the russo japanese war, in particular the fact that the russians and the japanese, primarily through improvisation,

without much direction from above, they are figuring out some really profound things about machine guns! machine guns, granted, seem to be kind of on sophisticated weapons. it's a garden! how is it just sprays. neglecting the fact that machine gun, especially during the first world war, they tend to be very accurate. you can shop sheet with a machine gun pretty well. the russians and the japanese are figuring out, just don't put them in a line, having them on flanks so they suite to agonal make the big difference. the japanese were learning that, because they had the hodgkins gun which was much lighter, they could send the machine gun troops up with the infantry assault, have the machine gunners fire from behind, after you trained the rest of the interest me not to freak out when the machine gunners are

firing over their heads from behind them. by the time the first world war breaks out some of the very basics of how you implement this terrifying new weapon the infantry tactics are already known. the first world war was a much riskier experience, obviously, the notion of using machine guns as a substitute for artillery, for example. the importance of having a portable machine gun, thinking of these guns that way close to 200 pounds when you put everything together. the russo japanese war surprised me in that way. i never thought of the -- i understood its role and advancing the technology of naval warfare. i did not fully expect that with the land warfare. it is a relatively minor thing. most of these other things for surprises because i've been thinking about this for a while! every time i have talked one of my military technology or art

or classes, something else would click that hadn't before. the advantages of being able to teach this is being able to work out my thoughts at students and therefore the course changes regularly. yeah? >> yes, you. sorry. [laughs] >> this is kind of a broad thing, and i'm one of the students he mentioned who is nitpicky -- i've been assembling research and focusing on civil war stuff. i shoot civil war weapons in competition. >> oh, i did to. a long time ago. >> in seeing that i always question historical accounts of things. i know with the training manuals were for the civil war. how they were trained to fire three rounds a minute. i have a hard time sort of believing some of the stuff when i can see fairly new recruits, some of them firing a fast is nine seconds. they are getting off almost

five or six shots in a minute. the level of accuracy being so much higher than what you read about in some of the books. trying to look at ballistics from some of those weapons, all those types of things when you assembling. i have numerous similar diaries when people talk about rates of fire, things like that. i guess i'm doing the same thing but my question is, what type of more in-depth research would you like to see done for civil war weaponry? >> earl has made a start. are you familiar with earl's book? civil war combat? he was my next door office neighbor when we were at purdue. we regarding the got to know each other. earl's book did a great job, although oral is clearly not a gun person. there are a few explanations of parabolic trajectory that do not entirely hold water. i would like to see, i'm surprised this hasn't been done,

more of civil war weapons and tactics in a broader western contextnd hallockin and ethan allen hitchcock. what are they getting out of in other words, what's our american officers -- what are they getting out of the franco austrian war? we are getting out of the crimea? because they clearly are. the u.s. army's and seven observers in 1859. they were fighting as french cavalry. to me, that is one of the big issues with civil war historiography. it's so insular, it's so american trick. and i think it does a disservice to people like mcclelland and halep who knew what was going on. they were quite sophisticated. to me, that's the main thing. i know what you mean about -- by the way, your observations about seeing new guys on the

firing line. i remember it was shocking to me. i was in an ss say from 81 to 84. and to see some of the old hands easily getting out six rounds a minute. but understand, civil war era bullets aren't sized, their diameter is not predictable, they are not particular. hearing him talk about not excavated bullets, but bullets that have survived without a patina on them. there diameters are all over the place. and the quality of powder is definitely different than it is now. i've had this issue myself, trying to compare what i have observed about the modern firing of antique weapons with what we have in terms of accounts of actual combat. when it comes to accuracy, i'm sure you have read all the various accounts that involve

recruits who are still absolutely petrified of their weapons. loading, aiming, squeezing their eyes shut tight and moving your heads away when they fire. good question. >> well thank, you professor locker. there are copies of firepower for sale. i'm sure -- >> i can do paypal or venmo or cash. >> okay, thank you. [applause]

ship of wolf capital. using the search box at the top of the page. .. hi everyone, i'm heather moran and i'm the ceo here at sixth and i. on behalf of our entire team, thank you for being with us tonight. i also want to thank the jay cc of san francisco for being our promotional partner. and give a warm welcome to all of our viewers from the bay area. this evening, we are so honored to welcome malcolm gladwell back to sixth and i insulation of his new release, the bomber mafia. we have the pleasure of hosting malcolm back in 2013 for his new york times bestselling book, david and